insight, sympathy and mind healing and social healing

8/13/2019 Insight, Sympathy and Mind Healing and Social Healing

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2011

International Conference

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he Mind Humanities, Philosophical Introspection and Social Healing

: 2011. 10. 13() ~ 14()

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International Conference

Institute of the Mind Humanities

Wonkwang University

I. Conference Title

: The Mind Humanities, Philosophical Introspection and Social Healing

II. Time and Place

1) Date: October 13th(Thur.) ~ 14th(Fri.), 2011

2) Location: International Conference Room (20th Floor)

Korea Press Foundation (Korea Press Center), Seoul, Korea

III. Organization and Sponsorship

1) Host: Institute of the Mind Humanities, Wonkwang University

2) Sponsorship: National Research Foundation of Korea (NRF)


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October 13th (Thur.) Program

Time Schedule Mind & Philosophical Introspection Presenters Discussants

10:30~10:50 Registration

10:50~11:00

Opening AddressHan, Nae Chang

Director, Institute of the Mind Humanities

Welcoming AddressJeong, Se-hyun

(Chancellor, Wonkwang Univ.)

11:00~12:00 Keynote Speech : The Western Mind

McBride, William L.

(President, International Federation of

Philosophical Societies, Purdue Univ.)

12:00~13:00 Lunch

13:00~13:50Practical Philosophy of Mind

: How Can We Get the Free Mind?

Lee, Jin-Woo

(POSTECH)

Kim, Jyung-Hyun

(Wonkwang Univ.)

13:50~14:40 A Study on the Cultivation of Morality in TaoistPractice

Kim, Nakpil(Wonkwang Univ.)

Lee, Bongho

(Duksung Womens

Univ.)

14:40~15:00 Break

15:00~15:50A Comparative Examination of Eastern and

Western Thoughts Concerning the Absolute Mind

Han, Ja-Kyoung

(Ewha Womans

Univ.)

Lee, Minyong

(KIBS)

15:50~16:40A Korean Way of Interpreting Mind : Wonhyos

Theory of One Mind

Cho, Eun-Su

(Seoul Natl Univ.)

Ko, Young-Seop

(Dongguk Univ.)

16:40~17:00 Break

17:00~18:00 Wrap-up Discussion Kim, Chae Young(Seogang Univ.)

18:00~19:30 Dinner


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October 14th (Fri.) Program

Time Schedule Mind & Social Healing Presenters Discussants

09:30~10:00 Registration

10:00~10:50Altruism is the Ultimate Law of Supra-social

Genesis

Jugay, Gerasim A.

(Institute for Far

Eastern Studies)

Kim, Do-Jong

(Wonkwang Univ.)

10:50~11:40 Mind of Won-BuddhismChung, Soon-Il

(Wonkwang Univ.)

Kim, Do Gong

(Wonkwang Univ.)

11:40~13:00 Lunch

13:00~13:50Attuning the Body-Person: the Way to Healing

in Chinese Medicine

Zhang, Yanhua

(Clemson Univ.)

Kim, JongWoo

(Kyung Hee Univ.)

13:50~14:40Mind-Body Interactions and Its Implication for

Healing

Lee, Sang Yeol

(Wonkwang Univ.)

Han, Changsu

(Korea Univ.)

14:40~15:00 Break

15:00~16:00 Special Lecture : Mind in the Natural SciencesChoe, Jae Chun

(Ewha Womans Univ.)

16:00~16:50Development of Mind Practice Based on Cooperative

Learning Model

Baek, Hyeon Gi

(Wonkwang Univ.)

Gang, Mun Koo

(Kongju Natl Univ.)

16:50~17:40 Happiness as Existential FeelingLee, Kiheung

(Wonkwang Univ.)

Song, Suckrang

(Hankuk Univ. of

Foreign Studies)

17:40~17:50 Closing


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Keynote Speech : The Western Mind

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The Western Mind

McBride, William L.*1)

(President, International Federation of

Philosophical Societies, Purdue Univ.)

It is a great honor for me to have been invited to present this lecture as part of an ongoing

program, here in Korea, that will highlight the importance of the humanities in general and of

the discipline of philosophy in particular. In my own mind, so to speak, I see what I am

about to say as a brief overview of the evolution of the concept of mind in the West,

especially in Western philosophy and religion, as viewed by someone who is familiar with its

general outlines but by no means a specialist in the sub-discipline called the philosophy of

mind. But I will also want to say something at the end of my talk, given the nature of this

conference as a whole, about the notion of mental health, or of the healthy mind, as it has

been treated at some important moments in that evolution and continues to evolve.

Not being a specialist in the sub-discipline in question may not in fact be disadvantageous

for me in this lecture. As an outsider I of course am not familiar with all of the most recent

scholarly literature concerning mind. At the same time, however, my relative ignorance of such

details may give me more freedom to look at the larger picture with, as we say, an

uncluttered mind. At least so I hope.

As everyone knows, the intellectual origins of Western philosophy and even, to a large

extent, Western religion are to be found above all in Greece, even though the larger half of

the Christian Scripture, the Bible, is Jewish in origin, and the events that produced the

Christian religion, which dominated the West for many centuries and to a certain though

diminished extent still does so, took place in the Middle East, mainly in Palestine. But the

early so-called Fathers of the Christian Church wrote primarily in Greek, then increasingly in

*

,


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The Mind Humanities, Philosophical Introspection and Social Healing

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Latin, and so we would do well to begin by reflecting on both the words in those languages

and the ideas that underlay their approaches to the notion of mind.

