initial lessons learned

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  • Initial Lessons Learned

  • Lessons Learned Operation Iraqi Freedom EXSUMTable of Content:1) C2 of Patriot Forces1-1 Patriot Defense Design Considerations1-2 Table VIII Qualifications Insufficiently Prepare Units for Combat assigned missions2) Patriot Engagement Operations2-1 Patriot Engagement Operations2-2 Patriot System Knowledge3) Communications (AMD)3-1 Force XXI Battle Command Requirements3-2 Software Compatibility of AMDWS with the Other ATCCS3-3 Division Command via TACSAT3-4 Long-haul communication equipment shortfall 3-5 Integration PATRIOT into the Joint Data Network in KU 4) Personnel and Logistical Support4-1 FAADC3I Contractor Support and Class IX Availability5) Joint Air Operations5-1 Tactical Ballistic Missile Early Warning 5-2 Information Flow Regarding Anomalies Experienced 6) Information on CID Lessons Learned

  • Lessons Learned 1-1

    Issue: Integration/Defense Design with other PATRIOT BNs (US and Allied) and other weapon systems was done on the fly.

    Discussion: No information, documentation, or test results were available to the war fighter on how to successfully integrate multiple PATRIOT BNs or other endospheric weapon systems. Units within Israel and Kuwait (KU) have been operating with Host Nation PATRIOT and other weapons systems for a number of years. However, no data on the impact of operating in this manner was available prior to the start of OIF. Two critical areas that need closer review:

    - Having two units in separate BNs linked via PATRIOT Automated Data Information Link (PADIL) providing coverage of the same asset resulted in the inefficient use of FUs in maximizing coverage of additional assets - Impact of having two separate endospheric weapon systems sharing the same battle and space covering the same assets

    Recommendation: The Lower Tier Project Office (LTPO) should assess the impact of employing the system the way it was used during OIF and publish the results. USAADASCH branch must analyze results and determine how to best employ the weapon system to maximize effective coverage of multiple assets based on these results and produce the appropriate updates to TTP.

    Lead: TSM-LT/DOTD

    SustainImproveXGeneral IssueADA IssueX

  • Lessons Learned 1-2

    Issue: PATRIOT units focus on Table VIII qualifications limits their ability to execute assigned missions

    Discussion: For the majority of PATRIOT units table eight gunnery certification is viewed as an end point in the unit training cycle. Table eight focuses on only 5 mission essential tasks: march order the FU/BN fire distribution section (FDS), emplace the FU/BN FDS, conduct air defense operations, conduct missile reload operations, and conduct Reconnaissance, Selection and Occupation of Position (RSOP). These tasks are for the most part conducted in a controlled environment with no other distractions.

    This narrow focus on a limited number of tasks fails to train units on how to operate in a war time environment. The fixed site TBM only mentality has led PATRIOT units to believe that if they are successful at Table VIIIs they will be successful at war. Operation OIF highlighted some of the problems this approach has caused. PATRIOT units are not assessed on their ability to fight as part of an integrated task force. Units are not evaluated on their ability to provide highly qualified ADAFCOs to higher echelon units. Units are not assessed on their ability to develop and execute complex defense designs. Units are not assessed on their ability to receive a mission and execute it. Table VIII certification is only one part of a units training as it prepares for its annual external evaluation. At some point, a PATRIOT battery/ BN needs to be assessed on its ability to execute its mission and fight as part of a BN Task Force and / or higher echelon integrated task force.

    Recommendation: USAADASCH relook what it takes to be qualified.

    For a unit to be considered qualified, it should not only be trained in the key Air Defense Tasks, but it should also be trained and qualified to operate as part of a larger, integrated and most likely joint task force. This approach may lead to a totally new training model. Review, update, and change current battery / BN requirements and establish measurable tasks, conditions, and standards for PATRIOT Gunnery Tables. Key to raising the level of expertise across the PATRIOT force is the use of external evaluations that will be used to assess the ability of unit to successfully execute Air Defense missions under a variety of conditions. USAADASCH establish policies and standards for conducting external evaluations that require they be conducted by a team of certified experts that have been assembled and trained for this purpose.

