indonesian political institution by m. faisal karim

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Indonesia Political System

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This is a presentation about Indonesian political institution made by Mr. M Faisal Karim for Britzone English club http://britzoneid.com

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Page 1: Indonesian Political Institution by M. Faisal Karim

Indonesia Political System

Page 2: Indonesian Political Institution by M. Faisal Karim

Outline

• Conceptual Framework of Political System

• Evolution of Indonesian Political System

Page 3: Indonesian Political Institution by M. Faisal Karim

PRESIDENTIAL AND PARLIAMENTARY

Page 4: Indonesian Political Institution by M. Faisal Karim

How Presidentialism Works

• Separate origin and separate survival of executive and legislature– Separate elections, fixed terms

• Assembly passes laws

• President also has powers– Name government

– Some legislative powers

• Major policy changes require cooperation

Page 5: Indonesian Political Institution by M. Faisal Karim

Variations on presidentialism

• Legislative powers of president

– Can issue decrees

– Exclusive proposal rights (eg, budget)

– Veto powers (line item, % to overrule)

• Reelection limits (1 term, 2 terms, none)

• Legislature involved in government

– Approve ministers, recall/censure

Page 6: Indonesian Political Institution by M. Faisal Karim

Origin of Presidentialism and Parliamentarism

• England: Parliament emerges as check to monarch

• US: English system but without monarch

– President stands in for monarch

• As England democratizes

– Parliament gradually takes over King’s governing council

– Final result: parliamentary system

Page 7: Indonesian Political Institution by M. Faisal Karim

Spread of presidentialism and parliamentarism

• Most European countries adopt parliamentarism

– Follow UK model

• Americas get presidentialism

– Follow US model

• Other regions – often follow colonial power

Page 8: Indonesian Political Institution by M. Faisal Karim

Perils of Presidentialism (1)

• Rigidity: can’t deal with crisis

– can’t drop president if doing a bad job, loses confidence

• Zero-sum elections: only one winner

– high stakes => conflict, polarization

Page 9: Indonesian Political Institution by M. Faisal Karim

Getting rid of a president

Page 10: Indonesian Political Institution by M. Faisal Karim

Perils of Presidentialism (2)

• Style: monarchical tendencies

• Inexperienced leaders, outsiders

• Dual legitimacy & gridlock

– what happens when president and assembly disagree

Page 11: Indonesian Political Institution by M. Faisal Karim

Government shutdown

Page 12: Indonesian Political Institution by M. Faisal Karim
Page 13: Indonesian Political Institution by M. Faisal Karim

Delegative Democracy

• President considers self embodiment of nation and governs as wishes

• Rules by decree, ignores assembly, courts

• Not responsive to public opinion

• Accountability only at election time

• Is this undemocratic?

Page 15: Indonesian Political Institution by M. Faisal Karim

In favor of presidentialism (1)

• Accountability: voters choose executive

• Leader responsible to whole nation

– Discipline particularistic tendencies

• Stability: fixed term of office

• Checks and balances

• Presidentialism tries to solve tradeoff between efficiency and representativeness

Page 16: Indonesian Political Institution by M. Faisal Karim

In favor of presidentialism (2)

• Is president dangerous in divided society?

• Will only represent one group

• Horowitz: problem is not presidency but electoral system

– President can provide unity in divided country

– But need certain type of election: alternative vote or regional requirements (eg, Nigeria)

Page 17: Indonesian Political Institution by M. Faisal Karim

How to test?

• Of 22 advanced democracies, only 2 presidential

• Regression of democracy on presidentialism and controls

• What are the problems?

Page 18: Indonesian Political Institution by M. Faisal Karim

Where famous scholars go wrong

Parliamentary (N=41) Presidential (N=36)

Bahamas Israel Algeria Mozambique

Bangladesh Jamaica Angola Niger

Botswana Laos Cameroon Philippines

Burma Mauritius Cyprus Rwanda

Chad Nigeria Congo Syria

Dominica Pakistan Gabon Taiwan

Fiji Singapore Ivory Coast Tunisia

Ghana Sri Lanka Korea Vietnam

India Sudan Madagascar Zambia

Indonesia … Mali …

Page 19: Indonesian Political Institution by M. Faisal Karim

Continuous Democracies 1980-1989

Parliamentary (N=15/41) Presidential (N=0/36)

Bahamas Nauru

Barbados St. Lucia

India St. Vincent

Israel Solomon Isl.

