indonesia: ending repression in irian jaya 20 september …€¦ · icg asia report no 23 20...

INDONESIA: ENDING REPRESSIONIN IRIAN JAYA

20 September 2001

ICG Asia Report No 23Jakarta/Brussels

TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS:.................................................................... ii

I. INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................. 1

II. PAPUAN NATIONALISM................................................................................................ 3

III. INDONESIAN SETTLER COMMUNITIES .................................................................. 5

IV. THE PAPUAN ELITE ....................................................................................................... 9

V. REFORMASI AND THE PAPUAN RENAISSANCE ................................................. 10

VI. THE PAPUAN PRESIDIUM COUNCIL ...................................................................... 12

VII. INTERNATIONAL LOBBYING ................................................................................... 16

VIII. INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT POLICY ................................................................... 17

IX. A SHOW OF FORCE ...................................................................................................... 20

X. RETURN OF REPRESSION .......................................................................................... 21

XI. SPECIAL AUTONOMY.................................................................................................. 22

XII. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................. 25

APPENDICES

A. MAP OF INDONESIA ............................................................................................................... 27

B. GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS..................................................................................................... 28

C. ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP .......................................................................... 29

D. ICG REPORTS AND BRIEFING PAPERS.................................................................................... 30

E. ICG BOARD MEMBERS.......................................................................................................... 34

ICG Asia Report No 23 20 September 2001


EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Indonesian policy in Irian Jaya is at a critical point.Since August 2000 the government has been able torestore its authority in the province by closing in thepolitical space that had developed after the fall ofPresident Soeharto. The government has curtailedopen demands for independence and the mobilisationof popular support for this objective. However, themethods used represent a return to those employed byPresident Soeharto -- relying principally on thegovernment’s near monopoly of military power. Theeffect of this has been to compound the politicalproblems posed by Papuan demands forindependence.

Simultaneously with the crack-down on Papuanpolitical activity, the government has been promotinga policy of Special Autonomy for the province. Thispolicy offers the best prospects for a long-termresolution of problems that have plagued Irian Jaya’sintegration into Indonesia since 1963. A strongSpecial Autonomy law could help break the cycle ofrepression and alienation. However, it is difficult toenvisage that this policy can be successfullypromoted and implemented in conditions whereJakarta’s authority rests on its use of repressivesecurity measures and the seemingly inevitable abuseof human rights.

Irian Jaya was the last region of the NetherlandsIndies to be incorporated into Indonesia, twelve yearsafter the rest of the country. Papuans were onlymarginally involved in Indonesia’s struggle forindependence. During the last eighteen years ofcolonial administration, the Dutch successfullyfostered a Papuan identity separate from Indonesia.They established a program of decolonisation thatenvisaged the establishment of an independent stateof West Papua by 1970.

Incorporation in Indonesia, rather than transformingPapuans from being subjects of a European colonialpower into citizens of an independent state, hasserved to consolidate a separate Papuan identity. ThePapuan feeling of marginalisation is related to themassive influx of migrant settlers from elsewhere inthe archipelago, facilitated and supported byIndonesian governments. The Indonesian migrantsettlers dominate the economy of the province. ManyPapuans consider that Indonesia is more interested inexploiting their land’s resources than in itsindigenous peoples.

Papuan resistance to Indonesian control commencedwith incorporation. The guerrilla resistance was moreeffective in keeping alive the ideal of independencethan ever threatening Indonesian control. The fall ofPresident Soeharto facilitated the transformation ofPapuan resistance into a movement led by an urbanelite, supported by key leaders with traditionalauthority, advocating independence by non-violentmeans. The pro-independence leaders, who came toform the Papuan Presidium Council, successfullymobilised support broadly in Papuan society andestablished a province-wide organisation.

The Indonesian government’s policy responses to thePapuan demands for independence have beenuncertain and inconsistent. The revival of Papuannational ideals poses particular difficulties for thegovernment and the broader political elite. Thetwelve year struggle Indonesia waged to reclaim IrianJaya from The Netherlands had broad support and itssuccess in 1962 is regarded as a national triumph.Like Aceh, Irian Jaya is resource rich. Thegovernments of presidents Habibie and AbdurrahmanWahid recognised that the people of the province hadsuffered political repression, abuse of human rightsand economic exploitation during Soeharto’s New

Indonesia: Ending Repression in Irian JayaICG Asia Report N° 23, 20 September 2001 Page ii

Order government. President Megawati apologisedfor the suffering caused by past policies. The post-Soeharto governments have had considerabledifficulty in formulating new policies of regionalgovernance in Irian Jaya that are compatible withnational ideals for democratising the political system.This challenge has become more acute since theseparation of East Timor heightened fears of thedisintegration of the state.

Presidents Habibie and Wahid established a dialoguewith Papuan leaders. Wahid made importantsymbolic gestures by allowing the Papuan “MorningStar” flag to be flown and gave his blessing for“Papua” to be used as the name for the province,rather than “Irian Jaya” although this change wasnever formally implemented and was in fact rejectedby the MPR in August 2000. He provided financialsupport for the pro-independence Papuan Congress.However, his accommodating and tolerant attitudewas severely criticised by national legislators and thePresident was instructed to take more decisive actionagainst separatist activities in Irian Jaya, as in Aceh.In August 2000, the Special Session of the NationalConsultative Assembly’s criticism of the Presidentmarked the beginning of a much tougher approach topro-independence activities in Irian Jaya.

The detention and trial of pro-independence leaders,the show of force to mark Papuan “independence”day and the tough security measures that have beentaken subsequently mark the end of politicalopenness and the return to the forms of governance,dependent on the use of force, that have characterisedthe Indonesian administration of the territory since1963. Unlike in Aceh, Indonesia has been able toreassert its authority in Irian Jaya. However, killings,torture and indiscriminate reprisals haveaccompanied this. The counterproductive dynamic ofrepression and alienation has been resumed.

The government of Indonesia has a responsibility tomaintain its territorial integrity. The issue withrespect to Irian Jaya is whether the methods currentlybeing employed will assist in the resolution orwhether they will compound the problems that havebedevilled Indonesian governance since 1963.

The objective of the “Special Autonomy” is political.It is to persuade Papuans that their preferred futureshould be as citizens of Indonesia – an Indonesia inwhich they can manage their own politicaldevelopment and enjoy the produce of their land andits resources. Experience has made Papuans highlysceptical of the government’s intentions. A form of“Special Autonomy” that does not reflect Papuanaspirations will have little or no utility and will serve

to discredit autonomy as an alternative toindependence and undermine the credibility of thosePapuans leaders who have publicly advocatedautonomy. The House of Representatives has passed“Special Autonomy” legislation for Aceh and isconsidering a draft for Irian Jaya.

A strong Special Autonomy law, however, will onlybe the first phase of a long process of capacity andinstitution building. It will provide an institutionaland policy framework in which Papuan social andeconomic disadvantage can be addressed but it doesnot in itself overcome those disadvantages.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

TO THE GOVERNMENT OF INDONESIA

1. Adopt the law on Special Autonomy based on theproposals submitted by the governor of IrianJaya.

2. Conduct a systematic dialogue with Papuanpolitical groups, including those represented inthe province’s legislatures and pro-independencegroups, including the Papuan Presidium Council.

3. Release all political detainees not accused ofcrimes of violence and end the trial forsubversion of the five leaders of the Presidium.

4. Withdraw military units not required for theexternal defence of the province.

5. Minimise the use of force in police and militaryoperations to help the implementation of theSpecial Autonomy law and the establishment ofpolitical dialogue.

6. Make the security forces accountable for humanrights violations.

TO THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT IN IRIAN JAYA

7. Step up training of officials, particularly infinancial management and policy formulation, toensure locals can manage autonomy.

8. Seek support of the UNDP and otherinternational organisations such as the WorldBank in the design and provision of capacity-building programs to manage the increasedrevenues under Special Autonomy.

9. Take steps to ensure a greater role for Papuans atall levels of government.

Indonesia: Ending Repression in Irian JayaICG Asia Report N° 23, 20 September 2001 Page iii

10. Establish programs to encourage and supportPapuan participation in the non-governmentsector and in the economy.

11. Work with churches and Moslem organisations,Papuan and non-Papuan, to establish processes ofreconciliation in local communities.

12. Request the assistance of the UN Commission forHuman Rights, under the Technical CooperationProgram, to train the proposed Papuan policeforce and officials of the provincial JusticeDepartment.

13. Request the assistance of the UN Commission forHuman Rights in making human rights a priorityin provincial legislation and to build up localhuman rights bodies

TO INDONESIA’S MAJOR DONORS:

14. Support the Indonesian government’sdetermination to implement Special Autonomy ina form that reflects Papuan aspirations.

15. Encourage the Indonesian government tominimise the use of force in its military andpolice operations

16. Make clear that continued human rightsviolations by the military and police will incurtangible sanctions against the institutionsinvolved and the leaders responsible.

17. Support Elsham and other human rightsorganisations in Irian Jaya with training andfinancial aid.

TO THE PACIFIC ISLANDS FORUM:

18. Encourage the Indonesian government to use theForum’s ‘good offices’ in the search for apeaceful resolution to the violence in Irian Jaya.

19. Consider granting the autonomous province ofPapua observer status with the Forum.

TO THE UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION FORHUMAN RIGHTS:

20. Appoint a Special Rapporteur for West Papua toreport on human rights.

21. Include Elsham, and other human rightsorganisations in Irian Jaya, in UNCHR technicalcooperation projects in Indonesia.

Jakarta/Brussels, 20 September 2001

ICG Asia Report No 23 20 September 2001


I. INTRODUCTION

In her Independence Day speech on 16 August 2001President Megawati Soekarnoputri offered thenation’s apology to the people of Irian Jaya for therepressive policies of the past. She committed hergovernment to a new policy framework that wouldnot only respect the cultural identities and specialcharacteristics of the people, but also give theprovincial government wider authority to manage itsown affairs in the form of special autonomy. Thisnew policy framework would be realised in thecontext of preserving the territorial integrity of theUnitary Republic of Indonesia. President Megawatiestablished the preservation of the unitary state as hergovernment’s top priority.1 In her intensecommitment to the unity of Indonesia, she espousesthe ideals of her father, Soekarno, the foundingPresident. For both, Irian Jaya 2 has a special place in 1 Kompas, 18 August 20012 The name of Indonesia’s easternmost province is amatter of political dispute and has been since the 1940s.The official Dutch name was Netherlands New Guinea(Nederlands Nieuw Guinea). In the English-speakingworld the term Dutch New Guinea or WestNew Guinea was used. Most Papuans preferred Papua,while pro-Indonesia Papuans and Indonesians adoptedIrian. Some Papuans disliked Papua because it hadnegative connotations (slave and dumb) in Ternataneseand east Indonesian Malay dialects. In 1961 the Dutchagreed with the National Committee's request that thename should be West Papua although they continued touse Nederlands Nieuw Guinea in Dutch language officialdocuments. In 1969, the Indonesian government officiallychanged the name from West Irian to Irian Jaya. Thisremains the official name, despite the fact that PresidentAbdurrahman Wahid gave his blessing to the use of Papuaas the name of the province; no follow-up action was takento formalise this. Papua is the name preferred by theindigenous peoples of the province. In this report, Irian

the Republic. Recalling her father, Megawati has saidthat “…without Irian Jaya, Indonesia is notcomplete.”3

Irian Jaya is but one of the challenges confrontingIndonesia’s new President. Whether PresidentMegawati is able to realise her father’s ideal ofnational unity as well as accommodate the aspirationsof the Papuan people is related to a broader questionof her ability to, and interest in, controlling themilitary. Breaking the cycle of repression andalienation together with the provision of broadautonomy are necessary preconditions if Megawati isto realise her father’s dream. If the President canresolve the problems of Irian Jaya through inclusivenon-military means, she will make an importantcontribution to both the maintenance of Indonesia’sterritorial integrity and the processes ofdemocratisation.

The Papuan struggle for independence and theIndonesian government’s determination to maintainIrian Jaya as a province in the Republic pose difficultchoices for policy makers in Indonesia and theregion. In the international community there is astrong commitment to Indonesia’s territorial integrityand sovereignty in Irian Jaya. However, this supportis qualified by opposition to the harsh militarymeasures and abuses of human rights that haveaccompanied Jakarta’s efforts to assert its authorityin Irian Jaya. The Indonesian government’s policy of“Special Autonomy” for Irian Jaya has receivedstrong encouragement internationally as a means toresolve peacefully the conflict in the province as wellas ensuring the territorial integrity of Indonesia.

Jaya is used to refer to the province currently. Papuan isused to refer to the indigenous population as it is the termthey tend to use themselves.3 “Wapres: Tanpa Irian, Indonesia tidak Utuh”, Tifa Irian,20-31 Desember 1999

Indonesia: Ending Repression in Irian JayaICG Asia Report N° 23, 20 September 2001 Page 2

Central to the political issues discussed in this reportis the disaffection of the indigenous peoples of IrianJaya. Many Papuans think of themselves as beingunder a form of colonial rule; economically,politically and culturally marginalised in what theyconsider to be their own land.

Indonesia has been able to sustain its administrationin Irian Jaya since the incorporation of the provincein 1963 largely without the consent of the indigenouspopulation. The ad hoc and localised guerrillaresistance led by the Free Papua Organisation (OPM)never threatened Indonesian control of the province.The OPM was established in 1964 and the firstsubstantial revolt took place in Manokwari thefollowing year. It became the principal organisationof Papuan resistance to Indonesian control. TheOPM’s operations along the border were the mosteffective of its activities, where it found sanctuary inPNG territory and support from West Papuanrefugees. The OPM’s activities along the border havecaused considerable tension between Indonesia andPNG. The OPM’s limited military capacities andinternal conflicts do not diminish its importance asthe bearer of the ideal of independence. Most of thePapuan leaders in exile identified themselves with theOPM.4

Indonesian authority has appeared most vulnerable inthe period of political openness that followed the fallof President Soeharto, during which relatively freeexpression and organisation of Papuan nationalsentiments was permitted. Indonesian control seemedfragile because it became apparent that Indonesia hadmade little progress in convincing Papuans that theirpreferred future should be as citizens of theIndonesian State.

Since 1998 Papuan disaffection and marginalisationhas been expressed in a strong and simple demandfor independence from Indonesia. Papuan nationalaspirations have historical roots going back intoDutch colonial times and Papuan experience ofIndonesian rule has further consolidated a separateidentity.

The post-Soeharto governments presided over thecreation of a political space that enabled thetransformation of Papuan resistance from a sporadic,localised and low- level armed struggle in the junglesof the province to an urban-led mass-based, open andlargely peaceful struggle against Jakarta’s authority. 4 See Robin Osbourne, Indonesia’s Secret War, Allen andUnwin, Sydney, 1985; John R.G. Djopari, PemberontakanOrganisasi Papua Merdeka, Gramedia, Jakarta, 1993

The pro-independence leaders have successfullypropagated the ideal of separation from Indonesiabroadly and deeply in Papuan society - from anIndonesian-educated urban elite to remote villages.


II. PAPUAN NATIONALISM

History is central to an understanding ofcontemporary Papuan politics and relations betweenIrian Jaya and the Indonesian government. It is inpart history that distinguishes Irian Jaya from the restof Indonesia. History is one of the issues of disputebetween Irian Jaya and the Indonesian Government.History is an important influence on Papuan politicalrhetoric and it shapes the way many Papuan leadersthink about the political issues they confront. Thenationalist slogan: “Correcting the Course of PapuanHistory” conveys something of the influence ofhistory. The history that many Papuans want to“correct” is the integration of Papua into Indonesia.This interpretation of history has become dominant inPapuan political circles and is in sharp contrast toIndonesia’s official history.

Papua was one of the neglected backwaters of theNetherlands East Indies. Prior to the Pacific War, thecolonial presence was a handful of administrativeposts, where east Indonesian officials, teachers andmissionaries far outnumbered the Dutch. Christianmissionaries had a more extensive infrastructure andnetwork of contacts in Papuan society than thecolonial authorities and were largely responsible forthe education system. This history is reflected in theimportance of the Christian churches incontemporary Papuan society and politics.

