informing homeland security strategy through gaming theory

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Informing Homeland Security Strategy Through Gaming Theory
University of Colorado at Colorado SpringsCollege of Engineering and Applied ScienceComputer Science Department

Ph.D Thesis Proposal

Richard L. White

Faculty Advisors:Dr. Edward Chow (chair)Dr. Terrance BoultDr. Ziaobo ZhouDr. Scott TrimboliDr. Stan Supinski

ThesisProposal

Policy Track

Presentation OverviewProblem DescriptionProblem AnalysisRelated ResearchThesis ProposalResearch ProposalConclusion
History
Political Science
International Relations
Law
Public Administration
Economics
Mathematics
Sociology

What is the terrorist threat?What prompted the largest reorganization of US government since WWII?Are we safe now Osama bin Laden is dead?

Is the threat Islamic extremism?No 1982 Marine BarracksNo 1993 WTC BombingIs the threat mass casualties?No Disease & AccidentsNo 25 Terrorism Deaths since 2001

Macroterrorism1>= 500 deaths / $1B damages

On September 11, 2001, 19 men armed with no more than box cutters and pepper spray inflicted as much damage as the Imperial Japanese Navy on December 7, 1941.

Critical Infrastructure joined Weapons of Mass Destruction as a means for small groups or individuals to inflict catastrophic damage once wielded by a nations military might.2
1Woo, 200329/11 Commission Report, 2004

Homeland Security Strategy2002 Office of Homeland Security2007 Homeland Security Council2010 National Security Council

Objectives3Prevent terrorist attack within USReduce vulnerability to terrorismMinimize damage and rapidly recover3

Strategy4PreventProtectRespondRecover

32002 National Strategy for Homeland Security42002 National Strategy for Homeland Security

Is it a good strategy?

2004 GAO Evaluation CriteriaPurpose, scope, & methodologyProblem definition & risk assessmentGoals, objectives, & measures of meritResources, investments, risk managementRoles, responsibilities, & coordinationIntegration and implementation

Criteria FormulationStatutory requirementsLegislative & Executive branch guidance1993 Govt Performance Results ActGeneral literature reviewStudy of past GAO reportsPast Commission RecommendationsComments from ANSER and RAND5
5Yim, 2004

Can we make better strategy?

Theoretical FrameworkMethodological basis for disciplined thought processAssists others in comprehending, evaluating, and critiquing meritsProvides roadmap for more complete analysisFacilitate evaluation & executionBetter communication6
6Yarger, 2006

Which theory?

International Relations TheoryInstitutionalistLiberalEpistemicRealism

Realism Predominates TodayStates rational, unitary actors in anarchyStates have fixed, conflictual goalsRelations governed by material capability7
7Legro & Moravcsik, 1999

Which theory?

Terrorism TheoryPsychologicalSocietalSystemic

Collectively, terrorism theories address motivations why people turn to terrorism. The underlying assumption is that if you can isolate the cause, you can eliminate the effect.
8Borum, 2004

Which theory?

Terrorism Risk ModelingDeterministic ModelingResorts to subjective expert judgmentStochastic GamesRequire continual parameter adjustmentNetwork AnalysisRequires protected personal informationGaming TheoryNo expert judgmentLimited parameterizationImperfect informationIncorporates human behavior

Game TheoryFormal study of conflict & cooperationAgents actions are interdependentBroad application across disciplinesInternally consistent math foundationCooperative games: power sharingNoncooperative games: strategic choicesStrategic formExtensive formDominant strategiesNash equilibriumMixed strategiesImperfect information9
9Turocy & Stengel, 2001

GT Terrorism ApplicationsHostage Negotiation PolicyTerrorist Target SelectionAttack SignalingStrategic Accommodation10
10Sandler & Arce, 2003