Jamaica Tuvalu

Kiribati …

Page 20: Indonesian Political Institution by M. Faisal Karim

Another explanation?

• But maybe countries that choose presidential systems are already prone to instability

– Why would they choose presidentialism?

• Does another factor cause both presidentialism and instability?

Page 21: Indonesian Political Institution by M. Faisal Karim

Also note

• Most successful cases of parliamentarism in small British colonies

• Maybe historical factors matter

– 1st Reverse Wave: mostly parliamentary democracies fall

– 2nd Reverse Wave: mostly presidential democracies fall

Page 22: Indonesian Political Institution by M. Faisal Karim

Better ways to test

• Difference-in-difference– Look at countries that changed systems and consider

before and after

• 2SLS (two stage least squares) – estimate causes of presidentialism and then use

predictions in second stage (also other instrumental variable techniques)

• Matching methods– Compare apples with apples: countries that are likely to

have presidentialism (or parliamentarism) – some have it and others don’t

Page 23: Indonesian Political Institution by M. Faisal Karim

Making presidentialism work

• Works best with small number of parties– President can have majority in legislature

– “The difficult combination”

• Divided government a problem– Hold elections at the same time: coattails

– Avoid midterm elections

• Limit decree powers

• More reelection

• Switching to parliamentarism worse?

Page 24: Indonesian Political Institution by M. Faisal Karim

A compromise?

• Semi-presidentialism

– Elected president with some powers

– But also government which needs to hold confidence of assembly

• How does it solve each of problems of presidentalism?

• French 5th republic – Who is in charge?

– Problem of cohabitation

Page 25: Indonesian Political Institution by M. Faisal Karim

Types of parliamentarism

• Majoritarian type – Westminster

– 2 parties, powerful PM, majority government, little opposition

• Party-controlled – Germany

– 3-4 parties, coalitions but strong majority government

• Assembly government

– Multiple parties, weak discipline, minority/surplus majority govts, short duration, PM first among equals

Page 26: Indonesian Political Institution by M. Faisal Karim

Parliamentarism rationalized

• Investiture vote

• Constructive vote of confidence or elections after no confidence

• Head of state role in formation

• Only PM elected, not cabinet

• Guillotine: confidence attached to laws

• Fewer parties

• Party discipline

Page 27: Indonesian Political Institution by M. Faisal Karim

Types of Political Systems

Presidential Parliamentary

Plurality

Elections

United States

Philippines

United Kingdom

India

Proportional

Representation

Latin America Western Europe

Page 28: Indonesian Political Institution by M. Faisal Karim

Majoritarianism & Consensus

• Where do presidentialism/parliamentarism fit in Lijphart’s scheme?

• Is presidentialism majoritarian?

– Strong, unified executive

– But only if weak legislature

• Is it consensus?

– Separates power

– But only if legislature strong

Page 29: Indonesian Political Institution by M. Faisal Karim

INDONESIAN POLITICAL SYSTEM

Page 30: Indonesian Political Institution by M. Faisal Karim

Republic of Indonesia I (1945-1959)• Adopted parliamentary system (1949 Constitution and 1950 Constitution)

• President (should) serves as a figure head/constitutional head, while political responsibility day to day befalls on ministers

• Political parties were too fragmented, built many coalitions with both small and big parties.

• Existing coalition did not last/fragile

Bina Nusantara University 30

Page 31: Indonesian Political Institution by M. Faisal Karim

World War II

• The Dutch promise a conference on self-government before they leave in 1941.

• Sukarno, Mohammed Hatta and Sutan Sjahrir released from jail by the Japanese when they occupied Indonesia in 1942.

• Sukarno, Hatta and others formed Putera as a double edge puppet government.

Page 32: Indonesian Political Institution by M. Faisal Karim

Indonesian Revolution

• Sukarno announced the Five Postulates and declared independence in 1945.The Dutch had not yet returned.

– Nationalism (National unity)

– Internationalism (One sovereign nation among equals)

– Representative Democracy (All significant groups represented)

– Social Justice ( A Marxist view)

– Belief in God (A secular state, not Islamic)

Page 33: Indonesian Political Institution by M. Faisal Karim

Struggle for Independence

• The Netherlands asked Britain to reoccupy Indonesia on its behalf.

