indictment (public redacted version)rafik hariri) with premeditation by using explosive materials....

Case No:

Filed with: .I

Date of document:

Party filing:

Original language:

Type of doc~ment:

Filed by:

The Prosecutor

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'!.l!L 4.-WI ~ U .. SPECIAL TRIBUNAL FOR I fBANO"

TRIBUNAL SP£CIAL POUR LE LIRA"

BEFORE THE PRE-1RIAL JUDGE Special Tribunal for Lebanon

STL-11-01I11PTJ

Pre-Trial Judge

10 June 2011

The Prosecutor

English

CONFIDENTIAL AND EX PARTE

THE PROSECUTOR v.

MUSTAF A AMINE BADREDDINE, SALIM JAMIL A YY ASH,

HUSSEIN HASSAN ONEISSI & ASSAD HAS SAN SABRA

INDICTMENT

Distribution to:

The Registrar D.A. Bellemare, MSM, QC Mr. Herman von Hebel

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I. Preamble

I. The Prosecutor of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, pursuant to the authority

stipulated in Articles I and II of the Statute for the Special Tribunal for Lebanon,

charges under Articles 2 and 3 o( the Statute, and thereby under the Lebanese

Criminal Code l and the Lebanese Law of 11 January 1958 on 'Increasing the

penalties for sedition, civil war and interfaith struggle,2:

a. MUST AF A AMINE BADREDDINE, SALIM JAMIL AYY ASH, HUSSEIN

HASSAN ONEISSI, and ASSAD HASSAN SABRA, each and together with:

Count I - Conspiracy aimed at committing a Terrorist Act; and

b. MUST AFA AMINE BADREDDINE and SALIM JAMIL AYY ASH, each and

together with:

Count 2 - Committing a Terrorist Act by means of an explosive device;

Count 3 - Intentional Homicide (ef Rafik HARIRI) witb premeditation by

using explosive materials;

Count 4 - Intentional Homicide (of 21 persons in addition to the Intentional

Homicide of Rafik HARIRI) with premeditation by using explosive

materials;

Count 5 - Attempted Intentional Homicide (of 231 persons in addition to the

Intentional Homicide ofRafik HARIRI) with premeditation by using

explosive materials; and

I As translated from Arabic into English by the Languages Services Section of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon. 2 As translated /Tom Arabic into English by the Languages Services Section of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon.

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c. HUSSEIN HASSAN ONEISSI and ASS AD HASSAN SABRA, each and

together with:

Count 6 - Being an Accomplice to the felony of Committing a Terrorist Act

by means of an explosive device;

Count 7- Being an Accomplice to tbe felony of Intentional Homicide (of

Rafik HARIRI) with premeditation by using explosive materials;

Count 8 - Being an Accomplice to tbe felony oflntentional Homicide (of 21

persons in addition to the Intentional Homicide of Rafik HARlRI with

premeditation by using explosive materials; and

Count 9 - Being an Accomplice to the felony of Attempted Intentional

Homicide (of 231 persons in addition to the Intentional Homicide of

Rafik HARIRI) with premeditation by using explosive materials.

2. The Indictment contains the Prosecutor's allegations concerning the 14 February 2005

attack that killed Rafik HARIRI and 21 others and that resulted in injury to 231

others. As is the case in all criminal proceedings, the Accused are presumed innocent

until proven guilty in a court of law.

3. The case against the Accused is built in large part on circumstantial evidence.

Circumstantial evidence, which works logically by inference and deduction, is often

more reliable than direct evidence, which can suffer from first-hand memory loss or

eye-witness distortion. It is a recognised legal principle that circumstantial evidence

has similar weight and probative value as direct evidence and that circumstantial

evidence can be stronger than direct evidence.

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11. The Accused

4. Pursuant to Rule 68(D) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Special

Tribunal for Lebanon, the name and particulars of the Accused persons on this

indictment are as follows:

a. MUSTAFA AMINE BADREDDINE3 (BADREDDINE) (also known as

'Mustafa Youssef BADREDDINE', 'Sami ISSA' and 'Elias Fouad SAAB')

was born on 6 April 1961 in AI-Ghobeiry, Beirut, Lebanon. He is the son of

Amine BADREDDINE (father) and Fatima JEZEfNI (mother). His precise

address is not known, though he has been associated with: the property of Khalil

AI-Raii, Abdallah AI-Haij Street, AI-Ghobeiry, in South Beirut; and the AI-Jinan

Building, AI-Odaimi Street, Haret Hreik, in Beirut. He is a citizen of Lebanon.

His Lebanese civil registration number is 34I1AI-Ghobeiry. BADREDDINE,

under the alias 'Elias Fouad SAAB', was convicted in Kuwait for a series of

terrorist acts there on 12 December 1983, where inter alia suicide bombers drove

trucks loaded with explosives into the French and US embassies. He was

sentenced to death but he escaped from prison when Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990.

b. SALIM JAMIL A YY ASH4 (A YY ASH) was born on 10 November 1963 in

Harouf, Lebanon. He is the son of Jamil Dakhil A YY ASH (father) and Mahasen

[ssa SALAMEH (mother). He has resided inter alia at: AI-Jamous Street, Tabajah

building, Hadath, in South Beirut; and at the A YY ASH family compound in

Harouf, Nabatiyeh in South Lebanon. He is a citizen of Lebanon. His Lebanese

civil registration is 197/Harouf, his Haij passport number is 059386, and his social

security number is 63/690790.

c. HUSSEIN HASSAN ONEISSIs (ONEISSI) (also known as 'Hussein Hassan

ISSA') was born on 11 February 1974 in Beirut, Lebanon. He is the son of Has san

ONEISSI (also known as 'Hassan ISSA') (father) and Fatima DARWISH

(mother). He has resided in the Ahmad Abbas Building, at AI-Jamous St, near the

] fnArabic~.AI~\~ 4 fn Arabic ~~ ~~ s In Arabic~ u-c.»- . the birth name 'ISSA' having been changed to 'ONEISSI' by judicial declaration on 12 January 2004.

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Lycee des Arts, in Hadath, South Beirut. He is a citizen of Lebanon. His Lebanese

civil registration is 7/Shahour.

d. ASSAD HASSAN SABRA 6 (SABRA) was born on 15 October 1976 in Beirut,

Lebanon. He is the son of Hassan Tahan SABRA (father) and Leila SALEH

(mother). He has resided at apartment 2, 4111 floor, Building 28, Rue 58, in Hadath

3, South Beirut, also described as St. Therese Street, Hadath, in South Beirut. He

is a citizen of Lebanon. His Lebanese civil registration is 1339/Zqaq AI-Blat.