Papua was part of the Netherlands East Indies and assuch became part of the territory claimed byIndonesia’s founding fathers. Papua became anobject of dispute between Indonesia and TheNetherlands during Indonesia’s struggle forIndependence. It was under Dutch control during theRevolution and support for Indonesia was limited tominor revolts in Jayapura and Biak. Papuan politicalgroups were divided between those supportingintegration with Indonesia and those supportingcontinued Dutch administration. From mid-1949, theDutch sought to separate Papua from the transfer ofsovereignty of the rest of the Netherlands East Indies.Ethnic, cultural and religious differences betweenPapua and the rest of Indonesia were prominentamong the publicly advanced arguments as to whyThe Netherlands did not consider Papua to be part ofIndonesia. Dutch determination not to cede Papua toIndonesia developed into a protracted internationaldispute that by the late 1950s became intertwined inthe politics of Cold War Southeast Asia.5

5 See Richard Chauvel, “West New Guinea: Perceptionsand Policies, Ethnicity and the Nation State”, in Anthony

The dispute between Indonesia and The Netherlandsmeant that Papuans did not share with otherIndonesians the crucial nation-forming experiencesof the revolutionary struggle for independence andinitial period of independence. Dutch policies weredirected towards the promotion of a Papuan identityseparate from Indonesia and, from the late 1950s asinternational pressure on The Netherlands increased,towards rapid political advancement with the ultimateobjective of creating an independent state of WestPapua by 1970. As part of this program the Dutchcultivated a Papuan elite committed to this goal.

As an international dispute, the conflict betweenIndonesia and The Netherlands was resolved inAugust 1962 with the signing of the New YorkAgreement which transferred administration toIndonesia. Negotiations for the agreement had beenconducted under the auspices of the United Nations.Self-determination for Papuans had been acornerstone of Dutch policy and, as a face-savinggesture, the New York Agreement containedprovision for an act of self-determination, accordingto international practice, within six years ofIndonesian administration. The Act of Free Choicewas conducted in 1969, under United Nationssupervision, in very controversial circumstances.6The “return” of West Irian to the nation was regardedas the successful outcome of a nationalist struggle,led by President Soekarno and supported by allsignificant political groups. Soekarno constructed thestruggle against the Dutch in West Irian as an issue tounify the nation – to complete the Revolution. Heastutely used the dynamics of the Cold War toacquire substantial armaments from the Soviet blocand detach United States support from its NATOally, The Netherlands. The Indonesian struggle waslargely diplomatic, but the limited use of armedinfiltrations and the threat to deploy its Soviet armsproved an effective support to diplomacy. The Act ofFree Choice was finally conducted in 1969 under theSoeharto government. Jakarta brought 1025traditional leaders to Jakarta where, under greatpressure, they voted unanimously on behalf of thePapuan people to join the Republic of Indonesia. Nomeaningful consultation was conducted with thepeople themselves.

Milner and Mary Quilty (ed), Episodes: Australia in Asia,Oxford University Press, 1998, pp. 10-366 See John Saltford, “United Nations Involvement with theAct of Self-determination in West Irian (Indonesian WestNew Guinea) 1968 to 1969”, Indonesia 69 (April 2000),pp. 71-92


Indonesia derives satisfaction from the fact that,through the UN’s acceptance of the results of the Actof Free Choice, the international community hadendorsed the process through which West Irian hadbeen returned to Indonesia. In the light of the strongsense of national pride Indonesians feel about the“return" of West Irian, the revival of Papuan nationalaspirations is particularly difficult for them tounderstand. Soekarno’s daughter, MegawatiSoekarnoputri, captured this sentiment when sherecalled a childhood conversation with her father.She had asked why he had visited Irian. It was so faraway. To which he replied: “Without Irian JayaIndonesia is not complete to become the nationalterritory of the Unitary Republic of Indonesia.” Shewanted to maintain her father’s vision. She appealedto the people of Irian Jaya that the territory had beenentrusted to the nation through the sacrifice ofheroes.7

The dominant Papuan view is completely differentand summarised in the first three resolutions of theSecond Papuan Congress (Kongres Papua), held inJayapura 29 May – 4 June 2000:

! “The people of Papua have been sovereign as anation and a state since 1 December 1961.

! The people of Papua, through the SecondCongress, reject the 1962 New York Agreementon moral and legal grounds as the agreement wasmade without any Papuan representation.

! The people of Papua, through the SecondCongress, reject the results of Pepera (the Act ofFree Choice) because it was conducted undercoercion, intimidation, sadistic killings, militaryviolence and immoral conduct contraveninghumanitarian principles. Accordingly, the peopleof Papua demand that the United Nations revokeresolution 2504, 19 December (sic) 1969.”8

The first resolution refers to the occasion in 1961when the national symbols – the Morning Star flagand “Hai Tanahku Papua” (the anthem) - wereunveiled. In October 1961 the National Committee ofleading Papuan members of the New Guinea Councilhad adopted the flag and anthem as the symbols ofstate for an independent West Papua together with aPolitical Manifesto that demanded independence. On1 December 1961 the flag was raised and the anthemsung for the first time, in front of the New GuineaCouncil and in the presence of the Governor of Dutch

7 “Wapres: Tanpa Irian, Indonesia tidak Utuh”, Tifa Irian,20-31 Desember 1999, p. 88 Resolusi, Kongres Papua, Port Numbay (Jayapura), 4June 2000. The UN resolution was on 19 November 1969.

New Guinea and members of the Council.9 TheCongress resolution represents the view that 1December 1961 was the date on which Papua becameindependent. Not without some irony, PresidentSoekarno’s instruction to his armed forces on 19December 1961 to destroy the puppet State of WestPapua has been used as evidence that such a stateexisted.10

The commitment to this interpretation of Papua’shistory is not restricted to pro-independence groups.In the provincial government’s proposal for SpecialAutonomy there is provision for the establishment ofthe “Commission to Correct the Course of PapuanHistory”, which would research the history ofintegration.11 Across the political spectrum, there is akeen awareness of Papua having been the ‘object’ ofinternational conflict, rather than Papuans havingbeen participants. Hence, the rejection of the NewYork Agreement because Papuans were not party tothe negotiations about the fate of their homeland. TheNew York Agreement and the UN supervision andacceptance of the results of the Act of Free Choicesupport, in Papuan eyes, the contention that Papuawas sacrificed for the interests of others.12

It is the link that Papuans make between this historyand the contemporary struggle that is critical to thisreport. Commenting on the “Act of Free Choice” aForeri [Forum for the Reconciliation of Irian JayaSociety] report has noted: “All the Papuan peoplewitnessed the injustice, the deceit and themanipulation. Papuans could not resist. All resistance 9 Bestuursverslag van de Resident van Hollandia over demaanden November en December 1961, Nieuw GuineaArchief, Dosier G 16725, Dutch State Archives10 “Otonomi Khusus Itu Binatang Apa Eeee”, Tifa Irian, 1-5 November 1999, p. 711 RUU Republik Indonesia Nr…. Tahun 2001 tentangOtonomi Khusus bagi Propinsi Papua Dalam BentukWilaya Berpemerintahan Sendiri, pasal 43.12 The Papuan interpretation of the Act of Free Choice hasreceived support from recent research based on previouslyclassified UN documents as well as Netherlands, UnitedStates, British and Australian government sources. JohnSaltford argues that under the 1962 New York Agreement,“…the Netherlands, Indonesia and the UN had anobligation to protect the political rights and freedoms ofthe Papuans, and to ensure that an act of self-determinationtook place, in accordance with international practice. Onboth these points, the three parties failed, and they did sodeliberately since genuine Papuan self-determination wasnever seen as an option by any of them once the [NewYork] Agreement was signed.” John Saltford, “UnitedNations Involvement with the Act of Self-determination inWest Irian (Indonesian West New Guinea) 1968 to 1969”,Indonesia 69 (April 2000), p. 91


at the time was suppressed with arms. Thewidespread murders conducted since then haveinstilled the desire for independence in the heart ofthe people.”13

13 Laporan Foreri, cited in “Gus Dur Minta ke MPR,Thom Bilang Dialog Internasional”, Tifa Papua, 10-15January 2000.

III. INDONESIAN SETTLERCOMMUNITIES

The dramatic demographic changes during theIndonesian administration are not part of the publicpolitical discourse in Irian Jaya or about Irian Jaya,but they are of the greatest importance inunderstanding the evolving political situation. Theinflux of Indonesian settlers, and their dominance ofthe economy, contribute much to the Papuan sense ofno longer being in control of their homeland. Despitethe heterogeneous composition of Papuan societyconstituting more than 250 ethno-linguistic groups,Papuans define themselves in reference to thesettlers, often in simple physical terms - curly-hairedPapuans and straight-haired Indonesians. Externally,Papuan identity is an ethnic identity. In its politicalexpression, it is an ethnic nationalism. The leadingpro-independence organisation, the Presidium DewanPapua (the Papuan Presidium Council, hereafter thePresidium), is a Papuan ethnic organisation. At theanniversary of “independence” on 1 December 2000there were a few migrant settlers observing from theperiphery, but otherwise the only Indonesians presentwere the police and military. The substantial non-Papuan minority represent the major constraint andgreatest challenge for pro-independence leaders. Asthe conflicts in Wamena and Abepura in October,November and December 2000 suggest, tensionsbetween Papuans and non-Papuans have the potentialto be the source of widespread social disruption andviolence.

The demographic transformation in Papua had beenconsiderable by any standards. In 1960 the “Asian”population, mainly eastern Indonesians, Javanese andChinese, numbered just 18,600 out of an estimatedpopulation of 736,700 or 2.5 per cent.14 TheIndonesian census does not provide figures forPapuan and non-Papuan populations of the province.The census data for religious affiliation gives someindication of the ethnic composition, but there arePapuan Moslem populations in some western coastalareas of the province around Fak Fak, Sorong and theRaja Ampat islands and many of the Indonesiansettlers are Christians from Maluku and NorthSulawesi. In 1998 there were 452,214 Moslems,constituting 21.14 per cent of the province’spopulation15, an increase from 139,739 or 11 per cent

14 Netherlands Government Annual Report to the UnitedNations on Netherlands New Guinea, 1960, The Hague,pp. 6-715 Irian Jaya dalam Angka 1998, BPS Proponsi Irian Jaya,1998, p. 193


in 1982.16 The 1990 census indicates that 16.13 percent of the population were born outside theprovince. The figure was higher for urban areas ofthe province at 35.1 per cent. The capital Jayapura iswhere the settler communities are most evident andwhere the Moslem portion of the population in 1998was 42.72 per cent.17 University of Cenderawasihdemographer, Michael Rumbiak, estimates that therewere fewer than 1.5 million Papuans, which wouldmean that settler communities constituted about 30per cent of the population.18

Under the Netherlands Administration, Indonesians,especially Ambonese, Menadonese and Keiese aswell as Eurasians were officials, police, teachers andmissionaries. Papuans experienced a form of dualcolonialism, as much eastern Indonesian as it wasDutch. The emerging Papuan elite of the 1950s andearly 1960s sharpened its identity in reference to theeastern Indonesians, who held the jobs to which theyaspired.19 The sense of competition with settlers forpositions within the bureaucracy and the resentmentfelt about settler domination of key positions remainsa strong motive force in Papuan nationalism amongthe educated elite. Michael Menufandu, a seniorPapuan civil servant and former Mayor of Jayapura,complains of the intellectual arrogance of officials inbelieving that policy can only be made in Jakarta.Whereas it is the local people who know the regionand its problems best.20 Another cause of resentmentamong Papuan officials is that, while they have tocompete with Indonesians for the senior positions inIrian Jaya, they are rarely appointed to positions inother provinces.21

Migration to Irian Jaya has been in two forms: thecentral government’s transmigration programs and

16 BPS Propinsi Irian Jaya cited in John RG Djopari,Pemberontakan Organisasi Papua Merdeka, Gramedia,Jakarta, 1993, p. 81.17 Penduduk Indonesia, Hasil Sensus Penduduk 1990, BiroPusat Statistiek, Jakarta, p.6918 M.C. Rumbiak, “Sumber Daya Manusia Papua”,unpublished paper. Fakultas Ekonomi, UniversitasCenderawasih, Jayapura, 2000, p. 2.19 Richard Chauvel, “ Decolonising without the Colonised:The Liberation of Irian Jaya”, in Dolores Elizalde (ed), LasRelaciones Internacionales en el Pacifico (Siglos XVII-XX): Colonizacion, Descolonizacion Y EncuentroCultural, Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas,Madrid, 1997, p. 56020 “Michael Menufandu, Senior Advisor Masalah OtonomiDaerah untuk Irian Jaya”, Tokoh, Denpasar, 20-26Desember 1999, p. 2621 “Papuanisasi Jurus Jitu dan Sederhana”, Papua Post,Jayapura, 25 November 2000

voluntary migration, which in turn have created twopatterns of settlement. The transmigrants, mostlyfrom Java, have been settled in rural areas, while thesettlers who come by their own means have beenattracted by the economic opportunities in the urbanareas of the province. The largest groups of settlersare Javanese, Buginese, Makasarese, Ambonese,Menadonese and Bataks.22 Although Indonesiansettlers form a small minority in the rural areas of theprovince as a whole, in the transmigration sitesaround Jayapura, Merauke, Paniai, Fak Fak andSorong the rapid increase in transmigrants hasoverwhelmed the local Papuan population.

The voluntary migrants have tended to settle in theurban areas of Papua. The statistics noted abovesupport the visual impression that Jayapura, inparticular, is an “Indonesian” city. Settlers have beeneconomically successful. They dominate the city’seconomic life. The streets of Jayapura’s centralmarket reflect the economic hierarchy. The shops areIndonesian Chinese- and settler-owned, settler tradersrun the market stalls in front of the shops. In front ofstalls sit Papuan traders, mainly highlanders, sellingsmall quantities of fruit and vegetables. One Papuanobserver noted that the “…presence of the settlers hascreated a colonial economic structure, where only thetraditional sector is run by the indigenouspopulation.”23

The urban markets have become a focus of conflictbetween the settler traders and Papuans. Theysymbolise the economic disparities between thecommunities. In April 2000 there were clashesbetween Papuans and Bugis-Makasarese settlers inEntrop, one of the principal market centres inJayapura. In November 2000, the market at Abepura,near Jayapura was the locale of two violent clashes.The first violence occurred when three Papuans(highlanders) refused to pay for a meal and a fightfollowed, in which the Bugis-Makasarese tradersarmed with home-made weapons wounded 5Papuans.24 The police account of the incident notedthat disputes between the settlers and the Papuanswere common around the market. "The migrants areusually vendors who work hard to earn their money,while some locals tend to extort money from them. In

22 Penduduk Indonesia, Hasil Sensus Penduduk 1990, BiroPusat Statistiek, Jakarta, p.6923 Jhon Wanane, Mth, “Politik Ekonomi dan MigrasiBangsa Melayu di Tanah Papua”. Tifa Papua, 11-16December 2000, p. 624 “Insiden di Pasar Abepura”, 11 & 12 November 2000,ELS-HAM


the Abepura case, the migrants fought back,"25 Acouple of days later a further clash occurredinvolving larger numbers of Papuans and leaving 16people injured.26 In April 2001 a Buginese boy waskilled and a Papuan stabbed in a clash betweenPapuans and settler traders at the Abepura market.27

On 7 December 2000 ] about 300 people armed withtraditional weapons attacked the police station nearthe Abepura market killing three policemen as wellas burning down shops. The police were unable toidentify or capture any of the attackers. On suspicionthat the attackers were highlanders, the police raidedthe student dormitories (mainly highlanders),attacked the sleeping students, and detained 90 ofthem. In detention some were tortured and threekilled.28

The patterns of conflict between highlanders, on oneside, and security forces and settlers, on the other,were most evident in the violence in the highlandstown of Wamena on 6 October 2000.29 The violenceand loss of life in Wamena occurred in the context ofthe Government’s determination that the Papuan flagshould no longer be flown. On 6 October, theWamena police lowered the flag at a number ofSatgas Papua (pro-independence militia) posts in thetown without any resistance. By the time theyapproached the main Satgas Papua post, near thepolice headquarters, a crowd of independencesupporters had gathered to defend the flag. Neitherthe Satgas nor the crowd heeded the policeinstructions and in the violence that followed twopolice were wounded and police shot one Papuan.The death of Elieser Alua was a catalyst for Papuanattacks on Indonesian settlers and lowland Papuans 25 “Papua council leaders to go on trial soon”, JakartaPost, 15 November 200026 “Abepura market brawl leaves 16 injured”, Jakarta Post,14 November 200027 “Overnight clash in Abepura market claims one life,”Jakarta Post, 5 April 200128 “About 300 People attacked Police Sector Abepura andBurn down Shops”; “Police and Mobile Brigade(BRIMOB) in Jayapura Arrest and Detain People Illegallyand Torture Them”, 7 December 2000, ELS-HAM. SeeSwiss journalist, Oswald Iten’s, account of the torture anddeaths of the highlander students in “Prison, Torture andMurder in Jayapura, Twelve Days in an Indonesian Jail”,Neue Zurcher Zeitung, Zurich, 22 December 2000. See:http://www.nzz.ch/english/background/background2000/background0012/bg001222west_papua.html. For a detaileddiscussion of the Abepura and Wamena cases see HumanRight Watch, “Violence and Political Impasse in Papua”vol XX, No. X (X), July 2001.29 Wamena is the administrative centre of the BaliemValley in the central highlands, located about 290 km fromJayapura.

who had migrated to the region.30 In one area ofWamena town, Wouma, settlers were attacked intheir houses and the houses burnt. According toPapuan sources, the settlers were attacked in theirhouses because police and soldiers were using thehouses for cover and firing on Papuans.31 Policeestimated that about 30 people were killed.32 Theimpact of violence in Wamena, the trauma sufferedby those involved and the exodus of settlers andcoastal Papuans from Wamena is a reflection of thebrutality and sadism of the killing as well as thenumbers who lost their lives.33 It is important to note,however, that there were numerous stories ofPapuans defending and protecting settlers.