• The initial British force attempted to occupy Surabaya on November 10, 1945. The result was a bloody one-month long battle.

• Negotiations with Dutch led to Linggadjati Agreement in 1947 creating the United States of Indonesia under Dutch sovereignty. The USI was to be part of a larger Netherlands-Indonesian-Surinam-Curacao Union.

Page 34: Indonesian Political Institution by M. Faisal Karim

Sovereignty At Last

• The Indonesians were not satisfied with the lack of sovereignty. A guerrilla war ensued during which 6,000 Dutch and 150,000 Indonesians were killed during 1947-49. – A cease fire was imposed by the U.N. in 1947.

– An Asian Conference hosted by India imposed sanctions against the Dutch in 1949.

– Sovereignty was finally transferred by the Dutch in December, 1949.

Page 35: Indonesian Political Institution by M. Faisal Karim

Coping with Independence

• Indonesia found it extremely difficult to create and operate a viable government..

– Elections only yielded pluralities and weak, short-lived coalition governments.

– The economy was in decline and inflation rampant. The country was bankrupt.

– Fear of nationalization of assets prevented significant foreign investment.

Page 36: Indonesian Political Institution by M. Faisal Karim

Republic of Indonesia II (1959-1965)

• Known as Guided Democracy

• Characteristics:

• Strong president role (domination)

• Limited role of political parties

• Increased influence of communism

• Strong military element as socio-political power

• Basis of regime: Presidential Decree 1959 as a solution to break political chaos through strong presidential leadership

Bina Nusantara University 36

Page 37: Indonesian Political Institution by M. Faisal Karim

Guided Democracy

• In 1957 Sukarno established guided democracy to “save” the country.– A national advisory council was established

composed of representative groups, e.g., peasants, workers, the military.

– A “cooperating parliament” was established in place of the elected parliament. Opinion could be expressed but votes were not taken. The goal was to govern by deliberation and consensus.

Page 38: Indonesian Political Institution by M. Faisal Karim

The Gestapu Affair

• On the night of September 30, 1965, six leading generals and one lieutenant were assassinated in an attempted coup. – General Nasution escaped the assassination and Major

General Suharto was not targeted.

– The reaction was a massacre of a half million Communist and Chinese, a combination pogrom and Jihad.

– Sukarno had no advanced knowledge of the coup but his powers were curbed. He was removed as president in 1967 and died in 1970.

Page 39: Indonesian Political Institution by M. Faisal Karim

Republic of Indonesia III (1965-1998) • Also known as Democracy Pancasila/New Order

• Formal basis: Pancasila, 1945 Constitution and decree of MPRS (people’s consultative assembly)

• Stronger presidential role in government as the most dominant figure in Indonesian political system. No effective check-and-balances, leading to abuse of power

• Political goals:

- Maintain political stability

- Promote national development

- Strengthen national integrity

• General election was routinely and continuously held every five year. However, violation against democratic values was massive: no freedom for voters in election

• Opposition was suppressed

Bina Nusantara University 39

Page 40: Indonesian Political Institution by M. Faisal Karim

Suharto’s New Order• March 11, 1966 – Sukarno

signed the Supersemar decree authorizing Suharto to take all measures necessary ... This was the beginning of the New Order.– Revived the parliament of 1955.– Adam Malik renegotiated debt

of $1.7 million.– Ended Confrontation Policy.– Joined ASEAN– Befriended the West and Japan.– Held national elections in 1971.

Page 41: Indonesian Political Institution by M. Faisal Karim

New Order Problems• Sekber Golkar (the

government party) lost creditability in the early ’70s.

• Legitimized “Dual Function.”

• Graft, cronyism and corruption were extremely wide spread. Examples:– Astra Toyota & Tommy– Pertamina lost $10.5

billion.

Page 42: Indonesian Political Institution by M. Faisal Karim

Eco dev’t cont:Crony Capitalism

• He also turned the country into a family business

• Suharto’s family and friends were virtually synonymous with Indonesian big business

• Arranged economic life to the point where it was virtually impossible for an Indonesian to make any purchase without some profit ending up with the first family

• Within this context, there was much corruption within govt.