5. The four Accused participated in a conspiracy with others aimed at committing a

terrorist act to assassinate Rafik HARlRJ and their respective roles may be

summarised as follows: BADREDDINE served as the overall controller of the

operation; A YY ASH coordinated the assassination team, which was responsible for

the physical perpetration of the attack; ONEISSI and SABRA had the task of

preparing the false claim of responsibility, which served to identify the wrong people

to investigate, in order to shield the conspirators from justice. As participants in the

conspiracy, all four Accused played important roles in the attack on 14 February 2005

and therefore all four bear criminal responsibility for the results of the attack.

6 In Arabic, 1.Jf'"'I u- .a...l

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Ill. A Concise Statement of the Facts

6. The Prosecutor submits, pursuant to Rule 68(0) of the Rules of Procedure and

Evidence of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, that the following facts have been

ascertained during the ongoing investigation.

A. OVERVIEW

7. On 14 February 2005, at 12:55 on Rue Minet el Hos'n in Beirut, Rafik HARIRI, the

former Prime Minister of Lebanon, was assassinated as a result of a terrorist act in

which a suicide bomber detonated a large quantity of high explosives concealed in a

Mitsubishi Canter van. In addition to killing HARIRI, the explosion killed 21 other

persons (listed in Schedule A) and injured 231 persons (listed in Schedule B).

8. Shortly after the explosion, AI-Jazeera news network in Beirut received a video with a

letter attached on which a man named Ahmad ABU ADASS (ABU ADASS) falsely

claimed to be the suicide bomber on behalf of a fictional fundamentalist group called

. Victory and Jihad in Greater Syria'. The video was later broadcast on television.

B. RAFIK "ARIRI

9. Rafik Baha'eddine AL-HARIRI (HARIRI) was born on I November 1944 in the city

of Sidon, Lebanon. HARIRl served as Prime Minister of Lebanon in five

governments from 31 October 1992 to 4 December 1998, and from 26 October

2000 until his resignation on,26 October 2004.

10. From 20 October 2004 until his assassination, HARIRI was a Member of Parliament

and a prominent political figure in Lebanon. Upon resigning as Prime Minister in

2004, he started preparing for parliamentary elections to be held in June 2005.

11. In the morning of 14 February 2005, HA RI RI departed his residence at Quraitem

Palace, in West Beirut, to attend a session of Parliament, located at Place de l'EtoiJe,

Beirut.

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12. Shortly before 11 :00, HARIRI arrived at Parliament where he met with many

Members of Parliament, including his sister, MP Bahia HARJRJ, and MP Marwan

HAMADEH.

13. Shortly before 12:00, HARIRJ left Parliament to go to Cafe Place de l'Etoile, located

nearby where he stayed for approximately 45 minutes.

14. At about 12:45, HARIRl left the Cafe and asked his security detail to prepare the

convoy to go back to his residence for a lunch appointment.

15. At about 12:49, HA RI RI entered his armoured vehicle accompanied by MP Bassel

FULEIHAN and the convoy then departed the Place de l'Etoile. His security detail

had planned to drive back to Quraitem Palace along the coastal road.

16. Approximately 2 minutes ahead of the convoy, the Mitsubishi Canter van slowly

moved towards its final position on Rue Minet el Hos'n. As the convoy passed, the

suicide bomber detonated the explosives.

C. THE COMMUNICATIONS ANALYSIS

17. The evidence gathered throughout the investigation, including witness statements,

documentary evidence and Call Data Records (COR) for mobile phones in Lebanon

has led to the identification of some of the persons responsible for the attack on

HARlRI.

18. Call Data Records contain information such as incoming and outgoing phone

numbers, the date and time of a call, its duration, call type (whether voice or text

message), and the approximate location of mobile phones by reference to the cell

towers which carried a call.

1. MOBILE PHONE NETWORKS

19. Analysis of the COR has revealed the presence of a number of interconnected mobile

phone networks involved in the assassination of HARJRI. Each network consisted of

a group of phones, usually registered under false names, which had a high frequency

of contact with each other.

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20. There are two types of networks, which can be described either as:

a. 'covert networks' where members only call each other; or

b. 'open networks' where members sometimes call others outside the group.

21. The investigation identified five covert and open networks which have been colour-

coded as follows:

a. Red Network: a covert network used by the assassination team and consisting of

_hones (of which.ere particularly active) operational from 4 January 2005, "

Red Network Number

Sbort-Dame

until it ceased all activity 2 minutes before the attack on 14 February 2005. The

Red Network phones are listed below with their short-names:

b. Green Network: a group of. phones that formed a covert network from 13

October 2004 until it ceased all activity on 14 February 2005 about one hour

before the attack. Two of the Green Network phones were used to control and

coordinate the attack. The.Green Network phones were once part of a group of

.phones. Th~reen Network phones are listed below with their short-names:

Green Network Number

Short-name

c. Blue Phones: an open network consisting of.phones operational between

September 2004 and September 2005. Blue Phones were used by the

assassination team inter alia for preparation of the attack and for surveillance of

HARlRI.

d. Yellow Phones: an open network consisting of lip hones activated between 1999

and 2003 and operational until 7 January 2005. Yellow Phones were over time

mostly replaced by Blue Phone use.

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e. Purple Phones: an open network consisting of.a:onventionally used phones

activated before 2003 and operational until 15 or 16 February 2005. Purple

Phones were used to coordinate the false claim of responsibility.

22. Some users of the network phones carried and used multiple phones on the different

networks.

a. The analysis of COR shows many instances where a Red Network phone was

active at the same location, on the same date, and within the same timeframe as

other phones, including a Green Network phone and Blue Phones. It is

reasonable to conclude from these instances that one person is using mUltiple

phones together when over a significant period, the patterns of use for each phone

never deviate in an inexplicable manner, the phones are recorded by cell-towers as

being together over extensive geographical areas, and the phones do not contact

each other. This is called 'CO-LOCATION'.

b. For example,. Blue Phones co-located with. Red Network phones as

follows:

Blue Pbones

Blue Pbones short name Co-located Red Network

23. In addition, analysis of COR shows co-location between network phones and persona)

mobile phones (PMP).

a. A PMP is a phone used for day-to-day matters, including contact with family,

friends and legitimate business associates. In general, a PMP is therefore used to

make calls to people who do not behave in a covert manner and whose identity is

more easily traced.

b. By identifying and then investigating persons who have been in contact with a

PMP, the user of that PMP can be identified.

c. Identifying the user of a phone is called ' ATTRIBUTION'.