The immediate impact of the violence in Wamenawas an exodus of Indonesian settlers and coastalPapuans. The scale of the exodus out of Wamena isdifficult to quantify. Kompas estimated that about1000 settlers (of a settler population of 15,000) hadleft in the two weeks following the violence.34 WhenICG visited Wamena in early November 2000 theexodus was continuing. Settlers and coastal Papuans,including many long-term residents, were leaving forsecurity concerns. Most of the schools outsideWamena had closed and those in town werefunctioning with reduced staff.35 The WamenaHumanitarian Investigation Team asserted that theeducation system had suffered long-term damage.Many teachers had fled the region. Some 200 30 Although Papuan society consists of some 250ethnolinguistic groups, a broad distinction can be madebetween highland and coastal communities. Among thelatter there has been much longer contact with the worldoutside Papua. Some coastal societies were converted toChristianity in the late 19th century. In 1930 the island ofBiak had a higher rate of literacy than Java. The denselypopulated communities around Wamena were only“discovered” in 1938.31 Dance Bleskadit, “Jika Polisi Sembunyi di RumahWarga Sipil”, Tifa Papua, 16-21 October 2000, p. 5. Someof the survivors deny that the security forces had used theirhouses for cover. ICG confidential interviews withrefugees in the Military headquarters, Wamena, 8November 200032 Dance Bleskadit and Kris Ansaka, “Kebiasaan Perangyang Sengaja Dibangkitkan”, Tifa Papua, 16-21 October2000, p. 5. This figure probably underestimates thenumber of Papuans killed and wounded by the securityforces.33 “Suara Pengungsi Wamena: Biar Dibangun sepertiSurga, Kami Tetap Trauma”, Kompas, 24 October 2000 34 ibid35 “Nasib Ribuan Guru di Jayawijaya Belum Jelas”,Kompas, 11 October 2000. It is estimated that about 95 percent of the teachers in regency around Wamena(Kabupatan Jayawijaya) were settlers or coastal Papuans


teachers had applied for transfer and many schoolswere without teachers. As of January 2001, theeducation authorities had not taken any measures toremedy the situation.36

The violence in Wamena and the uncertainties aboutwhat might happen in Irian Jaya on 1 December, theanniversary of Papuan “independence”, appears tohave stimulated a significant exodus of people andgoods, including vehicles, from the province. Theinter-island shipping line, Pelni, reported an“explosion” of demand since the Wamena affair andthat it had been forced to sell tickets without berths orseats. In October and November 2000 about 25,000people had left Jayapura on Pelni ships. The shippingof vehicles from Jayapura and Biak by their ownerswould suggest that the principal factor was thesecurity concerns generated by the political situation,rather than a larger than usual number of peoplewanting to celebrate the end of the fasting month orChristmas outside Papua.37

There is a suspicion among some Papuans that theviolence in Wamena was related to an attempt by thesecurity forces to shift the dynamics of politicalconflict from the demand for independence to one ofethnic tensions.38 This suspicion was given somecredence a few days after the violence at Wamena byBrigadier General S.Y. Wenas, the then Chief ofPolice in Papua. Wenas encouraged settlers to armthemselves against any attacks from Papuans. In theAbepura market clash in the second week ofNovember the market traders from Sulawesi werearmed.39 The identification of highlanders, 36 Tim Kemanusiaan Wamena Bagian Investigasi,“Peristiwa Tragedi Kemanusiaan Wamena, 6 Oktober2000, Sebelum Dan Sesudahnya: Sebuah LaporanInvestigasi”, Jayapura, Januari 2001. This report wascompiled by a team from Justice and Peace Secretariat ofthe Catholic Church in Jayapura, Kontras Papua, Elsham-Papua and LBH Jayapura.37 “400 Mobil Keluar dari Jayapura”, Kompas, 28November 2000; “Ratusan Kendaraan dinyatkan Ekodus”,Radar Biak, 25 November 2000. John Rumbiak suggeststhat the exodus of settlers slowed after Jakarta reassertedits authority. It is difficult to monitor the numbers ofsettlers returning in 2001. ICG Interview with JohnRumbiak 6 September 2001.38 Benny Giay, “Peristiwa Wamena 6 Oktober: SiasatMembuburkan PDP (Presidium Dewan Papua)”,unpublished manuscript, Jayapura, November 2000; “AdaSkenario Besar Jakarta untuk 1 Desember di Papua Barat”,Radio Nederland interview with John Rumbiak, 1December 2000.39 Radio Republik Indonesia, Jayapura, 9 October 2000,cited in Frans Maniagasi, “Papua Merdeka atau SekadarProyek Keamanan”, Tempo, 10 December 2000

particularly those from Wamena, as pro-independence hard-liners and as being responsible forthe attack on the police station at Abepura on 7December, further heightened ethnic tensions andfears. The Abepura police chief, Alex Sampe,“declared war” on the highlanders.40 The Director ofthe Legal Aid Institute in Jayapura, DemianusWakman, noted that it was the responsibility of thesecurity forces to arrest those who attacked the policestation, not to hunt and capture an ethnic group, suchas happened with people from Wamena.41 Thetension between highlanders and the security forcesis also reflected in the exodus since early Decemberof Wamena people, resident around Jayapura,seeking refuge across the border in PNG.42 ACatholic Church report noted that the number ofrefugees in Valimo (PNG) alone had more thandoubled since November 2000. The report identifiedthe absence of security and peace in West Papuasince December 2000 and the attitudes and behaviourof the security forces towards Papuans, particularlyhighlanders as key factors in the exodus.43

The exodus of refugees from the conflicts in EastTimor, Maluku and more recently CentralKalimantan provides some insight into what mighthappen in Irian Jaya. The demographictransformation in Papua has been extreme and thecultural tensions and economic rivalries generatedmake ethnic conflict and exodus of refugees a matterof great concern. The modest refugee flows in 2000and early 2001 are a measure of political tension.Indonesian settlers left Irian Jaya in the last monthsof 2000 because of the rising tensions between thepro-independence movement and the Indonesianauthorities as the commemoration of “independence”day approached. Papuans, particularly highlanders,sought refuge across the border in Papua NewGuinea as a response to the security forces pursuit ofthem.

40 “Police raid student hostels in Jayapura, arrest scores”,AFP, Jakarta, 7 December 200041 Kris Ansaka, “Kedamaian di Papua mulai Terusik”, TifaPapua, 11-16 December 2000.42 “Pengungsi Jayapura”, Astaga.com, 6 January 2001; ATifa Papua editorial, 11-16 Desember 2000, made a directlink between the security force’s pursuit and detention ofhighlanders and refugee flow of highlanders into PNG.43 Letter, the Catholic Bishops in Papua to the Governor ofIrian Jaya, drs. Jaap Solosa, 16-2-2001


IV. THE PAPUAN ELITE

The Papuan elite has been the key agent in thedevelopment of a Papuan identity. They were the first‘Papuans’, brought together from many regions of theprovince and educated in the schools and trainingcolleges established after the Pacific war. Theselective and elitist approach of the Dutch has givenway to a more broadly based education systeminvolving much larger numbers under the Indonesianadministration. The graduates of the Dutch andIndonesian education systems have assumed theleadership of political, religious and communityorganisations.

The leaders of Papuan society have grown up, beeneducated and developed careers often incircumstances that have demanded difficult decisionsabout access to education and employmentopportunities, personal and family welfare, culturalidentity and political values. Those in positions ofresponsibility have often been confronted withchoices between the interests and values of thepeople they represent, on one side, and institutional,community and personal advancement and survivalin the Indonesian State, on the other.

The pressures of living within what many of themregard as a colonial system have involvedaccommodations that since the fall of Soeharto havesometimes been the source of embarrassment. Mostof the contemporary Papuan leaders have New Order‘pasts’. Prominent Presidium members, Theys Eluayand Yorrys Raweyai, are but the most controversialexamples.

The Papuan elite is a bureaucratic elite. In aneconomy dominated by Chinese and Indonesiansettlers, there are few Papuan business figures ofsubstance. Besides traditional (adat) legitimacy,status is based on educational achievement andoccupation. The Papuan elite is in the senior andmiddle positions of the provincial and districtgovernment, the churches, institutes of highereducation and NGOs.

The older generation still in the senior positionswithin the bureaucracy and the churches were Dutch-educated. Dutch education and Dutch values remainmuch more apparent than elsewhere in Indonesia.The last of the Dutch-educated Papuans are 13 - 20years younger than their Indonesian counterparts.The preservation of Dutch values is stronger, notbecause Dutch education was at more advancedlevels or more broadly accessible, but rather because

it remains highly valued, at least in comparison to thepolitical, cultural and educational values of NewOrder Indonesia. There is a much less ambivalentattitude to the Dutch colonial past than elsewhere inIndonesia.

The Papuan elite’s accommodation with theIndonesian State is a key factor in understandingcontemporary political change. The dominant modeof accommodation is borne out of a pragmaticacceptance of Indonesian authority over Irian Jayaand the opportunities it provides for economic,political and social development of the territory aswell as for personal political and career advancement.With respect to the Papuan Churches’ leaders, BennyGiay has argued that senior churchmen becameagents, mediators and peacemakers for thegovernment.44 They were motivated by their sense ofresponsibility to protect their flock against what theyperceived to be the overwhelming force that theIndonesian authorities were able to mobilise. Thepolitical agenda of the more conservative members ofthe elite remains structured by their appreciation ofpolitical realities: How can less than two millionPapuans hope to wrest their freedom from 210million Indonesians?45

Church leaders have their counterparts in thosemembers of the elite in senior positions within theIndonesian administration. At critical moments, suchas the Act of Free Choice and the 2000 anniversaryof Papuan “independence”, when the Indonesianauthorities were determined on a course of action,those Papuans in the senior posts were in a positionwhere they felt they had to use their influence tocontain Papuan resistance in order to save lives andlimit violence. They see themselves as acting tosecure the continuation of Papuan society. GovernorJacobus Solossa was in this position on“independence” day 2000. In an interview with RadioNederland, he provided some insight into thepredicament that confronted him. In response to aquestion about why, in the circumstances of abroadly conceived freedom (Merdeka) that thegovernor was advocating, the Papuan flag could notbe flown, he stated: “Don’t incite our people todemand independence. It has to be explained thatIndonesia would not accept the demand that easily.There would be many complex problems and our 44 Benny Giay, “Church and Society: The Church leadersof Irian Jaya in the midst of change and conflict”,unpublished discussion paper presented at the Eukumindomeeting, De Tiltenburg, The Netherlands, 18-19 April1996, p. 2; Benny Giay, “Gereja dan Politik di PapuaBarat”, Jayapura, January 2000.45 ICG Confidential interview, 9 December 2000


people would be the casualties. We must explainclearly and see with clarity so that we do not behaveemotionally. [If not,] our people will become thevictims. Who will be responsible for the people?”46

The governor implicitly recognised the widespreadsupport for independence in Papuan society. He wasamong the 100 Papuan leaders who demandedindependence at a meeting with President Habibie inFebruary 1999. Yet, as a long-serving Golkarpolitician, he is keenly aware of the political realitiesof the struggle for control of government in Jakarta,the determination of nearly all sections of the Jakartapolitical elite to maintain Irian Jaya as part ofIndonesia and the implications that has for theprovince. There is a duality in the Papuan elite’saccommodation with the Indonesian state. ThosePapuans who reach the middle and senior levels ofthe administration have publicly accepted thedemands of loyalty the state imposes. However, theircommitment to the state, its values and ideals maynot be what it seems.

The duality of loyalties among senior Papuans iscaptured by the striking figure of Filip Karma, anindependence activist and senior government official,who was often seen in Jayapura in the days before the“independence” anniversary, in his Indonesianbureaucratic attire, with a Papuan flag proudly pinnedto his chest. The government’s own intelligenceassessments have acknowledged the ambiguity ofelite loyalty. In one leaked intelligence document,some of the most senior Papuan officials, includingthe present governor and the former governor, BasSuebu, currently the Ambassador to Mexico, wereincluded in what was labelled the “Papuan politicalconspiracy”. It recognised the provincial governmenthad been “contaminated” by the independence idealand recommended that strong sanctions be applied towell-known supporters of independence amongstlocal officials.47 It was announced in September 2000that sanctions would be taken against Papuangovernment officials who openly supported theindependence movement.48

46 Radio Nederland Siaran Indonesia, “Upacara PerayaanKemerdekaan Ke 39 Papua Barat Berjalan Aman”, 4December 2000.47 Nota Dinas, Direktur Jenderal Kesbang dan Linmas,Ermaya Suradinata to Menteri Dalam Negeri, 9 June 2000,578/CD/kesbang/D IV/VI/2000.48 Antara, 27 September 2000, www.KABAR-IRIAN.com.

V. REFORMASI AND THE PAPUANRENAISSANCE

Until the fall of Soeharto the only alternatives for theelite other than co-operation were joining the OPM’sarmed resistance, other forms of open protest orexile. The response to Reformasi in Papua wascomplex. On the one hand, it created politicalopportunities successfully suppressed in the past byPresidents Soekarno and Soeharto. Reformasirepresented the revival of the values of a more open,accountable, egalitarian and less corrupt polity thatappealed to activists across the archipelago. On theother hand, Papuans tended not to join their fellowIndonesians in the struggle for a more democraticIndonesia; rather they seized the opportunity torevive the struggle for an independent Papua. HumanRights Watch argued that the expectation for changewas even greater in Papua than elsewhere inIndonesia, because of the “…accumulated resentmentof three decades of harsh and often discriminatoryrule…”.49

In August 1998, within weeks of the suppression ofpro-independence demonstrations in Jayapura,Sorong, Wamena and Biak50, intellectuals, Churchleaders and activists had established the Forum forthe Reconciliation of Irian Jaya Society (Foreri).Foreri sought the opportunity for Papuans to managetheir own affairs, through autonomy, a federal systemor independence.51 There was awareness amongactivists in Jayapura that they had to disassociatethemselves from the OPM after the 1996 LorentzExpedition kidnapping affair,52 if Papua was to

49 “Human Rights and Pro-Independence Actions In IrianJaya, 1999-2000”, Human Rights Watch, Vol. 12, No.2(C), http://www.hrw.org/hrw/reports/2000/papua/50 Biak was the most significant of these demonstrations.The demonstrators occupied the centre of Biak town forseveral days and raised the flag. The demonstration wasbrought to an end when the military opened fire on thedemonstrators, killing 26 of them. Human Rights Watchpress release, 12 December 1998; Mark Worth, “BannerDay for strife-torn Province”, Australian, 2 December1999.51 “Human Rights and Pro-Independence Actions In IrianJaya, 1999-2000”, Human Rights Watch, Vol. 12, No.2(C), http://www.hrw.org/hrw/reports/2000/papua/52 In January 1996 12 members of a joint European-Indonesian scientific expedition were kidnapped for overfour months by an OPM group led by Kelly Kwalik. TwoIndonesian members of the expedition were killed in anattempt to release the hostages. The military’s “perfidious”use of the International Committee of the Red Cross’ rolein the affair has been a matter of controversy. Summary


attract international support. A letter sent to PresidentHabibie by 15 US congressmen on 22 May 1998encouraged them. The congressmen urged Habibie toopen a dialogue with the peoples of East Timor andIrian Jaya on human rights and a just solution to theirpolitical status.53

Foreri, with the support of the three major churches54

, leading intellectuals and NGOs as well as a numberof traditional leaders, emerged as the principalvehicle of Papuan ideals. Foreri became the dialoguepartner with the central government in a series ofmeetings – the Jakarta Informal meetings – which ledto the Team of 100 Papuan leaders meeting withPresident Habibie in February 1999. The 100members of the delegation were broadlyrepresentative of the Papuan elite bothgeographically and in terms of social and religiousbackground. The statement that Thom Beanal, theleader of the Team of 100, read to Habibie and hiscabinet stated that Irian Jaya wanted to secede fromIndonesia, that a transitional government beestablished in Irian Jaya under United Nationssupervision and, if necessary, the UN become part ofan international dialogue between the government ofIndonesia and the Papuan people.

