intermediary liability: basics and emerging issuescyberlaw.stanford.edu/files/blogs/intermediary...

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IntermediaryLiability:BasicsandEmergingIssues

DaphneKellerDecember2019

Intermediary Liability

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PresentationRoadmap

§ HighLevelOverview(Slides3to13)§ ReviewofSpecificLaws(Slides13- 22)§ DialsandKnobsforLawmakersAdjustingIntermediaryLiabilityLaws(Slides23-29)

§ EmergingQuestionsandIdeas(Slides31-42)


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IntermediaryLiabilityLaw

HighLevelOverview


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IntermediaryLiabilityLaw§ Definesintermediaries’legalresponsibilitiesforcontentpostedbyusers.

§ Longstandingissue:respondingtoillegal content.§ Often,butnotalways,“noticeandtakedown”

§ Emergingissue:respondingtolegal content§ Mightplatformsberequiredtocarrylawfulspeech,eveniftheydon’twantto?

§ Mightplatformsberequiredtoremovelawfulbutharmfulspeech?


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IntermediaryLiabilityLawsTradeOffBetweenThreeMajorGoals1.Harmprevention

§ ILlawscanreduceharmsrangingfrommoviepiracytochildpornography.Platformgatekeeperrolemakesthempowerfulenforcers.

2.Economicgrowthandinnovation§ ExpresspurposeofmanyILlaws.Attheextreme,badILlawswouldmakeplatformbusinessesimpossible.

3.Freedomofexpressionandinformation§ Platformsthatfearliabilitytakedownlegalspeechtobesafe.Investorsthatfearliabilitydon’tfundopenplatforms.


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IntermediaryLiability:IdealOutcome?

Platformstakedownbadcontent,andleaveupgoodcontent.


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Platformstakedownbadcontent,andleaveupgoodcontent.§ Ifonlywecouldagreeonwhatisgoodandbad…§ Theanswermightvaryforasitedirectedtokids,arealestatesite,abusinessreviewsite,etc….


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Platformstakedownbad illegal content,andleaveupgood legal content.


9Presentation Name-Change in Slide Master 9

RatioofValidtoInvalidNotices– RighttoBeForgotten,perGoogle’sTransparencyReport


10Presentation Name-Change in Slide Master 10

PotentiallyIllegalContent

The problem the law needs to solve is not: “What should platforms do with illegal content?” It is: “What should platforms do with this whole array of potentially illegal content?”


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PlatformMotivationsinNoticeandTakedownSystems§ Economicincentivetoover-remove.§ Multiplestudiesdocumentover-removal.See Urbanetal2016,myCISblogpostlistingotherstudies.*§ Notificationerrors§ Censorshipgoals:Ecuador,RetractionWatch§ Commercialgoals:takedownstargetingcompetitorsarevery,verycommon

§ “Wrongfulremoval”claimsagainstintermediariesareclosetoimpossibleinUS.Globally,afewsuchclaimssucceededbeginningin2018(Brazil,Germany,Poland).

*http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2015/10/empirical-evidence-over-removal-internet-companies-under-intermediary-liability-laws

http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2015/10/empirical-evidence-over-removal-internet-companies-under-intermediary-liability-laws

http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2015/10/empirical-evidence-over-removal-internet-companies-under-intermediary-liability-laws


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“Over-Removal”andFundamentalRights§ Expressionandinformationrights

§ Mostwidelydiscussedandaddressedincases/literature§ Privacyanddataprotectionrights

§ Particularlyin“monitoring”cases§ Fairtrialandremedyordueprocessrights§ Equalityandnon-discriminationrights

§ Disparateimpactofover-removalbecauseofhumanbias,machinebias,sloppiness,politicalpressure,etc.