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24. Once network phones, subscribed under false names, are shown to be co-locating with

PMPs, then through attribution of a PMP, a person can ultimately be identified by co

location to be the user of a network phone.

2. THE RED NETWORK IS THE ASSASSINATION TEAM

25. The users of the Red Network,.,f whom were in the possession of a co-located

Blue phone, made up the assassination team that killed HARIRI. The _member

assassination team was led by AYYASH and the other.members of that team are

unidentified at present. The assassination team conducted surveillance and physically

carried out the attack. This can be reasonably concluded from the following:

a. The Red Network was covert in nature and functioned in an organised and

disciplined manner because:

i. Red Network users exclusively called each other;

11. AU"Red Network phones were activated in the Tripoli area within

30 minutes of each other on 4 January 2005 which shows that its activation

was coordinated;

Ill. The Red Network phones were all registered under false names; and

IV. Credit was added on all ofthe Red Network phones together in the Tripoli

area within 45 minutes of each other on 2 February 2005 which shows that

the addition of credit was coordinated.

b. The location and concomitant movement of Red Network phones and Blue

PhoDes shows surveillance on HARIRI on at least 15 days before l4 February

2005. Between 11 November 2004 and 14 February 2005, the concomitant

movement of the Red Network phones and co-locating Blue Phones, as

evidenced by the timing and location of calls, often coincided with:

I. the movements ofHARIRl; and

ii. locations relating to HARJRJ, such as his residence at Quraitem Palace in

Beirut or at his villa in Faqra.

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c. The co-located Blue Phones show association with the purchase of the Mitsubishi

Canter van which occurred in Tripoli on 25 January 2005.

d. It may be reasonably concluded that the activity of the Red Network phones on

14 February 2005 shows the execution of the attack on HARIRI because:

i. _fthe Red Network phones were active in Beirut;

ii. The movements of the Red Network phones reflect HARJRI's

movements, starting from the vicinity of his residence at Quraitem palace

in the morning, later moving to the vicinity of Parliament, and then to the

vicinity of the St. Georges Hotel where the attack took place;

iii. The final 33 calls made by the Red Network phones between 11 :00 and

12:53 were mostly in the vicinity of Parliament and the St. Georges Hotel;

iv. At 12:50 the user of a Red Network phone located in the vicinity of

Parliament called the user of a Red Network phone located in the vicinity

of the St. Georges Hotel at the same time as HARIRI left the area of

Parliament in his vehicle convoy which coincides with the Mitsubishi

Canter van moving into its final position for detonation.

e. All Red Network phones ceased use 2 minutes prior to the attack, by which time

the Mitsubishi Canter van had reached its final position. The phones were never

used again.

f. From paragraphs 25(a)-(e) above, it is reasonable to conclude that phone use in

the Red Network is inconsistent with innocent or coincidental communications

and shows instead a coordinated use of these phones to carry out the assassination.

Moreover, it is reasonable to conclude that the movement of the Mitsubishi Canter

van within 2 minutes of the arrival of the convoy cannot be coincidental and must

be the result ofa coordination, demonstrable in the Red Network usage, between

people observing the convoy and the person driving the van.

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3. IDENTIFICATION OF THE ACCUSED

26. Communications analysis, including co-location, witness statements and documentary

evidence, identified Mustafa Amine BADREDDINE, Salim Jamil A YY ASH,

Hussein Hassan ONEISSI and Assad Hassan SABRA, amongst others as yet

unidentified, as having different roles in the killing of HARlRI and others by a

terrorist act.

27. The Accused used various phones before, during and after the attack.

28. A YY ASH used, over time, at least 8 phones, including a phone in each of the Red

Network, Green Network, Blue Phones and Yellow Phones, and four PMPs.

a. His Red Network phone was

b. His Green Network phone

c. His Blue Phone was

d. His Yellow Phone was and

e. His 4 PMPs were:

i.

ii.

Hi. and

IV.

29. BADREDDINE used, over time, at least 8 phones, including one Green Network

phone and 7 PMPs.

a. His Green Network phone was and

b. His PMPs were:

i.

11.

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iii.

iv.

v.

vi. and

vii.

c. Analysis initially attributed some of the PMPs in paragraph 29(b) to a man named

'Sami ISSA'. Further communications analysis and investigation into 'Sami

ISSA' revealed that this was a false identity being used by BADREDDINE. It

can be reasonably concluded that the background of BADREDDINE as a man

experienced in committing terrorist acts corroborates that 'Sami ISSA' is his alias.

30. ONEISSI used at least one phone, being a Purple Phone, -31. SABRA used at least one phone, being a Purple Phone, namely -32. By analysing their phone use, the respective role of each Accused in the attack

became clear:

a. BADREDDINE on Green.communicated covertly with AYYASH on Green

"and through these calls exercised control over the preparation and execution

of the attack carried out by AYYASH and the other members of the assassination

team.

b. AYY ASH, on both Red. and Blue. coordinated the assassination team

through their respective Red Network phones and Blue Phones.

c. ONEISSI on Purple. and SABRA on Purple. communicated with an

unidentified person who used the to

report on the progress of the false claim of responsibility. During this period,

A YY ASH on PMP. was also in communication with Purple. It is

reasonable to conclude that A YY ASH was monitoring the false claim preparation.

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d. The following section, detailing the Chronology of the Attack, provides greater

detail on the role of each of the Accused. A pictorial representation of these

relationships appears below:

The Control (Green Network)

The Assassination Team (Red Network with co-locating Blue Phones)

The False Claim Team (Purple Network)

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D. CHRONOLOGY OF THE ATTACK

1. Preparations

33. The investigation -uncovered evidence that AYYASH and other members of the

assassination team observed Rafik HARIRI on a number of days prior to the attack.

By comparing the movements of Rafik HARlR1 and the concomitant movement of

the Blue Phones and Red Network phones, it is reasonable to conclude that these

periods of observation were preparatory steps for the assassination. In short, these

parallel movements of HARlRI and the Blue Phones and Red Network phones

cannot be explained as mere coincidence.

34. On at least 20 days between 11 November 2004 and 14 February 2005, AYVASH

and other members of the assassination team, communicating on their Blue Phones

and Red Network phones, carried out acts in preparation for the attack including

observation and surveillance, in order to learn the routes and movements of his

convoy and the position of HARIRI's vehicle within it. Surveillance occurred on at

least 15 days and in particular on 11 November 2004, 1, 7, 14, 20, 28 and 31 January

2005, and 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 10, I I and 12 February 2005. By doing so, AYVASH and the

assassi~ation team determined the most suitable day, location and method for the

attack, which they then executed on 14 February 2005.

