institutional aspects of standardization – jurisdictional conflicts and the choice of...

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This article was downloaded by: [University of Windsor] On: 17 July 2014, At: 02:40 Publisher: Routledge Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK Journal of European Public Policy Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rjpp20 Institutional aspects of standardization – jurisdictional conflicts and the choice of standardization organizations Raymund Werle Published online: 04 Feb 2011. To cite this article: Raymund Werle (2001) Institutional aspects of standardization – jurisdictional conflicts and the choice of standardization organizations, Journal of European Public Policy, 8:3, 392-410 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13501760110056031 PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the “Content”) contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinions and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors, and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sources of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arising out of the use of the Content.

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This article was downloaded by: [University of Windsor]On: 17 July 2014, At: 02:40Publisher: RoutledgeInforma Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH,UK

Journal of European PublicPolicyPublication details, including instructions for authorsand subscription information:http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rjpp20

Institutional aspects ofstandardization – jurisdictionalconflicts and the choice ofstandardization organizationsRaymund WerlePublished online: 04 Feb 2011.

To cite this article: Raymund Werle (2001) Institutional aspects of standardization– jurisdictional conflicts and the choice of standardization organizations, Journal ofEuropean Public Policy, 8:3, 392-410

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13501760110056031

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all theinformation (the “Content”) contained in the publications on our platform.However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make norepresentations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness,or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinions and viewsexpressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors, andare not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of theContent should not be relied upon and should be independently verified withprimary sources of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for anylosses, actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages,and other liabilities whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly orindirectly in connection with, in relation to or arising out of the use of theContent.

This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes.Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan,sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone isexpressly forbidden. Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found athttp://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

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Institutional aspects ofstandardization – jurisdictionalcon�icts and the choice ofstandardization organizationsRaymund Werle

ABSTRACT Standardization organizations in the area of information and tele-communications technology have mushroomed in the last two decades. In additionto new of�cial organizations at the regional level, many private consortiums andforums have been set up that complement and compete with the incumbentnational and international organizations. The organizational landscape and therelations between the standardization organizations are examined, and institutionalreasons that could explain why the frequency and intensity of jurisdictionalcon�icts have remained low are considered. Institutional features not only frame astandardization organization’s behavior toward other organizations, they also ac-count for speed, exclusiveness, costs and market acceptance of standardization andthus in�uence �rms’ decisions about which organization to turn to with a standardsissue. Although designed to promote collaboration between �rms which usuallycompete, institutional rules do not guarantee a smooth internal standardizationprocess if the economic gains at stake are high.

KEY WORDS Coordination; information technology; institutionalism; jurisdic-tional con�icts; standards; standardization organization.

1. INTRODUCTION 1

In the last two decades standardization organizations (SOs) in telecommunica-tions and information technology – the focus of this paper – have proliferated.Both the globalization of markets and the blurring of technical boundarieshave induced an overlap of the domains of international and regional SOs. Atthe same time, SOs at the national level are losing signi�cance. Traditionalorganizations have been restructured, and – assisted by governments – newof�cial SOs have been created at the regional level. Most dramatic, however,has been the growth of private consortiums and forums. Thus, ‘of�cial’standard-setting is confronted with an ‘informal sector’, the evolution of whichindicates some discontent with the traditional organizations and entails aninherent potential of jurisdictional con�ict.

In the paper’s �rst part I examine how the structure of the global landscapeof SOs developed, how the organizations deal with one another, and whether

Journal of European Public PolicyISSN 1350–1763 print/ISSN 1466-4429 online © 2001 Taylor & Francis Ltd

http://www.tandf.co.uk/journalsDOI: 10.1080/13501760110056031

Journal of European Public Policy 8:3 Special Issue: 392–410

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competition or collaboration prevails. I argue that the level of jurisdictionalcon�ict has remained low – not simply because scarce resources demandavoiding duplication of work, but also owing to institutional similarities of oldand new SOs.

Telecommunications and information technology are network industrieswhere standards play a crucial role (Shapiro and Varian 1999). Producers aswell as users can bene�t from standards, although they are usually developedby producers because they have the greatest potential economic bene�t fromstandards. The multitude of SOs offers �rms a choice as to which organizationthey can turn if they want to initiate standardization. This raises the questionof which factors the decision is guided by. Some of these factors rooted in theinstitutional form of SOs are illustrated in the paper’s second part.

2. THE LANDSCAPE OF STANDARDIZATIONORGANIZATIONS: COMPETITION, COORDINATION,CO-EXISTENCE

This section is concerned with organizations that develop compatibility stan-dards. These standards de�ne protocol, code, and interface speci�cations andaim at interoperability of complementary technical components. Compatibil-ity allows different products and services to work together in networks.Following the distinction drawn by Abbott and Snidal (this volume) compat-ibility standards are coordination standards: they facilitate coordinated manu-facturing of network goods, help to reduce transaction costs and tend to beself-enforcing (see also Schmidt and Werle 1998: 119–20). This is why inmany cases producers of network goods who acknowledge technological inter-dependence are interested in coordinating with others, and it is at the sametime one raison d’être of SOs, which provide an arena to collectively approvestandards.

