influencing ripeness - analyzing the factors necessary to induce successful negotiations in military...

8/8/2019 Influencing Ripeness - Analyzing the Factors Necessary to Induce Successful Negotiations in Military Conflict

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Shane HensingerThis study is an overview of three different cases of inter/intra state conflict, Bosnia,Kosovo and Macedonia, and the methods used to bring about negotiations which led to

settlement agreements in those conflicts. More specifically this paper will focus on theconditions necessary to bring the relevant parties in conflict to the bargaining table, the

context of which is known as a ripe moment. I will focus on three aspects of ripeness

and indicate whether each was present, this will serve as the quantitative portion of thepaper. The qualitative portion will focus on describing the history leading to the ripe

moment and to what degree those elements were present or not present in each

different case.

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A f f a i r s . P r o f e s s o r H o l g e r S c h m i d t



2

RIPENESS AS A CONCEPT ...................................................................................................................... 3

BOSNIA.................................................................................................................................................. 5

KOSOVO ............................................................................................................................................. 10

BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................................................................................................... 31



4

1. A mutually hurting stalemate

2. An impending, recently experienced or recently avoided catastrophe

3. An alternative way out

1. Mutually hurting stalemate: A mutually hurting stalemate is by definition a

situation where both parties have engaged in extended conflict and where neither

side is mutually ascendant or descendent. Mutually hurting stalemates are usually

categorized as military stalemates but they can also include a diplomatic as well

particularly in a case, like Cyprus, where one side has a military advantage but is

checked by the ascendant diplomatic power of its rival (Hensinger 11). The lack of

a mutually hurting stalemate is referred to as a fluctuating stalemate where one

side is always ascendant. The presence of a fluctuating stalemate prevents the

emergence of a mutually hurting stalemate until both sides are brought into a rough

equilibrium of power, both diplomatic and military.

2. An impending, recently experienced or recently avoided catastrophe: This

category refers to a deadline which one or the other party wants to avoid in order to

keep the balance of power in its favor. It can also include a recently avoided

catastrophe, such as a battle one side almost lost, or a recently experienced

catastrophe such as an act of extreme violence perpetrated by one side or another.

3. An alternative way out: This factor refers to the presence of willing and

resourceful mediators (Schrodt, Yilmas and Gerner 3) who can provide a

negotiated end to conflict which the two parties are unable to reach on their own. It

can also refer to pressure created by internal actors citizens demanding an end to

war or the election of parties hostile to the continuation of conflict are twoexamples.

After indentifying whether these three factors were present or not present in each

of my case studies I will then look at the issue of positive and negative inducements

introduced before and during the negotiations. Positive and negative inducements



5

take many forms including the imposition of sanctions, whether the sanctions are

broad-based or military-based, the presence of peace negotiations and how many

parties were involved in peace negotiations and the larger question of peacemaking

with power did the presence of certain peacemakers indicate a commitment to

use powerful means, including military force, to bring parties to a ripe moment?

And finally the use of military force employed against one of the main parties to

the negotiations (not by the parties themselves) and whether this was employed

during or before negotiations and on what scale (directed only at the territory in

question or directed at the territory AND at one or more of the main parties directly

involved in negotiations?)

My hypothesis is that the type and intensity of inducement, and by which party it is

introduced, greatly impacts the inducement of a ripe moment amongst the parties in

conflict.

Bosnia

The conflict in Bosnia was predicated on the secession of Bosnia from the Yugoslav

Federation in 1992and continued in varying degrees of intensity until the Dayton

Accords were signed in 1995.

There exists a great amount of literature on the negotiations which led to the Dayton

accords, as well as the events preceding them. It is from this information I draw

upon in order to look at the confluence of events and inducements, both positive

and negative, which led to the ripe moment which produced the Dayton Accords.

Bosnia and Herzogovina was a constituent state of the former Federal Republic of

Yugoslavia which, following the secession of Slovenia and Croatia in 1991, seceded

in 1992. Unlike Slovenia and Croatia, however, Bosnia was not populated largely by



6

any one ethnic group and instead represented within its borders what the former

Yugoslavia was comprised of before its dissolution, a majority-minority mix of

ethnic groups. Bosnia was comprised of 43% Bosniak Muslims, 31% Serbs, 17%

Croats and the remainder of mix of others. This set the stage for a conflict quite

unlike those which took place in Slovenia and Croatia one which lasted longer, was

bloodier and which eventually drew in more participants and multinational

alliances.

A major difference between the conflicts which involved Croatia and Slovenia was

the length of time each states was involved in active conflict on its territory

The chart below illustrates the difference in length of time of each states conflict,

with Slovenia representing less than one month of conflict, Croatia representing less

than eighteen months of conflict and Bosnia representing nearly four years of

conflict.

The total amount of time involved in conflict can be a key indicator of whether a

party is ready to enter into serious negotiations which itself can be a key element

of a the creation of a ripe moment designed to bring peace to warring parties.

020

4060

Bosnia

Croatia

Slovenia

Total Months of Conflict

Bosnia

Croatia

Slovenia



7

Bosnia Mutually Hurting Stalemate

By the time the negotiation process began which produced the Dayton accords the

shape of the conflict, which has been fluctuating for some time, has begun to change

due to a confluence of factors, including a US-brokered alliance between the Bosnian

and Croat federations within Bosnia which led to military victories on the ground.

