Assessment2001

Assessment 2000

India Assessment – 2014

In a series of arrests, at once indicating a major intelligence breakthrough and the sheer spread ofthe enduring threat of Pakistanbacked Islamist extremist terrorism in India, as many as 77 personshave already been arrested across the country in 2014, in connection with a string of Islamistterrorist plots and subversive activities. These prominently include Tehseen Akhtar alias Monu, whohad replaced Yasin Bhatkal as the Indian Mujahiddeen's (IM’s) ‘India operations chief’, and was the'mastermind' of the Bodh Gaya and Patna attacks, and who was arrested from Naxalbari in DarjeelingDistrict of West Bengal [arrest date not disclosed, announcement made on March 25, 2014], in theeastern corner of the country. Top IM operative, Pakistani national ZiaurRehman alias Waqas, wasarrested from outside the Ajmer Railway Station in the Western State of Rajasthan, in the morning ofMarch 22, 2014. In a continuing series of arrests, Mohammad Mahruf and Mohammad Waqar Azharalias Haneef, were arrested from Jaipur on March 23. On the same day, Shaquib Ansari alias Khalid,was arrested from Jodhpur, even as "a huge amount of explosive materials, detonators, electroniccircuits/timers" was recovered from "the residences of these three people from Jaipur and Jodhpur".Again, on March 25, another three IM operatives, Barkat Ali, Mohammed Javed and MohammedIqbal, were arrested from Jodhpur, followed by the arrest of five IM operative Mohammad Aquib,Mohammad Sajjad, Mohammad Waqar, Mohammad Umar, and Mohammad Wahid from Sikar onMarch 28, 2014. In Uttar Pradesh, two IM operatives, Murtaza and Owais, were arrested fromGorakhpur on March 26, 2014.

These arrests added to at least 882 persons arrested since 26/11 (the Mumbai attacks of 2008),according to partial data compiled by the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), in connection withIslamist extremism and terrorism, and including terrorist cadres, Pakistani InterServices Intelligence(ISI) agents, and Bangladeshi, Nepali and Pakistani nationals. 151 of these arrests were made in2013, and another 348 in 2012. These included three top terrorists – Yasin Bhatkal aka MohammadAhmed Siddibappa Zarrar aka Imran aka Asif aka Shahrukh; Asadullah Akhtar aka Haddi; and AbdulKarim Tunda – who were arrested from the Indian State of Bihar along the IndoNepal Border inAugust 2013. Yasin Bhatkal was thought to be IM's 'operational chief in India', while Tunda ranked15th on India's dossier of most wanted terrorists in Pakistani safe havens.

In Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) at least six persons, including three militants, two civilians and onesoldier were killed in Kathua District on March 28, 2014, when three Pakistani terrorists struck atTarnah bridge at Dayala Chak near Hiranagar, killing a Bolero driver before striking at an Army campat Janglot. An Army soldier and all three militants were killed while another trooper was injured.

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In the Sukma District of Chhattisgarh, one of the States worst afflicted by the Left Wing Extremistinsurgency, fifteen Security Force (SF) personnel were killed in an ambush by Communist Party ofIndia Maoist (CPIMaoist) cadres, on March 11, 2014. One civilian, Vikram Nishad, also died in thecrossfire, while three were injured. The incident occurred in the Jeeram Ghati area, barely eightkilometres from the location of the May 25, 2013, attack, when CPIMaoist cadres killed 28 persons andinjured at least 30 (another three subsequently died of their injuries), including the top leadership ofthe Congress Party in the State.

In the Kokrajhar District of Assam, in India's troubled Northeast, six persons were killed whensuspected militants of the Ingti Kathar Songbijit faction of the National Democratic Front of Bodoland(NDFBIKS) opened fire at a bus on National Highway (NH) 31, at Serfanguri.