The absence of any formal response from Habibie atthe meeting, and subsequently, has meant that from aPapuan perspective the hoped-for “national dialogue”with the central government has not eventuated.Nevertheless, the meeting with Habibie was animportant stage in the transformation of the Papuanresistance and in the emergence of a new leadership.The meeting provided legitimacy to the Team of 100and gave credibility to non-violent strategies forattaining independence.

Since November 1999 the key Papuan leaders of the”Team of 100” have organised a series of massmeetings the principal objectives of which were tomobilise support, establish their leadershipcredentials and articulate their demands to theIndonesian government and the internationalcommunity.

and Conclusions of the Investigation into the events of 9May 1996 in Western Papua, entrusted by the ICRC to anOutside Consultant, 15 March 2000, cited in MemoriaPassionis di Papua: Kondisi Hak Asasi Manusia danGerakan Aspirasi Merdeka: Gambaran 1999, Jakarta2001, pp. 82-8353 “Indonesia Alert: Trouble in Irian Jaya”, Human RightsWatch, 7 July 199854 The largest Christian denominations in Papua are theChristian Evangelical Church in Papua (GKI), the CatholicChurch and the Evangelical Church of Indonesia (GKII).

The first such political gathering was held justoutside Jayapura on 12 November 1999 – to markTheys Eluay’s 62nd birthday. Theys Hiyo Eluay, atraditional (adat) leader from Sentani and long timeGolkar politician, had emerged as the foremost leaderof the pro-independence movement.55 Theys Eluayled the celebration for the 38th anniversary of theoccasion many contemporary Papuan leadersconsider their independence day. The anniversary on1 December 1999 was marked in Jayapura with a flagraising of both the “Morning Star” and theIndonesian flag in the same place as in 1961, outsidethe building that had housed the Dutch-establishedNew Guinea Council, ironically, opposite theMerdeka Square, where Indonesia built a monumentto those lost in a naval encounter against the Dutch inJanuary 1962. In stark contrast to the anniversary in2000, the flag raising took place with little or noIndonesian military presence.56 Theys Eluaydescribed the absence of military intervention as a“miracle”.57 The lack of military intervention inthese political gatherings signified the beginning ofthe nearly year-long period of substantial politicalopenness that Wahid’s presidency facilitated.

55 Tifa Irian, 15-22 November 1999, p. 6, “PenyataanSikap Politik”, 12 November 1999.56 Asia-Pacific, ABC Radio National, 1 December 1999.57 Mark Worth, “Banner day for strife-torn province”, TheAustralian, 2 December 1999; The Jakarta Post, 2-December 1999, noted that: “Police and soldiers, who inthe past have shot West Papuans for raising the flag whichsymbolises the separatist cause, showed greater restraint.”


VI. THE PAPUAN PRESIDIUMCOUNCIL

The flag raising of 1 December 1999 was a symbolicmoment, however in terms of establishing andconsolidating a new leadership structure andmobilising support throughout the province, the mostimportant meetings were the Musyawarah BesarPapua 2000 (Mubes, Papuan Mass Consultation),23-26 February, and the Kongres Papua II (the 2nd

Papuan Congress), May – June 2000. Delegationsfrom the province’s fourteen regencies (kabupatan)attended both meetings along with representatives ofPapuan communities overseas. The Mubesestablished a Papuan Presidium Council, whichbecame the principal organisation of the pro-independence groups. In terms of personnel, there isa strong element of continuity among Foreri, theTeam of 100 and the Presidium. The Councilconsisted of 22 members, with two chairpersons andtwo moderators. The Council as an executive wasresponsible to a “Panel”, a legislature of 200representatives of the regencies and Papuancommunities overseas. The Presidium described itselfas being a form of collective leadership. Theys Eluayand Thom Beanal, the two chairpersons, wererecognised as the senior leaders.58

The Presidium provides a leadership structure for thediverse forces in favour of independence as well assome legitimacy to the ongoing dialogue with theIndonesian authorities. Associated with thePresidium, particularly with Theys Eluay, was amilitia, the Satgas Papua (the Papuan Task Force).The Satgas Papua was led by one of his sons, BoyEluay, and commonly thought to have been fundedby Theys Eluay’s close associate in the Presidium,Yorrys Raweyai59. The security forces permitted theSatgas Papua to maintain security at the twomeetings.

The leadership that emerged from the Mubes wascollective and inclusive. Many hoped that thecollective leadership would be confirmed at the 58 Decree No. VII/Mubes Papua/2000; Decree No:Iv/Mubes Papua/2000, Jayapura, 26 February 2000. Thesize of the legislature was later expanded to 501.59 Lindsay Murdoch and Andrew Kilvert , “Golkar YouthFunding Separatists”, Sydney Morning Herald, 6 March2000, p. 17. Yorrys Raweyai is a controversial figure inPapuan and Jakarta politics. He is deputy leader ofSoeharto’s notorious youth group, Pemuda Pancasila, andis thought to have close links with the former first family.He is the son of a Chinese father and Papuan (Serui)mother.

Congress. Instead Theys Eluay took the initiative tohave himself acknowledged as the supreme leader.Unexpectedly, he proposed to the Congress that hebecome the leader and Thom Beanal the deputy.60

The manner of his self-appointment reflected TheysEluay’s conviction that he was the one to unite Papuaand lead it to independence. How was it that someonewho had been among the 1025 Papuans to vote forincorporation with Indonesia in the 1969 Act of FreeChoice, was suspected of involvement in humanrights abuses and had served for three terms in theprovincial parliament as a Golkar member could berecognised as the leader of the independencemovement? Theys Eluay was a traditional leaderfrom Sentani with limited education and experienceof the world outside Papua.61 However, he had theforceful personality, imposing physique and theability to communicate to a broad cross section ofPapuan society. The latter capacity together with hisstatus as a traditional leader helped convince hiscolleagues in the Presidium to accept him as leader,despite reservations about his autocratic style,reluctance to consult and tendency to makeunrealistic promises to his supporters. Theys Eluayand Yorrys Raweyai’s role in the Presidium, giventheir links to the Soeharto past, remains a concern inintellectual circles and has caste a shadow over theindependence movement in Indonesia and overseasamong groups that might otherwise be expected to besympathetic.

Despite the reservations about Theys Eluay andYorrys Raweyai, the Presidium leadership thatemerged from the Congress was broadly reflective ofPapuan society. The highlands were less wellrepresented than the coastal regions, but intellectuals,the Churches, Papuan Moslems, women and Dutch-era activists had their representatives. Theys Eluayand Thom Beanal had stature as traditional leaders.To what extent this was a source of legitimacyoutside their own region is more difficult to assess.

If Theys Eluay illustrates one aspect of thetransformation of Papuan politics post-Soeharto,Thom Beanal sheds light on another. He is atraditional leader of the Amungme, on whose land

60 “Kongres Rekomendasikan Bangsa Papua Keluar dariNKRI”, Tifa Papua, 5-9 June 2000, p. 461 In 1996 at the time of the OPM’s kidnapping ofmembers of the Lorentz expedition (see footnote 51) ,Theys Eluay, as head of the Lembaga Adat Irian Jaya (thetraditional law council of Irian Jaya), was dismissive ofthose who wanted to establish a Papuan state. “This isrubbish (omong kosong), we have been independent since17 August 1945 and confirmed by the 1969 Act of FreeChoice.” Tifa Irian, minggu ketiga januari 1996, p. 6.


the giant Freeport mine operates. Freeport is one ofthe largest gold and copper producers in the world. Itdominates the economy of Irian Jaya and is asignificant corporate player in Indonesia. Beanalcame to prominence as a defender of his peopleagainst Freeport. In 1997 he took the company tocourt in the United States on environmental andhuman rights issues. In early 2000, however, heseemed to reverse his position when he wasappointed as a well-paid Commissioner of Freeport.Later in the year he signed a Memorandum ofUnderstanding with the company on behalf of theAmungme and Kamoro peoples concerning socio-economic resources, human rights, land rights andenvironmental rights.62 The transformation ofFreeport from the symbol of exploitation of theprovince’s resources and degradation of itsenvironment and society to being a potentialbenefactor and partner has not been withoutcontroversy. John Rumbiak, the human rights leader,criticised Freeport at its Annual General Meeting in2001. He questioned the company’s economicdevelopment and human rights programs for the localcommunities. He described the company’s occasionalfinancial support of the independence movement as“Classic Politics of Freeport”. “It is no secret thatFreeport is playing a deceitful game by contributingto the independence movement of West Papua whentheir real purpose is to pacify the Papuans.”63

The participation of regional delegations in thePapuan Mass Consultation and Papuan Congress alsocreated the opportunity for the returning delegates todisseminate the ideas in their local communities. Thedelegations established themselves as local Panel,recognising the leadership of the Presidium inJayapura and being responsible for the “socialisation”of the ideal of independence as well as establishinglocal Satgas Papua and Posko (Command Posts).With the establishment of the Presidium and the localPanels, the independence movement had thebeginnings of a province-wide organisation and acentral leadership – something that neither the firstgeneration of Papuan politicians during the Dutchadministration or the OPM had ever achieved.Around Wamena in the Baliem Valley the process of“socialisation” seems to have been particularlyintensive and far-reaching. Delegates from Wamenahad made a mark with their traditional attire at the 62 Press Release, Freeport Indonesia, 18 August 2000.www.kabar-irian.com63 Statement by John Rumbiak, the West Papua Institutefor Human Rights Study and Advocacy ELS-HAM), basedin Jayapura, West Papua. Submitted at the Annual GeneralMeeting (AGM) of Freeport McMoRan Copper and GoldInc. held in Wilmington, Delaware USA on May 3, 2001

Congress and by the fact that many of them hadwalked the 300 kms to Jayapura for the occasion.Senior members of the Presidium as well as localleaders undertook propagating the results of theCongress. Socialisation involved mass gatherings,inspiring speeches and often emotional appeals.Outside the town of Wamena the local leaders, intheir enthusiasm to spread the ideals ofindependence, went beyond the policies establishedby the Presidium, making unrealistic promises.According to one report, “The element that most ofall found a place in the hearts of people of the Baliem[Valley] and Papua in general was that the demandfor independence was non-negotiable.”64 Themobilisation of Satgas Papua and the establishmentof Posko were extensive both in Wamena and thesurrounding districts. Referring to Irian Jaya moregenerally, an intelligence assessment from theDepartment of Internal Affairs observed that theatmosphere down to the village level following theCongress was one of euphoria and enthusiasm withthe idea of Merdeka (independence). The“conspiratorial groups” supporting Merdeka wereincreasingly cohesive and were endeavouring to“socialise” the results of the Congress throughoutIrian Jaya, elsewhere in Indonesia andinternationally.65

It is important to note that Wamena and thesurrounding districts in the Baliem Valley haveexperienced some of the most extreme brutality andrepression at the hands of the security forces,particularly in 1977. The Humanitarian InvestigationTeam report argues that many of the older generationare still traumatised by the experience.66 Theindependence ideal was so readily andenthusiastically accepted in significant part becauseof the experience of repression. The understandingsof what independence would mean might be naiveand people might be all too ready to acceptunrealistic promises, but their support forindependence should not be dismissed. On thecontrary, it is strong because it is based on their ownexperience.

64 Tim Kemanusiaan Wamena Bagian Investigasi,“Peristiwa Tragedi Kemanusiaan Wamena, 6 Oktober2000, Sebelum Dan Sesudahnya: Sebuah LaporanInvestigasi”, Jayapura, Januari 2001.65 Nota Dinas, Direktur Jenderal Kesbang dan Linmas,Ermaya Suradinata to Menteri Dalam Negeri, 9-6-00,578/CD/kesbang/D IV/VI/2000.66 Tim Kemanusiaan Wamena Bagian Investigasi,“Peristiwa Tragedi Kemanusiaan Wamena, 6 Oktober2000, Sebelum Dan Sesudahnya: Sebuah LaporanInvestigasi”, Jayapura, Januari 2001


The widespread, straightforward anduncompromising support for independence at thevillage and provincial town level of Papuan societyhas created a particular dynamic within the pro-independence groups. The new political leadership –the Foreri, the Team of 100 and the Presidium – arepart of an elite that seized the opportunity created byReformasi to advocate independence through non-violent means. By doing so they quickly mobilisedbroad support from sections of Papuan society thatdid not share their experience of accommodationwith the Indonesian State. The mass support base’sexperience of Indonesia is that of the cutting edge ofrepression. This is not to suggest that the elite hadescaped the heavy hand of the State, but they had arange of alternatives not available to other Papuans.The movement’s supporters might have naive andunrealistic notions of independence, but they havedirect experience of what they do not want. The pro-independence leaders, on the other hand, tend to bemoderate, pragmatic and open to negotiation andcompromise. Their supporters are the ‘hard core’ ofthe movement. There has been tension between theleaders who felt the need to articulate their ideals insimple terms to communicate with their supporters,on one side, and the imperative to preserve someroom for manoeuvre in their negotiations with thegovernment. Within this dynamic, there is the riskthat unfulfilled promises will lead to disillusionmentand feelings of having been betrayed.

The emergence of new leadership and theestablishment of the Presidium did not mean that theOPM disappeared. It continued to operate throughoutthe period of political openness. Indeed, sinceDecember 2000 there has been a reversion tokidnappings and OPM and OPM-like attacks on thesecurity forces. The relationship of the Presidiumand the OPM factions has been an uneasy one. Theyshare the ideal of independence, but the new leaderssought to disassociate themselves from the OPM andits methods. The Presidium considers itself theleaders of the struggle for independence for allPapuans, including the OPM.

That part of the elite that led the pro-independencegroups, because their message found such readyacceptance, quickly acquired authority andlegitimacy as the “representatives” of Papuan society.It was they, rather than their more cautiouscolleagues, who held the formal position of politicalleadership in the provincial government andparliament, who are the de facto leaders of thesociety. In June 1999 Irian Jaya elected a provincialparliament, democratically, for the first time since

integration with Indonesia.67 Yet it was a group ofself-proclaimed leaders, the Presidium, who, fromlate 1998 to December 2000, were the negotiatingpartners of the central and provincial authorities. Itwas those involved in Foreri, the Team of 100 andthe Presidium who set the political agenda in Papua.

Ethnicity also influences the issue of legitimacy. ThePresidium is an ethnic Papuan organisation, whereasa majority of the members of the provincialparliament and the senior officials of the provincialgovernment are Indonesians from outside Papua.Their association with Golkar and the Soeharto pastdisadvantages many of the senior Papuans in theparliament and government.There are two sets of opinions that distinguish thosemembers of the elite who became the pro-independence leaders and those, their ideals notwithstanding, who remained cautious. Firstly, thereare the pragmatists, who while recognising thechanges that followed the fall of Soeharto, werenevertheless sceptical about the limits of tolerance ofthe Indonesian authorities. They recognised theeconomic and symbolic importance of Irian Jaya toIndonesia and did not believe that any Indonesiangovernment of this generation, even a democraticone, would permit the separation of the territory andwould use the military means at its disposal toprevent secession. Pushing the limits of Indonesiantolerance involved risks both for the pro-independence leaders and their followers. The loss oflife that followed from the security forces’determination to lower the flag in late 2000 and thepattern of repressive military activity in the first halfof 2001 confirmed these views. The pragmatists,particularly those in formal positions of authority,were critical of the Presidium leadership becausethey were risking the lives of their innocentsupporters as well as risking the return of more overtrepression for Papuan society as a whole.68 Thiscriticism was tinged with resentment of thelegitimacy and authority the Presidium leaders hadacquired in Papuan society through their advocacy ofindependence.

