international documents on palestine 1971 part 2 of 2

ARAB WORLD 361

Nations Charter and the scrupulous imple¬ mentation of Security Council Resolution 242 and all other relevant United Nations resolutions.

In order to reach such a settlement in accordance with the provisions of the Security Council resolution, it is necessary that:

(1) The Israeli aggression be terminated and the Israeli armed forces be withdrawn beyond the 5 June 1967 lines, as provided for in Security Council Resolution 242 which reaffirms the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war, and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every State in the area can live in security.

(2) Israel declare its repudiation of the policy of territorial expansion which it has pursued at the expense of the neighbouring Arab States. This policy is repeatedly ex¬ pressed in the statements made by Israeli leaders.

(3) A just settlement of the Palestine refugees must be reached. This can only be realised through Israel’s respect for the rights of the Palestinian people in accordance with the United Nations resolutions.

(4) The termination of all claims or states of belligerency and guaranteeing freedom of navigation in waterways.

(5) Respect for and acknowledgment of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and po¬ litical independence of every state in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognised boundaries free from threats or acts of force.

(6) Guaranteeing of peace and the terri¬ torial inviolability and political independence of every State in the area.

The Security Council may decide upon the necessary arrangements which would provide security to all states in the area. These arrangements may, inter alia, include:

(a) The establishment of a United Nations peace-keeping force in which the four per¬ manent members of the Security Council would participate.

(b) The establishment of demilitarised zones astride the borders.

The United Arab Republic has previously stated its readiness to implement its obligations

in accordance with Security Council Resolu¬ tion 242. This was clearly manifested in the United Arab Republic answers submitted to you on 5 March 1969. You may recall that during our contacts over the last 3 years the United Arab Republic has frequently assured you of this intention. Moreover, the United Arab Republic has declared in the Security Council and in the General Assembly, that to achieve a peaceful settlement it is indispensable that all the obligations provided for in the Security Council resolution be fully carried out and that this is the essential prerequisite for the achievement of a just and lasting peace in the area.

The United Arab Republic reiterates anew its full readiness to carry out all its obligations as contained in Security Council Resolution 242. It is essential that Israel, on its part, fully carries out all its obligations under the same resolution.

265

Statement by the Official Spokesman

of the Palestine Liberation Organization

Central Committee, Affirming the Con¬

tinuation of Armed Struggle and Denying

Any Reversal of the P.L.O. Rejection

of U.N. Resolution 2421

Amman, Mid-January, 1971

The Palestine revolution has not changed its stand rejecting Security Council Resolution 242 of November 22, 1967 and the Rogers Plan, and is continuing its armed struggle for the full liberation of Palestinian soil.

However, this attitude of ours, which was reflected in an emotional reaction to the United Arab Republic in view of the political move it made when the Rogers Plan was announced, has been the subject of discussion by the Central Committee and the Secretariat. The conclusion reached is that our obligation to armed struggle is a Palestinian obligation, which we express by the continuity of the

1 Translated from the Arabic text of the P.L.O. state¬ ment, al-Dustur (Amman), January 21, 1971.

362 INTERNATIONAL DOCUMENTS ON PALESTINE, 1971

Palestine revolution; this obligation does not place any restrictions on the United Arab Republic’s attempts to eliminate the consequences of the June 1967 aggression, as long as these efforts do not waive the rights of the Palestinian people or impose on them any restriction that could prevent their con¬ tinuing their struggle.

It must be clear that our understanding of the elimination of the consequences of the aggression is very different from all the proposals that have been made for a settle¬ ment, and we are certainly not opposed to total Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories, which would restore the situation that existed on June 4, 1967, without preju¬ dicing the Palestinian right to struggle for the full liberation of Palestinian soil, especially as we are not, and do not intend to be, a party to these settlements since our struggle did not begin in 1967 but in 1965.

266

Press Interview Statement by Crown Prince and Premier al-Jaber of Kuwait, Welcoming the Idea of Holding an Arab Summit Conference1

Kuwait, January 18,1971

Q. There have been reports in the last few days of the possibility of a new Arab conference at summit level being held in Kuwait. Would Tour Highness be so good as to say what truth there is in these reports ?

A. In its reply to Colonel Muammar Qadhafi’s letter to His Highness the Amir, Kuwait proposed that an Arab meeting be held to discuss all aspects of the present situa¬ tion and the joint efforts it requires. When the Libyan Arab Republic proposed that such a conference should be held in Kuwait we welcomed the idea of acting as host to this brotherly meeting which we hope-—if it

1 Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text of

Shaikh Jaber al-Ahmad al-Jaber al-Sabah’s statement,

al-Siyasa (Kuwait), January 19, 1971.

comes about—will lead to positive and con¬ structive consequences to the advantage of the Arab nation, and we believe that such a conference at the highest level is made absolutely necessary by the grave situation through which the Arab nation is at present passing. It has therefore been decided that the Minister of the Interior and Defense, Shaikh Saad al-Abdullah al-Sabah, should go to Saudi Arabia tomorrow, Tuesday, to exchange views with the authorities there on this subject. It has also been decided that the Minister of Guidance and Informa¬ tion, Shaikh Jaber al-Ali al-Salem, should go to Iraq the day after tomorrow for the same purpose.