These developments and widely dispersed incidents come as sobering reminders of the enduringthreat of extremist violence across India, despite broadly positive trends in fatalities and armedviolence in a multiplicity of theatres. Crucially, total terrorism and insurgency related fatalitiescollapsed from a peak of 5,839 in 2001, to just 885 in 2013, according to the SATP database. Themost dramatic drop has been in J&K, from 4,507 killed in 2001, to just 181 in 2013. Maoist violence,which peaked in 2010, with 1,080 fatalities, also registered a sharp contraction, with a total of 421killed in 2013. In the multiple insurgencies across India's Northeast, fatalities collapsed from a peakof 1,317 in 2001, to a total of 251 in 2013. Pakistanbacked Islamist terrorist attacks outside J&K,which resulted in 364 fatalities in 2008, saw 29 killed in 2013. Significantly, on November 21, 2013,Syed Asif Ibrahim, Director, Intelligence Bureau, observed: "The LeT (LashkareToiba) and IM haveenlarged their network and developed capabilities to carry out acts of terror at short notice in variousparts of the country... Evidence gathered from various cases indicates Pakistan continues to nurtureterrorist groups..."

Demonstrating the fragility of these gains, however, J&K registered a rise in fatalities, from 117 in2012, to 181 in 2013. This was compounded by an escalating campaign of cease fire violations byPakistan's Army with at least 195 violations recorded through 2013, resulting in 10 SF fatalities, asagainst 93 such violations in 2012, resulting in three SF fatalities. In the Maoist belt, fatalities rosefrom 367 to 421 between 2012 and 2013; Islamist terrorist attacks outside J&K accounted for onefatality in 2012, and 29 in 2013. In the Northeast, at least two States registered an increase in totalfatalities between 2012 and 2013: Assam, from 91 to 101; and Meghalaya, from 48 to 60. India'speculiar vulnerabilities, the sheer weakness of governance and of the internal security apparatus, andthe mercurial geopolitical environment, leaves no room whatsoever for complacency.

205 of the country’s 640 Districts continued to be afflicted by varying intensities of chronicsubversive, insurgent and terrorist activity in 2013, including 120 Districts where the Maoistsremained active; 20 Districts in J&K afflicted by Pakistanbacked Islamist separatist terrorism; and65 Districts in six Northeastern States where numerous ethnicity based terrorist and insurgentformations operate. This is, of course, down from a peak of 310 Districts so listed in 2010, principallyas a result of the abrupt contraction of the Maoist rampage which had escalated enormously in the200910 period. In 2012, the number of afflicted Districts stood at 252.

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The divergent trends and their causal dynamic in different States and theatres have been analysed indetail elsewhere, and need not detain us here. It needs to be emphasised that a wide range ofextraneous factors, often unrelated to state policy or strategy, have influenced these trends, andgrave dangers of reversal including the impact of developments in Afghanistan and a creepingimplosion in Pakistan exist. Crucially, India's own vulnerabilities and deficits in its security andintelligence apparatus remain glaring, and there is much reason to be sceptical of the claim made byUnion Minister of Home Affairs, Sushilkumar Shinde, that "The Government will deal with iron fist(sic) when it comes to terrorism." Indeed, the lackadaisical, often corruptionled approach to India'ssecurity is everywhere in evidence, with crucial projects, acquisitions and plans delayed beyondmeasure, or implemented in a fitful manner that destroys the very possibility of their efficacy insecuring intended ends. A brief review of the status of some of the most urgent measures illustratesthe sheer incoherence of approach, despite massive increases in expenditure on internal security.The annual budgetary allocation for the Union Ministry of Home Affairs (UMHA), for instance, hasescalated dramatically since 26/11, more than doubling, from INR 254.39 billion in 200809, to 592.41billion in 201314. A detailed breakdown of this expenditure is not available, nor is any detailedassessment of its components possible here. It is useful, however, to take an overview of some ofthe most pressing heads and commitments made post26/11, to see the sheer magnitude ofimplementation failure. More than five years after the debacle in Mumbai, and the many politicaldeclarations of determination and intent, capacity augmentation has been no more than marginal, andmost state agencies continue to struggle with manpower, technology and resource deficits that arelittle different from the situation in 2008.

