Interim Administration of KosovoAdministratra e Perkohshme e KosovesPrivremena Adminstracija Kosova

THE OFFICE OF THE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR OF KOSOVODC Prizren C. No. 28/2002 dated 24 March 2003

PPA Nr. 262/2003 dated 2 July 2003AP Nr. 262/2003

On 31 July 2006To the District Court of Prizren (sitting in Pristina)

FINAL ARGUMENT OF THE PROSECUTION

I. Introduction

As a consequence of the Decision of the Supreme Court of Kosovo (AP. 262/2003) on 26 February 2004, an Amended Indictment was filed in the District Court of Kosovo on 29 September 2005 accusing Sali Veseli and Abit Haziraj of committing serious crimes that culminated in the assassination of Ekrem Rexha (Commander Drini) on 8 May 2000 in Prizren, Kosovo.

Simply put, the Accused Sali Veseli is charged in Count 1 of the indictment of creating or using a criminal association by entering into a conspiracy with Sadik Halitjaha and/or others for the purpose of inciting Fazli Neziraj on or about February 2000 to murder Commander Drini. Sali Veseli is further charged in Count 2 with the murder of Commander Drini on 8 May 2000.

The Accused Abit Haziraj is charged with carrying out Commander Drini’s assassination on 8 May 2000.

Should the Court, having heard the evidence of all witnesses who have testified, assessed their demeanour, considered all documentary exhibits filed, and considered all evidence read into the minutes, find that one or both of the accused committed the crime of aggravated murder, the International Prosecutor submits, that in all the aggravating circumstances of this assassination that they be sentenced to the maximum term of imprisonment allowed. For the offence of aggravated murder the maximum sentence of 20 years imprisonment. For the offence of Incitement the maximum sentence is 20 years imprisonment.

II. The Significance of the Persona of Commander Drini

In order to understand who killed Commander Drini and for what motive one must begin with understanding the man himself. In essence, he was an extraordinarily good, gifted, courageous, determined and popular man. That is why bad people had to kill him. He was in their way. It is that simple.

Commander Drini was a man of unblemished record who was married to a young wife, Hajrije Rexha. On the morning of May 8th, 2000 they had an eleven month old

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son named Drini. Drini was too young to remember the feel of his father’s last touching of him, the holding and playing with him minutes before his father left to give a memorial speech to fallen heroes of the war. Hajrije Rexha was 7 ½ months pregnant when she last held her mortally wounded husband. Their second son, named Ekrem, will grow up never having met his father.

Commander Drini’s hobby was that of an amateur radio operator with respect to which, like other things in his life, he excelled. This skill not only brought him joy, but enhanced his skills as a military commander, enabling him to better deploy his troops and save the lives of many of his soldiers engaged against or trapped by the Serb forces. Unfortunately, it was also that skill that bad people unjustly pointed to as a tool used by him to collaborate with the enemy.

Commander Drini was a man who was highly educated, spoke seven languages and served in the former Yugoslav Army. Leaving behind a successful family computer business in Prizren, he like many others, volunteered for the KLA in order to shake off the yoke of Serbian oppression of the Kosovar Albanians.

The Accused Sali Veseli told us that he is the proud recipient of Kosovo’s highest honour – the Adem Jashari Medal. Commander Drini did not win such an award. Yet from the evidence given by many, he was a man of great courage and stamina. He fought to the end despite being twice wounded and fatigued.

Despite Sadik Halitjaha’s evidence to the contrary, the overwhelming evidence of many witnesses is that Commander Drini liberated Prizren. He feared Serbian atrocities would be committed within Kosovo’s second largest city, and the looting and destruction of its buildings and homes by Serb armed forces in the seven day grace period given them to leave Kosovo by NATO. This is precisely what occurred in other communities in Kosovo during this volatile period, as the war drew to a close. Yet, despite being previously stripped of his combat command, the great respect he had amongst his soldiers and the non KLA HQ officers enabled him to gather a relatively small KLA fighting force who was willing to attack a far superior Serb force in the streets of Prizren. They were highly successful after catching the Serbs by surprise. Prizren was thus liberated with virtually no loss of life on either side nor was there any destruction of property. While Commander Drini had the vision, courage and respect of KLA fighters to carry out this plan, the KLA HQ sat well away from Prizren in a defensive mode. Needless to say, all citizens of Prizren were relieved and highly appreciative. To the people of Kosovo and those of Prizren in particular, Commander Drini was a true hero. Thus it is easy to understand the sadness felt by good citizens of Prizren when learning of his assassination and why over 40,000 people attended his funeral. It is also easy to understand why some members of the KLA HQ who did not even think about attacking the Serbs in Prizren, let alone join the fight, would be jealous.

Commander Drini did not possess the air of superiority or arrogance that has been repeatedly and blatantly demonstrated in this court in the evidence and in the demeanour of Sali Veseli, Sadic Halitjaha, and Halil Qadraku. Though far brighter, more educated, and more talented, and having greater respect of the troops, he was a humble man, a man who cared for his soldiers, who always took the time to have coffee with them or to help them during and after the war, until the day he was killed.

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He protected Serb civilian non-combatants. He had the greatest respect of his combat troops and veterans, more so than any other KLA commander. It is not difficult to understand that some other KLA commanders would be jealous of his prestige.

Having put his life on the line for his country during the war, he was one of the first to lay down his arms and pursued a means to help form a new and better Kosovo by entering municipal government.

Dr. Mark Baskin voluntarily attended court from the United States on November 8th as an independent expert witness in order to assist the court. He testified that he was part of the UN advance team that entered Kosovo right at the end of the war June, 1999. He was the Deputy Administrator of UN Administration until November 2000 and as such had regular contact with Drini and members of the Group, whose members will be identified later in this argument. Dr. Baskin enjoyed a very close personal and professional relationship with Drini. It was his view that Drini enjoyed a tremendous amount of respect from people of all ethnic backgrounds and the international agencies. Drini very much acted in the spirit of Security Council Resolution 1244, was very cooperative with the UN and other international agencies, and was against corruption. Because of all Drini’s attributes, Dr. Baskin was in the process of supporting his application to the Harvard University Kennedy School of Government, attended by future heads of state and ministers (Baskin November 14th p. 11-13).

In Dr. Baskin’s opinion the Drini’s assassination meant that:

We lost one of our best interlocutors, someone who was a source of many good ideas and someone who had the capacity to implement those ideas. Over the long term it was a tremendous loss for Kosovo because he was a man of extraordinary talent who brought together the breadth of vision with an operational capacity. There are very few people here that have that capacity (Baskin November 14th p. 13-14).

There also were two weaknesses in Drini’s character that caused or contributed to his death. Those weaknesses were described by his wife in her evidence of November 22nd. At page 11 she states:

Commander Drini had a feature in his character of being outspoken so whatever he would think he would say it out loud in the face of people and this was generally when he would have meetings in the municipal assembly or with meetings with UNMIK officials. I was always advising him not to say things up in front to people because people get angry. But he would reply to me that he was of the opinion that it was better this way to say everything he had to say right there in front of a person to refrain the person from doing any wrong.

The second weakness that contributed to his death was his failure to see the signs of his impending assassination by underestimating the will of the Group he spoke out against. As Hajrije Rexha also states at page 11:

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I always told him to protect himself but each time I would say this to him he would say … “I don’t have to protect myself because I have done nothing wrong to anyone, so I don’t have to protect myself or fear anyone”.

Thus, it is not hard to understand that with all his education, fluency in foreign languages, his popularity amongst the local citizenry, and his extraordinary vision, why the Group would likely conclude that if he decided to serve his country by entering politics he would likely be elected and they of course would not. He was just 39 years old when they killed him. He had much left to offer his family and his people.

III. The assassination of Commander Drini on the morning of May 8th 2000

Drini’s assassination occurred at approximately 08:15 hours as he was attempting to leave to deliver a speech for heroes who died in the war. In order to prevent his escape and distract him, his tire had been purposely slashed. His vehicle was parked in front of the family home on a narrow laneway that had no exit at one end. The escape route for an assassin was the “T” intersection at the other end where a major artery through Prizren was located. The only witnesses to the assassination were his wife and his brother Ruzhdi Rexha. In her evidence of November 29 th (pages 11 - 16), she states that she was looking out from her balcony watching her husband walk away. She saw the profile of a single driver of a red car drive up the lane in the direction of the dead end in the laneway. She heard gunfire and for approximately two seconds. She saw the opposite profile of the same person driving the same vehicle in the direction of the main artery. The windows were down in the car. She observed the lone occupant of the car to be clean shaven, having dark complexion, and a thin face. When shown a frontal picture of Hazir Isufi in Exhibit 2 p.12 she stated, based on her brief observations and the passage of time, that he was not the driver of the red car. By the time she got to her husband she found him being cradled in the arms of his brother Ruzhdi, noting that Drini was bleeding from multiple wounds, his face turning blue and his lips trembling. He was placed in a car and taken immediately to the German KFOR hospital where he died on route in the arms of his brother.

The autopsy results verify the cause of death to be from multiple gunshot wounds. Expert Ballistic reports prove they were from a single short-barreled Scorpion fully automatic assault rifle.

The red car did not have licence plates (Ruzhdi Rexha November 21 p. 27).

Mr. Elshani was coming up the lane from the main artery towards where Drini was being assassinated at around 08:15. He had been to buy a loaf of bread. He noted something “very strange” while doing so. Typically, at that time in the morning, that particular intersection is very busy with pedestrian, horse cart and vehicular traffic. That morning there was none. As he turned to walk up the lane he was almost hit by a red Opel coming towards the “T” intersection at a high rate of speed, such that it hit a bump and bounced into the air, into the intersection and turned left towards Petrovo (Statement of Elshani Exhibit 55). A reasonable inference could be drawn that the single driver of that vehicle could be confident that he would not have to stop at that busy “T” intersection so that he could make good his escape. Likewise a reasonable inference could be drawn that someone had the ability to stop all traffic in both

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directions. Who would have such ability? Certainly someone in authority, someone with a uniform would have such authority, perhaps members of the TMK.

Mr. Elshani continued up towards where Drini had been shot. After he arrived at the scene and determined Drini was already dead, he noticed two or three TMK members that had come to “help.” However, these individuals left immediately after UNMIK Police arrived. Exhibit 18 indicates that four TMK members were at the scene including Group member Qadraku and three other G2 members (Exhibit 5).

Within twenty minutes of the murder, Ferat Ademi attended the murder scene and saw two TMK officers right at that intersection, Nezir Kryeziu and Rrustem Bytyqi (Ademi July 12 p. 12-15).

Jusuf Krasniqi, Head of the PDK party in Suhareka, was at the crime scene that morning shortly after the shooting (Baskin November 14th p. 23).

IV. Assessing the General Credibility of the two most important prosecution witnesses: Bashkim Ndrecaj and Remzi Shala

It is important at this point in my submission to point out and appreciate that the two most important witnesses in this trial are Bashkim Ndrecaj and Remzi Shala. Though, as I will demonstrate later, there is much corroboration of their evidence, perhaps now is the moment to speak about their general credibility.

Bashkim Ndrecaj was a relatively young man in the war and until the assassination of Drini. He was 22-24 years of age then. He grew up being a next door neighbour and best friend of Remzi Shala. They both joined the KLA in May 1998 and fought well together for their country. They from time to time fought under the direct command of Sadik Halitjaha and later under Bislim Zyrapi, and Afrim Basha. Under Zyrapi and Basha’s command they served with Xhemajl Beqiraj, Fezli Neziraj, Hazir Kolgeci and others. Members of the unit were very close knit and trusting of one another, especially with their lives. At no time during the war or after did any of Shala and Ndrecaj’s co-fighters including Halitjaha, Veseli, Halil Qadraku or Alush Shala do anything to upset them, excepting statements about Drini, or cause them to make up lies about them. This is admitted by all of those individuals. Halitjaha was the special first guest of honour at Ndrecaj’s wedding.

The defence has repeatedly attacked their credibility. Yet this court has heard the evidence of many in this trial that their general reputation in the community for honesty and integrity was a good one. In fact, Sali Veseli and Beqiraj also trusted them. Veseli demonstrated that trust by hiring both of them in trusted positions without even asking for letters of reference. Shala was his personal driver and sometime bodyguard. Shala did not apply for those trusted positions where he would be privy to all sorts of confidential information; Veseli chose those positions for him. By appointing him as his personal bodyguard, Veseli trusted him with the most important thing of all – his life. Ndrecaj did not even apply for the secretarial position; Veseli simply assigned him to that important trusted position where he would be privy to all sorts of confidential information. He trusted them enough to drive from Prizren

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to Mitrovica with them each week, to have an affair in their presence and perhaps most importantly to close his eyes and sleep each night for months while they shared the same house and the same room in Mitrovica.

Dr. Baskin testified that one of the negative effects the assassination of Drini had in Kosovo was a fear amongst the people in that if a man like Drini could be assassinated then many other people felt much more at risk (Baskin November 14 p. 13).

Ulrich Fischer, an experienced international police officer from Germany, who served two missions in Kosovo, voluntarily came from his homeland to assist this court by giving evidence. In describing the difficulties he had in investigating Drini’s assassination and other crimes in Kosovo after the war, he too spoke of an unusual fear in the population. He told this court that there was an “atmosphere of fear”. By that phrase he meant that people were afraid because at this time a number of murders took place, including those of local political leaders of the LDK Party. Potential witnesses in these cases were afraid to give statements. The “atmosphere of fear” was more prevalent when people such as Fatmir Limaj, and members of the PDK Party or the TMK were suspects (Ulrich Fischer July 3rd p. 6-7).

Fischer testified that, rightly or wrongly, the general citizenry believe that the killers of members of the LDK and TMK Commander Skender Gashi in September 2000 were from the PDK Party. The general citizenry also did not think much of the TMK, feeling that wrong persons were in high ranks (Ulrich Fischer July 3rd p. 8-9).

This “atmosphere of fear” clearly explains why it took the police so long in this case to find someone brave enough and willing enough to come forward with specific evidence against a TMK General and other members of the TMK. This also explains why a number of key witnesses have fled Kosovo and have refused to return in order to testify in this trial.

This “atmosphere of fear” is why even an important and connected person such as Bislim Zyrapi, upon receiving threats that he and his family would be killed if he implicated certain people in his evidence, had to refuse to answer certain questions under the protection of Article 229.

That is why weaker or more fearful persons such as Fazli Neziraj are afraid to tell the police or the court the truth but may be prepared to tell their friends or take action to prevent the killing of someone, like Drini, who they held in great respect.

It would have been natural in the “atmosphere of fear”, as described by Dr. Baskin IPO Ulrich Fischer and KPS Officer Kastrati for Bashkim Ndrecaj and Remzi Shala to have done nothing to find out who killed Drini. It would have been natural for them to simply have done nothing and get on with their lives. That is what many in Kosovo have done.

Lulzim Kabashi had not been close to Ndrecaj and Shala during the war or after. When he found out of about their involvement after they had gone to the police he, being a member of Drini’s family, was highly appreciative of them. On page 40 of his June 20th evidence he states as follows:

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Witness: I was surprised with their brave approach. As citizens, they took up the courage and responsibility to shed light on the crime, as is the case of Drini’s assassination. This is one of the rare cases where such a thing has happened, as we know that these people are not Drini’s family members. So I certainly changed my opinion of them entirely.

Public Prosecutor: Particularly given the time they did so; so soon after the war in Kosovo, did you feel it took a great amount of courage for them to do that?

Witness: This is true because first of all, they endangered their lives. It was a very sensitive case. So it was normal that in order to take such steps they were to keep in mind that their lives could be in danger as well.

On June 27th the Presiding Judge further questioned Mr. Kabashi regarding this bravery and the “atmosphere of fear”. Some of that important exchange is as follows:

Presiding Judge: Mr. Kabashi, I invite your attention to your testimony on February 24 2003, where Counsel Rogova asked, page 180 English version, ‘Did you socialize with Remzi Shala, Bashkim Ndrecaj and Bislim Zyrapi after Drini’s murder’. Answer: ‘No, but after they courageously reported their knowledge of the murder of Drini. I socialized with them more frequently. Since the war in Kosovo no one dared report a crime, and would not allow exposing their names and surnames. What these two have done are very courageous acts and I simply admire them.’ Do you remember having given that answer?

Witness: Absolutely.

Presiding Judge: Now, since the war in Kosovo no one dared report a crime. When you made that statement can you describe to us what the atmosphere of peace and stability was in Kosovo?

Witness: Until that time when these people took the courage to report the crime and dared to make public their names and surnames, the murder rate at that period was quite high. But to my knowledge, Drini’s case was the first case when one dared to report a crime and reveal their names.

…

Witness: ….To my knowledge, as I said, Drini’s case was the first one where witnesses dared to come openly to Court and voluntarily report a crime.

…

Presiding Judge: Is it safe to say that in view of your answers there was an atmosphere of fear in the hearts of the people and there was hesitancy on the part of witnesses to come openly and testify as regards to their knowledge of said commission of crimes?

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Witness: It is true, Your Honour, because, for example, there was a case, and Sali Veseli himself said that there are other ways to talk about this, meaning there are “other ways”. For example, this line would have an influence on people that are afraid.

Presiding Judge: When you learned that Bashkim Ndrecaj and Remzi Shala came into the open and gave their testimony to the internationals you stated before us last week that you were surprised by their brave approach. Is that correct?

Witness: Yes. It was a very courageous act what they did.

Presiding Judge: Is it safe to state that even from the time of the death of Drini on May 8, 2000 until April 2, 2001, the atmosphere of fear lingered among the citizens?

