Informalion Processrng & Manogemenr Vol. 25, No. 5, pp. 583-584. 1989 Printed in Great Britain.

0306.4573/89 IE3.00 + .OO Copyright 0 1989 Pergamon Press plc

OPINION PAPER

INFORMATION PROCESSING AS A CENTRAL ISSUE IN PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

ROBERTO REFINETTI* Institute of Psychology, University of Sgo Paulo, 05508 S2o Paulo, Brazil

(Received and accepted 28 November 1988)

Abstract -The fragmentation of knowledge in contemporary science is in agreement with Comte’s view of the way knowledge progresses as opposed to Hegel’s view. Thus, con- temporary science requires a special class of experts who can organize and integrate the diverse pieces of knowledge. Information scientists are responsible for at least the ini- tial stage of this process of organization and integration. Thus, information processing is much more than an accessory science destined to help research scientists manage their data. Information processing is an extremely meaningful and essential philosophical enterprise.

For over 20 years, information experts have been aware of the fact that the surge in scien- tific research and publication during the second half of the 20th century poses a strong demand on the improvement in mechanisms of information processing and management [l-3]. If the increasing amount of existing information is to be used at all, urgent devel- opments in the mechanisms of indexing, storage, and retrieval of information are neces- sary. Making existing information readily available to the scientific and professional community is important for two main reasons: (1) a great waste of time and money can occur by involuntary replication of research previously conducted, and (2) insights into new theoretical and applied issues may be prevented by ignorance of information already exist- ing but actually unavailable. I would like to call attention here to the fact that the qual- ity of information processing is also directly relevant for an old and important issue in the philosophy of science, namely, that of the nature of progress of knowledge.

For centuries, philosophers have discussed whether knowledge progresses analytically or dialectically. In the Cartesian tradition of starting with simple concepts and then build- ing up more complex concepts [4], the idea of science as a gradual accumulation of small pieces of knowledge was put forward by Auguste Comte [5]. This constitutes an analyti- cal view of the progress of knowledge. On the other hand, Hegel proposed that knowledge grows as a whole, so that contradictions between opposing ideas are solved (and disperse pieces of knowledge are integrated) at each stage of the dialectical progress of knowledge [6]. This constitutes a dialectical view of the progress of knowledge.

The partial correctness of both the analytical view of Comte and the dialectical view of Hegel have been acknowledged for many years. Wisdom from both views can be found in the writings of many contemporary philosophers of science. Thomas Kuhn, for instance, writes as a partial dissident from the logical positivistic movement (i.e. in the analytical tra- dition) but is at the same time a supporter of the dialectical view in the sense that he sees scientific progress as a continuous process where periods of conceptual revolution are fol- lowed by periods of normal, integrated science [7]. Paul Feyerabend, for another exam- ple, supports the analytical view by accepting the gradual accumulation of disperse pieces of knowledge but also supports the dialectical view by insisting that all sorts of available knowledge (including mysticism and speculations) should be brought into science to guar- antee the wholeness of knowledge [8],

*Requests for reprints should be sent to the author’s current address: Institute of Environmental Stress, Uni- versity of California, Santa Barbara, CA 93106, USA.

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Although the analytical and dialectical views are partly complementary, a central dif- ference can be seen in practical instances. For example, Sartre stated clearly the objections of the dialectical thinker to the analytical thinkers in the particular case of psychology:

If they want nothing but the accumulation of details, they are in the right track. I just cannot see how one would be interested in this sort of collectors work. [9]

Piaget contended that Sartre’s criticism was too rash and did not apply to real science [lo], which is true to some extent. But Sartre’s statement stresses very well the discontent- ment of dialectical thinkers with the fragmented nature of modern science. The dialecti- cal thinkers are constantly reminding us that science today is an enormous depository of disconnected information- which is evident anyway in the analyses of philosophers of sci- ence [?,8,11,12] and in the difficulties found in the storage and retrieval of information [ 13,141. As sad as this may be for the supporters of the dialectical view, the disconnected character of contemporary science is merely a demonstration that knowledge does not always progress as a coherent whole. At least in a pragmatic perspective, Comte was quite right.

Now, if science progresses as an accumulation of dispersed pieces of information that must be put together later, then possession of the ability to index, store, and retrieve this information is of utmost importance. To say it formally, scientists working in information processing have that same essential role in the progress of knowledge that Comte attrib- uted to the synoptic philosophers who one day will integrate the enormous mass of data accumulated over the years [5]. In other words, the science of our times has turned out to be Comtean (accumulative) rather than Hegelian (integrative) and therefore a whole class of information managers is necessary to perform the highest function in the progress of knowledge-namely, the integration of disconnected data into a coherent whole. I will not say that information scientists are the ones responsible for this whole process of integra- tion, but they certainly play a major role, especially in the initial stages of the process. Information processing is a central issue in philosophy of science.

REFERENCES

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