67 Under Indonesia’s electoral system, the provincialparliament is elected by proportional representation from aprovince-wide constituency. Jayapura-based non-Papuanscontinued to dominate the main parties and selected theparty’s representatives in parliament, whose identity’swere not known to the voters at the time of the election..The result was heavy over-representation of urban non-Papuans.68 The Rev Herman Saud, Moderator of the ChristianEvangelical Church in Papua (GKI) , held Theys Eluayand the Presidium responsible for the loss of life atWamena. “Tragis”, Republika Online, 8 October 2000


Secondly, many within the NGOs, Churches andCendrawasih University were concerned that Papuawas not ready for independence. They pointed to thesettlers’ domination of economy and the senior levelsof the bureaucracy and the need to improve theeducation levels of Papuans. They doubted whetherthe provincial government had the capacity tomanage a nation state. Papua needed time to developits human resources, its institutional capacities andaddress the numerous areas of Papuan socio-economic disadvantage. Like other Papuans, theyknow that Papua is one of the richest provinces inIndonesia with one of the lowest standards of living,levels of educational attainment and health status,particularly among the indigenous population.

One of the implications of this analysis of elitepolitical opinion is that which divides members of theelite are pragmatic political assessments and differingviews of Papua’s development needs and capacities,rather than disagreements about the ideal ofindependence. In other words, the differences areabout the timeframe, means and likelihood ratherthan the objective. There are few Papuans whopublicly advocate that remaining part of Indonesiarepresents the preferred future for the territory. TheDepartment of Internal Affairs intelligenceassessment that pictured the Governor and theAmbassador to Mexico together with Theys Eluayand Thom Beanal as being members of a “PapuanPolitical Conspiracy” is correct.

As noted above, the Governor criticises those whowant independence because Indonesia will nottolerate separation and that innocent people willsuffer if pro-independence activities persist, ratherthan that independence is an undesirable objective.The Governor’s promotion of Special Autonomyreflects these pragmatic considerations. Indonesiawill oppose independence and Papua needs time toprepare for independence.

The Presidium emerged from the Congress withgreatly enhanced stature. President Wahid hadfunded the occasion. The leaders of the provincialparliament and government had attended. The eventattracted considerable coverage in the Indonesian andinternational media. The Presidium considered that ithad received a popular mandate from the Congress toadvance the struggle for independence. Inter alia, thePresidium was to seek recognition for the sovereigntyof West Papua from the international community andinitiate negotiations with Indonesia and TheNetherlands, under UN auspices, for a referendumfor the recognition of Papuan sovereignty. On 1

December, the anniversary of “independence”, it wasto account for the implementation of this mandate.69

69 Resolution of the 2nd Congress of West Papua, PortNumbay, 4 June 2000, Authorised and signed by: Thaha MAlhamid, Chairman, Tt. Aronggear, Rev. Herman Awom,Franzalbert Joku, Decky Iwanggin, Dra. Fera Kambu, SamManami Satia, Adolf Fonataba.


VII. INTERNATIONAL LOBBYING

By the time the Presidium accounted for its efforts toinvolve the international community in the strugglewith Jakarta, it could only point to formal supportfrom two microstates in the South Pacific. ThePresident of Nauru and the Prime Minister ofVanuatu spoke in support of West Papua at the UNMillennium Summit and Theys Eluay and othermembers of the Presidium were able to attend theSummit. Of greater significance was the profile thatPapua acquired at the Pacific Islands Forum inKiribati in October 2000. Presidium representativesattended as members of the Nauru delegation.Despite the reluctance of Australia, New Zealand andPapua New Guinea, the communiqué expressed"deep concerns about recent violence and loss of lifein the Indonesian province of Irian Jaya [WestPapua]". The Forum “called on the IndonesianGovernment, the sovereign authority, andsecessionist groups to resolve their differencespeacefully through dialogue and consultation. Theyalso urged all parties to protect and uphold the humanrights of all residents of Irian Jaya."70 The Presidiumdid not enjoy the same success at the 2001 meeting ofthe Forum. The host government, Nauru, excludedthe Presidium representatives. Since a change ofgovernment, Nauru has become a less fulsomesupporter of the Papuan cause.71 The 2001 Forummeeting was Indonesia’s first as a dialogue partner.Nevertheless, the Communiqué restated the Forumleaders’ concern about the continuing violence andloss of life. The Forum leaders urged Indonesia toseek a peaceful resolution through dialogue with allparties. They welcomed the Special Autonomyproposals.72 The Presidium’s diplomatic network inthe Pacific has enabled it to make contact with otherpowers, most notably China.73

Foreign governments have voiced their concerns inresponse to increased levels of violence from theIndonesian security forces. As tension mounted inlate 2000, the New Zealand Foreign Minister, PhilGoff, at a meeting with Presidium internationalrepresentative, Franzalbert Joku, offered to act as animpartial broker. New Zealand wanted "to encourage 70 Hamish McDonald, “PM softens Pacific swipe atJakarta”, Sydney Morning Herald, 30 October 200071 Craig Skehan, “Nauru bars warring West Papuansecessionists from Pacific Forum”, Sydney MorningHerald, 8 August 200172 Communique, 32nd Pacific Islands Forum, Republic ofNauru, 16-18 August 200173 “West Papuans seek Beijing's support”, SydneyMorning Herald, 19 May 2001

peaceful dialogue with a view to exploring theparameters of autonomy which might give people inWest Papua a high level of control over their ownlives".74 Following military reprisals around Wasior(Manokwari) in June and July 2001, AustralianForeign Minister Alexander Downer, indicated thatAustralia and the international community would beoutraged if there were to be a reversion to the type ofhuman rights violations in Irian Jaya which tookplace in East Timor in the past.75 A State Departmentspokesman noted that US support for Indonesia’sterritorial integrity did not mean support for harshmilitary crackdowns in places like Aceh or IrianJaya.76 The achievement from the Presidium’sperspective was that its struggle had found a place inthe international diplomatic agenda and that violenceand abuses of human rights has become a focus ofpressure on Indonesia.

74 “West Papuans to ignore warnings”, Sydney MorningHerald, 24-11-2000.75 Craig Skehan, “Villagers flee wave of beatings andarrests”, Sydney Morning Herald, 20 July 200176 Elaine Monaghan, “Official: U.S. Watching IndonesianMilitary”, Reuters (Hanoi), 24 July 2001


VIII. INDONESIAN GOVERNMENTPOLICY

Irian Jaya’s historical and ideological importance tothe Indonesian nationalist enterprise has beendiscussed. Like Aceh, it also has an economicsignificance as a resource-rich province thatgenerates substantial export revenue. Measured byper capita GDP, Irian Jaya is the fourth-richestprovince.77 The province’s economic significancewill grow further as BP Amoco and Pertaminadevelop a large gas field in Bintuni Bay, Manokwari.The giant Freeport gold and copper mine symbolisesthe province’s Eldorado status. Freeport is one ofIndonesia’s largest corporate taxpayers. Between1991 and 1999, it paid US $1.42 billion in taxes,dividends and royalties.78 Freeport also has acomplex political profile. It developed close relationswith Soeharto’s New Order and has a symbioticrelationship with the Indonesian military . As notedearlier, one of the independence leaders is aCommissioner. Although seemingly contradictory,Freeport is endeavouring to secure a future for itsoperations in a turbulent and unpredictable politicalenvironment.

The New Order Government’s response to Papuandemands for independence and use of nationalsymbols had been one of suppression and detentionor elimination of those involved. This approach wasstill evident after the fall of Soeharto in the violentsuppression of the pro-independence demonstrationsin July 1998. Although not consistently maintained,Reformasi ushered in a new approach. There wassome tolerance of political activity and occasionaldialogue, which led to the Jakarta Informal meetingsand the Team of 100 meeting with President Habibieand intermittent discussions with President Wahid.They recognised the suffering of the Papuan peopleat the hands of the New Order Government, but wereconfronted by the simple and uncompromisingdemand - independence - that they could not possiblyconcede and remain in power.

The revival of Papuan demands for independence,under an urban-based leadership advocating a non-

77 Gross Regional Domestic Product, 1996-99, PBS.http://www.bps.go.id/statbysector/natreg/drdp/table1.shtml78 Freeport-McMoRan Copper & Gold Inc, EconomicImpact in Indonesia, see:http://www.fcx.com/mr/fast-facts/ff-econimpact.htm.Freeport estimates that its operations contributed a furtherUS $6.32 billion in the form of purchases, wages andbenefits, charitable contributions and re-investments.

violent struggle, posed an acute dilemma for thegovernments of Habibie and Wahid. They sought todemocratise Indonesia, but how much democracycould be extended to Papuans whose principalobjective was to separate from Indonesia?

Wahid gave his blessing to the flying of the MorningStar Flag and the change of name of the province toPapua. These symbolic gestures together with histolerance of discussion of Papuan ideals, providedthat nothing was done to achieve the ideals,combined with his stated determination to defendIndonesia’s territorial integrity, produced anunsustainable policy framework in the post-EastTimor environment. The Papuans considered thatEast Timor established a precedent and Wahid’swillingness to dialogue encouraged a belief that apeaceful struggle for independence was a viablestrategy. The President provided a billion rupiah tosupport the Papuan Congress. Whereas, the loss ofEast Timor strengthened the Jakarta elite’sdetermination to resist any further separatist pressure.

The Papuan Congress was a critical juncture in thegovernment’s policy making. Despite the attempt onthe part of some in Jakarta to dismiss the Congress asunrepresentative and illegitimate, the threat posed bythe independence movement began to be taken moreseriously.

As part of the Government’s public response, thePresident appointed a team of special envoys,including a number of prominent Papuans. Theyrecognised that the Congress represented “…thewhole indigenous people of Irian Jaya…” andrecommended that the President continue his policyof open dialogue.79 The Department of InternalAffairs advocated a less accommodating approach. Inits view, the independence ideal had spread quicklyto village level and the Presidium leadership wascohesive and working to propagate the results of theCongress throughout Papua and beyond. Amemorandum to the Minister of Internal Affairsargued that it was necessary to take immediate,concrete and appropriate actions to anticipate thefurther expansion of this political climate. Itenvisaged graduated activities, both overt andclandestine, targeting a broad spectrum of Papuanleaders. The Memorandum stressed the need forconsistency in the statements made by officials of the

79 The Special Envoys of the State Secretary for (West)Papua Problem, Executive Summary, Jakarta, 22 June2000, www.kabar-irian.com


central government so that provincial officials werenot hesitant or uncertain.80

The Department’s draft strategy envisaged a series ofmeasures to be taken at provincial, national andinternational levels. The objective of the former wasto create a more “conducive” environment by raisingthe levels of material welfare in Irian Jaya. By doingso it is hoped that the credibility of the governmentcould be improved and the people persuaded tosupport Indonesia. Specific measures included plansto:

! improve communication with leaders thought tohave influence in society

! give honours to local leaders and recognisenational heroes from Irian Jaya

! compile and disseminate a history of theintegration of Irian Jaya in Indonesia

! accelerate implementation of regional autonomy! accelerate the division of the province into three! provide those leaders who support Indonesia with

positions in government at all levels from thevillage to the province

! minimise the use of force in control of unrest! recruit train and support militia at village level

These policy recommendations illustrate some of thedifficulties intelligence analysts and policy advisersin Jakarta had in responding to the new politicalenvironment in Irian Jaya. Their ability to reflect onthe efficacy of similar policies pursued in East Timorseemed limited.

The Annual Session of the People’s ConsultativeAssembly (MPR) in August 2000 established afurther hardening of the Government’s attitude onIrian Jaya. Despite the efforts of Papuanrepresentatives to defend and explain Papuan ideals,members of all factions attacked Wahid’saccommodative attitude. The President’s agreementto change the name of the province’s name to Papuaand his granting of permission to fly the “MorningStar” Flag was rejected. Commission C of the MPRstated that "The President has not yet been able todeal with separatist movements which have beenthreatening the totality of the unitary state ofIndonesia especially in Aceh and Irian Jayaprovinces." Wahid was given the task of taking 80 Nota Dinas, Direktur Jenderal Kesbang dan Linmas,Ermaya Suradinata to Menteri Dalam Negeri, 9-6-00,578/CD/kesbang/D IV/VI/2000. This document wascompiled with input from the police, military and theintelligence services. It circulated widely in Papua and wassummarised in “Papua Punya Aspirasi, Jakarta PunyaJurus”, Tifa Papua, 13-18 November 2000.

decisive actions against separatism and implementingspecial autonomy for Irian Jaya and Aceh.81 TheMPR session was indicative of how the President’sapproach to the separatist movements had become anissue that his opponents used to attack hisPresidency. Wahid’s approach had few supportersand the detractors came from across the politicalspectrum. The MPR members’ desire to see a moredecisive and less tolerant stand reflected a broaderbody of opinion in Jakarta. A Tempo survey ofJakarta residents on attitudes towards the Papuanstruggle for independence found them to beunsympathetic and strongly supportive of thegovernment’s endeavour to maintain the unitary stateand Irian Jaya as part of it.82 Even among democracyactivists there are mixed feelings about the Papuanstruggle for independence.83

There were three key elements in the CentralGovernment’s policies to emerge following thePapuan Congress and the MPR directions for thePresident:

! Provide a program of special assistance to IrianJaya – known as the “Crash Program”.

! Remove the Presidium from the centre of thepolitical stage and the symbols of Papuannationalism from the public arena.

! Promote the alternative of Special Autonomy.

The “Crash Program” appears to have been initiatedby then Vice President Megawati Soekarnoputrifollowing a visit to Papua to support social andeconomic development, development of humanresources and places of worship. The “CrashProgram” represented a sum of money nearly the sizeof the provincial budget, to be dispersed at the districtlevel (Kabupaten) in a period of four months.84 The“Crash Program” was very much in keeping with theDepartment of Internal Affairs’ strategic objective toimprove the levels of material welfare and by sodoing enhance the credibility of the government andpersuade people to support Indonesia. Papuansappreciated that the “Crash Program” represented asubstantial sum that should be effectively used toaddress social and economic disadvantage. Thisappreciation did not deflect Papuan attention fromthe central government’s political purpose, however.

81 “Indonesia's Assembly Assigns President to CurbSeparatism” Xinhua News Agency, 15 August 200082 “Papua Membara, Jakarta Kecewa”, Tempo, 29 October2000, p. 1283 Stanley, “But is it democratic?”, Inside Indonesia, July-September 2001, p. 2984 Tifa Papua, 4-9 September 2000, pp. 1-3


Tifa Papua’s banner headline read: “Crash Program:Will it dampen the desire for independence?”

The removal of the Papuan national symbols andmarginalising the Presidium was a three-and-a-half-month struggle, beginning with the MPR session andending in early December, as will be discussedbelow, when the “Morning Star” flag was no longerflown in the middle of Jayapura and key leaders ofthe Presidium were safely in detention. The struggletransformed Papuan politics and relations with theCentral Government. The political space for thearticulation and mobilisation of Papuan aspirationsthat developed after the fall of Soeharto was closed.

The “Morning Star” flag became the focus of thestruggle. For Papuans it had long been associatedwith acts of defiance against Indonesian authority.Since the fall of Soeharto and after Wahid hadsanctioned the flag’s use, there had been sevenclashes with the security forces about flying the flagin which scores of Papuans had lost their lives.85 Bythe end of 2000, the Indonesian authorities’determination to prevent the flag from being flownextracted a heavy toll in human life and reinstated theuse of force as the centrepiece of governance in IrianJaya. This happened despite much official rhetoricabout the government taking a “persuasive” approachand the Department of Internal Affairs’recommendation that the use of violence beminimised.86

The violence at Wamena on 6 October 2000 was themost important of the incidents that flowed from theGovernment’s determination to remove the Papuanflag. Wamena illustrated the fragility of the crisismanagement processes between the Indonesianauthorities and the Presidium as well as that of themilitary and civilian command structures. The policeattack on the Satgas positions and the lowering offlags took place despite an agreement between thePresidium and the provincial authorities that theimplementation of Jakarta’s orders to lower the flagwould be postponed.