Witness: yes

Bashkim Ndrecaj and Remzi Shala were criticized by the defence for not taking notes, not telling their family or friends what they were doing and learned, and not telling the police earlier. Once they committed themselves in this atmosphere of fear, it becomes very understandable that they decided to keep their mouths shut even from their family and friends, not keep notes that if found would betray their intentions in their association with the TMK, and to only take trips to Skenderaj at night while the others slept or were otherwise occupied in order to look for evidence of the killer that would corroborate things Veseli and Beqiraj told them. They did these things secretly because even in the atmosphere of fear they were brave men. They knew if they were found out before they went to the police that they and likely their families would be killed. They knew who Veseli was, what power he had, what connections he had to other powerful and dangerous members of the Group and they knew that if these people could kill a man such as Drini, that they too could easily be eliminated. They knew too that if they were found out and killed that none of the evidence they had would find its way into the hands of the police and that Drini’s assassins would escape justice.

These two men demonstrated their bravery during the war. They were respected and trusted fighters, though modest in describing their own contributions and heroism. Those same engrained traits stayed within them after the war and gave them the courage to gather evidence, go to the police, go to the Investigating Judge and come many times over the years to give evidence in this trial. You have had the opportunity to assess their demeanour over the many days of their testimony. You may have found that they showed no fear in the face of a former General staring at them from a few feet away.

Like Kabashi, Ulrich Fischer considered them as very brave men for what they did and their willingness to give evidence. They were offered relocation to Germany by the investigating judge in order to protect them but all they wanted was a WAC and felt that would be sufficient to protect themselves and their families (Ulrich Fischer July 3rd p. 9)

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When trying to determine if, as the accused has repeatedly suggested, Ndrecaj and Shala are lying one has to consider what possible motive they would have to do so on the facts of this case. If people lie under oath, there must be a motive to do so. Some may do so for money. There is no evidence of that here. Some, like Neziraj, may do so out of fear. These men have no fear. There is no evidence that they have been threatened to fabricate evidence. Some may lie for notoriety. Here the evidence is clear that when they came forward they in fact did not want what they had to say made public (see Kastrati and Fischer). Some may do so out of revenge for past real or perceived mistreatment from an accused person. Here the evidence of both Ndrecaj and Shala is that, other than matters concerning Drini, Veseli never mistreated them. Veseli himself confirms that he never did anything to them to have caused them to fabricate lies about him. Qadraku, Halitjaha and Alush Shala said likewise. Beqiraj, on the other hand, suggested an incredible motive for them to have lied about him, but that had nothing to do with Veseli or the others. I will discuss this aspect of Beqiraj’s ‘Roma Story’ shortly. Some persons may lie because they are in legal jeopardy, such as Veseli. As such, in the facts of this case, there is no evidence of a motive for Ndrecaj or Shala to lie.

Thus, the better question for the Court to consider in assessing their credibility is what motive, on the facts of this case, in the “atmosphere of fear” did they have to launch their search for Drini’s murders to begin with.

They first came to know Drini during the war. They, like thousands of other KLA soldiers, held him in the highest esteem. Ndrecaj describes his respect for Drini as follows:

Witness: When commander Drini was in command of Pashtrik area he would often go and pay visits to the battalion and brigades and each time he would come to Budakova. And … he would come to our unit. He would stop for a while and often we would go with him to other units. He would ask how everything was going on and would give us advice.

Public Prosecutor: From your personal observation of him how would you describe him and his general reputation of the military community of which you were a party of, as a military commander and as a person?

Witness: Drini certainly earned the respect of every one of our unit as well as other battalions. He was a very good communicator. He knew how to approach soldiers; how to give healthy advice and he enjoyed great authority, more than 80 percent soldiers served him in Pashtrik zone. I can freely say that no other commander had such authority over his soldiers.

…

Witness: Commander Drini enjoyed great authority and ability to affect soldiers and their moral.

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Public Prosecutor: Did he raise the moral of KLA soldiers?

Witness: Yes, he did.

Public Prosecutor: Did he ever come across to be arrogant or too educated or to economically well to associate to the soldiers?

Witness: Commander Drini always connected with the simple soldiers and I have never heard him say to anyone, “I cannot see you or talk to you now”. He spoke to all soldiers especially those who asked for his help and after the war I can say that he met over a 100 soldiers every day.

Public Prosecutor: And he spoke with them?

Witness: Yes, he spoke and assisted each of them. He never came across as a big headed guy. He was very sincere and spoke freely with everyone and us soldiers even though we were at the presence of the commander we spoke freely. We asked always for his help and he was always willing to help.

Public Prosecutor: Was he a kind of guy who would sit with common fighters and have a coffee or juice with them?

Witness: Yes.

Public Prosecutor: I understand that during the war about 500 members of the KLA and members of your unit were left behind the enemy lines in the hills and mountains, is that correct?

Witness: Yes, during the offensives we withdraw so we continued our activity in those areas where we could move like villages in mountain areas at times.

Public Prosecutor: Of all commanders of the KLA at that time did any of them assist you and the other 499 soldiers to get out of there and to break through the Serb lines and join the KLA?

Witness: Several times we were under siege. I remember when we were surrounded at Hoxha e Vogel, our unit was together with the unit which was under 124th brigade, we were surrounded but thanks to the advise we received through the radio connection from Commander Drini who intervened with another unit called Kitrat we managed to escape from the siege.

Public Prosecutor: Once you and the other soldiers heard that Drini had been replaced and before Tahir Sinani showed up in the command, what impact did his removal had upon you and your co-fighters?

Witness: In general, with all the people I met during that time every one expressed their surprise as to why this replacement took place. Why remove a professional person and replace him with someone who we never heard of before… In general, all the soldiers did not accept this news very well. [ Ndrecaj March 20th p. 38-40]

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Regarding his view of Drini after the war, he states at page 42 as follows:

…every day after the war his respect and authority was increasing. The worst happened to him, worse than at the war times. During the war they removed him from the command whereas after the war they assassinated him.

Drini assisted Ndrecaj, Shala and other veterans in many ways after the war including assisting them in their enrolment in a de-mining course.

As will be described in more detail later, in January 2000, when Ndrecaj and Shala had gone to Veseli’s office to get a job and overheard the heated exchange with Qadraku regarding the Days of Hope article concerning Drini, Ndrecaj was concerned for Drini’s safety. He went alone that same day and warned Drini by telling him what he had heard earlier in Veseli’s office and told him to “take care of yourself and guard yourself because people are talking”. Drini replied with “I am afraid of no one because I have caused no one harm” (Ndrecaj March 21st p. 7-9). Shala, in his testimony, corroborates Ndrecaj. Shala states that Ndrecaj related this incident to him shortly after Ndrecaj met with Drini. Drini’s applications for a WAC (Exhibits 31-31) also tend to corroborate this warning.

On the morning of May 8th 2000, when Drini was assassinated, Ndrecaj was at the hospital for perhaps one of the most important events in a husband and father’s life: the birth of their first born child. As he was in the waiting room he heard people commenting that Drini had just been killed. Just then the nurse came out and told him he had a son. He “could not express any joy”. Upon checking that his wife and son were fine, he immediately left the hospital in sorrow to find out what had happened and to visit the Drini family home (Ndrecaj March 21st p. 10).

When asked why he would leave his family at such an important time he stated at page 11 that:

Commander Drini was a very important person to me because I had spent a lot of time with him. I loved him very much and I also respected him very much. He helped me out a lot. I think these were the reasons.

The genuineness of that statement and his love for Drini is readily exemplified not only by the subsequent risks he took to find his killer, but in the very fact of giving Drini the greatest honour that a man can give another man – naming his first born child after him. It is important to understand that he did so in a moment in time when he would have no idea that he would end up seeking the killer and coming to court, risking his son’s life in order to give testimony against a very powerful man and organization.

When the accused questioned him as to why he did not tell the Drini family of the incident in Veseli’s office regarding Qadraku Ndrecaj, he stated on March 28 th page 11 that:

It seemed to me unreasonable to go to Drini’s family and tell them what I knew and put them in a blood feud. It was reasonable for me to tell these

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things in front of the judge. The defence counsel Mjekiqi: knows very well about a blood feud in Kosovo. If I would go and tell to the members of Drini’s family that I have heard these words, I would incite them to a blood feud.

Ndrecaj eventually joined the TMK at the time Veseli was stationed in Mitrovica in October 2000. When asked why he did so he stated he had several reasons. His main reason was his love for Drini. He stated that by this time not only was he familiar with the incident in Veseli’s office, but that Shala had told him of a meeting at the Theranda Hotel a few weeks before Drini’s murder where Veseli, Fatmir Limaj, Alush Shala and others met privately, and that Shala had told him about Veseli’s toast at the Pojata Restaurant on the day of Drini’s funeral (Ndrecaj March 21st p. 20). At page 20 he states:

…putting all these pieces together I wanted to be somehow closer so that I could listen with my own ears as to what in reality Sali Veseli was saying.

Ndrecaj and Shala knew that this was a dangerous task that they were undertaking not only for them but their families. They knew that they would be sleeping at night with someone they suspected was a killer, together with other armed bodyguards. When asked if he was afraid to embark on this task to find Drini’s killers he simply stated at page 20 that “I was afraid and that was quite normal. Everyone is afraid of something, but my fear of Sali Veseli was beaten by the respect I had for Commander Drini.”

On April 24th at pages 10-11, the Presiding Judge asked Ndrecaj why he was testifying against Veseli. To that he answered as follows:

I would also like to explain to the court that the reason why I gave my statement was because I loved commander Drini and I am testifying here in honor of his soul and his family because since year 2001, it is true that my whole life has changed too. I think there is no money, which can buy life itself. I say this, because there were rumors, that maybe I received or gave money. What normal person who after the war would testify in order to get money? I never hid myself. I went alone in all trials and I am alone here although I was afraid since that time that maybe something could happen to me. I want to state that the reason why I gave my statement in front of the court was the only one which I have mentioned before. [Emphasis added]

In keeping with the above answer on should recall Ndrecaj’s very first statement to Judge Risch of April 2nd 2001 were he stated at page one as follow:

As I said before, I wanted to find out who was the killer of Drini and my friend Remzi Shala and myself wanted to be sure about that fact. We wanted to avoid getting an innocent person arrested. [Emphasis added]

There can be no doubt of Ndrecaj and Shala’s love and admiration for Drini. There can be no doubt of their motivation to incur risks to themselves and their families in order to gather evidence as to who was responsible for Drini’s assassination. There is no evidence otherwise. The defence states they are fabricating their evidence. What

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possible motive would they have to lie given that the reason they did what they did was to honour Drini’s ‘soul’. Drini’s soul can only be honoured by them telling the truth so that Drini’s killers can be brought to justice. Drini’s soul cannot be honoured nor would Drini be allowed to rest peacefully in his grave if they came to court and allowed someone they knew to be innocent to be convicted. It would have defeated their whole mission. They would have risked all that they did for nothing. They have continued to brave the continued risks well since first coming forward in 2001 for the last five years by coming to assist the court in the three trials into Drini’s death. Few, in the “atmosphere of fear”, would have done so.

Both Ndrecaj and Shala have repeatedly testified that though they had heard the admissions of Veseli earlier, they did not go to the police right away and continued to take risks as they were trying to gather sufficient information as to the identity of the assassin. They were not trained police officers or jurists. As such, they came forward expeditiously when they felt, rightly or wrongly, that they had sufficient useful information to turn over to the police.

Ndrecaj and Shala both state that though Neziraj had spoken to them about Veseli inciting him before Drini’s assassination, the first person they spoke to was KPS Kastrati. They were anxious when they came forward. They said they chose him because he was a former KLA Commander and related to Drini. They trusted him. They say that he then took them to international police and then to Judge Risch on April 2nd 2001. Kastrati confirms this sequence of events. Kastrati says that they told him that they were giving him this information because they loved and respected Drini and because they trusted Kastrati. He observed their demeanour when they were giving him this information. He concluded that they appeared upset and afraid and had to give them encouragement to speak to the international police as they were afraid to give the information to local KPS (Kastrati July 6th p. 3-8).

It is very important for this Court to recall the criticisms of the Supreme Court of the findings and reasoning of the previous trial panel regarding their assessment of the credibility of Ndrecaj and Shala (S.C. Ruling page 12-13). In essence, the previous trial panel felt “it is possible” that the police had contaminated their evidence and provided them additional information [regarding Abit Haziraj from Llausha] between their first and second statements. Second, they were critical of the trial panel’s additional “speculation” that the reason for the differences in their two statements was as a result of information they received from their continued investigations after the first statement. With respect to this latter point, if one accepts Shala’s evidence, this is precisely what occurred and is a perfectly reasonable explanation of how they came upon that information.

The first criticism remains improper pure speculation. Unlike the prior trial panel, this panel has had the benefit of the full unfolding of the Ndrecaj and Shala narrative to the police – from Kastrati, to Judge Risch on April 2nd 2001, to their continued investigation in Mitrovica and the additional information they learned, to the contemporaneous police discoveries, to the meeting of May 20th, and finally to their 2nd statement. It would truly be pure speculation that the police gave them information as the evidence of all relevant witnesses is that they did not. There is no evidence to the contrary.

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The Supreme Court states at the top of page 13 as follows:

In concluding that certain additional incriminating facts about the accused Veseli in their second statement were lies, prompted by information received form the police, the court ignores the clearly established fact that Shala and Ndrecaj became suspicious of Veseli and the other accused long before they first spoke with the police. [Emphasis added]

In addition, the Supreme Court, as can been seen at pages 13 and 14 was highly critical of the trial panels reasoning in assessing their credibility in using as a bases of attack their “summaries” of statements to Judge Risch. The Court makes several important criticisms as follows:

While the Supreme Court acknowledges that such changes [from their testimony in court] amendments and additions must be weighed and considered, the court of first instance should not have given absolute discrepancies.

Even when testimony is recorded verbatim, critical errors can be (and in this case were) made and when the testimony is summarized the danger of inaccuracy is even more acute. [Emphasis added]

There are a few other interesting observations regarding their credibility. It is well known that in the prosecution’s theory, some of the motives to kill Drini included his vision of a multi-ethnic Kosovo (including Serbs) and his alleged collaboration with the Serbs before and after the war. On March 21st, at pages 36 and 37, I specifically asked Ndrecaj if, in all the time he spent with Veseli he ever overheard Veseli say anything bad about Serbs. After very careful consideration, he finally responded “no”. He even went further and told the Court how Veseli had taken steps to stop the protests in Mitrovica. Had he wanted to lie or embellish his evidence and put Veseli in an unfair bad light, he could easily have done so.

V. The Alleged Roma Massacre

This serious allegation that Bashkim Ndrecaj and Remzi Shala massacred an entire Roma family near Budakova first emerged in the second trial when wafted into these court proceedings by Beqiraj. This occurred after Beqiraj was housed and had contact with another inmate, Bujar Basha, who is a convicted murderer and thief who was trying to sell information to the police in exchange for freedom. Undoubtedly, the two of them spoke together and Beqiraj brought it forward into the public domain. There can be no question that if a person witnesses such horrific traumatic events the memories of those events would last a life time. That is why many war veterans have trouble after the war with their memory. The problem of course is not their ability to remember, but their inability to forget.

When comparing the descriptions of the events as described by Bujar Basha (Exhibits 41 and 42) with those of Beqiraj, in the two different versions he has told the court in the 2nd and 3rd trial, and the different versions again set out in Exhibits 43, 44, 46 and 47, it becomes very clear that each time the events are described by either of them that they differ externally from each other on major points and are internally inconsistent.

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Ndrecaj and Shala deny these events. Their commanders Bislim Zyrapi and Afrim Basha deny these events. A co-fighter, Hazir Kolgeci who was there when the alleged events happened, denied the occurrence of the event and Beqiraj’s allegations that Kolgeci later help dig us the bodies out of the mass grave and place them in another mass grave. This is even more unlikely given the serious and permanent disability to his back caused by shrapnel during the war. Finally, the prosecution led evidence of the investigations by international police (War Crimes Unit) and the Office on Missing Persons and Forensics. Their expert opinions were that the alleged massacre and burial did not happen.

Beqiraj stated that the reason Ndrecaj and Shala made up these lies about him so that he would be arrested. He further claimed that they threatened him to give false testimony against Veseli because he knew what they allegedly did to the Roma family and was going to report them to the police. Ndrecaj and Shala of course deny this. As stated above, the weight of the evidence is that the massacre did not occur. Furthermore, Beqiraj’s reasoning for their motivation defies logic and common sense. If anything, Ndrecaj and Shala would have covered for Beqiraj in fear that he would otherwise be angry at them and expose them to committing one of the worst forms of crime a man can be accused of.

These serious allegations by Beqiraj have been nothing more that a feeble attempt to discredit Bashkim Ndrecaj and Remzi Shala. In addition to his many other contradictions on other matters, I submit that this Court should reject his evidence whenever it conflicts with others or where it is independently corroborated.

There are too many instances in Beqiraj’s evidence where he is being untruthful to the Court, in order to put himself in a better light. To mention them all or even a number of them would require many pages. One that immediately comes to mind is that at his arrest, the police found him in illegal possession of an AK 47 assault rifle. He denied it and tried to pin it on his own brother. Yet he was convicted of this offence by the second trial panel.

VI. The Assassin

The Indictment alleges that the assassin who gunned down Commander Drini the morning of May 8th 2000 was Abit Haziraj.

