international decision making- leadership matters.pdf

7/24/2019 International Decision Making- Leadership Matters.pdf

1/15

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International Decision Making: Leadership MattersAuthor(s): Margaret G. Hermann and Joe D. HaganReviewed work(s):Source: Foreign Policy, No. 110, Special Edition: Frontiers of Knowledge (Spring, 1998), pp.124-137Published by: Washingtonpost.Newsweek Interactive, LLCStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1149281.

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2/15

nternational

Decision

Making

eadership

atters

byMargaret

. Hermann

Joe

D.

Hagan

hen

conversations

urn to

foreignpolicy

and international politics, they often

focus on

particular

leaders

and

evalua-

tions of

their

leadership.

We

grade

Bill

Clinton's

performance

broad;

rgue

about

why

Benjamin

Netanyahu

s or is

not

stalling

he MiddleEast

peaceprocess;

ebateMohammed

hata-

mi's intentions

regarding

ranian

elationswith

the United

States;

and

ponder

what

will

happen

n

South

Africa

or Russiawhen

Nelson

Mandela rBorisYeltsin eavesoffice.In eachcase,ourattention s

rivetedon

individualswhose

eadership

eems o

matter

beyond

he

borders f

the countries

hey

lead.

Yet,

though

many

of

us find such

discussions

nformative,

or

the

past

several

decades

most scholars f

world

politics

wouldhave dis-

counted

hem,

proposing

nstead o focus

on

the internationalon-

straints

hat imitwhat

eaders

an

do.

Their

rationale

wentasfollows:

Becausehe

systemicmperatives

f

anarchy

r

interdependence

reso

clear,

eaders

an choose

from

only

a

limited

range

of

foreign

policy

strategies.

f

they

are

o exercise ational

eadership

ndmaximize

heir

state'smovement

oward ts

goals,

only

certainactionsare

feasible.

Consequently,

ncorporating

eaders nd

eadership

nto

general

heo-

riesof

international

elationss

unnecessary

ince

such

knowledge

dds

MARGARET

G. HERMANN is

professor

f

political

cience

t OhioState

University

and heeditorftheMershonnternationaltudiesReview.

OE

D.

HAGAN

ispro-

fessor

f

political

cience

t West

Virginia niversity

124

FOREIGN POLICY

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3/15

Hermann

&

Hagan

little to our

understanding

f the

dynamics

f

conflict,

cooperation,

and

change

n

international

ffairs.

In

the

bipolar

nternational

ystem

hat

characterizedhe

Cold

War,

such

a

rationale

might

haveseemed

easonable. ut

today

here

s

little

consensus

n

the

nature

f

the

new

world

order nd moreroom

or

interpretation,

nnovation,

misunderstanding,

nd

miscommunication.

In such an ambiguousnvironment,he perspectivesf the leaders

involved

n

foreign

policy

making

an

have more

nfluence n

what

governments

o.

Moreover,

s

international

onstraintsn

foreign ol-

icy

have become

more lexible

and

indeterminate,

he

importance

f

domestic

political

concerns

has

increased.

cholarsof

international

relations ave

begun

o talk

not

only

about

different indsof

states-

democracies,

ransitional

emocracies,

nd

autocracies-but lso

about

how

domestic

olitical

pressures

an

help

to define

he

state-strong,

weak; table,unstable;ohesive,

ragmented;

atisfied,evisionist. nd

they

have

started o

emphasize

hat

government

eadershave

some

choice in

the roles

that their

states

play

in

international

olitics-

doves,

hawks;

nvolved,

solationist;

nilateral,

multilateral;

egional,

global;

ragmatists,

adicals.

hese

differences

reordain

ifferent

inds

of

reactionswithin

he

international

rena.

Ironically,

omeof

the

more

nteresting

llustrationsf

the

effects

hat

leaders nddomesticolitics anhaveonworld olitics aveemergedn

the

very

iterature

hat

originally

ismissedheir

ignificance.

esearchers

have

ried

o account

or

why

tateswith

imilar

ositions

n

international

affairs

ave

reactedn

varied

and

often

self-defeating)ays.

For

exam-

ple,

in

examining

he

crises

f

the

1930s,

tudents f

internationalela-

tions

have

puzzled

ver

why

the

democracies

f the

time

reacted n

divergent

ays

o the

Great

Depression

nd

why

they

ailed

o

balance

against

eemingly

bvious

ecurity

hreats.

cholars

eeking

o

answer

suchquestionsave ooked tdomesticressuresnd eadershiprrange-

ments

with

an

eye

toward

eveloping

theory

f

state

behavior.

Although

nterest n

leaders

nd

domestic

politics

has

ebbed

and

flowed,

cholars

who

focus

on

understanding

he

foreign

olicy

process

have

made

progress

n

identifying

he

conditions

under

which

these

factors

o

matter

nd

n

specifying

he

nature f

their

effects.

