indicators of local democratic governance...

INDICATORS

OF LOCAL

DEMOCRATIC

GOVERNANCE

PROJECT

CONCEPTS

AND

HYPOTHESES

INDICATORS

OF LOCAL

DEMOCRATIC

GOVERNANCE

PROJECT

CONCEPTS

AND

HYPOTHESES

Local Governmentand Public ServiceReform Initiative

BY

GÁBOR SOÓS

TOCQUEVILLE

RESEARCH CENTER

BY

GÁBOR SOÓS

TOCQUEVILLE

RESEARCH CENTER

Open Society

Institute

LGI Documents

THE INDICATORS OF LOCAL DEMOCRATIC

GOVERNANCE PROJECT

CONCEPTS AND HYPOTHESES

BY GÁBOR SOÓS

TOCQUEVILLE RESEARCH CENTER (T-RC)

([email protected])

BUDAPEST

March 2001

Published by

Local Government and Public Service Reform Initiative

Open Society Institute

Nador utca 11

H-1051 Budapest

Hungary

tel: (361) 327-3104

fax: (361) 327-3105

http: //www.osi.hu/lgi

Translation supported by Local Government and Public Service Reform Initiative

Production by Violetta Zentai, Alexandra Scacco

© 2001 LGI/OSI

All texts copyright © by the original authors, unless specified.

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a

retrieval system or translated, in any form or by any means, without the permis-

sion of the Publisher

ISSN 1586-3026

Design by Arktisz Studio

Printed in Hungary by Arktisz Studio

Local Government

and Public Service

Reform Initiative

Local Government and Public Service Reform Initiative (LGI), as one of the pro-

grams of the Open Society Institute (OSI), is an international development and

grant-giving organization dedicated to the support of good governance in the

countries of Central Eastern Europe (CEE) and Newly Independent States (NIS).

LGI seeks to fulfill its mission through the initiation of research and support of

development and operational activities in the fields of decentralization, public

policy formation and the reform of public administration.

With projects running in countries covering the region between the Czech

Republic and Mongolia, LGI seeks to achieve its objectives through:

⋅ Development of sustainable regional networks of institutions and profes-

sionals engaged in policy analysis, reform-oriented training and advocacy;

⋅ Support and dissemination of in-depth comparative and regionally applica-

ble policy studies tackling local government issues;

⋅ Support of country specific projects and delivery of technical assistance to

implementation agencies;

⋅ Assistance to local Soros foundations with the development of local govern-

ment, public administration and/or public policy programs in their respec-

tive countries;

⋅ Publishing of books, studies and discussion papers dealing with the issues of

decentralization, public administration, good governance, public policy and

lessons learnt from the process of transition in these areas;

⋅ Development of curricula and organization of training programs dealing with

specific local government issues;

⋅ Support of policy centers and think-tanks in the region.

Apart from its own projects, LGI works closely with a number of other inter-

national organizations (Council of Europe, Department of International Devel-

opment, USAID, UNDP and World Bank) and co-funds larger regional initiatives

aimed at the support of reforms on the subnational level. Local Government Infor-

mation Network (LOGIN) and Fiscal Decentralization Initiatives (FDI) are two main

examples of this cooperation.

For additional information or specific publications, please contact

Local Government and Public Service Reform Initiative

P.O. Box 519

H-1397 Budapest

Hungary

E-mail: [email protected] • http://www.osi.hu/lgi

Tel: (361) 327-3104 • Fax: (361) 327-3105

CONTENTS

Contents 5

Introduction 7

PART I THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE SUBPROJECT 9

1. The Concept of Local Government Performance 10

1.1. The Idea of the Local Government Performance Profiles 10

1.2. Profile Components: Local Government Performance

Measurements 11

1. 2. 1. Policy-Making Performance: Informed

and Coordinated Decisions 13

1. 2. 2. Democratic Performance: Openness and Fairness 14

1. 2. 3. Policy Implementation: Effectiveness 16

1. 2. 4. Responsive Performance: Satisfaction

and Goal Congruence 17

1. 2. 5. The Level of Service Provision as

a Performance Measurement 19

2. Explanatory Variables 21

2.1. Characteristics of Local Governments and the Local

Government System 21

2.1.1. Characteristics of the Local Government System 21

2.1.2. Budget 24

2.1.3. Distribution of Formal Authority and the Administrative

Staff 25

2.1.4. Characteristics of the Representative Body 27

2.2. Local Institutions 30

2.2.1. Local Political Parties 30

2.2.2. Civil Society 32

2.2.3. Local Media 36

2.3. Local Political Culture 38

2.3.1. Citizen Participation in Local Politics 38

2.3.2. Citizens’ Political Culture 39

2.3.3. Representatives’ political culture 42

2.4. Characteristics of the municipality 46

2.4.1. Size 46

2.4.2. Socioeconomic development 47

2.4.3. Inequalities 49

2.4.4. Heterogeneity and cleavages 50

2.4.5. History and Administrative Status 52

2.4.6. Geography 53

PART II THE LOCAL DEMOCRACY REPORTS PROJECT 56

I. Central-Local Relationship 57

II. Administrative Features of Local Governments 57

III. Political Performance of Local Governments 58

IV. Characteristics of Local Representatives 58

V. Local Civil Society Organizations 59

VI. Local Media 59

VII. Local Political Culture and Participation 60

Appendices 60

7

INTRODUCTION

The goal of the Indicators of Local Democratic Governance project is to offer com-

prehensive, longitudinal and cross-nationally comparable information on local

democratic governance for different research and development activities in Cen-

tral and Eastern Europe. The indicators of the project cover a wide range of polit-

ical activity of local governments and their contacts with local citizens and civic

organizations.

Consequently, the key indicators should be made available for three groups of

potential users:

– individual countries (central governments, legislators, etc.) will regularly

obtain data on the state of local governments and local democracy;

– the Local Government and Public Service Reform Initiative (LGI) and other

professional and donor organizations will gain comprehensive knowledge

on CEE countries, including needs and progress in the development of local

governance;

– regularly measured indicators will serve comparative academic and applied

research.

The Indicators of Democratic Local Governance project has been initiated within

the framework of the Fiscal Decentralization Initiative (FDI). FDI is a consortium

of major international organizations established with a mission to assist transition

economies implementing intergovernmental reform. The project entitled Indi-

cators for Decentralization in CEE and fSU is one of the major endeavors of FDI

that aims to establish a uniform framework for comparative local government

analysis. The main goal of the project is to develop a set of operational, flexibile,

and adaptable indicators based on internationally recognized definitions and to

publish reports measuring the process of decentralization in the target countries.

The project has two arms: the Fiscal Design Across Levels of Government project,

managed by the OECD and the Indicators of Democratic Local Governance pro-

ject, managed by LGI.

To design the conceptual framework of Indicators of Democratic Local Gover-

nance and carry out pilot research, LGI established a partnership with Tocqueville

Research Center (T-RC), Budapest.

This paper contributes to the project in two equally important ways. The first

objective of this paper is the development of a conceptual framework and the

selection of the indicators to be used in the project. Part I builds this framework

by focusing on the political performance of local governments and their poten-

8

tial determinants. Part II reorders the variables conceptualized in Part I and uses

them as indicators of country reports on the state of local democracy and local

government in the region.

The main activity in the implementation of the project is the collection of data

from various sources. Data collection is a highly costly process. To make the most

of expensive surveys, it is important to utilize data in more than one way. This

paper proposes three schemes as potential subprojects in the Indicators of Local

Democratic Governance project.

· The Local Government Performance (LGP) subproject intends to measure the

political performance of local governments and explain it by a number of con-

textual factors such as the strength of civil society, the political culture of repre-

sentatives, the size of the municipality and so on. The studies made in the sub-

project strive for deeper analysis than country reports and target a somewhat

different audience.

· The Local Democracy Reports (LDR) subproject aims to provide annual sys-

tematic data and report on local governments and other local political actors.

The report’s task is to provide donors, decision-makers and researchers with a

well-structured description of the current state of local governance in the region.

· The objective of the Data Management and Dissemination (DMD) subpro-

ject is to generate research on the basis of data collected in the framework of the

project. The project produces a huge database with timely, cross-country data.

In exchange for studies made available to donors and participants in the project,

experts with various backgrounds can obtain data from the database. The sub-

project maintains an easily manageable database, advertizes its potential uses,

distributes the permissions of access and places the products on the project’s web-

site.

This paper focuses only on the LDR and LGP subprojects.

9

PART I

THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE SUBPROJECT

After the fall of communism, Soviet-type councils were replaced by local gov-

ernments everywhere in Central and Eastern Europe. The designers of the new

constitutions expected local governments to be both more effective and more

responsive than the Communist local administration had been. In some cases, the

dream came true, in other cases it did not. There are municipalities where local

government performance is systematically better and some where it is poorer.

Why do similar institutions perform systematically better here than there? Rec-

ognizing the enormous practical implications of this question for the new democ-

racies in East Central Europe, the Indicators of Local Democratic Governance pro-

ject aims to help decision-makers and researchers assess and explain local

government performance. Thus, the project is organized around the concept of

local government performance and uses a wide variety of variables to gauge its

variance on the one hand, and its roots in economic, political, legal, cultural and

social factors on the other. This part of the paper proposes a conceptualization

of local government performance and its potential determinants. Since the

approach is conceptual, references to methodology in the text are rather illus-

trative.

10

1. The Concept of Local Government Performance

1.1. The Idea of the Local Government Performance Profiles

The variable to be explained in the research is the political performance of local

governments. There is no single, widely accepted definition of government per-

formance in the social sciences. Consensus on the measurement of local govern-

ment performance, in particular, is conspicuously absent in the literature. Per-

formance has been identified with several concepts and their combinations.

Effectiveness, efficiency, productivity, economy, appropriateness and accessibil-

ity of services, smoothness of the decision-making process, service quality, client

satisfaction or satisfaction of the strategic constituency, responsiveness, and respect

for political freedoms have all been used in defining performance.

Picking out one concept or even a combination of concepts from this list would

certainly be criticised for arbitrary conceptualization. The problem of definition

by fiat can be overcome by recognizing that the political performance of local

governments is a multidimensional concept. More than one definition of per-

formance can be formulated and each definition can be defended on solid

grounds. These perspectives have equal rights to aspire to the measurement of

local government performance.

Consequently, the most fruitful solution seems to keep the different approach-

es separate and measure local government performance by conceptually distinct

systems. Presenting all of the performance results offers a more comprehensive

picture than providing a single abstract number. The higher validity of such a

profile stems from the heterogeneity of its components. Since the measurement

systems evaluate performance from different perspectives, their mean value can

cover different combinations of performances, i.e. distinct types of local govern-

ments. The same score can disguise distinct profiles. At the end of the day, the

measurement components of the profiles can be collapsed into a performance

“superindex”, most likely constructed by principal component analysis. This might

be useful for some research. Still, this is not necessarily the case and the profiles

have higher validity.