In this trial there is prima facie evidence of Abit Haziraj’s guilt

A. Bashkim Ndrecaj and Remzi Shala are the main witnesses who link Haziraj to being the assassin. They have testified that they learned of his identity as Drini’s assassin during the period of time that they were members of the TMK in Mitrovica. The main source of that information was Beqiraj. Ndrecaj testified that it was his recollection that Beqiraj told them before he appeared in front of Judge Risch on 2 April 2001 a number of details about the killer. Some of those details can be found in his evidence of March 27th 2006 at pages 12 to 15. Some of the details he recalls Beqiraj giving prior to 2 April 2001 are summarized as follows:

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His name is Abit Haziraj whose nickname is Ninja. He is from Llausha Village in Drencia Region. He kills for money. He is a friend of Beqiraj. He operates a disco bar named Titanic. Sali Veseli “paid 15,000 DM’s to Ninja” to kill Drini.

B. Ndrecaj’s memory is that he told this all of this information to Judge Risch and the Judge recorded it incorrectly or failed to note all the things he said that day. There likely is some truth to this given the reputation of the Judge, and the failure to have it translated into the Albanian language at the time it was signed. However, from all the evidence in this case, including that of Remzi Shala, KPS Officer Kastrati, IPO Ulrich Fischer, the suspected war crimes list containing the named Abit Haziri of Llausha, and the Police Continuation Reports that have been marked as Exhibits, it is clear that Ndrecaj is honestly mistaken as to when he heard those things from Beqiraj and thus when he and Shala went to Skenderaj to check out the disco themselves.

C. Remzi Shala corroborates all the points mentioned above that implicate Abit Haziraj as the assassin except with regard to when Beqiraj told them the link to Abit Haziraj as the assassin. Briefly put, you will recall that he testified that Beqiraj had lied to them in the beginning and told them that it was Hazir from Likoshan. He states that he told Judge Risch on April 2nd the truth of what he knew at that moment in time, including who he believed the assassin was. That was the whole purpose of his mission, and for this reason, he provided the judge with the name Hazir from Likoshan. This further confirms that this was in fact the information that Shala had on that date and why the police were looking for a ‘Hazir’. Shala testified that it was after that statement of April 2nd when he and Ndrecaj went back to Mitrovica to gather more evidence that Beqiraj then gave them the information of the killer being Abit Haziraj from Llausha, that he went by the nickname Ninja, and that he ran the Titanic Disco in Skenderaj. Thus, on all the evidence, one can conclude that Shala’s testimony on this point is accurate.

D. In order to understand the proper context and significance of the above information supplied to them by Beqiraj, one has to also consider it together with what Veseli said to or in the presence of Shala and Ndrecaj as set out in Ndrecaj’s evidence of March 27 on pages 8 -15.

Veseli boasted on a number of occasions that he had killed Drini and the reason therefore.

Veseli told Beqiraj that the “friend of yours whom I gave 15,000 DMs, there is no need for him to pay the money back because he fulfilled his duty as he should”.

E. Shala corroborates the above. Thus, looking at all of the evidence they gathered regarding the assassin, from their perspective it is understandable that by April 2nd they would have believed that they had sufficient information to turn over to the police concerning the identities of those responsible for Drini’s assassination.

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F. The evidence clearly establishes that the accused in fact has the name Ninja, lives in Llausha, and had a disco named “Titanic” in Skenderaj.

G. There is evidence in this trial that whoever was able to place so many rounds from a short barrelled automatic weapon from a moving vehicle at a moving target had to be a skilled assassin. The evidence clearly establishes, contrary to the lies and other testimony of the accused Abit Haziraj on this point that he in fact was familiar with the use of automatic weapons such as AK 47’s and a machine gun (see war time photographs marked Exhibits 22). He was mentioned in the book “War without Masks” (Exhibit 21) were he was in actual combat and was described by his fellow co-fighter as a “skilled” soldier. In short, he had the ability to assassinate Drini.

H. Despite Abit Haziraj’s lies regarding his financial condition at the relevant time and where he obtained the money to do all the renovations to his house and the disco, the documents tendered as exhibits, and the evidence requested to be read in to the record of the minutes of the last trial of the witnesses Hajdari and Kemal Lushtaku, clearly contradict his evidence that he had sufficient funds. Even in the prosecution’s questioning of him, it is clear that with all the costs, all the income from the sale of the Serb house, and former disco, and all the swapping of vehicles; he was still short of money in April to meet all his expenses. In fact on his own evidence, he was about 15,000 DM’s short: just the amount that Ndrecaj and Shala heard Veseli and Beqiraj talk about as the amount paid by Veseli to the assassin.

I. On September 15th 2001, Hajrije Rexha attended the office of International Police Officer Ulrich Fischer. There she was shown a booklet of 50 male persons (Exhibit 23) without names attached and asked if she could identify the driver of the red car the morning Drini was assassinated. She excluded 48 persons as being the driver. Conversely, she pointed out the person shown in photograph’s 23 and 50 and described those persons as looking ‘similar’ to the driver. The person depicted in each photo was Abit Haziraj – one a profile and the other a frontal. On September 27th 2001, she attended before Judge Risch and identified Abit Haziraj as the driver of the red car (Hajrije Rexha’s evidence of November 29th p. 32-36).

J. Remzi Shala identified Abit Haziraj on 20 May 2001 from a photo line-up at KPS Officer Kastrati’s home as the person he had seen before prior to Drini’s murder at TMK HQ and Kadri Shabani’s coffee bar in Prizren.

K. Abit Haziraj has some linkage to members of the Group. Haziraj served during the war under the command of Sami Lushtaku. Kemal Lushtaku, who bought the Serb house from Haziraj, is related to Sami.

L. Thus, if the Court were to accept the above evidence as the truth of what Beqiraj said to Ndrecaj and Shala, and rejects the evidence of the accused Abit Haziraj, there would be sufficient evidence to convict him as the assassin.

M. Deficiencies in the Prima facie evidence

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a. While the court should accept the evidence of Ndrecaj and Shala regarding what was told to them by Veseli and Beqiraj regarding Abit Haziraj being the assassin, great care must be taken in assessing any weight to it. That is not because of the veracity of Ndrecaj and Shala but the veracity of their main source of assassin identification. Virtually the entire case against Haziraj comes from the mouth of one person: Beqiraj. First, it is a recognized tenet of law that where a person is a co-conspirator and a party to an offence, as surely Beqiraj was if what he told Shala and Ndrecaj was in fact true, that the trier of fact must use great caution in assessing that person’s evidence when it reflects upon the culpability of another conspirator or party to the offence. But perhaps more importantly, out of as number of witnesses in this trial who were demonstrated to lack credibility, it is clear that Beqiraj was the worst of all the liars and the most unreliable.

b. While it could be argued that Haziraj had the ability to use an automatic weapon with the skill used by the assassin, there were thousands of other former KLA soldiers with the same skills. One former KLA soldier linked to Veseli from the Drenica area since the war is Hazir Isufi (Exhibit 64).

c. Although Haziraj, even on his own evidence, had a need for money at the relevant times, he may well have been lying about his source of funds for other reasons that may have been unlawful.

d. Although the odds of picking Haziraj out of 50 pictures and later in a prison line-up is noteworthy, caution should be exercised in attributing much weight to either identification made by Hajrije Rexha. Though there is no doubt about her veracity, caution must be used concerning her reliability on this point. She only had a few brief seconds in total to make the observation of the passing driver in the first place. She was not presented with the photo line-up until almost one and one-half years later. Understandably she could not positively identify Haziraj as the driver. From the time of her original brief observations of the driver and her looking at the photographs, IPO Fischer described in his evidence that there was a great deal of press when Haziraj was arrested in June 2001 and he candidly agreed with the prosecution that he could not exclude the possibility of media pictures subconsciously affecting her subsequent identification. The prison line up in front of Judge Risch was clearly contaminated by her seeing the photographs earlier and no weight should be attached to that identification.

e. With respect to linkages to the Group, there is no evidence other than from Shala and Beqiraj. Beqiraj is clearly a liar. Shala on the other hand admitted to KPS Officer Kastrati at Kastrati’s apartment that though he recognized the man in the picture as the man he saw at TMK, the man in the picture now looked fitter. The evidence establishes that Hazir Isufi did in fact meet with Veseli at the TMK HQ and he was not as in good shape as Haziraj

N. Evidence of innocence

Abit Haziraj states that on the morning of May 8th 2000 when Drini was assassinated, he was far away in his village working on repairs to his disco,

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and moving and/or organizing the remodelling of his home. That alibi is corroborated by the minutes of the testimony in previous trials of this matter namely, Beqir Qerimi and Beqir Zejnullahu, whose testimony has been read into the records of this trial.

Hajrije Rexha testified that from her brief observation, that the driver of the car was aged between 20-30 years of age. Abit Haziraj was approximately 44 years of age at the time (November 29th p. 41).

There is evidence from several sources including Beqiraj and Ferat Ademi that the suspected killer’s wife was from Montenegro. The evidence is clear that Haziraj’s wife has no such connection. However, Hazir Isufi’s wife is from there.

Though there is no evidence of a direct connection between Veseli and Haziraj, exhibits 63 to 65 clearly establish a direct link between Veseli and Hazir Isufi at the relevant times. Isufi’s statement indicates that he was good friends with Veseli during and since the war and was carrying Veseli’s TMK business card in his wallet when he was arrested in 2001 for unrelated matters.

Though not in evidence, I feel an ethical obligation to inform the court that since at least September 2005, shortly after I was assigned this file, I have made repeated efforts through INTERPOL and other means to locate Hazir Isufi. He is an elusive man who uses forged passports and aliases. I have not been able to locate him.

O. International Prosecutorial Role in Criminal Proceedings

The proper and ethical role of an International Prosecutor should be no different than the traditional, ethical and professional role found in free and democratic societies with well established justice systems. The role of a prosecutor in such societies is that of an officer of the court. It is a quasi judicial role based on the simple search for truth. That role, simply defined, should be no different to that of an International Prosecutor in Kosovo. Ethics require that a prosecutor have neither a political agenda nor a personal desire to obtain a conviction at the expense of the truth, the rule of law or in disregard of the serious burden to prove a case against an accused beyond doubt. .

The evidence against Abit Haziraj, prior to being tested at trial, raised grave suspicions of guilt.  The Supreme Court of Kosovo, in setting aside the previous verdict of acquittal was of like mind. For that reason, I proceeded with the Indictment to trial and evidence was called before this Court. The prosecution has fully disclosed, led and tested evidence that is both favourable and unfavourable to both accused in this case. During the course of trial however, that evidence was tested according to the rule of law. 

The prosecutor’s role is not to obtain a conviction at all costs. This is especially so where the consequences to an accused person charged with aggravated murder are so serious, both to him and his family. And, this is especially so where we, as internationals in a foreign land, advocate the necessity of the need for the rule of

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law to prevail in Kosovo should it ever hope to truly become a free and democratic state in the future

It may well be that this Court will conclude that the evidence, although still raising grave suspicions of Haziraj’s guilt, does not meet the test of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

It must be remembered that the credibility of any verdict by this Honourable Court will be judged by the adherence to the rule of law both by present day jurists and future legal historians.   If you harbour a reasonable doubt about the guilt of the accused based on the evidence before you, it is your duty to give that benefit to the accused.  Similarly, as a prosecutor, sworn to execute my duties fairly and according to the rule of law, it is my duty to acknowledge when the standard of proof has not been met to the appropriate legal standard.   This case is one where I have such a concern.

VII. The Accused Sali Veseli

A. In the prosecution’s submission, Sali Veseli was linked to a ‘Group’, whose members had animus towards Drini or were hostile towards him. That linkage is significant when considering the motive for Sali Veseli to incite Neziraj in February and to ultimately have Drini assassinated in May. The Supreme Court in its ruling also considered such a linkage to be of importance. The Supreme Court was critical of the trial panel’s reasoning where throughout its decision it looked at pieces of evidence in isolation and did not assess it in the context of all the evidence led in the trial. With respect to the meeting at the Theranda Hotel attended to by a number of members of the Group shortly before Drini’s murder, the Supreme Court stated at page 17 as follows:

…while the court [trial panel] found that this meeting showed that the accused Veseli was a member of a faction of the KPC that was hostile to Drini, thereby providing motive, the court again, instead of considering this motive evidence in the context of all the evidence in the case, instead seemed to have dismissed it because of its finding that this evidence “ALONE” cannot serve to fulfil the legal requirements of aiding or jointly committing murder. [Italicized emphasis added]

In addition to the criticisms pointed out by the Supreme Court, there are many more instances of animus or hostility of members of the Group, other than the one at the Theranda to which I will refer shortly. At this point, the import of Sali Veseli’s association with a Group who collectively had animus towards Drini is powerful and relevant evidence of the motives to kill Drini.

In the interim, I wish to identify the relevant members of the Group. They include the following:

Rexhep Selimi – former KLA HQ General Inspector and subsequent high ranking member of the PDK Party. He was opposed to FARK (see Zyrapi).

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Kadri Kryeziu – former Mayor of Prizren appointed after the war by Fatmir Limaj until removed by Dr. Baskin.

Fatmir Limaj – former KLA Commander, member of the General Staff and Director of the military police. He was opposed to FARK (see Zyrapi) and subsequent high ranking member of the PDK Party

Nezir Kryeziu – former KLA leader of a Special Purpose Unit called Eye of the Eagle that performed military police functions. He was closely linked to Fatmir Limaj. After the war he became a regular TMK soldier and was at Pojata Restaurant after Drini’s burial (see Remzi Shala) seated with members of the Group. He became the president of the Prizren branch of Halitjaha’s parallel veterans association.

Alush Shala – Head of TMK G2 Intelligence and a card carrying PDK Party Member. Though uneducated and with no formal military training, he rose very rapidly from a simple soldier to an officer and Head of G2 at or near the time of Drini’s assassination.

Sadik Halitjaha – former KLA Commander, high ranking TMK Officer, closely linked to Fatmir Limaj and the PDK Party, former head of a veteran’s association in conflict with Drini’s parallel association. He was opposed to FARK.

Halil Qadraku – former KLA commander, former Head of TMK G2 and strong supporter of the PDK Party (see Zyrapi). He was opposed to FARK.

Jusuf Krasniqi - former KLA Commander who “hung out” with Sadik Halitjaha and Halil Qadraku (see Ferat Ademi), former member of the TMK and at time of Drini’s assassination he was the Head of the PDK Party of Suhareka Municipality.

Besim Baraliu – PDK Party supported and manager of Theranda Restaurant frequented by Veseli and members of the TMK and PDK. He was friends with Fatmir Limaj (see Zyrapi)

Tahir Sinani – former Pastrik Zone KLA Commander who replaced Drini. Later killed in fighting in Macedonia

Kadri Veseli – former member of the General Staff and Head of KLA G2 during the war. He was as opposed to FARK. He was closely linked to Hashim Thaci (see Zyrapi) and was the former Head of SHIK after the war. Sali Veseli visited Kadri Veseli in Mitrovica (See Ndrecaj and Shala).

Sami Lushtaku – former KLA Commander, closely linked to Thaci and PDK Party, replaced Sali Veseli as TMK Zone II Commander. Attended Rexha Home with Alush Shala to pressure Drini’s widow after Veseli’s arrest.

Hashim Thaci – Former member of the KLA General Staff, closely linked to Fatmir Limaj and Rexhep Selimi, and was former leader of the PDK Party at

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the relevant times. Attended Rexha Home with Fatmir Limaj to pressure Drini’s widow after Veseli’s Arrest.

Xhemajl Beqiraj – former KLA member, related through marriage to Veseli. He was the former bodyguard of Veseli at relevant times.

And if course, Sali Veseli himself

B. The Charge of Incitement

The initial mutant seeds of discontent by this group towards Drini were first planted during the war and were fed by other occurrences of animus after the war finally culminated in a decision to have him killed. The first known action taken on that decision was when Sali Veseli and Sadic Halitjaha and/or Xhemajl Beqiraj approached Fezli Nesiraj in February 2000 and offered him money to kill Drini to which he refused and warned Drini indirectly through his former KLA commanders Afrim Basha and Lulzim Kabashi. The warning was passed on to Drini. Unfortunately the indirect threat by Kabashi to Sadic Halitjaha and Sali Veseli, through a mutual friend and TMK officer, Xhafer Gashi, not harm Drini was never communicated to them, unbeknownst to Kabashi.

C. Legal Basis for the Charge of Incitement

Article 2 of the Provisional Criminal Code of Kosovo lays out several important principles which should be considered in relation to the instant case. Article 2(1) enshrines the well-known principle that accused shall be tried pursuant to the law in effect at the time the alleged offence was committed. However, Article 2(2) makes clear that where a person allegedly committed a criminal act prior to a change in the law criminalizing that act, the accused must be given the benefit of the law which is deemed to be most favourable to him or her. Article 2(3) takes this principle one step further. Where an accused person is charged or convicted under the law applicable at the time of the offence, and a change in the law renders the act for which the accused was charged or convicted as no longer criminal, any sentence passed against the accused in relation to this act cannot be executed.

In the case before the Panel, Sali Veseli is charged with inciting Fazli Neziraj to kill Ekrem Rexha in 2000, four years prior to the entry into force of the Provisional Criminal Code of Kosovo (PCCK). It is therefore against the backdrop of the preceding discussion that we must consider the applicability of the offence of incitement in relation to these circumstances. Simply put, the conduct alleged against Mr. Veseli is a punishable offence, both under the old and new law.