Building

on

the

research

of

Graham

Allison,

Michael

Brecher,

Alexander

George,

Morton

Halperin,

Ole

Holsti, IrvingJanis,

Robert

Jervis,

Ernest

May,

James

Rosenau,

and

Richard

Snyder,

hey

have

explored

how

leaders

perceive

and

interpret

constraints

n

their

international

SPRING

1998

125



4/15

International

ecision

aking

anddomestic

nvironments,

ake

decisions,

nd

manage

omestic

political pressures

n their

foreign

policy

choices. These scholars

con-

tend that state leaders

play

a

pivotal

role in

balancing

international

imperatives

with those

arising

rom,

or embedded

n,

domestic

politics.

What has

emerged

is a more nuanced

picture

of the

processes

that

drive

and

guide

the

actions

of

states

in

world

politics.

THE

ROLE

LEADERS

PLAY

Leaders Perceive and

Interpret

Constraints

Leadersdefine

states' nternational

nd domestic

constraints.Basedon

their

perceptions

nd

interpretations,hey

build

expectations, lan

strate-

gies,

and

urge

actionson their

governments

hat conform

with

their

udg-

ments about

what is

possible

and

likely

to

maintain

them

in

their

positions.

Such

perceptions elp

frame

overnments'

rientationso inter-

national affairs.

Leaders'

nterpretations

rise out of

their

experiences,

goals,

beliefsabout he

world,

and

sensitivity

o

the

political

context.

The

view that the

world is

anarchic-embodied in

former

ecretary

of

state

Henry

Kissinger's

xiom

that

tranquility

s not

the

natural

state of the

world;

peace

and

security

are

not the

law of

nature -leads

to a focus on

threats and

security,

a sense of

distrust,

and a

perceived

need for carefullymanagingthe balance of power.Leaderswith this

view

must

always

remain

alert to

challenges

to

their

state's

power

and

position

in

the

international

ystem.

John

Vasquez

has

argued

hat the

rise

to

power

of

militant

hardliners who

view the

world in

such

realpolitik

erms is

a crucial

prerequisite

or

war.

Thus,

the

American

road to

war

in

Koreaand

Vietnam

was marked

irst

by

the

demise of

former

President

Franklin

Roosevelt's

accommodationof

nationalism,

then

by

the

fall of

George

Kennan's

selective

containment

strategy,

and ultimatelyby the rise of formersecretaryof state Dean Acheson's

focus on

military

containment.

Describing

he

vulnerability

of

empire,

Charles

Kupchan

has

observed

that the

entrenched belief

that one's

state

is

highly

vulnerable

has led

the

leaders of

declining

states

to

appease perceived

rising

powers

(consider

British

behavior

before

World

War

II)

and

encouraged

eadersof

risingpowers

o

become

over-

ly

competitive

(Wilhelmine

Germany

before

World

War

I).

Drawing

on

a more

optimistic

view of

human

nature,

cholars uch

as

Bruce

Russett

have

argued

hat

democracies

do not

fight

one

another

because

democratic

eaders

assume heir

peers

have

peaceful

ntentions,

126

FOREIGN

POLICY



5/15

Hermann

Hagan

adhere o

cooperative

norms,

and face domestic

political

constraints

n

the

use of force.

Otherssuch

as

Ido

Oren and

John

Owen have

proposed

that leaders

who followa liberal

deology nterpret

he world

n this man-

ner and act

accordingly-they place

a

higherdegree

of trust

n the lead-

ersof countries

hey

currently erceive

are

democratic.

Leaders

Often Disagree

But what

happens

f there is

no

single

dominant

eader

or no set of lead-

ers

who

share

a common

interpretation

f the

world?What

if

a

govern-

ment is

led,

as in the

People'sRepublic

f

China,

by

a

standing

ommittee

whose

members

ange

n views

along

a continuum

composed

of hardlin-

ers

and

reformers?

r what

if there is a coalition

government

uch

as the

one

PrimeMinister

Netanyahu

must lead

in

Israel,

omposed

of leaders

with different

nterestsand constituencies

and,

as

a

result,

various

per-

spectiveson what is at stake n thepeace process?

Beforeaction

is

possible,

eaders

must achieve

consensus

on how to

interpret

he

problem,

what

options

are

feasible,

what

further nforma-

tion is needed and

from

whom,

who

gets

to

participate

n decision

. 4 6 C A

AW

Three

who

counted:

Genghis

Khan,

Napoleon Bonaparte,

and

Joseph

Stalin

making,

and

where

implementation

will occur. If consensus

s

highly

unlikely,dealing

with

the

problem

will

probably

be

postponed

until

a

decision is forced

or the

decision

unit

can

be reconstituted.