Compatibility facilitates interoperation of complementary components suchas a word processor and a PC operating system. But it also provides a choicebetween functionally equivalent components such as different word processors.This means that compatibility standardization entails an inherent tensionbetween collaboration and competition (Katz and Shapiro 1985; Economidesand Salop 1992). Only the producers of complementary goods are generallybetter off with compatibility than without. For them convergence on onesingle compatibility standard would be the most ef�cient solution. Striving forsuch a standard implies concentrating standards development for a speci�csystem and its respective market in one SO (see Genschel 1997). Thissuggestion, however, contrasts sharply with what has been observed in stan-dardization of telecommunications and information technology, two networkindustries in which compatibility standards play a crucial role. The number ofSOs has grown signi�cantly in the last two decades, and there can be no doubtthat their jurisdictions overlap, which entails con�ict potential.

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It would be extremely dif�cult to give a comprehensive overview of all SOsin telecommunications and information technology. The organizational land-scape is still changing rather fast. Therefore, the analysis will be restricted toa selection of organizations which represent different types with respectprimarily to three relevant dimensions:

1 The level (scope) of standardization. We �nd organizations with national,regional or global signi�cance.

2 The sector or industry af�liation. Although the boundaries are blurring,we can still distinguish organizations with a focus on information techno-logy from those focusing on telecommunications.

3 The formal status of the organizations. We have of�cial SOs – recognizedand often supported by governments. And we have private groups(forums, consortiums) based on informal agreements or multilateralcontracts.

The third dimension is used to structure the following description of thedevelopment of SOs, their prevalent features and their relations to oneanother.

Of� cial organizations

The two of�cial organizations with the broadest range of responsibilities at theinternational level are ITU-T, the standardization branch of the InternationalTelecommunication Union (ITU) and the Joint Technical Committee 1(JTC1), which was set up in 1987 by the International Organization forStandardization (ISO) and the International Electrotechnical Commission(IEC). Although ITU and ISO/IEC have a different legal status, they can beregarded as classical international organizations with national membership andone-nation-one-vote decision rules. ITU-T issues telecommunications stan-dards, whereas JTC1 covers information technology. Their standards areinternational. At the national or regional level, other standards with a speci�cpro�le matched to the particular area and market may apply. They are issuedby organizations with respective responsibility. Thus, in of�cial standardizationwe have a horizontal and vertical separation of jurisdictions which helped toavoid con�icts between SOs and prevent more than one standard from beingissued in one jurisdiction.

The creation of JTC1 provides an early example of cooperation betweenSOs whose domains of responsibility overlap. Since the early 1970s ISO andIEC had dif�culties in clearly separating their jurisdictions in the area ofinformation technology equipment. After an internal agreement (in 1976)concerning a division of labor, both organizations institutionalized collabora-tion by setting up JTC1 in 1987 (David and Shurmer 1996: 792).

Another example of cooperation relates to the Open Systems Interconnec-tion (OSI) frame of reference adopted by both ITU and ISO in the early

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1980s. OSI was meant to provide a framework for developing open, i.e. non-proprietary, standards for computer networks at a time when vendor-speci�cproprietary networks prevailed. ITU and ISO claimed competence in this areabecause public networks (ITU) and computers (ISO) were the constituentcomponents of computer networks. Drawing undisputed distinctions betweenthe jurisdictions proved to be dif�cult which became apparent in the case ofe-mail standardization (Schmidt and Werle 1998: 229–62). In the early 1980s,experts in both organizations worked on what was called message-handlingstandards. After a short period of mutual ignorance both sides started tocoordinate work, and later consolidated most of the work under the roof ofITU, although no of�cial agreement was striven for. As a result, both organiza-tions published many identical standards in message handling. In doing so,they avoided duplicating work and – more important – adopting competingstandards, which would not be compatible with the SOs’ basic goal ofconverging different technical solutions into one single standard. In this casecollaboration was initiated by members of the standards committees and notby the top-level executives of ITU and ISO. Some of the members alsoparticipated in pre-standardization work on message handling in the Inter-national Federation for Information Processing (IFIP), where they had anopportunity to exchange information concerning the work of ITU and ISO.Overlapping membership in ISO, ITU and IFIP, the emerging personalnetworks crosscutting organizational boundaries and the organizations’ com-mon interest in an open standard fostered collaboration.

Many other instances indicate that ITU and ISO/JTC1 have avoidedcon�ict not only through informal cooperation but increasingly on a for-malized basis. In particular, with OSI-related standardization, cooperationbecame a matter of routine (Genschel 1995: 162–8). OSI – although a failurein many respects – can be regarded as an early example of what has been calledthe ‘meta-standards’ approach (David and Shurmer 1996: 810). Meta-standards stipulate technical performance features rather than de�nite speci�-cations, thereby leaving room for different, but not incompatible, standardsapproved by different organizations. A more formal move to coordinatestandardization activities at the international level – through cross-representa-tion and information sharing – was the creation of a Joint Committee onGlobal Information Infrastructure Standards by ISO, IEC and ITU in1995.