Related Research

Sandler, T., Tschirhart, T. T., and Cauley, J. (1983). A theoretical analysis of transnational terrorism, American Political Science Review, Vol. 77, No. 4.Atkinson, S. E., Sandler, T., and Tschirhart, J. T. (1987). Terrorism in a bargaining framework, Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 30, No. 1.Lapan, H. E., Sandler, T. (1988). To bargain or not to bargain: That is the question, American Economic Review, Vol. 78, No. 2.Sandler, T., & Lapan, H. E. (1988). The calculus of dissent: An analysis of terrorists choice of targets, Synthese, Vol. 76, No. 2.Lee, D. R., & Sandler, T. (1989). On the optimal retaliation against terrorists: The paid-rider option, Public Choice, No. 61.Enders, W., Sandler, T. & Cauley, J. (1990). UN conventions, technology and retaliation in the fight against terrorism: An economic evaluation, Terrorism and Political Violence, No. 2.Sandler, T. (1992). Collective Action: Theory and Applications, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.Enders, W., & Sandler, T. (1993). The effectiveness of anti-terrorism policies: Vector-autoregression-interventions analysis, American Political Science Review, 87, No. 4.Lapan, H.E., Sandler, T. (1993). Terrorism and signaling, European Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 9, No. 3.Enders, W., Sandler, T. (1995). Terrorism: Theory and Applications, Handbook of Defense Economics, Vol. 1 (pp. 213-249). Amsterdam: North-Holland.Sandler, T. (1993). Collective action and transnational terrorism, World Economy, Vol. 26, No. 4.Sandler, T., Siqueira, K. (2002). Global terrorism: Deterrence versus preemption, Unpublished manuscript, University of Southern California.

Sandler, T., Arce M., D. G. (2003). Terrorism and Game Theory, Simulation and Gaming, Vol. 34, No. 3.Sandler, T., Arce M., D. G. (2003). Pure public goods versus commons: Benefit-cost duality, Land Economics, Vol. 79, No. 3.Sandler, T., & Enders, W. (2004). An Economic Perspective on Transnational Terrorism, European Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 20, No. 1.Sandler, T. (2005): Collective versus unilateral responses to terrorism, Public Choice, Vol. 124.Sandler, T. and D. G. Arce (2007): Terrorism: A game-theoretic approach, Handbook of Defense Economics, Vol. 2. Amsterdam: North-Holland.Sandler, T., Siqueira, K. (2008). Games and terrorism: Recent developments, Simulation Gaming Online, May 7, 2008, http://sg.sagepub.com/.Sandler, T. And W. Enders (2008): Economic consequences of terrorism in developed and developing countries: An overview, Terrorism, Economic Development, and Political Openness, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.Sandler, T., Arce, D.G. and W. Enders (2009): Transnational terrorism, Global Crises, Global Solutions, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.Sandler, T. (2009). The Past and Future of Terrorism Research, Revista de Economia Aplicada, No. 50.Sandler, T. and K. Siqueira (2009): Games and terrorism: Recent developments, Simulation and Gaming, Vol., 40, No. 2.

Game Informed Strategy

Sandlers game theoretic analysis of terrorism, and of others, follow some common themes:Address one or more strategic interactionsGenerally two or three strategic playersThey use multiple stagesNumber of continuous variables limited11
11Sandler & Siqueira, 2008

GT & Homeland Security Strategy

The impressive work amassed by Sandler and others to date have made an indirect impact on homeland security strategy.We wish to extend their techniques to more directly inform homeland security strategy with respect to macroterrorism.Examination of Sandlers applications reveal no underlying themes to problem selection.In part, their methods are restricted to the ability to frame specific problems within a small set of parameters amenable to mathematical computation.
3Citation

Finding HSS Problem Sets

Denial TopoiMeansMotiveOpportunity

Macroterrorism Risk ModelWeapons of Mass DestructionCritical Infrastructure
3Citation