35. As part of the assassination preparations, between 22 December 2004 and 17 January

2005, ONEISSI and SABRA were responsible for locating a suitable stranger who

would be used to make a false claim of responsibility, on a video, for the attack

against HARIRl. With ONEISSI falsely calling himself 'Mohammed', the person

they chose was ABU ADASS, a 22-year old Palestinian man, found at the Arab

University Mosque of Beirut, also known as 'the AI-Houry Mosque'.

a. The activity of ONEISSI and SABRA is illustrated inter alia by the fact that their

Purple Phones, Purpl~ and Purpl~ registered against the cell-tower

covering the mosque on 11 days, being on 22, 29, 30, and 31 December 2004 and

I, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 17 January 2005. ONEISSI and SABRA would later deliver

the video for broadcast, accompanied by a letter in Arabic, after the assassination.

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b. ONEISSI and SABRA have a history of contact with the unidentified person on

Purple. In particular, SABRA ~as been in contact 213 times with Purple.

between 7 January 2003 and 14 February 2005, and ONEISSI 195 times with

Purple. between 25 June 2003 and 26 January 2005. This pattern of phone

usage shows both compartmentalisation and that Purple" served as the

intermediary between AYY ASH and ONEISSI and SA BRA.

c. Between 4 December 2003 and 6 February 2005, the unidentified person on

Purple. was in contact 32 times with AYYASH on PMP. PMP. and

PMP. and in particular 7 times on PMP. between 23 January 2005 and 6

February 2005.

36. Between 1 January 2005 and 14 February 2005, often during activity by the

assassination team, BADREDDlNE on Green. was in contact 59 times with

A YY ASH on Green.

37. On 4 January 2005, the"Red Network phones were activated in the Tripoli area

over a period of approximately 30 minutes._Blue Phone and.Yellow Phones

were in the vicinity at the time of activation.

38. On 11 January 2005, AYYASH visited the area of AI-Beddaoui in Tripoli where

vehicle showrooms are located including the one from which the Mitsubishi Canter

van would be purchased on 25 January 2005. From the same area, AYY ASH, on

Green. contacted BADREDDINE twice on Green.

39. On 16 January 2005, at about 07:00, ABU ADASS left his home to meet with

ONEISSI calling himself 'Mohammed'. ABU ADASS has been missing since that

day.

40.

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41. On 20 January 2005, HARIRl was scheduled to attend the Grand Mosque of Beirut in

the morning but instead attended the Imam AIi Mosque for Eid prayers. All active

Red Network phones operated for less than one hour in the areas surrounding

Quraitem Palace and the Grand Mosque. A YY ASH, on Red. participated in the

observations on that day.

42. On 25 January 2005,. relevant Blue Phones were active, including Blue.

belonging to A YV ASH who made 16 calls. In particular:

a. Between 14:41 and 14:59, AYVASH on Blue_in Beirut was in contact 3 times

with a member of the assassination team on Blue.who was in the Tripoli area.

b. At 15:10, AYYASH on Green.called BADREDDINE on Green_for 81

seconds.

c. Between 15:30 and 16:00, the member of the assassination team on Blue.

with another unidentified person, both giving false names, purchased for $11250

in cash a Mitsubishi Canter van with engine block number 4033-J01926 from a

vehicle showroom in the AI-Beddaoui area of Tripoli. The assassination team later

used the vehicle to carry the explosives in the attack.

d. At 15:37, the member of the assassination team on Blue_during the purchase

negotiations called A YY ASH on Blue.for 8 I seconds.

e. It is a reasonable conclusion from these calls that BADREDDlNE authorised the

purchase of the Mitsubishi Canter van through A YV ASH, and AYY ASH then

coordinated it.

43. On 28 January 2005, HARIRI stayed at Quraitem Palace throughout the day. The

assassination team, using the Red Network phones, including A YV ASH on Red.

operated for more than six hours around Quraitem Palace and HARlRl's residence in

Faqra.

44. On 31 January 2005, HARlRI was at Quraitem Palace before going to the Higher

Shiite Council, later returning to the Palace. The assassination team, using the Red

Network phones, were actiye for less than three hours covering the period before,

during and after HARIRI's movements. They were located around Quraitem Palace

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and the Higher Shiite Council when HARIRI was present. In both areas and in the

same timeframe, A YY ASH used Red. Blue_and Green. In particular, on

Green~ he was in communication I1 times between 10:49 and 12:07 with

BADREDDINE on Green.

45. On 2 February 2005, the credit of the~ed Network phones was topped up in

Tripoli over a 45 minute period. In the same vicinity, within 10 minutes of the top-up,

one member of the assassination team, on Blue. called another member of the

assassination team on Blue" Later, while travelling back to Beirut, the same

member of the assassination team, on Blue. was in communication 3 times with

A YY ASH in Beirut on Blue_

46. On 3 February 2005, HARIRl had a meeting close to his residence before going to the

St. Georges Yacht Club for lunch and later returning to Quraitem Palace._Red

Network phones were active for more than 4 hours and some co-locating Blue

Phones for 10nger._Red Network phones were active around· Quraitem Palace,

and.Red Network phones (with.Blue Phones) around the St. Georges Yacht Club

at the same time that HARJRI was having lunch there. In particular:

a. AYY ASH, on Red" was around the St. Georges Yacht Club and in regular

contact with other members of the assassination team.

b. Between 13:56 and 15:44, AYYASH had contact four times on Green.with

BADREDDINE on Green"

c. By around 15:44, A YY ASH and BADREDDINE were in the same area, in close

proximity to HARIRI and to the location that would be used for the attack on 14 , February 2005.

47. On 8 February 2005, HARlRJ's movements and those of the assassination team are

similar to their respective movements on 14 February 2005, being the day of the

attack. HARIRI was at Quraitem Palace in the morning before attending Parliament

and afterwards returning to the Palace at around 13:45.~ed Network phones and

their co-located Blue Phones were mainly active around Quraitem Palace, Parliament

and the routes normally used by HARIRI to travel between both locations. In

particular:

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a. AYY ASH was active on Re~ Blu~ Gree~ and on his PMP _and

PM~, at relevant locations, in particular around Parliament and where the

attack would take place on 14 February 2005.

b. At 13:40 and 15:05, AYVASH on Gree"'was twice in communication with

BADREDDINE on Gree.-.

2. The Attack

48. On 14 February 2005, the assassination team consisting of A YY ASH and. others

positioned themselves in locations where they were able to track and observe

HARIRI's convoy from his residence at Quraitem Palace in Beirut to Parliament and

thereafter, travelling back to his residence, into the area of the St. Georges Hotel.