With tensions mounting in Papua amid fears offurther violence, the Presidium and the provincialcivil and military authorities (Muspida) reached anagreement on 9 November concerning the “MorningStar” flag and how the Papuan “independence” daycould be marked. The flag could be flown in public 85 Kris Ansaka, “Menebar Kemerdekaan, MenuliaKonflik”, Tifa Papua, 23-28 October 2000, p. 9.86 ICG interview with Mr. Ermaya Suradinata, DirectorGeneral for National Unity, Department of InternalAffairs, Jakarta, 15 December 2000

until 1 December. From 2 December it could only beflown at the houses or offices of the traditionalleaders in 5 regions (kabupatan) in the province. Athanksgiving service would be permitted on 1December, after which the Irian Jaya Arts Centre87

would have to be vacated by the Satgas who would,along with the flag, move to Theys Eluay’s house innearby Sentani.88

The deal involved significant concessions on bothsides. The authorities had to postpone theimplementation of Jakarta’s instruction to remove theflag in the centre of Jayapura and indeed continue topermit it at traditional leaders’ houses. Thecommemoration of “Independence Day” would betolerated. The Presidium’s supporters had very highexpectations about what might happen on 1December. Some hoped there would be aproclamation of independence. In any case thePresidium had to account for its activities undertakenunder its mandate from the Papuan Congress. Toconvince its supporters to accept that the flag wouldno longer be flown after 1 December was a challengeas it indicated that the independence movement hadlost some of its momentum. The Presidium wasnevertheless optimistic. They thought they hadsecured the authorities’ agreement to “IndependenceDay” activities. They were confident that agreementon the flag could be extended to all 14 regions. Theyconsidered that the proposal to declare Papua a “zoneof peace” had been placed on the agenda.89

The Presidium’s cautious optimism persistedthroughout the preparations for 1 December,90 despiteominous signs from Jakarta. Security Minister SusiloBambang Yudhoyono warned that anycommemoration of the independence declarationwould be regarded as an “act of treason” and toughmeasures would be taken.91 Additional troops weredispatched to Papua following the MPR’s Augustsession and further reinforcements were sent duringthe last weeks of November. Estimates of the

87 The Centre occupies the building that once housed theNew Guinea Council – the territory’s first electedrepresentative institution – established by the Dutch as thefirst phase in the process of decolonisation. This historyhas made the Centre a symbol of Papuan nationalaspirations.88 “Papua separatists and Indonesian governmentcompromise over flag”, Radio Australia, 9 November200089 ICG Interview with Willy Mandowen, Jayapura, 10November 200090 ICG attended a number of Presidium meetings91 “West Papuans ignore warnings”, Sydney MorningHerald, 24 November 2000


numbers varied, one source reported that 4 battalionsof army and mobile police were assembled in the portarea of central Jayapura.92 Some of thereinforcements were landed very publicly in the mainharbour.

92 ”We Will Stop Papuan Independence Declaration”,DetikWorld, 30 November 2000

IX. A SHOW OF FORCE

The arrest of five of the Presidium’s senior leaders inthe days before the anniversary dramatically changedthe political atmosphere. The five Papuans – TheysEluay, Thaha Al Hamid, the Rev. Herman Awom,Don Flassy and John Mambor – were detained oncharges of subversion. For the previous two yearsthese people had been the negotiating partners of theauthorities in Jayapura and Jakarta. It was easy toforget, given the seemingly dramatic nature of thechange, that accusations of subversion, summons andinterrogations have been a means used by theauthorities to keep pressure on the pro-independenceleaders for most of the period of political openness.This pressure gave an ambiguity to the notion ofpolitical openness. The occasions by which thepolitical openness was measured – the flag raising on1 December 1999 together with the two massmeetings of 2000 - are also the basis for the chargesof subversion.

On 7 December a delegation of four senior Papuansappeared to have persuaded Wahid to order therelease of Theys Eluay and his colleagues. Ittranspired that on this matter the President was a in asmall minority in his own Government and theinstruction was not carried out.93 The Presidiumleaders remained in detention until 15 March 2001.Their trial commenced in mid-May.

On 29 and 30 November, Jayapura was placed undermilitary occupation and the security forces put on animpressive “show of force”. Convoys of trucks fullyladen with troops sped up and down the mainthoroughfare between Jayapura and Sentani withsirens blaring and motor cycle escorts. The keyinstallations in central Jayapura were occupied.

On hearing of the military convoys, the leaders ofPapua’s Christian Churches held a press conferencein which they appealed for restraint and avoidance ofanything that might provoke conflict between thesecurity forces and the people or between differentgroups within the society.94 The substance of thepress conference, rather than the text of the pressrelease, was that the Church leaders had noconfidence in the Indonesian authorities. They fearedthat the authorities’ handling of what had become atense situation would lead to violence. The Church

93 “Gus Dur Memang Meminta Agar Theys Dibebaskan”,Tempo Interaktif, 8 December 200094 “Gereja di Irja Serukan Aparat dan OPM Tahan Diri”,Astaga.com, 30 November 2000


leaders did not believe that their opinions were takenseriously.95

Under great military pressure the “IndependenceDay” anniversary was marked. The Imbi Square inthe centre of Jayapura, where the flag raising,thanksgiving prayers and speeches took place, wascordoned off by police in full riot gear. The riotpolice surrounded those Presidium leaders still atliberty and a crowd of a couple of thousand Papuansupporters. Apart from the fact that the ceremonytook place at all, there was a small symbolic victoryfor the Presidium. The program began with theraising of the two flags. The Indonesian flag wasraised first then the “Morning Star”. The Indonesianflag was faded and tattered, perhaps reflecting howmany Papuans view the Indonesian State, while the“Morning Star” was twice the size, bright and new.In marked contrast to the impassioned prayers andsermons that followed the flag raising, Thom Beanalgave a brief and cautious address referring to theconstraints he was under. The Presidium leaders justmanaged to contain the dissatisfaction of theirsupporters with the agreement that the flag would nolonger be flown and that there would not be a fullaccounting of the Presidium’s activities under itsmandate from the Papua Congress.96

The following day the “Morning Star” flag was notraised and the Papuan militia were removed from thesymbolic centre of Papuan nationalism. Threemonths after the MPR session, the Government hadsecured an important symbolic objective.

While there was no bloodshed in Jayapura inconnection with the anniversary, in Merauke eightpeople lost their lives and in Fak Fak two peoplewere killed in clashes between demonstrators and thesecurity forces.97 There was a strong militarypresence in place for the anniversary in most regionalcentres. The commemoration was relatively peacefulin Biak and Serui, while in Nabire there appears tohave been cooperation with the local authorities,indeed the head of the regional government (Bupati)attended the occasion.98

95 ICG attended the press conference in Jayapura, 30November 200096 ICG attended the ‘thanksgiving’ service in Jayapura.97 Human Right Watch, “Violence and Political Impasse inPapua” vol XX, No. X (X), July 200198 “Laporan Khusus: Situasi Sosial Politik Di SeluruhWilayah Papua Barat Menjelang Dan Pasca 1 Desember2000”, Els-Ham, Jayapura, 7 December 2000

X. RETURN OF REPRESSION

The first edition of Tifa Papua for 2001 observedthat:

“The Satgas Papua (pro independence militia)are no longer to be seen. The Papuan flag fliesno more. Nevertheless, the ideal of Papuanindependence remains the topic ofconversation in front of shops, in the marketsas well as in food stalls and even in thevillages.”99

Unlike in Aceh, the Indonesian Government havebeen able assert their authority in Irian Jaya.However, the means with which this was donesuggest that Indonesia has few “assets” in its politicalcontrol of the province, other than its near monopolyof the use of military force. There is fragility aboutIndonesia’s authority.

In June 2001 the leaders of Papua’s churches and theMoslem community issued an appeal for theestablishment of “a culture of peace and dialogue”,so that Papua could become “a zone of peace”. Theyobserved that over the previous six months a patternof violence had emerged, with one act of violencebeing followed by another to the extent that violencewas becoming the only way by which problems arehandled.100 The atmosphere of open and vigorousdebate had given way to the domineering presence ofthe security forces. The feeling that the people’saspirations were being listened to had gone andpeople did not know what to expect.101 The humanrights group Elsham likened the political situation inearly 2001 to that of the 1960s, when “…the peoplewere terrorised and intimidated, fear was spreadeverywhere, and at its peak PEPERA (the 1969 “Actof Free Choice”) was conducted”.102

99 Kris Ansaka, “Sikilas Mengenal Peta Papua Merdeka:Roh Aspirasi Merdeka Tahun 2001”, Tifa Papua, 15-20Januari 2001, p.3100 “Appeal for a cessation of violence in Papua”,Jayapura, 14 June 2001. The appeal was signed by theleaders of the Islamic Council of Indonesia (MUI), theCatholic Church and the major Protestant Churches.www.kabar-irian.com101 “Recent Developments in Papua: Papua Congress II, 29May – 4 June 2000, and the Situation Pasca-Congress”Office for Justice and Peace, Diocese of Jayapura, January2001102 “Situasi Sarmi, Tor Atas, Betaf dan Bonggo pascaPembunuhan 4 Anggota Kopassus: “Aparat Keamananlancarkan operasi warga Sipil mengungsi”, Institute forHuman Rights Study and Advocacy (Elsham), Jayapura, 8-


This pattern of violence started almost immediatelyafter the ‘independence’ thanksgiving service, withthe attack on the Abepura police station on 7December 2000, which was followed by the securityforces’ pursuit of highlanders. The imprisonment,torture and killing of highlander students arediscussed above. In their Appeal, Papua’s religiousleaders cited seven cases of violence, as examples.This report will briefly discuss just the most recentcase in Wasior, Manokwari.

On 31 March 2001, three Indonesian settlers,employees of a timber company, were killed inWasior district. Additional security forces weredeployed and they conducted what Elsham describedas ”arbitrary action against the civilian population”,including arbitrary arrests, torture and the killing ofsix civilians. On 13 June 2001, an armed unknowngroup killed five Brimob and a civilian.103 In Juneand July the security forces have conducted a"Sweeping and Clampdown." According to Elshamand Church sources, the operation has resulted indetention, torture and houses being burnt. Elshamestimates that about5,000 civilians have fled their homes. Daily socialand economic activities have been completelyparalysed and everyone lives in a state of fear.104

This pattern of violence suggests a change in thecharacter of Papuan resistance. This report hasargued that with the fall of Soeharto Papuanresistance was transformed from the localised,sporadic armed resistance of the OPM to an urban-led, mass-based largely non-violent struggle. Withthe closing in of the ‘Reformasi’ political space atthe end of 2000, Papuan resistance has reverted to theearlier pattern. The kidnapping of the two Belgianfilmmakers in Ilaga district, Puncak Jaya, in earlyJune 2001 is part of this trend.105

02-2001103 Urgent Action No:46/ELS-HAM Papua/VI/2001,Jayapura, 19 June 2001104 Elsham, Impact Of Sweepings And Clampdown InWasior, Manokwari, West Papua, 16 July 2001105 Johan van den Eynde and Philippe Simon were releasedon 17 August. “Separatists free abducted Beligians”,Jakarta Post, 18 August 2001

XI. SPECIAL AUTONOMY

The third and most important of the Government’spolicies in Irian Jaya is Special Autonomy. Specialautonomy offers the most obvious policy frameworkin which a political resolution can be negotiated.However, autonomy poses considerable politicaldifficulties for the Government, the Papuan elite andbroader society in the province.

Post-independence Indonesian history has not beenkind to either the promise or practice of regionalautonomy. From the perspective of regional elitesthroughout Indonesia, previous forms of autonomy,under various labels, have either not beenimplemented or have had little substance. Credibilityis the first and most significant obstacle for theGovernment’s offer of special autonomy. PresidentSoekarno promised autonomy to Papuan leaders atthe time of the province’s “return” to the Republicand this was legislated for in 1969. It will be difficultto convince Papuans, across the political spectrum,that the Government’s commitment to autonomy isserious and that the devolution of decision-makingpowers, division of revenues and control of resourcesis substantial. It is in part the history of unfulfilledpromises of autonomy that has enabled the advocatesof independence to dominate the political debate inPapua and create a strong body of opinion that rejectsany suggestion of autonomy.

Given this history, the Governor, Drs J.P. Solossa,and his supporters faced a formidable challenge topersuade their fellow Papuans that Special Autonomywas credible. On the face of it, the detention of thefive Presidium leaders gave the Governor anopportunity to re-orient the Papuan political agenda.Yet, the pattern of violence that has developed sincelate 2000 has made the Governor’s task much moredifficult.

Special Autonomy also requires a transformation ofpolitical culture and practice in Jakarta. Thecommitment to the unitary state, central control anduniformity has been an integral part of whatconstitutes the Jakarta political elite’s notions of thenation state. At a more material level, the devolutionof decision making power and control of resources,revenues and business opportunities affects thevested interests of many groups influential in thegovernment and the national parliament.

The Habibie Government legislated for regionalautonomy and a fairer distribution of revenuesbetween the centre and the regions in 1999 (Laws 22


& 25). These nation-wide reforms began to beimplemented at the beginning of 2001. Theydevolved authority from the central government tothe second level of regional administration(kabupatan), not to the provinces. With respect toIrian Jaya, Habibie’s autonomy initiatives werecomplicated by the attempt to split the province intothree. This move was rejected by the provincialparliament, but the legislation and the appointment oftwo additional governors remain in place, but notimplemented. The Government’s commitment toSpecial Autonomy for Irian Jaya was enshrined in theMPR’s Broad Outline of government policy(GBHN), 1999-2004. The granting of specialautonomy is specifically linked to the objective ofstrengthening the national integrity within the unitarystate.106 A year later, the MPR’s criticism of Wahid’shandling of separatism in Papua and hisaccommodation of Papuan national symbols waspaired with an instruction to implement specialautonomy.107

The absence of a clearly elaborated and public policyframework from Jakarta enabled groups within thePapuan political elite to draft their own proposals. Bymid-December, the Ministry of Internal Affairs inJakarta, the provincial parliament, the provincialgovernment and a group of Papuan NGOs had eachproduced a draft. As part of the consultative process,the Ministry organised a meeting betweendelegations from the Provincial Parliament andgovernment, on one side, and representatives ofvarious central government departments, on theother, to discuss the drafts.108

Since January the Governor, Drs J.P. Solossa, hasconducted a campaign to “socialise” specialautonomy and consult broadly throughout theprovince. He appointed a team of leading Papuanintellectuals, officials, academics and church leadersto help conduct the consultations and draft thelegislation. The governor’s advocacy of specialautonomy has been a mixture of the positive and thenegative. Special Autonomy was a “goldenopportunity” for self-government in Papua. It wouldbring economic development and welfare. Christianand Papuan cultural values as well as customary lawwould be reflected in special autonomy. Given thatthe terms of autonomy had not been established bythe central government, Papuans would be able todetermine the conditions themselves. Early in the 106 MPR Decree No. IV/MPR/1999.107 MPR Decree No. VIII/MPR/2000, Appendix 1.1.a.108 ICG attended the meeting at the Hotel Indonesia on 14December 2000 at the invitation of the Department ofInternal Affairs.

campaign, Solossa emphasised the determination ofthe Indonesian government to maintain Irian Jaya asa province and resist the Papuan struggle forindependence. Given this determination, continuingthe struggle would only bring suffering to Papuansociety and the innocent supporters of independencewould be the victims. If the opportunity of specialautonomy was not grasped, Papuans would becondemned to be mere observers of the developmentof their homeland. As had long been the case, evensecurity guards and taxi drivers in Papua weresettlers.109 Towards the end of the campaign, thegovernor’s rhetoric against independence hadsoftened. Autonomy was not about restricting orabolishing the ideal of independence. Bas Suebu, aformer governor and member of the SpecialAutonomy team, acknowledged that Papuanssupported independence and rejected autonomy, butargued that special autonomy was nearly the same asindependence, although still within the IndonesianState. Independence and special autonomy should notbe seen as alternatives. They were both heading inthe same direction.110

Governor Solossa’s campaign to propagate SpecialAutonomy in the first months of 2001 encounteredsignificant resistance in a number of regions. InNabire, the people who attended the CendrawasihUniversity information session destroyed thepublicity material and demanded independence.111

The last set piece of the governor’s campaign was aseminar in Jayapura held on 28 March.Representatives of the fourteen regencies attended it.The proceedings were disrupted by thousands ofuninvited guests with banners proclaiming supportfor independence and rejection of autonomy. Asignificant proportion of the delegates shared thesesympathies and staged a walk out.112

The governor’s proposal for Special Autonomy, inthe form of a 76-clause draft bill presented to thePresident and Parliament on 16 April 2001113, reflectsPapuan political and cultural values and idealscombined with a substantial devolution of decision-

109 Frans Ohoiwutun, “Gubernur Drs JP. Solossa: SuarakanAspirasi “M” Silakan, “Otonomi Khusus” harus direbut”,Tifa Papua, 15-20 Januari 2001.110 “Peserta Seminar Otonomi Minta Irja Merdeka”,Republika, 29 March 2001111 “Sebagian Rakyat Irja Tolak Otonomi Khusus”,Republika, 7 March 2001112 “Peserta Seminar Otonomi Minta Irja Merdeka”,Republika, 29 March 2001 113 RUU Republik Indonesia Nr…. Tahun 2001 tentangOtonomi Khusus bagi Propinsi Papua Dalam BentukWilaya Berpemerintahan Sendiri


making authority and distribution of resources fromthe centre to the province. It establishes Papua as aregion of self-government within Indonesia. Underthe proposed distribution of powers the province hasauthority in all areas of government except foreignaffairs, external defence, monetary policy and theSupreme Court. The distribution of revenue is 80 percent to the province and 20 per cent to the centre. 114

In its structure, the governor’s proposal shares muchwith the regional autonomy document discussed atthe UN for East Timor in August 1998 and the lawon special autonomy for Aceh adopted in July 2001.Its key provisions were developed from the PapuanNGO draft of late 2000.115

The promotion and protection of Papuan interests iscentral to the proposal. The governor’s draft makes adistinction between indigenous Papuans and residentsof the province. The governor and deputy governorhave to be Papuans. Papuan dominance of thelegislature is established through the creation of twohouses of parliament, with a Papuan upper houseconsisting of customary (adat), religious and womenrepresentatives. In contrast to national law, local aswell as national political parties will be able tocontest the elections for the Lower House. Theprovince will be called Papua and it will have its ownflag, anthem and coat of arms, in addition to theIndonesian national ones. There will be notransmigration. Priority will be given to theemployment of Papuans in all sectors of theeconomy.