We have learned that a number of Arab countries have expressed their readiness to attend this conference, and we have great hopes that the efforts being made to bring about this brotherly meeting in the present decisive circumstances will bear fruit.

267

Jordan Government Memorandum Wel¬ coming the Resumption of the Jarring Mission and Reiterating and Detailing the Jordanian Position on the Imple¬ mentation of U.N. Resolution 242, Sub¬ mitted to U.N. Special Envoy Jarring in Response to His Transmittal of Israeli Peace Proposals2

January 18, 1971

The Government of Jordan welcomes the resumption of the mission entrusted to Am¬ bassador Gunnar Jarring to assist efforts to achieve a just and durable peace in the area in accordance with the provisions of Security Council Resolution 242.

2 English text of Jordanian statement submitted to Jarring

on January 18, Mew York Times, January 26, 1971, p. 6.

(Reuter reported that Lebanon had submitted a

statement to Jarring “over the weekend” previous to

January 31, but that no details were available.)

ARAB WORLD 363

Jordan’s acceptance of that resolution is based on its desire to achieve a just and speedy peaceful solution. It is further based on the provisions and principles of the Charter under which the Security Council has moved in its Resolution 242 towards the establish¬ ment of a just peace.

The Government of Jordan has always cooperated closely with Ambassador Jarring in the fulfillment of his mission and will continue to do so. As evident from Ambas¬ sador Jarring’s report, the Government of Jordan has acted in a constructive and positive manner and has made its position very clear. In doing so it was prompted by a sincere desire to implement Resolution 242 in all its parts as well as all other relevant United Nations resolutions aimed at the solution of the Middle East crisis in all its aspects.

The Government of Jordan hereby reit¬ erates its position concerning the implementa¬ tion of the Security Council resolution:

(1) Withdrawal of the Israeli armed forces from all occupied territories without exception in conformity with Resolution 242, which em¬ phasized “the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war.” Israel must- accept and put into effect this concept which governs relations amongst nations.

(2) Peace is indivisible. Every state in the area is entitled to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force. Israel should unequi¬ vocally repudiate its policy of territorial ex¬ pansion.

(3) The Government of Jordan recognizes the religious and cultural importance of the Arab city of Jerusalem to all faiths. It will, therefore, guarantee free access to all religious and historical places to all concerned as well as freedom of worship. Jordan stands ready to make all necessary arrangements to this effect.

(4) A just settlement of the Palestine refugees must be reached. This can only be realized through Israel’s respect for the rights of the Palestinian people in accordance with the United Nations resolutions.

(5) The termination of all claims or states of belligerency and guaranteeing freedom of navigation in international waterways.

(6) Guaranteeing the territorial inviola¬ bility and political independence of every state in the area.

The four permanent members may, through the Security Council, obtain adequate ar¬ rangements to provide security to all states in the area. Such arrangements may include United Nations observation force in which the permanent members may participate.

Arrangements for insuring security of the states in the area might also include the establishment of demilitarized zones on a reciprocal basis.

(7) With the implementation of the above steps the elements of conflict and dissension will disappear and a just and durable peace will ensue. There will be respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, terri¬ torial integrity and political independence of every state in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized bound¬ aries free from threats or acts of force as envisaged in Resolution 242.

268

Statements by Foreign Minister Masmoudi of Tunisia, Expressing His Country’s Confidence in the U.S. Desire for Peace in the Middle East1

Tunis, January 22, 1971

We shall not be telling the truth if we say that we agree with you in your estimate of the situation in this area, for we have no illusions about the situation in the Middle East or even in Israel itself.

We believe that the government of the United States is utterly attached to peace,


Masmoudi’s speech at a banquet he gave in honor of

U.S. Under-Secretary of State Irwin on a visit to

Tunisia, al-Amal (Tunis), January 24, 1971.


and we cannot say the same about certain other countries. And I do not think that I am being paradoxical if I say that your attach¬ ment to peace constitutes a safeguard for the Palestinian people and the Palestine of tomor¬ row. It is sufficient that we should believe in the warmth of your attachment to peace for us to talk of our friendship for you without complexes, and we firmly believe that you can do much in this field, being primarily responsible for the world and its security and safety, and we expect from you more than we expect from others.

We are aware of the efforts you are making and we know that the Rogers Plan is a dynamic plan for peace, and we also know that you support Jarring’s mission.