T~ey kept in frequent contact with each other on their Red Network phones and their

co-located Blue Phones. In particular, there were 33 calls within the Red Network

between 11 :00 and 12:53. Significant calls included:

a. At 11 :58, A YY ASH, on Gree~ while positioned close to the area of the St.

Georges Hotel, contacted BADREDDINE on Gree..- for 14 seconds. The

Green Network phones were never used again. It is reasonable to conclude from

this last Green Network call that BADREDDlNE issued the final authorisation

for the attack.

b. At 12:50:34, as HARJRI was leaving Parliament to drive home, Re~ located

near Parliament, called for 5 seconds to Re«tlllocated near the St. Georges

Hotel and near the Mitsubishi Canter van. Immediately after, at 12:50:55, Red

_then called A YV ASH on Re~ for 10 seconds who was located between

Parliament and the St. Georges Hotel. At around this time, from a location close to

AYY ASH, the van began moving towards the St. Georges Hotel. It is reasonable

to conclude from these calls that the assassination team member on Re~

informed AY,Y ASH and another member on Re<llll of HARIRI's departure

from Parliament so that the van could move into its final position for attack.

c. At 12:53, the last ever call within the Red Network took place, from Re~in

the area of Parliament to R~ nearby. By that time, all members of the

assassination team had been informed ofHARlRJ's final movements.

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49. On 14 February 2005, at about 12:52, closed-circuit TV footage shows the Mitsubishi

Canter van move slowly towards the st. Georges Hotel.

50. On 14 February 2005, at about 12:55, a male suicide bomber detonated a large

quantity of high explosives concealed in the cargo area of the Mitsubishi Canter van

with engine block number 4033-J01926, killing HARIRI as his convoy of six

vehicles on Rue Minet el Hos'n passed the St. Georges Hotel.

51. The explosion took place on a busy public street and was enormous and terrifying.

Forensic examination has established the quantity of explosives was approximately

2500 kilogrammes of TNT (trinitrotoluene) equivalent. In addition to HARIRJ, 8

members of his convoy and 13 members of the public were killed. Not including the

suicide bomber, the explosion killed a total of 22 persons. Due to the size of the

explosion, the attack attempted to kill a further 231 persons who were injured, and

also caused partial destruction of the St. Georges Hotel and nearby buildings.

52. Fragments of the suicide bomber were recovered at the scene and forensic

examination has established both that the remains were: (a) of a male, and (b) not of

ABU ADASS. The identity of the suicide bomber remains unknown.

3. Delivery of the Video

53. Starting about 75 minutes after the attack, ONEISSI and SABRA made a total of 4

calls to the offices of the Reuters and AI-Jazeera news networks in Beirut. All 4

phone calls were made using the same prepaid Telecard 6162569 from 4 different

public payphones:

a. At about 14: 11, ONEISSI or SABRA, both acting together, claimed to Reuters

that a fictional fundamentalist group called' Victory and Jihad in Greater Syria'

executed the attack.

b. At about 14: 19, ONEISSI or SABRA, both acting together, uttered into the phone

to AI-Jazeera a claim of responsibility from 'Victory and Jihad in Greater Syria',

a report of which was broadcast shortly after.

c. At about 15:27, SABRA called AI-Jazeera and gave information on where to find

a videocassette which had been placed in a tree at the ESCW A Square near the

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AI-Jazeera offices at Shakir Ouayeh building, Beirut. ONEISSI was watching the

location to confirm receipt by AI-Jazeera of the videocassette. On the video, ABU

ADASS claimed responsibility for the attack, that it was in support of'Mujahidin'

in Saudi Arabia, and that further attacks would follow. Attached to the

videocassette was a letter in Arabic which stated in/er alia that ABU ADASS was

the suicide bomber.

d. At about 17:04, ONEISSI or SABRA, both acting together, demanded with

menace that Al-Jazeera broadcast the video, which was done shortly after.

54. On 14 February 2005, ONEISSI and SABRA delivered the ABU ADASS

videocassette while using their Purple Phones close to the public payphones which

they used to call Reuters and AI Jazeera and close to the tree in which ,the

videocassette was hidden.

55. On 14 February 2005, between about 14:03 and 17:24, before, between and after

these 4 public payphones calls to the news networks, SABRA on Purple.was in

contact with the unidentified person on Purple.on 7 occasions.

56. On 15 February 2005, Purple. ceased being used.

57. On 16 February 2005, ONEISSI's Purple_and SABRA's Purple~ceased

being used.

E. THE CRIMINAL AGREEMENT

1. The Conspiracy

58. The facts as outlined above show that a conspiracy had come into existence by

sometime between at least 11 November 2004 and 16 January 2005. In the

conspiracy, BADREDDINE, AVYASH, ONEISSI and SABRA, together with

others as yet unidentified, including the assassination team and the person on Purple

_ agreed to commit a terrorist act by means of an explosive device in order to

assassinate HARIRl.

a. The conspiracy began sometime between at least 11 November 2004 and 16

January 2005, and was executed on 14 February 2005. This is ~cause:

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i. On I1 November 2004 two unidentified conspirators, using Blue Phones,

carried out the first detected surveillance ofHARlRI; and

ii. By 16 January 2005 the Red Network had been established and ABU

ADASS was missing; while

iii. The conspiracy was then executed on 14 Febmary 2005 with the attack on

HARIRl.

b. BADREDDINE, as the controller, AYY ASH, as the assassination team

coordinator, and the other members of the assassination team were early members

of the conspiracy.

c. ONEISSI and SABRA together with the unidentified person on Purple~

joined the conspiracy at the latest by between 22 December 2004 and 16 January

2005 with the task of preparing the false claim of responsibility. This timeframe

starts on 22 December 2004 because inter alia the Purple Phones of ONEISSI

and SA BRA were then active around the Arab University Mosque of Beirut

where ABU ADASS prayed. In the conspiracy, they agreed to act as accomplices

performing supporting tasks for the assassination, namely:

i. to seek a suitable individual, later identified as ABU ADASS, who would

be used to make a false claim of responsibility, on a video, for the attack

against HARIRl; and,

ii. to deliver the video, with a letter attached, for broadcast after the

assassination.

59. All four Accused are supporters of Hezbollah, which is a political and military

organisation in Lebanon.

a. In the past, the military wing of Hezbollah has been implicated in terrorist acts.