The provisions titled “incitement” in the Criminal Code of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (1977) (CCY) and the Provisional Criminal Code of Kosovo (PCCK) (2004) are as follows:

CCSFRYArticle 23 - Incitement

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(1) Anybody who intentionally incites another to commit a criminal act shall be punished as if he himself has committed it.(2) Anybody who intentionally incites another to commit a criminal act for which five years imprisonment or a more severe punishment is laid down by statute, and the act is never attempted, shall be punished in accordance with the provisions applicable to attempt.

PCCKArticle 24 - Incitement Whoever intentionally incites another person to commit a criminal offence shall be punished as if he or she committed the criminal offence if the criminal offence was committed under his or her influence.

A cursory review of the two sections may lead one to conclude that save for the penalty provision in the old law embodied in Article 23(2), both the CCY and the PCCK hold criminally liable those who incite others to commit offences, irrespective of whether the person who has been incited ultimately carries out the offence for which he was incited to commit. A closer look reveals that PCCK Article 24 only punishes incitement if the instigated person commits a criminal offence under the influence of the instigator. That is, unsuccessful incitement is not punished under PCCK Article 24.

In the 20 January 2004 decision of the Supreme Court of Kosovo, quashing the conviction of Sali Veseli for “attempted incitement”, the court made clear that such an offence was unknown to the law applicable in Kosovo. At page 31 of its decision (footnote 19), the court observed, in obiter:

Incitement is an inchoate crime that is, an incipient crime that generally, but not necessarily, leads to another crime. Incitement is trying to induce a person to commit a criminal act, either by persuading another person to commit a certain crime, or strengthening such a decision. It is considered that the instigator has committed the crime as foreseen by Article 23 CCY is he has taken all the necessary steps to persuade another person to commit a certain criminal act and has done so with premeditation. The fact the instigated person failed to carry out the criminal act for which he was instigated bears no consequence on the criminal responsibility of the instigator, or the legal qualification of the actions that he consumed.

Trying to persuade another to commit a crime realizes the perpetration of the completed criminal act. Therefore, there is no such crime as attempt incitement; it is by undertaking a premeditated step to induce someone to commit a criminal act that the perpetrator has accomplished his goal and criminal responsibility ensues. There can be instances of incitement, in which the instigated person does not accomplish, or even undertake to commit the crime to which he is incited; nonetheless the instigator is still liable.

The Supreme Court notes that in terms of the legal qualification of the act the law does not differentiate a successful incitement from a futile one; the instigator only receives a more lenient sentence if the incitement remains

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unsuccessful, i.e. if the instigated person does not undertake the criminal act in question.

According to the Commentary on Article 23 of the CCY, two preconditions must be established for an accused person to be guilty of incitement: (1) the person who is approached by the instigator to carry out the future offence must not have already formed the intention to carry out that offence prior to the incitement and (2) the instigator undertook a premeditated course of action by which he "formed or strengthened the decision on the part of the future perpetrator to commit the criminal act." Under the old law, at the moment these two preconditions are met, the crime of instigation has been perpetrated, irrespective of whether the instigated person carries out the offence incited by the instigator. The commentator writes:

In a certain number of cases instigation is foreseen as an independent criminal act, so that the person who undertakes the action of instigation is answering as the perpetrator. Independence of instigation as a criminal act exists if the instigated person does not embark on the act of commission...

Despite this analysis, the PCCK Article 24 makes clear that a person will be punished for incitement "if the criminal offence was committed under his or her influence." Therefore, this provision requires that the instigated person carry out the offence he or she was incited to commit before the law will hold the instigator criminally responsible. In other words, unsuccessful incitement is not punishable under Article 24 of the new law.

However, the PCCK clearly indicates that under certain circumstances, perpetrators of unsuccessful incitement will continue to be held criminally responsible. Article 26 of the PCCK states the following:

Criminal Association

(1) Whoever agrees, explicitly or implicitly, with one or more persons to commit or to incite the commission of a criminal offence punishable by imprisonment of at least five years and undertakes preparatory acts for the fulfillment of such agreement participates in a criminal association and shall be punished as provided for in Article 65(2) of the present Code. (2) The court may reduce or waive the punishment of a person who is criminally liable as provided for in paragraph 1 of the present article is such person:

(i) Voluntarily renounces the agreement; (ii) Voluntarily undertakes actions to prevent the continuous existence of the criminal association or the commission of a criminal offence consistent with its goals; or(iii) Voluntarily discloses knowledge of the agreement to the police while the planned criminal offence may still be prevented.

Under Article 26, a person is criminally responsible where (1) he or she agrees with at least one other person to commit or incite a serious offence and (2) that person undertakes preparatory acts for the fulfillment of such agreement. There is no

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requirement under Article 26 for the incitement to be successful. So long as an agreement between two or more individuals exists to incite a serious offence, and one of those individuals engages in the incitement, criminal responsibility follows. The fact that Article 26(2) allows the court to reduce or waive the punishment where the instigator provides the police with knowledge of the criminal association before the incited offence takes place, further demonstrates that Article 26(1) specifically criminalizes unsuccessful incitement.

Criminal liability for those involved in criminal associations also exists under the CCY pursuant to Article 26 of that code:

Criminal liability and punishability of the organizers of criminal associations Whoever has, for the purpose of committing criminal acts, created or used an organization, gang, conspiracy, group or any other association shall be criminally liable for all criminal acts which have transpired from the criminal plan of these associations and shall be punished as if he himself had committed them, regardless of whether or not and in which role he has directly participated in the commission of any of these acts.

Criminal liability under this section therefore requires the establishment of three elements: (1) the creation of a criminal association, (2) the existence of a criminal plan and (3) the commission of at least one criminal offence by the members of the association.

Thus, under the old law, members of a criminal association formed with the intention of having a particular person assassinated, and that unsuccessfully incites an individual to carry out the assassination, would he liable under CCY Article 26 read together with CCY Article 23. These provisions find their analogue in PCCK Article 26 which criminalizes incitement carried out by members of a criminal association, whether or not the incitement is successful.

It should also be remembered that the Supreme Court rendered its decision in the Veseli case in January 2004, only three months prior to the entry into force of the PCCK. Considering that the PCCK was proclaimed by Regulation 2003/25 on 6 July 2003, it is obvious that by January 2004, the Supreme Court was well aware of the changes that would be reflected in the new law. If unsuccessful incitement was no longer an offence subsequent to the introduction of the PCCK, the Supreme Court, taking into account Article 2(3) of the PCCK, would not have ordered a retrial in relation to an offence which no longer exists.

D. The chronological instances and sources of animus or hostility of members of the Group towards Commander Drini prior to the incitement of Fazli Neziraj are as follows with specific instances regarding Veseli, not mentioned elsewhere, in bold print:

In September 1998 a group of Drini’s soldiers, which included Musa Krasniqi, an uncle of KLA Commander Rexhep Selimi, were ambushed and killed. Though Drini was subsequently exonerated (Bislim Zyrapi, July 10 p. 11-12), Rexhep Selimi blamed Drini for his uncle’s death. He told Drini “I will kill you because I hold you responsible for killing my uncle” (Ruzhdi Rexha November 21 p. 20-

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21). Note that Bislim Zyrapi claimed protection of Article 229 when asked if Selimi vowed revenge (Bislim Zyrapi, July 10 p.11).

Drini issued very clear orders to his command and to the G2 units that they were to have nothing to do with the civilian population (Serb and others) without a direct order from him.

In January and February 1999 Halitjaha, Qadraku and Kabashi shared a room at the officer training school. They told Kabashi of their high esteem for Hashim Thaci, that Drini was a Farkist, and that Drini supported the Bukoshi government. Veseli would often come to their room and socialize with Halitjaha and Qadraku (Kabashi June 20th p. 11). Kabashi had not told them of his relation to Drini. This is confirmed by Halitjaha that he was not aware of the relationship until the trial.

The Joint Declaration of Sadik Halitjaha and Halil Qadraku dated March 14th, 1999 (Exhibit 3) was undoubtedly the catalyst for Drini’s removal from combat command the following week. Amongst many other things, they accused him of being a FARK supporter, interfering with their work, interfering with the operations of SHIK, and supporting Bukoshi Government in exile who would create a government after the war eliminating from it the leadership and command of the KLA.

On approximately March 20th 1999 Drini was relieved of his combat command and replaced by two members of The Group who did not have the respect of the soldiers that Drini enjoyed nor did they have former combat command experience. The order came from KLA General Commander Syleman Selimi, Rexhep Selimi’s cousin, despite the objections of Chief of General HQ Zyrapi and Commander Nexhmedin Kastrati, Drini’s cousin. Members of The Group present at the meeting that resulted in Drini’s removal included Fatmir Limaj and Rexhep Selimi (Bislim Zyrapi, July 10 p. 16-19) and (Kastrati June 27th p. 34-35).

Shortly after Drini’s removal as a combat commander, Zyrapi and Kastrati, who were also trained former JNA officers with combat experience, who were linked to Drini through blood or friendship, who also shared a number of Drini’s views and who had the respect of their soldiers, were also removed as combat commanders and sent to Albania on “Operation Arrow” until the end of the war. (Bislim Zyrapi, July 10 p. 20-22).

Drini’s liberation of Prizren in mid-June 1999, as mentioned above. In addition, Kabashi, whose Kabash Brigade was at the forefront of the liberation though out the attack, was present at the relevant time. He contradicts Halitjaha’s evidence of Halitjaha’s participation in the liberation. In fact, he testified that there was no prior communication with HQ as the liberation units were in the Kabash mountains where there was not communication available. He did not see Halitjaha set one foot in Prizren during the whole attack (Kabashi June 20th p. 17-20).

In late June 1999, immediately after the war, Drini and Tahir Sinani had a confrontation at the military barracks. Drini told his wife that Tahir Sinani

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pointed a gun at him and threatened to shoot him because he was jealous that Drini was the first KLA commander into Prizren (Hajrije Rexha November 29 th at p.9). Though it may relate to a separate incident, Kabashi confirms there was a confrontation between Drini and Sinani at the barracks and that he was present. Sinani was very loud and angry at Drini in reference to the newspaper article that referred to Drini as a “General” in relation to the liberation of Prizren. Kabashi was concerned for Drini’s safety. Kabashi was successful in safely removing Drini from the situation. When Kabashi returned alone to the barracks, Fatmir Limaj was angry at him and told him “I can give you a bullet”. Limaj then ordered Kabashi’s arrest. Kabashi was then held in prison until, at Drini’s request, Kabashi was released by KFOR (Kabashi June 20th p. 21-24).

At a round table meeting that took place in July 1999, Dr. Baskin witnessed Kadri Kryeziu screaming at Drini with anti-Serb overtones suggesting that Drini was a Serb sympathizer (Baskin November 14 p. 14).

In September 1999, Kabashi was present at Kadri Kryeziu’s office and overheard an angry exchange between him and Drini.

In September 1999, Drini called Nexhmedin Kastrati in Sarajevo and told him that he had heard Sadik Halitjaha and Qadraku saying bad things about him on a Prizren radio broadcast (Kastrati June 27th p. 39).

In October 1999, Drini founded a veteran’s association that subsequently brought him into confrontation with Sadik Halitjaha who decided to form a parallel association (Ruzhdi Rexha November 21 p. 39) (Kabashi June 20th p. 28-29).

In approximately December 1999, Drini and his wife were watching television when Sadik Halitjaha was on a program being interviewed about the war. Drini got up and turned off the TV stating as set out by his wife on November 22nd at p. 17:

Who would be the one to pay attention to this guy, he is just a psycho. He is not telling the truth. Not a single shred of it.

Dr. Baskin testified that Kadri Kryeziu, a member of the Group, had been the self appointed Mayor of Prizren prior to Dr. Baskin setting up a new civil administration that ousted Kryeziu in January 2000. Prior to that time, Dr. Baskin had difficulties with him in that he did “many things …in ways that were not in accordance with…Resolution 1244”. Kryeziu was involved in the illegal collection of taxes and did not believe in diverse ethnic representation. Sali Veseli had nothing to do with the Kryeziu’s removal. (Baskin November 14th p. 9-10).

In late 1999 or early 2000 Ferat Ademi was at the Theranda Restaurant. This is a restaurant frequented by Sali Veseli, and members the TMK and PDK. It was managed by a PDK supporter Besim Baraliu (Lulzim Berisha November 22). On that occasion Drini and Bislim Zyrapi were meeting Tahir Sinani, Kadri Kryeziu and Besim Baraliu. Baraliu called Drini and Bislim Zyrapi FARKists and told them they had to leave (Ademi July 12 p. 15-17) (see also Zyrapi July 10th p. 28).

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Sali Veseli, even though a founding member, was also opposed to FARK (Ndrecaj March 28th p. 28).

In January 2000, Drini told his wife that he publicly accused Kadri Kryeziu, while he was still the Mayor of Prizren, of taking care of himself and not pushing for public progress. Drini told her that Kryeziu said “only one of us will survive” (Hajrije Rexha November 29th at p.10).

In January 2000, when Kadri Kryeziu was disposed, he was not pleased at all (Baskin November 14 p.14). Fatmir Limaj was friends with Kryeziu and was influential in his appointment as the mayor (Bislim Zyrapi, July 10 p. 27-28).

On January 13th 2000 TMK G2 Qadraku receives information that Drini had keys to a radio net, had Serb friends and after the war he stopped a Roma from taking revenge on Serbs (Exhibit 9).

On January 13th or 14th, 2000 Ndrecaj and Shala decided that they wanted to join the TMK and went to Veseli’s office without an appointment, as they knew him from the war, to get a job. Veseli let them into his office, greeted them and closed the door. Suddenly Qadraku burst into Veseli’s office without knocking or acknowledging Ndrecaj or Shala though they were known to him. Qadraku was holding a newspaper called Days of Hope (Exhibit 11 dated January 13th 2000) in his hand. This contained an article about Drini, the liberation on Prizren and the future of the TMK (Ndrecaj March 21st p. 3- 6 and 8). Qadraku was “pissed off” meaning:

…behaving in a very arrogant manner and quite tough when speaking in a high-pitched voice. He was nervous [angry] (Ndrecaj March 21st p. 6).

Qadraku showed the newspaper to Veseli and said to him “look what that dog [Drini] has written”. Veseli said, also in a high pitched voice “you know the order that I gave you. Get out and carry it out immediately”. Qadraku replied “I will cut Drini in pieces and I will throw the pieces in the trash can” (Ndrecaj March 21st p. 6-7). Given not only what was said, but the manner in which it was said, Ndrecaj had concerns for Drini’s safety and went and warned him.

The Supreme Court at page 16 stated that this conduct [of Veseli and Qadraku] “shows a distinct and sharp hostility towards Drini (motive)”. In criticizing the courts rejection of that evidence that it would be “unusual” that they (Veseli and Qadraku) in front of Shala and Ndrecaj the Supreme Court felt that in fact it is imaginable given that they were both war veterans known to Veseli and that Veseli and Qadraku could have been so angry that they lost control.

Qadraku’s hostility against Drini on the exact same day as the Days of Hope article of January 13th, 2000 is corroborated not only by the information that he received in Exhibit 9 as previously mentioned, but by his report to the Command of the Second Zone (Exhibit 10), also dated January 13th, as follows:

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During the war he [Drini] handed it [radio] over to a Serb Ilia Nikiq, who used to work in the defense and during the war contacted with Serbia providing them with information with regard to events in Kosova and different military movements.

There can be no greater dishonor to a patriot such as Drini than to be called a traitor.

On January 19th 2000, Bota Sot published an article of an interview with Drini headlined “We Liberated Prizren without the Order of the General HQ” (Exhibit 12). On January 24th a scathing article about Drini was written the Kosova Press (Exhibit 13). Kastrati read that article and recalls hearing Halitjaha on TV expressing anger at Drini for things appearing in the article. Drini came to Kastrati’s coffee bar and told him that Halitjaha was angry with him.

In mid January to early February 2000, Veseli, Kadri Kryeziu and Halitjaha entered the Hotel Prizrini where Lulzim Berisha was a waitress shift manager. He knew these individuals. Until Drini’s assassination, members of the TMK and PDK Party frequented the hotel’s private meeting room and restaurant. He had seen these three together on two or three occasions in the private meeting room and on other occasions in the public restaurant area. From his observations of how they interacted with each other, he concluded that they were good friends. On one occasion, other members of the Group were present including Selimi, and Fatmir Limaj (Berisha November 22 p. 24-26). With respect to the mid-January to early February meeting, Berisha’s attention was drawn to their table in the restaurant area because Halitjaha was angry and was raising his voice. When Berisha looked over he saw Halitjaha pointing his hand to Veseli in an up and down motion and yelling at him. He yelled:

He was due to get that job done times [long] ago and not now. When they caught him [later clarified as Drini] and his 20 friends he was due to get that job done precisely at that time. [Berisha November 22 p. 24-26]

Berisha noted that though Veseli was a General, he did not react to Halitjaha’s behavior. Berisha was concerned about what he had heard as Drini was a cousin of his. Later that same day, Berisha warned Drini of what he had just witnessed but Drini simply responded that “you do not need to worry about it…I owe nothing to anyone, therefore I do not need to be afraid” (page 26).

The incident that Halitjaha may well have been referring to above was during the war when he says he saved Drini’s life near the village of Doberdelan when Drini was wounded. At that time Drini was approaching the front line in a battle and was unaware of the precise location of the enemy (Halitjaha March 20th p.13). At page 20, the Presiding Judge followed up on this incident. Halitjaha stated that since Drini was not aware that the KLA had retreated, Halitjaha felt obliged to warn him. More importantly Halitjaha responded that Halitjaha had no more than 30 fighters with him at

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the time. That certainly is a number consistent with the “20” used by him in the Hotel Prizrini. Veseli also claims to be one who saved Drini’s life (Veseli October 18th p. 12).

