Infintesimal Confirmation

The Raven Paradox

1) A red herring confirms that all non-black things are non-ravens.

2) The hypothesis that all non-black things are non-ravens is logically equivalent to the hypothesis is that all ravens are black.

3) If (1) and (2), then a red herring confirms that all ravens are black.

4) A red herring confirms that all ravens are black.

4) A red herring confirms that all ravens are black.

Nicod’s Criterion (c): A generalization is neither confirmed nor disproved by non-Fs that are not G or by non-Fs that are G.

4) A red herring confirms that all ravens are black.

4) A red herring confirms that all ravens are black.

Don’t get too cozy with this resolution. It is easy to see that that same red herring also confirms “All ravens are white.” The contrapositive of the latter is “All nonwhite things are nonravens,” and the herring, being a nonwhite thing, confirms it. An observation cannot confirm two mutually exclusive hypotheses. Once you admit such a patent contradiction, it is possible to “prove” anything. The red herring confirms that the color of all ravens black, and also that that color is while; ergo: Black is white.