A new source of con�ict (for ITU) in the 1980s was the emergence oftelecommunications SOs at the regional level, which re�ected the growingsigni�cance of regional markets in this liberalizing area. Regional diversity ofstandards appeared to be inevitable, and it expressed the competitive concernsof regional companies. The European Telecommunications Standards Institute(ETSI), the US Exchange Carriers Standards Association (ECSA T1)2 and theJapanese Telecommunications Technology Committee (TTC) were established.ECSA T1 and TTC are virtually national organizations which have regionalsigni�cance. Foreign members are admitted. Their membership structure is

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company-based. Each company has one vote. ETSI has a mixed system withsome decisions taken by company-based and others by nation-based weightedvoting. The appearance of the regional organizations threatened to undermineITU’s authority (cf. Hawkins 1992). However, early on, the three regionalorganizations and ITU opted for coordination and division of labor in linewith the institutional rule to avoid con�icting standards which might resultfrom competition. A �rst step towards work-sharing was �nalized in 1990(Genschel and Werle 1993).

A similar development could be observed in information technology. In1991, ISO and IEC and their European counterparts, the European Commit-tee for Standardization (CEN) and the European Committee for Electro-technical Standardization (CENELEC), reached a consensus on cooperationbetween the two levels of standardization. Two formal agreements on this issuewere followed by the ‘Dresden Agreement’ in 1996, which additionallyspeci�es how new work is taken up by IEC or CENELEC (Falke 1999).Horizontal coordination of the three of�cial European SOs is provided by anInformation and Communications Technologies Standards Board (ICTSB)with representatives from ETSI, CEN and CENELEC.

At the national level we �nd of�cial SOs in all industrialized countries. Theyare politically independent, but linked to governments in one way or another.The national organizations represent their countries as members in ISO orIEC. In contrast with most other industries, telecommunications has notradition of formally independent standardization in many countries. Thenational post, telephone and telegraph (PTT) monopolies used to set thestandards in their own right. In the wake of liberalization the PTTs lost theirpredominance, but in Europe this did not lead to the creation of nationalstandardization bodies. The equipment manufacturers preferred regional orinternational standards and supported the plan of the European Commissionto establish ETSI (Werle and Fuchs 1993). In general, purely national stan-dardization work has signi�cantly decreased in Europe, as it has in other partsof the world. National organizations, however, play an important role intransposing regional into national standards (cf. de Vries 1999). This requirescoordination between these two levels, which in Europe is provided, forinstance, through the so-called ‘Vilamoura Procedure’, which was adopted in1988 to govern the relationship between CENELEC and the respectivenational organizations in Europe (David and Shurmer 1996: 808).

Although they represent only a minority of all organizations involved instandard-setting, the of�cial SOs have most visibly shaped the landscape’sinstitutional structure. Table 1 shows the prevailing institutional features whichhave been explored in several studies using different research methods.3 Manyof these features, which shall not be discussed in detail, are shared by theprivate SOs.

Standardization work is done by committees. The standards are voluntaryand not mandatory. Their implementation cannot be imposed and theirdiffusion in the market is not guaranteed. Thus, in constellations with a level

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playing �eld (symmetric power relations), the most widespread standards arethe ones that have been adopted on the basis of consensus by committees opento all interested players. Formally, the decision rules of the of�cial SOs allowfor some kind of quali�ed majority voting. De facto, however, their work isalso consensus-based because at the working level, i.e. in the technical commit-tees and study groups where the developmental activities take place and eachparticipating organization has one vote, no decision is taken against explicitand serious opposition from any single participant.

Inclusiveness of committees and consensus as decision rule – two ratherundisputed institutional features – facilitate the diffusion of a voluntarystandard. On the other hand, negotiation processes in these constellations canbe time-consuming, and they easily lead to deadlock or to unattractivecompromise solutions which in the end nobody wants to implement (cf.Scharpf 1997). More exclusive SOs with fewer players promise to be moreef�cient and also more effective, given that their membership is restricted totechnology leaders and �rms with substantial market power. Setting up newSOs is often motivated by the potential bene�ts of exclusiveness. However,other objectives have also guided the establishment of new organizations, as wecan see when we look at some of these forums and consortiums in more detail.All these organizations differ in one way or another from the incumbentof�cial ones, though they share with them many institutional features. Someobservers fail to notice this phenomenon of institutional similarity, which,however, does not rule out jurisdictional con�icts and struggles for predom-inance in standardization.

Older private organizations

The majority of SOs do not have an of�cial status. They are private con-sortiums and forums. Some older formally unof�cial SOs, however, haveachieved a quasi-of�cial status. A prototype of this kind of SOs is the European

Table 1 Prevailing institutional features of standardization organizations

1 Participation is within certain membership rules open to those who are‘substantially interested’.

2 Members are organizations rather than individuals. Individuals are regarded as‘delegates’ of organizations.

3 The work is committee-based, cooperative and consensus-oriented. It followsformalized rules and procedures.

4 Organization and working procedures are impartial, unsponsored and politicallyindependent (‘due process’). The organizations are non-pro�t organizations.

5 The work is based on technological knowledge and follows the principle ofparsimony of standard options. It is not remunerated (voluntary) and isconceived of as superior to market selection of standards.

6 Standards are non-mandator y and public goods. However, they are notnecessarily provided to the public free of charge (but on equal terms).

