international approaches to tunnel safety - … 2012-2013...1. lessons from the last 15 years’...

International approaches

to tunnel safety

Didier Lacroix

Centre d’Études des Tunnels

Short history of tunnel safety

Before 1999

After 1999

Catastrophic road tunnel fires in Europe (1999)

Not an issue!

Road tunnel safety before 1999

Not a serious problem (for public opinion)

- rather less accidents than in the open

- fires : 50 fatalities in 50 years worldwide

However :

- a few serious fires

(up to 9 fatalities; a fire lasted 4 days in Japan)

- some research, recommendations, regulations(in a few international associations / countries)

Limited number of tunnel specific requirements in national regulations

- Safety globally high in rail systems

- Due to regulations regarding the whole system

- Tunnels not specially dangerous parts

More specifications by network owners

Rail tunnel safety before 1999

Even less requirements for tunnel safety in national regulations:- Regulations for stations ( ≈≈≈≈ buildings)

- Low probability of a stop out of a station

- Even then, stations generally used for evacuation

Specific safety concepts of each network(depending on standards for rolling stock)

Metro tunnel safety before 1999

Before 1999

After 1999

1999

Short history of tunnel safety

- Mont Blanc (France - Italy) : 39 fatalities

In 1999

2 catastrophic fires in road tunnels:

- Tauern (Austria) : 12 fatalities- Mont Blanc (France - Italy) : 39 fatalities

In 1999

2 catastrophic fires in road tunnels:

- St Gotthard (Switzerland) : 11 fatalities

In 2001

Another catastrophic fire in a road tunnel:

Further to the 1999 and other fires,

tunnel safety became a major concern

�� Initiatives at the nationalEuropeaninternational levels

�� Aiming at researchnew guidelines & legislation

1. Lessons from the last 15 years’ fires

2. Initiatives to improve tunnel safety

3. Current trends

Your questions…

4. Example of the EU Directive

5. Risk analysis for road tunnels

6. Conclusions

Your questions…

International approaches to tunnel safety



�� The catastrophic fires of 1999-2001

in alpine road tunnels:Mont-Blanc, Tauern, St Gotthard

�� Fires in rail / metro systemsThree rather similar

tunnels…

Mont Blanc Tauern St Gotthard

Country France-Italy Austria Switzerland

Length 11.6 km 6.4 km 16.9 km

Traffic Bi-direct. Bi-direct. Bi-direct.

Vehicles /d. 3 300 15 000 18 700

HGV / day 1 300 3 000 3 800

VentilationSemi-transv.

Semi-transv.

Semi-transv.

Opening 1965 1975 1980

MONT BLANC TUNNEL FIRE(24 - 26 March 1999)

MONT BLANC TUNNEL

6

MONT BLANC TUNNEL

OPERATION

• Theoreticallya joint subsidiary of the Fr and It companies

• In facts2 operators that did not cooperate much2 independent control centres

• Safety in operationcommon procedures (1985)private firemen (only at French portal)only one exercice in 34 years…

FIRE LOCATION

BURNT VEHICLES FATALITIES

Found dead Users Staff Firemen

In their vehicle 27

In the tunnel 7 1

In another vehicle 2

In a shelter 1 1

TOTAL 37 1 1

Fire duration = 53 hours… Fire duration = 53 hours…

3 years to reopen…

VENTILATION CONDITIONS

before alarm

VENTILATION CONDITIONS

after alarm

Smoke after 10 min :Italian side

Smoke after 10 min :French side

TAUERN TUNNEL FIRE(29 May 1999)

TAUERN TUNNEL

TAUERN TUNNEL ORIGIN OF THE FIRE

End-of-queue accident (works inside tunnel)

PROGRESS OF THE FIRE

� 8 people are killed in the accident

� Fire starts immediately

� Alert is fastbut firefighters are slow to arrive

� Smoke control is effective in early

�� 80 people escape by car or on foot

� Then explosion and smoke destratification

� 1 HGV driver goes back in the tunneland dies

� 2 people stay in their carand die

� Another person flees before the fire, does not go in the shelter and dies


Fire duration = 15 hoursBurnt vehicles : 16 HGVs + 24 PCs

Fire duration = 15 hoursBurnt vehicles : 16 HGVs + 24 PCs

3 months to reopen

ST GOTTHARD TUNNEL FIRE(24 October 2001)

ST GOTTHARD TUNNEL

ST GOTTHARD TUNNEL OPERATION

• 2 control centreseach responsible in turn(every two weeks)