Local government profiles can feature not only overviews of local government

performance but also descriptions of the state of the local government system at

the country level. For this, the types of local government performance profiles

should be distinguished and aggregated into a country profile. These country

11

profiles can then serve as very intuitive instruments with which to compare coun-

tries. Such aggregated profiles can also be constructed at the regional level and

with certain types of municipalities (e.g. cities).

In addition to these insightful descriptions, local government profiles and the

local government types isolated by means of the profiles can be dependent vari-

ables even in quantitative studies. The components of local government perfor-

mance profiles can also serve as dependent or independent variables in research

designs. For example, the satisfaction rate of local citizens can be the dependent

variable, explained by several independent variables (e.g. municipality size or

wealth) or other types of performance (e.g. the effectiveness or transparency of

local governments). Our research questions address both the profile and its com-

ponents as dependent variables.

1.2. Profile Components: Local Government Performance Measurements

What are the components of the local government profiles? How can one dis-

tinguish the measurement systems that are relevant to local government activi-

ties? Performance definitions ultimately depend on which role of the local gov-

ernment the researcher chooses to emphasize. To reach a set of definitions covering

local government performance, one should consider the expectations local gov-

ernments are designed to fulfill. Four duties seem to be relevant. All of them

imply a basis against which performance can be assessed.

(1) Local governments are expected to set community goals and formulate poli-

cies. As decision-makers, the basis of evaluation is the congruence between

policy requirements (e.g. budgeting) and actual policy-making (e.g. bud-

get promptness).

(2) Local governments are expected to effectively implement their decisions.

As administrative units, the basis of comparison is the consistency between

what local governments decide (policy objectives) and what they can carry

out (outputs).

(3) Local governments are expected to work for their communities. As respon-

sive organizations, their policy-making is compared to articulated societal

demands.

(4) Local governments are expected to be democratic. As democratic organi-

zations, their activities are assessed on the basis of the realization of certain

basic values.

The following table lists these four performance types and their basis of mea-

surement.

12

Research Question 1

The most general research question of the project is as follows. What explains

the variance in performance profiles of local governments? What makes for

local governments with a high capacity to manage their tasks well?

The four performances can be grouped according to the means/ends dimension.

The first two measurement systems concentrate on the policy process, evaluating

it from administrative and democratic viewpoints. The second two performance

measurements focus on the output of local government activity, assessing it from

the perspectives of public administration and local demands.

Grouping the four components of a local government performance profile in

another way, policy coordination and policy implementation belong to the admin-

istrative side of local government activities. On the other hand, the respect of

basic democratic values and responsiveness to popular demands portray the local

government’s contacts with its citizenry.

The next sections elaborate on the four performance concepts.

Performance Role Basis of Definition

name measurement

Process Policy Policy-maker Policy The capability to address policy

requirements requirements by making informed

and coordinated decisions.

Democracy Democratic Democratic The capability to operate in an

institution values open and transparent way and

treat citizens in a fair and just

manner.

Output Respon- Representative Popular The capability to respond to local

siveness of local needs demands people’s demands and satisfy

citizens.

Effectiveness Policy-imple- Policy The capability to implement deci

mentation objectives sions and reach self-declared policy

objectives.

13

1. 2. 1. Policy-Making Performance: Informed and Coordinated Decisions

Research Question 2

Policy-making performance can be a dependent variable, especially inter-

esting for political scientists. The question that is raised: What explains the

variance in the policy-making capabilities of local governments? What makes

for local governments with high capabilities for decision-making?

Local governments are policy-makers. Thus, the first type of performance con-

cept implies a decision-making process. As politico-administrative units, local gov-

ernments are required to address policy requirements such as budgeting, regu-

lations for dog-keeping or the formulation of an economic strategy. Frequently,

past decisions made by the local government itself also necessitate new decisions

(e.g. the continuation of a multi-year project).

How well do local governments formulate their decisions? Are they capable

of making informed, innovative and consistent decisions in good time? Local

governments must reconcile competing viewpoints and make policies within

strict time limits. The coordination element of the performance profile refers to

the capability to make decisions on the basis of a comprehensive knowledge of

relevant constraints and opportunities (especially local interests) and of the prob-

able impact of the decision. This type of performance also implies the capabil-

ity to bring together the opinions of various agencies whose competence is rel-

evant in the given policy area. Performance is defined from this perspective as

the capability of the local government to make informed and coordinated deci-

sions, given the temporal constraints placed on it. The measurement of such a

performance is a comparison between the policy requirements and the actual-

ly taken policy decisions. The main measure is the assessment of delays in pol-

icy-making. Frequent delays indicate a great amount of dissent among decision-

makers, weakly prepared motions or inadequate cooperation within the local

government.

14

Performance 1: Policy-making

1. 2. 2. Democratic Performance: Openness and Fairness

Local governments are not simply decision-makers but also democratic decision-

makers. Thus, local governments must meet certain standards of democracy. This

measurement of democratic performance focuses on the degree of the incorpo-

ration of democratic norms in the operation of the local government.

Political science has a long tradition of measuring democratic performance.

The problem of “good government” has been one of the most important items

on the research agenda of the discipline. In empirical democracy studies, com-

parisons have been drawn, sometimes on a large scale, among countries by means

of performance indicators, such as political corruption, personal freedom, gov-

ernment fairness etc. Most of these criteria do not apply to local governments.

Freedom rights or the fairness of elections, for example, depend on the state and

cannot be secured by local governments.

Research Question 3

Taking democratic performance as the dependent variable, the research ques-

tions is as follows: What explains the variance in the democratic performance

of local governments? Which factors account for a more democratic local

government?

Variable Policy performance

name

Definition Policy performance refers to the capability of the local government to

make informed and coordinated decisions given the temporal constraints

on it.

Measures Delays in making key decisions, e.g. budget promptness

Proportion of agenda items that are postponed

Frequency of no quorum

Information-gathering mechanisms

Data Local government survey (or local government documents directly)

source

15

Nonetheless, there is a common point in measurements of democratic perfor-

mance in political science. All concentrate on the contacts between local gov-

ernment and local citizens. An analysis of local governments’ scope of activities

from the viewpoint of citizen-local government contact highlights two measure-

ment criteria. Both are familiar in the democratic tradition of political theory.

The first one is openness. Is the local government open and transparent by

readily providing information about its activities? Does the local government

allow and further local people’s involvement in decision-making? A democratic

local government must offer local citizens the opportunity to understand its oper-

ation and participate in making decisions on local public issues. People might

not accept this offer for whatever reason (e.g., because of a non-participatory

political culture). This does not influence the level of performance: local govern-

ment activities are measured here, not their outcomes.

The other important democratic duty that a local government can and must

discharge is fairness. Local governments as democratic institutions are required

to treat each citizen equally and according to the rules. Fair and just treatment is

a fully legitimate expectation if the institution is declared democratic.

From the viewpoint of democratic decision-making, in sum, performance is the

capability of the local government to operate in an open and fair manner. Mea-

surement is subjectively based on survey questions about the sense of political

efficacy, open discussions on public issues, the level of information on local gov-

ernment, the role of good connections and corruption in local government offices.

The “objective” measures concentrate on the transparency and openness of pol-

icy-making.

16

Performance 2: Democratic capabilities

1. 2. 3. Policy Implementation: Effectiveness

Research Question 4

Policy implementation capability as a dependent variable implies the fol-

lowing research question: What explains the variance in the effectiveness of

local governments? What makes for effective local governments?

What is decided must be implemented. Local governments as administrative units

are expected to manage organizational and financial resources in order to pro-

vide public services, carry out developmental programs and enforce regulatory

rules. The questions are as follows: How well do local governments transform

Variable Democratic performance

name

Definition Democratic performance refers to the capability of the local government

to operate in an open and fair manner.

Measures The transparency of the budget (the specification of some significant

items, e.g. the costs of a teaching program; ordinal scale)

The existence and transparency of the rules of public purchases.

The existence and sophistication of rules regulating public access to local

government documents

The number and comprehensiveness of local government meetings,

hearings and forums and the method of their announcement

The existence and power of citizens’ consultative committees that are

organized or recognized by the local government

Number of copies of free bulletins issued by the local government per

1000 inhabitants

Citizens’ answers to survey questions about the importance of good

connections and bribery in local government offices

Citizens’ answers to survey questions about discrimination (e.g. ethnic)

Citizens’ answers to survey questions about the fair-mindedness and

helpfulness of local government bureaucrats

(All of them are on an ordinal scale)

Data Local government survey and citizen survey

source

17

their decisions into action? Are they capable of reaching their self-declared objec-

tives? Implementation performance is defined as the capability of the local gov-

ernment to meet its self-declared policy objectives. The basis of comparison is

the decision of the local government. Effectiveness as a performance measure is

the ratio of decided policy objectives to those which are actually realized.

Performance 3: Effectiveness

1. 2. 4. Responsive Performance: Satisfaction and Goal Congruence

Local governments must produce outputs. However, local governments must pro-

duce the correct balance of outputs, i.e. outputs that reflect real needs. Local gov-

ernments are political representatives of their respective constituencies. Their duty

is to keep a close eye on their citizens’ wants and needs. The perspective of the

local governments’ strategic constituency cannot be overlooked in a performance

profile.

Research Question 5

If one analyzes responsiveness as a dependent variable, the research ques-

tion is this: What explains the variance in the political responsiveness of local

governments? What makes for responsive local governments? What are the

factors that satisfy local citizens?

Variable Policy performance

name

Variable Effectiveness

Definition Effectiveness refers to the capability of the local government to meet

its self-declared policy objectives.

Measurement An index composed of several measures

Measures Frequency of the modification of regulations

Spending capacity of state development grants

Data source Local government survey and citizen survey

18

Performance in this sense refers to the ability of the local government to address

local people’s demands. (In a technical sense, responsiveness is used as a mea-

sure of technical efficiency in service provision, e.g. the time needed to replace

a defective streetlight. If it satisfies real demands, such efficiency may be a sign

of political responsiveness, but it cannot be measured by this.) On the level of

policy-making, political responsiveness implies congruence between local gov-

ernment policy objectives and citizens’ demands and the match between service

delivery and client needs. The level of satisfaction with the objectives and imple-

mentation of services and programs of local government demonstrates this kind

of responsiveness.