This was recognized by the United States chief negotiator Richard Holbrooke, who

said the success of the Croatian (and later the Bosnian-Croat Federation) offensive

was a classic illustration of a fundamental fact: the shape of the diplomatic

landscape will usually reflect the actual balance of forces on the ground (Holbrooke

73). Military victories by jointly-aligned Bosnian and Croat forces created facts on

the ground which changed the overall situation and stopped the ascendancy of the

Bosnian Serbs - leading to a mutually hurting stalemate, the presence of which was

vital to the eventual arrival of a peace agreement between the parties.

The inducement of a mutually hurting stalemate between the Bosnian state and

Bosnian Serbs was not accomplished solely by Bosnian-Croat victories on the

battlefield but also by a sustained US-led NATO bombing campaign which targeted

key assets of the Bosnian Serbs, including command and control facilities and

weapons storage and placement sites. This stands in contrast to earlier NATO

strikes on the Bosnian Serbs, which were pin prick attacks aimed at single

armored vehicles or weapons placement sites.

Another key element which led to a mutually hurting stalemate between the two

sides was the evolution of operational coherence between the variouscomponents of the international regimes policy towards the Bosnian conflict

(Rothfield and Cousens 537). Prior to the United States NATO-led sustained

bombing of Bosnian Serb-led positions in Bosnia international policy towards the

conflict was in extreme disarray this was particularly the case in relation to the

European Union, where no strong mediators stepped forward to offer a way out



8

for the conflicting parties. This lack of coordination contributed to a fluctuating

stalemate as the Bosnian Serbs, while under international embargo (as was the

Bosnian state) had a built in advantage in weaponry and training due to their

extensive ties with the armed forces of the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

(FRY), which was almost entirely Serb-dominated.

Bosnia - An impending, recently experienced or recently avoided catastrophe

During the summer of 2005 the Bosnian state had experienced in Srebrenica, which

was a UN-declared safe area, the worst act of genocide and mass murder in Europe

since WWII, when Bosnian Serb-led forces, with the participation of volunteers from

Greece and Russia, murdered more than 7000 Muslim men and boys after taking

control of the area from Dutch-led UN peacekeepers.

This atrocity led to deep recriminations within the EU, NATO and the United Nations

and a growing awareness amongst both organizations that policy on Bosnia had

become a complete failure which could threaten the very existence of all three

organizations.

Srebrenica also had the same effect on Bosnia, where the leadership of the state

began to cooperate more closely with Bosnian Croats in joint offensives which

changed the balance of power on the ground. At the same time Serb forces in the

self-declared Serbian Krajina area of Croatia were expelled in an operation

(Operation Storm) which was tacitly supported by the United States this led to a

refugee crisis in Serb-dominated areas of Bosnia as well as in Serbia proper, which

were flooded by Serb civilians from Croatia.

Finally on August 30th, 2005 NATO forces began Operation Deliberate Force. This

consisted of waves of NATO aircraft operating from Italy and the US aircraft carrier

T heodore Roosevelt which targeted Bosnian Serb military positions within Bosnia.

Air power was accompanied by French and British artillery barrages aimed at



9

Serbian barracks on the outskirts of Sarajevo (Holbrooke 102). Bosnian Serb and

Croat ground offensives were begun at the same time which quickly overwhelmed

Bosnian Serb positions on the ground.

Bosnia An Alternative Way Out

Shuttle diplomacy, led by veteran US diplomat Richard Holbrooke, had begun in

advance of NATO-led military operations and continued, without pause, during the

bombing campaign. While diplomatic efforts had taken place during the entire

Bosnia conflict they were often disjointed, reflecting the unsettled power

relationships in the European Union at the time. The role of the United States in

spearheading diplomatic efforts appears to have been crucial in unifying efforts by

the west, and in particular by France, Great Britain and Germany, to forge a unified

front vis-à-vis the Bosnian Serbs and in particular to their sponsors in Serbia itself.

The role of the United States in forcing strong military action against the Bosnian

Serbs and in negotiations which eventually ended the war provided a clear way

out for all parties in the conflict.

The role of Serbia, which was an ally of the Bosnian Serbs, had also changed under

pressure. Previously Serbia had seen its interests aligned with the Bosnian Serbs

and had provided its ethnic allies with support and supplies, in defiance of UN

embargos. US-led shuttle diplomacy and the strong demonstration of western

resolve through Operation Deliberate Force appears to have convinced the

leadership of Serbia that the time had come for an alternative way out of the

conflict and that more lay to be gained than lost in negotiations a crucial factor inconvincing any party to enter into negotiations. This factor was illustrated by a

meeting US diplomat Richard Holbrooke had with Serbian President Milosevic on

August 30th, 2005 where the Serbian President finally agreed on a formula to

represent the Bosnian Serbs in multiparty negotiations (previous offers had been

rejected because they included indicted war criminals Radovan Karadzic and Ratko



10

Mladic) and which provided the leader of the Serbian delegation President

Milosevic the right to break deadlocks within the delegation (Holbrooke 107).