In the works of Homer, who was the supreme literary source for Greeks of the Classicalperiod such as Plato, the word , which is today almost always translated into English as

soul, is closely linked with the notion of breath. This reflected, it would seem, the vague

popular view according to which, upon death when one breathed ones last breath, the soul

would leave the earthly body and go down to the underworld, or Hades, where it would live

in some kind of reduced state. Plato, writing several centuries after Homer, criticized him

vehemently for many things, including his unflattering portrayals of many of the Greek gods

and his characterization of life in Hades as a life of misery. In the Republic and other

dialogues, Plato developed a relatively rigorous tripartite conception of the soul as consisting of

intellectual and appetitive, or desiring, components mediated by something in between them that

could be called spirit. In Greek dictionaries, one translation of this in-between part of the

soul, , is also soul, and it seems, as it is for Plato, to be particularly connected with

anger. In the late Nineteenth and early Twentieth Centuries of the Common Era we find

Sigmund Freud advocating a tripartite conception of the human personality ego, id, and

superego that is still strongly indebted to Platos schema. Plato also argued, in several

places but especially in one of his dialogues concerning the trial and death of his teacher,

Socrates, the Phaedo, that it was highly reasonable, as well as very hopeful, to regard the soul

as immortal. In connection with this, Plato drew a far more clear-cut distinction between the

soul and the body than is to be found in extant writings from any of his predecessors

(although it is well known that he was influenced by the followers of Pythagoras, who held a

similar belief). Philosophy itself, argues Platos teacher Socrates in that dialogue, is a long

training in separating the soul from the body, which in this life acts, as it were, as a prison

for the soul.

What, then, can be said about the concept of mind, as distinguished from soul, among the

ancient Greeks? In the same dialogue of Platos that I have already cited, the Phaedo, Socrates

recounts a time in his life when he was searching through the works of his philosophical

predecessors for a coherent explanation of the cosmos; one of those philosophers, Anaxagoras,

did indeed claim that the supreme causative principle of all things was , which is the

ancient Greek word that is usually translated into English as mind. But Socrates goes on to


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say that he was ultimately disappointed by Anaxagoras account, because Anaxagoras never

really tried to explain exactly how mind made the world what it is, so that it remained more

of an abstract slogan than a real explanation. Aristotle, Platos successor, uses a word that isclose to , namely , translated into English as thought, as a similarly ultimate

explanatory principle: For Aristotle, the Prime Mover of the world is

, or self-thinking thought. But, while this notion appears in a part of his book called the

Metaphysics, and the idea of reason as supreme pervades all of Aristotles philosophy, he also

devoted an entire book to an analysis of the soul, a work that is usually referred to by the

Latin translation of its title, De Anima. For Aristotle the soul is above all the life principle,

rather than a completely distinct entity as it was for Plato.

In Latin the word for mind is mens, and in the Roman world there was a very popular

conception of the ideal of human life that was expressed by the words mens sana in corpore

sano, a healthy mind in a healthy body an expression that one still occasionally hears in

contemporary English. But among most intellectuals of the later Roman world, in an

atmosphere in which philosophy and theology were ever more closely entwined as Christianity

gradually achieved a dominant position, it is fair to say that anima, soul, was far more the

focus of their attention than either mens (mind) or corpus (body). This remained the case

throughout the Christian Middle Ages.

The pervasive influence of the Latin language on Western thinking and literature for

centuries even after Latin ceased to be a widely spoken language can perhaps be illustrated in

a somewhat banal but nevertheless very suggestive way by looking to the end of one of Karl

Marxs last works, his Critique of the Gotha Programme of 1875, which was first published by

Friedrich Engels in 1891, after Marxs death. Marx, who was certainly not a believer in the

immortality of the soul or indeed in the very existence of any such thing as a soul, wrote as

his final sentence of that essay Dixi et salvavi animam meam I have spoken and have

saved my soul.

In the evolution of Western thought concerning the notions of both mind and soul, no single

individual thinker is of greater importance than Ren Descartes. But before I turn to him, let

me mention one more related in some ways very strange notion that played an

important role in both later Greek and Latin literature under the influence of Christianity,

namely, , or spirit. In traditional Christian doctrine, God consists of three inseparable


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Persons, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, . The original meaning of this

word was in fact wind, or breath, and there still exist words in English today

notably the word pneumatic that is used to refer, for example, to automobile tires, which arefilled with air that reflect that original meaning. The Latin translation of this word is,

simply, spiritus. Near the beginning of the so-called Acts of the Apostles in the Christian

Scripture, the Holy Spirit is said to have descended on the large group of the Apostles, or

followers of Jesus, who were gathered together in a room after his death, resurrection, and

ascension into heaven; the arrival of this Spirit was signalled by a loud noise and a violent

wind, and then tongues of fire hovered over each of them.

It would require an entire lecture in itself if I were to explore just a few of the ways in

which spirit has been used over the centuries, in both English and German as well as to

some extent other Western languages. It appears and reappears especially as a synonym for

ghost, meaning the mostly intangible remains of a deceased person that is thought still to

haunt a house or some other location in our world. In Shakespeares play Hamlet, when

Hamlet believes that he sees the ghostly image of his murdered father, he says, If thou be a

spirit, speak! And in earlier English, in fact until quite recently, the Holy Spirit of the

Christian Trinity was more commonly called the Holy Ghost. The German word is Geist,

which became the single most important word in the idealist philosophy of Hegel, the name

for the absolute reality that pervades and dominates the universe.