Why is responsiveness regarded as a performance type different from democ-

ratic performance? It might be argued that democratic theories treat respon-

siveness as a distinctive feature of democratic institutions. And these theories are

right: democratic institutions should be responsive to the demands of their con-

stituencies. Thus, all democratic institutions are responsive. The argument is not

true the other way around, however. Not all responsive institutions are democ-

ratic. Non-democratic governments also wish to survive and attempt to address

their subjects’ wants and needs. From time to time, communist governments

raised the standard of living of (even disliked) societal groups, contrary to their

long-term ideological goals, to avoid crisis and increase their survival potential.

Regimes led by enlightened rulers explicitly declare their intention to respond to

societal needs – without consulting people regarded as ignorant. Eighteenth-cen-

tury Austria and Singapore today serve as prime examples. The distinction between

responsiveness and democratic performance has implications for concrete mea-

sures as well. For example, public opinion polls organized by local governments

are certainly indicators of responsiveness. Still, polls are signs of openness only

if their questions are unbiased and the results are publicly discussed. Otherwise,

they are only power-maintaining techniques. After all, polls were quite frequent

in Jaruzelski’s Poland.

Political responsiveness is the relationship between what local government does

and what local citizens think it should do. This relationship can be measured by

satisfaction rates with the allocation of resources among and the quality of ser-

vices and programs provided by the local government.

19

Performance 4: Responsiveness

1. 2. 5. The Level of Service Provision as a PerformanceMeasurement

The endproduct of local government activities, i.e. the services, programs and

regulations provided locally, can be the basis of measurement directly. For the

sake of comparison, the level of service provision measured directly should be

standardized. The number of street lamps per kilometer or the number of fami-

ly doctors per 1000 inhabitants are good examples for this type of performance

measurement. The level of service provisions is the measure of the quantity, qual-

ity, accessibility and efficiency of public services delivered or regulated by the

local government.

The obvious problem is that the measured performance highly depends on other

factors than the local government’s activity. A municipality with a wealthy popu-

lation, a large taxbase and political support is more likely to have good services

than a poor municipality with poor inhabitants and no political support. The dif-

ference the local government actually makes cannot exactly be measured because

the precise subtraction of the impact of other factors to obtain local government

performance as the residual is not possible. This is the reason why the level of ser-

vice provision is not included in the local government performance profile.

Research Question 6

The level of service provision as a dependent variable implies the following

research question: What explains the variance in the level of services among

local governments? What makes for good local government services?

Variable Responsiveness

name

Definition Responsiveness refers to the capability of the local government to

address local citizenry’s demands.

Measures Survey questions on the congruence of goals

Survey questions on the satisfaction with services

Data Citizen survey

source

20

Still, the level of services can be a very interesting dependent variable. A real-

ly important question is why some local governments can attract more invest-

ment, build more roads and maintain better social services than others. If the

politico-administrative performance of the local government is measured and

used as an independent variable, one can assess to what degree local govern-

ments are responsible for their situation (especially economic growth) and what

role can be attributed to other variables such as geographic position, residents’

level of education or the party composition of the local representative body.

By means of official statistics, the level of service provision can be indicated in

a relatively easy way. To maintain comparability, it is important to focus on tasks

that must be fulfilled by all local governments, independent of size and country.

These are the management of primary schools, the local economy and public util-

ities.

Performance 5: Service provision

Variable Service provision

name

Definition Service provision is the local government’s capability to supply the

services for which it is partly or fully responsible.

Measures Population change due to migration

Economic growth

Dwellings supplied with public water pipe

Dwellings supplied with public sewerage

Proportion of roads with solid surface

Family doctors per 1000 inhabitants

Pupils per teacher in primary school

Borrowed library units per inhabitant

Data Official statistics

source

21

2. Explanatory Variables

What is the effect of institutional arrangements, local political culture, civil society,

local media, the size of the municipality etc. on local government performance?

This is the most general question this research addresses. To assess the impact of

different factors, a selection of potential explanatory variables is necessary. The fol-

lowing long list is the result of an overview of the social science literature.

The list proceeds from the internal variables characterizing the institutional fea-

tures of local governments to the wider social, economic and cultural environ-

ment. Each variable is defined, its hypothesized effect on local government per-

formance presented, and the potential measures mentioned. These independent

variables are often theorized to influence each other, creating explanatory paths

with numerous variables. Each variable is evaluated in five ways:

· the definition of the variable;

· the expected direct effects of the variable on the local government perfor-

mance profile;

· the expected effects of the variable on other independent variables that inter-

vene or interact;

· the variables that are expected to influence the given variable;

· reference to the possible operationalization and data source.

2.1. Characteristics of Local Governments and theLocal Government System

The institutional features of the local governments themselves have an apparent

effect on local government performance. The voter/representative ratio, internal

distribution of power, the size and competence of the administrative staff, the

amount of money that can be allocated or the fragmentation and composition

of the representative body are all expected to influence the political quality of

local governments.

2.1.1. The Characteristics of the Local Government System

The legal and constitutional arrangements that regulate the local government

system may have an effect on local government performance. First of all, the

level of devolution should be mentioned. The degree of devolution of central

22

powers to local governments might influence their performance. The wider the

local autonomy is, the more room for maneuver the local government has. This

increases the possibility of extracting more local resources, form more complex

strategies and find innovative solutions in policy-making. On the other hand,

wider autonomy may exceed the municipality’s administrative and political com-

petence and organizational capacity. Its potential may simply not be enough to

live up to the expectations of the designers of a country’s constitution. Future

empirical research should determine the degree and direction of the devolution’s

effect on local government effectiveness.

The degree of legal devolution may have another effect. Wider autonomy may

make the local government system more legitimate. Citizens simply take local

governments more seriously and regard them as important institutions that influ-

ence their everyday lives. In this case, people are more willing to participate in

local activities. Such political participation certainly influences local government

performance. The degree of legal autonomy is measured by the devolution of

some key powers.

Devolution of certain powers does not mean that the state renounces the right

to supervise the implementation of constitutional and other legal rules. Local

autonomy is bounded by the external control of other administrative, legislative

and judicial institutions. This is called horizontal accountability. This concept

means that local government officials have to be ready to justify their decisions

and be answerable to administrative, legislative or judicial authorities.

Horizontal accountability exerts an influence on effectiveness. Accountability

as a control mechanism presses decision-makers to formulate feasible and effec-

tively implementable policies, reduce the diversion of public resources towards

particular interests, and improve service quality by imposing minimum standards.

Variable name Level of devolution

Definition The level of devolution is the degree to which the state

transfers duties and authorities to local governments.

Expected direct Policy-making and implementation

effects on performances

Expected effects on Political participation

intervening variables

The variable influenced by

Measures The number of devolved powers (checklist)

Data source Legal documents

23

If the state represents democratic principles, horizontal accountability enhances

democracy in local government. It improves transparency because other admin-

istrative units also require clear statements and detailed (especially budgetary)

data. Effective legal remedies for discrimination and the violation of rules also

increase the degree of democracy in local governments. On the other hand, exag-

gerated horizontal accountability leads to a stronger dependence on external

institutions. This has a negative consequence in terms of responsiveness.

Voter/leader ratio refers to the accessibility of local representatives for their vot-

ers. If the gap between them is not wide, representatives have a better chance

of recognizing local needs and the exact weight of interest-groups. This promotes

policy congruence between citizens and representatives, which, in turn, enhances

the quality of policy-making and implementation of the local government. From

the viewpoint of voters, accessible leaders can more easily be pressured and the

chances for accountability, a means of social control, are much greater. Local

leaders, who can easily be approached and controlled, tend to be more respon-

sive. The ratio of representatives to the represented is influenced by the size of

the municipality, but the electoral system remains an obvious modifier.

Variable name Horizontal accountability

Definition Horizontal accountability refers to the responsibility

of the local government to explain its actions to judi-

cial, administrative or legislative authorities.

Direct effects on Effectiveness, democracy

performances

Indirect effects by Dependence on the state



Measurement A list should be created with potential accountability

types. Each element should be given a weight (score).

The more points the local government collects, the

higher is its level of horizontal accountability.

Data source Legal documents and local government survey

24

2.1.2. Budget

Most local politicians believe that money makes the difference in local govern-

ment performance. They claim that the amount of local government income

determines the opportunities to manage the municipality well. A larger budget

lubricates the cooperation among stakeholders by providing room to maneuver

and increases the likelihood of compromise. This leads to better policy perfor-

mance. More income allows for the hiring of a larger administrative staff with

more competent specialists. This is conducive to the effectiveness of the local gov-

ernment. Even responsiveness may be better if the local government has more

money because more popular demands can be met.

Variable name The voter-leader ratio

Definition The voter-leader ratio is the number of local citizens

with voting rights per the number of elected local

government representatives.

Expected direct effects Responsiveness

on performances

Expected effects on Policy congruence between leaders and voters


The variable influenced by Municipality size

Measures Number of voters / number of representatives (includ-

ing the mayor)

Data source Election data and local government survey

Variable name Local government income

Definition Local government income refers to the total income

of the local government per inhabitant.

Expected direct effects Policy-formulation, implementation, responsiveness

on performances

Expected effects on Size of the administrative staff


The variable influenced by Socioeconomic development

Measures The total yearly income of the local government per

inhabitant

Data source Local government survey

25

Nevertheless, not only is the amount of resources local governments have impor-

tant, but their source is also significant. Financial dependence on state resources

decreases local autonomy, even if there is, at the end of the day, a generous flow

of resources. This may undermine local government responsiveness - for instance,

local projects can be designed with an eye toward other expectations than those

of local residents. Such a local government may be good at policy-making and

implementation, but these policies respond to external demands. The financial

dependence of the given local government is measured by local tax income vs.

state funds in budget.

2.1.3. Distribution of Formal Authority and the Administrative Staff

The distributions of authority among local government agents may have an impact

on local government performance. The centralization of power in the hands

of the mayor or committees may improve policy-making and implementation

performance by decreasing the number of players and veto points, but it may

lead to more favoritism and less responsiveness. The distribution of power is mea-

sured by important jurisdictions in the hands of main local government agents

(e.g. mayors, chief executives, committees, officials).

Variable name Financial dependence on the state

Definition Financial dependence on the state refers to the

reliance of the local government on state funds.


on performances

Expected effects on



Measures The share of state grants in the income of the local

government


26

A crucial factor of effective policy-implementation is the relationship between

elected politicians and administrative staff. The well-established horizontal

accountability mechanisms within the local government promote the realiza-

tion of policy decisions. Even very well-designed policies with plentiful resources

will not be translated into real outputs unless those who execute political deci-

sions are responsible to those who are elected to represent local citizens. The

internal horizontal accountability mechanisms ensure the effective and respon-

sive performance of the local government.

Variable name Centralization of power within the local government

Definition The level of local government centralization refers

to the degree to which the authorities of the local

government are concentrated in the hands of on

of the institutional actors.