Bosnia, Summer 1995 Was a Ripe Moment Present?

Figure 1. Presence of Element of Ripeness in Bosnian Conflict

M utually hurting Stalemate? Present Bosnian/Croat victories onbattlefield, greater cooperation between

Bosnian/Croat forces, NATO-led

bombing campaign, Croatian retaking of Krajina, operational coherence in

international policy towards Bosnia

I mpending, Recently Avoided or

Experienced Catastrophe?

Present Srebrenica, NATO-led

bombing campaign Alternative Way Out? Present concerted US-led shuttle

diplomacy effort.

Using the formula elaborated on in the first part of this report all the elements

necessary to induce ripeness in the Bosnian conflict were present in the later part of

the summer of 1995 the ripe moment which led to the Dayton Accords.

Kosovo

Much like Bosnia the causes of the conflict in Kosovo were rooted in ethnic conflict.

But unlike Bosnia the ethnic balance in Kosovo was much more skewed against the

Serbian population, the presence of which had led the Serb-dominated forces of the

FRY to intervene in other constituent parts of the former Yugoslavia.

Kosovo was estimated to have a population balance of 90-10 in favor of the ethnic

Albanian population in the state. The ethnic Albanian population in Kosovo was

overwhelmingly Muslim with small populations of Catholic and Orthodox Muslims

scattered around Kosovo. The rest of Kosovos population was composed primarily



12

constitution for Yugoslavia in 1974 Kosovo was given an enhanced status within the

Yugoslav confederation equal to other constituent Republics. In 1989, following a

visit from Serbian nationalist and soon-to-be President Milosevic in 1987 where he

infamously promised Kosovos Serbs that no one would beat you, Kosovo was

again reduced to a province of Serbia.

Tension thus increased between the provinces ethnic Albanian majority and its

Serb minority. Following wars in other parts of Yugoslavia Serb refugees from those

areas were settled in Kosovo in an attempt to change the ethnic balance on the

ground. This was coupled with mass firings of ethnic Albanians from positions in

state-owned and run enterprises including the school and university system, where

Albanian had been banned as a language of instruction. Kosovos Albanians settled

on a policy of non-violence and set up parallel state institutions1 which gained

legitimacy amongst the ethnic Albanian population. Following the end of the war in

Croatia and Bosnia the Serbian government turned its attention to Kosovo, which

served as a perfect foil for continuing the passions of nationalism which had

sustained the Milosevic government throughout the 1990s.

However Kosovo was different from the other constituent republics which had

endured war as the former Yugoslavia broke up. The strategic concerns of western

and regional actors were much more heightened in Kosovo by its location within the

Balkans and by the potential for mass violence which could have the impact of

bringing in the nearby states of Greece, Macedonia, Albania and Turkey and

possibly involving Bulgaria and Romania as well. This heightened sense of fear of

escalation on the part of the United States had been made clear in what is called

The Christmas Warning issued by the administration of American president George. H. W Bush on Dec 24, 1992, which bluntly stated:

1 These included separate Albanian schools, and records registries including thosefor deaths and births.



13

In the event of a conflict in Kosovo caused by Serbian action, the

United States will be prepared to deploy military force against theSerbs in Kosovo and in Serbia proper

Source: Henricksen 103

The warning from the United States served notice on Serbia that its interference in

Kosovo in the same manner in which it interfered in Bosnia and Croatia would not

be tolerated and served to limit the range of action of FRY (Federal Republic of

Yugoslavia) troops within the province. However as shown above this did not stop

the government of the former Yugoslavia from engaging in internal oppression

designed as police actions.

Within every movement based on nationalism there are always going to be those

with differing opinions who chose a difference course of action than that which has

been decided on by the majority. In Kosovo this took the presence of the

establishment of armed groups which were opposed to Serb control in Kosovo the

most prominent of which is the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). From its beginnings

in 2003 the KLA was intended to serve as the spear of resistance to the Belgrade

governments forces in Kosovo.

The role of the KLA within Kosovo is still plagued with a great deal of controversy.

While some would say the KLA acted heroically as the defender of the Kosovar

Albanian people, strong evidence exists indicating the clandestine army engaged in

war crimes including the mass expulsion of Serb visitors and the summary

executions of captives (BBC).

The KLA began engaging in heavy fighting with forces of the FRY in 1996 with local

attacks on isolated Serb police stations as well as the targeting of Serb officials it

accused of participating in the mass expulsion of ethnic Albanian villagers in

Kosovo.



14

This campaign of violence quickly escalated into a series of broad confrontations

between the KLA and the forces of the FRY. The KLA was massively outgunned and

outmanned but had been assisted from neighboring Albania, particularly during

1997 when the government of Albania collapsed in a massive pyramid scheme,

resulting in the looting of Albanian armed forces armories and the transfer of

massive amounts of weaponry to Kosovo (Janes).

During 1997 the KLA was able to increase the number and strength of its attacks,

resulting in a spectacular coordinated assault on widely dispersed Serb police

barracks and vehicles during September 10th and 11th, 1997 which showed the

group was capable of sophisticated attacks ranging across the province.