• A rescue team at each portal2 x (4 people + vehicles)

• Detailed instructions

• Annual exercises

ORIGIN OF THE FIRE

A HGV losses control and crosses the carriageway


� Fire starts very quickly

� Firefighters arrive very fast from South but cannot control fire

� The aiflow pushes smoke to North

� But before that, there was time enough for users to reach the emergency exits

USERS’ BEHAVIOUR

� The drivers of the crushed/burning HGVs flee

� Another HGV driver informs the control centre

� Passenger cars make U-turns and flee

� Passenger cars make U-turns but are blocked

� People escape through emergency exits

� People stay in their car or in the tunnel (or go back there) and die: 11 fatalities

THE TUNNEL AFTER THE FIRE

Re-opening after 2 months

What was learnt?


ORIGIN OF THE FIRE

Self-ignition

End-of-queue accident

Front-to-frontaccident

Lessons on fire risk

SIZE OF THE FIRE

Mean=30 MW

Max = 100-150>> 30 MW >> 30 MW

53 hours 15 hours 48 hours

EXTINGUISHING BY USERS

Did not try ? ?

EXTINGUISHING BY FIREFIGHTERS

Did not reach fire place

Arrivedtoo late

Did not succeed


Possibilities of extinguishing


Evacuation by car

OVERTAKING VEHICLES

Yes,successful

Impossible Yes(far from fire)

blocked tunnel

U-TURNS

French side:yes, no successblocked tunnel

Italian side :yes, successful

Impossible? Yes,-some=success-others = noblocked tunnel(⇒⇒⇒⇒ fatalities)


Perception of risk by users

STAYED IN THEIR CARS

27 people(dead)

2 people(dead)

several(dead)

CAME BACK FOR BELONGINGS

? 1 (dead) 1 (dead)

Fatal behaviours…


Operators’ behaviour

Italian side:No extraction According

to plans

(but no thorough,

independent investigation?)

French side:Other mistakes

Both sides: No exercise

Lack of communication

2 separate control centres

According to plans

(but no thorough,

independent investigation?)



�� The catastrophic fires of 1999-2001

in alpine road tunnels:Mont-Blanc, Tauern, St Gotthard

�� Fires in rail / metro systems

Catastrophic fires in rail/metro tunnels too:

- Channel Tunnel (1996 & 2008): no fatality but very serious damage

- Kaprun funicular tunnel (2000):155 fatalities

- Daegu metro (2003):196 fatalities

- Etc.



3. Current trends

Your questions…



6. Conclusions

Your questions…





�� at the national level

�� at the European level

�� at the international level

France / Italy�� joint investigation into Mt Blanc fire

France�� check of all road tunnels > 1000 m (40)�� check of important rail tunnels (32)�� new regulation road tunnels (August 2000)�� new law road, rail, metro (January 2002)

Switzerland��Tunnel Task Force

Austria, Norway, etc.

�� Need for consistency!

In / just after 1999







United NationsEconomic Commission for Europe

(Geneva - 55 countries)

Ad hoc multidisciplinary group of experts

�� Report on road tunnel safety (Dec. 2001)(official recommendations – not compulsory)

�� Amendments to European agreements(more or less compulsory agreements, on: road traffic, road signing, dangerous goods, E-roads, vehicles, etc.)

United NationsEconomic Commission for Europe

(Geneva - 55 countries)

Other ad hoc multidisciplinary group of experts

�� Report on rail tunnel safety (Dec. 2003)

European Union

� Included Tunnel Safety in the calls for research projects/networks( 5th & 6th framework programmes)

European research projects / networks

D•A•R•T•S

European Union

� Included Tunnel Safety in the calls for research projects/networks( 5th & 6th framework programmes)

� Not competent for policy on tunnel safety(subsidiarity)

But requested by the Head of States

� Topic not considered urgent in 1999-2001

But became a priority after the St Gotthard fire (Oct. 2001)

European Union

Legislation (compulsory) on tunnel safety:

� Road tunnels:Directive 2004 / 54 / EC of 29 April 2004

on minimum safety requirements fortunnels in the trans-European road network

� Rail tunnels:In the framework of the 2nd railway package

Technical Specification for Interoperability

European Association for Railway Interoperability

European Association for Railway Interoperability

European Railways Agency

AEIF, replaced by the European Railways Agency,was mandated by EC to lay down theTechnical Specifications for Interoperability (TSI)

�� TSI on ‘Safety in Railway Tunnels’

