india’s regional and international support for … · deeply skeptical of india’s true...

Asian Survey, Vol. 49, Issue 3, pp. 403–428, ISSN 0004-4687, electronic ISSN 1533-838X. © 2009by The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. Please direct all requests for permis-sion to photocopy or reproduce article content through the University of California Press’s Rights andPermissions website, at http://www.ucpressjournals.com/reprintInfo.asp. DOI: AS.2009.49.3.403.

403

Jan Cartwright received a Master’s Degree in foreign policy and in-ternational security from Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service in 2007. She is currently employed with the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). The in-formation and views presented in this article were prepared by the author prior to her employ-ment with USAID and are solely hers. They do not necessarily represent the views or the positions of USAID or the U.S. government. The author wishes to thank James Seevers, Howard Schaffer, Teresita Schaffer, and two anonymous reviewers for their help in preparing this article. Email: <[email protected]>.

INDIA’S REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRACY

Rhetoric or Reality?

Jan Cartwright

AbstractIn recent years, Indian leaders have elevated the prominence of democratic

rhetoric in their regional and international political discourse. This paper ex-

amines India’s record of democracy promotion. It argues that India has much

to gain by selectively supporting democracy in neighboring countries. Further-

more, participating in multinational efforts at democracy promotion offers In-

dia a potential vehicle for global leadership.

Keywords: India, democracy, South Asia, regional, multilateral

Introduction

“Democracy is good,” mused India’s founding father Jawaharlal Nehru, echoing an earlier statement by Winston Churchill: “I say this because all other systems are worse.”1 Although Nehru believed

1. Quoted in the New York Times, January 15, 1961, p. E15. Nehru’s comment echoes a famous statement by Winston Churchill: “Indeed, it has been said that democracy is the worst form of government except all those other forms that have been tried from time to time.” (House of Commons speech, November 11, 1947).

404 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XLIX, NO. 3, MAY/JUNE 2009

strongly in the merits of democratic freedom at the individual level, he re-tained a “glass-half-empty” view of democracy as a political system for post-colonial nations.2 India’s relations with the communist Soviet Union during the Cold War, after all, were far deeper than those with the demo-cratic U.S. For decades, the U.S. and India seemed to be two countries separated by a common form of government. Yet, Indo-U.S. relations have improved markedly since the end of the Cold War.3 As political ana-lyst C. Raja Mohan points out, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh takes an openly positive view of democracy: “Liberal democracy is the nat-ural order of political organization in today’s world. All alternate systems, authoritarian and majoritarian in varying degrees, are an aberration.” 4

India’s rhetoric about democracy has been, without a doubt, pervasive in recent years. This is evident from examining the current prime minister’s offi cial speeches.5 As a percentage of total speeches made by Prime Minis-ter Singh, those including the term “democracy” (or a variant thereof ) was 54% in 2004, 43% in 2005, 36% in 2006, and 25% in 20076 (see Figure 1). These numbers point to two important things. First, over half of Singh’s speeches during his fi rst half-year in offi ce (2004) mention democracy—a very high fi gure, but one that may have amounted to a nod to the system that brought him to power. Second, the percentage of speeches mention-ing “democracy” steadily declined after 2004, perhaps refl ecting the prime minister’s increased political security in offi ce or the fading rhetorical ap-peal of democratic ideals resulting from frustrated U.S. efforts in Iraq. Never theless, the startling prevalence of the language of democracy in Singh’s speeches remained politically noteworthy.

Beyond the rhetoric, however, how seismic has been the shift in India’s policy on democracy promotion and support? India’s Cold War history as a leader of the non-aligned movement, its often repressive actions in the dis-puted state of Jammu & Kashmir, and its open commitment to the concept

2. For the purposes of this paper, democracy is defi ned as “a government in which the su-preme power is vested in the people and exercised by them directly or indirectly through a sys-tem of representation usually involving periodically held free elections,” Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary, 10th ed. (Springfi eld, Mass., 2000), p. 306.

3. For an analytical discussion, see S. Paul Kapur and Sumit Ganguly, “The Transforma-tion of U.S.-India Relations: An Explanation for the Rapprochement and Prospects for the Future,” Asian Survey 47:4 (July/August 2007), pp. 642–56.

4. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh quoted in C. Raja Mohan, “Balancing Interests and Values: India’s Struggle with Democracy Promotion,” Washington Quarterly 30:3 (Summer 2007), p. 99.

5. The prime minister’s offi cial speeches are readily available on his website. See “Prime Minister’s Offi ce: Speeches,” <http://pmindia.nic.in/speeches.htm>, accessed August 9, 2007.

6. The fi gures for 2004 and 2007 are only for partial years due to availability of data during the time of writing.

JAN CARTWRIGHT 405

of non-interference in other countries’ internal affairs make many analysts deeply skeptical of India’s true commitment to the ideological concept of “democracy.” Nevertheless, India is today witnessing substantial political changes among many of its regional neighbors and, indeed, within coun-tries throughout the world as societal calls for democratization appear to be spreading. At the same time, India is also testing the waters as a quickly emerging global power with political and economic interests in helping foster the stability and political development of other states, both within its region and internationally.

In this article, I argue that the tangible assistance India has provided for democracy both in its immediate neighborhood and internationally sup-ports the general perception that India’s policy regarding democracy pro-motion has shifted since the end of the Cold War. This was particularly so after President Bill Clinton’s visit to India in 2000 and the Indo-U.S. nuclear cooperation agreement announced in July 2005.7 Yet, this apparent shift in policy remains an evolving “work-in-progress.” After all, members of the In-dian old political guard—who were raised on the idea of non-interference —will not change their views overnight. Furthermore, India’s immediate

FIGURE 1 No. of PM Mentions of “Democracy” (or Variant)

7. For details about the Indo-U.S. nuclear cooperation agreement, see Dinshaw Mistry, “Diplomacy, Domestic Politics, and the U.S.-India Nuclear Agreement,” Asian Survey 46:5 (September/October 2006), pp. 675–98.

http://www.jstor.org/action/showImage?doi=10.1525/as.2009.49.3.403&iName=master.img-000.jpg&w=312&h=179


geopolitical interests are often at odds with its rhetorical support for de-mocracy, and the strategic interests of India and the U.S. may not always be commensurate with each other. Likewise, the U.S. might not be ready to accept India as a truly global power even though it would like for India to champion the cause of democracy around the world. Thus, this article suggests that India’s apparent increasing support for democracy is predi-cated more on “realist” political concerns about the country’s strategic and economic interests, rather than an idealistic predisposition to sup-porting the spread of “democracy” as a goal in and of itself.

India’s Regional Support for Democracy

The world today is witnessing a wave of political change in South Asia. Five states—Nepal, Bhutan, the Maldives, Bangladesh, and Pakistan—are struggling with the idea of democracy and what it means in and for their nations. As political analyst S. D. Muni explains, “There are different sorts of evolutions taking place, but underneath there is a common thread—the search for democracy. People in the region have become far more aware and aspirational. The states are realizing this.”8 This emerging political transformation in South Asia represents both a challenge and an opportu-nity for India.

India’s relations with its neighbors in the region have historically been fraught with tension. India’s geographic size and its centrality on the sub-continent have made it a regional superpower, often to the chagrin of its smaller neighbors. India’s size and global importance have also compli-cated its relations with neighboring countries. As Mohan argues, “There is built-in instability arising from the tension within the neighborhood be-tween economic dependence and cultural similarity and the political anxi-eties of preserving a separate national identity.”9 According to political scientist Stephen Cohen, one strategy that India has used to try to manage relations with its neighbors has been “political transformation”—in other words, “mak[ing] them more perfect neighbors” by applauding and, at times, encouraging political reforms seen to enhance stability in the re-gion. Cohen notes that “Indians tend to complain that the leaders of some of these states are undemocratic, corrupt, or authoritarian, and invariably

8. S. D. Muni, as interviewed by Neelesh Misra, “United in Search for Democracy,” Hin-dustan Times, April 4, 2007, <http://www.hindustantimes.com/StoryPage/FullcoverageStory Page.aspx?id=1f35c410-2a69-496d-b230-a3a59c84777cSAARCSummit_Special&>, accessed April 13, 2007.