269

Statements on the Necessity for Political and Military Unification Among the Arab States and Among the Elements of the Palestine Resistance in Order To Combat Israel Effectively, Included in a Speech by President Qadhafi of Libya1

al-Zawiya, January 24, 1971

So it is a question of self-defense, and in this connection the Libyan proposal advocating that the battle should be placed on a pan-Arab basis was submitted by us after we had studied the situation prevailing in the Arab world after the revolution, and as partners on the field of battle we have seen, in fact, that the Arab armies have no unified command as a result of the absence of a unified political command. That is to say, military unity cannot be successful unless it is preceded by political unity, so that there may be a single political commander who gives orders to the


Qadhafi’s speech at a Martyrs’ Day rally, al-Haqiqa

(Benghazi), January 25, 1971.

armed forces. Among the Arab forces on the Eastern Front, for example, every army is under a different political command. More¬ over, the deployment of Arab forces is still wrong; Arab forces are not stationed in the areas which directly affect the Israeli entity; they are still stationed in the wrong places. After considering the views of Iraq, in par¬ ticular, and of Algeria, who have been taking part in the battle recently, although they

are not confrontation countries—after con¬ sidering their views, we agreed that the coun¬ tries which are not confrontation countries, like the Libyan Arab Republic, Iraq, Algeria and any other country that is taking part, must state their views on the front and the battle, because they are taking part with their forces. In Iraq they said that the situation is not right, the deployment of forces is wrong. We want to take part more effect¬ ively, but on the basis of a pan-Arab plan, and Algeria has been asking about the attitude towards the 1967 Security Council resolution, about the ceasefire and other matters of this kind. When we saw them doing this we were encouraged and agreed with them because we have a point of view which is nearly the same as that of Iraq and Algeria. The Libyan proposal first asked whether every country was to enter the battle on its own, or whether the whole Arab nation was to fight the battle, and if the battle was for the liberation of Palestine, or the liberation of the territories occupied in 1967.

We asked these questions and asked for answers to them. The answer was that it was the duty of the countries concerned, which are the confrontation countries, to decide what the battle was to be like and what forces were necessary for it, and with this in view the commands concerned met in Tripoli on Evacuation Day and determined their objective and answered these questions and recommended that the military men and the Ministers of Defense should meet to draw up a military plan. Between the meeting of the heads of the confrontation states in Tripoli and the meeting of the Ministers of Defense, the Rogers Plan was put forward, and Algeria and Iraq protested by not attending the conference of Ministers of

ARAB WORLD 365

Defense. And the Ministers of Defense con¬ tinued to discuss the recommendations of the conference of Heads of State and assigned additional military obligations to Algeria, Morocco, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Libya and Sudan; they also asked the United Arab Republic and Syria to increase their military

forces. Everything was decided—time, place and

magnitude—and we informed the Arab coun¬ tries of their obligations. Iraq eventually answered that it refused to accept the obliga¬ tions that had been allotted to it and at the same time withdrew its forces from the Eastern Front. After the Rogers Plan Algeria withdrew its forces from the Front; Algeria is still preparing its forces to take part in the battle, but there are points it wants to raise.

The other Arab countries have not given a decisive answer; they have given procrast¬ inating answers. Kuwait recently replied that it wanted a conference to be held which it would attend so that it could take part in allotting obligations to itself and to the other countries because, it said, when the obligations were allotted it had not been present at the conference. So we replied to Kuwait that it should call for the convening of an Arab summit conference at which it could discuss the obligations we had allotted in conformity with the Libyan proposal.

In fact Kuwait made efforts to ensure that the Arab countries should meet there; in fact it was not we that called for an Arab summit conference but Kuwait that asked for it, and we gave our support. It transpired that certain Arab countries intended to send deputies, but we shall only attend a summit conference if it is attended by the Presidents and Kings themselves; if they do not attend it is not a summit, but the evasion of a summit.

It has transpired that Saudi Arabia wants to send a deputy and that Morocco will send a deputy; but we do not want to attend a summit conference unless it is really a summit. I tell you frankly that the Arab countries in their present situation cannot achieve the wishes and aspirations of the masses as regards the battle.

The present regimes in most of the Arab countries today are incapable of producing

armed forces even to protect their territorial integrity; how then can they take part in a battle of destiny?

I tell you that the Arab regimes in most of the Arab countries are weak and feeble, living parasitically on life and on the age we are now living in.

These Arab regimes, even if they met, could have no effective influence, but if the resources of certain Arab countries were mobilized they could have a strong influence on the battle. If the confrontation countries —in addition to Algeria, Iraq and Libya— if these countries manage to agree with each other they will be able to do something for the battle.

I say that the Arabs are capable of mobi¬ lizing a thousand planes for the battle and five thousand tanks and a million men: this force exists in the Arab world, scattered here and there, but I doubt that it will really get into the battle.

If the Arabs can manage to be prepared and escape from the fragmentation that now besets them, much of this force can be mobi¬ lized, three quarters of it can be mobilized by the confrontation countries along with Algeria, Iraq and Libya.

As for the other Arab countries, some of them have some strength and others have none, but if they are all gathered together they will be strong.