An escalatory dynamic was in place in Kosovo both sides increasingly hardened

their positions as attacks on one another increased in scope and ferocity. Serbs

retaliated mainly against the ethnic Albanian population in the province who proved

as easy target as the KLA used traditional guerilla tactics to merge into the forests

and countryside covering the province. Flows of refugees increased into

neighboring countries, particularly into Macedonia and Albania. Macedonia (which

will be discussed in the next segment of this report) was of deep concern to EU and

NATO members because of its delicate ethnic balance. Macedonia had also been the

cradle of conflict in the region for centuries wars had been fought over the area

between Greece and the Ottomans, between Bulgaria and Greece, between Serbia

allied with Greece against Bulgaria and more. The scenario that was unfolding in the

region represented the nightmare scenario the United States had warned against

in its Christmas warning of 1992.

When conflict began between NATO and Serb-led forces in March of 1999 it was

preceeded by more massive forced population transfers from Kosovo to Macedonia

and Albania as well as the creation of a significant number of IDPs (Internally

Displaced Persons) within both Kosovo and Serbia. The NATO air war against Serb

forces in Kosovo and then escalating to those forces in Serbia, Montenegro and



15

Bosnia, was an escalated campaign which began at a level of 400 sorties flown per

day, by the end of the campaign in May NATO forces were flying over 900 sorties per

day and had begun striking vital parts of Serbian civilian infrastructure in Serbia

itself including bridges, power stations, economic facilities and symbols of the

civilian government itself (Owen).

Within Kosovo NATO allies had inserted a small number of special operations forces

which had rendezvoused with and begin to direct operations of the KLA increasing

the effectiveness of the armys attacks on Serb forces in the region. After President

Clinton proclaimed that no US ground forces would enter the region (I do not

intend to put our troops in Kosovo to fight a war) the United States, led by SACEUR

(Supreme Allied Commander Europe) Wesley Clark concluded that NATO should

begin planning for this option in the event the air campaign were to fail in its goal of

forcing the Serb. Work was begun by NATO engineers, specifically German, Italian

and American forces, to reinforce a road from Tirana to Kukes into Kosovo which

would serve as the launch point for an armored thrust into the region. (Priest)

The message communicated through the strengthening of the road into Kosovo

seems to have been a major factor in the capitulation of Milosevic to NATO forces.

That, in combination with widespread NATO attacks coordinated specifically to hurt

business controlled by Milosevic and his allies, created a mutually-hurting stalemate

which led all parties in the conflict into negotiations which led to the independence

(thus far not recognized by Serbia) of Kosovo. While the KLA was ascendant in the

conflict it could not, by itself, win a war without the support of NATO. And NATOs

goals in the region were not mutually inclusive with those of the KLA.

During the Rambouillet agreements which had preceded the NATO campaign the

parties which formed the Kosovo shadow government (of which the KLA was one2)

had to be pressured into accepting the agreement by US and other allied officials

2 The spokesperson for the Kosovo shadow government at Rambouillet was HashimThaci, who was also the political spokesperson for the KLA.



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(Crawford 520). After initially refusing to accept the agreement the Kosovar

delegation decided to accept the agreement, which led to Milosevics refusal to

accept and thus, in March 1999, began NATOs air campaign which ultimately ended

(in NATOs eyes anyway) Serbian control over Kosovo and independence.

Kosovo Mutually hurting stalemate

The situation which led to Serbian acceptance of de-fact Kosovar independence was

caused by a conflux of factors which produced a mutually hurting stalemate on the

part of the Serbian government which had previously been ascendant in military

and economic terms. The military campaign against Serbian forces in Kosovo does

not appear to have had the impact that NATOs campaign against Serbian targets

within Serbia itself seems to have had. Specifically NATO targeted portions of the

civilian infrastructure which were designed to cause the civilian population the

most discomfort without proving fatal. These included attacks on Serb power

stations, TV towers and bridges, the cumulative effect of which was to turn the Serb

populace against Milosevics latest nationalist campaign abroad. Previously the Serb

civilian population had seen Serb nationalist campaigns abroad carry little cost at

home. Yes, Serbia was under international sanctions which made it increasingly

difficult to get by in the country and which made some vital necessities difficult to

procure, but this created an opening which Milosevic and his allies were able to fill

using smuggling routes which helped to ameliorate the impacts of international

sanctions. However the immediate loss of electricity, radio and TV broadcasts and

extreme difficulty moving around the country were far more impactful and were felt

right away by the Serbian civilian population. The following quote shows what

NATO was attempting to achieve:

Over time, they [NATO] became convinced that it was necessary to

target not just military bunkers, barracks and ammunition depots but

also factories, bridges, TV stations and power plants. While avoiding

civilian deaths, they were trying to inflict a certain amount of pain on



17

the Serbian people. NATO wanted, in the words of White House

spokesman Joe Lockhart, to "turn out the lights on Belgrade."

Source: Washington Post

The targeting of Milosevic-owned or connected businesses helped to increase this

feeling of depravation, which was now brought into focus for Milosevics allies

who themselves had previously felt little impact from Serb-supported wars outside

of Serbia and Montenegro.