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Computer Manufacturers’ Association (ECMA).4 What we today call a privateconsortium, ECMA was established in 1961, with the objective of becomingactive in standardization. Early on its membership was restricted to computermanufacturers engaged in Europe, but associate members from other parts ofthe world were accepted when they had a general interest in the association’swork. Moreover, all vendors who owned manufacturing facilities in Europecould join ECMA. Thus, it was no problem for American multinationals to beaccepted as regular members. All members of ECMA’s technical committees,regardless of their national basis, have full voting rights. ECMA’s standards areusually meant to complement of�cial international standards or be submittedas proposals into ongoing standardization work of the of�cial internationalorganizations. The European thrust in ECMA, which aimed at leveling theplaying �eld in information technology, was moderated by opening theorganization to global players with a base in Europe. Thus, ECMA quicklyestablished itself as a recognized SO with stable links to ITU-T, JTC1 andETSI. In a settlement between ECMA, ETSI and CENELEC in 1991, ECMAwas recognized as an SO in its own right and at the same time a feederorganization for the of�cial regional and global SOs.

The initial interest in neutralizing existing differentials in market powerbetween European and North American vendors underlying the creation ofECMA also became apparent in other efforts to set up SOs. Examples areprovided by several facets of the so-called Open Systems Movement, which islinked to the efforts of ITU and ISO to promote OSI. In 1983, the EuropeanStandards Promotion and Application Group (SPAG) was set up by eightmajor manufacturers of information technology based in Europe. SPAG aimedat facilitating the implementation of open international standards through thespeci�cation of ‘functional pro�les’. In 1987 SPAG initiated the formation ofthe European Workshop for Open Systems (EWOS), which was created byEuropean associations of technology suppliers and user organizations tocoordinate work and provide for collaboration. EWOS also included CEN/CENELEC and, as a member of the steering committee, Directorate-GeneralIX of the European Commission (Genschel 1995). Similar to the of�cial SOs,SPAG, ECMA, EWOS and some others have a political root with industrialpolicy goals to the commercial bene�t of European manufacturers. As theseolder private organizations specify general standards rather than de�ne newones, their relationship to the of�cial international organizations is com-plementary rather than competitive.

Younger private organizations

The idea of open standards, with a different connotation, though, has also leftits mark on the landscape of the younger private consortiums and forums.Most of them were set up in the 1990s and only a few can be mentioned here.From the point of view of organizational change as a consequence of institu-tional adaptation, the X/Open Group deserves attention. Similar to EWOS,

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X/Open was an alliance of �ve European computer manufacturers forged (in1984) to counterattack non-European vendors. However, after a few years – aswith ECMA – all major international computer vendors became members ofX/Open. With its general objective to level the playing �eld by supporting orcreating open standards, X/Open was committed to industry-wide cooperationand could not refuse applications for admission by non-European computermanufacturers. Thus, X/Open lost its exclusive character. Other private forumsand consortiums, such as the Corporation for Open Systems (COS), the X-Window Consortium and the Open Software Foundation (OSF), all set up inthe late 1980s, relied on even broader membership. Like the of�cial organiza-tions, some of the private ones have been confronted with the problem ofjurisdictional overlap. In order to avoid open competition, OSF and X/Openconsolidated their activities by creating a new organization called the OpenGroup in 1996.

The tendency to set up new SOs of regional and global signi�cance, insteadof dealing with new standardization problems in the traditional of�cial organi-zations, has gained momentum in the 1990s – not only in the area ofinformation technology but also in telecommunications. Many new con-sortiums and forums were created, while others extended their domains. Intelecommunications, the Asynchronous Transfer Mode (ATM) Forum and theFrame Relay Forum are two examples. Others are related to the IntegratedServices Digital Network (ISDN). The biggest consortium in the area ofinformation technology is the Object Management Group (OMG), foundedby eight companies in 1989 to develop software speci�cations. Today theconsortium includes over 800 members. Many private SOs cover areas inwhich the of�cial ones have also been active.

Internet standardization, in contrast, has developed quite differently, beingcompletely detached from any of�cial standardization. Internet standards areadopted by the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), which is split intonumerous working groups with individual rather than organizational member-ship. They can be easily created, and most of them are wound up after theyhave �nished their task. Participation in IETF is open to anyone and a broadand unrestricted discussion of proposals via electronic mailing lists is possible.All the work is done by volunteers on the basis of consensus – similar to mostother SOs. For many years Internet standards were almost completely ignoredby JTC1 and ITU-T. Only recently has the Internet been of�cially recognized,and links of coordination have been established between IETF and other SOsincluding JTC1 and ITU-T. The success of the Internet has contributed muchto changing of�cial understanding of open standards. Initially, only speci�ca-tions within the OSI frame of reference were regarded as open standards.Today, virtually all non-proprietary standards, no matter by whom they areissued, are accepted as open.

Estimations of the number of private SOs vary. A recent survey of theInformation Society Standardization System (ISSS) identi�ed over 140 con-sortiums and forums which claim to be open organizations (CEN/ISSS 1999).

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Most of them are vendor-driven, ‘openly responsive to commercial marketconcerns’ (NRC 1995: 37) and only loosely linked to politics. Not all theseprivate groups are transformed into stable institutionalized standardizationcommittees; many disappear once a particular task has been �nished.