Expected direct effects Policy-making, effectiveness, responsiveness

on performances

Expected effects on



Measures The distribution of power among the representative

body, committees and boards, mayor, and chief

executive


Variable name Internal horizontal accountability mechanisms

Definition The concept of internal horizontal accountability

mechanisms refers to the legal and administrative

means by which the elected officials monitor and

control the activities of the administrative staff.

Expected direct effects Effectiveness, responsiveness

on performances

Expected effects on



Measures The number of deployed accountability mechanisms

(checklist)


27

The size of the administrative staff is an important feature of local govern-

ment. Both the bureaucratic modes of decision-making and the issues of com-

plexity are well-indicated by the size of the local bureaucracy. More bureaucra-

cy may mean greater effectiveness (better specialization), but lower responsiveness

(i.e. a greater distance between citizens and local government administration). A

larger bureaucracy contains more specialized and professional members. A greater

competence, i.e. better knowledge, expertise, skills and experiences, furthers the

informed assessment of the impact of planned decisions as well as their effective

policy-implementation.

On the other hand, the larger the administrative staff, the more bureaucratic

the administration. This decreases the local government’s capacity to respond to

ever emerging demands. Concerning the size of the administrative staff, effec-

tiveness and responsiveness are in an inverse relationship.

The administrative staff of local governments includes those offices preparing

and implementing policies and has an official authority. The concept does not cover

the bureaucracy of the firms owned by the local government, or organizations and

institutions (like schools) that lack administrative governmental authority.

2.1.4. Characteristics of the Representative Body

The representative body is invariably the main policy-making unit within Central

and Eastern European local governments. Thus, the party composition and the

weight of factions and coalitions are important from the viewpoint of local gov-

ernment performance.

Party composition refers to the relative weight of the parties having elected

positions in the local government. The political color of the representatives may

Variable name Size of the administrative staff

Definition The size of the administrative staff is the number of

employees in the local government administration.

Expected direct effects Policy-making, effectiveness, responsiveness

on performances

Expected effects on


The variable influenced by Municipality size, the income of the local government

Measures Staff number


28

have an impact on local government performance, since political parties have

different priorities, recruitment patterns, and past experience. The presence of

certain parties (e.g. extreme parties or post-communist parties) might also affect

the political performance of the local government. The relatively easy access to

election data encourages the testing of such hypotheses.

Democratic performance may be influenced by the ideas of political parties.

Certain parties are closer to the ideals of democracy than others. Therefore, the

presence of certain parties might produce leaders with more democratic values,

encouraging closer and more fair contacts between the local government and its

constituency. The political color of local governments in relation to parliament

might produce a creative tension between the two levels of government, while

at other times it might block public decisions.

Parties organized on the country level might have non-local considerations

when making decisions on local issues. The difference in the strategic constituency

to which local politicians feel responsible results in a decrease in responsiveness

to local citizens. The dependence on external forces increases if the central gov-

ernment distributes development grants according to the political color of local

governments (i.e. whether the local ruling parties belong to the majority or the

opposition in the national parliament).

Variable name Party composition of the local government

Definition Party composition refers to the relative weight of the

parties having elected positions in the local govern-

ment.

Expected direct effects Civicness and democracy of representatives

on performances

Expected effects on



Measures The % of representatives belonging to parties that sup-

port the central government in the parliament

The % of representatives belonging to formal commu-

nist parties

The % of representatives of extreme-right parties

The % of representatives of extreme-left parties

The % of representatives of ethnic/religious minority

parties

Data source Official election data and local government survey

29

The continuity and change in the composition of a local representative

body may also influence local government performance, although in an unclear

way. Neither the maximum, nor the zero rotation will serve the representation

of the changing composition and interest of the local community, even though

no optimum can be determined either a priori or on the basis of national aver-

ages and the like. High rotation may increase the innovative capacity of the local

government body but decrease the competence stemming from political experi-

ence. High continuity may produce more competent leaders, but may lead to

cronyism at worst, and a benevolent oligarchy at best. It is the task of future

empirical analysis to explore the relationship between political continuity and

change, and the quality of governance on the local level. The proportion of new

members in an elected body (in an election year) is the measure of change in the

composition of a local representative body.

The weight of factions and coalitions, i.e. the level of association among repre-

sentatives may have an important impact on local government performance. The

fragmentation of the representative body is the degree to which the local

representatives form disciplined political groupings in the elected bodies. The

more factions and independent representatives can be found in the representa-

tive body, the more fragmented that body is. Large and organized blocks in the

representative body facilitate cooperation because of the smaller number of play-

ers. Coordinating a few demands is easier than coordinating many demands.

Thus, low fragmentation (few parties and party discipline) results in better deci-

sional efficacy (policy performance) than high fragmentation (many factions and/or

weak party discipline).

Variable name Rotation in the composition of local representative

body

Definition The degree of rotation in the composition of the local

representative body.


on performances

Expected effects on Political competence of local representatives



Measures The proportion of new members of the elected body

(last election year)

Data source Official election data

30

However, the smaller number of parties in the representative body cannot rep-

resent as wide a range of interests as a more fragmented elected assembly. Pol-

icy-making capacity and responsiveness may move in opposite directions. The

fragmentation of the representative body is measured by the number of factions

and the level of discipline within these factions and the ruling coalition (if there

is a coalition). The organizational capacity of local political organizations had an

effect on the level of fragmentation within the representative body.

2.2. Local Institutions

The institutions of local public life may affect performance. Civil organizations,

local media and political parties are often said to influence the policy capacity,

effectiveness, responsiveness and democracy of local governments. This section

deals with local political organizations, civil society organizations, and local media.

2.2.1. Local Political Parties

The term “local political group” refers to all political forces that have some orga-

nization in the locality and have attempted to win elected local government posi-

tions. Consequently, this definition also comprises those civil organizations that

Variable name The fragmentation of the representative body

Definition The fragmentation of elected bodies is the degree to

which the local representatives form disciplined

political groupings in the elected bodies. The more

factions and independent representatives can be found

in the representative body, the more fragmented it is.

Expected direct effects Policy-making, responsiveness

on performances

Expected effects on


The variable influenced by The organizational capacity of local political organiza-

tions

Measures The membership of factions

The voting discipline of factions

Data source Election data and local government surveys

31

take part in local elections, and especially those that have seats in the local gov-

ernment elected body. The organizational capacity of a local political organiza-

tion implies its potential to act effectively on the political field. This includes per-

sonnel capacity (paid staff), technical capacity (office, fax, telephones, copy

machines etc.) and social mobilization capacity (members, supporters).

Well-organized political parties may have a positive impact on local govern-

ment performance by holding local government representatives accountable for

their actions. Party members and supporters can compel the representatives of

their party to justify their deeds regularly and in detail. This form of vertical

accountability bolsters local government responsiveness.

Parties and other political organizations are intentionally designed to collect,

articulate and aggregate societal demands to representative institutions. Strong

political organizations are more likely to do this job than organizations with lim-

ited membership and infrastructure. This also holds for the information-flow

between local government and its environment, which political parties may help

or hinder. This promotes responsiveness, policy-making and implementation.

Well-organized local parties (and proto-parties) tend to have more profession-

al politicians, more experienced specialists and better knowledge about impor-

tant issues. This positively contributes to the competence level of the represen-

tative body. This is conducive to a high quality policy-making process.

Variable name Organizational capacity of local political groups

Definition Local political group refers to all political forces that

have some organization in the locality and have tried to

win elected local government positions. The organiza-

tional capacity of a local political organization implies

its potential to act effectively on the political field.

Expected direct effects Policy-making, implementation, responsiveness

on performances

Expected effects on Political competence of representatives


The variable influenced by Socioeconomic development

Measures The possession of certain facilities by the political

organization (office, office machines)

The number of paid staff of the political organization

The self-reported membership of the political

organization

The self-reported number of activists who contributed

to the campaign during the last local and

parliamentary elections

Data source Local government survey and the local representatives

survey

32

2.2.2. Civil Society

Theorizing about civil society has a long and venerable tradition from Aristotle’s

Politike Koinonia to Hegel’s Bürgerliche Gesellschaft. As a consequence, there are

many conceptualizations of civil society. This project uses a common and easily

operationalizable definition. Civil society here refers to the realm of voluntary,

self-initiated, and self-organized intermediary groups that are independent of the

family, the market and the state. It is operationalized as the domain of non-gov-

ernmental, legally accepted organizations. Thus, the strength of civil society

is measured by the number of NGOs in the municipality. This is double-checked

by the self-reported civic participation in the citizen survey.

Civic groups are to give shape to various efforts and initiatives of citizens that

address different public issues. Local NGOs and civic associations, organized around

single or complex issues, address locally relevant policy issues, express specific

opinions and interests between two elections, and many times provide services

for the local communities. NGOs are crucial actors in the local policy-making

process in several ways. An overview of the literature suggests seven ways in

which civil society may affect local government performance.

The first approach deals with civil society as a social force holding elected offi-

cials accountable. Civil society is presented in this perspective as a societal sphere

that is capable of exploiting its independence and resisting the state. Making

(local) government actions public, civic organizations hold public officials account-

able. In an extreme case, the tyrannical actions of rulers are potentially imped-

ed by an opposing civil society. All of this facilitates responsiveness.

A second positive impact of civil society organizations on local government per-

formance is the furthering of information-flow. Civil organizations provide infor-

mation on many aspects of the state of the municipality from the opportunities

of project funding to the technical difficulties in implementing policy decisions.

A good information-flow helps policy-making as well as implementation.

Thirdly, civil society provides channels to articulate and aggregate societal inter-

ests. Political parties and other explicit political organizations have the same func-

tion, but it turns out in democratic practice that civil associations are indispensable

in the expression of a wide range of interests that cannot be channeled by parties.

This stabilizes social and political expectations. The literature of corporatism focus-

es particularly on the mediating institutions through which certain civil organiza-

tions take part in the officially recognized aggregation of societal interests. Well-

articulated interests make policy-making easier and improves responsiveness.

The fourth hypothesized effect of civil society is the stimulation of political par-

ticipation. People taking part in civic activities gain a feeling of political efficacy,

i.e. an attitude that one can influence political life. Social participation leads, as

the argument claims, to political participation. Where people are engaged in civic

33

associations, interest in elections, electoral campaigns, street demonstrations, and

single-issue movements is higher. High-level political participation, then, results

in better-performing governments.

The fifth contribution of civil society to government performance is the incul-

cation of civicness. Tolerance, moderation, trust, accommodation of difference

are the building blocks of democratic political life. These norms and attitudes

help to peacefully resolve conflicts.

A sixth, indirect, contribution of civil society to political performance is the pro-

motion of the sense of community. Civil society is a channel not only of interests,

but also of sentiments and identities. People participating in civic activities are

less likely to feel alienated from the system because they tend to be more inte-

grated through self-expression in civic groups. Identification with the communi-

ty can lead in a democracy to a more legitimate status of the political system.