The Kosovar Albanians had become militarily ascendant thanks to the help of NATO,

but their military success was predicated on NATO support, which was not absolute

and was not going to continue unabated in the event the interests of NATO and the

KLA began to clash. Large outflows of refugees had also contributed to a mutually

hurting stalemate between the two parties to the conflict. In that sense Serbias

targeting of the civilian Kosovar Albanian population was successful in introducing

an element of pain amongst that population, in the same sense NATOs targeting of

civilian infrastructure between the two sides also introduced a level of pain to each

respective civilian population.3

The KLA and the Albanians were, above all, helped to the negotiating table by the

pressure from them on NATO. They were allowed to operate only as far as NATO

agreed. NATOs commitment to undertake military action on the part of the Kosovar

Albanians was seen as a strong commitment on their part which necessitated a

strong commitment on the part of the Kosovar Albanians to NATO goals which

3 This is not to in anyway suggest equivalency between the two sides. But there is no

doubt that each sides actions were designed to inflict pain on the civilian populationand both sides succeeded in their goal.



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included a democratic Kosovo with respect and equal rights for its minority

populations, in particular the ethnic Serbian population in the province4.

Kosovo - An impending, recently experienced or recently avoided catastrophe

Unlike in Bosnia, where the perpetration of mass genocide on the part of the Serbs

was interpreted by the Bosnian Muslims as a catastrophe, there were no genocides

on that same scale within Kosovo. There were, however, massacres of Kosovar

Albanian forces in the province, including 45 Albanians killed in the village of Raak

an incident verified by OSCE and which was a strong factor in the subsequent

NATO-led bombing.

Serbia, on the other hand, experienced a catastrophe caused by NATO bombing of its

civilian-led infrastructure. In addition the increasing toll of Serb casualties caused

by NATO and KLA attacks appears to have led to greater resistance amongst the

civilian population and an increasing sense of combat fatigue within Serbia.

Kosovo An Alternative Way Out

An alternative way out was always present in Kosovo the Rambouillet Accords

provided a peaceful roadmap for all parties should they wish to chose it. But Serbia

rejected the accords while the Kosovar Albanians accepted them. What changed in

the interim which led Serbia to accept the loss of Kosovo?

I hypothesize that Serbia realized that the backing of Russia was no longer enoughto mitigate the impact of a strong and united NATO. By the time Serbia accepted

NATOs demands and moved its forces out of Kosovo it had undergone over 70 days

of increasingly effective bombing on the part of NATO-led forces. While Milosevic

4 Sadly this has yet to be realized today. Serbs within Kosovo are a decliningminority and face great risk of attacks at the hands of their Albanian neighbors.



19

appeared to believe that Russia would mitigate the impact of any NATO-led action

against Serbia he seems to have changed his mind after 70+ days of bombing when

Russias support of Serbia was limited to verbal squawks of protest (Crawford 521).

Serbias reliance on Russia to provide an alternative way out thus ended and it was

left with one choice to the continuance and heightening of war capitulation to

NATOs demands.

At the same time NATO warned the Kosovar Albanians that the war was not

continuing on their insistence but rather until Serbia met NATOs demands

regarding Kosovo. When NATO was able to offer the Serbs a face-saving

compromise on Kosovo5 the Serbs agreed to withdraw their forces into Serbia and

Montenegro proper essentially bringing an end to the war.

Kosovo, May 1999, Was a Ripe Moment Present?

Kosovar Albanians Serbs

M utually hurting

Stalemate?

Present Kosovar

Albanians unable to winwar militarily without

NATO support.

Present Serb civilian

and military capabilitiesincreasingly degraded by

NATO air attacks. Lack of Russian support.

I mpending, Recently

Avoided or Experienced

Catastrophe?

Present Mass atrocities

perpetrated on KosovarAlbanians including

massive forced population

movements.

Present NATO

destroying civilianinfrastructure in Serbia.

Impending NATO land

invasion.

Alternative Way Out? Present NATO-led

negotiation.

Present face saving

agreement.

5 That face saving compromise was that Kosovo would not become an

independent state. Its unclear whether Serbia knew all along that this would occurat some point but Kosovos independence is now a fait accompli.



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All of the factors elaborated on in the framework introduction to this report were

present in the Kosovo conflict. But at the same time its clear they are not entirely as

clear cut as they were in the earlier case of the Bosnian conflict. The air campaign

against Bosnian Serb targets did not last nearly as long or contain as many sorties as

did the NATO-led attack against Serbs in Kosovo.6 Casualties civilian and military,

were nowhere near as high in the Kosovo conflict nor was the conflict as long as that

in Bosnia.

Macedonia7

6 NATO carried out approximately 3400 sorties against the Bosnian Serbs whereas it carried out over 30,000 in the war over Kosovo.7 Macedonia will be used in this report to indicate the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40

Slovenia

Croatia

Bosnia

Kosovo

Length of Conflict (in months)



21

The final case to be examined is the conflict in Macedonia, which differs widely from

the previous two cases examined because it was largely an internal conflict

involving relatively small levels of external support for either side in the conflict.