Persons trained by the military wing have the capability to carry out a terrorist

attack, whether or not on its behalf.

b. BADREDDINE and A YY ASH are related to each other through marriage and

together to a certain Imad MUGHNIY AH: they are brothers-in-law. Imad

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MUGNIYAH was a founding member of Hezbollah a~d in charge of its milit~

wing from 1983 until he was killed in Damascus on 12 February 2008. He was

wanted internationally for terrorist offences.

c. Based on their experience, training and affiliation with Hezbollah, therefore, it is

reasonable to conclude that BADREDDINE and A YY ASH had the capability to

undertake the 14 February 2005 attack.

60. All who concluded or joined the criminal agreement were perpetrators of the

conspiracy against state security. BADREDDINE, AYYASH, and the assassination

team, were perpetrators of the substantive offences of committing a terrorist act,

intentional homicide of HARJRI, and of 21 others, and attempted intentional

homicide of 231 others. ONEISSI, SABRA, and the unidentified person on Purple

.were accomplices to the above substantive offences by preparing and delivering

the false claim of responsibility.

61. It is reasonable to conclude that the aim of the conspiracy, to which all conspirators

knowingly agreed, was to commit a terrorist act by detonating a large quantity of

explosives in a public place, in order to kill HARIRl.

, 62. The conspirators had two additional goals, namely:

a. To create a false claim of responsibility on behalf of a fictional fundamentalist

group named 'Victory and Jihad in Greater Syria', to identify the wrong people to

investigate, and so shield the conspirators from justice; and

b. By doing so, to add to the state of terror, by raising in the mind of the population

insecurity and fear of further indiscriminate public attack.

2. Blaming Others

63. Phone use shows that the conspirators, including A YY ASH and other members of the

assassination team, as well as the false claim team, were centred in South Beirut.

64. To create a false trail away from Beirut, the conspirators chose Tripoli for certain

traceable acts, such as:

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a. On 4 January 2005, the.Red Network phones were first activated, including the

number used by A YY ASH, traceably in Tripoli.

b.

c. On 25 January 2005, the device employed to carry the explosives for the terrorist

act, namely the Mitsubishi Canter van, was traceably purchased in Tripoli.

d. On 2 February 2005, the credit of each of the~ed Network phones was

traceably topped up in Tripoli.

65. The conspirators expected that the false trail, together with the false claim of

responsibility by ABU ADASS, would cause the authorities to investigate others in

Tripoli, and so shield the conspirators from justice by shifting attention away from

Beirut.

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IV. The Counts

66. WHEREFORE, pursuant to Rule 68(0) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the

Special Tribunal for Lebanon, the Prosecutor charges the Accused persons with the

following counts:

COUNT ONE

Statement of Offence

67. Conspiracy aimed at committing a Terrorist Act,

a. pursuant to Articles 188,212,213, 270, and 314 of the Lebanese Criminal Code,

and

b. Articles 6 and 7 of the Lebanese Law of 11 January 1958 on 'Increasing the

penalties for sedition, civil war and interfaith struggle', and

c. Article 3(1)(a) of the Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon.

Particulars of Offence

68. MUSTAFA AMINE BADREDDINE, SALIM JAMIL AYYASH, HUSSEIN

HASSAN ONEISSI, and ASSAD HASSAN SABRA,

a. between at least the eleventh day of November 2004 and the sixteenth day of

January 2005,

b. together with others unidentified,

c. each bearing individual criminal responsibility as co-perpetrators with shared

intent,

d. concluded or joined an agreement, aimed at committing a terrorist act intended to

cause a state of terror by a predetermined means liable to create a public danger,

e. namely by the assassination by means of a large explosive device in a public place

of the former Prime Minister, and leading political figure, Rafik HARJRI,

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f. which intentionally with premeditation should,

g. or they foresaw and accepted the risk would,

h. kill and attempt to kill others in the immediate vicinity of the explosion, and cause

the partial destruction of buildings,

I. all of which they agreed as two additional goals of the said conspiracy

i. to blame falsely on others in a fictional fundamentalist group so to shield

themselves from justice, and

ii. to add to the state of terror, by raising in the mind of the population

insecurity and fear of further indiscriminate public attack,

j. and in so doing thereby. together they committed a conspiracy against state

security.

COUNT TWO


69. Committing a Terrorist Act by means of an explosive device,

a. pursuant to Articles 188, 212, 213, and 314 of the Lebanese Criminal Code, and

b. Article 6 of the Lebanese Law of 11 January 1958 on 'Increasing the penalties for

sedition, civil war and interfaith struggle', and

c. Article 3( I)(a) of the Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon.


70. MUSTAFA AMINE BADREDDINE and SALIM JAMIL A YY ASH,

a. on the fourteenth day of February 2005,


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intent,

d. committed a terrorist act intended to cause a state of terror by a means liable to

create a public danger,

e. namely by the assassination by means of a large explosive device in a public place

of the former Prime Minister, and leading political figure, Rafik HARIRI,

f. thereby bringing about the detonation at 12:55 on the fourteenth day of February

2005 at Rue Minet el Hos'n, Beirut, Lebanon, being a public street, of

approximately 2500 kilogrammes of TNT equivalent,

g. and, it being an aggravating circumstance that, in so doing,

i. resu Iting in the deaths of Rafik HARIRI and 21 other persons, and

ii. in the partial destruction of the St. Georges Hotel and nearby buildings,

h. while also attempting to kill 231 other persons.

COUNT THREE


7l. Intentional Homicide (of Raftk HARlRl) with premeditation by using explosive

materials,

a. pursuant to Articles 188, 212, 213, 547 and 549(1) and (7), of the Lebanese

Criminal Code, and

b. Article 3(1)(a) of the Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon.


72. MUSTAFA AMINE BADREDDINE and SALIM JAMll.. A YY ASH,


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intent,

d. committed the intentional homicide of Rafik HARIRl,

e. in the aggravating circumstance of

I. premeditation, and

ii. by bringing about the detonation at 12:55 at Rue Minet el Hos'n, Beirut,

Lebanon, of explosive materials of approximately 2500 kilogrammes of

TNT equivalent.