We do not want to take part in the summit conference which Kuwait has called for and we have supported unless the Kings and Presidents themselves attend.

This is making the battle a pan-Arab one; this is the proposal, but in any case the confrontation countries are resolved to liberate their territories, so long as one man is left standing, either on our side or on theirs, as the late President [Nasser] said.

At the Cairo meeting these things were studied, as you have heard, but it is not in our power to force Iraq, Algeria or any other country, though there are great hopes of Algeria.

The meeting also dealt with the question of the Resistance which is being liquidated; the Resistance must unify itself, it must urge its forces into the occupied territories


and avoid bickering and political manifesta¬ tions which rob it of so much; it must avoid side conflicts which rob it of its efforts, and the regime in Jordan is seeking any justifica¬ tion for wiping out the Resistance.

There are also elements in the Resistance, like the Popular Front and the Democratic Popular Front, which we shall regard as deviationist splinter organizations. It is these organizations that organize civil strife and force Fateh and the Palestine Liberation Organization into false positions. These people write pamphlets and books and publish magazines and theorize about how the bourgeoisie is to be turned to Marxism- Leninism instead of thinking how to turn Palestine into a free country. At this time the Palestinians should not be occupying them¬ selves with the problems of Marxism-Leninism or the problems of capitalism and such things; the free Palestinian is he who leaves these things and bears arms and crosses the frontier to inflict losses on the enemy every day. We have made every effort to ensure that the Resistance unites itself, and since we called on it to do so, very great efforts have been made in this direction, and the whole of Arab public opinion now demands that the Resist¬ ance should unite and rid itself of the errors that beset it. We know that certain errors are leading it into a clash with the regime in Jordan or Lebanon, and in Jordan they have been lying in wait for the Resistance.

This is the situation of the Resistance, which we have studied, and brother Yasser Arafat came to us and this is what we told him.

270

Statement Urging the Necessity of Op¬ posing Any of the Proposals Put Forward for a Middle East Settlement, Issued by

the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine—General Command (Excerpt)1

Early February, 1971

The leaderships of the regimes and of certain sections of the Resistance which are allowing the peaceful solution to take its course, are involved in that solution and, as far as the outcome is concerned, are contributing to it. The generation that is allowing liquidation to take place before its eyes is guilty of cowardice and irresponsi¬ bility, and even though it displays varying degrees of ability to act, it will basically be a generation that allowed the conspirators to continue ruling it under the same slogans as they employed to reach the centers of power and authority, and which brought down on the Arab nation the defeat of Black June and the great defeat of solutions involving final liquidation. Our glorious masses:

The surrender solution means the Palestine problem being settled forever, the establish¬ ment of the “Zionist state” being recognized by the Arab countries, economic doors being opened to it, its ships being allowed to sail through the Canal, the Holy Places being under its control, and full cooperation with it; it means the non-existence of the Arab liberation movement, and the Arab nation once more groaning under the yoke of odious colonialism in its new guise.

Similarly, the peaceful solution means the soil of Palestine being swallowed up by Zionism, the loss of parts of Arab territory and all Arab rights; it means, too, despite the appearances of relief that will accompany it, our Arab society remaining under the control of monopolies and capitalism.

The peaceful solution which is now taking

1 Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text of the

General Command statement, Ila al-Amam (Beirut),

No. 335 (February 5, 1971), p. 10.

ARAB WORLD 367

the form of constant extensions of the ceasefire and attacks on the Resistance in Jordan as a prelude to attacking it in certain other coun¬ tries, and which sometimes takes the mis¬ begotten form of a Palestinian state, is the Trojan horse which will bring Zionist control into the land of the Arabs.

This solution will put an end forever to all aspirations to national sovereignty, to national independence and to all possibility of escape from international spheres of influence; it will invalidate the world role which our nation ought to play in world affairs.

271

Palestine Red Crescent Appeal for Inter¬ national Action Against the Conduct of the Israeli Occupation Forces in the Gaza Strip1

Early February, 1971

Since the beginning of this year the Gaza Strip has been subjected to a campaign of terrorism, annihilation and deliberate starvation of unprecedented ferocity. For forty days the camps of the Strip have been under a permanent curfew, during which the occupation troops have been killing, robbing and maltreating the citizens.

At the press conference he held in Gaza on February 2, the Israeli military spokesman, General Shlomo Gazit, admitted some of the crimes committed by the occupation when he acknowledged that the Israeli author¬ ities in the Strip had arrested 1112 citizens in 1970, killed 161 and wounded 642.

Other crimes not mentioned by the Military Governor of the Strip include the blowing up of hundreds of houses and the eviction of citizens in large numbers to the Sinai desert and the East Bank of Jordan—in the first month of this year 54 persons were evicted

1 Translated from the Arabic text of the Palestine Red

Crescent appeal, al-Dustur (Amman), February 6, 1971.

through the desert area of southern Jordan. We call on all international bodies to

protest against the barbarous conduct of the Israeli army of occupation, and to inter¬ vene to stop the campaign of annihilation, deliberate starvation and terrorism to which our people in the Gaza Strip are being subjected.