� Published in 2008, currently under revision

� Compulsory in new and upgraded tunnelson interoperable lines all over Europe







NFPA (National Fire Protection Association)

Road tunnels: NFPA 502

� Became a standard:Standard for Road Tunnels, Bridges, and Other Limited Access Highways

� Successive editions have followedinternational developments

� Last edition = 2011

NFPA (National Fire Protection Association)

Rail & metro: NFPA 130

� Standard for Fixed Guideway Transit and Passenger Rail Systems

� Not limited to tunnels (open sections as well)

� Last edition = 2010

Committee on Road Tunnel Operation

30 countries5 working groups

World Road Association (PIARC)

International association - road tunnels

�� 130 experts

118 member governments> 2000 members

in 130 countries

PIARC Technical Committee on Road Tunnel Operation

Operation, Safety,

Environment, Equipment

25 reports published in 15 years

On-line PIARC Tunnel Manual

(all freely available on www.piarc.org)

+ 9 new reports (2011-2012)

Working party of infrastructure managers/operators:

�� Leaflet ‘Safety in Railway Tunnels’ (2003)

International association - rail tunnels

International Union of Railways(World organisation of railways)

� Tunnels between 1 and 15 km with mixed traffic

� > 50 measures described and analysed�� recommendations (≠≠≠≠ new and existing tunnels)

� Covers infrastructure, rolling stock and operation

� Inspired UN ECE report and SRT TSI

Working group:

�� Recommendations on safety in metro tunnels

International association - metro tunnels

International Association of Public Transport

� Gathers 64 member Nations (like AFTES)

+ 310 affiliate members

� Deals with all aspects of tunnels(and other underground facilities):mainly design and construction, but also operation, safety, etc.

� Agreements with PIARC, UITP, etc. to organise co-operation and avoid duplications

ITA - AITES (International Tunnelling and

Underground Space Association)

International association - all tunnels ITA Committee on Operational Safety in

Underground Facilities (COSUF)

� Initiated by European projects/networks to:- continue / deapen their activities- widen to international level

� Launched by ITA in cooperation with PIARC

� Deals with all kinds of underground facilities

� Main objectives:- create a worldwide network- develop research activities- promote safety underground



3. Current trends

Your questions…



6. Conclusions

Your questions…


General consensus:

1. Prevention of critical events (��human life, environment, tunnel)

2. Reduction of consequences

Differences road ↔↔↔↔ rail/metro:

� Prevention �� larger role for rail & metro

� Different ways to reduce consequences

1. Convergent objectives

Road tunnels (EU directive)

�� self-rescue�� intervention of road users�� emergency services

Rail tunnels (UNECE report)

�� mitigate the impact of incidents�� facilitate escape�� facilitate rescue

1. Convergent objectives

Reduction of the consequences of incidents:

2. Take the whole system into account

SAFETY

Users Operation

Vehicles Infra-structure

2. Take the whole system into account

�� a holistic approach!

� a ‘system view’ (UN ECE – rail tunnels)

� ‘all aspects of the system composed of the infrastructure, operation, users and vehicles’(EU directive – road tunnels)

Road tunnels:�� traditionnally, guidelines = infrastructure�� Mont Blanc, Tauern: importance of operations�� Swiss Task Force: users, vehicles

EU Directive provisions�� users + operation + infra + vehicles

Rail and metro tunnels:�� role of rolling stock and operation recognized

TSI �� infrastructure + rolling stock + operations(users behaviour dealt with, but not as such)

3. Provisions for the infrastructure, operation, users and vehicles

4. Partial move from prescriptive to risk-based approaches

Traditionally: prescriptive standards

« A tunnel is safe if it is designed in line with valid regulations »

Advantages:�� Easy to use / to check

�� Uniformity in tunnels

Drawbacks:�� Choices are not optimal

�� Owners/designers/operators may forget to think about safety

Definition of a risk-based approach:

« A tunnel is safe if it meets predefined risk criteria »

Why no purely risk-based legislation today?

� Quantitative objectives - are difficult to establish- raise objections

� QRA tools are not (fully) reliable

� Authorities (often) do not trust QRA

� It may lead to very different provisions according to cases and experts…


Several current standards provide for an intermediate approach (incl. EU road tunnel directive):

Risk analysis is a complement to prescriptive provisions

� To choose between alternatives

� To check general consistency

� To demonstrate safety in case of deviations from prescriptionsor cases not dealt with by prescriptions


Before opening new or modified tunnel:

� Checks by independent experts

� Authorisation by safety authority

5. Provisions to check tunnel safety

During operation:

� Safety exercises

� Feedback from incidents and accidents

� Possibly periodic inspections



3. Current trends

Your questions…



6. Conclusions

Your questions…


Your questions?



