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“Intelligent Design”: Philosophy of Science Issues Wesley R. Elsberry Wildlife & Fisheries Sciences Texas A&M University

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Page 1: “Intelligent Design”: Philosophy of Science Issues Wesley R. Elsberry Wildlife & Fisheries Sciences Texas A&M University

“Intelligent Design”: Philosophy of Science

Issues

Wesley R. Elsberry

Wildlife & Fisheries Sciences

Texas A&M University

Page 2: “Intelligent Design”: Philosophy of Science Issues Wesley R. Elsberry Wildlife & Fisheries Sciences Texas A&M University

“Did you hear about the Aggie professor…?”

Page 3: “Intelligent Design”: Philosophy of Science Issues Wesley R. Elsberry Wildlife & Fisheries Sciences Texas A&M University

Problems With “Intelligent Design” Arguments

Use of “marker of intelligent agency” approach is invalid in principle (Irreducible Complexity & Specified Complexity)

Mistaking criticism of Darwinian theories for a positive case for “Intelligent Design”

Making unsubstantiated or overblown claims

False claims of “scientific” status

Poor track record of following scientific practice in pursuing Intelligent Design arguments

Page 4: “Intelligent Design”: Philosophy of Science Issues Wesley R. Elsberry Wildlife & Fisheries Sciences Texas A&M University

Dembski’s Explanatory Filter & Design Inference (EF/DI)

Explanatory Filter: Supposed to capture the essential features of how humans already make design inferencesDesign Inference: Supposed to make the argument of the Explanatory Filter rigorousArgument by elimination of alternatives“Design” is a residueGoing from “design” to agency is based upon induction

Page 5: “Intelligent Design”: Philosophy of Science Issues Wesley R. Elsberry Wildlife & Fisheries Sciences Texas A&M University

Criticism of Dembski’s EF/DI: Invalidity

In spite of limited publication venue of EF/DI, it has attracted significant criticism

Several critics contend that Dembski’s basic arguments are invalid

Fitelson & Sober, 1999

Ellery Eells, 1999

Massimo Pigliucci, 1999

Eli Chiprout, 1999

Richard Wein

Page 6: “Intelligent Design”: Philosophy of Science Issues Wesley R. Elsberry Wildlife & Fisheries Sciences Texas A&M University

Criticism of EF/DI: Improper Procedures

The methods deployed in Dembski’s EF/DI have come under criticism

Elsberry, 1999

Wilkins & Elsberry, (in press)

Ivar Ylvisakar

Page 7: “Intelligent Design”: Philosophy of Science Issues Wesley R. Elsberry Wildlife & Fisheries Sciences Texas A&M University

Criticism of EF/DI: Interpretation

Some critics contend that even if basic EF/DI is a valid argument, that certain interpretations made do not follow

Elsberry, 1999

Wilkins & Elsberry, (in press)

Page 8: “Intelligent Design”: Philosophy of Science Issues Wesley R. Elsberry Wildlife & Fisheries Sciences Texas A&M University

Criticism of EF/DI: Theology

Criticism of Dembski’s EF/DI on theological grounds

Howard Van Till

Edward Oakes

Nancey Murphy

Page 9: “Intelligent Design”: Philosophy of Science Issues Wesley R. Elsberry Wildlife & Fisheries Sciences Texas A&M University

Criticism of EF/DI: MethodologyBill Jefferys’ point that DI is not predictiveProper practice of natural science

Show the work before making public claims

No significant empirical testing of EF or DIIs DI even subject to empirical test? (Dembski 1997)Dembski has thus far only proposed a verificationist programHistorical review (“regression testing”)

• Does DI put fairies in the fairy rings?

Look where the evidence is, not where it isn’t• Examine Krebs’ citric acid cycle, mammalian middle ear, etc.

Page 10: “Intelligent Design”: Philosophy of Science Issues Wesley R. Elsberry Wildlife & Fisheries Sciences Texas A&M University

The Ordinary & the Extraordinary

Humans & certain animals executing plans to a purpose are within our empirical experience, and hence are ordinary

Action of God is not within the same scope of empirical experience, hence extraordinary

“This cell made by YHWH” example• Naturalizes God, result is a “God who is not very

Godly” [Pennock]

Page 11: “Intelligent Design”: Philosophy of Science Issues Wesley R. Elsberry Wildlife & Fisheries Sciences Texas A&M University

