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Inferring Internet Server IPv4 and IPv6 Address Relationships Robert Beverly, Arthur Berger * , Nicholas Weaver , Larry Campbell * Naval Postgraduate School * Akamai ICSI/UCSD [email protected], [email protected] February 7, 2013 CAIDA Active Internet Measurement 2013 Beverly, et al. (NPS) CAIDA AIMS-5 1 / 18

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Page 1: Inferring Internet Server IPv4 and IPv6 Address Relationships · Track IPv6 evolution Security: IPv6 is largely unsecured! Inter-dependence of IPv6 on IPv4 (and vice-versa) e.g. attack

Inferring Internet Server IPv4 and IPv6 Address

Relationships

Robert Beverly, Arthur Berger∗, Nicholas Weaver†, Larry Campbell∗

Naval Postgraduate School∗Akamai

†ICSI/[email protected], [email protected]

February 7, 2013

CAIDA Active Internet Measurement 2013

Beverly, et al. (NPS) CAIDA AIMS-5 1 / 18

Page 2: Inferring Internet Server IPv4 and IPv6 Address Relationships · Track IPv6 evolution Security: IPv6 is largely unsecured! Inter-dependence of IPv6 on IPv4 (and vice-versa) e.g. attack

Sibling Resolution Intro

Sibling Resolution

New Problem We Term “Sibling Resolution:”

Given a candidate (IPv4, IPv6) address pair, determine if these

addresses are assigned to the same cluster, device, or interface.

Lots of prior work on passive sibling associations: e.g. web-bugs,

javascript, flash, etc.

Prior work focuses on clients (adoption, performance)

This work:

Targeted, active test: on-demand for any given pair

Infrastructure: finding server siblings

Eventual goal: router siblings (not there yet)

Beverly, et al. (NPS) CAIDA AIMS-5 2 / 18

Page 3: Inferring Internet Server IPv4 and IPv6 Address Relationships · Track IPv6 evolution Security: IPv6 is largely unsecured! Inter-dependence of IPv6 on IPv4 (and vice-versa) e.g. attack

Sibling Resolution Intro

Motivation

Why?

Adoption (non-adoption):

IPv4 and IPv6 expected to co-exist (for a long while?) →

dual-stacked devices

Track IPv6 evolution

Security:

IPv6 is largely unsecured!Inter-dependence of IPv6 on IPv4 (and vice-versa)

e.g. attack on IPv6 resource affecting IPv4 serviceCorrelating geolocation, reputation, etc with IPv4 host counterpart.

Performance:

Getting measurements of IPv4 vs. IPv6 performance correct:

isolate path vs. host performance

Operationally deployed today in Akamai, informing Edgescape

geolocation.

Beverly, et al. (NPS) CAIDA AIMS-5 3 / 18

Page 4: Inferring Internet Server IPv4 and IPv6 Address Relationships · Track IPv6 evolution Security: IPv6 is largely unsecured! Inter-dependence of IPv6 on IPv4 (and vice-versa) e.g. attack

Methodology

Techniques

3 Techniques:

1 (Passive) Induce DNS resolvers to use both v4 and v6 during

natural resolution of Akamai resources (deployed, large set of

measurements).

2 (Active) Force DNS to use a chain of v4 and v6 addresses to

perform resolution. Allows us to validate (a subset) of the

passively collected results.

3 (Active) Probe potentially in-common TCP stack of a candidate

v4, v6 sibling pair to obtain timestamp fingerprint.