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CaseLawonIntermediariesandRights§ EuropeanCtofHumanRights

§ Delfi,2015:OKtomakenewsforummonitorforhatespeech

§ MTE,2016:NOTOKtomakenewsforummonitorfordefamation/personalityrightsinfringement

§ CJEUSABAM andothercasesbrieflydiscussuserrights

§ BelenRodriguezv.Google,S.Ct.ofArgentina2014§ Nomonitoringobligation,becauseofthreattospeech§ Publicadjudication/orderstandardformanyremovals

§ ShreyaSinghal,S.Ct.ofIndia2015§ Publicadjudication/orderstandardforallremovals

§ OlderU.S.Cases§ RareInternetcases:Zeran,Cubby,CDTv.Pappert§ Pre-Internetcases:Smith,BantamBooks


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ReviewofSpecificLaws


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IntermediaryLiabilityGlobally§ Manycountrieshavelawforjustoneaspect,i.e.justforcopyright(Chile)orjustforISPs(Japan)

§ Manyhavenospecificlaw,but– asinBelenRodriguezinArgentina - reasonfromgeneraltortandrightsprinciples.

§ Somerelyoncontroloflocalarchitecture(likeChina’s“GreatFirewall”)

§ Inpractice,law/politicsfromafewregionsshapeoutcomesfortherestoftheworld§ US– DMCAtakedowns,1st Am.DrivesculturalnormsofUSplatforms,etc.

§ EU– globalcompliancewithhatespeechcodeofconduct,e.g.§ China– increasinglyvisiblewithTiktok etc.


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EU:eCommerceDirective§ eCommerceDirective

§ Art12:Safeharborfor“mereconduit” informationtransmission.§ Art13:Safeharborforcaching,mustbe“automatic,intermediate,andtemporary”

§ Art14:Safeharborforhosting,providermustremoveuponobtainingknowledgeofillegality

§ Art15:“Nogeneralobligationtomonitor”§ NewsLawsandPendingChangesinclude:

§ AVMSD§ CopyrightDirective§ TerroristContentRegulation§ DigitalServicesAct


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USIntermediaryLiabilityLaw§ ThreeMajorComponents:

§ CDA230:completeimmunityforleavingmostcontentup,“goodSamaritan”immunityfortakingitdown

§ DMCA:highlyformalnoticeandtakedownforcopyright§ Gapsbetweenthetwo:non-©intellectualproperty,federalcrimes,prostitutionandtraffickingclaimsper2018amendment

§ Statuteslargelyoccupythefield.§ UScourtshavebarelyconsideredconstitutionalorfundamentalrightsissues,whilecourtsinmanyothercountrieshave.


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CommunicationsDecencyAct230§ ExtremelybroadimmunityforclaimsthatarenotIPorfederalcriminalclaims.§ Don’thavetotakecontentdownevenifknowntobeillegal.

§ Coversverybroadrangeoftechnologies.§ Aslongasdonotcontributetocreatingthecontent.

§ 1996lawwithexpresseconomicgoal(topromoteInternetdevelopment)andfreeexpressiongoal.

§ Ongoinglegislativeattacks,includingSESTA/FOSTAamendmentin2018.


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CommunicationsDecencyAct230§ Twoseparateimmunities:

§ Immunityforleavingupillegalcontent.(230)(c)(1)§ “GoodSamaritan”immunityfortakingdownlegalcontentbasedongoodfaithefforttoweedoutillegaloreven“objectionable”material.(230)(c)(2)

§ Pragmaticcalculationabout“moderator’sdilemma ”– perverseincentivenottomoderate.§ Underpriorlaw,platformsthatmoderatedusercontentriskedliabilityaseditors(withcontrol)orbasedonhavingknowledge ofunlawfulcontent.

§ Toencouragemoderation,Congressmadeplatformsimmuneregardlessofcontrolorknowledge.


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WhyChange230?Conflictingrationaleswouldleadtoverydifferentamendments…

§ Tomakeplatformstakedownmoreracist,bullying,andotherwiseuglyorharmfulspeech?§ PROBLEM:Muchofthatislegalspeech.230isnotthereasonit’sonline.But230ISthelawfreeingplatformstotakeitdown.

§ Tomakeplatformsstop(allegedly)silencingconservatives?§ PROBLEM:Thatrequiresagovtagencytodefinepoliticalneutrality.

§ Tostopopioidsales?§ PROBLEM:Federalcriminallawalreadyreachesplatforms.

§ Toreachbadactors(Backpage,e.g.)?§ Toshiftbusinessadvantagebetweenhotels/AirBnB,retailers/Amazon,newsmedia/newsaggregators?