    Lead: DOTD

    SustainImproveXGeneral IssueADA IssueX

  • Lessons Learned 2-1

    Issue: Patriot Engagement operations (D)(T)


    Bridging the gap between MDMP (doctrinal and situational templates) and Patriot tactics, tabular entries, and firing doctrineReduce target identification uncertainty with engagement criteria tied to threat and friendly platformsIncrease friendly protect; procedurally and technically

    Remote Launch Operations capture technical and tactical requirementsAutonomous operations TBM Only is no longer an optionRedundant Coverage advantages and disadvantagesBased upon EMI, how far apart should Patriot Batteries be placed defending an asset

    Incorporate tactical reasoning/decision making: Counter-TBM is not automatic; WCS Free for TBMs presents risk in the SRBM fightAirspace Control and deconfliction remains a Joint problemMETT-TC relationship with tabular settingsCombat operations routine verification of Mode IV; updating OPTASKLINK, radar registration

    Recommendation: Include in new Patriot TTPs, doctrine during Joint Training Exercises and MRE standards

    Lead: DOTD

    SustainXImproveGeneral IssueADA IssueX

  • Lessons Learned 2-2

    Issue: General knowledge of PATRIOT Initialization tabular data and its origin/impact on how the air battle is fought is minimal.

    Discussion: PATRIOT operators did not understand how the values for the systems initialization tabular entries were established. During discussion with soldiers in the area of responsibility (AOR) prior to and during OIF, it became clear that the operators did not understand the various tabular entries required for their system as outlined in the Tactical Standing Operating Procedure (TSOP), Area Air Defense Plan (AADP), and Special Instructions (SPINS). Operators did not know the purpose of the parameters, where it came from or why it was needed. When asked why a tabular entry was set to a specific value, the soldiers normally responded because the TSOP or the PATRIOT Information and Coordination Central (ICC) told us to set it to that number. The operators did not know why it was a particular number, who had established the value or what the setting would accomplish.

    Lack of expertise in this area limited the PATRIOT units ability to modify/change the weapon system parameters as the threat changes and provide accurate and timely input for the AADP and SPINS. Operators did not know what their system can and cannot do.

    Recommendation: USAADASCH develop a formal training program to provide the PATRIOT operator with intermediate and advance level weapons system training. Recommend development of exportable training packages or courses that can be conducted via distance learning. Prior to assuming the duties of a PATRIOT TCO, TD, TCA, or TDA; soldiers should be required to complete these courses. These courses should be annotated in their training record.

    Lead: DOTD

    SustainXImproveGeneral IssueADA IssueX

  • Lessons Learned 3-1

    Issue: The Patriot battalion does not have a Force XXI battle command brigade and below (FBCB2) required for battle tracking. (MO)

    Discussion: The division fielded FBCB2 as the standard for blue force tracking. The ADA battalion was not included in the fielding. During combat operations, the battalion had to locate an FBCB2 on the battlefield to get situational awareness. Even this was limited since none of the air defense assets were displayed on the FBCB2 screen. Not only did the lack of FBCB2 systems in the battalion hinder situational awareness, all division fragmentary orders (FRAGOs) and graphics were issued over FBCB2 , making it difficult for the battalion to track the battle and conduct simultaneous planning in support of the division.

    Recommendation: At a minimum, issue one FBCB2 terminal to each battery, the battalion TOC, and the battalion commander; also ensure that each air defense weapon and radar system is displayed on the FBCB2 screen.

    Lead: TSM-LT

    C2 / Interoperability Branch Comment3-1 PAT was/is not organic to DIV & therefore did not receive FBCB2. Avail. of FBCB2s and addit. EPLRs will be a real problem at this pt.

    SustainImproveXGeneral IssueADA IssueX

  • Lessons Learned 3-2

    Issue: Software compatibility of AMDWS with the other ATCCS. (M)

    Discussion: During operational planning and execution, the battalion is required to provide the division a current air picture superimposed over the current airspace control measures (ACMs). On demand, the divisions leadership may also request that maneuver graphics be projected so that they can see where aircraft are in relation to the ground forces. Currently, these products are manually input into AMDWS by either the Army airspace command and control (A2C2) or air battle management operations center (ABMOC) operators, a slow and tedious process. These operators are duplicating the efforts of other operators who are entering the same graphic control measures into t


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