The Macedonian conflict also involved a far lower number of casualties and was

much shorter than the previous two cases. Many analysts refer to the conflict in

Macedonia as the small war.

The conflict in Macedonia began nearly a decade after the countrys independence.

In that its very different from its fellow former Yugoslav Republics, each of which

was consumed in conflict quite quickly upon its declaration of independence from

the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Thus Macedonia did not experience year-after-

year of war to where war became normalized as did Croatia and Bosnia.

Macedonias short civil conflict began in 2001 in the aftermath of the Kosovo war.

Following Kosovos occupation by NATO forces, many of which transited through

Macedonia on their way to Kosovo, the remnant forces of the KLA (Kosovo

Liberation Army) were supposed to be reintegrated into a nascent Kosovo

Protection Corp which would be modeled on civilian-based disaster relief military

groupings like the US National Guard. KLA members were not forcibly disarmed by

NATO forces in Kosovo however, which allowed the more expeditionary of their

members to seek violent redress to Albanian political demands elsewhere in the

Balkans. The creation of the National Liberation Army (NLA) of Macedonia was

spearheaded by the same cast of leaders responsible for the creation of the KLA in

Kosovo which had actually been formed on Macedonian soil, in 1993 during a

meeting in Kicevo in Western Macedonia (Hislope 140).

Macedonia had long been high on the minds of international leaders as a spot with

the potential for severe violence to occur. Macedonia has long portrayed itself as

having four wolves at the door. The four wolves being Serbia, Greece, Albania and

Bulgaria each of which has at some point in the past claimed all or part of

Macedonian territory as their own. Bulgaria claims the Macedonian language is in



22

reality Bulgarian (a claim with some merit) while Greece miraculously claimed over

200,000 Macedonian Vlachs (a nomadic Balkan people) as Greeks of pure national

Greek consciousness in the early 1990s. Serbia at one time approached Greece with

an offer to partition Macedonia between the two states.8 Macedonia felt its existence

as a state was always under threat by those who never accepted the existence of a

separate Macedonian identity in the first place. In this sense very canny diplomacy

by former Macedonian President Kiro Gligorov, very early on in the new states

existence, helped strengthen the ties of the international community to Macedonia

so it never slipped from the radar of international consciousness. This was done

through the deployment of UNPREDEP in Macedonia early in 1993 was designed to

serve as a trip wire which would prevent irredentist elements from other states

from stirring up trouble in Macedonia. UNPREDEP served in Macedonia during the

height of the wars in the former Yugoslav Republics and its presence inarguably was

a major factor in keeping ethnic passions from escalating within the state and in

holding back forces which wished to dismember Macedonia. In particular the

presence of US forces in UNPREDEP, which were placed under UN command for the

first time, acted as a check on those who hoped to forment violence in the state

both within and outside of its borders (Bellamy 128)

Gligorovs focus was on anchoring Macedonia in the community of nations in a way

which had not occurred for Bosnia and Croatia giving time for the idea of an

independent Macedonian to take hold and grow, both within the state and outside of

its borders as well.

The conflict which began in 2001 was very different from the others we have

examined in this study to this point. The emergence of the NLA within Macedoniawas roundly condemned by the international community and received no official

state support from outside of Macedonia. This stands in contrast to Bosnian Serb

8 An offer Greece very wisely rejected and submitted to the European Community.



23

and Bosnian Croat armies who were heavily financed, trained and armed by Serbia

and by Serb elements of the forces of the former Yugoslavia.

The NLA was also very different from its Albanian brethren in Kosovo in that it

never demanded a separate state be carved from within Macedonian to satisfy its

demands. The demands of the NLA (which acted as a proxy for the larger Albanian

community at-large) were political and operated within the constructs of the

Macedonian state (although, a reformed one in the minds of Macedonian Albanians).

Their demands centered around the political status of the Albanian community

within Macedonia and were centered on five key issues:

1. The status of Albanians within the current Macedonian constitution.

2. The question as to the number of Albanians within Macedonia (which goes to

the question of the issue of political power within the state).

3. The right to use the Albanian language in higher education.

4. The right to use national symbols.

5. The rights of Albanians to access to state employment.

Source: Bellamy 124

As can be seen from the above list Albanian demands were inherently political vs.

military or secessionist as they were in Bosnia or Croatia. Albanians in Macedonia

were not attempting to destroy the Macedonian state because they felt they could

not exist within it (as did Bosnian and Croatian Serbs), they were attempting to

reform the Macedonian state so their aspirations would be included within the

Macedonian state.

On that basis the conflict in Macedonia was almost an entirely different category of

conflict than those in Bosnia, Croatia or Kosovo. Also lacking in Macedonia was any

group with power acting in the roll of ethnic spoiler such as Mladic or Karazdic in

Bosnia. Rhetoric in Macedonia from one ethnic group towards another hardened but



24

it never reached the levels it did in places like Bosnia or Kosovo where it became

acceptable to advocate for mass expulsion and murder of ethnic groups considered

the enemy. The closer ties between Macedonia and the west, and the role the west

played in the liberation of the Albanians ethnic brethren across the border in

Kosovo, seems to have played a major role in moderating rhetoric on all sides. The

removal of power of Milosevic from power in Serbia in October 2000, which had

become a key goal of much of the West, also reduced the utility of Albanian

paramilitaries for Western foreign policy. Suddenly Albanian nationalism became

the main threat to peace and stability in the region (Hislope 142).