COUNT FOUR


73. Intentional Homicide (of21 persons in addition to the Intentional Homicide ofRafik

HARIRl) with premeditation by using explosive materials,

a. pursuant to Articles 188, 189,212,213,547 and 549(1) and (7) of the Lebanese

Crim inal Code, and



74. MUSTAFA AMlNE BADREDDINE and SALIM JAMIL A YY ASH,


b. (or subsequently as a result of injuries sustained on the fourteenth day of February

2005),

c. together with others unidentified,

d. each bearing individual criminal responsibility as co-perpetrators,

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e. by using a large quantity of explosive materials in a public place with shared

intent and premeditation to commit the intentional homicide of former Prime

Minister, and leading political figure, Rafik HARIRI, within his motor convoy,

f. in addition, either intending to kill members of the said convoy and members of

the general public in the vicinity,

g. or by reason of foreseeing and accepting the risk that deaths would occur within

the said motor convoy and among the general public in the vicinity,

h. by then bringing about the detonation at 12:55 at Rue Minet el Hos'n, Beirut,

Lebanon, being a public street, of approximately 2500 kilogrammes of TNT

equivalent,

i. thereby with shared intent,

j. and in the aggravating circumstance of

i. premeditation, and

ii. by bringing about the said detonation of explosive materials,

k. committed the intentional homicide, as named alphabetically in Schedule A,

I. of eight members ofthe said convoy, namely:

L Yahya Mustafa AL-ARAB,

2. Omar Ahmad AL-MASRI,

3. Mazen Adnan AL-ZAHABI,

4. Mohammed Saadeddine DARWISH,

5. Bassel Farid FULElHAN (who died on 18 April 2005 as a result of

injuries sustained on 14 February 2005),

6. Mohammed Riyadh Hussein GHALA YEENI,

7. Talal Nabih NASSER, and

8. Ziad Mohammed TARRAF;

m. and of thirteen members of the general public, namely:

1. Joseph Emile AOUN,

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2. Zahi Halim ABU RJEIL Y (who died on 15 February 2005 as a result

of injuries sustained on 14 February 2005),

3. Mahmoud Saleh AL-HAMAD AL-MOHAMMED,

4. Mahmoud Saleh AL-KHALAF,

5. Sobhi Mohammed AL-KHODR,

6. Rima Mohammed Raif BAZZI,

7. Abdo Tawfik BOU FARAH,

8. Yamama Kamel DAMEN,

9. Abd AI-Hamid Mohammed GHALA YEENI,

10. Rawad Hussein Suleiman HAIDAR,

11. Farhan Ahmad ISSA,

12. AlaaHassan OSFOUR, and

13. Haitham Khaled OTHMAN (who died on 15 February 2005 as a result

of injuries sustained on 14 February 2005).

COUNT FIVE


75. Attempted Intentional Homicide (of 231 persons in addition to the Intentional

Homicide ofRafik HARIRI) with premeditation by using explosive materials,

a. pursuant to Articles 188, 189, 200, 212, 213, 547, and 549(1) and (7) of the

Lebanese Criminal Code, and



76. MUST AFA AMINE BADREDDINE and SALIM JAMIL A YY ASH,



c. each bearing individual criminal responsibility as co-perpetrators,

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d. by using a large quantity of explosive materials in a public place with shared

intent and premeditation to commit the intentional homicide of former Prime

Minister, and leading political figure, Rafik HARIRI, within his motor convoy,

e. in addition, either intending to kill members of the said convoy and members of

the general public in the vicinity,

f. or by reason of foreseeing and accepting the risk that deaths would occur within

the said motor convoy and among the general public in the vicinity,

g. by then bringing about the detonation at 12:55 at Rue Minet el Hos'n, Beirut,

Lebanon, of approximately 2500 kilogrammes of TNT equivalent,

h. thereby, with shared intent,

i. and in the aggravating circumstance of

i. premeditation, and

ii. by bringing about the said detonation of explosive materials,

j. in so causing injury in the explosion to persons from the said convoy and general

public, attempted to commit the intentional homicide of 231 other persons, as

named alphabetically in Schedule B.

COUNT SIX


77. Being an Accomplice to the felony of Committing a Terrorist Act by means of an

explosive device,

a. pursuant to Articles 188,219(4) and (5), and 314 of the Lebanese Criminal Code,

and

b. Article 6 of the Lebanese Law of 11 January 1958 on 'Increasing the penalties for

sedition, civil war and interfaith struggle', and

c. Article 3(1)(a) of the Statut~ of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon. ?

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78. HUSSEIN HASSAN ONEISSI and ASSAD HASSAN SABRA,

a. between not later than the sixteenth day of January 2005 and the fourteenth day of

February 2005,

b. knowing that others as co-perpetrators intended to, and on the fourteenth day of

February 2005 then did,

c. commit a terrorist act intended to cause a state of terror by a means liable to create

a public danger, namely by means of a large explosive device in a public place;

d. which the co-perpetrators agreed as two additional goals:

I. to blame falsely on others in a fictional fundamentalist group so to shield

themselves from justice; and

11. to add to the state of terror, by raising in the mind of the population

insecurity and fear of further indiscriminate public attack;

e. ONEISSI and SABRA, knowing the intent of the said co-perpetrators to commit

the said terrorist act,

f. together with shared intent,

I. each bearing individual criminal responsibility and participating as an

accomplice to the terrorist act, and

ii. each aiding and abetting the co-perpetrators of the felony,

g. agreed with the co-perpetrators to perform, and then performed, acts preparatory

to the offence, and acts to shield the co-perpetrators and themselves from justice,

which would falsely blame others in a fictional fundamentalist group so as to add

to the state ofterror, as follows:

J. as preparatory to the offence, by identifying and then using a 22-year old

Palestinian man named Ahmad ABU ADASS in order to create a false

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claim of responsibility from him on video for the forthcoming offence on

behalf of a group called 'Victory and Jlhad in Greater Syria '; and

11. as acts to shield the co-perpetrators and themselves from justice, by then

ensuring the video, with the attached letter, of the false claim of

responsibility would be broadcast on the television in Lebanon

immediately after the said offence.

COUNT SEVEN


79. Being an Accomplice to tbe felony of Intentional Homicide (of Rafik HARIRI)

witb premeditation by using explosive materials,

a. pursuant to Articles 188,219(4) and (5),547, and 549(1) and (7) of the Lebanese

Criminal Code, and



80. HUSSEIN HASSAN ONEISSI and ASSAD HASSAN SABRA,


February 2005,



c. commit with premeditation by using explosive materials the intentional homicide

of the former Prime Minister, and leading political figure, Rafik HARlRI;

d. which the co-perpetrators agreed as two additional goals:



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11. to add to the state of terror, by raising in the mind of the population


e. ONEISSI and SABRA, knowing the intent of the said co-perpetrators to commit

the said intentional homicide of Rafik HARIRI,

f. together with shared intent,

i. each bearing individual criminal responsibility and participating as an

accomplice to the intentional homicide of Rafik HARlRI, and

11. each aiding and abetting the co-perpetrators of the felony,

g. agreed with the co-perpetrators to perform, and then performed, acts preparatory

to the offence, and acts to shield the co-perpetrators and themselves from justice,

which would falsely blame others in a fictional fundamentalist group so as to add

to the state of terror, as follows:

i. as preparatory to the offence, by identifying and then using a 22-year old



behalf of a group called 'Victory and Jihad in Greater Syria '; and

ii. as acts to shield the co-perpetrators and themselves from justice, by then




COUNT EIGHT


81. Being an Accomplice to tbe felony of Intentional Homicide (of 21 persons in

addition to the Intentional Homicide of Rafik HARlRI) with premeditation by using

explosive materials,

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a. pursuant to Articles 188, 189, 219(4) and (5), 547 and 549(1) and (7) of the


b. Article 3(1)(a) of the Statute ofthe Special Tribunal for Lebanon.