Beverly, et al. (NPS) CAIDA AIMS-5 4 / 18

Page 5: Inferring Internet Server IPv4 and IPv6 Address Relationships · Track IPv6 evolution Security: IPv6 is largely unsecured! Inter-dependence of IPv6 on IPv4 (and vice-versa) e.g. attack

Methodology

Passive DNS

Encode IPv4 address of querying resolver into a AAAA record

returned for the next-level NS

Subsequent query to the IPv6 authority nameserver permits

linking v4 and v6 resolver addresses

src: IPv6, dst: 2001:428::IPv4

Pairs

DNS Resolver

IPv4

IPv6

NS=2001:428::IPv4A? www.a.example.com

(IPv4,IPv6)

A? www.a.example.com Second−Level

First−LevelAuth DNS

Auth DNS

Beverly, et al. (NPS) CAIDA AIMS-5 5 / 18

Page 6: Inferring Internet Server IPv4 and IPv6 Address Relationships · Track IPv6 evolution Security: IPv6 is largely unsecured! Inter-dependence of IPv6 on IPv4 (and vice-versa) e.g. attack

Methodology

Active DNS

Custom DNS server as authority for special domain

Chain of alternating v6, v4 CNAME records, only available via v6 or

v4, that maintain state within the dynamic name.

v6Q? c1.N.v6.domain

CNAME=c2.N.A1.v4.domain

CNAME=c3.N.A1.A2.v6.domain

CNAME=txt.N.A1.A2.A3.v4.domain

v6Q? c3.N.A1.A2.v6.domain

v4Q? txt.N.A1.A2.A3.v4.domain

TXT="A1 A2 A3 A4"

v4Q? c2.N.A1.v4.domain

c1.N.v6.domain

TXT="A1 A2 A3 A4"

Resolver (w/ IPv6=A1,A3; IPv4=A2,A4)

Prober

dom

ain

Aut

h D

NS

Beverly, et al. (NPS) CAIDA AIMS-5 6 / 18

Page 7: Inferring Internet Server IPv4 and IPv6 Address Relationships · Track IPv6 evolution Security: IPv6 is largely unsecured! Inter-dependence of IPv6 on IPv4 (and vice-versa) e.g. attack

Methodology

DNS Results

Deployed on Akamai; gathered ≃ 675,000 v4,v6 pairs

Importance: directing users to content in a CDN relies on

properties of DNS resolution. Improves IPv6 geolocation.

77% of v4,v6 pairs are 1-1, the rest is messy. Most complexity due

to large cluster resolvers (e.g. nominum, google DNS, openDNS,

comcast, etc).

2-1 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 210

number of v4 addresses in equiv. class

2-1

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

29

210

211

number of v6 addresses in equiv. class

0.1%

0.2%

0.5%

1%

2%

5%

75%

Beverly, et al. (NPS) CAIDA AIMS-5 7 / 18

Page 8: Inferring Internet Server IPv4 and IPv6 Address Relationships · Track IPv6 evolution Security: IPv6 is largely unsecured! Inter-dependence of IPv6 on IPv4 (and vice-versa) e.g. attack

Methodology

Targeted, Active Technique

Intuition: IPv4 and IPv6 share a common transport-layer (TCP)

stack

Leverage prior work on physical device fingerprinting using TCP

timestamp clockskew [Kohno 2005]

TCP timestamp option: “TCP Extensions for High Performance”

[RFC1323, May 1992]. Universally supported, enabled by default.

Note: TS clock 6= system clock

Note: TS clock frequently unaffected by system clock adjustments

(e.g. NTP)

Basic Idea: Probe over time. Fingerprint is clock skew (and

remote clock resolution).

Beverly, et al. (NPS) CAIDA AIMS-5 8 / 18

Page 9: Inferring Internet Server IPv4 and IPv6 Address Relationships · Track IPv6 evolution Security: IPv6 is largely unsecured! Inter-dependence of IPv6 on IPv4 (and vice-versa) e.g. attack

Methodology Examples

Example

Example

Gather 4 timestamp series:

www.caida.org (v4 and v6)www.ripe.net (v4 and v6)

Beverly, et al. (NPS) CAIDA AIMS-5 9 / 18

Page 10: Inferring Internet Server IPv4 and IPv6 Address Relationships · Track IPv6 evolution Security: IPv6 is largely unsecured! Inter-dependence of IPv6 on IPv4 (and vice-versa) e.g. attack