A seventh way in which civil society indirectly influences the level of govern-

ment performance is the training of new leaders who have roots in certain social

spheres. Those who learn how to manage a civic organization are much more

prepared to run political organizations. In addition to the increased competence,

these persons also tend to have more democratic values and a greater social cap-

ital in the sense of Bourdieu’s theory. Leaders coming from civil society bring

many connections with them, which is highly important in political recruitment.

Variable name Strength of local civil society

Definition Local civil society refers to the realm of voluntary,

self-initiated, and self-organized intermediary groups

that are independent of the family, the market and

the state. The strength of local civil society refers to

the number and total membership of non-governmen-

tal, legally accepted organizations that are active in

the municipality.

Expected direct effects Policy-making, implementation, responsiveness,

on performances democracy

Expected effects on Political participation, civicness, the sense of communi-

intervening variables ty; representatives’ competence, democracy, and social

capital


Measures The number of civil society organizations active in the

municipality per 1000 inhabitants

The proportion of inhabitants active in civil society

organizations

The total time spent on activities in local civil organiza-

tions per inhabitant

Data source Official statistics and citizen survey

34

After enumerating seven potentially positive effects found in the optimistic lit-

erature, one must admit that civil society may also have a negative influence on

government performance. The same organizational capacity can be used to siphon

off public resources and undermine local government performance. To assess the

actual impact, other characteristics of civil society should be taken into consider-

ation. One of them, cleavages, will be discussed later.

The size distribution of local civil society influences the actual role it plays.

Where a big and well-organized NGO dominates the field, one cannot expect to

find equivalent success among all organizations. The biggest organization will in

all probability put forward its claims as the voice of the local society and distort

the allocation of public resources. The aforementioned positive effects will not

materialize at best or will hinder local government performance at worst.

Another important feature of local civic organizations is their inclusiveness. The

same ties that promote the interests of the civil organization allow for the exclu-

sion of outsiders from a certain sphere of local life. Such an organization does

not produce civic values, weakens the sense of community, hinders interest-for-

mation and the flow of correct information. What is expected to be positive in

the case of inclusive organizations turns into negative in the case of organizations

based on exclusion.

Variable name Size distribution of local civil society

Definition The size distribution of local civil society refers to the

relative shares of local organizations in the civil sector.

The more unbalanced the size distribution, the higher

value of the variable.



Expected effects on Inclusiveness of local civil society, political

intervening variables participation, civicness, the sense of community;

representatives’ competence, democracy, and social

capital


Measures The number of local civil organizations that have

more than 30% of the total membership in local

civil organizations


35

Finally, a direct effect of civil society is executed by civil organizations purpose-

fully designed to improve local government performance. Human rights groups

or tax reform movements provide information and opinions independent of gov-

ernmental information and opinions. Local development groups or the associa-

tions that provide public services also have more direct influence on local gov-

ernments. Although all civil society activities may produce civic values and skilled

leaders, political actions especially make the contributions formulated in the seven

points above. One should consider the political activity of local civil organi-

zations as a separate variable.

Variable name Inclusiveness of local civil society

Definition The inclusiveness of local civil society refers to the

members’ values toward outsiders.



Expected effects on Political participation, civicness, the sense of

intervening variables community; representatives’ competence, democracy,

and social capital

The variable influenced by Size distribution

Measures Civicness of the respondents with NGO membership

Data source Citizen survey

Variable name The political activity of local civil organizations

Definition This concept includes the activity of local civil

organizations to monitor local government, lobby

for policies and participate in policy implementation.



Expected effects on Political participation, civicness, the sense of

intervening variables community; representatives’ competence, democracy,

and social capital


Measures The number of formal policy proposals of local civil

organizations

Local representatives’ reports on the lobbying of civil

organizations

The political activities of citizens with NGO member-

ship in their organizations

Data source Local government survey, local officials survey and

citizen survey

36

2.2.3. Local Media

Local media is one of the key facilitators of lively communication between citi-

zens and governments, and other actors of local policy making. Local media refers

to electronic or printed products that are regularly published and have coverage

on local issues.

Obviously, the regularity and coverage of local information and the total audi-

ence are very important characteristics of media. The variable called the size of

local media includes these features as an index. The total coverage and audi-

ence have an obvious impact on the information-flow between local governments

and their constituencies. Discussing local problems and providing forums for the

public claims of various societal groups and organizations, the size of the local

media is likely to correlate positively with horizontal interest-formation. Both clear

interests and information increase policy performance and responsiveness. Through

the articulation and aggregation of interests, local media may also motivate peo-

ple in the same position and with similar ideas to organize themselves in civic

organizations. As an effective means of social control, the media effectively and

regularly press decision-makers to publicly explain and justify their acts. Local

media actors are consequently hypothesized to enhance vertical accountability

between local politicians and their voters by monitoring, interpreting and eval-

uating political utterances, decisions and events. This promotes the realization of

democratic norms and responsiveness in local government.

Variable name Size of local media

Definition The concept of local media size refers to the audience

reached by local media and their total coverage on

local political issues.

Expected direct effects Policy-making, responsiveness, democracy

on performances

Expected effects on Political participation, the size of civil society, policy

intervening variables congruence


Measures Audience of pressed media, self-reported by citizens

Audience of TV and radio channels, self-reported by

citizens

The total hours of local programs in electronic media

per month

The total number of pages covering local issues in

printed media

Data source Local government survey and citizen survey

37

Thus, local media has a vertical as well as a horizontal impact. However, this

effect depends on the internal structure of the public sphere. The openness and

fairness of local media in providing information for all major actors and issues,

decisions, implementations and conflicts are also indispensable for well function-

ing governance. The diversity of local media refers to the opportunity of local

citizens to use alternative information sources. Knowing the size of local media is

not enough to asses its influence. Media monopolized by specific interest groups

tends to provide more biased and less reliable information. The existence or lack

of independent media sources interacts with the size of the local media. The poten-

tially beneficial effects of local media described above are realized only if there is

no monopoly in the public sphere. For example, a balanced and diversified media

market is obviously more effective in holding local politicians accountable for their

actions than the one that is dominated by a single medium with its political con-

nections and beliefs. The same interactions apply to the relationships between

information flow, the formation of interests and local civil society.

Variable name Diversity of local media

Definition The diversity of local media refers to the number of

locally available information sources that have regular

coverage on local issues and are independent of each

other.

Expected direct effects Policy-making, responsiveness, democracy

on performances

Expected effects on Political participation, the size of civil society, policy

intervening variables congruence


Measures The number of locally available information sources

that have regular coverage on local issues and are inde-

pendent of each other

Data source Local government survey, local officials survey and

citizen survey

38

2.3. Local Political Culture

2.3.1. Citizen Participation in Local Politics

Participation is the way in which people attempt to assert their claims on public

issues. The concept covers not only voting but engagement in electoral cam-

paigns, petitions, political meetings, demonstrations, etc.

The participation of citizens in local elections is a crucial condition for democ-

ratic governance. Participation expresses opinion on the achievements of incum-

bent leaders as well as general trust in local governments. The variable of polit-

ical participation includes the following activities:

· Turnout at local elections is the most easily quantifiable and most common

measure of citizen participation.

· Electoral campaigns also offer an opportunity for political participation. This

may be especially lasting if the participants continue to be active after the

elections.

· Citizens may give voice to their concerns or interests by forming action groups

or initiating specific issue-related actions, besides or outside the activity of

classical NGOs. These actions certainly demonstrate the willingness of the

local community to express its opinion on local issues. Quantifiable measures

might be the number of action groups, or citizens’ actions during a particu-

lar period.

· Citizens may express their opinions and interests, especially in periods between

two elections, by making formal inquires to councillors and committees (e.g.

written inquiries that put some recommendations on the table or ask for

information related to some local policy issues).

· Local governments often organize forums to learn about citizens’ opinions

on local issues. Parties also hold meetings to influence local public opinion

or propagate their candidates. Participation in political events organized by

local government and local political forces is measured by citizen survey

questions.

All of these forms of participation contribute to the information-flow and the artic-

ulation of local interests and demonstrates the level of support for these inter-

ests. Thus, the degree of participation in such political events may have a posi-

tive correlation with policy-making and implementation. Moreover, political

participation enhances vertical accountability, which improves the responsiveness

of the local government. If the character of the demands of participating citizens

39

and groups are democratic, political participation also contributes to the demo-

cratic performance of the local government. This directs attention to citizens’ polit-

ical values.

2.3.2. Citizens’ Political Culture

An informed and interested citizenry is more likely to press local government

towards a more responsive and democratic operation by making it more account-

able. Political competence and the interest in politics are together called politi-

cal sophistication. Uninterested, parochial citizens do not reveal their prefer-

ences and do nothing to influence public decisions. Thus, a certain level of political

interest is necessary to make democracy work. The degree to which local leaders

and the activities of local governments are known for the average citizens is also

important. Knowledge does not necessarily induce participation in elections and

decision making processes, but it is the preliminary condition for any participa-

tion. Hence, citizens’ interest and competence in politics may exert an effect on

local government performance through participation. Citizens’ competence and

interest in local politics have a mutual relationship with political participation in

local political activities. According to modernization theory, political sophistica-

tion is influenced by the socio-economic development of the municipality.

Variable name Citizen participation in local politics

Definition Political participation is the way in which people try to

assert their claims on public issues.

Effects on performances Policy-making, effectiveness, responsiveness,

democracy

Effects on intervening

variables

The variable influenced by Size of civil society, participatory political values

Measures Local election turnout

Number of participants in electoral campaigns

Number of significant non-institutionalized, grass-root

actions

Formal inquires to councillors by individual citizens

Number of participants in political events

Data source Citizen survey, election data

40

Many concepts are incorporated under the heading “civicness”. The term includes

or implies the accommodation of difference, i.e., tolerance for those who defend

different interests and values; pragmatism, i.e., thinking and acting in a flexible

way; a willingness to bargain and reach a compromise; political restraint as

opposed to extremism; openness to new ideas; respect for equality; and, last but

not least, a sense of trust in other political actors. The interrelationships among

these concepts is likely to be both complex and strong; this is the reason why

they are collected under a collective term. Interpersonal civicness facilitates coop-

eration among citizens. This is the basis of social participation (civil society) as

well political participation. The relationship is mutual, however. Social and polit-

ical participation further general civicness in the local community. According to

some democratic theories, civicness spills over to the level of the political élite.

Modernization theory claims that the level of socio-economic development influ-

ences tolerance, pragmatism and such values. Civicness is measured by survey

questions.