Institutional isomorphism and peaceful co-existence

The landscape of of�cial and private SOs has been characterized from differentangles. Rutkowski (1995), reviewing Internet standardization, regards theorganizations as being both cooperative and competitive. Cargill has observed‘a struggle for hegemony’ between private and of�cial organizations with somedecline in the importance of the latter. However, in his view, the ‘majority’ ofcorporations accept both as ‘equal partners in standardization’ (Cargill 1999:37, 41). The CEN/ISSS (1999: 7) survey also comes to the conclusion thatthere has been a relative decline in the role of of�cial standardization, whichhas been matched by the development of consortium standardization. Otherauthors stress the stability and ef�ciency (Genschel 1997), the symbioticnature (David and Shurmer 1996) or even the synergistic quality (Walli 1999)of the relationship between formal and informal SOs.

We �nd very few instances of open con�ict between the of�cial SOs and theprivate ones. The majority of the private units only claim competence innarrow areas of standard-setting, some of which are not adequately covered bythe of�cial organizations. Even IETF has never of�cially expressed imperialisticclaims with respect to international standardization, although the Internet hasdeveloped into the most signi�cant global computer network. IETF has alsoaccepted that standards for the World Wide Web (WWW) are developed bythe W3 Consortium, which has been established outside IETF.5 This, however,does not mean that there is no overlap with inherent potential con�ict. Giventhe rapid technological change, it is almost inevitable that different organiza-tions decide to develop standards for a new product or service simultaneously.An example is provided by Internet telephony. The opportunity to use theInternet as a cheap telephone network, or even as a means for real-timemultimedia communication, has been discerned by a number of vendors. Atthe same time SOs have started to develop standards for such new services. Theincomplete list of organizations involved includes: ITU-T, ETSI (Tiphon),the Voice over IP (VoIP) Forum, the Interoperability Now (iNow) Group, theInternational Multimedia Teleconferencing Consortium (IMTC), IETF(IPTEL working group), the Enterprise Computer Telephony Forum (ECTF),the Internet Telephony Interoperability Consortium and, to a minor degreealso, the ATM Forum, the ADSL Forum, OMG, and a technical sub-committee of ECSA-T1.

All these organizations are not only aware of each other’s involvement in thisarea; they also maintain coordinated liaison or other coordination and ex-change links. While some organizations focus on developing standards, others

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see their role in the selection and promotion of standards for speci�c applica-tions in this innovative �eld.

If, in general, con�icts between SOs occur, such as those at the nationallevel in the USA reported by the Of�ce of Technology Assessment, they areresolved through formal or informal cooperation agreements (OTA 1992:12–14). In the international realm, informal mechanisms are usually activatedat the working level of the SOs in order to avoid con�ict (Gibson 1995). Ifa group in one organization learns that people in another organization areworking on a similar problem, they try to concert activities without involvingthe top executives of their organizations. This is facilitated by personal net-works cross-cutting organizational boundaries or by individuals who are mem-bers of several SOs (overlapping membership).

However, formal committees have also been set up to coordinate standard-ization activities. The already mentioned Europe-based ICTSB coordinates thework of ETSI, CEN, CENELEC and many private ICTSB members such asthe ATM Forum, ECMA or the Open Group. The European Commission andthe European Free Trade Association (EFTA) Secretariat are af�liated asobservers.

Also, many bilateral or multilateral agreements between private consortiumsand of�cial SOs indicate a preference for cooperation on both sides. Theagreements range from formal liaisons and memorandums of cooperation tooccasional issue-speci�c links initiated by individual members of the organiza-tions. The CEN/ISSS (1999) survey gives an idea of the frequency of linksbetween all kinds of SOs. Table 2, based on the data in this report, providesan overview of the frequency with which (selected) of�cial SOs are mentionedas partners by private consortiums and forums. If we add to this picture all thelinks among these private organizations, we arrive at a complex web of of�cialand unof�cial organizations which has upset the traditional hierarchy ofSOs.

If we ask why, despite the increase in potential jurisdictional con�icts instandardization, the level of observable con�icts has remained low, one ex-planation is the weakness of most SOs. Looking at them from the angle ofcollective action and organization theory, they are what Coleman calls corpor-ate actors, who develop an interest not only in autonomy and organizationalsurvival, but also in growth and domain expansion (Coleman 1990). Thisinterest prevails in large corporations as well as in smaller organizations and itis not identical with an interest in pro�t maximization. Therefore, we canexpect that SOs also struggle for predominance in their area of responsibility.However, owing to institutional features, including the non-pro�t orientationwhich most organizations in the standardization �eld have in common, thecorporate actors – even if they have hundreds of members – are comparativelyweak. The resources directly available to the organizations are small. They onlyhave small teams of full-time employees and rely on volunteers to whom theyhave to grant autonomy in the process of standard-setting (cf. Salter 1999:108, 109). Members expect their fees to be used to provide resources for the

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work of the committees and for the dissemination and implementation ofstandards, rather than for organizational politics and domain expansion. Themajority of consortiums and forums have limited scale and scope, while theof�cial SOs likewise cannot adequately cover all areas of standard-setting.