At

issue

are

the rulesof

aggregation

hat facilitate

consensus

building

when disagreement xists among those who must make policy.Ideas

derived

romstudies

of

group

dynamics,

bureaucratic

olitics,

and coali-

SPRING

1998

127



6/15

International

ecision

Making

tion

building

ave

proved

seful

n

understanding

he factorshat

nflu-

ence

the shift from ndividual

o

collectivedecisions.

Thus,

scholars

have

ound hatexcessive

roup

ohesion an

produce groupthink

nd

premature

losure round

ptionspreferred

y

the more

powerful oli-

cymakers;

ureaucratic

nterests

enerally

nlyyield

o

compromise;

he

possession

f some

idiosyncrasy

redit -be

t

vital

nformation,

ontrol

over

a critical

esource,xpertise,

r

charisma--canead that

party's

position

o

prevail;

he

lack,

or

failure,

f

rules

f the

game

sually

meansdeadlock nda

politically

nstable

ituation;

ogrolling

rovokes

overcommitmentndoverextension.

So howcanwe

determine

hose

ositions

ount

n

foreign

olicy?

ur-

ing

an

international

risis,

when

he

values

f

thestateare

hreatened

nd

timefor

decision

making

s

short,

uthority

ends

o

concentrate

mong

those

persons

r

groups

hatbearultimate

esponsibility

or

maintaining

the governmentn power.Howtheseindividuals,abinets,untas, r

standing

ommittees

nterpret

he

problem

ill

dominatehe

state'seac-

tions.Little

outside

nput

s

sought

r

tolerated. he

experiences,

ears,

interests,

nd

expectations

f

thesedecision

makersemain

nfetterednd

affect

ny

action hat s

chosen.Considerhe British

abinet

uring

he

Falkland

slands

risis rthe

Bush

dministration

uring

he

Gulf

War.

n

both

cases,

he

tendency

as o

close

anks

nd

nsulate

olicymakers

rom

bothdomestic

nd nternationalnfluences.

ach

roup ecognized

hat ts

government

ould iseor all

depending

n

its

decisions,

nd hatan

over-

ly

participatory

ecision-making

rocess

ouldmean

dangerous

elays.

The

nature

of the

foreignpolicy

problem

an also

help

to dictate

whose

positions

ount.

Economic,

ecurity,

nvironmental,

nd

human

rights

ssues,

or

example,may

all

be

handled

by

different

arts

of the

government

r

by

different ets of

actors,

each

brought

ogether

o

interpret

what

s

happening

ndmake

udgments

bout

policy.

These

actorsmaynot be at the apexof powerbutareoftengivenultimate

authority

o

make

oreign

olicy

decisions or

the

government

ecause

of their

expertise,

ast

experience,

articular

oint

of

view,

or

official

position.

The recent

hreat

of

the U.S.

Federal

Maritime ommission

to detain

Japanese-flag

iner

vessels

n

American

orts

over

questions

of market

ccess

s

an

extreme

xample

f a

well-documented

act:The

power

to

negotiate-and

then

ratify-trade

agreements

s

generally

dispersed

across

ministries,

egislatures,

nd interest

groups.

Anothercrucial actor s the extent to which rivalries xist within a

domestic

political

system.

When

authority

becomes

fragmented

and

128

FOREIGN

POLICY



7/15

Hermann

Hagan

competition

for

power

turns

fierce,

an

unstable situation

is

likely

to

ensue,

with

each

person,

group,

or

organization cting

on its own

in

an

uncoordinated

ashion.

Witness

the

disparate

ctions

in Iran

of

radical

students,

relatively

moderate

politicians

n

the Provisional

Revolution-

ary

Government,

hard-line

lerics

dominating

he

Revolutionary

Coun-

cil,

and

Ayatollah

Ruhollah

Khomeini

ollowing

he

1979

seizure f the

U.S. embassy n Tehran.Until Khomeiniconsolidatedhis powerand

coordinated

action,

a coherent Iranian

oreign

policy

was

impossible.

When

authority

s

dispersed

ut little

competition

for

power

exists,

the

result is an

oligarchy

ike

that

of

the

Soviet

Politburo

during

the late

1960s and

early

1970s:

Building

consensus

among

these

leaders

took

time since

no

one wanted

to

concede

any

authority.

The current

divi-

sion in the U.S.

government

between

a

Democratic

administration nd

a

Congress

dominated

by

Republicans

ervesas an

example

of

what

hap-

pens

when

consolidated

authority

s

combinedwith

strongcompetition

for

power-each

side

questions

the other's

foreign

policy

record and

often

attempts

o

block

the other's

nitiatives.

Leaders and Domestic

Opposition

In

addition

to

interpretingpotential

constraints in the

international

arena,

leaders

must also

respondeffectively

to domestic

pressures.