Variable name Citizens’ political sophistication

Definition Citizens’ political sophistication refers to the political

skills and knowledge local citizens have and the atten-

tion they pay to local political events.

Expected direct effects

on performances

Expected effects on Political participation


The variable influenced by Socioeconomic development of the municipality

Measures Attitude questions


Variable name Citizens’ civicness

Definition Civicness refers to political values and norms such as

the accommodation of different, tolerance, willingness

to compromise, and trust.

Expected direct effects Democracy

on performances

Expected effects on Civicness of the representatives, the size of civil society,

intervening variables political participation

The variable influenced by The sense of community, the size of civil society,

political participation, socio-economic development



41

Legitimacy is defined here as the degree to which the institutions of a politi-

cal system are seen by citizens as morally justifiable. The opponents of democ-

racy and/or the local government system are less likely to comply with local gov-

ernment decisions and collaborate in implementing them. Legitimacy is enhanced

by good previous performance on the part of the local government system, the

level of devolution, and the distance from the older democracies of the West. A

belief in the legitimacy of the democratic system implies democratic values.

Legitimacy of the political system does not necessarily result in trust in actual

leaders of local government. Distrust in local politicians makes local government

decision-making and implementation less effective by hampering information

flow, demand-making, and collaboration with local government. The level of ver-

tical trust is influenced by the previous performance of the local government, the

physical accessibility and social capital of representatives.

Variable name Legitimacy of the political system

Definition Legitimacy is the degree to which the institutions of a

political system are seen by citizens as morally justifiable.

Expected direct effects Policy-implementation

on performances

Expected effects on Political participation, democratic values


The variable influenced by Previous performance of the local government system,

the level of devolution, the distance from the older

democracies of the West



Variable name Trust in actual leaders

Definition Trust in actual leaders is citizens’ belief that local elect-

ed leaders do the right things.

Expected direct effects Policy-making and implementation

on performances

Expected effects on Political participation, democratic values


The variable influenced by Previous performance of the local government, the

voter-representative ratio and the social capital of

representatives



42

The sense of belonging is the feeling of solidarity among the residents of a

settlement. The concept includes a common local identity. Such a common iden-

tity may improve moderation and, consequently, cooperation among local polit-

ical actors. Binding ties among local people enhances policy effectiveness because

people are more willing to collaborate with their local government and comply

its rules. The feeling of common identity promotes fairness towards ordinary cit-

izens. The sense of community is measured by attitude questions in the citizen

survey.

2.3.3. Representatives’ political culture

Good political cooperation among local politicians is crucial for the effectiveness

of decision-making. Deep political cleavages among elite factions, distrust among

individual politicians and a general atmosphere of hostility hampers policy-mak-

ing to a considerable degree. Civicness among local representatives greatly

facilitates cooperation within local government. The concept of civicness com-

prises the representatives’ values and norms concerning their interpersonal and

intergroup relationships. These values are the accommodation of difference, tol-

erance, willingness to compromise, and trust. Collective action is lubricated by

intra-élite trust and tolerance. Trusting political actors that are ready to compro-

mise are less constrained to monitor each other, save much energy for coopera-

tion and reduce decisional transaction costs. Civicness is measured by survey ques-

tions in the elite questionnaire. It is influenced by the civicness of the general

public and the sense of community among people in the municipality and the

size of the civil society sector.

Variable name The sense of belonging

Definition The sense of belonging refers to the common local

identity that emotionally binds local people to their

community.

Expected direct effects Effectiveness, democracy

on performances

Expected effects Civicness, the size of civil society, political participation

on intervening variables

The variable influenced by The size of civil society, political participation



43

Another dimension of elite political culture that is important from the viewpoint of

the research project is representatives’ democratic values and norms. While civic-

ness refers to the horizontal relationships among the elected, democratic norms

and values refer to the vertical relationship between voters and their representa-

tives. Democratic values and norms mean the representatives’ belief in the impor-

tance of citizens’ participation in local politics even between two elections (as opposed

to an elitist or technocratic vision) and a great emphasis on fairness and justice. In

all probability, civic leaders are more likely to treat citizens in a democratic man-

ner. These values are conducive to responsiveness as well. The measurement is

based on the survey among local government representatives. The democracy of

élite values is expected to be influenced by the size and character of civil society

and the local media, the potentially democratic actors of the local society.

Variable name Democratic values and norms

Definition Democratic values and norms refers to the representa-

tives’ belief in the importance of citizens’ participation

in local politics even between two elections and a

great emphasis on fairness and justice.

Expected direct effects Responsiveness, democracy

on performances

Expected effects on


The variable influenced by Citizens’ democratic political culture, the size of civil

society and local media, party composition of the

representative body


Data source Local representatives survey

Variable name Civicness of representatives

Definition Civicness of the representatives refers to the elected

officials’ political values such as the accommodation of

different, tolerance, willingness to compromise, and trust.

Expected direct effects Policy and democratic performance

on performances

Expected effects on


The variable influenced by General civicness, the sense of community, the size

of the civil society sector, party composition of the

representative body



44

A very important feature of any kind of representation is the extent to which

the policy preferences of representatives are congruent with the preferences of

the represented. Policy congruence means a consonance between voters and

their leaders’ policy preferences. It illustrates the degree to which local repre-

sentatives are able to recognize their constituency’s demands and/or convince

local citizens of the soundness of their judgments. The precondition of good

responsiveness is a congruence between leaders and voters’ preferences. Policy

congruence is influenced by the level of political participation in the municipal-

ity. It is measured by a comparison between citizens and representatives’ respons-

es to questions about the most important problems of the municipality and their

expenditure preferences concerning some policy areas.

The more the local representatives are rooted in the local society, the more like-

ly it is that they know their constituency’s needs and can involve local people in

the programs of the local government. The better information-flow and the greater

chance of vertical cooperation promote both the policy-making and implemen-

tation of the local government. In addition, the representatives’ deeper embed-

dedness may further the local government’s responsiveness. Both the better recog-

nition of local interests and the stronger vertical accountability stemming from

the shorter distance of local leaders tend to generate enhanced responsiveness.

The concept of social capital is used in the narrower sense here. It refers to the

embeddedness of local representatives in formal and informal networks and orga-

nizations (NGOs) in local society. The measures are the number of representa-

tives’ social connections and formal memberships. A larger civil sector may influ-

ence the social capital of representatives in a positive direction.

Variable name Preference congruence

Definition The concept of preference congruence refers to the

consonance between voters and their leaders’

policy preferences.


on performances

Expected effects on


The variable influenced by Political participation, representatives’ social capital,

the voter/leader ratio, size of the municipality

Measures The most important problems of the municipality

Expenditure preferences concerning some policy areas.

Data source Local representatives and citizen surveys

45

Better leaders produce better policies. The competence of local representa-

tives is crucial in the policy-making process. Skilled, experienced leaders with a

broad general knowledge about the political-administrative issues of local gov-

ernments are more prepared to make careful decisions. The level of competence

is measured by questions in the representatives survey about respondents’ fam-

ily background, academic qualifications, special political training and previous

political, administrative and civil society experience.

Variable name Social capital of representatives

Definition The social capital of representatives refers to the

embeddedness of local representatives in formal and

informal networks and organizations in the local society.

Expected direct effects Responsiveness, democracy

on performances

Expected effects on Policy congruence between leaders and voters


The variable influenced by Size of civil society

Measures The number and frequency of representatives’

informal social connections

Representatives’ formal memberships


Variable name Competence of representatives

Definition The concept of the competence of representatives

refers to the political and administrative education,

skills, training, and experience of the elected local

government officials.

Expected direct effects policy-making

on performances

Expected effects on


The variable influenced by Municipality size, socioeconomic development of the

municipality

Measures Questions about the respondent’s family background,

academic qualifications, special political training and

previous political, administrative and civil society

experience


46

2.4. Characteristics of the municipality

2.4.1. Size

The appropriate size of local governments has been the subject of long debates

in countries facing public administration reform. This practical problem has

inspired an important body of theoretical and empirical research, which suggests

several possible relationships between municipality size and local government

performance.

The most conventional argument points at the existence of economies of scale.

In larger units, more institutional services are available (since there is a threshold

for the provision of services) and services are more efficient (since there is a neg-

ative relationship between the amount and the unit cost of production). Provid-

ing more and better services satisfies citizens more and better. Increasing size is

expected in this perspective to imply higher responsiveness. An efficient service

provision also bolsters the chance of implementing policies. In grater munici-

palities, the administrative staff also tends to be larger and more competent. A

large and professional administration improves effectiveness, as it is elaborated

on earlier.

The opposite approach argues that smaller political systems are more respon-

sive. Even if the production of services is cheaper in larger units, their provision

provides more satisfaction for people in smaller communities. In small places, the

congruence between the preferences of citizens and their representatives is bet-

ter because both the voter-leader ratio (representatives are physically closer to

their voters) and the complexity of issues is lower.

Another intervening variable is heterogeneity. While majority preferences are

more likely to be dominant in smaller communities, larger units are more het-

erogeneous and local politicians are more constrained to take minority prefer-

ences into account. This decreases the chance of achieving legitimate agree-

ments.

Political participation is also affected by municipality size, although the direc-

tion of the effect is unclear. Greater local units control more aspects of citizens’

lives; they, therefore, have more incentives to participate. Furthermore, collec-

tive and more effective forms of political participation (political parties with more

organizational capacity) are more likely to be organized in larger communities.

Local civil society and media also tend to be larger in bigger municipalities, which

are conducive to the responsiveness and democracy of the local government. In

smaller units, nonetheless, citizens are more aware of the fact that bureaucracies

can be controlled and, hence, that their personal responsibility is higher. The

47

lower complexity also contributes to citizens’ relative competence, i.e. sophisti-

cation. Thus, participation is expected to be stronger and more frequent in small-

er municipalities (though not through formal organizations).

2.4.2. Socioeconomic development

The largest school of empirical democratic research has up to now been mod-

ernization theory. The basic tenet of this perspective is that an overall transfor-

mation, in which economic, social, and political changes (e.g. industrialization,

urbanization, migration, and democratization) coherently go together, is the mas-

ter process of our age. This transformation is basically the same everywhere and

occurs through evolutionary stages. Consequently, societies can be placed on a

development scale and their futures can, to some degree, be predicted. Empiri-

cally, the evidence to which the proponents of this approach most frequently

refer is a high and significant correlation between the level of democracy and the

level of socioeconomic development.

The research on the relationship between socioeconomic development and

the degree of democracy has brought some variables to the forefront. Develop-

ment is typically measured by economic development, educational level, urban-

ization, geographic and social mobility, industrial production, and health care.