The Provincial Government is obliged to protect anddevelop Papuan Culture. There is provision for theprotection and representation of traditionalinstitutions, the advancement of human rights andecologically sustainable economic development.

The central government’s jurisdiction in externaldefence is recognised, but the deployment of militaryunits in Papua will be subject to the consideration ofthe Papuan Parliament and government. Papua willhave its own police force responsible to the governor.The central government’s external affairs powers arealso qualified. The Province will be able to conductexternal relations in the fields of trade, investment,education, culture and technology as well as establishliaison offices overseas. 114 The share of its output that Papua currently retainsvaries each year and the figures are not made public butmost estimates put the figure at between 10-15 percent ofrevenues.115 Tim Perumus Foker LSM Papua, “Draft Undang-Undang Tentang Otoritas Khusus Propinsi Papua”Jayapura, 2000.

There are safeguards against changes in the specialautonomy law, the 1945 Constitution and treatyobligations. The supremacy of the special autonomylaw is established. Where other laws conflict, they donot apply in Papua. If, five years after Papuabecomes a self-governing region, the ProvincialParliament considers that special autonomy has notbeen effectively implemented, it can request that thePeople’s Consultative Assembly hold a referendumto ascertain the opinion of the Papuan people. If the“Commission to Correct the Course of PapuanHistory”, discussed earlier, finds that the integrationof Papua did not accord with international law onself-determination, the provincial Parliament wouldtake measures to resolve the matter.

It is not surprising that reaction from members of thenational parliament and government leaders has beenmixed. There have been concerns expressed aboutwhether the proposal is compatible with the unitarystate principle. There was some suggestion thatspecial autonomy would create a “state within astate” and was too federalist in its orientation. Thesensitive issues included the provision for Papuannational symbols, control over internal security andthe possibility of representation overseas. Partyleaders suggested that they were open to acompromise on the core elements of the proposal, butthe principle of the unitary state was non-negotiable.116 Nevertheless, with the support of 60members, the House of Representatives has acceptedthe Papuan bill as the basis for its deliberations. Itaccepted the Papuan bill instead of a much moremodest one submitted earlier by the Government.117

A special committee of the parliament wasconsidering the Governor’s proposal as this reportwas being prepared.

116 “Soal RUU Otonomi Khusus Megawati: DengarkanMasyarakat Irian Jaya”, Kompas, 25 June 2001117 “House accepts special autonomy bill on Papua”,Jakarta Post, 30 June 2001


XII. CONCLUSION

Indonesia has made little progress in recent decadesin convincing Papuans that their preferred futureshould be as part of Indonesia. Indeed it has sustainedan administration in Irian Jaya largely without theconsent of the indigenous population of the territory.The protracted, but localised and sporadic armedresistance of the OPM has not, however, threatenedIndonesian control. Indonesian authority hasappeared most vulnerable in the brief period ofpolitical openness that permitted the relatively freeexpression and organisation of Papuan nationalsentiments. Indonesian control seemed fragilebecause it became apparent that opposition to theirrule was widespread and deep-rooted.

Since the end of 2000 Indonesia has been pursuingtwo seemingly contradictory approaches. This reporthas argued that Special Autonomy offers the bestprospect of resolution. Given the deep distrust of thegovernment in Papuan society, it is difficult toimagine how Special Autonomy can be successfully“socialised” and accepted by broad sections of thesociety in political circumstances of great tension,uncertainty and fear created by the security forces.Continuing human rights violations by the securityforces are contrary to Indonesia’s interests in tworespects. First, violations serve to intensify thealienation of Papuans, both those directly involvedand the community at large. Secondly, they attractinternational attention and the publicity like thatgenerated by the recent Human Rights Watchreport118 which further tarnished Indonesia’sreputation. Human rights violations of the Soehartoera created a political environment in which supportfor independence was easily mobilised. Continuedabuses by the security forces will have the sameeffect.

The Papuan proposal for Special Autonomy has astrong commitment to the protection of human rights.The recommendations in this report are designed tosupport the development of norms and procedures inthe provincial government and its legislation that willadvance human rights for all residents in theprovince.

There is no possibility of the Papuan proposal forSpecial Autonomy being adopted in its entirety.However, if the policy is to be effective, the House ofRepresentatives will need to enact a strong law.

118 “Indonesia: Violence and Political Impasse in Papua”,Human Rights Watch, Vol. 13, No. 2(C), July 2001.

Governor Solossa and his supporters tookconsiderable political risks in their autonomycampaign. While the draft has broad support in thePapuan elite, including some pro-independenceleaders, the law will need to be a strong one if theelite is to mobilise support for it in the broadersociety. The government needs to support thosePapuans who are willing to back Special Autonomy.A law that does not contain the crucial provisionsfrom the Papuan draft will serve to undermine thepolitical credibility of the governor and hissupporters and weaken their ability to argue thatSpecial Autonomy within Indonesia is an acceptablealternative to independence.

The crucial provisions encompass Papuan values andideals, the devolution of powers and the distributionof revenue. The name Papua, the flag and anthemsymbolise the Papuan values and ideals in the draft;without them the Special Autonomy Law will haveno legitimacy in the province. The maintenance ofinternal security is a responsibility of the province.The draft provides for the establishment of aprovincial police force responsible to the governor.The deployment of army, navy and airforce units inthe province is a matter of consultation between theIndonesian government and the governor and that, inprinciple, deployment of these forces be sufficient todefend the province against external threat. Theseforces would not be involved in the maintenance ofinternal security, except at the request of thegovernor and the Provincial Parliament. Theseprovisions are crucial if the Special Autonomy law isto help break the cycle of repression and alienation.Internal security as a responsibility of the governorand the provincial police force will break the nexusbetween the maintenance of security and controlfrom Jakarta.

One of the objectives of Special Autonomy is toprovide Papuans with a sense of ownership of theland they regard as their own. This is conveyed in thetitle of the Papuan draft: “Special Autonomy for theProvince of Papua in the form of a region of self-government” (Otonomi Khusus bagi Provinsi Papuadalam Bentuk Wilayah Berpemerintahan Sendiri)There are a number of provisions that support Papuanauthority in the provincial government. The creationof a bicameral legislature with an upper chamber inwhich Papuan traditional authority (adat), religiousorganisations, women and youth are represented isone element. Another element is the provision thatthe governor and deputy governor are Papuans as isthe province’s control over migration. One of thereasons for Papuan opposition to Special Autonomyis the history of unfulfilled promises. The provisionthat the Special Autonomy law can only be amended


with the agreement of the governor and theProvincial Parliament is crucial if Papuan distrust ofJakarta’s intentions is to be overcome. The divisionof revenue, 80 per cent to the province and 20 percent to the centre, is the crucial economic provisionto facilitate Papuan control over their own resources.

It is important to recognise that these provisions,crucial to the success of the policy, are also some ofthe most difficult for the House of Representatives toaccept. They involve fundamental changes inregional governance as well as to the ideologicalvalues and nationalist principles that have developedsince Indonesia’s struggle for independence.

A strong Special Autonomy law, however, will beonly the first phase of a long process of capacity andinstitution building. It will provide an institutionaland policy framework in which Papuan social andeconomic disadvantage can be addressed but it doesnot in itself overcome those disadvantages. UnderSpecial Autonomy the provincial government willassume far greater responsibilities for financialmanagement, policy development and serviceprovision than under the present highly centralisedsystem. The provincial government will have tofunction in a more open and democratic environment.Expectations of transparency and accountability willbe high.

To facilitate the successful implementation of SpecialAutonomy the provincial government will needconsiderable external support in long-term capacityand institutional building. It will require trainingprograms for its senior officials in financialmanagement, policy formulation and servicedelivery. The institution building and trainingprograms should have as their objective support ofthe provincial government to address the problems ofPapuan social, educational and economicdisadvantage. Under the New Order government,legislatures at provincial and regional (kabupaten)level did little more than affirm the actions of the

executive. The elected representatives and officials ofthe legislatures will require training and support ifthey are to hold accountable and scrutinise theexecutives. The Irian Jaya Special Autonomyproposal vests considerable authority in theprovincial parliament. The parliament will determinegovernment priorities and allocation of expenditures.The present parliament has not been required to fulfilthese tasks.

As noted earlier in this report, non-Papuans dominatethe senior levels of the provincial government. Theyoccupy many of the decision-making and policyadviser positions. The sense of rivalry felt by seniorPapuan officials is one of the motivating factors inPapuan nationalism. They have a strong sense of notbeing the boss in their own house (tuan rumah dinegeri sendiri) The promotion of more Papuanofficials to senior positions within the provincialadministration will need to be supported by trainingprograms. Non-Papuans will continue to beemployed in some positions while appropriatetraining programs for Papuans are established. Thepromotion of Papuans in the administration could bepart of a broader policy framework of affirmativeaction to facilitate Papuan participation in educationand employment in the non-government sector.

Progress with regional autonomy is the only hope ofa peaceful resolution to the enduring conflict in theprovince. Restraining military action and controllinghuman rights abuses are essentially steps in the longprocess of building trust. Papuans need to be givenconsiderable control over their own policing, politics,education, and economy. To do this successfully,there needs to be a major commitment by Indonesia,the provincial government and international donors toprovide training and assistance to help the people ofPapua control their own society.

Jakarta/Brussels, 20 September 2001


APPENDIX A

MAP OF INDONESIA

Source: www.cia.org


APPENDIX B

GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS

ELS-HAM Lembaga Studi Dan Advokasi HakAsasi Manusia; Institute for HumanRights and Advocacy, Jayapura

GBHN Garis-Garis Besar Haluan Negara;Broad Outline of government policy

MPR Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat;People’s Consultative Assembly

OPM Organisasi Papua Merdeka; FreePapua Organisation

PNG Papua New Guinea (eastern NewGuinea)

TNI Tentara Nasional Indonesia –Indonesian National Army


APPENDIX C

ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP

The International Crisis Group (ICG) is a private,multinational organisation committed tostrengthening the capacity of the internationalcommunity to anticipate, understand and act toprevent and contain conflict.

ICG’s approach is grounded in field research. Teamsof political analysts, based on the ground in countriesat risk of conflict, gather information from a widerange of sources, assess local conditions and produceregular analytical reports containing practicalrecommendations targeted at key internationaldecision-takers.

ICG’s reports are distributed widely to officials inforeign ministries and international organisations andmade generally available at the same time via theorganisation's internet site, www.crisisweb.org ICGworks closely with governments and those whoinfluence them, including the media, to highlight itscrisis analysis and to generate support for its policyprescriptions. The ICG Board - which includesprominent figures from the fields of politics,diplomacy, business and the media - is directlyinvolved in helping to bring ICG reports andrecommendations to the attention of senior policy-makers around the world. ICG is chaired by formerFinnish President Martti Ahtisaari; former AustralianForeign Minister Gareth Evans has been Presidentand Chief Executive since January 2000.

ICG’s international headquarters are at Brussels, withadvocacy offices in Washington DC, New York andParis. The organisation currently operates fieldprojects in eighteen crisis-affected countries andregions across three continents: Albania, Bosnia,Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia inEurope; Algeria, Burundi, Rwanda, the DemocraticRepublic of Congo, Sierra Leone and Zimbabwe inAfrica; and Burma/Myanmar, Cambodia, Indonesia,Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan in Asia.

ICG raises funds from governments, charitablefoundations, companies and individual donors. Thefollowing governments currently provide funding:Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France,Germany, Ireland, Japan, Luxembourg, theNetherlands, Norway, the Republic of China(Taiwan), Sweden, Switzerland and the UnitedKingdom. Foundation and private sector donorsinclude the Ansary Foundation, the William andFlora Hewlett Foundation, the Charles Stewart MottFoundation, the Open Society Institute, thePloughshares Fund, the Sasakawa Foundation, theSmith Richardson Foundation, the Ford Foundationand the U.S. Institute of Peace.