As

RobertPutnamand Andrew Moravcsikhave observed, eadersarethe

central

strategic

actors

n

the

two-level

game

hat

links

domestic

politics

and

international

bargaining.

n the

domestic

political game,

they

face the

dual

challenge

of

building

a

coalition

of

supporters

o

retain their

authority

while

contending

with

opposition

forces

to

maintain

their

legitimacy.

An

appreciation

of the

alternative

strategies

that

leaders use

to

respond

o

domestic

opposition

is

key

to

understanding

ow

domestic

politics

affects

foreignpolicy.

Leaderswho

prefer

o avoid

controversy

at

home often seek

to

accommodate he

opposition

by

granting

con-

cessions

on

foreign

policy.

The

result s

frequently

a

policy

that

is

large-

ly

unresponsive

to

international

pressures

and

involves little

risk.

Note,

for

example,

how

nationalistic

eelings

in both

Russiaand

Japan

have

precluded

he

leadersof

these

countries

rom

resolving

ownership

issues

over the

islands

that

constitute

Japan's

Northern

Territories,

despite the likely diplomaticand economic benefitsof a peace treaty

and

normalized

relations.

Leaders

can also

seek to

consolidate their

domestic

position

by

pushing

a

foreign

policy

that

mobilizesnew

sup-

SPRING

1998

129



8/15

International

ecision

Making

port, ogrolls

with

complementary

nterests,

r undercuts

he

opposi-

tion.

By

this

logic,

the

political

attraction f

NATO

xpansion

or

the

Clinton administrations that

it

garners

upport

rom wo otherwise

contentious

roups-liberal

nternationalists,

ho

favor he

spread

f

democracy;

nd

conservative

nternationalists,

ho

worry

bout

esur-

gent

threats.Another

trategy

s to insulate

oreign olicy

rom

domes-

ticpressuresltogether ycoopting, uppressing,r gnoring pposition.

Leaders f nondemocraciesan more

easily

nsulate heir

oreign oli-

cies from

domestic

pressures

han their

counterparts

n

democracies.

Leadersn transitional emocraciesre

earning

his

the

hard

way

as

they

face the unfamiliar

hallenge

f

having

heir

agendas

crutinized

by

an

inquisitive ress

nd

elected

egislatures.

BRIDGING

TOMORROW'S

GAPS

As

Alexander

George

has

observed,

ractitioners

ind t

difficult

o

use

academic

pproaches

hat

assumehatall stateactors re

alikeandcan

be

expected

o behave n the same

way

n

given

situations.

nstead,

policymakers

refer

o work

with

actor-specific

odels

hat

grasp

he

differentnternal

tructuresnd

behavioral

atterns

f

each stateand

leaderwith

which

hey

mustdeal.

Today,cholarswhostudy he dynamics f foreignpolicydecision

making

ecognize

he need to

bridge

he

gap

between

heory

nd

prac-

tice. In

particular,

keletal heoretical

rameworks ustbe

fleshedout

with

nuanced etail.

Here,

he

issue

of

context ooms

arge.

What

type

of

state

s

being

examined?

itizens

n

advanced

emocracies

avedif-

ferentwantsand

expectations

han those in

transitional

tates,

poor

economies,

r

states nvolved

n

ethnic

conflicts.

They

will

be

attract-

ed to different

indsof

leaders o

push

or

their

agendas.

How

do

the

leaderswho areselectedviewtheirstate's lace n theworld?Do they

view

their tate

as

participating

n

a

cooperative

nternational

ystem

r

as

struggling

o

maintain

scendancy

n

an

anarchic

world?Do

they

view

it as

part

of a

regional

Europe),

ultural

Arab),

ideological

(socialist),

eligious

Hindu),

or

ethnic

(Serbian)

rouping?

Which

eaders'

nterpretations

revail

n

the

formulationf

foreign ol-

icy depends

on

the nature

of

the

decision

unit

and who is

ultimately

responsible

or

making

a

decision. Is

an

individual

for

example,Deng

Xiaoping),

a

single

group

such

as the

junta

in

Burma),

or a

coalitionof

actors

much

like

the

Israeli

Labor-Likud

oalition

cabinet

of the

1980s)

130

FOREIGN

POLICY



9/15

Hermann

Hagan

in

charge?

When

one

predominant

eader

makes he

decisions,

hefocus

is on

theories

hat

explore olitical

ognition,

olitical

ocialization,

nd

leadership-what

s

that

person

ike,

andhow does

he or

she

view

the

world

nd nteractwith

others?When he decision nit

s

a

single

roup,

the focus hifts o theories

rowing

ut of

group

ynamics,

ureaucratic

politics,

nd

public

dministration-whereoesmember

oyalty

ie,

and

s

therea shared iewof theproblem?fthe decision nit s a coalition f

contending

ctors,

henattention

must urn o theories f

bargaining

nd

negotiation,oliticaltability,

nd nstitution

uilding-is

one

actor

more

pivotal

han

others,

nd

s

compromise

ossible?