82. HUSSEIN HASSAN ONEISSI and ASS AD HASSAN SABRA,


February 2005,




of the former Prime Minister, and leading political figure, Rafik HARIRl,

d. which in addition, as shown by the large quantity of explosive materials used, they

intended, or foresaw and accepted the risk, that this act would kill others in the

vicinity of the explosion,

e. and who thereby committed the intentional homicide of21 others,

f. which the said co-perpetrators agreed as two additional goals:





g. ONEISSI and SABRA, knowing the intent of the said co-perpetrators to kill

others in addition to killing Rafik HARJRI,

h. together with shared intent,

I. each bearing individual criminal responsibility and participating as an

accomplice to the intentional homicide of21 others, and

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i. agreed with· the said co-perpetrators to perform, and then performed, acts

preparatory to the offence, and acts to shield the co-perpetrators and themselves

from justice, which would falsely blame others in a fictional fundamentalist group

so as to add to the state of terror, as follows:




behalf of a group called 'Victory and Jihad in Greater Syria'; and

ii. as acts to shield the co-perpetrators and themselves from justice, by then




COUNT NINE


83. Being an AccompJice to the felony of Attempted Intentional Homicide (of 231

persons in addition to the Intentional Homicide of Rafik HARIRI) with

premeditation by using explosive materials,

a. pursuant to Articles 188, 189,200,219(4) and (5), 547 and 549(1) and (7) of the




84. HUSSElN HASSAN ONEISSI and ASSAD HASSAN SABRA,


February 2005,

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of the former Prime Minister, and leading political figure, Rafik HARIRI,

d. which in addition, as shown by the large quantity of explosive materials used, they

intended, or foresaw and accepted the risk, that this act would attempt to kill

others in the vicinity of the explosion,

e. and who thereby committed the attempted intentional homicide of231 others,

f. which the said co-perpetrators agreed as two additional goals:





g. ONEISSI and SABRA, knowing the intent of the said co-perpetrators to attempt

to kill others in addition to killing Rafik HARIRI,

h. together with shared intent,

i. each bearing individual criminal responsibility and participating as an

accomplice to the attempted intentional homicide of231 others, and


i. agreed with the said co-perpetrators to perform, and then performed, acts

preparatory to the offence, and acts to shield the co-perpetrators and themselves

from justice, which would falsely blame others in a fictional fundamentalist group

so as to add to the state of terror, as follows:




behalf of a group called 'Victory and Jihad in Greater Syria '; and

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11. as acts to shield the co-perpetrators and themselves from justice, by then




[Redacted] Original signed

D.A. Bellemare, MSM QC The Prosecutor

This 10th day ofJune 2011, Leidschendam, The Netherlands

9384

Word Count

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Schedule A

Below is an alphabetical list of 21 other persons intentionally or foreseeably killed as a direct

consequence of the public explosion on 14 February 2005 intended to kill the fonner Prime

Minister Rafik HARJRI, and who Counts 4 and 8 plead were each and collectively subject to

intentional homicide with premeditation.

In addition to Rafik HARIRI, eight members of Rafik HARIRI's motor convoy were

killed, (following in alphabetical order):

died 14 February 2005,

cause of death - burns due to an explosion.

2. Omar Ahmad R.1"'iVUIsn

died 14 February 2005, cause of death - (not provided on death

certificate ).

3.

cause of death - bums to more than 90% of the body due to an explosion.

4. Mohammed Saadeddine Darwisb,

cause of death - heart attack due to explosion of 14 February 2005 and bums to entire

body.

5. Bassel Farid Fuleihan,

6.

Mr. Fuleihan was a Member of Parliament who was travelling with

Mr. HARlRl. He initially survived the explosion but received third degree burns to

96% of his body. He was flown to Paris for emergency treatment. He remained in

hospital in a coma for 60 days before he died on 18 April 2005.

died 14 February

2005, cause of death - burns due to an explosion.

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9.

7. Talal Nabih Nasser,

died 14 February 2005, cause of death - bums

due to an explosion.

8. Ziad Mohammed Tarraf,

2005, cause of death - bums due to an explosion.

In addition, thirteen public bystanders were also killed (following in alphabetical

order):

2005, cause of death - crushed and disfigured in explosion.

cause of death - blockage of the respiratory tract as a result of the heavy accumulation

of debris due to an explosion in the St. Georges area.

11. Mahmoud Saleh AI-Hamad AI-Mohammed,

_ died 14 February 2005, cause of death - explosion leading to death.

12. Mahmoud Saleh AI-Khalaf,

February 2005, cause of death - explosion leading to death.

13. Sobhi Mohammed AJ-Khodr,

14. Rima Mohammed Raif Bazzi,

2005, cause of death - multiple injuries caused by the St. George's explosion.

15. Abdo Tawflk Bou Farah,

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February 2005, cause of death - explosion of the brain as a result of shattering of the

skull due to a bomb explosion.

16. Yamama Kamel DarneD,


17. Abd AI-Hamid Mohammed GhalayeeDi,

2005, cause of death - injuries due to an explosion.

18. Rawad Hussein Suleiman Haidar,

cause of death - cardiac and respiratory arrest due to an explosion.

19. Farhan Ahmad 18sa,

20. Alaa Hassan Osfour,


21. Haitham Khaled OthmaD,

2005, cause of death - [illegible] ... explosion.

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Schedule B

Below is an alphabetical list of 231 persons7 intentionally or foreseeably injured as a direct

consequence of the public explosion intended to kill the former Prime Minister Rafik

HARlRI and who Counts 5 and 9 plead were each and collectively subject to attempted

intentional homicide with premeditation.

1 This figure and the listed names are subject to change. as further evidence is gathered.

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indictment (public redacted version)rafik hariri) with premeditation by using explosive materials....

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