Methodology Examples

Example

-70

-60

-50

-40

-30

-20

-10

0

10

20

30

40

0 200 400 600 800 1000

obse

rved

offs

et (

mse

c)

measurement time(sec)

Host A (IPv6)Host B (IPv4)

α=0.029938 β=-3.519α=-0.058276 β=-1.139

CAIDA IPv6 vs. RIPE IPv4

Observe different skew

slopes (one negative)

Different timestamp

granularity

y = 0.029938x equates

to skew of ≈ 1.8ms /

minute, or ≈ 15 minutes

per year.

False siblings!

Beverly, et al. (NPS) CAIDA AIMS-5 10 / 18

Page 11: Inferring Internet Server IPv4 and IPv6 Address Relationships · Track IPv6 evolution Security: IPv6 is largely unsecured! Inter-dependence of IPv6 on IPv4 (and vice-versa) e.g. attack

Methodology Examples

Example

-70

-60

-50

-40

-30

-20

-10

0

10

20

30

40

0 200 400 600 800 1000

obse

rved

offs

et (

mse

c)

measurement time(sec)

Host A (IPv6)Host B (IPv4)

α=0.029938 β=-3.519α=-0.058276 β=-1.139

False Siblings

-70

-60

-50

-40

-30

-20

-10

0

10

0 200 400 600 800 1000

obse

rved

offs

et (

mse

c)

measurement time(sec)

Host A (IPv6)Host A (IPv4)

α=-0.058253 β=-1.178α=-0.058276 β=-1.139

True Siblings

CAIDA IPv4 vs. CAIDA IPv6: identical slopes (θ = 0.0098)

CAIDA IPv6 vs. RIPE IPv4: different slopes (θ = 31.947)

Beverly, et al. (NPS) CAIDA AIMS-5 11 / 18

Page 12: Inferring Internet Server IPv4 and IPv6 Address Relationships · Track IPv6 evolution Security: IPv6 is largely unsecured! Inter-dependence of IPv6 on IPv4 (and vice-versa) e.g. attack

Methodology Examples

Complications

-50

0

50

100

150

200

250

0 10000 20000 30000 40000 50000 60000 70000

obse

rved

offs

et (

mse

c)

measurement time(sec)

193.110.128.1992001:67c:2294:1000::f199

www.marca.com (#6 on

alexa ipv6)

Not always so distinct of

a difference!

Slope angle difference:

θ = 2.046

Beverly, et al. (NPS) CAIDA AIMS-5 12 / 18

Page 13: Inferring Internet Server IPv4 and IPv6 Address Relationships · Track IPv6 evolution Security: IPv6 is largely unsecured! Inter-dependence of IPv6 on IPv4 (and vice-versa) e.g. attack

Methodology Examples

Complications

0

5e+08

1e+09

1.5e+09

2e+09

2.5e+09

3e+09

3.5e+09

4e+09

4.5e+09

0 50 100 150 200

TC

P T

imes

tam

p

TCP Packet Sample

apache.org V4apache.org V6

www.apache.com

Raw TCP timestamps

Deterministically random

and monotonic for a

single connection

Random across

connections. Looks like

noise to us.

Beverly, et al. (NPS) CAIDA AIMS-5 13 / 18

Page 14: Inferring Internet Server IPv4 and IPv6 Address Relationships · Track IPv6 evolution Security: IPv6 is largely unsecured! Inter-dependence of IPv6 on IPv4 (and vice-versa) e.g. attack

Methodology Examples

Complications

-0.005

0

0.005

0.01

0.015

0.02

0.025

0 10000 20000 30000 40000 50000 60000 70000

obse

rved

offs

et (

mse

c)

measurement time(sec)

203.5.76.122001:388:1:5062::cb05:4c0c

What’s going on here?