Determining

he nature

of

the decisionunit

is

not

always

s

obvi-

ous asit would eem.A

rulingoligarchy

might

be

dominated

y

a sin-

gle

personality.

leaderwhose

authority

ppears

nchallengedmight

be answerable

n

reality

o a coalition hat

helpskeep

him or her in

power.Who,forinstance, s currentlyn chargeof foreignpolicy n

Iran?

PresidentKhatami aised

yebrows

n the

West

when

he called

recently

or

mproved

elationswiththe UnitedStates.But

Iran's

pir-

itual

leader,

Ayatollah

Ali

Khamenei,

who

controls

ts

security

er-

vices

and

enjoys

he

support

f

the conservative

Majlis,

has

openly

ruled

out

anydialogue

with

the Great

atan.

Also consider he

Japanese

overnment.

s Peter

Katzensteinas

pointed ut,some cholarsiewJapan'sovemrnmentsahighly entral-

ized

state

bureaucracy,

s evidenced

y

the

Liberal

Democratic

arty's

ability

o remain

n

power

with

few

interruptions

or

40

years.

Haruhiro

Fukui nd

others,

owever,

ave

uggested

hat

Japaneseovernments

re

bestdescribed

s

corporatistystems

hat

grow

ut of a

deeply

mbedded

political

orm

hat

requires

onsensus

uilding

cross

arty

actions

nd

businessnterests.ran nd

Japan

erve

sremindershat

understanding

government's

ormaltructures less

mportant

han

understanding

hose

positionsctuallyountat aparticularoint ntime.

The

Origins

of Preferences

To what

extentare eaders he

products

f their

cultures,

enders,

nd

domestic

political

ystems?

amuel

Huntington,

.

Ann

Tickner,

nd

BruceRussett

wouldhave

us believe

that these ties

are

quitestrong.

Socialization

nto

Christian,

democratic,

or

male-dominated

ultures,

they

would

argue,

imbues

people

with certain

predispositions

and

expectations.

In

sharp

contrast,

James

David

Barber

has

pointed

out

that the

leadership

tyles

of

American

presidents

often derive

from

the

SPRING

1998 131



10/15

Internationalecision

Making

same

techniques

hat

helped

hem

achieve heir initial

political

uc-

cesses.

Ronald

Reagan,

who was

president

f the Screen

Actors'

Guild

whenthat

organization

ought

off a

communist

akeover,

earned

rom

his

experience

hat

the

United

Statescould

only negotiate

with

the

Soviet

Union froma

position

f

strength.

Other

cholarsave hown

hat he

worldviewsf

leaders

re

haped

n

large artbythegenerationhat heyhappenedobe bornnto-specifi-

cally,by

what

critical

olitical

vents

hey

and

their

cohorts ave

faced

during

heir ifetimes.

et,

we

have

alsoobserved

eaderswho

appear

o

have

undergone

ubstantial

hanges

n their

perspectives.

onsider

ormer

Egyptian

resident

nwar

l-Sadat

ndhis

journey

o

Jerusalem,

ormer

Israeli

rime

minister

itzhak

abinand

his

pursuit

f the

Oslo

accords,

and

ex-president

ichard

ixon

andhis

decision o

open

U.S. relations

with China.

Arguments

bound

s to

whether

hese eaders

hemselves

changed

rwhether

hey

were

merely

esponding

o

changes

ntheinter-

national

cene,

heir

own

domestic

renas,

r

perceived

pportunities

o

attain

oals

hat

might

previously

ave

been

oreclosedo

others.

Underlying

his

debate

s

the

question

oncerning

he

extent

o

which

leaders

hape

heir wn

preferences.

n the

one

hand,

we

have

eaders-

such

as

former

ritish

rime

minister

Margaret

hatcher

ndCuban

res-

ident

Fidel

Castro-who

are

crusadersr

deologues,

ighly

nsensitiveo

informationndconstituenciesnless hesecanhelp urtherheir auses

or

spread

heir

worldviews.

hese

eadersre

nterestedn

persuading

th-

ers,

notin

being

persuaded.

n

the

other

hand,

we

have

eaders-former

Iranian

resident

Ali

Akbar

Hashemi

Rafsanjani

mong

hem-who

appear

hameleon-like,

heir

views

mirroring

hatever

ther

mportant

players

re

aying

r

doing

t the

moment.

hey

eek

ues rom

heir

nvi-

ronmento

help

them

choose

whichever

osition

s

likely

o

prevail.

n

between

hese wo

extremes,

e

find

eaders-such

as

Syrian

resident

Hafez l-Assad-who akea more trategicpproach;heyknowwhere

they

want

o

go

but

proceed

with

incremental

teps,

orever

esting

he

waters

o see if

the

time

s

right

or

action.