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DigitalMillenniumCopyrightAct(DMCA)1. Servicemustbelistedin512(a)-(d)(roughly:

accessproviders,caching,hosting,andsearchengines).

2. Providermustsatisfysomesimple,logisticalprerequisites(likeregisteringanagent).

3. MostprovidersmustproperlyrespondtovalidDMCAnotices.

4. Providermustnotrunafoulofsomeknown,andfiercelylitigated,DMCAhotissues(likehaving“redflagknowledge”).


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DMCAHighlyDetailedTakedownProcess§ Noticemustprovidespecifiedinfofrom512(c)(3)

§ Inadequatenoticecannotcreateknowledgeandliability.(c)(3)(B)(i).

§ Inadequatenoticecantriggerdutytocoach,orcanbeignored,see(c)(3)(B)(ii).

§ Intermediarymustremove“expeditiously.”§ Counternotice:host“takesreasonablestepspromptlytonotify”theaccused,whomaysubmitcounternoticeasspecifiedin512(g).§ Hostisnotrequired todoso,butgetsadditionalimmunities.§ 10-14daysafterreceiptofcounternotice,hostreinstatescontentunlesscomplainantnotifieshostthatitissuingtheaccused.


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DialsandKnobs


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MajorLegalDialsandKnobs1. Protectbroaderornarrowersetoftechnologies

orbusinessmodels2. Permitgreaterorlesserdegreeofplatform

control overcontent3. Defineculpable“knowledge”broadlyornarrowly4. Providemoreorlessdetailedproceduralrulesfor

noticeandtakedown


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1.ProtectingMoreorFewerIntermediaries§ Byfunction:enumeratetechnologies(likecaching,hosting,etc.)versusbroadlyprotectingunforeseentechnologies.§ Differencesheremaybeparticularlyconsequentialforinnovation.§ Differentrulesfordifferentnetworklayersoftenmakesense.

§ Bysize:definemorestringentrulesforlarger,better-resourcedplatforms.§ Ruleslikethesearehardtodefine.(WhathappenstoWikipedia?Perverseincentivesforgrowth/corporatestructure?)Butintheirabsencelawmakersmaysetrulesthatmakecompetitionbysmallplatformsclosetoimpossible.


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2.PermittingMoreorLess“Control”§ Ineveryintermediaryliabilitysystem,platformscanloseimmunitybyexercisingtoomuchcontrol.§ Thisisneededatminimumasadefinitionallinebetweenplatformsandcontentcreators.

§ Somesystemsuseconceptslike“passivity”or“neutrality”.§ Defining“control”canbeextremelydifficult

§ Canplatformshaverankingorsearchfunctionalityatall?§ Cantheyprohibitlawfulbutharmfulcontentatall?§ Foreseeabilityissues- doinnovatorsandinvestorsknowwhattoolsareimmunized?


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3.DefiningCulpable“Knowledge”§ Inmostintermediaryliabilitysystems,platformsloseimmunityforillegalcontentthey“know”about.

§ Law’sdefinition(orlackofdefinition)hasgreatconsequences.Doesplatformremovewhenit…§ Knowsthatthecontentexists?§ Knowsthatsomeoneallegeditwasillegal?§ Knowsthatsomeoneallegeditwasillegalinformalnotice,subjecttopenaltiesformisrepresentation,possibilityoflegalappeal,etc.?

§ Knowsbecausenon-lawyerscanrecognizeitasillegal?§ Knowsbecauselawyersrecognizeitasillegalafterresearchingthelaw?Musttheyseekoutadditionalfacts?Defensesfromtheaccused?

§ Knowsbecauseacourt/publicauthorityhashelditillegal?(ThisisConstitutionallymandatedstandardforsomeclaims/countries)


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4.ProceduralSafeguards§ Formalitiesforaccuser.

§ Formalrequirementsforinformationincludedinnotice.§ Penaltiesforbadfaithnotice.

§ Opportunityforaccusedspeakertoprovide“counter-notice”defendingspeech.§ Aspartofprivateprocesscarriedoutbyplatform.Note:datasuggeststhishasn’tdonemuchgoodsofar.

§ Aspartofpublicopportunitybeforecourtorregulator.§ Transparencyforindependentreview.