9. C. Raja Mohan, Crossing the Rubicon: The Shaping of India’s New Foreign Policy (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), p. 238.

JAN CARTWRIGHT 407

and wrongly anti-Indian,” but he also acknowledges that Indians recog-nize that democracy has had a checkered history within South Asia.10

Nearly every country in South Asia has witnessed a political crisis re-lated to the process of democratization. Pakistan, to some extent and among many other things, was the product of Muslim fears that the Hindu majority would dominate in a democratic, united India. Bangladesh, which broke away from Pakistan in 1971, was similarly the outcome of a representational system that favored West Pakistan over East Pakistan, with its Bengali-speaking population. Nepal’s political system has been characterized by fragmented parties unable to challenge either the mon-archy or the Maoists—until, perhaps, recently with abolition of the monar-chy and the inclusion of the Maoists into the governing coalition. Sri Lanka’s long-running confl ict was sparked by the domination of the ma-jority Sinhalese population over the minority Tamils in the representa-tional system set up after independence. Thus, while democracy in India itself has survived (if not prospered), the regional experience of democ-racy in South Asia has been much more problematic.

Indeed, the 1999 confl ict between India and Pakistan over Kargil is one of the primary cases often used to argue against the idea of a Kantian “democratic peace” between countries with representative forms of govern-ment.11 India, a stable democracy, and Pakistan, a nominally democratic country under then-Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, fought a brief but fi erce war for control over the Himalayan region of Kargil—an armed confl ict that raised the specter of a disastrous nuclear exchange on the Indian subcontinent.12 Although Pakistan under Sharif was hardly a model of democracy, the Kargil War certainly complicates the application of the democratic peace theory to the South Asian context.

While the Nehruvian philosophical tradition emphasized secularism and democracy within South Asia, India’s prevailing political approach has actually been to tolerate undemocratic regimes in the interest of pre-serving friendly relations with its neighbors. This idea was institutionalized in 1996 in the so-called “Gujral Doctrine” by then-Prime Minister I. K.

10. Stephen Cohen, India: Emerging Power (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2001), pp. 242– 43.

11. Immanuel Kant’s “democratic peace” theory, described in his 1795 essay “Perpetual Peace,” is one of the most widely discussed theories in international relations. Its main prop-osition is that democratic states do not go to war with each other. International relations scholars have modifi ed this claim to suggest that democracies are “less likely” to wage war with each other.

12. Ashley Tellis, C. Christine Fair, and Jameson Jo Medby, Limited Confl icts under the Nuclear Umbrella: Indian and Pakistani Lessons from the Kargil Crisis, Rand Corp. Monograph (2002), <http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1450/>, accessed April 24, 2009.


Gujral, who had previously held the post of foreign minister. The Gujral Doctrine set forth fi ve principles to help guide India’s foreign relations with its immediate neighbors.13 The crux of the Gujral Doctrine was to recog-nize the importance of amiable relations with India’s neighbors and avoid interfering in their internal affairs. This important doctrine has shaped In-dian foreign policy in South Asia for the past decade, and its principles, al-though not always followed in practice, remain prominent within New Delhi’s foreign policy discourse.14

Three broad patterns regarding India’s stance on democracy in its im-mediate neighborhood can be identifi ed. First, there are cases in which In-dia’s national interests happen to align with its stated democratic values. For the most part, these are the easy cases. For example, India has made, but played down, efforts to strengthen nascent democracies in Afghani-stan and Nepal. Yet, India’s policies regarding democratization in these countries remain rooted in “realist” geostrategic necessity vis-à-vis Paki-stan and China, respectively. Second, there are cases in which India has fewer strategic interests. For example, India has tentatively assisted de-mocracy in Bhutan and the Maldives by sending material assistance—that is, physical goods rather than money—to these small and non-threatening states. Lest this be seen as a major diplomatic initiative, it should be noted that little of this support is new; nor is much of it tied directly to tangible democracy-related activities. Especially in the case of Bhutan, such sup-port can also be seen extending Indian efforts to subordinate its tiny neigh-bor. Third, at the other extreme, there is the case of Burma—an important economic partner for India and a regional link to Southeast Asia. India has tried to foster closer relations with Burma even though the latter remains ruled by a military junta. To the great chagrin of the U.S., India has, in fact, abstained from criticizing the Burmese junta since the early 1990s, largely motivated by its own economic interests and security concerns in the re-gion. These Indian interests include trying to counter China’s infl uence in

13. The fi ve principles of the Gujral Doctrine are (1) India does not ask for reciprocity with neighbors such as Bangladesh, Bhutan, the Maldives, Nepal, and Sri Lanka but instead gives and accommodates what it can in good faith and trust; (2) no South Asian country should allow its territory to be used against the interest of another country of the region; (3) no South Asian country should interfere in the internal affairs of another; (4) all South Asian countries must respect each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty; (5) all South Asian countries should settle all their disputes through peaceful bilateral negotiations.

14. The Gujral Doctrine did not really represent a change in India’s foreign policy so much as an enunciation of how India, as the largest country in the region, should engage with its smaller neighbors. However, it was something of a renunciation of Indian interventions in the region, including the 1971 intervention in East Pakistan and the 1987 intervention in Sri Lanka.

JAN CARTWRIGHT 409

Burma and soliciting the cooperation of Rangoon in confronting separat-ist groups that use Burmese territory as staging grounds for insurgencies in India’s northeast.15

Uniting Ideals and Interests in Promoting Democracy: Afghanistan and Nepal

Afghanistan. The clearest example of India’s regional support for de-mocracy may also be the most challenging. Afghanistan has received sub-stantial public support from India for its post-Taliban democracy. As part of the much-trumpeted but little-employed U.S.-India Global Democracy Initiative (GDI), India has provided assistance for the following projects: construction of the Afghan parliament building, parliamentary training for Afghan offi cials, assistance for the U.N. development program called “Support to the Establishment of the Afghan Legislature,” and material support for elections including voting machines and indelible markers.16

Understandably, this material assistance—as well as the $750 million given by India to Afghanistan since 2001—has been viewed by Pakistan as unwelcome interference. India’s quick installation of its consulates through-out Afghanistan has perpetuated this Pakistani concern. To see India’s aid to Afghanistan as being driven purely by democratic idealism is clearly in-accurate. In reality, India’s democracy assistance to Afghanistan is moti-vated by both a perceived national interest in containing Pakistan’s infl uence, as well as a desire to enhance stability in a weak state. The lawless envi-ronment of Afghanistan after the 1979 Soviet invasion contributed to the emergence of the Afghan fi ghters known as mujahideen (literally, “those who struggle”), many of whom later transferred their jihad to Kashmir after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989. Thus, New Delhi has a strong strategic interest in ensuring the stability of the post-Taliban government in Afghanistan, in order to avoid any potential instability there spilling over into India in the future.

On his address to the fi fth session of the Indian Lok Sabha (the lower house of Parliament) on August 30, 2005, Prime Minister Singh waxed sen-timental: “I felt a deep sense of pride swell up in me as I sat listening to the

15. It should be noted that the three important but politically charged cases of Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka are not analyzed in this article. This is because, even though India has occasionally expressed its wishes for further democratization in these countries, its aid for these efforts is severely constrained by a history of tense relations and deep suspicion between them and India that is high even by South Asian standards. The highly politicized nature of India’s interactions with these neighbors thus complicates the issue of bilateral assistance, thus limiting the utility of including these examples in the present study.