Thus,

preferences

endto

be

more ixed or

crusadersnd

more

luid or

pragmatic

nd

trategic

eaders.

Balancing

Foreign

nd

Domestic

Pressures

At

times,

governments

can

seem

nearly

oblivious to

the

international

arena, ocusing

nstead

on

matters

at home.

Consider he

CulturalRev-

olution

in

China,

the

Botha

regime

n

South

Africa,

and

former

presi-

dent

Lyndon

Johnson's

nner

circle

of

advisers,

he

Tuesday

Lunch

132

FOREIGN

POLICY



11/15

Hermann

&

Hagan

Group.

n each

case,

domestic onditionssolated

he state's

eadership

from

ull

participation

n

world

politics.

During

he Cultural

Revolu-

tion,

no one was

effectively

n

charge

f China.All attention adtobe

directed

oward he

return f

political

tability.

ormer

resident

.

W

Bothawasa crusader

or

apartheid

nd

ntent

on

maintaining

t

regard-

less of

world

opinion

and sanctions.

And the

Tuesday

unch

Group

suppressedts skepticismnd doubtaboutU.S. involvementn Viet-

nam rather han

lose

favor

with

the

president.

With

theirattention

captured

y

events at

home,

these decision

units turned heir focus

inward,

ntent

on

maintaining

heir

authority

nd

legitimacy

n

the

domestic ront.But the

opposite

also

proves

rue at

times.Decision

units

may

decide

o

use

foreign

olicy

o

help

them

domestically.

Knowledge

bout he inner

workings

f decision nits

can

offer lues

as to whether

heir

effortswill be

intemrnally

r

extemrnally

riented.

he

currentiterature

uggests

hatthe

leadership

ocuses n domestic

res-

sureswhen

its

opposition

its

close to the centersof

power,

ontrols

many

of the resources eeded o deal with the

problem,

hallenges

domestic

olitical

rder,

r

has

legitimacy

f its own-in other

words,

when the

leadership

eels vulnerable

domestically.

Considerhow

Netanyahu's

urrentresistance

o

international

ressure

or

greater

Israeli

ooperation

n the

peaceprocess

eflects

ot

only

his

ownhard-

lineconvictions utthe Likud-ledoalition'senuousmajorityn the

Knesset,

is

dependence

n cabinet

hardliners

olding

key

ministries,

and,

more

enerally,

he

realignment

f

Israeli

arty

olitics

n

the 1990s.

There anbe a time

ag,

however,

efore

ertain ecision nits

espond

to

suchdomestic

ressures.

he

crusading

redominant

eader rthe

high-

ly

cohesive,

oyal

uling

roup

may ry

o

suppress

he

opposition

r

opt

to

engage

n several

iversionary

oreign

ctivities efore

ealizing

he seri-

ousness f the

domestic ituation.

n

coalitions

where

minority arties

havea veto-as whenFourthRepublic rancetalled ver hequestion

of

grantingndependence

o

Algeria

rwhenDutch

abinets eadlocked

over

accepting

ATOruise

missiles-foreign

olicymay

be

paralyzed

s

the

different

arties

ork o

preserve

government.

Strategic

Attribution

Much of

what

goes

on in

world

politics

revolves around

nteractions

between

governments-two

or more

states

trying

to

gaugethe ratio-

nales

behind the

other's

actions and

anticipate

its next

moves.

Here,

the critical

issue is how leaders

assess

the intentions

and

attitudes

of

SPRING

1998 133



12/15

International

ecision

Making

their

oreign

ounterparts.

re theseassessmentserived

rom

person-

al interactions

with the

leaders

of the other

state,

are

they

filtered

through

ther

peoples'

enses,

r are

hey

hunches

nd

guesses

ased

n

the

past

behavior

f that

state,

a

shared

dentity,

rnational nterests?

Leaders

end to

extrapolate

rom

their own

perspectives

n

solving

problems

when

they

have

had little or no contactwith

theircounter-

parts n theother ide.Buteven withcontact,adecisionunit edbya

crusading

eader,

or

example,

will see

what that leaderwants

o

see.

When

leaders

make ncorrect

ssessments,

he

consequences

an be

serious.Nikita

Khrushchev's

ttempted eployment

f

Soviet

missiles

to

Cuba n 1962 s

one

example

f

how

strategies

an

backfire

f

there

is

confusion

s to

what

the otherside's

eadership

s

doing.

Adding

o the

complexity

s

the realizationhat

leadersmust

not

only

engage

n

this

two-level

game

of

balancing

heir

own

perceived

domesticand international

ressures,

ut must

simultaneouslyry

to

comprehend

he nature

of

the

balancing

ct

in which

theircounter-

parts

re

engaged.

uch

comprehension

s critical n

today'smultipolar

world,

where

eaders

ary

n their

nterpretations

f how international

politics

should

work

and

face

increased

ressure

rom

constituents

t

homewho

clamor oran

ever

mproving uality

f life.