We also call on the International Red Cross to send medical supplies and foodstuffs to the Strip, and to take the necessary measures to ensure that'relief materials provided by our society reach our steadfast people in Gaza.

272

U.A.R. Memorandum Addressed to U.N. Special Envoy Jarring Commenting on Israel’s Notes of January 10 and 27 and Her Continued Occupation of Arab Territory, and Calling on the Security Council To Take Measures To Ensure the Implementation of U.N. Resolution 2422

February 1, 1971

On 22 November 1967, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 242 (1967) and accordingly the Secretary-General des¬ ignated you as his Special Representative to establish and maintain contacts with the States concerned in order to promote agree¬ ment and assist efforts to achieve, a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles of this resolution.

During your contacts with us, which started on 18 December 1967, we have confirmed to you our readiness to implement the resolu¬ tion as a “package deal” and our willingness to carry out our obligations as stipulated therein. We have explained this in our reply to your questions handed to you on 27 March 1969. This reply was included in the report submitted by the Secretary-General

2 English text of U.A.R. memorandum to Jarring, as

transmitted with a letter to the U.N. Security Council

president by U.A.R. U.N. Representative Zayyat on

February 2; U.N. document S/10098.


to the Security Council on 4 January 1970 [S/10070].

Our readiness to implement resolution 242 (1967) emanated from respect for the will of the international community and our compliance with the United Nations Charter. We have also welcomed all the international efforts exerted to achieve a peaceful settle¬ ment, declared our support of the French initiative of 16 January 1969, and accepted the American initiative submitted in June 1970.

All our international contacts were aimed at achieving a permanent peace in the Middle East established on the firm basis of justice and not dictated by the threat or use of force or as a result of territorial expansion. Hence our position remained that the settlement necessitates that Israel should respect the Charter of the United Nations and its decisions and implement the Security Council resolu¬ tion in full. Each party to the conflict should pledge to abide by its obligations and the settlement should not reflect the weight of conquest or the consequences of the use of force against United Nations Member States.

Reaffirming our desire for peace and for the continuation and success of your mission, we have stated our position in the communi¬ cation submitted to you on 15 January 1971, which was based on the implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) in order to achieve a peaceful and durable settlement [see S/10083].

From our experience, during the long time which lapsed since the beginning of your mission, it has become evident that Israel refuses to implement the Security Council resolution and continues to seek to impose its terms from a position of strength thus blocking the progress of your mission.

Firmly believing in the importance of achieving a just and lasting peace in the area, and because of Israel’s persistence in its refusal to implement the Security Council resolution, and being concerned about the continuation of your mission, we have sub¬ mitted the issue to the United Nations General Assembly, at its twenty-fifth session. The General Assembly adopted resolution 2628 (XXV) on 4 November 1970 which expressed

serious concern that Security Council reso¬ lution 242 (1967) had not been implemented, and reaffirmed that the acquisition of territory by force is inadmissible and that consequently territories thus occupied must be restored. The resolution reaffirmed that the establish¬ ment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East necessitates the withdrawal of the Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the conflict, the termination of all claims or states of belligerency, and recognized that the respect for the rights of the Palestinians is an indispensable element in the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. The resolution also called upon the parties directly concerned to resume contacts with you with a view to carrying out at the earliest possible date your mandate for the imple¬ mentation of the Security Council resolu¬ tion in all its parts. In adopting this resolution the United Nations has once more stressed the importance of achieving a peaceful settlement in accordance with the Security Council resolution, thus rejecting Israel’s policy which is based on the use of force to impose an Israeli settlement in the area, disregarding the Security Council resolution and the United Nations Charter.

Upon the adoption of that resolution on 4 November, the United Arab Republic Gov¬ ernment declared its readiness to resume contacts with you and instructed its repre¬ sentatives accordingly. On the other hand, Israel has always refused to comply with the Security Council resolution, rejected all inter¬ national efforts deployed towards achieving a peaceful settlement in the area, and con¬ tinues to occupy Arab territories.

In these occupied Arab territories, Israel persists in carrying [out] a policy ol repression, expulsion, and collective punishment against the inhabitants, adopting various administra¬ tive and legislative measures including the use of armed force to impound the property of these inhabitants. Moreover, it continues to establish settlements in the occupied terri¬ tories whose indigenous Arab inhabitants are replaced by new immigrants. The Gen¬ eral Assembly and the Security Council adopted several resolutions calling on Israel to abide by the provisions of the United Nations

ARAB WORLD 369

Charter, norms of international law and relevant international agreements which ob¬ ligate Israel to respect the rights of the Arab inhabitants of occupied territories. Neverthe¬ less, the repressive measures being currently perpetrated by Israel in these territories clearly reveal its persistence in a policy designed to change their Arab character, establish Israeli settlements and create a fait accompli with a view to consolidating its occupation. This brings further evidence of its expansionist policy. This explicitly indicates that the peace claims of the Israelis are merely intended to delude world public opinion.