16. U.S.-India GDI, “Model Case: Indian Efforts in Afghanistan,” <http://www.gdi.nic.in/>, accessed April 13, 2007.


words of President Hamid Karzai at a function in Kabul yesterday where the foundation stone for the Afghan Parliament was laid. President Kar-zai held up the example of India and said that our success in democratic governance had shown to the developing world that democracy is not a characteristic of the advanced Western nations alone.”17 Interestingly, al-though Singh stressed passivity in this statement—“the example of India,” “our success in democratic governance had shown”—the assistance given to Afghanistan on the ground has been quite active. Singh’s statement also illustrates that even when India is doing more, it prefers to be seen as doing less, because of regional political sensitivities.

Nepal. Mohan sees Nepal as being a successful case of joint U.S.-Indian democracy promotion efforts. He writes, “By cooperating with each other and with other major powers such as the European Union in coercing the Nepalese and by caution ing China not to break the arms embargo imposed by the Western powers and India, New Delhi and Washington successfully prevented the monarchy from dividing the great powers to its advantage.”18 Although Indian offi cials have long pledged that India would not attempt to infl uence Nepal’s internal politics, India’s foreign aid there has been linked to political developments in that country.19

In February 2005, after Nepal’s King Gyanendra seized power, India suspended arms supplies, despite worries that suspension would indirectly help the Maoist rebels, whose suspected links with separatist groups in northeast India such as the United Liberation Front of Assam constituted a security threat for India. India’s offi cial position at the time was that “constitutional monarchy and multi-party democracy are the twin pillars of stability in Nepal. . . . [D]isturbing this balance does not serve the long-term interest of the Nepalese people.”20 This coordination of aid policy with anti-democratic political events in Nepal was signifi cant, because India typically had not so explicitly linked its aid to its foreign policy.

The restoration of democracy in Nepal in April 2006 coincided with a concurrent tripling of Indian foreign aid to the country in fi scal year

17. Indian Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), “Prime Minister’s Valedictory Address to the Fifth Session of the 14th Lok Sabha,” August 30, 2005, New Delhi, available at <http://pmindia.nic.in/speech/content.asp?id=178>, accessed April 14, 2007. Karzai, in fact, has a personal history with India, where he studied political science from 1979 to 1983.

18. Mohan, “Balancing Interests,” p. 110. 19. “Analysis: India’s Nepal Aid Package,” World Peace Herald (Washington, D.C.), June

12, 2006, <http://wpherald.com/articles/23/1/Analysis-Indias-Nepal-aid-package/Pledge-of-non-interference-in-Nepals-internal-politics.html>, accessed March 19, 2007.

20. Sujan Dutta, “Nepal Military Loses Indian Arms to Rebels,” The Telegraph, Calcutta, August 14, 2005, <http://www.telegraphindia.com/1050814/asp/nation/story_5113283.asp>, accessed April 24, 2009.

JAN CARTWRIGHT 411

2006/07. Indian Foreign Secretary Shivshankar Menon released a state-ment in December 2006 saying, “As ever, India is ready to support all efforts aimed at promoting peace, democracy, and development in Nepal, where its people are able to choose the manner in which they wish their country to be governed and developed without fear of intimidation and coercion.”21 In February 2007, India pledged around 100 vehicles; 1,639 very high fre-quency (VHF) hand-held radio sets; 892 VHF transceivers; 6,800 metric tons of rice, sugar, and skim milk; 2,000 tents; and 20 generators for the Nepalese police and the U.N. Mission in Nepal to assist the peace process. It also donated 70 containers to be used for storing arms and ammunition surrendered by the Maoist rebels under the 2006 U.N.-assisted peace pro-cess.22 Finally, India provided budget assistance of Rs 1.6 billion (approxi-mately $40 million) for Nepal in fi scal 2006/07 and extended a credit line worth $100 million for infrastructure development projects.23

Yet, India’s Lok Sabha reduced aid to Nepal from $47 million to $31 mil-lion for fi scal year 2007/08. India has stressed that the MEA budget for Nepal represents only one channel through which the government allocates resources to Nepal. Offi cials have claimed that the government has other agencies and mechanisms that make signifi cant contributions, such as support for the peace process, which actually makes India’s assistance sub-stantially larger than the funds clearly demarcated in the MEA budget. Nonetheless, the decreased MEA support for Nepal sends a mixed signal to Kathmandu regarding India’s support for the newly established demo-cratic structure under the peace process. India has tied its assistance to po-litical occurrences in Nepal in the past but, in this case, the positive turn of events has not been rewarded with an increase in aid.

If the peace process did not include a plan to strengthen democracy in Nepal, would India still support it? Most likely it would, because India’s primary foreign policy goal with respect to its neighbors remains the pres-ervation of stability. However, India has other self-interested reasons to support increased democratization and stability in Nepal. By supporting a democratic process that includes the Maoists, India demonstrates the

21. Amit Dhakal, “All Support for Nepal Peace,” The Hindu (Chennai), December 2, 2006, <http://www.hindu.com/2006/12/02/stories/2006120203301200.htm>, accessed March 20, 2007.

22. “India Ready to Help Peace Process: Mukherjee,” February 23, 2007, <http://www.nepalnews.com/archive/2007/feb/feb23/news12.php>; and Kantipur Online, “Indian Aid to Nepal Rises to Rs 3.5 Billion,” March 17, 2007, <http://www.kantipuronline.com/kolnews.php?&nid=103873>, accessed April 13, 2007.

23. Kantipur Online, “Indian Aid to Nepal Rises to Rs 3.5 Billion”; and Indian Embassy in Nepal, press release, <http://www.south-asia.com/Embassy-India/press_release_2007/press_release_feb_23.htm>, accessed April 13, 2007.


viability of a political path for separatist groups in its own northeastern region, and also possibly to Maoist (Naxalite) insurgents within its own borders. Finally, as a strategic goal, India is interested in supporting Nepal as a democratic, relatively pro-India bulwark on China’s border.

Tentative Democratization and Assistance: Bhutan and the Maldives

Bhutan. Bhutan, a tiny state bounded on three sides by India, has long been infl uenced by its much larger neighbor in the conduct of its foreign affairs. In fact, many countries conduct their diplomatic relations with Bhutan through New Delhi. Bhutan has moved steadily along the path to-ward more-representative government since 1998, when King Jigme Singye Wangchuk gave up absolute power and began to rule with the advice of a royal council and national assembly. The country completed its transition from monarchy to a two-party democracy with a successful parliamentary election in March 2008.

India, which has historically controlled Bhutan’s foreign policy, has been actively engaged in the effort to transform the Bhutanese political system in a variety of ways. For example, about 250 Bhutanese elections offi cials, staff, and observers, as well as security personnel, have made elec-tion study tours to India.24 In addition, 70 Bhutanese offi cials observed assembly elections in the India states of Punjab and Uttarakhand. Indian legal experts have helped draft the Bhutanese Constitution and election law. India also provides substantial economic aid, fi nancing approximately 60% of Bhutan’s budget.25 According to India’s Information and Broad-casting Minister Priya Ranjan Dasmunsi, “It will provide support to the new king of Bhutan, and the kingdom’s transition to a constitutional d emocracy.”26

India’s involvement in Bhutan, of course, does not stem from pure be-nevolence. India had, in fact, long rejected the Bhutanese democratic move-ment, fearing that democracy there would alter the political dynamics in India’s own sensitive northeastern states. The Bhutanese democracy move-ment was long promoted by expatriate Bhutanese calling for a separate

24. “Thimphu Thank-You for India’s Democracy Gift Hamper: From Poll Experts to EVMs,” Indian Express (Mumbai) February 7, 2007, <http://in.news.yahoo.com/070206/48/6buws.html>, accessed April 13, 2007.