3. Current trends



6. Conclusions

Your questions…




3. Current trends



Responsibilities

Procedures

Safety measures

Directive bases & applicability

Based on�� UN ECE group of experts report�� PIARC (World Road Association) reports�� Pre-existing national regulations (eg. France)

Main novelties�� 1st plurinational tunnel legislation worldwide�� introduces the main components of

a Tunnel Safety Management System

Directive 2004 /54 /EC of 29 /4 /2004 on minimum safety requirements

for tunnels in the trans-European road network



� Applies to tunnels:�� on the Trans-European Road Network�� > 500 m

� Existing tunnels shall comply by 2014 / 2019�� 400 existing tunnels in 2004

� New tunnels shall comply from preliminary design



� Applicable only once transposed

into national legislation / regulations

� All EU members States (+ Norway & Switzerland)have transposed (except 7 with no tunnel on TERN)

� Most States have made the same or similar provisions also applicable to:

- tunnels > 500 m not on the TERN- and / or shorter tunnels



3. Current trends



Responsibilities

Procedures

Safety measures

Directive applicability

��

� A single Tunnel Manager for each tunnelat each stage (design, construction, operation)

� The Tunnel Manager is responsible for the day-to-day operation and safety

(not explicitly written in Directive, but essential!)

Tunnel Manager (TM)

� Ensures that - all aspects are taken into account - all tasks are performed

(inspections, schemes and plans, risk-reduction measures, etc.)

� Authorises and can suspend / restrict tunnel operation

Administrative Authority (AA)

� Are imposed few requirements

� But mentioned 29 times in the directive!�� very important role

� Provisions relate to their:- information - training - possibilities of action - coordination with Tunnel Manager

Emergency Services

� Nominated by Tunnel Manager

� Independent

� Coordinates all preventive & safeguards measures

� Checks safety and takes part in exercises, analysis of incidents, etc.

Safety Officer (SO)

� Inspection entities:�� perform inspections, evaluations

and tests

� Experts:�� give opinion on safety

Technical expertise

Tunnel

AdministrativeAuthority

auth

ori

sati

on

TunnelManager

EmergencyServices

InspectionEntity

Safety Officer



3. Current trends



Responsibilities

Procedures

Safety measures


A very important tool: the Safety Documentation

� To be compiled by Tunnel Manager

� Describes all preventive and safeguard measures

� Includes all information important for safety

�� Communication tool between all players

�� Basis of all safety procedures

Directive 2004 / 54 / EC of 29 April 2004

SAFETY

DOCUMENTATION

Tunneldescription

Opinionof external expert

Op

erat

ion

al s

afet

y m

easu

res

Operational means / measures

*

* From commissioning stage

Dem

on

stra

tio

n o

f sa

fety

lev

el

Trafficforecast

Dangerous goodsrisk analysis

Specifichazard investigation

Any otherrisk analysis

** Once tunnel in operation

Emergency response plan

*

System of permanent feedback

*

List/analysisof exercices

**

Report/analyseson incidents

**

1. Procedures for new constructionand modifications

� Before construction starts:Safety documentation submitted to AAThen design approved by competent authority

� Before tunnel is opened to traffic:Authorisation of AA

� Substantial modifications of the tunnel:Authorisation by AA before reopening to traffic

� Other modifications of the tunnel:Opinion of Safety Officer

2. Procedures once tunnel in operation

� Safety documentation to be keptpermanently up to date by Tunnel Manager

� Significant accidents and incidentsto be reported within 1 month to AA and emergency services

� Exercises to be jointly organised by TM and emergency services with Safety Officer

� Periodic inspections at least every 6 years�� measures must be taken if not satisfactory



3. Current trends



Responsibilities

Procedures

Safety measures


� Holistic approach:Systematic consideration of all aspects of the system composed of

Basis for deciding on safety measures

Users Operation

Vehicles Infra-structure

� Holistic approach:Systematic consideration of all aspects of the system


� Minimum requirementswith some derogation possibilities

�� Infrastructure requirements for existing tunnels ≤≤≤≤ new tunnels

�� Operationrequirements for existing tunnels ≡≡≡≡ new tunnels

� Holistic approach:Systematic consideration of all aspects of the system


� Minimum requirementswith some derogation possibilities

� Risk analyses

�� To justify alternative measures (derogations)

�� When tunnel has special characteristics

�� Before regulations on DGs are set / modified

include a Specific Hazard Investigation



3. Current trends



6. Conclusions

Your questions…




3. Current trends




�� Terminology and methodologies

�� Dangerous goods transport

�� Lessons on risk analysis

Based on PIARC reports (2008 & 2012)

What is risk analysis?