Beverly, et al. (NPS) CAIDA AIMS-5 14 / 18

Page 15: Inferring Internet Server IPv4 and IPv6 Address Relationships · Track IPv6 evolution Security: IPv6 is largely unsecured! Inter-dependence of IPv6 on IPv4 (and vice-versa) e.g. attack

Methodology Examples

Complications

-2e+16

-1.8e+16

-1.6e+16

-1.4e+16

-1.2e+16

-1e+16

-8e+15

-6e+15

-4e+15

-2e+15

0

2e+15

0 10000 20000 30000 40000 50000 60000 70000

obse

rved

offs

et (

mse

c)

measurement time(sec)

209.85.225.1602001:4860:b007::a0

Also detects load

balancing among

servers

But how to deal with it?

Beverly, et al. (NPS) CAIDA AIMS-5 15 / 18

Page 16: Inferring Internet Server IPv4 and IPv6 Address Relationships · Track IPv6 evolution Security: IPv6 is largely unsecured! Inter-dependence of IPv6 on IPv4 (and vice-versa) e.g. attack

Results

Machine Sibling Inference

Machine Sibling Inference Methodology:

Analyze Alexa top 100,000 websites

Pull A and AAAA records

1398 (≈ 1.4%) have IPv6 DNS

Repeatedly fetch root HTML page via IPv4 and IPv6 via

deterministic IP address

Record all packets

Beverly, et al. (NPS) CAIDA AIMS-5 16 / 18

Page 17: Inferring Internet Server IPv4 and IPv6 Address Relationships · Track IPv6 evolution Security: IPv6 is largely unsecured! Inter-dependence of IPv6 on IPv4 (and vice-versa) e.g. attack

Results

Machine Sibling Inference

Alexa 100K Targeted Machine-Sibling Inference

Case Count

v4 and v6 non-monotonic (possible siblings) 109 (7.8%)

v4 or v6 non-monotonic (non-siblings) 140 (10.0%)

v4 and v6 no timestamps (possible siblings) 94 (6.7%)

v4 or v6 no timestamps (non-sibling) 101 (7.2%)

Our technique fails when timestamps are not monotonic across

TCP flows (e.g. load-balancer or BSD OS)

Or, when timestamps are not supported (e.g. middlebox)

Note, can disambiguate non-siblings

Beverly, et al. (NPS) CAIDA AIMS-5 17 / 18

Page 18: Inferring Internet Server IPv4 and IPv6 Address Relationships · Track IPv6 evolution Security: IPv6 is largely unsecured! Inter-dependence of IPv6 on IPv4 (and vice-versa) e.g. attack

Results

Machine Sibling Inference

Alexa 100K Targeted Machine-Sibling Inference

Case Count

v4 and v6 non-monotonic (possible siblings) 109 (7.8%)

v4 or v6 non-monotonic (non-siblings) 140 (10.0%)

v4 and v6 no timestamps (possible siblings) 94 (6.7%)

v4 or v6 no timestamps (non-sibling) 101 (7.2%)

Skew-based siblings 839 (60.0%)

Skew-based non-siblings 115 (8.3%)

Total 1398 (100%)

25.5% (356) non-siblings

57% of skew-based non-siblings are in same AS

12.6% of skew-based siblings are in different ASes

Beverly, et al. (NPS) CAIDA AIMS-5 18 / 18

Page 19: Inferring Internet Server IPv4 and IPv6 Address Relationships · Track IPv6 evolution Security: IPv6 is largely unsecured! Inter-dependence of IPv6 on IPv4 (and vice-versa) e.g. attack

Results

Feedback

Thanks!

Viz: Awesome scatter plot!

Data-Sharing: None so far (Akamai data off-limits, web-probing

can be released)

Feedback:

Do you believe our motivation story!?!?

Operational experience with large DNS resolvers?Thoughts on router v4,v6 sibling resolution?

Beverly, et al. (NPS) CAIDA AIMS-5 19 / 18