25. Bhutan Country Profi le, U.K. Foreign and Commonwealth Offi ce, <http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/about-the-fco/country-profi les/asia-oceania/bhutan?profi le=economy&pg=2>, ac-cessed April 24, 2009.

26. “India to Offer Rs 26 Bn Assistance to Bhutan,” Hindustan Times, March 29, 2007, <http://www.hindustandainik.com/news/7598_1960313,000500020006.htm>, accessed April 24, 2009.

JAN CARTWRIGHT 413

state. India has been wary of giving encouragement to groups agitating for more power through separatist rhetoric because India itself faces chal-lenges relating to separatist groups in its northeast. Yet, democracy today appears to be deepening in Bhutan. Instead of standing in its way, India hopes to infl uence policies in a more democratic Bhutan—a move that seems strategic rather than necessarily nefarious. India may have simply accepted the inevitability of Bhutan’s democratic transition and decided that it prefers involvement over exclusion.

The Maldives. Like Bhutan, the Maldives is a small state with less strate-gic signifi cance to India than some of its other larger neighbors. Much like Bhutan, the Maldives also instituted a multi-party democracy in 2008. Ac-cording to a statement by Maldivian Foreign Minister Ahmed Shaheed, “We want to get India involved in the democratic reform process. India has immense expertise in building of democratic institutions and we want to tap this expertise.”27 Shaheed suggested that India could help the Mal-dives strengthen its electoral machinery, train police and judicial person-nel, and develop independent media. Indeed, there are signs that India has taken this request to heart. For example, India tripled aid to the Maldives from $1 million to $3 million in the fi scal year 2007/08 budget.

These increased aid allocations, plus India’s apparent willingness to pro-vide training and material assistance in both Bhutan and the Maldives, are tentative indicators that these small states may be forerunners of a more involved Indian approach to democracy assistance. To India, supporting democracy in these states presents few costs and many potential benefi ts. India can support expanding democratic processes in these small states—thereby gaining global plaudits—without jeopardizing its realist priorities in other areas.

Geostrategic Interests over Democratic Ideals: Burma

In most countries in its region, India has been supportive of democracy in rhetoric, if not in reality. Burma, however, is a glaring exception to this general rule. New Delhi has, in fact, ardently refrained from pressuring Burma’s military leaders to restore democracy. Whereas India’s wider geo-strategic national interests align with its rhetorical support for democracy in Afghanistan and Nepal, the situation is reversed in relation to Burma. This was not always the case: it has only been 14 years since India aban-doned its support for Burmese democracy. Under Prime Minister Rajiv

27. “Maldives Seeks India’s Help to Build Democracy,” Indo-Asian News Service, Octo-ber 25, 2006, <http://in.news.yahoo.com/061025/43/68qto.html>, accessed April 13, 2007.


Gandhi, who was in offi ce from 1984 to 1989, India began to actively sup-port opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi after the Burmese military cracked down on pro-democracy activists in 1988. But New Delhi subsequently re-versed course in 1993 in order to attempt to counter rising Chinese infl u-ence in Burma by improving relations with Burma’s ruling generals.28

To the West in general and to the U.S. in particular, India’s expanding diplomatic relations and burgeoning economic ties with the ruling Bur-mese military junta have been seen as being blatantly hypocritical. More-over, India’s failure to denounce the regime or actively push for democracy in Burma is viewed as a missed opportunity because India is assumed to hold considerable sway over its smaller neighbor. But India has repeated its position of not wanting to interfere in the internal political affairs of its neighbors. However, those opposed to the Burmese junta—both within India and internationally—assert that New Delhi’s often-stated policy of non-interference should not apply to a country accused of massive human rights abuses.

India has four good reasons for desiring stronger relations with Burma. First, India is battling secessionist insurgencies in its northeastern states, and roughly a dozen Indian insurgent groups are said to be seeking safety in Burma’s dense jungles.29 With a 1,600-kilometer border between the two countries, it is, according to Indian Foreign Minister Pranab Mukherjee, “impossible to crush these secessionist forces unless we get Burma’s help and target them inside the forest there.”30 Second, India is wary of Chinese encroachment next door because China has poured signifi cant investment into Burma’s energy and military infrastructure and modernized naval bases in the country as part of its “string of pearls” strategy designed to extend its geopolitical reach by improving its access to ports in an arc from the South China Sea to the Persian Gulf. As analyst Shyamal Sarkar notes, “Cir-cumstances have forced India into a competition for infl uence in Burma now. But in the race [for] military and economic infl uence in Burma, China is decades ahead of India.”31 Third, India has grown increasingly con-cerned about its energy security and is avidly looking to close long-term energy deals, particularly regionally, where transportation is cheap and stable. Burma’s large reserves of natural gas sit right at India’s doorstep,

28. For a discussion of India’s relations with Burma, see Renau Egrteau, “India’s Ambi-tions in Burma: More Frustration Than Success?” Asian Survey 48:6 (December 2008), pp. 936–57.

29. Shaikh Azizur Rahman, “India Seen Arming Burma to Counter Chinese,” Washington Times, March 24, 2007, <http://washingtontimes.com/world/20070323-103215-4113r_page2.htm>, accessed April 13, 2007.

30. Ibid.31. Ibid.

JAN CARTWRIGHT 415

with minimal transportation costs and relatively few security risks to pipe-lines on the ground or undersea compared with pipeline routes traversing Pakistan. Finally, Burma is a crucial piece in India’s “Look East” strategy, by which the latter wishes to build closer relations and ties to the South-east Asian “tigers.”

Is India’s apparently benevolent policy toward Burma’s military junta inevitable? The combined force of the four factors described is strong, and India has never shown a willingness to conform to U.S. requests on these types of matters. In fact, India’s refusal to cooperate with the U.S. on Burma has been a point of pride for many Indian politicians, who see it as demonstrating their country’s sovereignty and emerging global infl uence. Although domestic groups, including the Indian National Trade Union Congress (the trade union wing of the Congress Party) have objected to India’s policy toward Burma, they have had neither the strength nor the organization to advance their demands forcefully. While certain small par-ties on the Indian left, such the Forward Bloc and the Revolutionary So-cialist Party, have supported Burma’s pro-democracy movement and pushed for a new parliamentary caucus on Burma, they also generally lack power and cohesion. However, in an apparent shift, all of India’s major political parties on both the left and the right were critical of the country’s position on Burma during the military junta’s brutal crackdown on anti-government demonstrations in September 2007.

Because economics and security drive India’s policy toward Burma, only dramatic changes in these areas are likely to prompt a major shift in In-dian policy toward the junta. If India calms its secessionist insurgencies in the northeast, or if it secures energy resources through other avenues, New Delhi may feel that it can more readily pressure the junta to democ-ratize. Otherwise, India’s current approach is likely to continue. A 2008 Burmese an nouncement that Burma would sell its offshore natural gas to China rather than to India was a major blow to New Delhi. Although India still perceives that it has several reasons to stay engaged with Burma—countering Chinese regional infl uence, conducting better counterinsurgency in the northeast, and retaining the Indian stake in the Shwe oil/gas blocks— continued perceived slights of this sort by the Burmese generals may make India reconsider its policy of unconditional support.32

32. Ashis Biswas, “India—A Second Best,” Mizzima News (New Delhi), March 26, 2007, <http://www.mizzima.com/MizzimaNews/EdOp/2007/March/26-03-2007-04.html>, accessed April 14, 2007. The Shwe gas blocks, discovered in 2004 off of Burma’s west coast, are be-lieved to contain nearly $40 billion in natural gas reserves. The competition between India and China over the Shwe resources is seen as a microcosm of the two countries’ race for energy sources to fuel their expanding economies.