But Hegel would not have been Hegel I mean that his philosophy would have been

inconceivable without the historical influence of Descartes, to whom I now wish to turn.

Descartes lived during the time of Western reawakening of new discoveries in science, of

world exploration by ship, of religious reform and rebellion against the established Church, and

of philosophical disillusionment with the whole tradition of neo-Aristotelian thinking, known as

Scholasticism because it was divided into various schools that had become dominant during

the later Middle Ages. Descartes can be seen as a would-be bridge-builder between conflicting

trends, remaining faithful to the Catholic religion, retaining more elements of Scholastic

thinking than he himself probably realized, but seeking a new philosophical foundation that

would be in keeping with the new scientific ideals above all, the ideal of certitude through

deductive reasoning. What is most important for our purposes here is that the pivotal point of

Descartes entire philosophy is the so-called cogito, or I think, a fact which he takes to be


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indubitable even if he may have been deceived and misled in every other respect. The

affirmation of this leads him immediately to conclude that he must be a thinking thing res

cogitans in the Latin version of his work, Meditations on First Philosophy, une chose quipense in the French version. Throughout all his works he gives two names, which for him are

truly synonymous, to this thinking thing: mind and soul; and he clearly and definitively

contrasts this entity with body. In so doing he set the terms for mainstream Western

philosophy for several centuries to come, since if one had any interest in metaphysics or

ontology henceforth one had to decide whether to accept Descartes so-called dualism or to

deny that one its two components, either non-corporeal mind or soul, or else matter, was real

and not a mere illusion. Alternatives to this trilemma have emerged only very gradually in the

philosophical thinking of the West concerning mind that is, in the mind of the West.

If the account that I have given of soul, mind, and spirit in various philosophers and

periods of Western history prior to Descartes may have suggested a considerable lack of clarity,

lack of agreement, this is confirmed by Descartes himself in an interesting text in his Second

Meditation. Here, he is recalling what he himself had once thought about what it meant to be

a human being, and how confused his thinking had been. He begins this reflection by strongly

rejecting the traditional definition, inherited by the Scholastic thinkers from Aristotle, of man as

rational animal, since it is quite unclear what either rational or animal really means. So,

he says, he had once thought of himself as a mechanism composed of bone and flesh and

members, just as it appears in a corpse, and which I designated by the name of body. In

addition, I thought of the fact that I consumed nourishment, that I walked, that I perceived and

thought, and I ascribed all these actions to the soul. But either I did not stop to consider what

this soul was or else, if I did, I imagined that it was something very rarefied and subtle, such

as a wind, a flame, or a very much expanded air which penetrated into and was infused

throughout my grosser components.

As you can see, Descartes had some awareness of the vague connections between soul and

breath that, as I have shown, go back to the earliest days of Western literature and continued

to affect Christian thought, and he is eager to dispel all such quasi-materialistic elements from

his own more purified notion of soul or mind. On the other hand, he goes on to retain, in his

later meditations, the equation that he makes in this text between bodies and mechanisms. His

age was one in which mechanical objects excited great enthusiasm, and he shared in this. In


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William James. In England, the scholarly journal named Mind was founded in the late

Nineteenth Century and in its earliest years contained articles that straddled the border between

what we would now think of as philosophy and psychology. Two famous philosophers laterserved as its editors for roughly a quarter-century each: G.E. Moore from 1921 to 1947 and

Gilbert Ryle from 1947 until 1972. Probably Ryles best-known work, influenced as it was by

the movement known as linguistic analysis, is entitled The Concept of Mind, and probably the

most famous phrase in this text is Ryles scornful characterization of mind in the Cartesian

tradition as the ghost in the machine. Much of the recent literature in the philosophy of

mind, which is a flourishing area of Western philosophy, revolves around the issue as to

whether mind and brain are in fact identical, or whether, on the contrary, there is something

distinctive about what we understand by mind that cannot be reduced to a mere series of

brain-states.

But this issue, while theoretically interesting, should not be allowed to capture all the

attention of philosophers in this area of thought when in fact the question of mental health, the

quest for mens sana, which is clearly a central concern of this conference, is a matter of the

utmost practical urgency. A key word in Western literature, both philosophical and

psychological and also sociological, in coming to grips with this question is alienation. To

trace carefully the various meanings of this English word and its German and French

equivalents over, let us say, the past two and a half centuries would be a monumental task,

taking us far beyond the limits of this paper. Let me just recall a few points. In French, the

root of this word occurs in the word alin, which means someone who is mad, crazy; the

old expression for an insane asylum is maison [house] des alins [of those who are mad].

But it has other, quite different meanings as well; for example, in the late Eighteenth Century

political writing of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, whose own Confessions might well be read, and

have been read, as being among the first self-accounts of a modern, alienated Western mind,

the social contract is said to involve the alienation of the rights of each member of the society

to the General Will of the whole community a kind of alienation which, for Rousseau,

redounds to the greater good of each individual as well as of the whole. In Hegels German,

there are two words that translate into English as alienation: Entasserung and Entfremdung.

Entasserung, which means going outside of oneself, is for Hegel an essential part of the

development of spirit or mind at every stage from the first, which is immediate sensation, to


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the last, Absolute Spirit; as he says, the Phenomenology of Spirit traces a pathway of despair.