� A big family of - different approaches, methods, models- combining various components- for specific tasks

� A systematic analysis of sequences & interactionsin potential accidents

� Thereby identifying weak pointsand recognising possible improvements

� Risk analysis can attempt to quantify the risk

What is the purpose of risk analysis?

� To check general consistency of safety planning

� To choose between alternatives

� To demonstrate safety in case of deviations from prescriptions

� To optimise safety planning in terms of cost-effectiveness

� To assess safety in the framework of a performance-based approach

Risk Assessment Process

Two types of risk-based approaches

1. Scenario-based approach

Types of risk-based approaches


� Optimisation of design

� Check consistency of all safety provisions

� Detailed investigation of specific problems

� Planning of emergency response measures



2. System-based approach



2. System-based approach

�� Risk indicators for an overall system:

� Evaluation of different safety measures

� Comparison with other cases(or acceptance criteria)

Methodological components used at each step

Examples of methods(not aimed at dangerous goods )

� France: Specific Hazard Investigation(scenario-based approach)

� Greece: Specific Hazard Investigation(very similar to France)

� Austria: TuRisMo model(system-based approach)

� Netherlands: both- scenario analysis- and system-based model (RWSQRA)

Examples of methods(not aimed at dangerous goods ))

� Italy: IRAM - Italian Risk Analysis Method(system-based approach)

� Germany: System-based approach

� …

A little more on the Italian method(as an example among others)

� Compliant tunnel (with Directive, not special

case): no risk analysis

� Non-compliant tunnel (or special case):

perform risk analysis (IRAM)

1. Compare EV (average number of fatalities/year)with « standard » (directive-compliant) tunnel �� if lower: acceptable, stop here

if higher: next step

2. Compare tunnel F-N curve with criteria fixed by law

A little more on the Italian method(as an example among others)



3. Current trends







��

Dangerous goods

Tunnels

� Very low accident probability

� But possible catastrophic consequences

� Very high psychological impact

Dangerous goods

Tunnels

Decide if / which DGs can go through

If DGs allowed,reduce risks

Apply decision�� regulations

Joint OECD/PIARC projectTransport of dangerous goods

through road tunnels

From 1995 to 2001:

� Harmonisation of tunnel regulations

� Rational decision process

� Risk reduction measures

Basis for an harmonised regulatory system for DGs in road tunnels

Rational approach to risks in tunnels:

1. Explosions:- "Very large" explosion (e.g. hot BLEVE)- "Large" explosion (e.g. cold BLEVE)

2. Large releases of toxic gas(or volatile toxic liquid)

3. Large fires

Above order corresponds to:- Decreasing consequences- Increasing effectiveness of mitigating measures

Principle of tunnel categories

Category A No restriction

Category B Restriction for cargoes with a risk of very large explosion

Category C Restrictions of category B + for cargoes with a risk of largeexplosion or large toxic release

Category D Restrictions of category C + for cargoes with a risk of large fire

Category E Restriction for all DGs

Risk Assessment and Decision Process

• Principles for the decision:

� based on comparison of various alternatives

� taking into account tunnel and detour routes

Other data+political preferences

Choice of alternativeDSMQRA

modelRisk

indicators

Data

• Structure of recommended process

Development of a DG QRA model

� A system-based risk analysis model�� Societal risk: F-N curves for users / neighbours �� Individual risk (neighbours)�� Damage to the tunnel, to the environment

� Applicable to a route including (or not) a tunnel

� Based on 13 scenarios - representative of each of the 5 tunnel categories

(but cat. D and E cannot be distinguished: similar risks)

- probability and consequence models imbedded

� Available from PIARC (500 euros)

United Nations

Economic Commission for Europe(located in Geneva; gathers 55 countries;

manages ADR: European Agreement concerning the international carriage of dangerous goods by road)

� Group of experts on road tunnel safety(Report December 2001: recommended all OECD/PIARC proposals)

� WP 15: Amendments to ADR for tunnels(Compulsory since 1st January 2010; based on OECD/PIARC proposals)