Since the September 2007 pro-democracy protests in Burma, India has been under increasing international pressure to move away from its sup-port for the junta. Although the number of military contracts signed with Burma had been accelerating in early 2007, the Washington Post reported that India had halted military sales and arms transfers after the demon-strations and crackdown.33 However, a subsequent report by Jane’s Infor-mation Group questioned this assertion, saying India had not halted the delivery of military hardware promised to Burma but had merely slowed down its delivery.34 Thus, the full extent of India’s shift in policy toward Burma remains to be seen. If a true policy change occurs, it may indeed signal that issues of democracy and human rights are affecting India’s for-eign policy in even the most stubborn of cases. As yet, however, interests certainly trump ideals in these cases.

India’s International Support for Democracy

While India’s support for democracy within its immediate region is tem-pered by concerns regarding its vital national interests especially vis-à-vis Pakistan and China (among other worries), on the international scene it has fewer qualms. India has forged bilateral relationships elsewhere in Asia that have included elements of democracy promotion. India also partici-pates in an array of multilateral organizations that are designed to promote democracy around the world, including the Community of Democracies, the U.N. Democracy Fund, and the U.S.-India GDI.35 India’s bilateral

33. Glenn Kessler, “India’s Halt to Burma Arms Sales May Pressure Junta,” Washington Post, December 30, 2007, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/12/ 29/AR2007122901345.html>, accessed January 13, 2007.

34. Rahul Bedi, “Indian Arms Sales to Myanmar Remain under Scrutiny,” Jane’s Infor-mation Group (London), January 11, 2008 <http://www.janes.com/news/security/capabilities/jdw/jdw080111_1_n.shtml>, accessed January 13, 2008.

35. The Community of Democracies is an organization of states that is committed to a core set of democratic principles and that supports cooperation among democracies around the world. Members include Chile, India, Poland, the Czech Republic, the U.S., Mali, Mexico, Portugal, South Africa, South Korea, the Philippines, Mongolia, Morocco, El Salvador, Cape Verde, and Italy. The U.N. Democracy Fund, according to its website, is an organization with “the primary purpose of supporting democratization around the world. It supports projects that strengthen the voice of civil society, promote human rights, and encourage the participation of all groups in democratic processes.” See <http://www.un.org/democracyfund/XUNDEF BasicInformation.htm>. The U.S.-India GDI, according to a 2005 White House fact sheet, “will assist other societies in transition seeking to become more open and democratic. The two nations will support the U.N. Democracy Fund with major contributions to provide assis-tance to build democratic institutions and develop appropriate human resources.” See <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2005/07/20050718-8.html>.

JAN CARTWRIGHT 417

and multilateral efforts to support democracy outside its immediate neigh-borhood refl ect the widening scope of its world view.

Bilateral EffortsIndia’s bilateral support for democracy outside its region largely mirrors its bilateral behavior with its immediate neighbors: moderate fi nancial and material support upon request, and a reluctance to interfere in their inter-nal political affairs. Nevertheless, India has demonstrated its willingness to take coercive—although not military—action in support of democratically elected governments outside its region—more so than it has with immedi-ate neighbors. For example, in the case of Fiji, India joined with Australia to condemn the 2000 military coup and pushed for the British Common-wealth and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to sus-pend bilateral relations until democracy was restored.36 India has, in fact, had a longstanding interest in political events in Fiji because nearly 45% of Fiji’s population is of Indian origin. Interestingly, in contrast to the events of 2000, India’s stance toward the more recent 2007 coup in Fiji was to maintain relations and refuse to impose sanctions, unlike the U.S., Austra-lia, and New Zealand. Fiji, in turn, subsequently sought India’s help to re-institute democracy, including assistance with electoral reform.37 By taking this collaborative rather than confrontational approach toward Fiji, India expanded its infl uence in this small island state, at the expense of powers like the U.S. and Australia.

In other cases as well, India has shown that it will stand up for the democratic electoral process when presented with the opportunity. India supported the ASEAN Regional Forum in recognizing Cambodia’s con-troversial elections in 1998 “as an important step towards enhancing peace and stability in Cambodia.”38 This action was made more signifi cant be-cause it came amid international diplomatic fallout resulting from India’s Pokhran II nuclear tests in May 1998. India also supported the Com-monwealth Ministerial Action Group’s decision to suspend Zimbabwe’s membership in the intergovernmental organization known as the Common-wealth of Nations due to electoral violence.

The examples of Fiji, Cambodia, and Zimbabwe show that India is moderately willing to alter its bilateral relations with countries outside its

36. Robert G. Herman and Theodore J. Piccone, eds., “Defending Democracy: A Global Survey of Foreign Policy Trends, 1992–2002” (Democracy Coalition Project, Washington, D.C., 2002), p. 98.

37. East-West Center, “Fiji Seeks Tribunal, Military Assistance from India,” April 5, 2007, <http://pidp.eastwestcenter.org/pireport/2007/April/04-09-05.htm>, accessed April 13, 2007.

38. Herman and Piccone, eds., “Defending Democracy,” p. 98.


immediate region over concerns about democratic political development in those states. Yet, India has thus far proved unwilling to take the lead in condemning or sanctioning these states; rather, it has generally piggybacked on initiatives proposed by other states or through multilateral forums. Thus, India has tended to be cautious in its bilateral efforts promoting de-mocracy outside of its immediate neighborhood.

Multilateral EffortsOn the whole, many Indians remain rather wary about the merits of inter-national institutions, preferring to retain strategic autonomy and sover-eignty rather than be bound by global strictures. A 2006 survey found that 44% of Indians agreed with the following statement: “When dealing with international problems, India should be more willing to make decisions within the United Nations even if this means that India will sometimes have to go along with a policy that is not its fi rst choice.” In contrast, a signifi -cant 36% disagreed, producing a very divided result.39 In the same survey, only about half of Indians agreed that the U.N. Security Council should have the right “to restore by force a democratic government that has been overthrown.”40

Yet, despite this uncertain view of the overall merits of multilateral in-stitutions, India has grown increasingly active in founding, funding, and promoting a number of international groupings that focus on democracy, even though it initially remained a reluctant participant in these organiza-tions.41 On the heels of President Bill Clinton’s visit in 2000, for example, India was persuaded to serve as one of the co-conveners of the Community of Democracies, along with the U.S., Poland, Chile, the Czech Republic, Mali, and South Korea.42 Despite the fact that members “gave no sanction to the view that democracy promotion—meaning nonviolent and trans-parent efforts ‘to strengthen institutions and processes of democracy’—confl icts with sovereignty or violates the principle of non-interference,” India’s embrace of this new organization was only lukewarm.43 Thus, India

39. The Chicago Council on Global Affairs, “Global Views 2006,” <http://www.thechicago council.org/UserFiles/File/POS%20Topline%20Reports/Topline%202006%20fi nal%20-%20 India.pdf>, accessed April 13, 2007.

40. Ibid.41. Mohan, “Balancing Interests,” pp. 99–115.42. U.S. Department of State, press statement by Richard Boucher, “Toward a Community

of Democracies,” June 16, 2000, <http://secretary.state.gov/www/briefi ngs/statements/2000/ ps000616c.html>, accessed April 14, 2007.

43. Carl Gershman, “The Assault on Democracy Assistance,” address to the National Endowment for Democracy, Washington, D.C., April 25, 2006, <http://www.ned.org/about/carl/carl042506.html>, accessed April 24, 2009.

JAN CARTWRIGHT 419

did not invest signifi cant political or diplomatic energy into the organiza-tion in these early stages, remaining hesitant to take a stronger stand on democracy promotion.