Thus, on March 12, 2013, in a written statement to the Lok Sabha, Minister of State of Home Affairs,R.P.N Singh disclosed, “As against a sanctioned strength of 26,867 personnel in IB (IntelligenceBureau), at present 18,795 personnel are available with a total of 8,072 vacancies (30%).”Improvements in the manpowerstrapped IB have been conceived of as critical to the country'scounterterrorism (CT) and counterinsurgency (CI) responses, and this single datum, manifesting anmanpower at best marginally different from the situation in 2008, is itself a comprehensive indictmentof the state's approach.

Similarly, the Government informed the Rajya Sabha on August 22, 2013, that Indian Police Service(IPS) officers 'in position' as per the 2013 civil list stood at 3,637, some 1,093 short of the totalauthorized strength of 4,730 IPS officers, a deficit of 23.1 per cent, as compared to the situation in2008, when a deficit of 14.42 per cent existed against a lesser sanctioned strength of 3,903. Theactual addition to this cadre has been just 297 officers over five years. The sanctioned strength,moreover, remains well below the estimated requirement of Police leadership in the country.

The policepopulation ratio has risen from 128 per 100,000 in 2008, to no more than 138 per 100,000in 2012, as against a general norm of 220 per 100,000 for 'peacetime policing', with some Westerncountries maintaining ratios over and above 220 per 100,000. There is, moreover, no evidencewhatsoever of any significant change in the very poor manpower profile of the Police Forces, or intheir training and capabilities. Despite the creation of the 'elite' Force 10, Mumbai, today, has thesame general policing capabilities that so dramatically failed to protect the city against the 26/11attacks. The State Police across much of the country, with occasional exception, is measurablyworse in terms of resources, capacities and capabilities.

The Central Armed Police Forces (CAPFs), the stopgap responders for every emergency in the

country, including the chronic crises generated by enduring movements of terrorism and insurgency,have seen some increase in manpower. The sanctioned strength of CAPFs at end2008 stood at838,893, and actual strength at 777,743 (a deficit of 7.28 per cent). By January 2013, according toBureau of Police Research and Development data, these numbers had been raised to 984,781sanctioned, and 883,581 actual (a deficit of 10.2 per cent). Actual strength has, thus, seen animprovement of 105,838 personnel, which is significant, but far from adequate to meet theaugmenting challenges of a progressively widening mandate and the geographically dispersed threatsacross the country.

While these numbers may suggest some qualified gains in the CAPFs, the scandalous pace ofcapacity development is illustrated by a March 22, 2014, news report regarding the status ofprotective headgear for the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), the designated 'lead agency' forCTCI operations. Jugal Purohit discloses, in India Today, that, against an authorisation of 109,000protective headgear in two categories helmets and patkas the current availability is an abysmal762 helmets and under 1,100 patkas. Tortuous and dilatory bureaucratic processes continue toobstruct necessary acquisitions, placing SF personnel at unacceptable risk in counterinsurgencydeployments across India. Significantly, at least 226 CRPF personnel have been killed in the courseof their duties between 2010 and 2012.

Shortly after 26/11, a 'modernization plan' for the CAPFs was announced, with a total allocation ofINR 41.85 billion, to acquire the latest weapons, surveillance and communication equipment,vehicles, body protection gear, etc. But only a fraction of these financial commitments have actuallybeen met. Thus, the CAPFs sought INR 23.60 billion for 2013 for their CTCI and border controlacquisitions; the UMHA released just INR 900 million. The CRPF had raised a demand of INR 8.73billion, but was sanctioned just INR 200 million. The Border Security Force (BSF) sought INR 6.94billion, but received just INR 200 million.