We consider that the two Israeli notes of 10 and 27 January 19711 which were submitted to you reveal that Israel continues in its refusal to implement the Security Council resolution, since Israel does not commit itself to withdrawal from all Arab territories it occupied in June 1967. We also consider that peace referred to by Israel in its notes remains meaningless as long as Israel evades total withdrawal from the Arab territories. Israel’s refusal to commit itself to withdraw from all Arab territories is a confirmation of the expansionist designs for the realization of which it had launched its 1967 aggression.

1 During a visit to Israel January 8-10, Dr. Jarring

held a series of meetings with Israeli officials including

Premier Meir and Foreign Minister Eban. According

to the "‘Report of the Secretary-General on the Acti¬

vities of the Special Representative to the Middle

East” of 30 November, 1971 (U.N. document A/8541

and S /10403), it was at an early stage of these discussions

that Israel presented the U.N. envoy with its views

on “Essentials of Peace,” for transmittal to the other

governments concerned. (The purported text of these

proposals, as published in Jeune Afrique, appears as

Document 4 above.)

On January 27, it was reported that Israel’s U.N.

Representative Tekoah had that day handed Dr.

Jarring a new written policy statement for transmittal

to the U.A.R., the contents of which were not disclosed

(New York Times, January 28, 1971, p. 7). Reuter

on January 27 quoted “informed sources” as having

said that Israel was believed to be asking the U.A.R.

to define more precisely the possibility of an “agreement

to reopen ‘international waterways’ in the Middle

East and to recognize the sovereignty and independence

of all states in the area” (Arab Report and Record, 16—31

January, 1971, p. 76).

Israel’s deliberate omission in its notes of peace guarantees, the open opposition by its leaders to the stationing of United Nations peace-keeping forces in which the four per¬ manent members of the Security Council would participate to guarantee peace, and its opposition to the establishment of demili¬ tarized zones astride the borders, clearly underline Israel’s rejection of a just and lasting peace.

In its notes, furthermore, Israel does not commit itself to the implementation of the United Nations resolutions relevant to a just settlement of the refugee problem, resolu¬ tions which were adopted by the General Assembly during the past twenty-two years, the last of which was resolution 2672 (XXV) of 8 December 1970.

In adopting a position based on the use of armed force aimed at dictating its terms to the Arab States in order to realize its expansionist design, Israel is obstructing the achievement of the peaceful settlement stipulated in the Security Council resolution.

The continuation of the Israeli occupation of Arab territories is an act of aggression that constitutes a breach of peace in the area and seriously endangers world peace. Israel’s adamant refusal to implement the Security Council resolution makes it incumbent on the Council, in exercising its responsibility under the Charter, to take the necessary measures required to assist you in the discharge of your mandate and the implementation of its resolution 242 (1967), thus securing the withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from all the Arab occupied territories and establish¬ ing the requisite guarantees to ensure that international peace and security will not be endangered.


273

Statement on the Necessity for Total Elimination of Zionist Aggression, In¬ cluded in a Speech by President Qadhafi of Libya1

Benghazi, February 2, 1971

We in the Libyan Arab Republic also believe that the right solution is to put an end to aggression itself and that the elimina¬ tion of the consequences of aggression does not directly result in the elimination of aggression itself. If we eliminate the consequences of aggression but leave aggression, the enemy will still be there and will continue to make himself felt every ten years. This is the inevitable nature of the Arab-Zionist conflict. Such setbacks will be repeated about every ten years, even if we eliminate the con¬ sequences of aggression in the meantime.

This is frank speaking and is meant to be heard by Arabs both inside and outside the area of confrontation. To eliminate aggression itself and to liberate Palestine it is not sufficient to eliminate the consequences of aggression, and the whole process will be repeated in ten years5 time unless something new happens. So the elimination of aggression itself must be the strategic aim of the Arab nation—and let both our enemies and our friends hear this.


Qadhafi’s speech at a popular rally, al-Haqiqa

(Benghazi),- February 3, 1971.

274

Speech to the U.A.R. National Assembly by President Sadat, Responding to the Appeal of the U.N. Secretary-General with a Pledge To Extend the Middle East Ceasefire Until March 72

Cairo, February 4,1971

In the name of God. Mr. Chairman, brother Members of the National Assembly, I have deemed it my duty to our people in Egypt, represented here by you, and to our Arab nation of which our Arab people here in Egypt is the vanguard, to come to your honourable Assembly and to talk to you about what you know and I know preoccupies us all. I mean the cause of our holy struggle and our work on its course so far, as well as our responsibility to it in the future.