Macedonia Mutually hurting stalemate

The Macedonian conflict involved small, localized battle with very few casualties

between all sides. The NLA and other, smaller Albanian groups, were well-armed

and supplied from across the borders in Kosovo and Albania. As Albanian criminal

gangs were at this time well situated and established throughout Albania,

Macedonia, southern Serbia, Kosovo and Montenegro, the Albanian elements

engaged in armed rebellion within Macedonia could count on an extended support

network. They could fight and inflict casualties on the small Macedonian army and

even hold liberated territory within the Macedonian state but since their goals

were inherently political the deployment of military force by the rebels seems

designed to force a stalemate so their aspirations were taken more seriously by the

Macedonian government. The NLA never received any political support from any

government, either Western or non-Western. The United States and the EU placed

NLA members on terrorist watch lists which severely limited their ability to travel

and raise funds. Even Albanian itself was under enormous pressure not to showsupport for the NLAs armed actions, to which it acceded in order to maintain its

good graces with NATO and the EU.

The Macedonian government itself first relied on a military solution to what was a

political problem. But it quickly became clear that the Macedonian army could not



25

militarily defeat the rebels and that backing from the West for continuing military

action, which held the potential for creating further devastating and debilitating

refugee flows in the area, was not forthcoming. Macedonia had gone on an arms

buying spree in Ukraine, apparently convinced it could defeat the small, irregular

forces of the NLA with modern weaponry. Once the West learned of this move then

US National Security Adviser Condoleeza Rice flew to Ukraine and asked the state to

cancel the weapons purchase immediately which Ukraine agreed to do. There was

also widespread Western condemnation of Macedonian assaults on what it viewed

as rebel strongholds, wherein the Macedonian armed forces waged scorched earth

campaigns against mainly Albanian villages (Hislope 145).

In early 2001 Macedonia signed an Association and Stabilization Pact with the

European Union, becoming the first Balkan state to do so. This gave Macedonian

goods preferential trade relations with the EU and moved it forward on the path to

European integration. This gave the EU enormous leverage over the Macedonian

state leverage it lacked in the conflicts in Bosnia and Kosovo. During what it

referred to as the Aracinovo crisis9 the Macedonian government was threatened

with the loss of aid under the Stabilization Pact unless they agreed to begin talks on

ending the conflict they quickly buckled. Several weeks later the EU sweetened

the idea of compromise by offering an additional 50 million Euros in a political

settlement could be reached. The haggling would continue but the path to the

August peace deal had been found. Bereft of a military to force talks, EU negotiators

discovered that money talks with force (Hislope 145).

9 Aracinovo refers to a suburb on the outskirts of Skopje where Macedonian forceshad trapped a number of NLA fighters and inflicted heavy damage on the

surrounding area by using artillery barrages without seeming to care about the cost

to Albanian residents of the area. The West demanded an end to the barrage andsafe passage of the NLA fighters from the area, who were allowed to keep their

weapons. The Macedonian government agreed but this caused a major crisis inMacedonia with widespread riots in Skopje.



26

By the time of the Aracinovo crisis both sides had arrived at a mutually-hurting

stalemate through the pressure and inducements of outsides forces.

Macedonia - An impending, recently experienced or recently avoided catastrophe

This element of encouraging ripeness does not appear to be present in the same

manner in which it was present in the other conflicts discussed in this report so far.

One could surmise that Macedonia itself was at the verge of dismemberment, which

could certainly count as an impending catastrophe, except the evidence is not

there to make that empirical judgment. The Albanian resistance within Macedonia

was constrained in its actions by Western hostility to its goals, which never included

partition in the first place. Macedonia could not militarily defeat the rebels but they

did not produce the type of violence or incidents which rise to the level of

catastrophe. This element was not present in Macedonia.

Macedonia An Alternative Way Out

This element was provided for by Western mediation efforts and in particular by the

EUs offer of a Stabilization Pact with Macedonia. Western efforts convinced both the

Macedonian government and the Albanian resistance that the only way out of the

conflict was through negotiation and that there was no military solution to the

conflict. The decision of the Albanians to take up arms in the first place appears to

be a tactic designed to push the settlement of a political agreement forward. This

judgment is based on the fact that the NLA never articulated a plan for

dismembering the country or joining its Albanian-dominated parts with Kosovo or

Albania and that there was never any hope of Western military intervention in theside of the Macedonian Albanians as there had been in Kosovo. The sphere within

which the NLA was operating was severely constrained by its own choices and its

maneuverability was very different than the KLAs had been in Kosovo. The element

of providing an alternative way out was met by Western shuttle diplomacy and by

the EUs deep involvement in the conflict through its pact with Serbia. In the end



27

Macedonian politicians were more willing to risk political compromise with

Albanians than they were to risk the wrath of the EU and the West on continuing

military conflict with their Albanian community.

Albanian Macedonians Macedonians

M utually hurting

Stalemate?

Present Lack of support

for military goals, terrorist

listing by EU and NATO.