Denial Topoi

In rhetorical theory, topoi are a set of common arguments.In law, the Denial Topoi, means, motive, opportunity, are heuristic tools that help lawyers convince juries the strength or weakness of a case.12The strength of the Denial Topoi is based on long standing assumption that crime is only possible when all three elements are present.Use same heuristic to remove possibility of committing macroterrorism.
12Goodwin, 200613Rangel, 2005
The Fire Triangle. At the end of the 18th century, Antoine-Laurent Lavoisier (17431794) unveiled the mystery of fire, discovering that its anatomy- and minimum common denominator- constituted a triangle whose sides corresponded to heat (H), fuel (F) and oxygen (O). Lavoisier also deducted the biconditional characteristic of fire, i.e., it can occur if, and only if, all three elements are present, H, F, O Fire. Since then the fire triangle has been the foundation of all firefighting techniques.13

Deliberate vs. Accidental

Deliberate acts of malice require all three elements of means, motive, opportunity.

Accidents presumably lack motive, but still require means and opportunity (Heinrichs Domino Theory).14
14Cleveland State University, 2011
Heinrichs DominosPersonal injury (the final domino) occurs only as a result of an accident.An accident occurs only as a result of a personal or mechanical hazard.Personal and mechanical hazards exist only through the fault of careless people or poorly designed or improperly maintained equipment.Personal faults are inherited or acquired as a result of social environment or ancestry.Environment is where and how a person was raised and educated.

Macroterrorism Model

Weapons of Mass Destruction15ChemicalBiologicalRadiologicalNuclear

Critical Infrastructure16Agriculture & FoodDefense Industrial BaseEnergyHealthcare and Public HealthNational Monuments and IconsBanking and FinanceWaterChemical PlantsCommercial FacilitiesCritical ManufacturingDamsEmergency ServicesNuclear Reactors, Materials, & WasteInformation TechnologyCommunicationsPostal and ShippingTransportation SystemsGovernment Facilities
15National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, 200216National Infrastructure Protection Plan, 2009

Critical Infrastructure

Agriculture & FoodDefense Industrial BaseEnergyHealthcare and Public HealthNational Monuments and IconsBanking and FinanceWaterChemical PlantsCommercial FacilitiesCritical ManufacturingDamsEmergency ServicesNuclear Reactors, Materials, & WasteInformation TechnologyCommunicationsPostal and ShippingTransportation SystemsGovernment Facilities
By itself, CI is not destructive. Only through subversion may CI become destructive. Subversion means degrading, destroying, or diverting the intended CI function or capability. Some CI, even if subverted, will not pose a macroterrorism danger, and for that reason, will be removed from further consideration.

Macroterrorism Risk Model
Terrorists are Agents who seek to harm innocent civilians.Terrorists must acquire Weapons or Materials to achieve their means.Materials must be manufactured into weapons.Terrorists may choose Targets that indirectly affect civilians.Terrorists may choose to Target civilians directly.

MRM Analysis: Motive
Weapons Selection: Can government policies be directed to influence terrorists weapons selection to less destructive means?

MRM Analysis: Opportunity
CI Investment: Can government policies to make CI less vulnerable (i.e., failsafe) reduce the threat of catastrophic attack, and at what cost?

MRM Analysis: Means
Government Targeting: Is it better for the government to pursue terrorists or their means of attack?

Thesis Proposal

Conduct GT Analysis of HSS ProblemsMotive. Can homeland security policies governing availability and access to CBRN materials and weapons affect terrorists motives regarding their deployment?Opportunity. Can homeland security policies expediting development of failsafe CI reduce the threat of catastrophic attack, and at what cost?Means. Should homeland security policies focus more on terrorists, weapons, or targets? Which strategy would most stress the capabilities of terrorists, forcing them to withdraw from plans to conduct catastrophic attacks, versus actions that would encourage them to conduct catastrophic attacks?

Conclusion

9/11 opened eyes to threat of macroterrorism by small groups or individuals.CI joined the ranks of WMD.HSS can benefit from game theoretic analysis of macroterrorism problems.Denial Topoi and Macroterrorism Risk Model identify three immediate areas of potential analysis.Propose solving these problems to better inform HSS.


Questions?

informing homeland security strategy through gaming theory

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