But Entfremdung is an even more extreme form of alienation, sometimes translated into English

as estrangement; it is this form, taken over from Hegel, that Marx, in his once-forgotten andunpublished but later very influential Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844

highlights in his now-famous text on alienated labor.

Beginning a half-century later, the work of Sigmund Freud began to exert an influence

comparable to Marxs on Western intellectuals and eventually on the public at large. While

Freuds complicated analysis of the human psyche may not have focused as centrally on the

word alienation as did either the young Marx or many of Freuds later followers, the notion

of it plays a major role in his thought, and the overcoming of it in his patients may be said

to have been the principal goal of his therapeutic practice. Shortly before Freuds death in

1939, a group of German philosophers who were connected in varying degrees with the

Institute for Social Research in Frankfurt, and who became known by historians of thought as

the Frankfurt School, combined an interest in psychological questions as seen through what

could be called a post-Freudian lens with an interest in social theory that was influenced by

Marx. Forced to leave Germany by the threat of persecution or worse as Hitlers Nazi Party

consolidated its triumph there, many moved either temporarily, until after the end of the

Second World War, or permanently to the United States or elsewhere. Max Horkheimer, the

director of the Institute, Erich Fromm, the author of a famous book entitled Escape from

Freedom, and Theodor Adorno, the principal co-author of an influential study entitled The

Authoritarian Personality, are among the best-known names in this group. But the Frankfurt

School associate whose work became best known in the post-war period on into the 1960s and

1970s was undoubtedly Herbert Marcuse. While his ideas are certainly not perfect illustrations

of the Western mind in both its conceptual and its therapeutic aspects no ones are such

perfect illustrations, of course he seems to me to be an especially interesting individual

upon whom to focus in the conclusion of this paper, not only because of his way of bringing

together so many of the major past figures and points that I have mentioned, but also because

of his importance in recent Western history.

I shall make a brief reference to three of his works, Reason and Revolution, Eros and

Civilization, and One-Dimensional Man. The first, a product of his early career, attempted to

show that Hegels Phenomenology of Mind had laid the groundwork for reasoned protest


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against the repressive established political and social order in the world of his time, by

emphasizing what Marcuse came increasingly to call the power of negative thinking. Eros

and Civilization, subtitled A Philosophical Inquiry into Freud, was an effort to demonstrate,through an internal analysis of Freuds ideas and under the strong influence of the utopian

future vision of Marxs early work (although, in deference to the hostile intellectual atmosphere

in the United States during the so-called McCarthy Era when the book was published, the

name of Marx is never once mentioned in it), that a flourishing, civilized society without

psychological sublimation was a real possibility. It was intended to refute Freuds claim,

especially in the work entitled Civilization and Its Discontents, that the achievement and

maintenance of civilization required represssive mechanisms. Finally, One-Dimensional Man,

published in January 1964, was a cri de cur, a cry from the heart, against the consumerist

Western society in which, through advertising, propaganda, and the cult of gadgets to satisfy

what Marcuse called false needs, the mass of that society was lulled into giving up on any

dreams of a better world. A best-selling book by a Christian clergyman of the time, Norman

Vincent Peales The Power of Positive Thinking, well captured the spirit of consumerist

self-satisfaction, here supported by a very comfortable, bourgeois religious outlook, against

which Marcuses critique was directed.

Now I must try to show why I see Marcuses work, however imperfect it may be in some

ways as I have acknowledged, as confronting us with truly central questions about mental

health from within the perspective of Western thought. One way of approaching this is to

reflect back on a policy that was endorsed for some years by the United States military, a

policy called MAD, three letters that stood for Mutually Assured Destruction. It was in fact

adopted around the time of publication of One Dimensional Man. The thinking behind this

policy was, roughly, that by announcing that an actual or perceived attack by the Soviet Union

against the United States would be met with massive retaliation against all its major population

centers, one made such an attack less likely. But of course it required a firm commitment to

carry out this threat. It may or may not have been a coincidence that the three letters together

spelled the synonym for insane, but for many this perfectly reflected the insanity of

American and, in general, Western society itself. Marcuses message in his book of 1964 was

quite pessimistic, and he often said, during subsequent years, that in an insane society the

individual who dissents from its assumptions may be labeled insane, but may in fact be the


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sane one.

Remember that Marcuse himself, who like many of his Frankfurt School colleagues was

Jewish, escaped the insanity of Hitlers Holocaust that resulted in the extermination of millionsof Jews and others whom Hitler designated as inferior human beings. The mass of the

supposedly so civilized German and then Austrian people the homelands of Hegel, Marx,

and Freud had succumbed to the mad theories and plans of this supreme demagogue,

whether by actively accepting them or simply allowing them to prevail. Only a generation later,

for reasons that it would hard completely to explain, Marcuse came to be regarded as the guru

of the Student Movement of 1968, in which established institutions in France and Germany and

to some extent elsewhere in the West were severely shaken at least for a brief period of

time and the slogan, Power to the imagination! (Limagination au pouvoir), came to

symbolize a new, revolutionary mentality. It is extremely paradoxical, of course, that the

thought of this by now quite pessimistic senior professor should have helped to inspire the

wave of youthful optimism that swept the West at that time. But so it was. I last saw him at

the height of his period of extreme adulation, in the fall of that year, 1968, and it was clear

that he was quite surprised by the turn of events. There is, in my opinion, no one alive today

of a stature comparable to his who has undertaken such a probing crtical inquiry into the

nature of the Western mind.