After strenuous lobbying by foreign policy experts and others, the Community of Democracy states organized themselves into a Democracy Caucus at the U.N. in 2004.44 Yet, despite India’s avid participation in the Community of Democracies, India refused leadership of the Democracy Caucus, preferring to retain its ability to vote against the West when it wanted to demonstrate its national sovereignty. This position reportedly “puzzled” U.S. leaders, who expected India to show similar support for the caucus as it had for the Community of Democracies. India’s voting re-cord at the U.N. has actually not borne out its professed values of support for human rights. The Democracy Coalition Project, a non-governmental organization “that conducts research and advocacy relating to the advance-ment of democracy and human rights internationally, released a survey in December 2006 analyzing the voting behavior of Community of Democ-racy members on six human rights-related resolutions: fi ve country-specifi c resolutions condemning human rights abuses in Iran, North Korea, Burma, Belarus, and Uzbekistan, as well as a sixth, introduced by Belarus and Uz-bekistan, that would have undermined the signifi cance of country-specifi c resolutions.45 According to the project’s “scorecard,” India received the low-est score among the entire group of Community of Democracy-convening countries.46 Among the Community of Democracy countries as a whole, only Indonesia, Russia, and Venezuela fared worse. This weak record throws into doubt India’s true ideological commitment to the ideals behind this multilateral organization.

Mohan argues that India’s decreased anxiety about participating in multilateral democracy-promoting organizations and efforts may have been prompted by the Bush administration’s relatively hands-off policies on Jammu & Kashmir and on nuclear proliferation.47 In July 2005, India pro-vided the founding contribution to the U.N. Democracy Fund—a proposal

44. According to the website of the Campaign for a U.N. Democracy Caucus, “The Cam-paign seeks the permanent establishment of a U.N. Democracy Caucus as a group of demo-cratic nations committed to strengthening the U.N.’s ability to promote democracy and human rights.” See <http://www.democracycaucus.net/html/about.html>, accessed April 24, 2009.

45. Democracy Coalition Project, <http://www.demcoalition.org/site09-2008/2005_html/ about.html>, accessed April 24, 2009.

46. Democracy Coalition Project, “Scorecard: How Members Voted on Resolutions at the 61st Session of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights 2005,” <http://www.democracycaucus.net/pdf/61st_CHR_Scorecard.pdf>, accessed April 13, 2007.

47. Mohan, “Balancing Interests,” p. 104.


strongly pushed by then-U.S. President George W. Bush with signifi cant support from Prime Minister Singh. India’s $10 million contribution was matched only by Japan and was exceeded only by the U.S. India is also represented on the fund’s advisory board by New Delhi’s permanent rep-resentative to the U.N. in New York. Although support for the fund has been viewed by many as a meaningless gesture or cloying attempt to gain U.S. favor, the rhetoric surrounding the gift is interesting. At the launch of the fund in September 2005, Singh made the following remarks:

[W]e welcome the launch of the U.N. Democracy Fund, because it gives us an instrument to build the institutional and human capabilities that are necessary to underpin the successful exercise of democracy. India has been sharing its rich experience, institutional capabilities and training infrastructure with nations that share our values and beliefs and request our assistance. We are prepared to do much more, both as active participants in the Democracy Fund and in the Com-munity of Democracies. . . . If we wish to ensure that the relentless advance of globalization does not leave, in its wake, large pools of the dispossessed, then we must empower the voiceless. Only democracy can ensure that they, too, become stakeholders in a millennium of peace and prosperity that we, in the United Na-tions, seek to accomplish.48

Singh’s words in this international setting are notable for the “active” notion they convey (“We are prepared to do much more . . . ” and “we must empower the voiceless”), which contrast sharply with the passive democratic rhetoric employed by India within its own region. At the same time, as this speech shows, India is willing to go only so far, sharing its ex-perience and capabilities “with [only] nations that share our values and beliefs and request our assistance.” This phrase seems to be a deliberate counterpoint to the much more expansive, activist, and idealistic notion of democracy promotion set forth by Bush in his second inaugural ad-dress in January 2005. He stated, “It is the policy of the United States to seek and support the growth of democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world.”49 Singh’s proposal indicates two themes of India’s global support for democracy. First, it shows how India is prepared to be a global leader in endorsing democracy. Second, it demonstrates that India continues to envision itself in a role of a “positive example” or “sought-after teacher,” not proselytizer.

48. Indian MEA, “PM’s Remarks at the Launching of UN Democracy Fund,” September 14, 2005, <http://pmindia.nic.in/speeches.htm>, accessed April 14, 2007.

49. White House Archives, “President Sworn-In to Second Term,” January 20, 2005, <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2005/01/20050120-1.html>, April 24, 2009.

JAN CARTWRIGHT 421

As mentioned above, as part of its new relationship with the U.S., India committed itself in July 2005 to participate in the U.S.-India GDI. This initiative included working with other states and civil society organiza-tions to promote democracy and development, organizing training courses to help strengthen democratic institutions in other countries and develop their human resources, establishing a virtual Coordination and Informa-tion Center to share practices on building democracy, and partnering to ensure that U.N. Millennium Development Goals advance the important links between democracy and development.50 The GDI, much like the U.N. Democracy Fund, was heralded as an important statement of shared values and goals in most quarters but was rejected by the Indian left, which decried the pro-U.S. direction of Indian policy.51 Little of the GDI involved practical actions that could be evaluated empirically, and thus the initiative’s outcome has been questionable, if not simply unspectacular. While India did create a Coordination and Information Center to share its practices on democracy, the website <http://www.gdi.nic.in/> is abysmally uninformative and infrequently updated. While India, as promised, does highlight its capacity building program known as the Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC) program, very few of this program’s stated activities center on governance at all, let alone democracy-related training and capacity building.

Although one can question India’s motives, its emerging prominence in democracy-related activities at the multilateral level is striking and seems to be accelerating. What is India’s purpose in this recent push to partici-pate in international democracy organizations? Perhaps, not coinciden-tally, each of these initiatives has corresponded with a major initiative to enhance U.S.-India bilateral relations. Thus, India’s activity in such multi-lateral groupings is seen as an avenue for enhancing its bilateral relation-ship with the U.S. In addition, such multilateral democracy organizations are an international arena in which India, as the world’s largest democ-racy, feels it has a natural leadership role to play. In short, India’s partici-pation in these groupings gives it a seat with the “big boys.” By participating avidly in these organizations, India may also be setting itself up to gain deeper infl uence on world affairs—and, perhaps with a future seat on the Security Council—a position of greater power on the world stage.

Finally, from its brave independence struggle to its leadership of the non-aligned nations during the Cold War, India has always wanted to be seen as a model for emulation by developing and emerging post-colonial

50. U.S. Department of State, “Fact Sheet: U.S.–India Global Democracy Initiative,” July 18, 2005, <http://www.state.gov/p/sca/rls/fs/2005/49722.htm>, accessed April 14, 2007.

51. “Left Attacks Joint Statement,” The Hindu, July 22, 2005, <http://www.hindu.com/2005/07/22/stories/2005072206731400.htm>, accessed April 24, 2009.


nations. This is exemplifi ed by India’s actions within international organi-zations of developing countries. For example, India pushed for the inclu-sion of a phrase in a key G-77 document in April 2000 committing the participants to “promoting democracy and strengthening the rule of law.” 52 Although there were accusations that India’s goal in requesting this lan-guage was to humiliate Pakistan, where power had recently been seized by the military under General Pervez Musharraf, Indian offi cials asserted that it was “simply a way of re-emphasizing the third world’s commitment to democracy.” Even if the Pakistan issue did play into India’s calculation —as it likely did—the latter’s push for democracy in this forum of devel-oping nations was signifi cant.