Design Inferences: The Ordinary & the Rarefied

Inference to Ordinary Design: a class of causal regularity warranted in cases of known agencyInference to Rarefied Design: a class of causation based solely upon characters of artifacts examined

The color “Red” as an invalid marker of Rarefied DesignCSI as a(n invalid) marker of Rarefied Design

Mnemonics[*]• Ordinary Design, DAWKINS: “Design As We Know It, Not

Supernatural”• Rarefied Design, DEMBSKI: “Design (Exclusively Maintained

By Scanty Knowledge) Inference”

[*] Acronyms due to John Wilkins

Page 12: “Intelligent Design”: Philosophy of Science Issues Wesley R. Elsberry Wildlife & Fisheries Sciences Texas A&M University

The Pitfalls of Inferring Intelligent Agency

The question is not really over “design”The point of the ID movement is to infer “intelligent agency” (IA) as a cause for biological examples“Design” has simply been a means to this endReplacement of “artifact” with “event”What does an inference to “intelligent agency” require of us?

Page 13: “Intelligent Design”: Philosophy of Science Issues Wesley R. Elsberry Wildlife & Fisheries Sciences Texas A&M University

Finding the Action of an Intelligent Agent

Desired class of events“Intelligent Agency” (IA)

• Sufficient grounds: We observe the agent produce the artifact

• Epistemological warrant often occurs via multiple independent lines of evidence which imply existence and/or establish the identity of the agent causing the artifact

• Artifacts classed in IA because of evaluation of all the relevant evidence & consideration of the plausibility of agent causation

• Are we limited to “ordinary design” in assigning an artifact to “IA”? I argue “Yes”.

Page 14: “Intelligent Design”: Philosophy of Science Issues Wesley R. Elsberry Wildlife & Fisheries Sciences Texas A&M University

Are we limited to “ordinary design” in assigning an artifact to “IA”?

Consider an “IA” inference by looking at sets via Venn diagrams

Set view shows problems in the generalized logical argument:

• Instances of artifacts with attribute X are in IA• No instances of artifacts with attribute X are not

in IA• Thus, attribute X is a reliable marker that an

artifact is in IA

Call such classes “Marker of Intelligent Agency:X”

Page 15: “Intelligent Design”: Philosophy of Science Issues Wesley R. Elsberry Wildlife & Fisheries Sciences Texas A&M University

The ID “Treasure Map”: The Search for a Reliable Marker of Intelligent Agency

Argument from design advocates have searched exhaustively for their own “treasure map”

No map so far has gotten them to a reliable means of inferring rarefied design

“Specified Complexity marks the spot”Latest “treasure map” features statistics

Same old conceptual problems remain

Page 16: “Intelligent Design”: Philosophy of Science Issues Wesley R. Elsberry Wildlife & Fisheries Sciences Texas A&M University

Reliability

Claim by Dembski that his EF/DI makes no false positive attributions

Ignores a priori biases in applicationIgnores reliance upon current ignoranceNo test procedure yet given by an ID advocate

Claim by Dembski that his EF/DI finds design in biological systems

Where are the calculations?No fulfillment of requests for the work

Page 17: “Intelligent Design”: Philosophy of Science Issues Wesley R. Elsberry Wildlife & Fisheries Sciences Texas A&M University

Marker of Intelligent Agency: An Invalid Approach to Infer IA

“Marker of Intelligent Agency:X” (MIA:X) is then taken to imply IA without reference to plausibility of the designing agent or other evidence of an event

Inductive basis of argument provides no warrant for claims of reliability of any MIA:X approach, whatever “X” instantiates

MIA:X is an attempt to conclude IA on the cheap

Page 18: “Intelligent Design”: Philosophy of Science Issues Wesley R. Elsberry Wildlife & Fisheries Sciences Texas A&M University

MIA:X is an Appeal to Current Ignorance

Consider “red color” as a possible marker of intelligent agency

Intelligent Agency

MIA:RED

• Small enough experience favors view that MIA:RED is a proper subset of IA, and thus warrants inferring that event E in MIA:RED -> IA

• Examples: Red flashlight, fire truck, toolbox, fire hydrant

Page 19: “Intelligent Design”: Philosophy of Science Issues Wesley R. Elsberry Wildlife & Fisheries Sciences Texas A&M University

Induction Means That MIA:X Is Inherently Unreliable

• View that MIA:RED is a proper subset is based inductively

• Testing status are done by reference to empirical data

IA

MIA:RED

• Logic is insufficient to establish warrant for use of MIA:RED

• Asymmetry: can establish that MIA:RED is not a proper subset, but cannot establish that it is a proper subset

IAMIA:RED

This ->

Or this ->

*

Page 20: “Intelligent Design”: Philosophy of Science Issues Wesley R. Elsberry Wildlife & Fisheries Sciences Texas A&M University

Dembski & Markers

“In The Design Inference (Cambridge, 1998) I argue that specified complexity is a reliable empirical marker of intelligent design.”