Not all of these indicators can usefully be interpreted in the case of East Central

European local communities in the 1990s. The level of urbanization does not

make sense concerning localities and the rate of mobility does not express much

in a within-country comparison at the end of the 20th century. There are three

Variable name Municipality size

Definition Municipality size is the number of inhabitants living

permanently in the municipality.

Expected direct effects Responsiveness, policy-formulation and

on performances implementation

Expected effects on The size of the administrative staff, heterogeneity,

intervening variables voter-leader ratio, preference congruence, political

sophistication, the size of local civil society and media,

the organizational capacity of political parties


Measures The number of inhabitants living permanently in the

municipality

Data source Official statistics

48

relevant measures which can be used in local governments: economic develop-

ment, infant mortality and the level of education. The level of economic devel-

opment is measured as the income of both local firms and citizens. To measure

the degree of adaptation to new challenges, internet consumption is added as a

fourth indicator of socioeconomic development.

To explain the well-established correlation between the levels of democra-

tic and economic developments, students of empirical democratic theory

attempted to identify specific causal mechanisms and theoretically explain the

correlation between several intervening variables. Although these theories

have frequently been criticized for the poverty of convincing specification of

causality, their explanations suggest some testable hypotheses for our research

design.

Higher levels of education, the wealth that makes it easier to resolve conflicts

over the distribution of income, and a wider middle class strengthen tolerance,

moderation and the avoidance of extremism. This is what this project calls civic-

ness and theorizes as an intervening variable with large effects on local govern-

ment performance.

Economic and social development leads to the expansion of newspapers, radio,

and TV, i.e. a wider local media. The increasing media exposure makes people

more interested in politics, and more familiar with political phenomena. More

sophisticated citizens, then, take part in democratic policy-making; in the form

of electoral turnout, deeper commitment to political activities within and outside

formal political organizations. Sophistication, civicness, and media are in a mutu-

ally supportive relationship with the size of civil society. Consequently, political

sophistication and the size of the media and civil society are also influenced by

socioeconomic development.

Variable name Socioeconomic development

Definition Socioeconomic development refers to the state of eco-

nomic growth and social structure.


on performances

Expected effects on Political sophistication, civicness, the size of civil

intervening variables society and media, political participation, total

income of the local government


Measures The average yearly income of individuals

The total income of local firms per inhabitant

Infant mortality per 1000 births

The percentage of university graduates


49

2.4.3. Inequalities

Inequality is defined as the degree to which income or wealth is unevenly dis-

tributed among individuals. Economic and social resources can easily be trans-

formed into political resources. If these resources are extremely unevenly dis-

tributed, certain individuals or groups have greater opportunities to assert their

claims. This leads to extensive hierarchies of patron-client relationships, distort-

ing the democratic nature of political participation, local media and civil society.

In addition, the perception of inequality decreases the sense of community and

civicness among local people. This also has a negative impact on local govern-

ment performance.

Objective inequalities, however, do not necessarily harm democracy. If a gov-

ernment can detect and respond to inequalities, it may even gain allegiance. If,

on the other hand, people do not recognize inequalities or regard them as legit-

imate (a problem of culture and socialization) or do not articulate them in the polit-

ical sphere, objective inequalities do not become political problems. Furthermore,

different social strata have different sensitivities to inequality in different situa-

tions. This is the reason why the perception of inequalities is also surveyed.

Inequality is assessed by the ratio between the number of people in the high-

est income category and those in the lowest. The subjective inequality, i.e. the

tensions and frustrations caused by the perception of objective inequality as ille-

gitimate is measured by questions on the mass survey.

The way in which local society is organized influences political life. Vertical polit-

ical clientelism hinders, while horizontal cooperation facilitates collective action,

which, in turn, is conducive to good local government performance. The patron-

Variable name Social inequalities

Definition Inequality is the degree to which income or wealth is

unevenly distributed among individuals.


on performances

Expected effects on Civicness, the size of civil society and media, political

intervening variables participation, sense of community


Measures The ratio between the number of people in the

highest income category and those in the lowest

Questions about perceived inequalities


50

client relationships in local society are deeply undemocratic, decreasing the

chance of democratic local government performance. There is an inverse and

mutual relationship between vertical social dependence, on the on hand, and

horizontal cooperation in civil society organizations and political cooperation in

participation, on the other hand.

2.4.4. Heterogeneity and cleavages

Heterogeneity is the extent to which the population of a community is composed

of different groups. The more divided a population, the less homogeneous it is.

Heterogeneity increases the difficulty of finding social and political coalitions that

can form a majority backing specific policies. Homogeneity, on the contrary,

tends to enhance cooperation among stakeholders, which is crucial to the achieve-

ment of legitimate agreements, i.e. successful policy-making. A more homoge-

neous public can also be satisfied more easily. Local government responsiveness

is likely to be better in a more homogenous community. The local government

can be fair and just, i.e. democratic, in a more homogenous environment.

Heterogeneity or fragmentation is operationalized as the probability that two

randomly selected individuals will belong to different groups. The index ranges

between 0 (total homogeneity) and 1 (complete heterogeneity). The measures

include ethnic, religious, political, territorial, and sector distributions.

Variable name The patron-client relationships in local society

Definition The patron-client relationships in local society refer

to the vertical organization of local society, which

involves personal dependence between ordinary

and influential people.

Expected direct effects Policy-making (-) and implementation(-), democracy (-)

on performances

Expected effects on Civicness of the representatives, the size of civil society,

intervening variables political participation, the sense of community

The variable influenced by The size of civil society, political participation

Measures Attitude questions about the importance of influential

people in life success


51

Cleavages in local society are demarcation lines between societal segments. Peo-

ple belonging to a segment live their lives within the segment’s cultural and polit-

ical institutions. Cleavages are difficult to reverse. Sharp divides between reli-

giously or ethnically defined segments often yield hostile conflicts and an inability

to cooperate. The potential outcome of both high heterogeneity and sharp cleav-

ages is a high level of social conflict, which can spill over into politics. The lack

of cooperation among elite and citizen groups tends to decrease the effective-

ness of local government policy-making and implementation. This variable inter-

acts with many other variables and makes their effect on local government per-

formance negative. For example, civil society is usually beneficial to local

democracy and local government performance. In the presence of deep cleav-

ages, as the example of Northern Ireland demonstrates, parallel civil societies are

the sources of mutual hostility, distrust, uncivicness – and serious and permanent

problems with democracy, responsiveness, decision-making and implementation.

Variable name Heterogeneity

Definition Heterogeneity is the extent to which the population

of a community is composed of different groups.

Expected direct effects Policy-making (-) and implementation(-), democracy (-)

on performances

Expected effects on The sense of community



Measures The fragmentation of the population with respect to

ethnicity

The fragmentation of the population regarding

denominations

The fragmentation of the population in its voting

for party lists during general elections

The fragmentation of the population between people

living in housing estates, outer areas, the center, and

the green belts

The division of the population between people living

in geographically or historically separated quarters

The division of the population between people

working in the public and the private sector


52

2.4.5. History and Administrative Status

Historic events often create specific community and political cultures. There are

types of settlements that can be taken into consideration (e.g. new cities having

emerged from pre-communist or communist-led industrialization, older bour-

geois towns, suburban settlements, etc.). Different histories may produce differ-

ent local societies with differing local government performance.

The age of the community may have an effect on the sense of community.

The older the community, the stronger is the sense of belonging within it. The

age of the municipality is measured by the elapsed time from when it first formed

an administrative unit, and the changes in population size in the last 50 years.

Variable name Cleavages

Definition Cleavages are sharp socio-cultural lines between large

segments of local society.

Expected direct effects Policy-making, implementation, democracy

on performances

Expected effects on Civicness, the size of civil society, political participa-

intervening variables tion, the sense of belonging to the local community

The variable influenced by The sense of belonging to the local community



Variable name Historical types

Definition The concept of historical types refers to the classifica-

tion of municipalities according to their historical path.


on performances

Expected effects on The sense of community, representatives’ and citizens’

intervening variables political culture


Measures A typology of municipality history

Data source Historical data

53

In some countries, the administrative category of the municipality determines

its opportunities. The administrative category forms a variable (capital, city with

special rights, city, town, village etc.). Empirical research should clarify the impor-

tance of this variable. The source of the data is simply the official categorization

of public administration.

2.4.6. Geography

Geography may influence local political and social life in various ways. The coun-

try in which the local government can be found is obviously an important vari-

able. Regionalism is also substantial in most East Central European countries.

These geographic units have different historical experiences and social histories,

which may result in different political cultures and socio-economic structures. The

Variable name Age of the community

Definition The age of the community is the time passed since the

formation of the local society.


on performances

Expected effects on The sense of community



Measures The time since the territory formed an administrative

unit; changes in the number of inhabitants in the last

50 years

Data source Historical data

Variable name Administrative status

Definition The administrative status is the official categorization

of the municipality.


on performances

Expected effects on Dependence on state resources, leader/voter ratio



Measures Category of the municipality

Data source Official data

54

user-friendliness and intuitive importance of these variables encourage their inclu-

sion in the research project.

Municipalities closer to more democratic regions have more frequent economic

and cultural contacts with democracies and develop democratic values. Distance

from the Western democracies may have an effect on the diffusion of politi-

cal ideas and administrative methods. The closeness to the older democracies is

hypothesised to promote tolerance and participatory values among citizens as

well as politicians. Closeness might also help to adopt the latest ideas of effective

town management. Finally, more frequent contacts with the West may urge cit-

izens and their representatives to catch up with the attractive life of Western local-

ities. The variable is measured by the distance of the municipality from the cap-

ital of the closest Western democracy.

Variable name Position in a larger geographical unit

Definition Position in a larger geographical unit refers to the

country and region in which the municipality can be

found.


on performances

Expected effects on Representatives’ and citizens’ political culture



Measures The position of the municipality in a larger geograp-

hical unit

Data source Official data

Variable name Distance from the Western democracies

Definition The variable refers to the closeness of the munici/

pality to the Western democracies.


on performances

Expected effects on Representatives’ and citizens’ political culture



Measures The distance of the municipality from the capital of

the closest Western democracy

Data source Map

55

Distance from the capital or other big city often has significance: the clos-

er the city, the easier is the access to new ideas, but the more limited local auton-

omy is likely to be. The quick diffusion of innovations from the city with acade-

mic institutions and a wider intellectual stratum further the effectiveness of the

local government. Distance is measured simply on the map. Dependence on a

neighbouring city, on the other hand, has a negative impact on responsiveness

because local decision-makers have to take too many external interests into

account. This distracts the attention of local political leaders from the demands

of local citizens. Dependence also limits the municipality’s room to manoeuvre

in setting and implementing goals, which hinders policy-making and imple-

mentation. Dependence on a neighbouring city is indicated by the number of

commuters.

Variable name Dependence on a larger municipality

Definition Dependence on a larger municipality is the extent to

which the opportunities of the municipality relies on

the situation in another municipality.