Not only organizational weakness and scarce resources, but also positiveinstitutional commitments on the part of SOs trigger peaceful co-existencerather than competition. The most prominent institutional features which themajority of old and new, of�cial and private SOs have in common are includedin Table 1 above. New organizations are designed according to the model ofexisting ones with respect to these features. Similarly, if we look at the bylawsand charters of many consortiums and forums, as well as at the internalorganization of work, we come across mimetic isomorphism, as de�ned byDiMaggio and Powell (1991), referring to processes of imitation and copyingof organizational models. New SOs duplicate organizational and institutionalstructures of incumbent SOs.

This includes the consensus principle, even though, in combination withthe principle of the openness of organizations to all interested parties, it hasproved to be most critical with respect to a smooth process of standard-setting.As mentioned earlier, it is dif�cult to reach consensus on a standard if allinterested parties can easily get access to an organization. Of�cial SOs are oftencharged with being too slow because they are ‘too open’. Less open, i.e. moreexclusive, new consortiums and forums develop standards more quickly. In-cumbent organizations may regard this as a competitive move, but usually have

Table 2 Number of forums andconsor tiums reporting links toof�cial standardizationorganizations

Links to:

ANSI* 20ECMA** 5CEN** 10CENELEC** 6ETSI** 22IEC*** 13ISO*** 18ITU*** 21JTC1*** 8

N = 135 (Source: CEN/ ISSS 1999)* National (USA)** European*** InternationalANSI (American National StandardsInstitute)

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only limited capacity to speed up their standardization work. Therefore, theyaccuse new consortiums and forums of not being open and thereby assert aninstitutionalized value to which new organizations have to adapt. The pressureon these organizations to be suf�ciently open is often reinforced by govern-ments who conclude that exclusiveness sti�es market competition. To a certaindegree, SOs have to be open to new members if they do not want to appearas anti-competitive closed shops. Thus, there is also a mechanism of coerciveisomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell 1991) at work, which brings about institu-tional similarity and coordination rather than competition between SOs.

The institutionalized values in standardization change rather slowly. Theirdominant effect is one of delegitimizing and reducing competition and juris-dictional con�ict between organizations which, at the same time, only havelimited resources to devote to competitive strategies. If SOs work on similarstandards it is likely that they will coordinate their work. This can be achievedthrough some kind of division of labor, as in the example of Internettelephony, or by combining forces, as in the case of message handling, orsimply by granting the right to conclude the development of a standard tothose who �rst started working on it. The prevailing set of institutional normshas facilitated the development of international compatibility standardizationtowards a complex and hybrid self-coordinated ‘coordinative regime’ (Stein1982), where competition is avoided and at the same time not too muchcollaboration is needed because this would prove dif�cult to manage. Thedominant mode of interaction is oriented towards peaceful co-existence.

3. THE CHOICE OF STANDARDIZATIONORGANIZATIONS

The analysis of the landscape of SOs has shown that coordination and co-existence is the prevailing structural pattern. This appears to be inconsistentwith reports on spectacular ‘standards wars’ including the ongoing con�ictrelated to the Third Generation Wireless Telecommunications Standards(Grindley et al. 1999) which triggers the impression that hostility, antagonismand mistrust are the rules of the game. Many participants in standardizationrecall such con�icts. However, most con�icts occurred within standards com-mittees during the process of negotiations on standards. They can be explainedwith reference to institutional and procedural features of the SOs, on the onehand, and actor and interest constellations in the negotiation process, on theother hand (Schmidt and Werle 1998; also Werle 1998). Con�icts betweenSOs over their claims of competence or their involvement in overlapping areasof standardization have been rare. However, for companies interested in thedevelopment of a standard, this overlap provides a choice about which organ-ization to turn to in order to initiate standardization. On the other hand, thecompanies must select because only a few of them have the resources to senddelegates into virtually all major private and of�cial SOs (cf. Gabel 1991).

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Companies’ options and the limits of organized standardization

Generally, a company has different options concerning standard-setting, someof which I will illustrate here. One option is trying to bypass organizedstandardization and set a de facto standard in the market. Many standards aremarket standards, which have been imposed by market leaders or which haveevolved in market processes. A second option is participation in the work ofan of�cial or a private SO if the company has access to the organization. If thework on a standard has already been initiated by a company, other interestedcompanies usually have no choice but to join the SO which has begundeveloping the standard. In speci�c cases, companies may decide to initiateparallel standardization in another organization. A third option is setting up anew consortium or forum to deal with the standards project.

The attractiveness of the different options primarily depends on threegroups of variables (see Austin and Milner in this volume for more detail). The�rst group includes company features such as market position, the capabilityto develop advanced technology and general business strategy. The secondgroup is related to the nature of the technology and the relative signi�canceof a speci�c standard in a technical system. The third group includes thecharacteristics of SOs such as those discussed above. The relevance of this lastgroup, the institutional features, is what I will focus on after a brief look at therole of a standard’s signi�cance in the choice of an SO.

It has been stressed that compatibility standardization in general is anundertaking in which companies that usually compete now collaborate. How-ever, the tension between collaboration and competition remains an inherentstrain. In terms of game theory, compatibility standardization usually entails a‘battle of the sexes’ type of con�ict. Adopting a common standard promises thehighest total payoff for the players involved. All players gain but the relativegains of the parties differ (Farrell and Saloner 1988; Schmidt and Werle 1998:98–108). If the relative gains are moderate, the SOs’ rules of negotiationprovide opportunities for compromise. Whenever the relative gains at stake arehigh, the battle of the sexes can escalate and the game can be transformed froma positive sum to a zero sum game (Snidal 1985).