§ LikeLumenDatabase.


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OtherLegalDialsandKnobs§ Bright-linerulesversusfuzzystandards§ Privateversuspublicusercommunications§ DifferentrulesforinfrastructurelayersofInternet§ Duediligenceordutyofcareversuspenalizingcontrolandknowledge

§ Public/researchtransparency§ Differentrulesfordifferentclaims(childabusevs.defamation,e.g.)

§ LegalconsequencesotherthantakedownmandatesForalotmoredetail,seemyDesignPrinciplesforIntermediaryLiabilityLawspiecewithJorisvanHobokenorBuildYourOwnIntermediaryLiability pieceonBalkinology


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EmergingQuestionsandIdeas


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SomeBigQuestions1. Limitsonstatepowertopressureplatformsfor

“voluntary”removalunderTermsofService(TOS)?2. Limitsonplatform powertoremovelawfulexpression

underTOS?3. Limitsonnationalcourtscompellingglobal

removal/delisting?4. Limitsoncompellingintermediariestoactivelypolice,

monitor,orfilterusers’activitiesandexpression?5. Whichregulatorsownplatformcontentissues?(Media

regulators?DPAs?Someoneelse?)6. Ifneitherplatformsnorcourtsareviabledecision-

makers,whatisleft?


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1.Statesrelyingonplatforms’TOSforcontentremoval§ Byformalagreement:HateSpeechCodeofConduct§ Bystatepractice:InternetReferralUnits§ Humanrightsexpertsandacademicsask:

§ Doesencouragingprivate agreementsthateffectivelyrestrictInternetusers’rights(respeech,surveillance,etc.)violatethestate’s positiveobligationstoprotectfundamentalrights?

§ Arestatesabdicatingtheirowndutytosetrulessubjecttojudicialreviewtoprotectfundamentalrights?


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2.LimitsonplatformTOSpower(1/2)§ Canusersassertrightstosharelawfulexpressiononprivateplatforms(aka“must-carry”claims)?§ AfewlowercourtsinBrazil(speechrights),Germany(Drittwirkung),andPolandsayYES

§ 30-ishUScasessayNO(seemyWhoDoYouSue paper)§ Competitionandplatformdominancematters.SeeKavanaughanalysisinHalleck,USTA,andPepper(ormyWhoDoYouSue? paper)


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2.LimitsonplatformTOSpower2/2§ Canusersassertrightstofairandtransparentprocess forplatformTOSenforcement?§ SantaClaraPrinciples:clearlystatedrules,consistentenforcement,appeals,transparencyreports.

§ SomeEUauthoritieshavesaidYES,asamatterofconsumerprotectionlaw.

§ SomeUSproposalswouldvestsimilarpowersinFTC.§ Howwouldtheseprinciplesapplytorankingorrecommendationsystems?


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3.GlobalRemoval§ Equustek:S.Ct.ofCanadaordersGoogletode-listresultsgloballybasedontradesecretclaim,seesnofreeexpressionconflict

§ CNIL:CJEUsaysFrancecan’trequireglobalGooglede-listingforall RighttoBeForgottenclaims,butcanforsome

§ Glawischnig-Piesczek:CJEUsaysAustrianlawcanrequireglobalFacebooktakedowninsomecasesfordefamation

§ HappeningNow:globalremovalrulingsfromIndia,etc.


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4.Filtering– PracticalandPolicyIssues1/4

§ Filterscan’treliablydetectcontextofre-usedmaterial§ ISISrecruitmentvideousedbyreportersorincounter-speech

§ Comparechildsexabusecontent,whichhasnolawfulcontext

§ Errorsmayfalldisproportionatelyonspeakersbasedonlanguage,race,nationalorigin,religion§ Sapetal2019

§ Filterscanbeveryexpensivetoimplement(YouTubeContentID$100millionatlastreport)

https://homes.cs.washington.edu/~msap/pdfs/sap2019risk.pdf


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4.Filtering– Legislation2/4

§ EcommerceDirectiveArt.15saysno“general”monitoringduty

§ CopyrightDirectiveArt17§ DraftTerroristContentRegulationmayhavefilteringrequirementbasedonpolice notice(Commission&Councilvs.Parliamentdrafts)

§ EUDigitalServicesAct§ UKOnlineHarmsWhitePaper(referencesmonitoring)


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4.Filtering- HumanRightsCaseLaw3/4§ CJEU2012SABAM cases:monitoringburdensusers’rightstoprivacyandfreeexpression,host’srighttoconductbusiness

§ ECtHRDelfi andMTErulings:Makinganewssitemonitorusercommentsfordefamation violatesusers’info/expressionrights.Makingitmonitorforhatespeechdoesn’t.