On February 3rd 2000 Qadraku reported to Veseli (Exhibit 14) that they (G2) found Drini’s and Nekiq’s radio station and it is being protected by KFOR.

In February and March 2000, TMK G2 was allegedly intercepting radio communications and finding old transcripts from the war of Drini’s (Exhibit 15). They allege the transcriptions to be accurate and purportedly portray Drini as a Serb sympathizer before, during, and after the war. Kabashi, upon reviewing the transcripts, states that they are fabricated. He found two serious errors. The first was that the call signs were what had actually been used in the war. Second, Kabashi pointed out that the transcripts refer to him and Drini as being old friends although prior to the war Kabashi had only met Drini 3-4 times (Kabashi June 20th

p. 27-28).

After Drini was appointed as the Director of Environment he experienced enough fear so that in March 2000 he commenced the application process to secure a weapons permit. In that permit he sets out the grounds (Exhibit 31) as follows:

The reason I ask for this is the actual situation about my work in the municipality, cooperation which I have with the internationals.

In his renewed application for a WAC of April 28 2000 (Exhibit 32) he indicated that he had fear because he is being accused by a group of persons for helping international organizations, was threatened not to become the Director of Environment, and was threatened because of his article in the Kosova Press dated January 24th 2000 (Exhibit 13).

After the war, Drini told his wife that wherever he would go Alush Shala would follow him (Hajrije Rexha November 29th at p. 8).

Drini never spoke of Sali Veseli with good words (Hajrije Rexha November 29th at p. 4).

Drini comments to his wife included his view that Fatmir Limaj would end up in The Hague because he committed many crimes against innocent people during the war (Hajrije Rexha November 29th at p. 4).

Drini was not a member or supporter of the PDK Party (Hajrije Rexha November 29th at p.7).

E. Given the persona of Commander Drini, there were many varied motives of the Group to have Drini killed.

Revenge over Rexhep Selimi’s uncle’s death in the ambush. Prevent Drini from publishing a book about the war that may reflect badly on

members of the Group.

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Jealousy over Drini liberating Prizren while the KLA HQ sat far away in defensive positions.

Conflict between Drini and Sadik Halitjaha over the formation of parallel veterans associations.

Working closely with international organizations. Becoming the Director of Environment. Speaking out in the media. He was a FARK supporter Allegedly collaborated with the Serbs during the war Wanted a multiethnic Kosovo Was against corruption Fear that, because of his abilities and popularity, if he ran for politics he would get

elected and the PDK Party would be defeated and without power.

F. Specific evidence of Sadik Halitjaha and Sali Veseli inciting Fazli Neziraj

Neziraj was born and raised in Grejkovc, the same village as Beqiraj. He fought in the same unit as Ndrecaj, Shala, and Beqiraj. At one point in the war he served in the 125th Brigade under his “cousin”, Commander Lulzim Kabashi (Neziraj June 12th p. 38 and June 13th p. 5).

After the war he operated a coffee bar that was frequented by former members of the KLA, namely Ndrecaj, Shala, Beqiraj, Afrim Basha and members of the Group including Halitjaha and sometimes Veseli.

Neziraj admits that he met Veseli 2-3 months prior to Drini’s assassination, meaning February or March 2000 (Neziraj June 13th p. 10-11). Afrim Basha testified that he used to live in the same building as TMK HQ and he saw them together inside the TMK HQ (Basha June 19th, p.42, 48 and 49).

Afrim Basha, a veteran of the Bosnian War, was Neziraj’s direct commander during the Kosovo War. After the war Basha frequented Neziraj’s coffee bar. Neziraj admits that he trusted Basha. Zyrapi testified that Basha’s general reputation for honesty and integrity was that he was held in high esteem by those who knew him (Zyrapi July 10 p.5)( Kabashi June 20th p.15).

Basha states that after the war and prior to Drini’s assassination he socialized in Neziraj’s coffee bar. He also saw Bashkim Ndrecaj and Remzi Shala there from time to time In that time period he also saw Sali Veseli, Sadik Halitjaha, Xhemajl Beqiraj and Fezli Nesiraj sit and talk together three or four times. In his view, those four individuals had a good relationship. Basha saw them together at Fezli Nesiraj’s coffee bar on these 3-4 occasions ‘prior’ to a phone call regarding Drini that he received from Fezli Nesiraj in February, 2000 (Basha June 19th, p.42, 48 and 49).

Fezli Nesiraj called Basha in February, 2000. He knew it was Fezli Nesiraj from his voice and the number display on his phone. Nesiraj insisted that Basha meet him at his coffee bar and Afrim Basha went there as there appeared to be some urgency in Nesiraj’s voice. Nesiraj asked Basha to arrange a meeting with Drini as soon as possible as the life of Drini was in question. Basha hesitated to contact Drini directly for a number of reasons including (i) he did not have Drini’s phone number, (ii) he

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did not know where Drini lived, (iii) Drini was a high commander and dealt with internationals, (iv) Drini was a busy and important man and Basha had not seen Nesiraj and Drini together in the past. Basha therefore decided to call Lulzim Kabashi instead, who he knew to be closely related to Drini (Basha June 19th, p.49-51 and 56).

Basha did not know Kabashi and Nesiraj to be close and had never seen them together before (Basha June 19th, p.52). He called Kabashi and told him what Nesiraj had said to him. Kabashi told him to bring Nesiraj to his home and he walked there with him. When Kabashi came to the door by the summer kitchen, Basha went home leaving Nesiraj with Kabashi. He did not hear the discussion between them (Basha June 19th, p.51-52).

Although during the war Basha was of the view that Neziraj was prone to exaggeration from time to time, he believed him on that day. That is why he took the trouble to find Kabashi and take Neziraj to his home so that he could tell him why Drini’s life was in question (Basha June 19th, p.56).

Basha denies that Bashkim Ndrecaj and Remzi Shala ever threatened him to lie about Drini’s murder (Basha June 19th, p.52).

Basha denies being at a meeting at the Centrala Restaurant with Remzi Shala, Bashkim Ndrecaj, Ferat Ademi, and Bislim Zyrapi and in fact does not even know where the Centrala Restaurant is located nor has he ever met with this particular group of people at any time(Basha June 19th, p.52-53).

Lulzim Kabashi was a KLA Combat Pastrik Zone Brigade Commander who had a good reputation amongst his soldiers for honesty and integrity. He is a university graduate and now a successful businessman. He speaks 3 languages including English which he learned while working with the International Catholic Migration Committee. He was Drini’s brother-in-law and close personal friend.

Kabashi knew Neziraj briefly during the war as he was in Kabashi’s unit for the last two months. He was not close to Neziraj after the war.

Kabashi corroborates fully the evidence given by Afrim Basha regarding Basha calling him and telling him that Neziraj needed to see him right away. He says he met Basha and Neziraj at the door and invited them in but Basha declined and left. He brought Neziraj into his home. During a brief conversation, Neziraj told him that Sadik Halitjaha and Sali Veseli had come to his house and asked him to kill Drini. He stated that he had come to Kabashi so that Drini could be warned of their intentions (Kabashi June 20th p. 34-35).

That same night Kabashi warned Drini. Drini simply said “I don’t owe anything to these people”, and did not take any protective measures (Kabashi June 20th p. 35). The next morning, without informing Drini, he called Xhafer Gashi as he had good relations with him and Gashi was a better friend with Halitjaha. Gashi and Halitjaha were both working at TMK HQ at the time. He told Gashi to go see Halitjaha and tell him “if something bad happens to Ekrem it will be on your head”. This was a warning to Halitjaha not to take any action against Drini. Gashi later told him that he

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passed on the message and the Halitjaha’s response was “who is Lulzim Kabashi to send me such messages” and “why did he not approach me directly”. Kabashi had trusted Gashi to pass on the message and believed that he had. He did not personally give Veseli the same warning as he thought that the warning to Halitjaha would be sufficient to prevent hostile action from being taken against Drini (Kabashi June 20th p. 35-39).

In August 2002 Neziraj came to Kabashi and asked him not to state what he had earlier told him. Kabashi responded that he would not hide what had been said. At no time has Kabashi ever threatened Neziraj to tell lies about Halitjaha or Veseli (Kabashi June 20th p. 39-40).

Xhafer Gashi is a graduate of the Military Academy and was a KLA officer during the war. He was under the immediate command of Afrim Basha and under the indirect command of Bislim Zyrapi. At all material times he was member of the TMK in Prizren. He testified that he is a strong supporter of the PDK Party. After the war he was, and remains, friends of both Kabashi and Halitjaha. He was working at the TMK HQ in February 2000 when he received a call from Kabashi regarding Drini and during a subsequent meeting with Kabashi on the same issue. At that time, whatever Halitjaha’s position was with the TMK, Halitjaha had an office at TMK HQ. Halitjaha also maintained a residence in the same building as the HQ (Gashi June 26th p. 34-35).

In February 2000 he received a call at work from Kabashi stating that he wanted to see him. They met and Kabashi said that “there are certain voices alleging that Drini betrayed the war. That kind of thing”. He told me that the “voices were coming out of second zone” and to pass on a message to Halitjaha that “if something will happen to Drini, it will be on your neck”. Kabashi asked him as a friend to pass this on as a friend to Halitjaha (Gashi June 26th p.35).

Gashi went to Halitjaha’s office at TMK HQ but did not pass on the message as Halitjaha was very busy at the time. He returned about an hour later to pass on the message set out at page 36 as follows:

Witness: He was busy but he accepted me after one hour. And I said to him that Luli has a message for you. However, knowing that Sadik Halitjaha’s temperament is a bit explosive in nature, before I started conveying the message to him, he said to me, Luli can show up in my office at any time he wants and there is no need for someone to pass me the message.

Public Prosecutor: Did you then or have you ever passed that message that Luli Kabashi had asked you to give to Sadik Halitjaha?

Witness: No.

Public Prosecutor: Did you tell Luli about your dealings with Sadik Halitjaha regarding your messenger service?

Witness: I called Luli on the phone and I told him that he could go himself to pass on the message according to what Sadik Halitjaha had said to me.

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Nexhmedin Kastrati was the first cousin of Drini, a former KLA Commander, and at the material time a member of the KPS. These facts were well known by Neziraj. Kastrati knew, as a member of the police Special Task Force, that Ndrecaj stated in his April 2nd 2001 statement to Judge Risch that Neziraj had told him that Veseli attended his house before Drini’s murder to incite him to kill Drini but that he had refused and that he had gone and warned Drini (see April 2nd 2001 statement page 2). Kastrati, knowing of the close connection of Ndrecaj and Shala to Neziraj, on some date prior to Veseli’s arrest, determined that he would go see Neziraj in the presence of Shala and Ndrecaj under the guise of trading cars. He spoke privately with Neziraj about the incitement. Initially Neziraj confirmed that Veseli approached him to kill Drini but then indicated fear. Kastrati testified that Neziraj stated as follows:

Witness: “Please Nexh. Don’t involve me in this case. I'm scared. I will come to the police and say no.” These were the words that he told me and then from that moment, we didn’t pay any attention.

Public Prosecutor: Did he indicate to you who he was afraid of for himself and his family?

Witness: He mentioned to me that he was more afraid of them than the police. He said “They may do anything. Meanwhile, the police could only take me to prison.” That’s all. He never indicated to me who “they” were. He knows it. [Kastrati July 6th p. 14-16]

Kastrati states that after his meeting with Neziraj he reported the results of the meeting to Ulrich Fischer (Kastrati July 6th p. 16)

Ulrich Fischer corroborates Fazli Neziraj’s admission to Kastrati. Prior to the arrest of Veseli on May 8th 2001, Kastrati told him that he had met with Neziraj and, though not in a written statement, Neziraj had stated that Veseli had been to his house and wanted him to kill Drini but that Neziraj refused to do so. Kastrati advised Fischer that Neziraj told him he was afraid. Accordingly, Fischer decided not to pursue Neziraj at that time and to wait until Veseli was arrested and detained in hopes that Neziraj would then have less fear and cooperate (Fischer July 3rd p. 22-23).

Further corroboration that Veseli incited Neziraj comes from Bashkim Ndrecaj. He states, as is further corroborated by Remzi Shala, that many of those who served together during the war gathered on a regular basis at Neziraj’s coffee house. Those that came frequently include Halitjaha, Basha, and Beqiraj. He saw Veseli there on two occasions (Ndrecaj March 21st p. 15-18).

Ndrecaj states that Neziraj told him that Veseli and Beqiraj came to his place and asked him to kill Drini but he refused. These admissions were made on five or six occasions. Neziraj told him that he went to warn Drini a few days before he was killed by going to Lulzim Kabashi (Ndrecaj March 27th p. 15-19).

He also recalls Kastrati meeting with Neziraj at Neziraj’s home when looking and test driving Neziraj’s car. He did not overhear all conversation between them. There was a subsequent meeting which he attended with Shala, Kastrati and Neziraj at the

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Centrala Restaurant near Recane where Kastrati and Neziraj had a private conversation that he did not overhear (Ndrecaj March 27th p. 31-32).

Further corroboration can be found Drini’s first WAC application (Exhibit 31) which was submitted shortly after having received the warning.

Why would Fazli Neziraj tell all these people – Basha, Kabashi, Ndrecaj, Shala, and Kastrati that Veseli and Halitjaha had incited him to kill Drini? He would have told them simply because it in fact occurred. Moreover, Neziraj felt a loyalty to protect Drini. In fact he admits in his testimony that if he had known anyone wanted to kill Drini he “would have taken steps to warn Drini as he was really the only person that Drini could reply upon” (Neziraj June 13th p. 6-7). He trusted all of those people sufficiently to admit such sensitive information. He certainly would not hesitate to tell Kabashi, one of his former commanders, a friend, a person he respected and trusted, a “cousin” and who he knew to be Drini’s brother-in-law (Neziraj June 13th p. 6-7). Neziraj admits in his evidence that he always got along with Basha, Ndrecaj, Shala, Zyrapi, Kabashi and Kastrati and never did anything to any of them to cause them to lie about him.

The question remains, why Neziraj would tell friends he trusts one thing and lie to the police and the court. Dr. Baskin, Ulrich Fischer, and Nexhmedin Kastrati have very ably described the ‘atmosphere of fear’ that prevailed at that time, and unfortunately remains. Additionally, Neziraj tells us all we need to know to understand that the ‘atmosphere of fear’ grips him such that he does not have the courage to tell the truth, even under oath.

On July 18th 2001 Ulrich Fischer arranged a formal interview with Neziraj in hopes of getting the truth from him since Veseli had long since been detained. Neziraj denied the Veseli incident. Fischer is an experienced police witness interviewer. The interview had two basic parts to it. The first part dealt solely with whether or not Veseli attended his home and incited him to kill Drini. The second part dealt with Neziraj’s father-in-law’s disappearance and his fear of members of the Group and Veseli. Fischer’s observations of Fazli Neziraj’s demeanour during both parts of the interview are highly cogent.

During the first part of the interview dealing with Drini he observed that it was very difficult to get answers from him. There were long delays after the questions were put before he answered as if “he did not want to answer”. The longer the interview took the more nervous he became. In his evidence of July 3rd at p. 26-27 Fischer states as follows:

Witness: He tried to avoid giving the wrong answers but his body language at that moment told me that he was afraid. He started to sweat and his hands became nervous and every time, it was the same; he didn’t want to answer. Later on, his behaviour changed completely during the second part of the interview.

Public Prosecutor: In the first part, was there any delay in answering your questions, as compared to the second part of the interview?

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Witness: When you see one question and one answer on the paper, you usually need one minute for this, but in fact, he needed many minutes for one answer.

Public Prosecutor: Did you notice anything in the first part on eye-contact compared to the second part?

Witness: Yes. In the first part, he didn’t want to have eye-contact with me and also with KPS Berisha.

With regard to Neziraj’s demeanour during the second part of the statement that did not deal with Drini, Fischer states at p. 27-29 as follows:

Witness: Yes. It [the second part of the statement] was not like a question and answer. He was fluently talking and I didn’t have to interrupt him much.

Public Prosecutor: Is it fair to say in the second portion that Fezli Neziraj told you how Veseli and Fatmir Limaj destroyed his future?

Witness: Yes. He said that Sali Veseli and Fatmir Limaj destroyed his life because they put his father-in-law in jail and when he tried to get his father-in-law free, some people tried to kill him. They drove with him on the road to Recane, but he managed to escape. He waited one hour at the river and he came out when he saw a KFOR vehicle.

Public Prosecutor: Given the mannerism that you observed and the words he said, were you able to tell us who he feared?

Witness: During the first part of the interview, he didn’t mention any name. But when he started the second part, the names Veseli and Limaj I concluded, were the ones he feared.

Public Prosecutor: So with respect to his demeanour during the second part, his eye-contact, his nervousness, his delay in responses, did he appear markedly different during that second part?

Witness: He changed completely. We could no longer see him sweating. He was no longer nervous. He was looking straight at me and telling the story without interruption.

In his evidence of March 27th at page 18, Ndrecaj further corroborates Fischer and Kastrati’s observations that Neziraj was indeed afraid:

Public Prosecutor: So, you mentioned in your statement [April 2nd 2001] in reference to him that he was crying and saying to you that the person who approached him regarding Drini now wanted to kill him. Knowing him as close and as well as you did both in times of war and peace, when he told you this while he was crying, can you now recall his emotional state when he first told you this?