The size of the gains is often linked to the relative signi�cance of a standard.Many technical systems are asymmetric in the sense that a technical peripheryis grouped around a few core components. The standards of these corecomponents determine the shape of the systems. As a result, relative gains tendto be high when standards of core components are involved. If manufacturersof functionally equivalent core components prefer different standards, thecon�ict will be similar to zero sum. Such a standards con�ict compares witha con�ict between two companies which sell complete systems and thereforedo not rely on compatibility with the competitor’s technology. Many spectacu-lar standards con�icts are indeed what have been called battles of the systems(Schmidt and Werle 1998). In con�icts such as the struggle for a HighDe�nition Television (HDTV) standard in the 1980s, it is highly unlikely that

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a compromise can be reached in any of the of�cial or private SOs as long asthey are open to all competitors. If one company initiates standardization inone organization, the competitors will also enter the organization and blockthe standards process. Conversely, if companies are highly committed to thesame system, it is likely that they will reach an agreement on a standardnotwithstanding the organization to which the issue is taken. The Internetprovides such an example with individuals and organizations committed to thebasic TCP/IP protocol stack. The IETF has had only a few problems achievingconsensus on TCP/IP-based standards, and we can assume that the samepeople would have agreed on the same standards in another SO, too.

Market acceptance of standards and the costs of their production

The majority of standardization activities focus on components rather thansystems standards. In these cases, the characteristics of the SOs are assessed bycompanies when they have an option to choose where they are going to putthe standards issue on the agenda. One criterion which guides the decisionconcerns the implementation or market acceptance of a standard. An exampleof how organizational features are assessed when implementation is expected tobe an issue is provided by message-handling standardization (see Schmidt andWerle 1998: 229–62). Pre-standardization work started in the late 1970s, inthe IFIP. The IFIP’s Technical Committee 6 discussed technical design issuesof electronic mail and message handling, and reached a consensus that acompletely new open system was needed which would replace incompatibleproprietary systems.

Concerning the question as to where to initiate standardization, both ISOand CCITT, a forerunner of ITU-T, were regarded as suitable. The mostin�uential participants opted for CCITT. In particular, people from Canada’sBell Northern Research Corporation (BNR) were in favor of the top tele-communications SO. At the time BNR had a telecommunications backgroundand therefore an af�liation to CCITT. But also BNR’s conviction that globalimplementation of message-handling standards would be guaranteed by aCCITT endorsement played an important role. In the early 1980s, mostpublic network operators enjoyed a national monopoly. They regarded CCITTas ‘their’ international SO and were committed to implementing CCITTstandards in their networks.

Many computer and software vendors had reservations about opting forCCITT, which in their view would stabilize the monopolies of the operatorsof public networks. Being more familiar with computer messaging than thenetwork operators, these companies also feared that there would be uselesscontroversy with monopolies lagging behind the front line of innovations.Thus, outdated standards might be developed and implemented but notaccepted by the users. Therefore, several computer companies turned to ISO,where public network operators played a minor role. This shows that the SOs’

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membership structure and its relevance concerning the implementation anduser acceptance of a standard guided the companies’ choices.

Once adopted, standards reduce transaction costs. At �rst, however, theirdevelopment induces such costs. The expenses incurred by the companiesmultiply if they have to delegate experts to different organizations working onthe same standard. This occurred in message handling and led to a consolida-tion of work in one organization. Similarly, transaction costs increase becausestandardization at the international or regional level is often coupled withactivities at the national level. Global players striving for an internationalstandard bene�t from the support at the national level. However, this makesit vital to become involved also at this level and ensure that the preferredstandard is adopted ‘at home’. At times, national measures of coordination aremore contentious than the international negotiations. This could be observedin the USA regarding message-handling standardization. In the early 1980s,the National Bureau of Standards (NBS), an agency of the US Department ofCommerce, started work on message handling. NBS prepared a standardwhich it intended to feed into the CCITT process. The con�ict arose fromwork done for NBS by BBN – a company which had been much involved indata networking on the basis of government contracts. The results of BBN’swork were already approved by NBS when Xerox announced its oppositionbecause they ran counter to its work in CCITT. In a memorable confrontationXerox received stronger backing than NBS from the other members of the USnational delegation and NBS eventually withdrew its proposal. Thanks to itsactivity at both the national and the international level, Xerox managed toreceive approval for its proposal in CCITT. The resource-consuming require-ment of simultaneous involvement in standardization at the national and thesupranational level was an important reason for multinationals in Europe tosupport the establishment of ETSI as the of�cial European SO in tele-communications, and so prevent the establishment of many national bodiesafter liberalization of this industry.

The speed and exclusiveness of standardization

Thus far we have seen that considerations concerning the market acceptanceof a standard and the costs incurred in the standardization process guide thechoice of SO. Standards adopted on the basis of consensus in of�cial SOs witha broad membership are very likely to diffuse in the market. If diffusion isproblematic, the of�cial organizations appear attractive to companies. At thesame time, in order to minimize costs, companies prefer that work on astandard is concentrated in one organization, if possible a supranational,of�cial one.