§ CJEU2019Glawischnig-Piesczek case:approvedfilteringforcourt-specifiedcontentunderArticle15§ Withoutdiscussingfundamentalrights§ Seeminglyprecludeshumanreviewoffilters’work


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4.Filtering- HumanRightsFactors4/4Whatquestionswouldacourtaskintrulyreviewingafilterforfundamentalrightscompliance?§ Accuracyanderrorrateindetectingtechnicalduplicates anddiscerningnewcontext

§ Resultingbenefitstoclaimantorsociety§ ResultingharmstootherInternetusers

§ Qualitative:Whatistheharm– expression,information,dataprotection,privacy,non-discrimination,fairtrial?

§ Quantitative:Howmanypeopleareharmed?A.1%errorratecanaffectmillionsofpeopleaweek.

§ Alternatives toachievesamebenefitwithlessharm


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5.WhoArethePlatformRegulators?§ Mediaregulatorsarethenaturalownersifyouthinkplatformsarelikebroadcasters.§ Existingmodelbarring“harmfulbutlegal”speech§ UKOnlineHarmsWhitePaper§ AudioVisualMediaServicesDirective§ CoversYouTubeandothervideohosts

§ DataProtectionAuthoritiesalreadyoverseeintermediaryliabilityissuesfor“RighttoBeForgotten”

§ InUS– FTC?FCC?


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7.AFacebookSupremeCourtforEveryone?§ Problem:Everyoneisbadatcontentmoderationatscale

§ Platforms messupallthetime.Evena99.99%perfectjobleavesglaringerrors.

§ Courts/regulatorsdon’thavetheresources,Iftheyusedplatform-styleadjudicationshortcuts,itwouldviolatedueprocessguarantees.

§ FacebookOversightBoardaka“FBSupremeCourt”willatbestsolveatinyportionofthisproblem(whichIamhopefulfor.)Atworst,itwillbeapoliticized,mistrustedfailure.Weneedtimetowatchthisexperimentplayoutbeforebuildingonthismodel!

§ Noonehasevertriedtoregulatethismuch(previouslyephemeral)humanbehavior.Itwasneverpossible.Ourlawsandphilosophyhavenorealmodelfordoingitatthisscale.


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WaysForward?(1/2)§ Bettertakedownprocesses

§ Clearlyneeded,low-hangingfruit§ Notenoughtocounteractover-removalincentives§ Maybehardforsmallplatforms,hurtcompetitiongoals

§ TwoemergingideasthatareimportantbutalsoIMOcurrentlyunder-researchedandunder-theorized.Weneedveryseriousanalysisandcross-fieldcollaboration.I’mnotsayingdon’tdothese,justthinkalotbeforeacting.§ “Must-carry”ruleslimitingplatformpowertotakecontentdownunderTOS.(SeeWhoDoYouSue paperlistingmodels)

§ Regulationofrankingandalgorithms.(Thisismynextbigresearchproject.Ibelievethisisincredibly,incrediblycomplicatedandeasytomessup.)


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WaysForward?(2/2)§ Meaningfulplatformtakedowntransparency(notjustaggregatedata)iskey.Lawmakersneedbetterinformationtoregulatewisely.

§ Considerplatforms’strengths(speed,financialresources,automation)versuspublicauthorities’(applyinglaw,protectingrights,democraticaccountability).Allocateresponsibilitiesaccordingly.

§ Vetproposalsagainst,atminimum:§ Threerecurringplayers:claimant,platform,accused.§ Threebiggoals:anti-harm,expression,innovation.


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ThankYou

https://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/about/people/daphne-keller@daphnehk

https://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/about/people/daphne-keller

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