Moreover,

ov-

ernments

re

becoming

awareof the

importance

f

knowing

whose

positions ount n otherstatesandtowardwhichsideof the internal-

externaldebate these individuals re

likely

to lean.

Without such

information,

t is

difficult o

predict

whichdecision

makers

will

take

the

stability

of international

elations or

granted

and retreat rom

internationalffairso deal

withdomestic

nes,

which

will

stand heir

ground

nd take bold

initiatives,

nd which will

engage

n

behavior

that

couldcause heir

states

o

implode.

UNDERSTANDING LEADERSHIP

The leaderswho

dominated he world

tage

at

the

beginning

f

the

Cold

War-Stalin,

Churchill,

De

Gaulle,

and

Truman-often

seem

upon

reflection o

havebeen

larger

han

ife.

Today,

with the

collapse

of

the Soviet Union

and the

expansion

f

market

democracies,

t

is

hard to

imagine

such

leaders

coming

to

power

with

the same kind of

authority.

n

fact,

much of

contemporarynternational

relationstheo-

ry

would

contend that with

the

end of the Cold

War we

have

merely

exchanged

one

set of

constraints

or another.

Leadersare said

to

be as

134

FOREIGN

POLICY



13/15

Hermann

Hagan

limited

now

as

they

were when

superpowerivalry

defined

their

actions.

The

key systematic

onstraints o

longer

center

on

security

issues

but on

economicandenvironmental

nes.

Yet,

even

n

today'smultipolar

orld,

eadership

tillmatters.

eaders

arecalledon to

interpret

nd

framewhat

s

happening

n

the

interna-

tional

arena

or

heir

onstituenciesnd

governments.

n

addition,

more

leadersrebecomingnvolvedn theregionalnd nternationalegimes

defining

he rulesand norms hat will

guide

he international

ystem

intothe

twenty-first

entury.

hus,

or

example,

Clinton

must onvince

a

skeptical ublic

nda recalcitrant

ongress

hat t is

in

their

best

nter-

ests o free

up

funds

or

he United

Nationsand he International on-

etary

Fund's ailoutof

Asia,

as well as

try

to

strike

a

bargain

with

congressional

emocrats

hatwill

grant

him

fast-track

uthority.

Ratherhan

proceed

ith

hedebate ver

whether rnot

leaders

mat-

ter, t is essentialo continue he

study

fhowleaderswork o balance

what

hey

see

as

the

important

nternationalactors

mpinging

n their

countries

ithwhat

hey

believe re

heirdomestic

mperatives.

he les-

son to

be learnedo

far

s

that

nternational

onstraints

nly

have

policy

implications

hen

hey

are

perceived

s

such

by

the leaders

hose

posi-

tionscount n

dealing

witha

particular

roblem.

Whether ndhow

such

leaders

udge

themselves

onstrained

epends

on

the natureof

the

domestic hallengeso their eadership,owthe leadersreorganized,

andwhat

hey

are

ikeas

people.

Tochart

he

shape

f

any

uture

world,

we

need

o

be able o

demarcate hich

eaders

nd

eadership

roups

ill

becomemore

aught p

n

the

flow

of

events,

nd

hus

perceive

xternal

forces s

imiting

heir

parameters

or

action,

ndwhichwill

nstead hal-

lenge

he

international

onstraints

hey

see in

their

path.

WANT

TO

KNOW

MORE?

For

overviews f

recent

research

n

leaders,

omestic

olitics,

ndfor-

eign

policy,

onsult

ValerieHudson's

Foreign

olicy

Analysis

Yester-

day,

Today,

nd

Tomorrow

Mershon

nternational

tudies

eview,

ol.

39:

supplement

,

October

995)

andHarald

Muller

&

Thomas

Risse-

Kappen's

From he

Outside In

and

from the

Inside

Out:

Internation-

al

Relations,

Domestic

Politics,

and

Foreign Policy

in

David

Skidmore&

Hudson,

eds.,

The

Limits

of

State

Autonomy

(Boulder,

CO:

Westview,

1993).

Two

volumes

covering

a

wide

range

of

leadership

SPRING

1998

135



14/15

International

ecision

aking

phenomena

are

Timothy

McKeown

& Daniel

Caldwell,eds.,

Diploma-

cy,

Force,

and

Leadership:

Essays

in Honor

of

Alexander

George

(Boulder,

CO: Westview

Press,

1993)

and Laura

Neack,

Jeanne

Hey,

&

Patrick

Haney,

eds.,

Foreign

PolicyAnalysis: Continuity

and

Change

n

Its Second

Generation

Englewood

Cliffs,

NJ:

Prentice-Hall,

1995).