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Witness: On every occasion when we were talking with Fazli Neziraj regarding the murder of Drini, I observed that he was feeling deep pain. But anytime while he was speaking out about it, I got the impression that he was afraid. While mentioning that he was approached to kill Drini, very often he would say, “I tried to warn him but I could not achieve it.” On any occasion when we talked, he would feel bad about what happened.

Neziraj also knew at the time he was being asked to provide statements that Ndrecaj and Shala had been promised that their identities would not be discovered regarding evidence they had to give in Drini’s assassination. He knew that after the arrests their names appeared in the press. He knew that promises by police and prosecutors to protect witnesses identities in Kosovo did not work. In the context of the “atmosphere of fear” as previously described, Neziraj stated at pages 44 and 45 as follows:

Public Prosecutor: Was it your belief that once their identities became public that Shala, Ndrecaj and Zyrapi started to withdraw as major finger pointers to Veseli and start to point the finger to you, you, Fazli, is the one that can solve the case against Veseli?

Witness: Yes

Public Prosecutor: Those were your feelings, correct?

Witness: Not only me.

Public Prosecutor: When you came to that belief did you also believe that with the finger being pointed to you as the main witness against Veseli that that was a very dangerous thing in Kosovo.

Witness: Wes

Public Prosecutor: And in Kosovo that could cause your whole family to be killed, correct?

Witness: Yes

Public Prosecutor: And that is a concern, isn’t it?

Witness: Yes

Public Prosecutor: So by this time when, as you have described, you see yourself and your family in a very dangerous situation, knowing what happened to your father-in-law who disappeared just like that and how you narrowly escaped assassination yourself from the Limaj boys, seeing how easily it could happen even with the stature of Commander Drini and how just be a snap decision you and half of your family can be hauled off to jail and have your whole lives destroyed, having the finger pointed at you was a real concern for you wasn’t it?

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Witness: Yes

Public Prosecutor: And you certainly did not and would not want your name to end up in the press at all?

Witness: Yes

Neziraj clearly knew or honestly believed that if he identified members of the Group to the police, that the Group had the will, power and means to make people disappear. Accordingly, the only way he could do that once he told all these things to friends he trusted was to deny it. He simply did not have the same courage they had to come forward.

Other parts of his evidence the court may wish to consider when assessing Neziraj’s truthfulness before this court are as set out by Ulrich Fisher at page 28-29 as follows:

Public Prosecutor: Fazli Neziraj has testified in front of this Panel and the second Trial Panel and in front of the second Trial Panel, he gave evidence about your conduct at this interview, saying amongst other things, that you treated him quite decently and politely on July 18. But in front of this Panel, he recently testified quite to the opposite, that you weren’t very polite to him. Can you help us out since you were there on how you treated Fazli Neziraj?

Witness: I was polite to him always. There was a good atmosphere between us and my feeling was that he was lucky to have the interview with a German and not with a language assistant.

Public Prosecutor: Why did you think that?

Witness: There was good communication between him and me from the beginning. So there was no reason in the interview to be impolite and to treat him otherwise.

Public Prosecutor: Lastly, Fazli Neziraj told these judges that he had been offered money and that he had been threatened.

Witness: I can repeat that money was never offered to him and he was never threatened. There was no reason to. How can I threaten a person that showed a lot of fear? I tried to get him to overcome his fear.

Neziraj impeaches himself on the point as to whether Ulrich Fischer treated him well. At the 2nd trial, while under oath he told that panel that Fischer in fact treated him well (Neziraj June 13th p. 28-29).

Zyrapi and all others who were alleged to do so contradict Neziraj’s allegations that he was offered large bribes and/or threatened him to give false testimony against Veseli (Zyrapi July 10th p. 41 and others).

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The collective evidence of Zyrapi, Afrim Basha and Kastrati clearly contradict Neziraj’s further attempts to discredit them as deserters of the KLA in a time of war when in fact they were under orders to head Operation Arrow for the KLA.

Neziraj tells the court that Ndrecaj, Shala and Zyrapi threatened to kill him or have him imprisoned if he told anyone they were investigating Veseli yet he failed to tell that to Judge Risch when he had the opportunity to do so (Neziraj June 13th p. 23-24).

Neziraj stated to the second trial panel and to this court that all Remzi Shala told him was to “only tell the truth”. Neziraj then changed his testimony and denied that (Neziraj June 13th p. 24-25).

Neziraj stated that before he spoke to Ndrecaj and Shala [approximately March 2001] regarding Veseli he did not hate Veseli. He stated “I had no reason to hate him. He did not do anything wrong to me”. Yet he immediately contradicts himself at page 39 and 40 stating as follows:

Witness: Yes, but there is something I have to add. I do suspect that Sali Veseli incarcerated me on 28 July 2000. On 28 July the staff of Sali Veseli framed me and they cooked a proceeding for which I stayed for seven months in prison, together with half of my family for armed robbery. Nobody in my family has done anything similar, they have destroyed my career.

…

Witness: This was my explanation regarding the first part of the statement the Public Prosecutor read. I am not denying it as I said.

Public Prosecutor: By July 2000 when you were arrested did you also hate Xhemajl Beqiraj?

Witness: Yes, I hate him. I hated him then, I hate him now, and will hate him until I die.

Public Prosecutor: You hated Veseli and Beqiraj in July when they caused you and half of your family to be falsely arrested and imprisoned, correct?

Witness: Yes. You are again messing things up. I said something to that extent about Xhemajl Beqiraj and I have hated Sali Veseli from 2001 until today, and even today if he had anything to do with my arrest and the arrest of the members of my family.

Public Prosecutor: You may have hated Veseli in 2001 but you also hated him from at least July 2000 when he and Beqiraj caused you and our family to be imprisoned, correct?

Witness: Yes

Though I will not comment on his general demeanour, there is one very odd thing about it that gripped me. He continuously turned and faced Veseli with a smile and open palms as if looking for assurances from Veseli that his continuous denials and

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trashing the credibility of his former commanders and co-fighters met Veseli’s approval. Why else would a man continuously smile at someone he hates? Someone who he believes is Limaj’s dupe and responsible, amongst other things for falsely imprisoning him and his family members for 17 months and ruining his reputation forever.

Neziraj, before this panel, for the first time in cross-examination raised a startling accusation that Judge Risch threatened to lock him up for the rest of his life unless he gave false testimony (Neziraj June 19th p. 19-20). It is also noteworthy that Neziraj states that these threats were made in the presence of three lawyers who attended with Neziraj (Neziraj June 19th p. 25-26).

Neziraj has a previous criminal conviction for giving false testimony.

Though the above mentioned ‘specific evidence’ relating to whether or not Neziraj in fact told the truth to all his former co-fighters, though powerful in and of itself, the panel should not look at it in isolation of the motives that Veseli, Halitjaha and other members of the Group had to assassinate Drini as early as February 2000. Nor can Veseli’s subsequent admissions that he in fact killed Drini just 3 months later be ignored in assessing whether Veseli had the will and animus to incite Fazli Neziraj. Based on all those reasons I would ask the Court to find as truth what he told his friends and co-fighters.

During the war, the Group could and did control by relieving him of command. After the war they found that they could not. So they had to kill him. During the war they found that they could and did control Zyrapi by sending him to Albania. After the war they found that he too could not be controlled. So he was to be next.

Lastly, Halitjaha’s vision for the future of Kosovo was far different to Drini’s at the time he went with Veseli to Neziraj. On January 31st 2000, at pages 38 and 39 he stated that he did not believe that the TMK needed good relations with the Internationals. He further demonstrated his anti-Serb sentiments by stating that he did not wish Serbs to be part of the TMK as he “did not trust them, never did and you cannot find a Serb to love Kosovo even after 100 years”. Drini of course was of the opposite view.

G. Incriminating conduct of Sali Veseli on May 8th 2000 at the time of and immediately after the assassination

Drini’s assassination was not a spontaneous event but a planned one.

Ymer Draga is an elderly retired civil servant. He testified that on the morning of Drini’s assassination he attended the TMK HQ for the purpose of speaking to Veseli in order to ask him to attend a dedication to falling war heroes in his village. He noted many TMK soldiers lined up in the hall facing each other. Veseli came down the stairs, having a smile on his face and then addressed the troops. After doing so he approached Mr. Draga. He did not look sad. He looked normal and had a smile on his face when he spoke to Mr. Draga. He thought it suspicious that the TMK soldiers were not reacting (Draga January 30th p. 4-9).

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There is clear evidence that TMK had a muster every morning. All officers and soldiers must attend. There is an inspection, orders and tasks are given and then everyone goes out and raises the flag and sings a song. From there everyone disburses to fulfil their duties for the day. This flag raising occurs at 8:00 AM. This show of patriotism is a very important part of any army and it certainly was for the TMK given the recent war and shedding of Serb rule. The manner the muster was conducted on the morning of Drini’s assassination is of significance. Drini was shot at approximately 8:15 AM. A short distance from where Drini had been shot. Mr. Draga says that he was there for the morning muster and as such before the flag raising. Yet while the soldiers were lined-up in formation inside the HQ waiting for General Veseli to come down for the muster a young boy came into the HQ and announced that Drini had been killed. This deeply upset Mr. Draga given Drini’s kindness to him when his son had been killed. Accordingly this is not an event that he would easily forget. He was angry because he thought that the soldiers did not appear to be reacting or doing anything about the news. He says that it was sometime after that that Veseli came down the stairs with a smile on his face. The questions thus become “where was Veseli when Drini was gunned down” and “what was he doing during the lead up to, the execution and the escape” such that he could not come to muster on time.

If the muster and flag raising did not take place until well after the boy came to announce the Drini had been shot, how was it that members of the G2 were at the T intersection in the white car so soon after the shooting?

Sali Veseli told this court how badly he felt when he heard that Drini had been shot, how he loved Drini, what a devasting personal loss it was for him and all of Kosovo. He further described in as a “very shocking and memorable event” (October 28th page 29).

Despite such a memorable event Veseli himself had trouble in this trial remembering where he was when he received the news that “Drini had been hit”. Prior to dealing with that seeming lapse of memory, let us recall what others have said. Draga tells us Veseli was at TMK HQ at the relevant time. Remzi Shala says Veseli was in his office. Alush Shala says they were on the highway some distance on the way to Dragash when they first received the news. So where was Veseli? On October 28th at page 30, I began to ask him that very question. It was a simple question. The question was “Where you in your office or in your vehicle’. His response to this question was “It is all clear in my previous statement. I don’t wish to elaborate any further”. I then asked him if in his previous statement he stated that he was in the TMK compound. This was another simple question to which he again evaded by stating “I fully stand by my previous statement. Please do not go over the same question”. I pursued my right to get an answer when his defence lawyer handed him the minutes of his testimony in the previous trial on this issue. He then referred to the proper page where it stated that he was in his office. He then adopted that answer. It is one thing to have to refresh one’s memory over details. But such a detail as to where he was when he heard the news of such a devastating event is not one that a person forgets. Others knew exactly where they were. He says does not even remember who told him such important news.

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One also has to consider his evidence carefully regarding his lack of enquiry for details from whoever gave him the devasting news. He states on October 28th commencing at page 35 that “Drini had been hit”. Nothing else! Veseli was the commander of the TMK. He was, as he says a former co-fighter and a friend. Drini was a very popular and respected member of society. Since the incident happened in his jurisdiction certainly he knew that he would have to make a report to his superiors in Pristina as this would be big news. So in that setting what did he do regarding getting information? The answer is nothing. He did not ask what hit him (a car, a shovel, a falling tree, a bullet, etc.). He did not ask him at where geographically he was hit. He did not ask how Drini was doing. He did not ask when did it happened. He did not make any enquiries at all or send any of his men to go and find out more. There is only one of two possible inferences that can be drawn. One is that because he was a party to the assassination he already knew where Drini had been hit, in front of his home, what hit him, a bunch of bullets, when did it happen, just now and how he was doing, mortally wounded or dead. The only other inference is that he did not respect Drini as he has told this court and simply did not care about Drini.

In Kosovo culture going to the family to offer condolences is an engrained tradition. Veseli’s failure to go a few hundred meters to their home can only be construed of a sign of animus towards Drini or a sign of not caring

On such an important date in the history of Kosovo, though contradicted by Remzi Shala who says Veseli stayed in his office that day, Sali Veseli states that he had a regular meeting in Dragash. He does not remember anything important or unusual about the meeting, it was simply a regular scheduled meeting. Conversely, this court has heard the evidence of many other witnesses who also had plans for that day and dropped them immediately when they heard of Drini’s death.

One such person was Bashkim Ndrecaj who left his wife and just born first child at the hospital when he got the news so that he could find out what had happened and give condolences to the Drini family.

Dr. Baskin too was a very busy man that had plans for that Monday morning. Yet even though he is not even a Kosovar Albanian or former co-fighter of Drini, he states on November 14th at page 20 as follows:

The minute I learned that Ekrem was shot, every plan I had for the day was out the window. I wanted to see myself what his condition was and see if I could do anything to help him and then to contribute to any investigation or anything I could possibly do.

Unlike Veseli who made a crypt, uninformative call to his boss, Dr. Baskin immediately did a full report to SRSG, other bosses and the police. He then went to the KFOR hospital to see Drini with his “very own eyes in the faint hope that the deceased would be someone else”. Once satisfied it was Drini he then immediately put together a full action plan for his superiors – who they should visit, press issues and the like. He then went that morning to the Drini family home to offer condolences, in true Kosovar Albanian fashion, unlike Veseli (Baskin November 14th p. 20).

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Though Veseli had command of hundreds of TMK soldiers, posted throughout the region, with vehicles and radio equipment he took no steps to mobilize any of them to set up road blocks or look for the car, the description of which the TMK possessed that very morning (Exhibit 18). Whether they were permitted by law to investigate or not Drini’s assassination was an important event. He had to power to do something to try and assist. He did nothing. This lack of action is even more inculpatory given that on May 9th 2000 he told Dr. Baskin in a very calm voice that the assassination “was the result of a Serb secret service or the long arm of the [Serb] UDVA” (Baskin November 14th p. 23). Given the recentness of the end of the war and the years of Serbian oppression, one would think that Veseli, as the Zone II Commanding General would have been outraged that a former KLA Commander and hero would be assassinated on his turf on his watch and would have mobilized his entire force to set up road blocks or to intercept Serb radio communications, for which we know they had the capability (see intercepts Exhibit 15).

The only reasonable inference that can be drawn from the lack of sorrow or remorse shown in front of Mr. Draga, of the entire course Veseli’s subsequent non action from the moment he heard that “Drini had been hit”, particularly when he stated he thought it was Serbs who killed Drini, is that he took no action because he knew of the assassination, was part of the assassination, and he did not want the triggerman caught as such an apprehension could lead the international police on a trail back to him and other members of The Group.

And that is why he said to Remzi Shala that morning looking happy and in a calm voice “we killed Drini today” (May 29th p. 10-11).

The Supreme Court was critical of the trial court’s handling of Veseli’s admission to Shala in his office on the day of the killing that “we killed Drini today” and its inclination to treat it as “boasting” The Supreme Court felt otherwise and at page 18 stated that”

While of course, this is possible, traditionally such damning admissions against penal interest, such as this one, are generally considered highly probative and reliable. Without doubt, such a claim again demonstrates motive and possibly even the intent to see Drini killed. [Emphasis added]

H. May 11th Funeral and Gathering at the Pojata Restaurant

On May 11th 2000 a memorial service was held for Drini at the Cultural Centre prior to the subsequent burial at Landovica, near Prizren. Sali Veseli was one of those who gave a speech honouring Drini. Many of those attending were crying. As stated by Hajrije Rexha on November 29th at page 18:

After Drini was buried, Sadik Halitjaha approached me, together with Sali Veseli. They expressed condolences, telling me “You need to take care of little Drini and don’t worry.” At the time, I replied that Í will take care of little Drini and he will take revenge for his father. I remember they both blushed a lot and they left without greeting us.

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Public Prosecutor: This is a clear memory that you have?

Hajrije Rexha: Yes. The day of the funeral will always be in my memory until the day I die. It is present daily in my mind, as well as 8 May when my husband was killed - the day which I remember every minute until I die. These memories are always fresh in my mind.

The video played in court confirms Sali Veseli’s speech and that he entered the Cultural Centre with Alush Shala and sat beside Sadic Halitjaha. Photograph marked Exhibit 56 shows Sali Veseli and Sadic Halitjaha standing side by side at the Landovica portion of Drini’s funeral.

After Drini’s funeral service a large number of The Group and other members of the TMK attended the Pojata restaurant. This is admitted by the accused. Notable members of the Group attending were Veseli, Halitjaha, Alush Shala, Qadraku, Beqiraj and Nezir Kryeziu.

Remzi Shala gave evidence on May 29th regarding the Pojata gathering commencing on page 17. He testified that he sat with the above mentioned members of the Group. The atmosphere was like a “happy moment” with alcohol being served and everyone laughing and joking. He testified that Veseli stood to propose a toast. Everyone filled their glasses and every stood. Veseli then toasted saying “Cheers! We killed Commander Drini, now it is the turn of Zyrapi”. The Group then touched glasses (page 20).