What conclusions, then, can we draw from this brief survey of Western conceptions of mind,

going back to comparatively ancient times, and of more recent Western manifestations of

insanity and appeals to mental health? The central question, of course, is just what constitutes

mental health? To take one example in particular, were the events of May 1968, involving as

they did, at least in Paris, mass demonstrations and a radical disruption of institutional routines

I mean, at the universities, in the government, and so on moments of sanity in a

generally sick society or themselves irrational instances of insanity? Is Western society today a

sick society? Was it ever healthy? Can some inhabitants of a generally sick society nevertheless

themselves retain sanity, mental health? If so, what does that look like, how can one recognize

it, either in oneself or in others?

I hope, and expect, that at least some of these questions will be addressed in the remainder

of this conference, with input from traditions that are in some respects radically different from

the Western tradition, which itself, as I hope I have demonstrated, has been marked by great


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diversity. My own general perspective begins with affirming Aristotles observation that man is

not the best thing in the universe and by noting that the actual amount of time, the number

of years, that have passed from the very first moment in our history that I mentioned, the timeof Homer, until now is relatively short as compared with the age of the universe itself. So it

is possible that we may yet learn to use our individual minds and our collective mind better

than has been done up to now, provided that we do not reach the point of engaging, as is

also quite possible, in Mutual Assured Destruction. I also believe that I have lived all my life

in a society in which a deep mental illness of the sort identified by Marcuse and many others,

so deep that it eludes all psychoanalytic diagnosis, has been pervasive and that it may

always have been so, throughout past history. But as Martin Heidegger, whose own sometime

complicity with Nazi ideology was itself a manifestation of that deep sickness, put it in a

moment of optimism at the end of his essay, The Question concerning Technology, The closer

we come to the danger, the more brightly do the ways into the saving power begin to shine

and the more questioning we become.


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Practical Philosophy of Mind : How Can We Get the Free Mind?

- 13 -

1

?

*1)Lee, Jin-Woo

(POSTECH)

,

.1)

G.W.F. Hegel

,

.

.2)

Friedrich Nietzsche

* ( )

1) G.W.F. Hegel, Phnomenologie des Geistes, Werke Bd. 3, (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1970), p.145.

: / , , 1988, 25 .

2) Friedrich Nietzsche, Menschliches, Allzumenschliches, KSA 2, eds. Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari,

(Mnchen, 1980), p.17/8. , , , 7, ,

, 2002, 14/5

.


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1. ?

. .

. ,

.

?

.

(mind) , ,

(spirit), (soul),

(reason), "(heart), (truth) .

.

.

.

?

.

,

. ?

?

.

.

.3)

(mind)

3) (cosmopolitanism) Kwame Anthony Appiah

. practices and not principles are what enable us to live together in peace." Kwame Anthony Appiah,

Cosmopolitanism. Ethics in a World of Strangers, (N.Y: Norton paperback, 2007), p.85.


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(mindful) .

,

. ?

. .

.

. ,

,

.

,

.4)

(Mindfulness)

, (Geistesgegenwart, presence of mind) .

(Mindlessness) ,

(Mindfulness) .

,

.

.

, ,

,

.

, ?

.

.

4) F. Nietzsche, Menschliches, Allzumenschliches I, 35, KSA 2, p.57. : ,

7, 63

.


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.

, , .5) ,

,

. ,

.

.

(premature cognitive

commitments) .6)

.

,

.

.

, ,

7) .

,

,

.

. , ,

.

.

.

.

.

5) Ellen J. Langer, Mindfulness, (Cambridge, MA: Perseus Books, 1989), p.10.

6) Ellen J. Langer, Mindfulness, p.22.

7) Ellen J. Langer, Mindfulness, p.62.


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,

.

. ,

.

.

, ,

.

.

2. :

.

. ,

.

.8)

.

? ?

?

.

,

. .

8) Georg W.F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Spirit, translated by A. V.

Miller, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977); Georg W.F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Spirit(The

Phenomenology of Mind), translated by J.B. Baillie (A Digireads.com Book, 2009)

Geist

Sprit, Mind

.


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- 18 -

,

.9)

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.

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. ,

.

.

9) G.W.F. Hegel, Phnomenologie des Geistes, Werke Bd. 3, (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1970), p.145.

: / , , 1988, 25 .

10) G.W.F. Hegel, Phnomenologie des Geistes, p.16.

:

/

, <

I>, 66

.


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- 19 -

11)

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11) G.W.F. Hegel, .

12) G.W.F. Hegel, Phnomenologie des Geistes, p.17. : / , , 67 .


:

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, <

I>, 82

.


28/308


- 20 -

, .

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14) G.W.F. Hegel, Phnomenologie des Geistes, p.12. : / , , 60/1 .

15) G.W.F. Hegel, Phnomenologie des Geistes, p.24. : / , , 76/7 .


:

/

, <

I>, 74

.


29/308


- 21 -

,

.17)

. ? (Mindfulness)

(Selbstbewutsein, Self-Consciousness) .

.

.

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.

.

,

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, .

.

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17) G.W.F. Hegel, Phnomenologie des Geistes, p.38. : / , , 95 .

18) G.W.F. Hegel, Phnomenologie des Geistes, p.137/8. : / , , 244

: "Ich ist der Inhalt der Beziehung und das Beziehen selbst.(Ego is the content of the relation, and itself

the process of relating)."