“Thus a likelihood analysis that pits competing design and chance hypotheses against each other must itself presuppose the legitimacy of specified complexity as a reliable empirical marker of intelligence.” – WA Dembski, Another Way to Detect Design?

Page 21: “Intelligent Design”: Philosophy of Science Issues Wesley R. Elsberry Wildlife & Fisheries Sciences Texas A&M University

MIA:SC Is an Unreliable Basis Upon Which to Infer IA

MIA:SC fares no better than any other MIA:X

Quantitative difference, not qualitative difference

>=250 bits

>=50 bits

>=100 bitsIntelligent

AgencyMIA:SC

>=500 bits1234

5

Page 22: “Intelligent Design”: Philosophy of Science Issues Wesley R. Elsberry Wildlife & Fisheries Sciences Texas A&M University

MIA:IC Is an Unreliable Basis Upon Which to Infer IA

Michael Behe’s “irreducible complexity” (IC) is yet another case of MIA:X, & has the same problemsExamining MIA:IC

Given a mousetrap & knowledge of mousetrap makers, make ordinary design inference to IA (IC attribute is superfluous)Given a defective mousetrap & knowledge of fallible mousetrap makers, make ordinary design inference to IA (non-IC does not interfere with ordinary DI)Given sealed box labeled, “Contains IC widget”, have no warrant to make either an ordinary or a rarefied design inference to IA (IC attribute is uninformative regarding IA) [Behe’s “black box”]

Page 23: “Intelligent Design”: Philosophy of Science Issues Wesley R. Elsberry Wildlife & Fisheries Sciences Texas A&M University

Falsifiability

Popperian concept of “falsifiability”What is falsifiability?

• Theory X implies class of observation Y• If there exists y in Y such that ~y, then ~X

Need to state “theory” as a specific proposition• For example, “Flight” is not specific enough, but

“All birds fly” is a falsifiable proposition• Finding a flightless bird falsifies the proposition• A “basic statement” which contradicts the theory is

a falsifierNothing in there about somebody else’s idea

Page 24: “Intelligent Design”: Philosophy of Science Issues Wesley R. Elsberry Wildlife & Fisheries Sciences Texas A&M University

Dembski & Falsifiability

Dembski’s claim that Darwinian explanation of bacterial flagellum would falsify “specified complexity” as a marker of intelligent agency (2001/04/25) reveals confusion

No entailment, and thus no consequences for SC

Can simply say, “OK, what about this other example?”

Not really falsification

Page 25: “Intelligent Design”: Philosophy of Science Issues Wesley R. Elsberry Wildlife & Fisheries Sciences Texas A&M University

Behe & Falsifiability

Claim that IC as a marker of intelligent agency would be falsified by a Darwinian explanation of a bacterial flagellum

Same problem: no statement of a specific proposition & implied class of required consequencesSame confusion: the validity of another proposition in no way constitutes a falsification of the proposition being tested

Page 26: “Intelligent Design”: Philosophy of Science Issues Wesley R. Elsberry Wildlife & Fisheries Sciences Texas A&M University

The Excluded Muddle

EF/DI as an argument by elimination has practical as well as philosophical problems

Relies upon current ignorance (like all “marker of intelligent agency” approaches)Relies upon completeness of generation of alternative hypotheses (regularity or chance)Relies upon accurate assessment of plausibility of causation by regularity or chance hypotheses

• Begging the question by broaching hypothesis, but not correctly assessing its ability to cause the event

• EF/DI is a conduit for a priori biases

Page 27: “Intelligent Design”: Philosophy of Science Issues Wesley R. Elsberry Wildlife & Fisheries Sciences Texas A&M University

Real Design Inferences Are Ordinary Design Inferences

Properties of warranted design inferencesUse “design” as an independent category, not a residue of elimination

Evaluate plausibility of agent causation

Compare evidence & plausibility with respect to various causal hypotheses

Allow uncertainty to lead to categorization in “don’t know yet/get more data” bin