Coastal security was identified as one of the priority areas of security reform after 26/11, with itsutter and comprehensive vulnerability demonstrated in the Mumbai attacks. That India's coastlineremain just as vulnerable, was dramatically demonstrated with the discovery of the 390 tonneSeaman Guard Ohio, owned by a private US firm, AdvanFort, which its commander admitted hadbeen functioning undetected as an illegal 'floating armoury' for merchant vessels in Indian territorialwaters for 45 days prior to its detention 10 nautical miles off Tuticorin along the Tamil Naducoastline, on October 12, 2013. 35 weapons, including 34 rifles, one pistol and ammunition wererecovered from the vessel. The vessel was supposedly checked and found clean when it had berthedon August 23, 2013, at Kochi in Kerala, suggesting, either, that the inspection was far from thorough,or that the arms had been acquired in Indian waters before the vessel reached the point of itsinterception. Clearly, a terrorist attempt to pass through Indian waters to a target port would takeconsiderably less than 45 days of undetected movement.

Even more startling was the evident and continuing vulnerability of the Mumbai coast demonstratedby three incidents in 2011, when three massive vessels simply drifted into Mumbai, completelyunnoticed by the numerous Coastal Police Stations, checkposts, outposts, and sea and land patrolsthat had been established after 26/11.

With tens of thousands of vessels, large and small, at sea along India's vast coastline each day, it isimpossible, irrespective of the intensity of patrolling, to identify the interloper or deviant, unless there

is a GPS tagging system to identify those whose presence is legitimate. The rudiments of such asystem are yet to be created.

Substantial expenditure has certainly been incurred on various initiatives intended to secure India'scoastline, but the systems are far from functional and effective. A Comptroller and Auditor General(CAG) report released in July 2013 noted: “72 per cent of the fast patrol vessels (FPVs)/inshorepatrol vessels (IPVs), 47 per cent of the advanced offshore patrol vessels (AOPVs) and 37interceptor boats were either on extended life or their extended life had expired..." Many of thecoastal Police Stations and Posts sanctioned had not been established. Sea patrolling was a fractionof the prescribed frequency, and there had been no night flying. "Out of the 50 CCPs [Coastal checkposts] and COPs [Costal outposts] completed, 36 remained nonoperational as police personnel werenot deployed…"

Unsurprisingly, National Security Advisor Shivshankar Menon, observed, on November 21, 2013,“Coastal areas in southern states of India can be potential targets for terrorists to infiltrate into thecountry.”

Vulnerabilities along the country's land borders also persist. Home Minister Shinde noted onDecember 20, 2013, that “antinational” elements were taking advantage of “friendly borders”, anddescribed the task of guarding open and friendly borders with countries like Nepal and Bhutan as a“big challenge”. The problem along borders with notsofriendly countries is obviously greater.According to partial data compiled by SATP, at least 43 attempts at infiltration were made fromacross the International Border and Line of Control in J&K in 2013. The movement of terrorists andsubversive from Pakistan into India, through friendly countries such as Nepal and Bangladesh hasalso been frequently documented, and remains a persistent threat to internal security.

The multiagency centre (MAC), which coordinates all intelligence generated by various centralintelligence agencies, prominently including the Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW), NationalTechnical Research Organisation, Military Intelligence, among others, as well as the IntelligenceBureau’s (IB's) Subsidiary Intelligence Bureaus (SIBs) in the State, became active sometime in MayJune, 2012. This has resulted in significant improvements in the acquisition, coordination anddissemination of available intelligence, but falls considerably short of creating a national database onterrorist and insurgency activities an objective that can only come to fruition with the creation of theCrime and Criminal Tracking Network and Systems (CCTNS) project, which is intended to link up allPolice Stations in the country, and which received sanction on June 19, 2009. The CCTNS project isyet to take off, with several States failing even to initiate first steps. The National Crime RecordsBureau (NCRB), which has been charged with the implementation of the process, is yet to finalize anMoU between itself and the software developing agency that is to take the project forward. Theproject received approval of the Cabinet Committee on Economic Affairs (CCEA) on June 19, 2009.Crucially, the CCTNS project is a reinvention of the PolNet (Police Network) project, which wassanctioned as far back as 1996, with the same objective of linking the Police Stations across thecountry. INR 2.76 billion was allocated for the CCTNS project in 201314, but most observers believeit will take years before the network is ready.