The

ways

in which

leaders'

xperiences,

beliefs,

and

goals

can

shape

their interpretationsof international and domestic constraints are

described

n

Yuen

Foong

Khong'sAnalogies

at War

(Princeton,

NJ:

Princeton

University

Press,

1992);

Charles

Kupchan's

The

Vulnerabil-

ity of

Empire

(Ithaca,

NY: Cornell

University

Press,

1994);

John

Owen's

Liberal

War,

Liberal Peace

(Ithaca,

NY:

Cornell

University

Press, 1997);

John

Vasquez's

The

War

Puzzle

(New

York,

NY: Cam-

bridgeUniversity

Press,

1993);

as well

as

Henry

Kissinger's

iplomacy

(New York,

NY: Simon and

Schuster,1994).

Comprehensive statements on psychological perspectivesof for-

eign policy

decision

making

are found in

Yaacov

Vertzberger's

he

World

n Their

Minds:

Information

Processing, Cognition,

and Per-

ception

in

Foreign Policy

Decision

Making

(Stanford,

CA:

Stanford

University

Press, 1990)

and in

Nehemia Geva

&

Alex

Mintz, eds.,

Decision

Making

on

War

and

Peace: The

Cognitive-Rational

Debate

(Boulder,

CO:

Lynne

Rienner

Press,

1997).

The

different

roles leaderscan urgeon their governmentsare discussed n Margaret

Hermann &

Charles

Kegley,Jr.'s

Rethinking Democracy

and

Inter-

national

Peace:

Perspectives

from

Political

Psychology

(Interna-

tional

Studies

Quarterly,

December

1995),

and

Richard

Herrmann&

Michael

Fischerkeller's

Beyond

the

Enemy

Image

and

Spiral

Model:

Cognitive-Strategic

Research after the Cold

War

(Interna-

tional

Organization,

ummer

1995).

How

leaderswithin

a

government

resolve

their

differences nd

build

consensus is detailed in Jonathan Bendor & Thomas Hammond's

Rethinking

Allison's

Models

(American

olitical cience

Review,

vol.

86:

2, 1992);

Paul

Hart,

Eric

Stem,

&

Bengt

Sundelius,

eds.,

Beyond

Groupthink:

Political

Group Dynamics

and

Foreign Policy

Making

(Ann Arbor,

MI:

University

of

Michigan

Press,

1977);

Ze'ev

Maoz,

National

Choices

and

International

Processes

(Cambridge:

ambridge

University Press,

1990);

and

David

Welch's

The

Organizational

Process and

Bureaucratic

Politics

Paradigm:

Retrospect

and

Prospect

(International

ecurity,

all

1992).

Applications

of

decision-making

mod-

els

by

area

specialists

o

non-U.S.

settings

are

surveyed

n

chapter

wo of

136

FOREIGN

POLICY



15/15

Hermann

Hagan

Joe

Hagan's

Political

Opposition

and

Foreign Policy

in

Conmparative

Perspective

(Boulder,

CO:

Lynne

Rienner

Publishers,

993).

The

influence

that domestic

politics

can have on

foreignpolicy

and,

in

turn,

on

international

affairs,

has received

increased attention

in

recent

years.

Some of

the most

important

works

on

this

topic

are Bruce

Bueno de

Mesquita

& David

Lalman's

War and

Reason:

Domestic

and International Imperatives (New Haven, CT: Yale University

Press,

1992);

Peter

Evans,

Harold

Jacobson,

&

Robert

Putnam,

eds.,

Double-Edged

Diplomacy:

International

Bargaining

and

Domestic

Politics

(Berkeley,

CA:

University

of

California

Press,

1993);

Miroslav

Nincic,

Democracy

and

Foreign Policy

(New York,

NY:

Columbia

University

Press,

1992);

Richard

Rosecrance &

Arthur

Stein,

eds.,

The

Domestic

Bases

of

Grand

Strategy

(Ithaca,

NY:

Comrnell

niver-

sity

Press, 1993);

Bruce

Russett,

Controlling

the

Sword

(Cambridge,

MA: HarvardUniversityPress,1990);Beth Simmons'Who Adjusts?

Domestic

Sources

of

Foreign

Economic

Policy

during

the

Interwar

Years

(Princeton,

NJ:

Princeton

University

Press,

1994);

Jack

Snyder's

Myths

of

Empire:

Domestic

Politics and

International

Ambition

(Ithaca,

NY:

Comell

University

Press,

1991);

and

Stephen

Walt'sRev-

olution

and

War

(Ithaca,

NY: Comell

University

Press,

1996).

For

links

to

relevant Web

sites,

as

well as

a

comprehensive

ndex

of

related

articles,

access

www.foreignpolicy.com.

SPRING

1998

137

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