• World is open, not closed

Page 28: “Intelligent Design”: Philosophy of Science Issues Wesley R. Elsberry Wildlife & Fisheries Sciences Texas A&M University

Real Design Inferences are Ordinary Design Inferences

Where the Rubber Meets the RoadDembski’s examples of existing DIs are examples of Inference to Ordinary Design

• Includes SETI, “Made By YHWH” examples

Dembski’s real-world examples include the properties of warranted design inferences & use of ordinary design inferences (last slide)

Dembski extrapolates “ordinary” design inferences to “rarefied” design inferences

Not warranted

Page 29: “Intelligent Design”: Philosophy of Science Issues Wesley R. Elsberry Wildlife & Fisheries Sciences Texas A&M University

Summary (1)

Inductive arguments from a “marker of intelligent agency” give no warrant for either ordinary or rarefied design inferences

Ordinary design inferences remain our only reliable approach to inferring intelligent agency

Critics have argued variously against Dembski's underlying logic, his procedures, and his interpretations of results

Page 30: “Intelligent Design”: Philosophy of Science Issues Wesley R. Elsberry Wildlife & Fisheries Sciences Texas A&M University

Summary (2)

Dembski has consistently failed to properly subject his ideas to effective empirical test

Dembski has put little effort into explicating DI methodology in the peer-reviewed scientific literature

Dembski has failed to fulfill requests from his colleagues for data and work underlying publicly-made assertions

Dembski’s implication that his EF/DI is something that re-invents the basis of doing science is hype

Page 31: “Intelligent Design”: Philosophy of Science Issues Wesley R. Elsberry Wildlife & Fisheries Sciences Texas A&M University

The End

Page 32: “Intelligent Design”: Philosophy of Science Issues Wesley R. Elsberry Wildlife & Fisheries Sciences Texas A&M University

Dembski & the Genome

Features of genome due to “de-evolution” (U. Georgia lecture, 2001)

TDI says that the specificity of information can imply plagiary

Why is the specific information of dead viruses, parts of bacterial genes, and transposable elements not evidence of copying?

Page 33: “Intelligent Design”: Philosophy of Science Issues Wesley R. Elsberry Wildlife & Fisheries Sciences Texas A&M University

Dembski & ID Activism“Though design theorists believe Darwinism is dead wrong, unlike the creationist movement of the 1980's, they do not try to win a place for their views by taking to the courts. Instead of pressing their case by lobbying for fair treatment acts in state legislatures (i.e., acts that oblige public schools in a given state to teach both creation and evolution in their science curricula), design theorists are much more concerned with bringing about an intellectual revolution starting from the top down. Their method is debate and persuasion. They aim to convince the intellectual elite and let the school curricula take care of themselves. By adopting this approach design theorists have enjoyed far more success in getting across their views than their creationist counterparts.” – WA Dembski, What every theologian should know about creation, evolution and design

Page 34: “Intelligent Design”: Philosophy of Science Issues Wesley R. Elsberry Wildlife & Fisheries Sciences Texas A&M University

Dembski on Criticism

"I would go further than that and say that I value objective peer review. I always learn more from my critics than from the people who think I'm wonderful." - William A. Dembski as quoted by Fred Heeren

Page 35: “Intelligent Design”: Philosophy of Science Issues Wesley R. Elsberry Wildlife & Fisheries Sciences Texas A&M University

Dembski on Visceral Responses

"If we're generating such strong, visceral responses, we must be doing something

right." - William Dembski as quoted by Lynn Vincent

Does this imply that when critics evoke a strong, visceral response from Dembski, that they too are doing something right?

Page 36: “Intelligent Design”: Philosophy of Science Issues Wesley R. Elsberry Wildlife & Fisheries Sciences Texas A&M University

Who is Wesley R. Elsberry? (1)

Wesley’s allocation of scholarly effortLet’s look at the publications & participation from the time of the NTSE conference…

• (+) Enterprising science needs naturalism, 1997

• (+) Optimality book, co-editor, INNS series, 1997

• (+) First audiogram of a marine mammal at depth, JASA, 1997

• (+) TTS in delphinoids, JASA, 1997

• (+) U.S. Navy technical report #1751 on TTS, 1997

• (+) Letter responding to TTS comments, JASA, 1998

• (+) Dolphin dorsal fin morphology poster, 1998

Page 37: “Intelligent Design”: Philosophy of Science Issues Wesley R. Elsberry Wildlife & Fisheries Sciences Texas A&M University