I believe complete truth means complete responsibility. Since responsibility is a duty for all the nation, the nation is entitled to the whole truth. I therefore ask your permission to summarise for you the major facts of our position today. I am not doing this merely to review what has happened, but so that we shall all remember, be sure and trust the accuracy of our calculations and the decisions we base on them. In other words, we summarise and then draw conclu¬ sions.

Brothers, I shall here divide my speech into three parts in order to give a complete and clear picture. The first part deals with our principled commitments to a cause which is undoubtedly the most honourable because it is the most just. The second part deals with our continuous work, using every means, for the protection of our principled commit¬ ments from the time we first accepted the trust until now. The third part is about the next steps we envisage as dictated by the values we stand for and the principles we believe in.

(1) Our principled commitments: Brothers, we have never denied to ourselves or to others

2 Text of Sadat’s National Assembly speech broadcast

on Cairo Home Service in Arabic; English translation

in BBC Monitoring Service, Summary of World Broadcasts,

ME/3603/A/1-A/7; reprinted by permission.

ARAB WORLD 371

that our nation suffered a serious setback on 5th June 1967. We lost a battle. We had the dignity and courage to face the truth and face others with the truth. We did not deceive. We refused to bury our heads in the sand like ostriches or to pretend that the arrow aimed at us did not wound or hurt. We admitted that we lost a battle. At the same time we showed convincingly that we had not lost the war. This was not merely a claim on our part. It was the truth pertaining to our nation’s will, our nation’s resources, abilities and readiness.

A status quo at a certain moment cannot change the great truth—that is, if we are able to grasp the truth and if we in time of danger have strong enough nerves to absorb a shock and distinguish between what is superficial and transient and what is natural, real and has the strength to survive and endure.

We lost a battle in the war between our¬ selves and Israel. This was within the realm of probability. However, we have not lost the whole war because that is against nature, history and evolution. Clear proof of this was our Arab masses’ stand behind our immortal leader, Jamal Abd an-Nasir, on 9th and 10th June 1967. That stand was not an emotional outburst but a genuine expression of the nature of things. The precise interpretation of that stand is that the Arab masses told Jamal Abd an-Nasir: Never mind the obstacle on the road. We shall stand up and start anew. We shall march forward together placing our belief in God, ourselves and the possibility of victory. We are ready to bear all the costs and con¬ sequences of victory.

After that day, Jamal Abd an-Nasir defined our view of our principled commitments in two points which were accepted by everyone. In their adherence to these two points, our people have devoted all they have—money, work and sacrifice. The first point is the necessity to regain all the territories which were occupied as a result of the 1967 ag¬ gression and the inevitability of the with¬ drawal of the occupation forces from these territories. These territories as defined by Jamal Abd an-Nasir to the masses of our nation are: Arab Jerusalem, the West Bank of

Jordan, the Gaza Strip, the Syrian Heights and Sinai. We have never agreed to bargain over the land, because the land of any people is their national honour as Abd an-Nasir told you in this very place.

The second point is the necessity to preserve the rights of the Palestinian people, because we cannot and do not have the right to speak on their behalf, let alone relinquish or give anything in their name. We shall not be the generation which surrendered the rights of the Palestinian people. If we cannot extract any of the rights, then at least we must not be responsible before the nation, history and conscience for having relinquished any of these rights.

These were, still are and will continue to be, God willing, our principled com¬ mitments. No one can change them. Circum¬ stances cannot change them, because our belief in them is stronger than all individuals and more durable than all circumstances. They are not just the rights of a nation, but are the necessities of destiny.

(2) Our work to ensure respect for our principled commitments has not ceased throughout the past years whether on the battlefield against the enemy, in explaining the facts of our commitments to the world, or in our efforts to co-operate with the inter¬ national community to find a solution which guarantees just peace and is based on the principles of international law.

Our armed forces have not let the enemy live in peace, but have continued to clash with him even in the most difficult circum¬ stances. The Ras al-Ushsh battle took place barely a few weeks after June 1967. Our naval units clashed with the enemy units and sunk his largest warship, Eilat, in 1967. The artillery duels against enemy positions began in 1968. The year 1969 was the year of the crossing operations to attack enemy fortifications and clash with his soldiers face-to-face. In 1970 our air defence forces fought a battle which the enemy wanted to be fierce and ferocious. The enemy’s friends in the United States wanted him to have air superiority. Despite all that, the enemy suffered heavy losses in July of that


year. The sacrifices of our civilian masses in the firing line were enormous.

The enemy wanted to place the three main Canal towns—Suez, Ismailia and Port Said— at the mercy of his guns. The Canal people made great sacrifices and nobly just as any citizen would make sacrifices for his homeland. All the people’s forces supported the front with their work, production, steadfastness, consciousness, faith and patience to a degree which can be achieved only by great noble nations which know the values of freedom, civilisation and humanity.

We realise that major conflicts and prob¬ lems in modern times cannot be confined to the battle front or to national borders. For this reason we have tried to make contacts with the whole world and tell them our views and explain the facts. The crisis has proved that we have friends. Foremost of these friends—friends who are dear to us—are the people of the great Soviet Union who were not merely satisfied with showing understanding, but also hastened to give us things without which it would have been have been difficult to continue to fight strongly and effectively.