Zyrapi states that after the funeral he was not asked by Qadraku to attend at the Pojata Restaurant. He dealt with some funeral matters and then went home as he was sad and exhausted. Remzi Shala, whom he knew and trusted from the war and from Operation Arrow, knocked on his door that night after dark and spoke with him briefly in a trembling voice. Shala told him that he had been at the Pojata Restaurant and heard Sali Veseli say “Drini is gone now, Bislim Zyrapi is next” and I “should be careful”. Zyrapi testified that he trusted Shala and believed he was truthful but did not take it seriously (much how Drini took his warnings) as Veseli was a war friend and he could, at that time imagine why Veseli would want to kill him. He briefly confronted Veseli about it later and Veseli denied it. However he did not tell Veseli that his driver and body guard was the one who had told him that as he wanted to make sure that Shala would have no consequences from Veseli (Zyrapi July 10th p. 36-38 and 44-45 and July 11th p.5).

Though Zyrapi did not take the warning from Shala seriously at the time, having seen subsequent statements of Veseli about him at previous trials he states as follows:

…where he called me a collaborator and a nephew of Rankovic; all of this propaganda coming from this person. You asked me about their trustworthiness [Ndrecaj and Shala]. This is how I know I can trust these people and even today, I am convinced Sali Veseli had thought of liquidating me. [Zyrapi July 11th p. 5-6]

Dr. Baskin testified that Drini and Bislim Zyrapi were close personally and:

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…shared a vision of a multi-ethnic [Kosovo] one marked with tolerance and openness and one that would be characterized by economic development and those things. [Baskin November 14th p. 19]

Bislim Zyrapi confirms that he shared the same vision for the future of Kosovo with Drini and was trying to recruit Drini to join his Liberal Centre Party that would be in competition with The Group’s PDK Party. Accordingly, given that Bislim Zyrapi was also well educated, starting a political party, a former JNA officer who shared a consistent vision for the future of Kosovo; Remzi Shala’s evidence that members of The Group toasted Drini’s death and that Bislim Zyrapi was next becomes very logical, and boastful.

Veseli tells us himself that he did not like Zyrapi at the time Drini was assassinated. On October 31st at page 21 the following exchange took place.

Prosecutor: At that point in time did you know him to be a good man?

Veseli: No.

Prosecutor: Did you have any personal conflict with him up to that time?

Veseli: I do not wish to say anything in addition to that.

My learned colleague Mjekiqi was kind enough to clarify this with Veseli during her questioning of him on October 31st at page 29 where the following exchange took place:

Mjekiqi: To the Public Prosecutor’s question on whether Zyrapi was a good man your answer was no. I am asking you the question again. Why did you consider him as not a good man at that time [Drini’s assassination] and now?

Veseli: During the time of the former Yugoslavian army when I was serving, there was a major political manipulation against the officers of Albanian origin. Zyrapi was one of the men involved in the manipulative process and to be precise, he was the 4th participant in this manipulation. I learned this during the war from a cousin of his from the same village who had come to the war to fight. He sent me a letter and explained to me who Zyrapi was. At the time, I had no other way of action but only to keep silent. This is why I believe that he is not a good man. [Emphasis added]

Thus, on the night of the Pojata toast where Veseli said, “Cheers! We killed Commander Drini, now it is the turn of Zyrapi”, Veseli’s motives to kill Zyrapi were not only that Zyrapi’ vision of Kosovo was similar to Drini’s and he was a leader in a political party opposed to the PDK but also something else. So with the helpful assistance of my learned colleague in overcoming Veseli’s refusal to answer my question as to why he thought Zyrapi was not a good man, Veseli has told the court that he also had a deep routed personal hostility towards Zyrapi. This is further corroboration of Remzi Shala’s veracity that Veseli and the Group had motives to kill Zyrapi and a clear rationale why he would make such a toast at that time.

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When considering whether Veseli made such a toast the Court may also consider the evidence of Shala and Ndrecaj where they stated that after the arrest of Veseli and the others in May 2001, they went to the TMK HQ in Prizren were Alush Shala was Head of G2. By chance they met him in the hallway and took them into his office. Alush Shala appeared very frightened and at page 26 stated that

they have discovered all of us…Veseli was talking too much…we were celebrating there at Pojata and everybody saw us and discovered us, and someone has ‘rat on us’ (exposed us)

Alush Shala in his testimony denies these things were said but does admit that he did in fact meet them at the TMK HQ after Veseli’s arrest.

I. Post incitement offence conduct implicating Sali Veseli, Sadic Halitjaha, and other members of the Group establishing a motive for wanting to hire an assassin to murder Drini in or about February 2000.

On March 3rd 2000 Drini’s veteran’s association sent a scathing letter to the parallel association being started up by Halitjaha (Exhibit 30).

In late April 2000 Veseli attended the Theranda Hotel and met with members of the group including Fatmir Limaj, Halitjaha, Alush Shala, and Qadraku. This was a meeting thought of significance by the Supreme Court at page 17.

On May 8th 2000 Jusuf Krasniqi owned a red opal Kadett Sports model without license plates. Krasniqi left Kosovo to Germany or Austrians soon after the murder and has not returned. He was a commander in the war and “hung out” with Sadic Halitjaha and Halil Qadraku. After the war he became a member of the TMK until he quit becoming the Head of the PDK Party of Suhareka Municipality (Ademi July 12 p. 9-10) (Baskin November 14th p. 23).

Jusuf Krasniqi, though from Suhareka, was at the crime scene that morning shortly after the shooting. Dr. Baskin saw him at the Drini home (Baskin November 14th p. 23).

Exhibit 18 indicates that four TMK members were at the scene including Group member Qadraku and three other G2 members (Exhibit 5). Qadraku admits this.

A proper inference can be drawn that, as part of the planning of the assassination and the escape of the killer, someone in authority and uniform blocked off the T intersection at the end of Drini’s lane so that the red Opal could get through that busy intersection at the high rate of speed as described by Mr. Elshani without having an accident with a pedestrian, horse cart or vehicle. Within twenty minutes of the murder Ferat Ademi attended the murder scene and saw two TMK officers right at that intersection, Nezir Kryeziu and Rrustem Bytyqi (Ademi July 12 p. 12-15). Nezir Kryeziu is linked to Fatmir Limaj and Sadic Halitjaha (see Ndrecaj) during the war and was one of the “common soldiers (Rank 11) seated with Sali Veseli and Sadic Halitjaha at the Pojata restaurant after Drini’s funeral three days later toasting the death of Drini and the pending death of Zyrapi. Bytyqi on the other hand was a

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member of the G2 Intelligence Platoon (Exhibit 7) and thus linked to Sali Veseli, Halil Qadraku and Alush Shala. Shortly afterwards Ademi walked into a restaurant by chance just as Bytyqi was getting ready to leave but, upon seeing Ademi he flushed in his face and sat back down.

In Mid July 2000, near to when Hajrije gave birth to her son, Sali Veseli first attended her home to offer to her personally his condolences. This would be considered a long time in Kosovo culture to attend the widow’s home and give his personal condolences to her. He was in the accompaniment of Alush Shala, then Head of G2 Intelligence. That also the first time Alush Shala came to give her personal condolences. Prior to that time rumors had spread that Drini was in the process of writing a book about the war. Upon learning that Drini had kept his personal writings on his lap top and that the internationals seized it, Veseli offered to use his influence with the internationals and have it turned over to the TMK in order to return it to the family. Veseli caused a written authorization to have KFOR hand over the computer to the TMK to be drawn up but the Drini family did not sign it (Hajrije Rexha and Ruzhdi Rexha November 21 p. 35). If he had such influence with KFOR there would have been no need to have the lap top come into the possession of the TMK. The internationals could have done that directly. A reasonable inference from all the circumstances is that the TMK wanted that computer to see what was on it.

In May 2001, shortly after the arrest of Sali Veseli and Halil Qadraku for Drini’s assassination, Fatmir Limaj and Hashim Thaci came to Drini’s wife’s home uninvited as leaders of the PDK Party. While there they tried to convince the family that the TMK members arrested including Sali Veseli did not murder Drini and to refrain from accusing Sali Veseli and the other members of the TMK (Ruzhdi Rexha November 21 p. 36 and November 22 p. 5-6) (Hajrije Rexha November 29 p. 7-8).

On about May 9th or 10th 2001 within a couple of days of the arrest of Sali Veseli and Halil Qadraku, and Beqiraj, Zone II TMK Commander, General Sami Lushtaku and Alush Shala attended Hajrije’s home uninvited. Lushtaku had been appointed commander seven months before yet this was his first visit to her home. His excuse in not coming to her home located just a few blocks from the TMK HQ sooner was that he had been very busy. Alush Shala asked her if she had heard that Veseli had just been arrested for the murder. Alush Shala and General Lushtaku stated to her (Hajrije Rexha November 29th p. 38-39) as follows:

Don’t believe KFOR and the international police, but leave this with us because we are the ones who could find the murderer of Drini. We will try to find him.

…

Simply don’t trust the ones that have arrested Sali Veseli because he is not the one who killed Commander Drini…Don’t trust them.

The following highly relevant exchange took place during Hajrije testimony:

Public Prosecutor: but whom did they want you to put your trust into?

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Hajrije Rexha: they wanted me to trust them, that allegedly Sali Veseli was not the guilty one.

Public Prosecutor: did you say anything to them that perhaps could upset them?

Hajrije Rexha: I said that I felt sorry for that person, meaning Sali Veseli, who had been arrested because he would lower the image of TMK.

Public Prosecutor: did you notice or observe any reaction in them concerning those words or the position that you took?

Hajrije Rexha: Yes. I remember very well that Alush Shala had a Marlborough packet of cigarettes in his hand and was playing with it and his whole body was shaking. Our conversation did not last long after that then they left the house and appeared to be very irritated.

Public Prosecutor: when Alush Shala had the Marlborough packet of in his hand and was shaking, did he ask you to tell the internationals anything?

Hajrije Rexha: Yes. He told me tell them to leave this job to TMK but I told him that I would not do so because this is their job.

Public Prosecutor: did they appear to be happy with that answer?

Hajrije Rexha: Not at all.

Public Prosecutor: how were you feeling in the sense that Ruzhdi was not there and you were alone and these two men coming and saying to you these things?

Hajrije Rexha: my mother-in-law was there and in the meantime my husband’s uncle arrived. But I would have wished that Ruzhdi had been present, and to have heard with his own ears, those words.

Public Prosecutor: did their presence and what they had to say upset you a lot?

Her evidence is corroborated by that of Ruzhdi Rexha whom she told that night when he returned home from work (Ruzhdi Rexha November 22 p. 7-8).

Not only does this evidence refute the evidence of Sali Veseli, Sadic Halitjaha, Halil Qadraku, and Alush Shala Halitjaha, that the TMK does not investigate crime, but an adverse inference may be drawn from this evidence, and that respecting the similar attempt by Sadic Halitjaha and Hashim Thaci, that members of the Group (top TMK officers and leaders of the PDK Party) were complicit in the incitement and subsequent assassination by attempting to interfere with the lawful authorities’ ability to investigate Drini’s murder.

We are told by the members of the Group who have testified in this trial that the TMK does not investigate crime and did not investigate Drini’s assassination. Perhaps the

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latter portion of their evidence is one of the few portions of their collective evidence that in fact appears to be true. If that is the case, one has to wonder on what basis Thaci, Limaj, Lushtaku, and Alush Shala could say to the Rexha family that Veseli and the TMK did not assassinate Drini if they did not investigate the crime. Thus, these visits could be nothing more than subtle threats from powerful people or an attempt to intimidate them into having the case withdrawn from the international police and the Investigating Judge. Their attempts to put pressure on the Rexha’s, were nothing other than consciousness of guilt.

In May 2001, shortly after Veseli’s arrest and news of Remzi Shala’s involvement became public, Zenun Krasniqi, a PDK Party supporter and friend of Fatmir Limaj, showed up at Shala’s home after dark. He stated to Shala that he had come on behalf of Limaj in order to get him to change his statement (May 30th p. 28-29). Ndrecaj corroborates this in that Shala told him about the visit soon after Krasniqi left. Limaj’s earlier visit to Hajrije Rexha also tends to corroborate the threat to Shala. The Supreme Court at page 19 was critical of the trial courts failure to consider this evidence.

J. Veseli’s Admissions of Guilt to Ndrecaj and Shala

In addition to the admission of guilt that Veseli made to Shala in his office on the morning of Drini’s assassination Veseli made repeated subsequent admissions that he killed Drini once they went to Mitrovica. Those admissions are found in the testimony of Ndrecaj and Shala. On March 27th the following exchanges, commencing at page 8 and through to page 12, take place with Ndrecaj:

Public Prosecutor: if we could first deal with admissions made to you or in your presence by Sali Veseli in that regard, I refer to your testimony in the second trial of February 13 2003 at page 85 wherein you said as follows:

Later on I joined the TMK, the 4th zone and transferred to Mitrovica. We lived there in a house, which had two storeys. One night as we were talking in that house, Sali Veseli just knelt down and started to boast by saying, I am the one who screwed the mother of Drini and I shall screw the mothers of many people. By this he referred to members of FARK. Sali Veseli used to say quite frequently, ‘I kill people very easily and I can prepare very well their eulogies and when I read the eulogies, I make everybody cry as I did for Drini.’ Sali Veseli also used to say, ‘If we would not have killed Drini, he would have taken the power from us.’

Do you stand by that today?

Witness: I do recall, but maybe the statement has not been translated properly.

Public Prosecutor: what words?

Witness: for example, when Sali Veseli said,

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that easily I could kill people and could prepare what I could say for them in order to make everyone to cry for them.

…

Public Prosecutor: was Remzi Shala present when Sali Veseli said these quotes?

Witness: we had been together almost all the time and maybe he was present there too.

Public Prosecutor: being from Canada, when I hear someone say, “I am the one who screwed the mother of Drini,” I might be taken a little back by that phrase in a sexual manner. Is there a non sexual word which can be used instead of the term ‘screwing someone’s mother’ among Kosovar Albanians?

Witness: it is used when someone hates someone or is nervous of someone. We use the words I got rid of the problem or someone.

…

when he said, ‘He will take the power,’ he was referring to the fact that Drini had a huge authority and through his authority he could put in danger politically any of the candidates for any posts or positions either in TMK or outside of those forces. That could be the reason why Sali Veseli was referring himself the said words, ‘He will take power from us.’

Public Prosecutor: if we go back to that night of the boasting in the house when he knelt down and said those things, thinking back to that moment, can you tell us if you observed anything of his demeanour; of how he looked; of his tone of voice; his mannerisms to tell us if you observed his apparent emotional state at that time when he said those things while kneeling down?

Witness: he mentioned those things with a high tonality of voice. He was nervous which means that he got nervous. I am not able to explain how he got nervous. I could say that he hated someone.

…

Public Prosecutor: on page 89 of the same transcript, the Presiding Judge asked you as follows, “Today you said that the first time you heard Sali Veseli boast about the killing of Drini this happened in a house in Mitrovica. When did this happen?”

Witness – this occurred one and a half months after we officially went to Mitrovica.

Public Prosecutor – can you say approximately when he said those words?

Witness – it must have been in January 2001.

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Public Prosecutor – my question is, do you stand by that statement?

Witness: yes.

…

Public Prosecutor: if you go back to page 85 about screwing the mother of Drini and other mothers, you will recall, “that Sali Veseli used to say quite frequently that I kill people very easily and can prepare their eulogies and make people cry as he did for Drini.” So when you used the term, ‘He used to say it quite frequently,” am I to understand that after the night of the boasting he repeated at least that part of the boast?

Witness: I do not recall exactly, but he mentioned it 3-4 times after that.

Public Prosecutor: and where, generally speaking, would he feel comfortable enough to repeat that?

…

Public Prosecutor: would that be in a house, in the office or where?

Witness: he mentioned that at home.

Public Prosecutor: when you conclude that quote that I gave you by saying Sali Veseli also used to say, “If we had not killed Drini he would have taken power from us.” My question is, when you use the words, “Sali Veseli also used to say,” by using those words, did you mean that he said that on one occasion later or on more than one occasion?

Witness: as far as I remember, I heard those words only once.

Public Prosecutor: now on August 2 2001, you attended court in front of investigating judge Risch and gave a statement, is that correct?

Witness: Yes.

Public Prosecutor: on page 2 of that statement you said this, “In my presence Sali Veseli often mentioned Drini as being a bad and cruel person and he stated several times that he was right in killing him because otherwise Drini would have taken over power.” Do you stand by that statement today?

Witness: Yes. I do.

…

Public Prosecutor: on page 86 part of your evident at the second trial states and I quote, “Another night as we were playing cards, Sali Veseli told Xhemajl Beqiraj that (he) Xhemajl’s friend whom he gave 15,000

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Deutschmarks need not pay it back to him because he did his job as required.” Do you stand by that statement?

Witness: I stand by it.

Public Prosecutor: in that regard, when you say, ‘whom he gave 150,000 Deutschmarks’ who were you referring to as being given the 15,000 Deutschmarks?

Witness: Sali Veseli was talking to Xhemajl Beqiraj and he stated, “friend of yours whom I gave 15,000 Deutschmarks, there is no need for him to pay the money back because he fulfilled his duty as he should.

Public Prosecutor: so was this statement by Sali Veseli that he gave 15,000 Deutschmarks that did not need to be paid back to Xhemajl Beqiraj’s friend, did he make that statement after the boasting incident that you told us about earlier?

Witness: what he mentioned was said at the same period of time, but I cannot recall if he said those last words before or afterwards.

At page 15 the following exchanges take place:

Public Prosecutor: in your first trial in July of 2002, you stated on page 91 after discussing Veseli talking about this 15,000 DM that he gave to Xhemajl and you ride in the car with Beqiraj when you discuss that, you stated as follows, “Moreover, Sali Veseli used to say frequently ‘I, was obliged to remove Fatos as a chief of G2 because he talked a lot about the murder of Drini and we feared they could discover us, so I transferred him to Rahovec”, do you stand by that statement?