However, standardization in of�cial organizations often proceeds slowly. Inthese organizations political, business and technical interests are blended. Atthe same time, the organizations rely on a broad membership. Where differentdimensions of merit guide the evaluation of standards and many experts with

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diverging interests are involved, it is dif�cult to achieve consensus – at least ittakes considerable time. Companies with a great interest in a standard there-fore prefer to standardize ‘faster and better’ in a private, more exclusiveconsortium or forum (Cargill 1999: 38). Private SOs often have as muchinternational reach as of�cial ones. With a membership at least initiallyrestricted to technology leaders and �rms with substantial market power,private SOs have the potential to be more ef�cient and more effective thanof�cial SOs.

Setting up new SOs, however, also involves transaction costs. Consortiumsand forums are based on multilateral contracts including membership anddecision rules, cost-sharing principles, and other statutes and bylaws. Costs canbe reduced if a new consortium is established after the model of existing ones– another source of institutional isomorphism. It may also be attractive to usea consortium, once established, for new standardization projects after theinitial project has been concluded.

It is dif�cult to trace in every single case the reasons why companies set upa forum or consortium. Their standardization strategies often appear to be‘erratic and unstable’ (Krieb 1999: 95). In general, however, if the stakes areextremely high, companies try to exclude rivals and include allies throughsetting up new consortiums and forums. But the exclusion of rivals is notsustainable because it violates anti-trust rules. Thus, there is pressure to openup standardization for rivals which, as a consequence, makes it unlikely thatconsensus will be reached unless a competitive advantage is sacri�ced. In thiscase companies may submit their standards to another SO where their rivalsare not yet present.

A recent example of such committee-hopping is related to the standardiza-tion of Java from Sun. This company, traditionally committed to openstandards, originally submitted Java speci�cations to ISO/JTC1 to become anopen standard. After a short time Sun became concerned about losing controlover the process. Java in different variants appeared attractive for consumerelectronics manufacturers and operators such as Sony or Philips, who generallybacked Sun (cf. Krieb 1999; Cargill 1999). As Java’s design provides anencompassing alternative of a networked system, hostile to the PC-centricmodel of Microsoft and its PC-focused allies, it was taken on in ISO/JTC1 bythis group. To evade a battle of the systems type of con�ict, Sun switchedstandards efforts to ECMA and – assisted by the Open Group and OMG –submitted a proposal for a JavaScript standard which was adopted as ECMA-Script. However, this standard, which was fed into the JTC1 process andquickly adopted there, has no central signi�cance in the battle of the systems.Parts of this battle may take place within ECMA because the exclusivenesswhich it provided in the past when Microsoft was absent has been lost afterthis company – realizing that hostile standards were pushed within ECMA –became a member in the second half of the 1990s. Again, no SO, of�cial orprivate, will be able to facilitate a compromise in the battle of the systemsbetween Sun and Microsoft.

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4. CONCLUSION

The global landscape of SOs is shaped by political, professional and businessinterests. In the last decade business interests prevailed. They were the drivingforces towards setting up new consortiums and forums which were meant tobypass or complement the incumbent of�cial SOs. The result was not �ercejurisdictional competition, but rather increasing efforts to coordinate betweenthese organizations, in particular where jurisdictions overlap. Institutionalmechanisms and values guided this development. Their rationale lies in theneed for compatibility in network technologies such as telecommunicationsand information technology.

As the jurisdictions of SOs partly overlap, companies can choose to whichorganization they turn if they want to get a standard adopted. If the diffusionand implementation of a standard is regarded as the central problem, �rmsprefer to submit a proposal to one of the of�cial organizations; they arerecognized by governments, and their products enjoy high legitimacy. Ifcompanies expect dif�culties in achieving consensus, they prefer approachinga more exclusive arena with a small circle of participants, often one of the newspecialized private consortiums and forums. As problems – often unexpectedly– change during a standardization process, companies switch from one organi-zation to another or proceed in parallel in different organizations – an optionwhich is only available to large companies.

No SO combines all the merits required for the smooth development andsuccessful market diffusion of standards. However, the landscape of organiza-tions, which has developed into an organizational network with partly in-stitutionalized coordination links, offers many useful complementarities, themost visible being the tendency of consortiums and forums to feed theirstandards into the adoption process of the of�cial organizations, where they areapproved without intensive further negotiations. Spectacular standards wars ofthe battle of the systems type, however, cannot be paci�ed by today’s SOs.Their resolution is left to the market.

Address for correspondence: Raymund Werle, Max-Planck-Institut furGesellschaftsforschung, Paulstrasse 3, 50676 Koln, Deutschland. Tel: 0049221 2767224. Fax: 0049 221 2767452. email: [email protected]

NOTES

1 For valuable comments on an earlier version of this paper I am indebted to WalterMattli, Helen Milner, Stephen Woolcock, Evangelos Vardakas and FrankBorowicz. I also thank Ulrich Müller for research assistance.

2 The name has since been changed to the Alliance for TelecommunicationsIndustry Solutions (ATIS).

3 See among others Egyedi (1996: 111–20); OTA (1992); David and Greenstein(1990).

4 ECMA is now called the International Europe-based Association for Standardiz-ing Information and Communication Systems.

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5 The Consortium is open only to organizational membership. It has about 500members.

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