Similarly, the National Intelligence Grid (NATGRID) project, which was intended to integrate 21existing databases including banking, finance, and transportation databases and which theGovernment claimed would help 'fight terrorism', has also failed to take off. Nevertheless, the

foundation laying day of the NATGRID data centre in New Delhi was observed on December 19,2013. The NATGRID data centre and other administrative infrastructure are intended to be completedover the succeeding 30 months, inside a CRPF campus in south Delhi, will cost INR 2.34 billion.NATGRID's potential impact on terrorism is, moreover, debatable, and its efficacy has beenquestioned even by within the intelligence community. Crucially, sources indicate that the project is"several months to several years" away from providing any useful inputs to the securityestablishment.

The National Investigation Agency (NIA), which was hurriedly established in the immediate wake ofthe 26/11 attacks, has expectedly failed to impact significantly on the trajectory of terrorism, despiteoccasional successes. The total cases registered by NIA currently stand at just 72, in a countrywhere thousands of terrorist offences are committed every year. Charge Sheets have, thus far, beenfiled in only 33 cases. Convictions have been obtained in seven cases. The number of personsconvicted stands at 11, with one of these, Samir Ahmed, convicted in two cases. Interestingly, NIAhas failed to obtain a conviction in any major case of terrorist attack. Significantly, many of theinvestigations 'taken over' by the NIA had already been at least partially completed by Stateagencies. The cumulative CT impact of the NIA if at all measurable would at best be negligible. Itis useful to note that the total strength of all Crime Investigation Departments (CID) in the StatePolice across the country stood at 11,729 personnel in 2011; with as many as 6,252,729 offencesregistered that year, yielding a ratio of 533.09 cases per officer (it is no surprise that most of thesecases go uninvestigated). NIA has a sanctioned strength of 650 officers and 72 cases yielding aninvestigative caseload that can only be the envy of agencies in the States.

The Government quickly implemented the decision to establish 'hubs' of the elite National SecurityGuard (NSG) in four major metropolitan centres, but the utility of this move has always been inquestion. Moreover, the hubs continue to function under acute limitations for training and readinessof the units, even as the NSG suffers from a critical leadership shortfall, with a deficit of over 22 percent against its sanctioned strength of officers.

Despite numerous, sometimes dramatic, successes by India's resource strapped security andintelligence agencies, both at the Centre and in the States, the reality is that India's internal securityapparatus continues to suffer from gaping vulnerabilities. While we may celebrate the relief thatdeclining overall trends in terrorism and insurgency related fatalities offer, the truth is, these trendsare overwhelmingly a consequence of factors other than measurable improvements in statecapacities and capabilities. This is unsurprising. According to NCRB data for 2012, India's per capitaexpenditure on State Police, for instance, works out to a pitiable Rs. 1.25 per day a fraction of whata cup of tea would cost at a roadside stall. Only the blind and congenitally stupid could expect aneffective policing and internal security system at this kind of cost.

India's internal security apparatus continues to suffer extreme susceptibility under the control of anignorant, deeply compromised and corrupt political executive. The system lacks the capacities evento deal with current challenges and transient emergencies, and will certainly and comprehensively failif a generational shift in terrorist capabilities or intent to include catastrophic or chemicalbiologicalradiological and nuclear terrorism (CBRN) occurs.

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Manipur: Kuki negotiations drag on Giriraj Bhattacharjee, SAIRDisturbing Trend Deepak Kumar Nayak, SAIRJharkhand: Sustained Offensive Mrinal Kanta Das, SAIRBorders of Terror Giriraj Bhattacharjee & M. A. Athul, SAIRTripura: Final Consolidation Giriraj Bhattacharjee, SAIRJ&K: Sopore: Ascendant Terror Sanchita Bhattacharya, SAIRBihar and Jharkhand: Subdued Disturbances Mrinal Kanta Das, SAIRIslamic State: Lurking Dangers Ajit Kumar Singh, SAIRMaoists: False Starts, Critical Losses Fakir Mohan Pradhan, SAIR

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