19) G.W.F. Hegel, Phnomenologie des Geistes, p.139. : / , , 246 :

Selbstbewutsein ist Begierde berhaupt."(Self-consciousness is the state of Desire in general.)


30/308


- 22 -

.20)

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20) G.W.F. Hegel, Phnomenologie des Geistes, p.144. : / , , 253 :

Self-consciousness attains its satisfaction only in another self-consciousness.

21) Robert B. Pippin, Hegel on Self-Consciousness. Desire and Death in the Phenomenology of

Spirit (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2011), p.39 .

22) Friedrich Nietzsche, Menschliches, Allzumenschliches, KSA 2, p.14. , , ,

7, 9

: "eine Schule des Verdachts(a School of Suspicion)".


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- 23 -

,

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23) Friedrich Nietzsche, "Versuch einer Selbstkritik", Die Geburt der Tragdie, KSA 1, p.14. : ,

, 2, ( , 2005), 12 : to look an science in the perspective of

the artist, but at art in that of life.

24) Friedrich Nietzsche, Der Antichrist, KSA 6, eds. Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari, Mnchen, Berlin,

N.Y. 1980, pp.180-181.

:

,

15,

,

, 2002, 229-230.


32/308


33/308


- 25 -

,

, .

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, 29) .

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(Selbtbeherrschung) . 1878

.

. 1886

(freier Geist, free spirit) .

.

.

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.

.

.31)

?

.

does not flow into 'being'.

29) F. Nietzsche, Also sprach Zarathustra, IV, 1, KSA 4, p.297. : 13, ( ,

2000), 383.

30) F. Nietzsche, Die frhliche Wissenschaft, KSA 3, p.563. : 12, 307 .

31) F. Nietzsche, Menschliches, Allzumenschliches I, KSA 2, p.18. : , ,

7,

(

, 2001), 12

.


34/308


- 26 -

.

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.

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.

?

, (injustice).

32) F. Nietzsche, Menschliches, Allzumenschliches I, KSA 2, p.13. : , , 10 : Verschiedenheit des Blicks(difference of viewpoint).

33) F. Nietzsche, Menschliches, Allzumenschliches I, KSA 2, p.17. : , , 15 : Selbtbeherrschung und Zucht des Herzens(self-mastery and dicipline of the heart).

34) .

35) F. Nietzsche, Menschliches, Allzumenschliches I, KSA 2, p.20. : , , 17/8

.


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- 27 -

.

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37) F. Nietzsche, Die frhliche Wissenschaft, IV, 297, KSA 3, p.537. : , 12,

274/5

.


36/308


- 28 -

. .

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38) F. Nietzsche, Unzeitgemsse Betrachtungen I: David Strauss der Bekenner und der Schriftsteller, KSA 1,

167

.

: <

I>,

2,

(

, 2005), 193

.


37/308


38/308


39/308


- 31 -

.

.

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44) F. Nietzsche, Menschliches, Allzumenschliches I, KSA 2, p.55. : , , 59

.


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Abstract

Practical Philosophy of Mind

-How Can We Get the Free Mind?-

Lee, Jin-Woo

(POSTECH)

We shall experience the polyphony of the mind whenever we will try to figure out what the

mind is. The phenomenon signified by the word mind is so complicated and multivocal that

we will never be of a mind about the meaning of this word. We would do better to change

our question in order to know how mind does act in our life. How do we give our mind to

something that is thought of as giving sense to our life? As asking these questions, we are

facing two fundamental problems. The one is a theoretical problem how we talk about mind

meaningfully regardless of its ambiguity. The another one is a practical problem how we

combine this scientific question with the concrete real life. If we want to search for a

meaningful answer for these questions, we would do better to focus on the practical question:

How can we get the free mind?, instead of the metaphysical question: What is the mind?

As combining the problem of mind with the idea of freedom, our approach will change from

the psychological observation to the practical-philosophical one. Becoming mindful is closely

associated with the problem of freedom. Without understanding how freedom can be realized,

we cant grasp the importance of mind in our lives. Therefore it is no wonder that two

representative philosophers of Western philosophy, Hegel and Nietzsche, are approaching the

mind from the viewpoint of freedom.

Now we come to the main point of the practical philosophy of mind: How can we get the

free mind? As combining the problem of mind with the idea of freedom, our approach will

change from the psychological observation to the practical-philosophical one. Becoming mindful

is closely associated with the problem of freedom. Without understanding how freedom can be

realized, we cant grasp the importance of mind in our lives. Therefore it is no wonder that


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two representative philosophers of Western philosophy, Hegel and Nietzsche, are approaching

the mind from the viewpoint of freedom.

Hegels Phenomenology of Mind is nothing but a metaphysical attempt to describe thedynamic process of mind as freedom of self-consciousness (Selbstbewusstsein). On the contrary,

Nietzsche tried to sketch how to get the free mind (Freigeist)while deconstructing the

metaphysica lsubstance of mind. Regardless of the philosophical differences between them who

certainly go in the complete opposite direction, they are common in regarding freedom as

precondition of becoming mindful. By Hegel, mindfulness appears in the dynamic process of

self-consciousness.But Nietzsche claims that mindfulness can be realized only in the form of

self-mastery. I will portrait Hegels self-consciousness and Nietzsches self-mastery as two

practical ways of becoming mindful. And at the same time I want to show that two ways are

necessarily so connected with each other that we can agree on living mindfully without

agreeing about the philosophical justification of the mind.