• 1997 World Bank report claimed that at least 30% of gov’t development funds were diverted through informal payments to gov’t personnel and politicians and the ruling party faction GOLKAR.

• Before his resignation the the Suharto family’s personal wealth had been estimated at $4 billion.

Page 43: Indonesian Political Institution by M. Faisal Karim

Political development

• Suharto was the dominate figure, who controlled all aspects of political life.

• Limited opposition, both in parties and media

• State had own political party-GOLAR, became compulsory political affiliation for all govt. employees

• During his rule, rival parties (of which only 2 were permitted) were subject to significant state manipulation

• Thus, opposition was effectively silenced so the country (and by extension his family) could benefit economically.

Page 44: Indonesian Political Institution by M. Faisal Karim

Insecurity Forces

• Under Suharto’s rule the military served as the president's right arm, constituting a powerful force that penetrated every village.

• The military were part of the political establishment, as the Indonesian constitution assigned them the dual function of defending the country from external invaders and guiding its internal political development.

• Also, they were assigned a block of seats (38) in the parliament, which was not very important during Suharto’s rule as parliament simply served to rubber stamp the president’s policies

• But, this has the potential to complicate Indonesia’s transition to democracy since Suharto’s fall

Page 45: Indonesian Political Institution by M. Faisal Karim

Beurocratic Authoritarianism

• Suharto’s regime exemplifies B-A as defined by Waltz

• (1)Populist forces were controlled through a repressive state apparatus

• (2) Technocratic elite played an important role in rebuilding the economy once Suharto rose to power, and the military was utilized to maintain social order so uprisings would not impede economic success

• (3) Extreme centralization of public policy, such that Suharto dominated every aspect of political life ; a strong, unresponsive state (in terms of its typology)

• (4)As in Argentina and Brazil economic progress was not linked to democracy, as economic success linked to authoritarian rule for over 30 years

• this model falls in 1997

Page 46: Indonesian Political Institution by M. Faisal Karim

Republic of Indonesia IV (1998 – now)• Known as Reformation era, paved the way to reform politics and democratisation

in Indonesia

• Check-and-balance function is restored. Legislative is given more power to check executive (no longer serve as rubber stamp of president policy)

• Amendment of 1945 Constitution, e.g. role of DPR (House of Representative) is strengthened, all members of parliament is elected through democratic election, human rights is guaranteed

• Decentralisation of politics: direct election of local government

• General election in 2004 marked as an important milestone in Indonesian political history as president and vice president are elected preceded by the election of member of parliament

Bina Nusantara University 46

Page 47: Indonesian Political Institution by M. Faisal Karim

Institutions and Social Groups

• Constitution.– The constitution is a hybrid: “presidential with

parliamentary characteristics.” Government is unitary.• Executive power is held by the legislature in that it can subject the

president to votes of confidence.

• Until 2004, the legislature actually elected the president and V.P. They are now elected directly. Limited to two 5-year terms

• In 2004, the House of Regional Representatives (DPD) was established as a separate legislative body. It is composed of four representatives from each of Indonesia’s 33 provinces.The House of Representatives (DPR) is still the premier legislative body. Composed of 550 seats, members are elected for 5-year terms.

Page 48: Indonesian Political Institution by M. Faisal Karim

Institutions and Social Groups

• Constitution (Continued)• The Peoples Consultative Assembly (MPR) is composed

of the elected members of the DPR & DPD. Responsible to inaugurate and impeach president and amend the constitution.

• The president is head of state, CINC of armed the forces, responsible for domestic governance and foreign affairs.

• The president appoints a council of ministers. Members do not have to be elected members of the legislature. He also appoints provincial governors.

Page 49: Indonesian Political Institution by M. Faisal Karim

Institutions and Social Groups

• Military.– The military played both a security and

sociopolitical role under Suharto, labeled “dual function.” Active duty military were members of the cabinet, provincial governors, members of the legislature and leaders of Golkar.

– Since the election of SBY, the dual function concept has been down played. The goal is to eliminate it completely.

Page 50: Indonesian Political Institution by M. Faisal Karim

Institutions and Social Groups

• Bureaucracy

– Indonesia is a bureaucratic polity in which power and decision making is limited to members of the bureaucracy, specifically the military, civil servants and technocrats. Economists serving in top technocrat positions are commonly called the “Berkley Mafia.”