Yet, there are also numerous reasons to be skeptical of India’s apparently growing international support for democracy. First, India is believed by some to be pursuing this multilateral path as a substitute for being willing to engage in more robust support for democracy in its bilateral and regional relations. Empty, generalistic statements on the world stage are believed to distract from India’s unwillingness to advocate for democracy in neighbor-ing countries over which it has signifi cant potential leverage. Second, cynics view India’s efforts in these multilateral organizations optimistically as being meaningless, and more pessimistically as being payoffs to the U.S. One jour-nalist described these cynics’ fears that India is being used as a pawn by the U.S. to pursue its own agenda: “The agreement [New Framework for the U.S.-India Defense Relationship] refl ects the Bush administration’s desire to take the existing strands of strategic cooperation between the two coun-tries to a qualitatively different plane in which some of the military and political tasks of unipolarity—multinational operations, disaster response, ‘peace-building,’ spreading ‘democracy’ worldwide—can be outsourced to India.”53 While the veracity of this interpretation cannot be defi nitively ascertained, it does provide an alternative perspective on India’s increased participation in democracy-related activities on the international stage.

New Directions in India’s Support for Democracy on the International Stage

In response to a question about whether India is interested in ensuring the emergence of democracy in its neighborhood, former Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran provided the standard response in 2005:

52. Hasan Suroor, “India Claims ‘Major Gains’ at G-77 Summit,” The Hindu, April 15, 2000, <http://www.hinduonnet.com/thehindu/2000/04/15/stories/03150002.htm>, accessed April 14, 2007. The G-77 is an intergovernmental organization of 77 “developing” countries in the U.N.

53. Siddharth Varadarajan, “India Is Entering Uncharted, Risky Territory,” ibid., July 1, 2005, <http://www.hinduonnet.com/2005/07/01/stories/2005070105231300.htm>, accessed April 14, 2007.

JAN CARTWRIGHT 423

As a functioning democracy ourselves naturally we feel very comfortable and enthused if there are more democracies emerging. Our policy is very clear . . . we don’t believe in the export of ideology. We don’t believe in the imposition of democracy or democratic values on any country. But if there is any interest in any country about our democratic institutions or in the institutions . . . which India built over a period of time or the strong judicial system or training programme for Parliamentarians, we are very ready to share these with any country.54

The traditional view of non-interference and passive assistance still dominates Indian policymaking circles. However, India’s apparent grow-ing enthusiasm for multilateral democratic rhetoric is worth noting. Not only may this rhetoric prepare the groundwork for more concrete policies, but this “high-context” language also is indicative of where India sees it-self heading.

India’s rhetoric in support of democracy on the international stage ac-tually serves three concurrent purposes: to cement its ties to the world’s only superpower—the U.S.—in the short term; to enhance its status as a rising middle power in the medium term; and to pave the way for its pos-sible role as a dominant world power in the long term. In contrast, India’s tangible actions in support of democracy as an element of its foreign pol-icy lag behind. As journalist Siddharth Varadarajan notes, “In private, In-dian leaders and offi cials acknowledge . . . that a country of India’s size and importance cannot afford to limit its foreign policy to [only] saying ‘Yes’ or ‘No.’ Yet there is little appetite to play a bigger diplomatic role.”55 According to economist Arvind Virmani, India’s share of world gross do-mestic product (GDP) is projected to double within the next 20 years, from 6% today to 12% in 2025.56 If this rise occurs smoothly and India snaps up a larger piece of the economic pie, its appetite for the diplomatic pie will also likely grow as well.

Short-term goals. India’s democratic rhetoric has been, at least partially, an avenue for deepening relations with the U.S. The rhetoric of democ-racy is a salient vehicle of communication for India to the U.S. based on a common set of assumptions and language. During the Bill Clinton and George W. Bush administrations, U.S. relations with India were made a

54. Article published on May 26, 2006, by the Press Trust of India Limited. Quoted at <http://www.un.org/democracyfund/XNewsIndiaUNDEF.htm>, accessed April 14, 2007.

55. Siddharth Varadarajan, “News Analysis: India Struggles to Steer Its Own Course on Foreign Policy,” International Herald Tribune, January 25, 2007, <http://www.iht.com/arti-cles/ 2007/01/25/news/rindpol.php>.

56. Arvind Virmani, “World Economy: From Uni-Polar to Tri-Polar,” Hindu Business Line, February 8, 2005, <http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/2005/02/08/stories/2005020 800030800.htm>, accessed April 14, 2007.


high priority, and Indian governments, particularly beginning with Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, have also stressed the importance of this friendship. The values and interests that they claim to share, such as a be-lief in the importance of liberal democracy and human rights are believed to impart a level of comfort to bilateral interactions not seen in the past.

If India’s democratic rhetoric was directed primarily at the U.S., an ex-amination of the Indian prime minister’s speeches—admittedly a rough measure—might be expected to show that most speeches laden with dem-ocratic rhetoric were given in the U.S. or, at the very least, abroad. How-ever, this turns out to be incorrect: in 2004, three of fi ve speeches (60%) with 10 or more mentions of “democracy” (or a variant thereof ) were in-deed given in New York. In 2005, two of 12 (17%) were given in the U.S. (New York and Washington, D.C.), and in 2006 and 2007, the only speeches with over 10 mentions of “democracy” were given in India itself. Thus, this coarse measure indicates that India’s democratic rhetoric is not solely a function of its relationship with the U.S., as often assumed by many critics.

Indeed, the notion of democracy as a “shared value” between India and the U.S. is something of an oversimplifi cation. Although both countries have democratic systems, the processes and constituent institutions within them differ substantially, and there is very little understanding on either side about the similarities and differences. Moreover, as Mohan notes, “It is easy for India to talk about a natural alliance as a rhetorical device in publicly thinking about a different future for Indo-U.S. relations. It is en-tirely another matter to embark upon security cooperation with the United States, which could involve considerable short-term political risks that might be seen as outweighing long-term advantages.”57 Nevertheless, given the fl urry of interest on both sides for a new, stronger relationship, it is likely that democratic rhetoric will remain a familiar tune in Indo-U.S. relations. The potential mutual incompatibility of interests on specifi c world issues aside, the language of democracy certainly serves the purpose of bringing India and the U.S. closer together, at least in terms of common rhetoric.

Medium-term goals. India’s democratic rhetoric has also helped it fur-ther establish its claim as being a rising “middle power.”58 In many ways, scholarly thought about India’s foreign policy continues to be shaded by the subtexts of non-alignment and non-intervention. While these values are undoubtedly relevant to an understanding of India’s policy framework,

57. Mohan, Crossing the Rubicon, p. 81.58. A “middle power” is a term that is used in the fi eld of international relations to de-

scribe a state that is not a superpower but still wields substantial infl uence globally. In addi-tion to India, other “middle powers” include, for example, Australia and Canada.

JAN CARTWRIGHT 425

they may no longer characterize it in full. As India delves deeper into the 21st century, it is fast becoming a middle power, and it looks like, one day, it has the potential to become a great power on the international stage.

Much of this shift can be attributed to a changed global environment. To explain, the end of the Cold War left middle powers with much more room to maneuver. With only one superpower left—the one that explicitly endorses a democracy agenda, namely the U.S.—assistance for democracy promotion lost some of its bipolar ideological sensitivity. Democracy had, in effect, become the dominant political paradigm for much of the world, especially the West, after its supposed victory over communism. Moreover, the new global arrangement left wider geopolitical space for second-tier leaders, space that had been less available before and during bipolarity.

Yet, the loosening of bipolarity and apparent dominance of the U.S. on the world stage concurrently resulted in a rising tide of anti-Americanism, opening up new opportunities for middle powers to play a role on issues like indigenous democracy development as an alternative to the U.S. and its assertive insistence on democracy. The risk of being associated with an American agenda, indeed, precluded many countries from aggressively promoting democracy, especially in light of the U.S. war in Iraq.