Who is Wesley R. Elsberry? (2)

Wesley’s allocation of scholarly effort More publications and participation

• (+) Simultaneous digital data of physiological & acoustic signals during dolphin biosonar, poster, 1999

• (-) Review of TDI by William A. Dembski, 1999

• (+) Review of Tower of Babel by Robert Pennock, 1999

• (+) Dissertation research (intranarial pressure and biosonar click production in bottlenose dolphins), 1999-present

• (+) Multiple sound sources in the bottlenose dolphin, JASA, 2000

• (+) Deep Hear paper, J. Exp. Biol., in press

• (-) Wilkins & Elsberry, Biol. & Phil., in press

Page 38: “Intelligent Design”: Philosophy of Science Issues Wesley R. Elsberry Wildlife & Fisheries Sciences Texas A&M University

Who is Wesley R. Elsberry? (3)

Wesley’s allocation of scholarly effort Other activities

• (-) Dembski commentary on the Internet (talk.origins, web page, other fora)

• (+) Non-Dembski EvC discussion on the Internet

Page 39: “Intelligent Design”: Philosophy of Science Issues Wesley R. Elsberry Wildlife & Fisheries Sciences Texas A&M University

Dembski & Markers (1)“When SETI (Search for Extra-Terrestrial Intelligence) researchers attempt to discover intelligence in the extra-terrestrial radio transmissions they are monitoring, they assume an extra-terrestrial intelligence could have chosen any number of possible radio transmissions, and then attempt to match the transmissions they observe with certain patterns as opposed to others (patterns that presumably are markers of intelligence).” – WA Dembski, Intelligent Design as a Theory of Information

Page 40: “Intelligent Design”: Philosophy of Science Issues Wesley R. Elsberry Wildlife & Fisheries Sciences Texas A&M University

MIA:CSI Is an Unreliable Basis Upon Which to Infer IA

MIA:CSI fares no better than any other MIA:X

Proper subset?Examples known

from IA are expected;

this does not

validate inference to

IA

IA

MIA:CSI >=500 bits

Page 41: “Intelligent Design”: Philosophy of Science Issues Wesley R. Elsberry Wildlife & Fisheries Sciences Texas A&M University

MIA:CSI Is an Unreliable Basis Upon Which to Infer IA

MIA:CSI fares no better than any other MIA:X

Assertion that no example is outside IA

Current ignorance

IA

MIA:CSI >=500 bits

*

Page 42: “Intelligent Design”: Philosophy of Science Issues Wesley R. Elsberry Wildlife & Fisheries Sciences Texas A&M University

MIA:CSI Is an Unreliable Basis Upon Which to Infer IA

MIA:CSI fares no better than any other MIA:X

What about “local small probability bounds”?

>=250 bits

>=50 bits

>=100 bitsIA

MIA:CSI >=500 bits

123

Page 43: “Intelligent Design”: Philosophy of Science Issues Wesley R. Elsberry Wildlife & Fisheries Sciences Texas A&M University

History: Arguments To & From Design

Paley’s watch and watchmakerThe artifact implies an artificer

Paley and criticismThe Pre-criticism of Hume

• The insufficiency of analogy as a warrant

Darwin & alternative explanation• The sufficiency of natural causation to explain

adaptation

Dawkins and the “Blind Watchmaker”

Page 44: “Intelligent Design”: Philosophy of Science Issues Wesley R. Elsberry Wildlife & Fisheries Sciences Texas A&M University

More on Paley…

A “Sober” Re-evaluation of PaleyElliott Sober’s classification of Paley’s argument as abduction

Paley Redux: The “Intelligent Design” Movement

The rehabilitation of “natural theology”?

Page 45: “Intelligent Design”: Philosophy of Science Issues Wesley R. Elsberry Wildlife & Fisheries Sciences Texas A&M University

Dusting for Fingerprints

Forensics & fingerprintsTrace evidence implies existence of an agent

Trace evidence can identify the agent

This trace evidence is in the form of physical artifacts

The search for God’s fingerprintsA popular theological pastime

100% failure rate so far

Track record commends modesty in claimants

Page 46: “Intelligent Design”: Philosophy of Science Issues Wesley R. Elsberry Wildlife & Fisheries Sciences Texas A&M University

Why Do We Find Man’s Fingerprints & Not God’s?

We know the features & actions of our fellow humans by our sense experience & intersubjective critique

God has not yet deigned to be examined under the microscope