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1

?

:

*1)Kim, Jyung-Hyun

(Wonkwang Univ.)

, , ,

. (G. Achenbach)

(Philosophische Praxis)

.

( ) ?

?

.

.

.

,

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. ()

*

,


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- 35 -

, .

,

. /

, ,

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,

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()

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.

, (G.H. Mead) (mind)

. (I, Ich)

(me, ICH)

.

,

(Anerkennung)

.

.

,

.

,

?

?

.

,

. 1)

1)

,

,

, 2000


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.

(Wilhelm Schmid, Martha c. Nussbaum, Pierre Hadot),

(, Lou Marinoff, Peter Raabe, Ran Lahav,

Schlotmit Schuster ), ( Peter Koestenbaum, Martin

Poltrum) .

.

,

.

,

.

, .

.


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Comment 1

How Can We Also Make The Practical Philosophy

of Mind?

Kim, Jyung-Hyun

(Wonkwang Univ.)

The problem of mind is the main theme which covers all kinds of various contemporary

philosophical issues such as soul, emotion, existential void, anxiety, and so on. Philosophische

Praxis, which is begun by G. Achenbach, also deals with not only the grounds for the practical

philosophy concerning mind but also the possibility of its healing.

The writer tries to figure out the meaning of mind in a practical philosophical way, asking apractical question how can we get the free mind? instead of a metaphysical question What is

the mind? Currently, mind is necessarily covered in psychology as the metaphysical terms or

discussions of mind have faced with a theoretical aporia. Even acknowledging these

circumstances, he tries to approach the mind philosophically instead of a psychological

discussion. As he focuses on the practical question instead of a metaphysical question which

can often be left unsolved, he convincingly opens up a new dimension of its discussion.

Combining the mind of metaphysical issue with the idea of freedom, the matter of practical

philosophy, he brings out Hegels self-consciousness and Nietzsches self-mastery in order to

lay the foundations for the practical philosophy of mind. Interpreting freedom and the dynamic

process of mind, he finds the possibility of becoming mindful, that is, the possibility of

convergence of the two extreme thoughts, Hegels theoretical, metaphysical logic and

Nietzsches deconstructive and non-metaphysical reasoning. He observes the social nature of

mind and a struggle for recognition from the interpretations of Hegels self-consciousness. And

he finds the sublimation of mind and the possibility of self-conquest from Nietzsches


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self-mastery. As to Hegel, if we are only attached to sensible or realistic one, or merely strive

for supernatural things, the mind can be distorted and the spirit can be in poverty. Hence, he

highlights that it is necessary to gain a social approval, recognition by others, to becomemindful. As to Nietzsche, he mentions self-mastery, perspectivism, injustice, and hierarchy as

the methods of practicing self-mastery and discipline of the heart and the spirit of freedom.

Based on these two theories of philosophy, he draws out self-recognition of mind and strong

emotions of life as preconditions of mindfulness.

Reading this article, I wrote down a few questions to discuss further.

First, the theory of symbolic interactionism of G.H. Mead seeks the identity of mind in the

process of communication between practical, social activities and the experience of

self-awareness. His distinction between subjective I and the objective me also shows that

the identity of mind can be found in the social behaviors and inner reflections. Current

psychoanalysis also views that fundamental conflicts between humans can be avoided and seek

the balance of mind when ones hopes and expectations communicate with others or are

synchronized among their interactions, anerkennung. Furthermore, even we expand the

practical philosophy of mind to social philosophy and depth-psychology (Tiefenpsychologie), it

still comes to the similar conclusion. Although the writer wishes to transform the matter of

mind, a metaphysical theme, into a practical philosophy, he again explains Hegels

self-consciousness in a metaphysical way. Instead of the attempt, I suppose that it be easier to

establish an explanatory hypothesis, associating with social philosophy or depth- psychology.

Are there any other philosophical alternatives helpful for addressing the practical philosophy of

mind, instead of analyzing Hegels consciousness of freedom and recognition metaphysically? Is

it really necessary to rule out discussions of contemporary depth-psychology when we discuss

the practical philosophy of mind? I would like to listen more about the writers views.

Second, I believe that our discussions should expand from the practical philosophy of mind

to the philosophical practice of mind. Philosophy should move from abstract self-awareness to

concrete insights which are meaningful in our daily practices, as it appears in his book

philosophy, come down to the ground . And that concrete insights should lead to practical

activities which are dissolved in our lives.

Currently, philosophy takes the various types of roles such as descriptions of lives (Wilhelm

Schmid, Martha c. Nussbaum, Pierre Hadot), philosophical counseling (Lou Marinoff, Peter


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Raabe, Ran Lahav, Schlotmit Schuster) and clinical philosophy (Peter Koestenbaum, Martin

Potrum) so as to be helpful to modern people, harassed not only by emotional and

psychological sufferings but the existential void and the meaningless of life.The practical philosophy of mind tries to get a clue to the solution of specific matters of

our lives and mind. And thats where the philosophical practice of mind is able to go on.

While the practical philosophy of mind clarifies specific problems of mind theoretically, the

philosophical practice of mind is a practical work which solves the matters of mind in our

daily lives case by case. I would like to listen more about the writers view on how much

should philosophy engage in and take roles in such a practical work. And if it is meaningful,

how can we go on such a practical philosophical work in our country?