Witness: yes

Public Prosecutor: you said then, that Veseli said those words frequently, I take that be on more then one occasion, is that correct?

Witness: yes

Public Prosecutor: at what type of place he would say those things?

Witness: he mentioned those words while we were staying in that house in Mitrovica.

At page 16:

Public Prosecutor: in a very next sentence on page 91, you said as follows “One morning as we were driving to Mitrovica Sali asked us how we had spent the weekend, whether we had been out and met friends. We replied that we had both been out and met friends. Thereupon, Sali said “Have the people learned that I killed Drini? Is anyone in Suhareka mentioning anything?” and

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Remzi Shala said, “No, none is speaking” Then Sali said, “I can arrange these things very well and prepare just as well the eulogy on the burial day”. Do you stand by that statement today?

Witness: yes

In essence the above evidence is corroborated by Remzi Shala who was also present at the times and places where Veseli admitted his guilt for the assassination of Drini.

K. Why Sali Veseli would make any such admissions to Bashkim Ndrecaj and Remzi Shala

There can be no doubt that during the coarse of this trial that the accused Sali Veseli came across as arrogant, full of self importance and a braggart. In Dr. Baskin’s view, Veseli had a misplaced “very high opinion of himself and tried to impress upon us that he was a very important guy”. He supported the leadership in the PDK Party of Thaci and Fatmir Limaj (Baskin November 14 p. 15-16).

Veseli attempted repeatedly to discount the credibility of Bashkim Ndrecaj and Remzi Shala as their words only being the words of common people, common soldiers without rank, and uneducated. He states he does not socialize with the likes of them and certainly would not trust them to say incriminating words such as they allege.

Remzi Shala gave us another instance of when Veseli displayed his trust in Ndrecaj and him, while at the same time displaying his arrogance. Shala testified that one night in Mitrovica they were in the bedroom with Veseli, shortly before Veseli was relieved of command and transferred to Pristina HQ. Shale states that Veseli was reading to them letters between him and his boss Ceku. He was being critical of Ceku and they were all laughing. Veseli denies he did this. Accordingly, I tendered two such letters as exhibits 57 and 58. The very existence of these letter and their dates corroborate Shala’s evidence of the trust Veseli had in them and why he would say things to them. Ceku’s scathing response and his almost immediate transfer to Pristina also corroborates Shala’s evidence. Parenthetically, by Veseli mention and copying Thaci and Kadri Veseli also reaffirms his link to those members of the Group.

However, it is interesting to note that Sali Veseli, in questioning Ferat Ademi, unwittingly contradicted his own snobbishness and lack of trust in the common soldier. You will recall that during the war Ademi was a common soldier with a high school education. He was simply a bodyguard and driver of Zyrapi’s. In his question of Ademi on July 12th, Veseli stated at p. 34-35 as follows:

Sali Veseli: do you remember when we met in October 1998 after the first offensive when you were with two other soldiers in the village of Studençan and you were in the KLA uniform?

Witness: yes

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Sali Veseli: is it true that starting from that day no other soldier was closer to me than you?

Witness: it is true.

Sali Veseli: my question was, no one was closer to Sali Veseli than Ferat Ademi?

Witness: yes

Sali Veseli: is it true that I relied my trust on you while I supplied you with different things for the Headquarters so you could perform your duties?

Witness: yes, it’s true.

One must remember what I have stated above regarding the trust relationship that he in fact did have as brothers in arms, driver, bodyguard, personal secretary, having a mistress, and sleeping together with them in the same house at night for months.

L. Credibility of the accused Sali Veseli

On numerous occasions he arrogantly refused to answer simple questions. Answers to which were not according to any of the protections to witnesses afforded under Article 229. Many of his refusals were simply because he was “not interested”. Many of my questions that he did answer he answered in an arrogant and flippant way.

There were many questions that I presented to him regarding dates of significant events in his career, such as when was he appointed the General of Zone II, where he did not know. Yet he seems to know insignificant dates such as when he met Hazir Isufi.

He even denied having an Intelligence Platoon (G2) in Zone II TMK calling it a platoon for “search and rescue” when there is clear evidence to the contrary (Veseli October 25th p. 9).

Though repeatedly asked, he continuously refused to answer a very important and simple question in this trial “were you a supporter of the PDK Party”.

After stating in his questions of the prosecutor that he had no interest in politics he stated to my learned colleague Mjekiqi that the reason for the charges being brought against him and why they have been so prolonged was because “it was a good way to cause my political death”.

He had trouble identifying the likes of Halitjaha and others on the video of Ndrecaj’s wedding and a photograph taken at the funeral while Haziraj from a far greater distance away in the courtroom, and not even knowing them other then when they were on the witness stand, had no trouble doing so and admitting it.

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He claims that it was him who removed Kadri Kryeziu as the Mayor despite clear evidence to the contrary by Dr. Baskin (Veseli October 18th p. 27). He then qualified his answer to state that it in fact was Baskin, but with his approval just as Veseli approved Drini’s appointment. Dr, Baskin denied ever needing or seeking Veseli’s approval.

He purposefully ties to distances himself from Kadri Kryeziu as a person he was not close to. He testifies that he did not know if Halitjaha even knew Kryeziu despite much evidence to the contrary.

His excuse for doing nothing on the day of Drini’s murder, or subsequently to find Drini’s murderer was because the TMK did not investigate crime. He denies that the TMK investigated crime. The visits of Hashim Thaci, Sadic Halitjaha, Alush Shala and Sami Lushtaku to Hajrije Rexha within days of the Veseli arrest refute that. His evidence on the TMK not investigating crime is further refuted by the evidence of Dr. Baskin who had such information that the TMK investigated crime during his tenure (Baskin November 14th p. 17). And of course, it is contrary to many exhibits filed in this trial concerning Qadraku and Alush Shala.

He testifies that he was and is for a multi-ethnic Kosovo yet when I presented him a map as an exhibit that had Serbian names on it he repeatedly found that “offensive”.

He claims that even though he was the commanding general he did not receive reports or information from the heads of his department such as G2 or communications even though some of them are addressed to him (example Exhibit 14) and did not know that anyone was intercepting Drini’s radio communications, was collaborating with the Serbs or that a former KLA commander was being investigated by his own departments. This is not what one would expect from a Major General in charge of just 500 men in regular military organization.

He states he never had any close relations with Halitjaha (Veseli October 18th p. 10) despite an abundance of evidence to the contrary from Kabashi, Berisha (Hotel Prizrini), Shala, Ndrecaj and others. Ndrecaj also testified that even after they went to Mitrovica Veseli still maintained relations with Halitjaha (Ndrecaj March 21st p. 19).

Veseli also tries to distance himself from Kadri Veseli, Head of SHIK. Yet Ndrecaj and Shala testified that Veseli saw and had dinner at his home (Ndrecaj March 21st p. 23).

He testifies that Drini’s assassination was a very big loss to him Veseli. In fact he said that the news devastated him (Veseli October 17th p. 15 and October 18th p. 12) yet unlike every other witness who has testified here he is the only one who could not recall where he was when he got the news until my learned colleague refreshed his memory from his earlier evidence.

He testified that he did not go to Drini’s home that day or to the hospital as he was scheduled to go to Dragash for a routine meeting. In answer to the panel’s questions he stated that he is a military man and even if his mother died he would have to keep to his schedule. Yet when Skender Gashi unexpectedly was assassinated he dropped everything and was at the crime scene immediately.

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M. Credibility of Sadic Halitjaha

It is noteworthy that Halitjaha, in attempting to distance himself from Remzi Shala and Ndrecaj neglected to tell the court that he was the honoured guest at Ndrecaj’s wedding or that he was from the same village as Shala, related to him and attended with Shala at many family functions though out the years.

He is the PR man for TMK yet when Drini was murdered, and while admitting that Drini was a friend whose loss was a big loss for him and all of Kosovo, he does nothing to collect information from his buddies in Prizren or elsewhere.

His denial that TMK investigated crime is refuted by the visits of Hashim Thaci, Sadic Halitjaha, Alush and Sami Lushtaku to Hajrije Rexha within days of the Veseli arrest. His evidence on the TMK not investigating crime is further refuted by the evidence of Dr. Baskin who had such information that the TMK investigated crime during his tenure (Baskin November 14th p. 17).

Sadic Halitjaha testified that he was supportive of and cooperated with the UN. Conversely Dr. Baskin testified that he heard Sadic Halitjaha during a radio interview saying:

It was really the KLA that liberated Kosovo, that NATO played a very minor role, and that indicated that he was not particularly supportive or cooperative with Resolution 1244. [Baskin November 14th p. 18]

He contradicts himself in his evidence of January 31st 2000; at pages 38 and 39 he stated that he did not believe that the TMK needed good relations with the Internationals.

Halitjaha demeaned Drini’s honour by alleging, for the first time in this third trial that Drini deserted the JNA in 1998 and explained in detail how he knew that and the Serb equipment that he had been issued that year. This desertion has been proved by exhibit 40 and other evidence of the Injured Parties that he lawfully resigned in 1993. Thus this accusation and details of that desertion we simply fabricated. Qadraku also gave this evidence. Since these facts were fabricated Halitjaha and Qadraku must have collaborated prior to giving testimony in this trial.

N. Credibility of Halil Qadraku

His denial that TMK investigated crime is refuted by the visits of Hashim Thaci, Sadic Halitjaha, Alush Shala and Sami Lushtaku to Hajrije Rexha within days of the Veseli arrest. His evidence on the TMK not investigating crime is further refuted by the evidence of Dr. Baskin who had such information that the TMK investigated crime during his tenure (Baskin November 14th p. 17). His evidence is further refuted by Ulrich Fisher, who in commenting about the many documents seized by the police from Qadraku at the time of his arrest for Drini’s murder, state that the investigations conducted by Qadraku were “not a thing done by one person, it was well organized by the G2 of the TMK (Fischer July 3rd p. 11).

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Qadruku’s evidence on this point is clearly contradicted by the documents from him at his arrest that clearly show that the TMK investigated not only Drini but other crimes (Exhibits 9, 10, 14, 15 and 18).

Qadraku alleges that the police offered him millions of DM’s to give false evidence against Veseli. Ulrich Fisher states (Fischer July 3rd p. 17) as follows:

I can say that I have never in my life offered to give money to a witness. I said there was no fund, no institution or anyone who had money for this. What we offered him was the help of the Public Prosecutor when he tells the truth.

Qadraku denied investigating Drini. Some of the aforementioned exhibits refute this.

Qadraku gave contradictory evidence to this trial panel and the previous one regarding whether or not while in prison he had an opportunity to collaborate with Veseli. He stated that he could not because of where they were housed in prison and later changes his evidence to the opposite (Qadraku February 6th p. 26-31).

Qadraku gave contradictory evidence of his actions and the reasons therefore on the morning of the assassination. When he heard Drini had been hit, he first says that he went there to offer condolences. Problem with that is he did not know Drini was dead or even mortally wounded so there would have been no reason for him to go at that time to do so. Later in his testimony he says that he went there to investigate the crime scene. The problem with that of course is that he could not have known where the crime was nor could he have known it was a crime scene at all before he got there, unless of course he knew beforehand that an assassination was going to take place, at that certain location, and that the assassination had been successful.

His evidence of being supportive of a multi ethnic society is refuted by the documents seized from him and entered as exhibits in this trial.

O. Credibility of Alush Shala

He was the G2 man for TMK at the time yet when Drini murdered, and he says Drini was a friend whose loss was a big loss for him and all of Kosovo, he does nothing to collect information particularly with the “Serbs did it “ theory.

His denial that TMK investigated crime is refuted by the visits of Hashim Thaci, Sadic Halitjaha, Alush Shala and Sami Lushtaku to Hajrije Rexha within days of the Veseli arrest. His evidence on the TMK not investigating crime is further refuted by the evidence of Dr. Baskin who had such information that the TMK investigated crime during his tenure (Baskin November 14th p. 17). His evidence is also refuted by Ulrich Fischer who testified that when Alush Shala was arrested in 2001 on unrelated matters he possessed the TMK investigation into the assassination of TMK Commander Skender Gashi, complete with autopsy report and statements of witnesses taken by Shala. He also was found to have intimidated witnesses in other cases (Fischer July 3rd p. 11)( see also Exhibit 49).

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Alush Shale denied investigating Drini. Hajrije Rexha’s evidence of Drini telling her that he was following him refutes this.

His evidence of being supportive of a multi ethnic society is refuted by the documents seized from him and entered as exhibits in this trial (Exhibit 51).

Perhaps the most damaging blow to his credibility was his evidence under oath that he had never said or wrote anything negative about Drini or even about Halitjaha or Veseli. He was certain of that. Unfortunately for him he must have forgotten that a certain letter dated December 1st 2000 to Lushtaku was sized by the internationals. When I confronted him with the document, the very negative comments about these three people and his signature he became very uneasy. He firstly tried to get out of it by saying that it may not be his signature on the letter then tried to blame his secretary for mistakes. This letter also shows his animus towards Drini and his anti Serb sentiments.

P. Standard and Burden of Proof

As stated by the Supreme Court of Kosovo in its decision in the Vyrtyt Miftari case1criminal allegations must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The evidence need not exclude every hypothesis or possibility of innocence, but every fair or rational hypothesis which may be derived from the evidence, except that of guilt.

The burden of bringing evidence and proving the liability of the accused clearly lies with the prosecutor2 and arises from the principle of the presumption of innocence of the accused.3

Q. Sentencing Provisions

Pursuant to PCCK Article 2(2), where a crime is committed prior to a change in the law, the accused is to be given the benefit of the law most favourable to him or her. This principle also applies to the accused with respect to penalties.

Sali Veseli is charged with Incitement under Article 23(2), read together with Article 26 of the CCY. With respect to penalties, Article 23(2) specifically refers to Article 19, stating that unsuccessful incitement is to be punished in accordance with the provisions applicable to attempt. CCY Article 19 sets out the penalties for attempted offences. It states that attempted crimes shall be punished where the penalty for the completed criminal offence carries five or more years imprisonment.

Therefore, as Veseli is accused of inciting Fazli Neziraj to commit aggravated murder for basic, ruthless motives, we must look to CCK Article 30 to determine the relevant penalty. According to Article 30(2)(iii), whoever takes another person’s life for his own benefit, to commit or hide other criminal acts, for ruthless revenge or other basic motives, shall receive a sentence of imprisonment of no less than 10 years, and may receive the death penalty as a maximum sentence. Of course, the death penalty was

1 AP-KZ 91/2002 (4 September 2002)2 See Article 45(1) Yugoslav Law on Criminal Procedure (LCP)3 See Article 3 LCP and Article 6(2) of the European Convention of Human Rights

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abolished in Kosovo pursuant to UNMIK Regulation 1999/24. Although UNMIK Regulation 2000/59 replaced the death penalty with a maximum sentence of forty years, Section 4 of the Regulation makes clear that this principle only applies to crimes committed after 27 October 2000. For these reasons, the Court must look to CCY Article 38(2) which states:

The court may impose a punishment of imprisonment for a term of 20 years for criminal acts eligible for the death penalty.

Under the new law, Sali Veseli is charged with Incitement as part of a Criminal Association under Article 26 of the PCCK. A sentence following a conviction under Article 26 must be in accordance with Article 65(2) which states that the punishment imposed for attempt, assistance and criminal association shall be no more than three-quarters of the maximum punishment prescribed for the criminal offence. As the purpose of the criminal association in this case was to incite Fazli Neziraj to commit aggravated murder, the Court must therefore look to Article 147 to determine the maximum penalty. A conviction under Article 147 carries a penalty with a minimum of ten years imprisonment, and a maximum of forty years imprisonment. Three-quarters of forty years yields a maximum penalty of thirty years.

Thus, when the comparing the maximum penalties available under the old and new law, it is clear that most favourable law to Sali Veseli in relation to the offence of Incitement requires a penalty of at least ten years imprisonment, with a maximum penalty of twenty years imprisonment. The analysis also holds true with respect to the most favorable law to Veseli in relation to the charge of murder.

R. Conclusion

The Supreme Court was critical of the reasoning of the trial court once it found as a fact that Veseli did attempt to hire Neziraj to kill Drini three months before the assassination and then reasoned that this “in itself” did not prove he was successful later. At page 19 the Supreme Court stated as follows:

While it is true, to use the court of first instance’s terminology. that the fact that Veseli tried to hire an assassin three months earlier, BY ITSELF, Does not prove that his efforts were more successful three months later, but unquestionably such conduct shows both motive, intent and opportunity, powerful circumstantial evidence from which an inference as to his responsibility for Drini’s murder in May may be reasonable and logically drawn.

Conversely all Veseli’s hostility towards Drini and that of the Group both before and after the Neziraj incitement and his subsequent admissions of guilt of the assassination itself are also clear and powerful evidence that he did I fact go with Halitjaha to incite Neziraj in February.

I have listed above many instances of hostility of members of the Group of which Veseli was a part and many instances of Veseli’s own hostility or animus towards Drini. At page 19 the Supreme Court states that evidence of hostility is “powerful evidence of motive” to kill. Motives considered by the Supreme Court included

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Veseli undermining Drini as a FARKist and Qadruku’s intercepting of Drini’s communications. In this retrial, many more instances of hostility of Veseli and members of the Group have become apparent as I have stated above.

For all the reason set out above I respectfully submit that the counts charged against former KLA General Staff member and former TMK Major General Sali Veseli have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

Dana UrbanInternational ProsecutorJuly 31st 2006

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