India has become aware of the new political space available to middle powers and the new possibility of using democracy assistance as a foreign policy tool. Some analysts have pointed to the emergence of an “axis of democracies” in Asia—consisting of middle powers such as Japan, Aus-tralia, and India—as a counterbalance to a rising China. Political analyst B. Raman suggests that democracy is a “strategic weapon” shared by India and Japan and writes, “The Chinese fear not so much the military strengths of India and Japan despite their strong military capabilities, as their ideo-logical strengths arising from their democratic roots.”59 But military coop-eration is also developing between democracies active in the region. For example, the fi rst-ever joint military exercise by Japan, the U.S., and India was held in April 2007 in the Pacifi c Ocean near Japan. It was widely seen as a move to contain China, although this view was downplayed by the three respective governments themselves. While Sino-Indian and Sino-Japanese relations are improving, India and Japan also share a panoply of interests as powerful Asian democratic middle powers. Both, particularly Japan, also appear to be more willing than in the past to take a public stand on democracy. Thus, Indian support for democracy and the cooperation of democratic states in the region also serve to demonstrate and solidify In-dia’s image as a rising, powerful middle power.

59. B. Raman, “India & Japan: Democracy as a Strategic Weapon,” South Asia Analysis Group, no. 2064, December 17, 2006, <http://www.saag.org/%5Cpapers21%5Cpaper2064.html>, accessed April 14, 2007.


Long-term goals. Finally, India hopes its rhetoric in support of democ-racy will help, one day, propel it to the status of a world superpower. In-dia’s foreign policy “grand strategy” has been described as consisting of three concentric circles: the fi rst being its immediate region, the second be-ing Asia, and the third being the global arena.60 While India has long been active within its immediate region and is becoming increasingly active in Asia, its global strategy is less evident. India’s size has allowed for its tra-ditional dominance over many of its smaller neighbors, but its actions elsewhere were previously constrained by Cold War prerogatives. The Cold War chapter has defi nitively closed, and Indian foreign policy may be en-tering a pivotal era. Today’s Indian leaders envision India becoming one of the world’s great powers, whereas the older generation of Indian states-men worried that their country would be buffeted by the harsh winds of the two superpowers. According to an October 2006 survey by the Chi-cago Council on Global Affairs, Indians see their country as the second most infl uential in the world.61 India’s portfolio of global interests is also quickly expanding as its companies, capital, and citizens venture abroad. It is only natural that its foreign policy should adjust to accommodate these new interests, opportunities, and challenges.

Indians are justifi ably proud of their democracy, and their country’s in-creasing clout on the world stage provides the justifi cation for sharing its democratic experience with other states. Furthermore, as suggested by po-litical scientist Ashutosh Varshney, India has much to contribute to the world’s understanding of the function of democracy in newly independent states and emerging economies.62 If India is successful in rising as an eco-nomic superpower, it may singlehandedly dispel the theory that because economic reforms are painful, they can only be achieved under a non-democratic political system. This theory has already been put into ques-tion by the economic rise of democratic countries like Poland and Brazil.

In terms of public opinion, the spread of democracy ranked last among 12 global foreign policy priorities in a recent survey conducted in India. Nevertheless, 41% of respondents said the spread of democracy was “very important” and 70% said this goal was either “somewhat important” or “very important.”63 As India acquires the global interests of a major world

60. C. Raja Mohan, “India and the Balance of Power,” Foreign Affairs 85:4 (July/August 2006).

61. Cait Murphy, “India the Superpower? Think Again,” Fortune, February 9, 2007.62. Ashutosh Varshney, “India’s Democratic Challenge,” Foreign Affairs 86:2 (March/

April 2007).63. The Chicago Council on Global Affairs, “Global Views 2006,” <http://www.thechicago

council.org/UserFiles/File/POS%20Topline%20Reports/Topline%202006%20fi nal%20-%20 India.pdf>, accessed April 13, 2007.

JAN CARTWRIGHT 427

power, it may see a need to take a more activist stance on governance and human rights practices in countries that affect its expanded interests. Given that the spread of democracy is seen as at least a “somewhat important” goal by the above majority of Indians, it is conceivable that a political move to take India’s foreign policy in this direction would be supported by public opinion.

A lively dialectic between idealism and pragmatism has always existed in Indian foreign policy, and the issue of democracy is just one area in which this can be seen. The emergence of India’s more open stance on de-mocracy has been interesting to watch but is not yet necessarily indicative of where the country’s diplomacy is headed. While we can look to other middle powers as models (most of which have become increasingly com-fortable in taking an active role in democracy support), India’s unique his-torical, geographic, and cultural qualities may limit the utility of such an exercise. The last time India had a share of global GDP comparable to what it has today (11%) was in the 1870s, during the British Raj.64 Today, most projections of India’s growth forecast a sharp rise in economic clout. As India’s global portfolio of interests broadens, it may be only a matter of time before its foreign policy begins to back up these expanded interests.

Conclusion

This article has argued that India has made efforts to support the spread and deepening of democracy in its immediate region. But, for the most part, its support has been determined by a very “realist” perception of its na-tional interests, rather than an idealistic commitment to democracy per se. The birth of new democracies in South Asia, after all, has generally been associated with strife rather than stability, thus calling into question the likelihood of a Kantian “democratic peace” in India’s immediate neigh-borhood. India has, in fact, tended to tread very lightly on sensitive inter-nal issues like democracy, governance, and the rule of law in the region. For example, these types of issues are not included in the list of “areas of cooperation” delineated in South Asia’s only regional organization—the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation.

As described in this article, however, India has increasingly shown some glimpses of an idealistic commitment to regional democracy—but only when these ideals align with its perceptions of national interest, as with Afghanistan and Nepal. India has been much more willing to accede to re-quests for democracy assistance when this support holds few detrimental

64. Angus Maddison, “The World Economy: Historical Statistics,” Organization for Eco-nomic Cooperation and Development Development Center 2003, p. 261.


foreign policy consequences for itself, such as in Bhutan or the Maldives. In these cases, India seems to have made the strategic calculation that hav-ing input into the democratic transition is preferable to exclusion from it. Nevertheless, India has been adamant in standing its “realist” ground in instances where its geostrategic interests are not viewed as being commen-surate with its professed democratic ideals, such as for Burma.

In the international arena, India has also engaged in efforts at democ-racy promotion, sometimes bilaterally, as with Fiji, but more often through multilateral organizations. Yet, these efforts have also been used pragmati-cally as vehicles to advance India’s perceived geopolitical interests, both within Asia and in relation to the world’s only superpower—the U.S. Fur-thermore, the concepts of non-intervention and non-alignment continue to resonate with India’s policymakers for both strategic and ideological reasons, including as these ideas relate to the aggressive promotion of de-mocracy. In essence, India has shown its willingness to quietly support the process of democratization in countries where such assistance is requested (and where Indian interests are advanced through this support), but not aggressively or forcefully in an ideological manner. After all, as Samuel Huntington writes, there is a sense that “democracy is a solution to the problem of tyranny, but not necessarily to anything else.”65 The trend to-ward targeted support for democracy appears to have continuity within the major Indian political parties and is likely to remain an important, al-though not determinative, aspect of foreign policy as the country rises in global economic and geopolitical prominence. India may one day move away from a pragmatic focus on geostrategic interests to a view that places more ideological emphasis on the rights of individuals. But for the time being, “realist” concerns appear to dominate India’s support for democ-racy with its immediate neighbors, within Asia, and indeed internationally.

65. Quoted in Craig LeMay, “Review: Critical Mission: Essays on Democracy Promo-tion,” International Journal of Not-for-Profi t Law 6:4 (September 2004), <http://www.icnl.org/knowledge/ijnl/vol6iss4/special_1.htm>, accessed April 24, 2009.

india’s regional and international support for … · deeply skeptical of india’s true...

Documents