– Korpri was created in the 1970 to provide a new corps of civil servants, including provincial governors.

– The 1997 economic downturn did lessen the awe in which technocrats were held.

Page 51: Indonesian Political Institution by M. Faisal Karim

Institutions and Social Groups

• Political Parties.– Until 1999, no party could compete with Golkar, the official

government and military party. All government employees and the military were required to belong..

– Sukarno banned all competing political parties except PDI and PPP. Smaller political parties were forced to become part of one or the other. PDI is the Indonesian Democratic Party; PPP is the Muslim Party.

– Sukarno required that PDI and PPP espouse Pancasila only as their political philosophy and not depart from it.

– All these restrictions were lifted in 1999.

Page 52: Indonesian Political Institution by M. Faisal Karim

Institutions and Social Groups

• Democratization.– The Sukarno period of Guided Democracy (1950-57) was

followed by a return to the pre-1950 constitution under Suharto.

– Suharto’s New Order relied heavily on military rule (Dual Function), but did achieve great economic progress and a “middle class.” Suharto saw himself as the “Development President.”

– 1999 to 2001 saw the development of real democracy under Wahid and then Megawati Sukarnoputri.

– SBY has pledged to completely eliminate “Dual Function.”

Page 53: Indonesian Political Institution by M. Faisal Karim

Institutions and Social Groups

• Economic Development.– Has averaged a 6% GNP growth since 1965, although per

capita GNP is extremely low ($685.00).

– The 1997 economic crises slowed the GNP, but it has returned to a projected 5.2% for 2006.

– Natural resources include oil (aging fields and old equipment), natural gas (exports 20% of world’s LNG), tin, copper, and gold.

– Agricultural exports include palm oil, rice, tea, coffee, spices and rubber.

– Major industries include mining, petroleum, NG, textiles & apparel, labor intensive assembly.

Page 54: Indonesian Political Institution by M. Faisal Karim

Institutions and Social Groups

• Economic Problems,

– Most manufacturing is sub-contract assembly and low tech such as footwear, canning, & wood processing.

– Support by Chinese of Golkar led to preferential treatment by the government. Chinese businessmen, called cukong (boss), are resented for their power.

• Primitive slash and burn farming on Kalimantan and Sumatra started forest fires that spread smoke over much of SEA in 1997.

• Suharto family corruption and the national car – Timor.

Page 55: Indonesian Political Institution by M. Faisal Karim

Institutions and Social Groups

• Foreign Policy.– Sukarno sought security in anti-western nationalism: the NEFOSs

against the OLDEFOSs. Konfrontasi against Malaysia was the result.

– Suharto assumed a lower profile role in international affairs. Supported ASEAN and the Zone of Peace. East Timor was the exception. Played a role in attempting to resolve the Cambodia crises.

– Relations with China have improved since the Gestapu Affair. Established diplomatic relations in 1990.

– The West is still Indonesia’s primary market and source of investment and development assistance.

Page 56: Indonesian Political Institution by M. Faisal Karim

Democratic Transition

• This ties into the concept of political culture, particularly after being subject to an authoritarian regime for more than 32 years most ordinary Indonesians would not have a meaningful conception of democracy. If democracy was not entrained into their political culture than it would not be able to surface.

• Thus, the authoritarian regime may have caused an authoritarian political culture, as few citizens had any understanding of meaningful political competition

• Democracy, thus, may have been seen as more of a means to an end (economic success) than an end in itself.

Page 57: Indonesian Political Institution by M. Faisal Karim

The Complications of transition

• military- still holds a significant degree of power, particularly because it is still politicized. It is thought that they gave the new President Wahid its 38 votes in parliament, therefore he may now feel he owes them something. Arguably, democracy can not be fully realized with solders holding seats in parliament, or until the president places the solders under civilian control.

• Ethnic politics- As a country with 200,000 people speaking 250 languages and representing 300 different ethnicity's society has become increasingly divided since Suharto’s fall. His authoritarianism held the various elements together, as he was able to repress the vast differences among citizens. In the past 12 months, as many as 2000 have been killed in surges of religious warfare. (Muslim v. Christian

• “Few people here have any understanding of healthy political or social competition. For some of them democracy means chaos and killing”

Page 58: Indonesian Political Institution by M. Faisal Karim

The Reform

• Political Party

• The Military

• Central-local relations