I read this article pleasantly as I faced a new attempt on the practical philosophy of mind

which is rarely performed in Korea. And I raised a few questions to listen more about the

writers precious thoughts.


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A Study on the Cultivation of Morality in Taoist Practice

- 41 -

2

-() -

*1)Kim, Nakpil

(Wonkwang Univ.)

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50/308


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51/308


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.5) ()

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6) , , , 1960, 724 .

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7 , p.461.

8) .

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9) (

) , , 14, , 7 , P.308.

10)


53/308


- 45 -

.

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P.514.

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- 46 -

. () 18)

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55/308


56/308


- 48 -

.

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57/308


- 49 -

.

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58/308


- 50 -

. ,

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59/308


- 51 -

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, p.461.


60/308


- 52 -

.

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, 2005, P.644


61/308


- 53 -

43) . ()

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62/308


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. ,

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63/308


- 55 -

Abstract


Kim-Nakpil

(Wonkwang University)

During the late Han dynasty the thought of shin-shun (Immortals) was systematized in two

Taoist texts, Baupuzi and Zhouyicantonggi. These two texts mainly emphasised the cultivation

of morality as an essential element in the attaining golden elixir. L-Dongbin, a Daoist scholar

of the Five Dynasties period suggested that in attaining the Tao one must first cultivate

morality before proceeding into the deep and genuine stage of Naetan (Internal alchemy).

Zang-Boduan, a Taoist scholar of the Northern Song Dynasty, insisted that there remained a

number obstacles in the practice of internal alchemy before one could cultivate morality

sufficiently.

According to Zang-Boduan the human vital elements are divided into two aspects : inherited

original elements and postnatal elements. The essential way of Naetan is to recover the original

elements(primordial vitality and original nature) from the restricting postnatal elements. To

recover the original elements it is necessary for us to purify and cultivate our postnatal naturebefore anything else. He divided this practice of purification into two ways, cultivation of

morality and purifying the mind to be free from avarice. He regarded cultivation of morality as

a necessary step to uncover primordial vitality and original nature.

This discussion was developed on the topic of the relation of morality and pure primordial

vitality (perfect yangchi). Huang-Yuanji, a Taoist philosopher of the Qing dynasty, insisted that

Practice of humanity and justice can be regarded as the outer expression of inner primordial

vitality. Based on trying to integrate Taoism and Confucianism harmoniously he proposed that


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the restricted elements of primordial vitality were necessary for humanity and justice. Despite

their importance, however, he thought that these elements in moral virtue were insufficient in

attaining the golden elixir. Taoist Neian philosophers insisted on the existence of a reciprocalrelationship between primordial chi and original nature. Based on this view, they suggested that

primordial chi and the original nature should be cultivated in mutual harmony.

The cultivation of morality in order to attain the golden elixir aims at uncovering primordial

vitality in the human body. After attainment of the golden elixir pure primordial chi facilitates

spiritual enlightenment. We can say that moral cultivation is a pre-condition of attainment of

the golden elixir in order to develop the essential qualities of a person. This is a method of

self-cultivation of a person developing from selfish ego to a person immersed in social

realtionships and going even further, a person at one with the universe.


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2

- -

*1)Lee, Bongho

(Duksung Womens Univ.)

1. ()

.

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.

,

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2. ,

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,

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*


66/308


- 58 -

. ,

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67/308


- 59 -

3.

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(987~1082) ()

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.

.


68/308


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The remarkable description, "It is not difficult to find out cure-alls necessary to mind practice.

Also the perfect human being ought to depend on implementation of moral virtue." came from

Ojinpyeon. The citation from Hwangwongil, "If cultivation of moral virtue is deeply disciplined,

primodial conscience and original nature can be disclosed." makes us understand close relations

with Jingi

In "4 Revelation of Sunchongi (innate or inborn spirit) and cultivation of morality",

Jangbakdan's idea that recovering original elements (primordial vitality and original nature) from

restricted postnatal elements is the essentials of Naetan practice, such as the case of

Youilmyeong. For recovering original elements it is necessary for us to purify and discipline

postnatal nature above all. He divided this practice of purifying into two ways, cultivation of

morality and cleaning mind free from avarice. He regarded cultivation of morality as a

necessary step to disclose primordial vitality and original nature.

In "5. Implementation of moral virtue after recovering original elements, according to

Youilmyeong's idea, individuals' practice of morality is limited, but performance of virtue is

eternal. Therefore, a true taoist is considered as a individual being, a social being, and even a

universal being.

3. Questions

My question is closely related to the conclusive part of this article. We have yet to study

relations between virtue and original nature. In light of the performance or implementation of

moral virtue, even if we share Hwangwongil's mediocre view, I think that relationship of

manifestation of virtue and original nature may not be clear. What do you think of viewing

Mengzi's Hoyeonjigi( a great morale) as original nature or prmodial vitality? On the other

hand, I want to focus on the history of Tao itself. For example in the early of the North Song

dynasty the Confucian power of high social class seems to be deeply Shin Shun philosophy.

What is your comments on my opinion?

Another question is how to distinguish original elements (primordial vitality and original

nature) from restricted postnatal elements. Also what do you think of Jangjae's way of selection

of two elements and Jangbakdan's


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A Comparative Examination of Eastern and Western Thoughts Concerning the Absolute Mind

- 63 -

3

- -

*1)Han, Ja-Kyoung

(Ewha Womans Univ.)

1.

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72/308


- 64 -

, ( , , ).1)

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- 66 -

(B)

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