Tunnels: category is compulsory

� Any restriction to DGs in a tunnel⇒⇒⇒⇒ assign the tunnel to a category

(A to E: those proposed by OECD and PIARC)

� Category may change according to hour / day

� Categories must be signed:- Category A: no sign (no restriction)- Other categories:

BBBB CCCC DDDD EEEE

DG vehicles: tunnel restriction code

� each DG vehicle gets a « tunnel restriction code » (B to E)

� a DG vehicle can only pass through tunnel categories before its restriction code(in the alphabetical order)

E.g. - a vehicle with code C

�� only through tunnel categories A and B

- a vehicle with code E

�� only through tunnel categories A, B, C and D

UN No. 1073 : refrigerated liquefied oxygen

ADR : tunnel restriction code C

?No

sign

BBBB CCCC DDDD EEEE

Current DG risk assessment practice

Example of the Alpine countries(cover a very large majority of the TERN tunnels)

� 4 countries use very similar approaches, based on specific assessment of DG risk: AT, CH, DE, FR

� Italy does not assess DG risk separately

�� First examine AT, CH, DE, FR methodologies,then IT approach

Common features (AT, CH, DE, FR)

� Progressive development of methods:- FR started first (published in 2005; ongoing revision)- Parallel developments in AT, CH then DE

(all to be finalised soon)

� Step-by-step process - First step(s): quickly deal with low-risk cases

(identify those which do not deserve detailed analysis)- Next step(s): only for tunnels with significant risk

� Based on a system-based risk analysisfollowed by evaluation of Expected Values (EV)

and possibly F-N curves

� Using the OECD/PIARC QRA modelat least for some steps, possibly with adjustments

Summary of AT methodology

� Step 1: Classification matrix

EV threshold value = same as FR = 10-3 fatality / year

Summary of AT methodology

� Step 1: Classification matrix

� Step 2: Detailed approach (OECD/PIARC model)

Step 2a: Comparison with acceptance F-N curve

Category A

Category A

Step 2b: Idem with additional measures

Category A

� Step 3: Comparison with alternative routes

Similar to FR approach Category B, C, D, E

The IT approach to DGs in road tunnels

� DGs are not considered separately

� DGs included in a global risk acceptance criterion �� F-N curve proportional to 1/N �� Applicable per tunnel (whatever its length)�� Cumulates fires and DG accidents �� Road accidents are excluded

�� DG restrictions (choice of category B, C, D, E)are only one measure among others to reduce global risk if needed

Conclusions on DG transport in tunnels

� Harmonisation of DG tunnel regulations: a large progress for DG transport organisation and safety(even though the system is indeed complex!)

� Decision making processes:. diverse . but rational and based on risks

Differences reflect different national risk cultures�� harmonisation is not envisaged,

and not necessary



3. Current trends







Lessons drawn on risk analysis

1. As they provide a structured & transparent

assessment of risks,

Risk-based approaches are a valuable complement to prescriptive requirements

2. No method is today the most suitable in all cases:

Possibilities for harmonisation are limited

3. General guidelines could be developedto ensure appropriate use of risk analysis

4. Uncertainties are high due to the limited data and

modelling techniques

�� results of quantitative risk analysis mustbe interpreted as orders of magnitude

�� risk evaluation by relative comparisonmay improve robustness of conclusions

Lessons drawn on risk analysis



3. Current trends



6. Conclusions

Your questions…


� The 1999 (and other) fires have showed that:- Existing tunnels are of concern (also) - Safety is not ensured by infrastructure (only):operation, users, vehicles must be considered

� A profusion of initiatives have taken place:- Research, syntheses- Recommendations, legislation

� Many documents are available:

A huge work has been done since 1999

Consensus is being achieved on

� Safety objectives 1. Prevention2. Reduction of consequences

� Holistic approach users, operation, infrastructure, vehicles

� Risk analysisto complement prescriptive provisionsto check global consistency

� Feedback from experienceto improve safety

�� All elements of a safety management system(best Example = EU directive 2004/54/EC)

6-YEAR VIRTUOUS

CIRCLE

CONTINUOUSVIRTUOUS

CIRCLE

Analysis of incidents

Exercise every year

Feedback from operation

Inspection and external point of view

every 6 yearsSafety

documentation

Safety measures

Riskanalysis

Technical reference system



3. Current trends

Your questions…



6. Conclusions

Your questions…


Your questions?

international approaches to tunnel safety - … 2012-2013...1. lessons from the last 15 years’...

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