July 2001


APPENDIX D

ICG REPORTS AND BRIEFING PAPERS*

AFRICA

ALGERIA

Algeria: The Press in Crisis, Africa Report N°8, 11 January1999Algérie: La Crise de la Presse, Africa Report N°8, 11 January1999The People’s National Assembly, Africa Report N°10, 16February 1999Assemblée Populaire Nationale: 18 Mois de Législature, AfricaReport N°10 16 February 1999Elections Présidentielles en Algérie: Les Enjeux et lesPerspectives, Africa Report N°12, 13 April 1999

The Algerian Crisis: Not Over Yet, Africa Report N°24, 20October 2000La Crise Algérienne n’est pas finie, Africa Report N°24, 20October 2000La concorde civile : Une initiative de paix manqueé, AfricaReport N°24, 9 July 2001

BURUNDI

Burundi: Internal and Regional Implications of the Suspensionof Sanctions, Africa Report N°14, 27 April 1999Le Burundi Après La Suspension de L’Embargo: AspectsInternes et Regionaux, Africa Report N°14, 27 April 1999Quelles Conditions pour la reprise de la Coopération auBurundi? Africa Report N°13, 27 April 1999Proposals for the Resumption of Bilateral and Multilateral Co-operation, Africa Report N°13, 27 April 1999Burundian Refugees in Tanzania: The Key Factor in theBurundi Peace Process, Africa Report N°19, 30 November 1999L’Effet Mandela: Evaluation et Perspectives du Processus dePaix Burundais, Africa Report N°20, 18 April 2000The Mandela Effect: Evaluation and Perspectives of the PeaceProcess in Burundi, Africa Report N°20, 18 April 2000Unblocking Burundi’s Peace Process: Political Parties,Political Prisoners and Freedom of the Press, Africa Briefing,22 June 2000Burundi: Les Enjeux du Débat. Partis Politiques, Liberté de laPresse et Prisonniers Politiques, Africa Report N°23, 12 July2000Burundi: The Issues at Stake. Political Parties, Freedom of thePress and Political Prisoners, Africa Report N° 23, 12 July 2000Burundi Peace Process: Tough Challenges Ahead, AfricaBriefing, 27 August 2000Burundi: Ni guerre ni paix, Africa Report N° 25, 1 December2000

Burundi: sortir de l'impasse. L'urgence d'un nouveau cadre denégociations, Africa Report N°29, 14 May 2001Burundi: Breaking the Deadlock, The Urgent Need for a NewNegotiating Framework, Africa Report N° 29, 14 May 2001Burundi: Cent jours pour retrouver le chemin de la paix, AfricaReport N°33, 14 August 2001

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO

How Kabila Lost His Way, DRC Report N°3, Africa ReportN°16, 21 May 1999Africa’s Seven Nation War, DRC Report N°4, Africa ReportN°17, 21 May 1999The Agreement on a Cease-Fire in the Democratic Republic ofCongo, Africa Report N°18, 20 August 1999Kinshasa sous Kabila, à la veille du dialogue national, AfricaReport N°19, 21 September 1999Scramble for the Congo: Anatomy of an Ugly War, AfricaReport N° 26, 20 December 2000From Kabila to Kabila: Prospects for Peace in the Congo,Africa Report N°27, 16 March 2001Disarmament in the Congo: Investing in Conflict Prevention,Africa Briefing, 12 June 2001

RWANDA

Five Years after the Genocide: Justice in Question, AfricaReport N°11, 7 April 1999Cinq Ans Après le Génocide au Rwanda: La Justice enQuestion, Africa Report N°11, 7 April 1999Uganda and Rwanda: Friends or Enemies? Africa ReportN°15, 4 May 2000Tribunal pénal international pour le Rwanda: l’urgence dejuger, Africa Report N°30, 7 June 2001

SIERRA LEONE

Sierra Leone: Time for a New Military and Political Strategy,Africa Report N° 28, 11 April 2001

ZIMBABWE

Zimbabwe: At the Crossroads, Africa Report N°22, 10 July 2000Zimbabwe: Three Months after the Elections, Africa Briefing,25 September 2000Zimbabwe in Crisis: Finding a way Forward, Africa ReportN°32, 13 July 2001

* Released since January 1999


ASIA

BURMA/MYANMAR

Burma/Myanmar: How Strong is the Military Regime?, AsiaReport N° 11, 21 December 2000

INDONESIA

Indonesia’s Maluku Crisis: The Issues, Asia Briefing, 19 July2000Indonesia: Keeping the Military Under Control, Asia ReportN°9, 5 September 2000Aceh: Escalating Tension, Asia Briefing, 7 December 2000Indonesia: Overcoming Murder and Chaos in Maluku, AsiaReport N° 10, 19 December 2000Indonesia: Impunity Versus Accountability for Gross HumanRights Violations, Asia Report N°12, 2 February 2001Indonesia: National Police Reform, Asia Report N°13, 20February 2001Indonesia's Presidential Crisis, Indonesia Briefing, 21 February2001Bad Debt: The Politics of Financial Reform in Indonesia, AsiaReport N° 15, 13 March 2001Indonesia’s Presidential Crisis: The Second Round, IndonesiaBriefing, 21 May 2001Aceh: Why Military Force Won’t Bring Lasting Peace, AsiaReport N° 17, 12 June 2001Aceh: Can Autonomy Stem the Conflict? ICG Asia Report No18, 27 June 2001Communal Violence in Indonesia: Lessons from Kalimantan,ICG Asia Report No 19, 27 June 2001Indonesia-U.S. Military Ties: Asia Briefing, 18 July 2001The Megawati Presidency, Indonesia Briefing, 10 September2001

CAMBODIA

Back from the Brink, Asia Report N°4, 26 January 1999Cambodia: The Elusive Peace Dividend, Asia Report N°8, 11August 2000

CENTRAL ASIA

Central Asia: Crisis Conditions in Three States, Asia ReportN°7, 7 August 2000Recent Violence in Central Asia: Causes and Consequences,Central Asia Briefing, 18 October 2000Islamist Mobilisation and Regional Security, Asia Report N°14,1 March 2001Incubators of Conflict: Central Asia’s Localised Poverty andSocial Unrest, Asia Report N°16, 8 June 2001Central Asia: Fault Lines in the Security Map, Asia Report N°20, 4 July 2001Central Asia: Uzbekistan at Ten – Repression and Instability,Asia Report N°21, 21 August 2001Kyrgystan at Ten: Trouble in the Island of Democracy, AsiaReport N°22, 28 August 2001

BALKANS

ALBANIA

The State of Albania, Balkans Report N°54, 6 January 1999Albania Briefing: The Refugee Crisis, 11 May 1999Albania: State of the Nation, Balkans Report N°87, 1 March2000Albania Briefing: Albania’s Local Elections, A test of Stabilityand Democracy, 25 August 2000Albania: The State of the Nation 2001, Balkans report Nº111,25 May 2001Albania Briefing: Albania’s Parliamentary Elections 2001, 23August 2001

BOSNIA

Brcko: A Comprehensive Solution, Balkans Report N° 55, 8February 1999Breaking the Mould: Electoral Reform in Bosnia &Herzegovina, Balkans Report N° 56, 4 March 1999Republika Srpska: Poplasen, Brcko and Kosovo – Three Crisesand Out? Balkans Report N°62, 6 April 1999Why Will No-one Invest in Bosnia and Herzegovina? BalkansReport N°64, 21 April 1999Republika Srpska in the Post-Kosovo Era: Collateral Damageand Transformation,Balkans Report N°71, 5 July 1999Rule over Law: Obstacles to the Development of anIndependent Judiciary in Bosnia and Herzegovina, BalkansReport N°72, 5 July 1999Balkans Briefing: Stability Pact Summit, 27 July 1999Preventing Minority Return in Bosnia and Herzegovina: TheAnatomy of Hate and Fear, Balkans Report N°73, 2 August1999

Is Dayton Failing? Policy Options and Perspectives Four YearsAfter, Balkans Report N°80, 28 October 1999Rule of Law in Public Administration: Confusion andDiscrimination in a Post Communist Bureaucracy, BalkansReport N°84, 15 December 1999Denied Justice: Individuals Lost in a Legal Maze, BalkansReport N°86, 23 February 2000European Vs. Bosnian Human Rights Standards, HandbookOverview, 14 April 2000Reunifying Mostar: Opportunities for Progress, Balkans ReportN°90, 19 April 2000Bosnia’s Municipal Elections 2000: Winners and Losers,Balkans Report N°91, 28 April 2000Bosnia’s Refugee Logjam Breaks: Is the InternationalCommunity Ready? Balkans Report N°95, 31 May 2000War Criminals in Bosnia’s Republika Srpska, Balkans ReportN°103, 02 November 2000Bosnia’s November Elections: Dayton Stumbles, Balkans ReortN°104, 18 December 2000Turning Strife to Advantage: A Blueprint to Integrate theCroats in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Balkans Report N° 106, 15March 2001


No Early Exit: NATO’s Continuing Challenge in Bosnia,Balkans Report Nº110, 22 May 2001Bosnia's Precarious Economy: Still Not Open For Business;Balkans Report N° 115, 7 August 2001

KOSOVO

Unifying the Kosovar Factions: The Way Forward, BalkansReport N°58, 12 March 1999Kosovo: The Road to Peace, Balkans Report N°59, 12 March1999Kosovo Briefing: Atrocities in Kosovo Must be Stopped, 29March 1999Kosovo Briefing: The Refugee Crisis, 2 April 1999Kosovo: Let’s Learn from Bosnia, Balkans Report N°66, 17May 1999The New Kosovo Protectorate, Balkans report N°69, 20 June1999Kosovo Briefing: Who Will Lead the Kosovo Albanians Now?28 June 1999The Policing Gap: Law and Order in the New Kosovo, BalkansReport N°74, 6 August 1999Who’s Who in Kosovo, Balkans Report N°76, 31 August 1999Waiting for UNMIK: Local Administration in Kosovo, BalkansReport N°79, 18 October 1999Violence in Kosovo: Who’s Killing Whom? Balkans ReportN°78, 2 November 1999Trepca: Making Sense of the Labyrinth, Balkans Report N°82,26 November 1999Starting From Scratch in Kosovo: The Honeymoon is Over,Balkans Report N°83, 10 December 1999Kosovo Albanians in Serbian Prisons: Kosovo’s UnfinishedBusiness, Balkans Report N°85, 26 January 2000What Happened to the KLA?, Balkans Report N°88, 3 March2000Kosovo’s Linchpin: Overcoming Division in Mitrovica, BalkansReport N°96, 31 May 2000Reality Demands: Documenting Violations of InternationalHumanitarian Law in Kosovo 1999, 27 June 2000Elections in Kosovo: Moving toward Democracy? BalkansReport N°97, 7 July 2000Kosovo Report Card, Balkans Report N°100, 28 August 2000Reaction in Kosovo to Kostunica’s Victory, Balkans Briefing, 10October 2000Religion in Kosovo, Balkans Report N°105, 31 January 2001

MACEDONIA

Challenges and Choices for the New Government, BalkansReport N°60, 29 March 1999Toward Destabilisation? Balkans Report N°67, 21 May 1999Macedonia Briefing: Government Holds Together, Eyes Fixedon Upcoming Presidential Poll, 11 June 1999Macedonia Briefing: Update of Recent Political Developments,14 June 1999Macedonia: Gearing up for Presidential Elections, BalkansReport N°77, 18 October 1999

Macedonia’s Ethnic Albanians: Bridging the Gulf, BalkansReport N°98, 2 August 2000Macedonia government expects setback in local elections,Briefing Paper, 4 September 2000The Macedonian Question: Reform or Rebellion, BalkansReport N°109, 5 April 2001Macedonia: The Last Chance for Peace, Balkans Report N°113, 20 June 2001Macedonia: Still Sliding, Balkans Briefing, 27 July 2001Macedonia: War on Hold, Balkans Briefing, 15 August 2001Macedonia: Filling the Security Vacuum, Balkans Briefing, 8September 2001

MONTENEGRO

Montenegro Briefing: Milosevic to Move on Montenegro, 23April 1999Montenegro Briefing: Calm Before the Storm, 19 August 1999Montenegro: In the Shadow of the Volcano, Balkans ReportN°89, 21 March 2000Montenegro’s Socialist People’s Party: A Loyal Opposition?,Balkans Report N°92, 28 April 2000Montenegro’s Local Elections: Testing the NationalTemperature, Background Briefing, 26 May 2000Montenegro’s Local Elections: More of the Same, BriefingPaper, 23 June 2000Montenegro: Which way Next? Balkans Briefing, 30 November2000Montenegro: Settling for Independence? Balkans ReportN°107, 28 March 2001Montenegro: Time to Decide, Balkans Briefing, 18 April 2001Montenegro: Resolving the Independence Deadlock, BalkansReport N°114, 1 August 2001

SERBIA

Sidelining Slobodan: Getting Rid of Europe’s Last Dictator,Balkans Report N°57, 15 March 1999Milosevic’s Aims in War and Diplomacy, Balkans Report N°65,11 May 1999Yugoslavia Briefing: Wanted for War Crimes, 1 June 1999Back to the Future: Milosevic Prepares for Life After Kosovo,Balkans Report N°70, 28 June 1999Transforming Serbia: The Key to Long-Term Balkan Stability,Balkans Report N°75, 10 August 1999Serbia’s Embattled Opposition, Balkans Report N°94, 30 May2000Serbia’s Grain Trade: Milosevic’s Hidden Cash Crop, BalkansReport N°93, 5 June 2000Serbia: The Milosevic Regime on the Eve of the SeptemberElections, Balkans Report N°99, 17 August 2000Current Legal Status of the Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) andof Serbia and Montenegro, Balkans Report N°101, 19September 2000Yugoslavia’s Presidential Election: The Serbian People’sMoment of Truth, Balkans Report N°102, 19 September 2000Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Sanctions Briefing, BalkansBriefing, 10 October 2000


Serbia on the Eve of the December Elections, Balkans Briefing,20 December 2000A Fair Exchange: Aid to Yugoslavia for regional Stability,Balkans Report N° 112, 15 June 2001Peace in Presevo: Quick Fix or Long-Term Solution?, BalkansReport N°116, 10 August 2001

REGIONAL REPORTS

War in the Balkans, Balkans Report N°61, 19 April 1999Balkan Refugee Crisis, Balkans Report N°68, 1 June 1999Balkans Briefing: Stability Pact Summit, 27 July 1999After Milosevic: A Practical Agenda for Lasting BalkansPeace, Balkans report N°108, 26 April 2001Milosevic in the Hague: What it Means for Yugoslavia and theRegion, Balkans Briefing Paper, 6 July 2001

ISSUES REPORTS

HIV/AIDS as a Security Issue, ICG Issues Report N° 1, 19 June2001Eu Crisis Response Capability: Institutions and Processes forConflict Prevention and Management, ICG Issues Report N° 2,26 June 2001The European Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO): CrisisResponse in the Grey Lane, ICG Briefing Paper, 26 June 2001


APPENDIX E

ICG BOARD OF TRUSTEEES

Martti Ahtisaari, ChairmanFormer President of Finland

Stephen Solarz, Vice-ChairmanFormer U.S. Congressman

Gareth Evans, PresidentFormer Foreign Minister of Australia

Morton AbramowitzFormer U.S. Assistant Secretary of State; former U.S.Ambassador to Turkey

Kenneth AdelmanFormer U.S. Ambassador and Deputy PermanentRepresentative to the UN

Richard AllenFormer Head of U.S. National Security Council andNational Security Advisor

Hushang AnsaryFormer Iranian Minister and Ambassador;Chairman, Parman Group, Houston

Louise ArbourSupreme Court Judge, Canada;

Former Chief Prosecutor, International CriminalTribunal for former Yugoslavia

Oscar Arias SanchezFormer President of Costa Rica; Nobel Peace Prize,1987

Ersin AriogluChairman, Yapi Merkezi

Paddy AshdownFormer Leader of the Liberal Democrats, UnitedKingdom

Zainab BanguraDirector, Campaign for Good Governance, SierraLeone

Alan BlinkenFormer U.S. Ambassador to Belgium

Emma BoninoMember of the European Parliament; formerEuropean Commissioner

Maria Livanos CattauiSecretary-General, International Chamber ofCommerce

Eugene ChienDeputy Secretary General to the President, Taiwan

Wesley ClarkFormer NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Jacques DelorsFormer President of the European Commission

Uffe Ellemann-JensenFormer Foreign Minister of Denmark

Gernot ErlerVice-President, Social Democratic Party, GermanBundestag

Mark EyskensFormer Prime Minister of Belgium

Yoichi FunabashiJournalist and author

Bronislaw GeremekFormer Foreign Minister of Poland

I.K.GujralFormer Prime Minister of India

Han Sung-JooFormer Foreign Minister of Korea

El Hassan bin TalalChairman, Arab Thought Forum

Marianne HeibergSenior Researcher, Norwegian Institute ofInternational Affairs

Elliott F KulickChairman, Pegasus International

Joanne Leedom-AckermanNovelist and journalist

Todung Mulya LubisHuman rights lawyer and author

Allan J MacEachenFormer Deputy Prime Minister of Canada

Barbara McDougallFormer Secretary of State for External Affairs,Canada

Matthew McHughCounsellor to the President, The World Bank


Mo MowlamFormer British Secretary of State for NorthernIreland

Christine OckrentJournalist

Timothy OngChairman, Asia Inc magazine

Wayne OwensPresident, Center for Middle East Peace andEconomic Co-operation

Cyril RamaphosaFormer Secretary-General, African NationalCongress; Chairman, New Africa Investments Ltd

Fidel RamosFormer President of the Philippines

Michel RocardMember of the European Parliament; former PrimeMinister of France

Volker RuheVice-President, Christian Democrats, GermanBundestag; former German Defence Minister

Mohamed SahnounSpecial Adviser to the United Nations Secretary-General

William ShawcrossJournalist and author

Michael SohlmanExecutive Director of the Nobel Foundation

George SorosChairman, Open Society Institute

Eduardo SteinFormer Foreign Minister of Guatemala

Pär StenbäckFormer Minister of Foreign Affairs, Finland

Thorvald StoltenbergFormer Minister of Foreign Affairs, Norway

William O TaylorChairman Emeritus, The Boston Globe

Ed van ThijnFormer Minister of Interior, The Netherlands; formerMayor of Amsterdam

Simone VeilFormer Member of the European Parliament; formerMinister for Health, France

Shirley WilliamsFormer British Secretary of State for Education andScience; Member House of Lords

Grigory YavlinskyMember of the Russian Duma

Mortimer ZuckermanChairman and Editor-in-Chief, US News and WorldReport

indonesia: ending repression in irian jaya 20 september …€¦ · icg asia report no 23 20...

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