Expected direct effects Responsiveness, policy-making and implementation

on performances

Expected effects on



Measures The distance of the municipality from the nearest city

The number of commuters to the neighboring city

Data source Map, citizen survey

56

PART II

THE LOCAL DEMOCRACY REPORTS SUBPROJECT

Part I of this paper conceptualized several variables that may influence the polit-

ical performance of local governments. The Indicators of Local Democratic Gov-

ernance project, however, has other goals as well: the establishment of a data-

base available to experts with different backgrounds and the regular publication

of country reports to characterize the state of local democracy in Central and East-

ern Europe. Part II proposes an outline for country reports, based on a grouped

list of indicators

The aim of the report is to characterize local governments and local democra-

cy in the region. A set of indicators (indices) serves as a tool with which to pro-

file the countries’ local governance. This report is primarily a political analysis

concentrating on the political performance of local governments, their relation-

ship with the environment, and the state of local civil society (media and NGOs).

Its main focus, consequently, is on the situation at the local level and not on the

relationship between different tiers of public administration (which does not

exclude some general indicators on the legal-institutional situation). This first

report is more static, however subsequent reports published annually will also

cover the progress made by the surveyed countries.

Country reports consist of five sections. Each section discusses a group of indica-

tors that feature an important dimension of local governance. All the indicators are

presented in an aggregated format to characterize the whole country in a compa-

rable way. Frequency tables by background variables help the analysis on a sub-

national level. Indicator data is always broken down into five background variables:

· size of the municipality (understood as the number of inhabitants);

· geographical position (region, distance from the capital and the country’s

Western border);

· legal status of the local government (village, town, city with county rights,

capital district, etc.);

· the heterogeneity of local society (social, ethnic and religious divisions);

· the level of socio-economic development (composed of statistical data).

Some indicators in the country reports have an official source (statistics, adminis-

trative data, etc.). In most cases, the presented data was gathered by a four-coun-

try survey organized within the framework of the project. Nonetheless, the inter-

57

pretation of survey results is always based on additional data and research from

other, “external” sources. Most indicators are composed of several measures.

The structure of country reports differ from that of the research project outlined

in Part I, since the goal of reports also differs from that of the local government

performance sub-project. While the LGP subproject is an explanation-centered

research agenda, country reports provide an evaluative description of the current

conditions of local democracy, largely based on new and original data.

The following chapters are planned in country reports.

I. Central-Local Relationship

This section is the only one that deals with the relationship between central and

local governments. Two indicators characterize the degree to which powers and

resources are transferred to local governments. Not only is the level of local auton-

omy important, however, but also the mechanisms through which the proper use

of jurisdictions and money is guaranteed by horizontal accountability to other

institutions. Two other indicators assess accountability. The four indicators belong-

ing to this section require the expertise of report writers and the methodology

of their measurement will be imported from other sources.

· Legal decentralization (jurisdictions devolved)

· Fiscal decentralization (resources distributed)

· Financial accountability (mechanisms of answerability and enforcement in

financial matters)

· Legal and administrative accountability (mechanisms of answerability and

enforcement in legal matters)

II. Administrative Features of Local Governments

This section deals with the administrative capacity of local government and the

place of the administration staff within the institution. Two indicators character-

ize the capacity of local administration in terms of sheer number and the quali-

ty of its workforce (measured by education). Another indicator assesses the strength

of the accountability of staff to the elected politicians (mayor and council) and

the accountability of the mayor to the council (or its board). The fourth indica-

tor gauges the formal and informal distribution of power among the main insti-

tutional players (council, mayor, and administration), measured by the central-

ization of powers in the hands of these actors.

58

· Quality of the administrative staff

· Size of the administrative staff

· Accountability mechanisms within local government

· Power distribution within local governments

III. Political Performance of Local Governments

This section concentrates on the capability of local governments to perform their

duties. The four indices used here feature four aspects of local government per-

formance. The indicator of decisional performance measures the capability of

local governments to set community goals and formulate policies. The indicator

of implementation performance assesses the capability of local governments to

effectively reach their policy objectives. The third indicator focuses on the insti-

tutional capability to respond to local people’s demands and satisfy citizens. The

indicator of democratic performance focuses on the capability of local govern-

ments to operate in an open and transparent way and treat citizens in a fair and

just manner. The local government survey organized within the project is the

source of all four indicators.

· Decisional performance

· Implementation performance (effectiveness)

· Responsiveness

· Democratic performance

IV. Characteristics of Local Representatives

This section characterizes local decision-makers by means of seven indicators. The

first three focus on representatives’ socio-demography: their belonging to reli-

gious or ethnic minorities, their social status (as a measure of micro-social repre-

sentation) and their membership in local civic groups. The fourth indicator also

deals with personal characteristics, but is more political: it assesses the political

experiences accumulated by and in local politicians. The indicator of civic culture

assesses the level of trust and tolerance among representatives. The next indica-

tor measures the rotation in the composition of the representative body. The last

two indicators present the degree to which local representatives belong to polit-

ical organizations: party membership and membership in council groups.

· Ethnic and religious distribution of local representatives

· Social distribution of local representatives

59

· Representatives’ embeddedness in local society

· Political experience of local representatives

· Civic culture of representatives

· Stability of local representatives

· Party composition of local government bodies

· Fragmentation of the representative bodies - factions and majority

V. Local Civil Society Organizations

The characterization of the social and political milieu of local governments begins

with this section, focusing on locally active NGOs. The relative number of local

NGOs (compared to the size of the population) is the first and most important

indicator in this section. The second indicator features the balanced or unbal-

anced nature of local civil sector, by measuring the relative shares of local NGOs

in terms of financial, organizational and mobilization capacity. The number of

political activities organized by NGOs, the next indicator, gauges the extent to

which local civil organizations are capable of holding local governments account-

able. As political parties form the link between civil society and government, the

measure of the strength of local political organizations is also discussed here.

· Density of local NGOs

· Size distribution of local NGOs

· The political activity of local NGOs

· Strength of local political organizations

VI. Local Media

Although the media is a part of civil society, its importance and specificity explains

why it is treated in a separate section. The first indicator focuses on the size of

local media, measured by the total audience reached by local media outlets. The

second indicator adds the information about the number of locally available

media sources that are independent of each other. The total coverage of local

media outlets is the next indicator. Finally, the measure of the capacity of the

local media in terms of the number of journalists is presented.

· Size of local media

· Diversity of local media

· Local coverage of media

· Organizational capacity of local media

60

VII. Local Political Culture and Participation

This section aims to grasp citizens’ political attitudes and behavior. The first two

indicators assess the level of local political participation. Its most easily quantifi-

able and most common indicator is the turnout at local elections. Our surveys

also try to gauge the institutionalized and non-institutionalized (grass-root) polit-

ical activities (demonstrations, petitions, etc.) at the local level. The other four

indicators focus on local political culture. One indicator is intended to assess the

level of citizens’ political knowledge on their local governments. Another one

measures the degree to which citizens accept civic values and norms such as the

accommodation of difference, tolerance, willingness to compromise, and trust.

The indicator of legitimacy concentrates on the degree to which citizens see the

institutions of democracy and the local government system as justifiable. The last

indicator assesses the strength of common local identity, which emotionally binds

local people to their community.

· Local election turnout

· Citizen participation in local politics

· Citizens’ political sophistication

· Civic culture

· Legitimacy of the system

· Localism (the sense of belonging)

Appendices

All country reports are followed by four appendices, which provide basic infor-

mation on the country’s local government system, the available sources in local

government studies, and the technical data of the surveys (sample, methodolo-

gy and the questionnaire).

· Appendix A: Information sheet on the local government system of the coun-

try

· Appendix B: Information sources in the country

· Appendix C: Sampled municipalities and survey methodology

· Appendix D: The questionnaire in the national language

In a book format, some of the appendices (e.g. the translations of the core

questionnaire) are unnecessary. The expected length of each country report is

80,000-100,000 characters.

Books published by LGI

Dimitrijevic, Nenad, ed. 2000. Managing Multiethnic Local Communities in the

Countries of the Former Yugoslavia. Budapest: LGI.

Guidebook to Proposal Writing in CEE and the Former Soviet Union ’99. Please

specify English or Russian version.

Horváth, Tamás M., ed. 2000. Comparative Papers, Volume 1, Decentralization,

Experiments and Reforms. Budapest: LGI.

Kimball, Jonathan D., ed. 1999. The Transfer of Power: Decentralization in Cen-

tral and Eastern Europe. Budapest: LGI.

Mlinar, Zdravko, ed. 2000. Local Development and Socio-spatial Organization.

Budapest: LGI.

Mlinar, Zdravko, ed. 2000. Local Development and Socio-spatial Organization.

Budapest: LGI.

Kovács, Petra; Bíró Annamária, eds., 2000. Diversity in Action. Local Public Man-

agement of Multi-Ethnic Communities in Central and Eastern Europe.

Budapest: LGI.

Studies

European Union Enlargement and the Open Society Agenda. Local Government

and Public Administration. Budapest: LGI.

Title: ...................... First Name: ...........................................................

Last Name: .................................... Position: .........................................

Institution:................................................................................................

Address: ...................................................................................................

City:.........................................................................................................

Post Code: ..................................... Country: .........................................

Phone:........................................... Fax: ................................................

E-mail: .....................................................................................................

Please indicate the publications you or your organization would like to order in

the margin with the number of copies next to the titles of your choice and fax

to (361) 327-3105.

LGIDocuments

LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND PUBLIC SERVICE REFORM INITIATIVE OPEN SOCIETY INSTITUTE

Nádor u. 11. 1051 Budapest, HungaryE-mail: [email protected] · www.osi.hu/lgi · Tel: (361) 327-3104 · Fax: (361) 327-3105

OSI

Local Governmentand Public ServiceReform Initiative

The Indicators of Democratic Local Governance project has been initi-

ated within the framework of the Fiscal Decentralization Initiative (FDI).

FDI is a consortium of major international organizations established

with a mission to assist transition economies implementing intergov-

ernmental reform. The project entitled Indicators for Decentralization

in CEE and fSU is one of the major endeavors of FDI that aims to estab-

lish a uniform framework for comparative local government analysis.

The main goal of the project is to develop a set of operational, flexi-

bile, and adaptable indicators based on internationally recognized def-

initions and to publish reports measuring the process of decentraliza-

tion in the target countries. The project has two arms: the Fiscal Design

Across Levels of Government project, managed by the OECD and the

Indicators of Democratic Local Governance project, managed by LGI.

To design the conceptual framework of Indicators of Democratic Local

Governance and carry out pilot research, LGI established a partnership

with Tocqueville Research Center (T-RC), Budapest.