Present Lack of support

for military solution to

conflict. Embargo of arms

purchases

I mpending, Recently

Avoided or Experienced

Catastrophe?

No No

Alternative Way Out? Yes EU-led negotiations Yes EU-led negotiations

All the factors deemed necessary to inducing a ripe moment in negotiations were

not present in the conflict in Macedonia yet this conflict produced less casualties

than either Kosovo or Bosnia and ended at much less cost (no territory was

exchanged for example) than in either of the two previous cases.

The question then arises as to why this case is as anomaly when looking at Kosovo

or Bosnia. From the outside it appears they contained similar elements a restive

population feeling itself excluded from the state, a bad neighborhood where war

seemed omnipresent and a poor economy.

Macedonia though, was quite different from Kosovo and from Bosnia. It had almost a

full decade of independence under its belt when the conflict erupted vs. Bosnia

(which had none) or Kosovo (which was never independent). This factor seems to

have introduced a greater desire on the part of the populace to avoid conflict, or at

least to avoid the escalatory dynamics that were present in other Balkan states like



28

Kosovo or Bosnia. Macedonia was also fortunate to have a leader who was adept at

keeping his country out of the conflicts which consumed the Balkan region in the

1990s, particularly through his support of the placement of UN forces into

Macedonia before a conflict had erupted (in Bosnia UN forces served to separate

combatants after fighting had begun).

Fearing the Four Wolves theory the West had always supported Macedonias

territorial integrity from the moment of its independence. This support limited

irredentist aims on the part of nearby neighbors, whereas in Bosnia it had always

seemed the state would need to be carved up to ensure a peace between all parties

in the state (Bellamy 140).

Peacemaking with power was employed early and forcefully in Macedonia in ways

it had never been in either Kosovo or Bosnia. Perhaps the West, terrified by what it

had seen in other areas of the Balkans, finally realized that early, forceful

involvement to halt conflict was necessary in order to prevent a much larger war.

Macedonia also bordered a NATO and EU member Greece. The risks of

conflagration in Macedonia clearly held much larger consequences for both NATO

and the EU than did the conflicts in Bosnia or Kosovo. The territorial factor may

have been the crucial one.

Finally the conflict in Macedonia was essentially one of political disagreement over

points which could be resolved through slight alterations of the states political

institutions. This was not the case in Bosnia or Kosovo where many of the parties

demanded complete separation from one another (in many cases it was the Serbian

parties who demanded separation). Once both sides in Macedonia realized that amilitary solution could not be utilized to force agreement on a political problem they

settled their difference through a negotiated agreement.



29

CONCLUSION:

This paper began as an attempt to analyze the elements necessary to bring parties

to agreement once the parties were at the table together. As I proceeded with myresearch I found that the necessary elements to bring the parties to agreement were

present before the parties entered negotiations. A ripe moment therefore, seems to

be brought into existence not during negotiations but in the days, weeks and months

leading up to negotiations.

I isolated three variables which I felt were necessary to the creation of a ripe

moment a mutually hurting stalemate, a recently avoided, impending or

experienced catastrophe and an alternative way out. These elements were deemed

necessary to bring forth the ripe moment which would parties on the path to

successful agreement in conflict situations. But in the case of Macedonia all of these

elements werent present, while they were, to varying degrees, in the other conflicts

I studied.

I used a very simple model for each conflict where I did not weight the factors at all

simply marking them present or not present. Should I chose to move this

project forward I would seek to further quantify the elements I discussed as being

necessary to inducing ripe moments. I would also look at additional factors like

number of casualties, acts of genocide or mass killings, refugee flows into or out of

conflict zones and more. There are numerous factors which werent included in this

report, including the ones I just named, which I feel could be used to more

accurately predict why a conflict continued for as long as it did vs. one which ended

quickly as in the case of Macedonia.

One factor which clearly important in the length and severity of my study, which I

did not study but which kept appearing as I moved through, is the issue of outside

state support and what form that took. The lack of external support in Macedonia



30

seems to me to have been an enormous factor in bringing the conflict to a relatively

quick close.

I also would like to look at the issue of recently, impending or experienced

catastrophe as a predictor of a ripe moment. Catastrophes can serve to shock a

group or an institution into bargaining an end to a conflict but they can also serve to

harden a state or peoples resolve to fight to the end. Catastrophes need to be

further defined and then refined and additional elements should be built into their

quantification in order to understand more closely what role they play in conflict

dynamics. The lack of a catastrophe in Macedonia may have been a large factor in

why all sides were willing to settle quickly whereas, according to Richard Holbrooke

at least, Serbian genocide in Bosnia hardened the resolve of the Bosnian leadership

to resist compromise.

This project served to bring more questions to the fore than it helped to answer the

ones I elaborated on when I began. In that way it serves as a good tool from which to

launch further research projects exploring the very concept of ripeness and looking

at the question of whether it exists in the first place. But it is clear from my research

so far that elements of ripeness are necessary and can serve as valuable signals of an

opening within the negotiation process. But I have doubts as to whether that model

can be applied universally and would like to do further research on types of conflict

and the elements they involve in order to clarify this issue further.



32

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