Through its support of us during this crisis the Soviet Union has established one of history’s great friendships and has made such a friendship an example of international fraternity and of the unity of the forces opposing imperialism, intimidation and ag¬ gression. And so, the crisis has proved that the socialist people’s front, the grouping of the non-aligned States, and the solidarity of the three continents—Asia, Africa and Latin America—are one strong front along which extends the strong and impregnable national liberation line.

Moreover, the crisis has proved that right has its supporters regardless of consequences. This is evident in the present important change in Western Europe’s attitude. This attitude has unquestionably been influenced by French policy since the beginning of the crisis.

Throughout this time we have shown the greatest sincere co-operation and good will to the world community, represented by the United Nations, by taking part in all the

attempts to find a solution to the crisis before its dangers to world peace become difficult to contain. We have taken specific steps in this regard: We have accepted the Security Council resolution of 22nd November 1967; we have sincerely and honestly extended our hand to the UN Secretary-General’s special envoy, Ambassador Jarring, entrusted with following up the implementation of the Security Council resolution; we have also maintained constant contact with him, parti¬ cularly during the first 18 months of his mission when the Ambassador found himself visiting the Middle East capitals without being able to find any objective to hold on to. When he became tired of this, he was forced to suspend his mission temporarily.

In every international arena and world conference our call has always been the call of peace which we have made conditional on only one thing—that it be a just peace; otherwise peace cannot be established or maintained.

While we, on our side were acting in this way, the enemy on his side was procrastinating and evading any question put to him about his real intentions. It was clear all the time that he would not implement the Security Council resolution and that he was continu¬ ously looking for excuses not to fulfil its clauses. He was continuing his aggressive policy. This policy materialised in mad and destructive raids on factories and schools in Egypt, cities and camps in Jordan and airports and villages in Lebanon as well as in killing, imprisonment and torture of patient strugglers in the occupied territories. The enemy was doing all this as if he were free to do as he pleased, as if there were no one to stop him, and as if he were not afraid of any punishment.

Despite all we have seen and suffered, in July 1970 we accepted an initiative submitted on behalf of the United States by the US Secretary of State, William Rogers, so that we could prove to the world the sincerity of our intentions and our regard for peace—if ever there is a path to peace. Our reasons for this acceptance were explained by our eternal leader himself to you, to the people and to the nation.

ARAB WORLD 373

The firing on our front, which faced the responsibility of constant confrontation with the enemy, stopped for three months. It was expected that during this time some progress would be made towards a peaceful solution of the crisis. But this was not achieved. This is because the enemy used the excuse of the Egyptian missile network on our front and therefore did not contact the UN Sec¬ retary-General’s representative. The stipu¬ lated three months ended and the whole crisis was placed before the UN General Assembly which on 4th November gave its opinion extending the temporary cease-fire period for a further three months. It affirmed its adherence to the implementation of the Security Council resolution and drew up a plan for the UN representative to resume his mission.

Israel wasted the first cease-fire period until it obtained unlimited quantities of arms and equipment on the pretext of re¬ establishing a balance of power as a result of the claim about Egyptian missiles. Israel decided to repeat the same operation of defamation and extortion. It did not begin contacting the UN Secretary-General’s repre¬ sentative until after it had contracted a deal for arms, equipment and economic aid amounting to 500 million dollars from the United States. The excuse this time was to reassure itself before it contacted Ambas¬ sador Gunnar Jarring. Contrary to all that it says and claims, the United States en¬ courages the aggressor and enables him to continue his aggression.

Israel finally contacted Jarring, but in our opinion it resumed its original position. Its documents to him contained a repetition of its previous attitudes which are against any hope for peace. Superficially it claims to be looking for peace, but it does not want peace. In fact, it accepts nothing more than expansion. It denies its expansionist intentions but exercises this desire for expansion. We have not forgotten, brothers, Israel’s official declaration of its annexation of Sinai to its territory in October 1956. During the tri¬ partite aggression it imagined that time was convenient for it to do so.

We began to hear calls to extend the cease¬

fire because this period was insufficient. For this reason we were in contact with everybody to explain our views.

As you remember, the Soviet President, Nikolay Podgorny, came to Cairo. He was accompanied by an excellent delegation. With them we studied the situation and all its developments and possibilities. I say before you that in order to push matters forward and in appreciation of the historical respon¬ sibilities of our times, I sent a letter to the US President, Richard Nixon, and received his reply. I am sorry to say before you now that the US attitude is the same as it was: full alignment with Israel. In my letter I asked for a reply to a specific question: What does the United States want? I have received no reply to this question nor is it likely that such a reply will come.

At the same time, when the US Secretary of State sent a letter to his UAR counterpart, I encouraged the continuation of correspond¬ ence between them to reach the greatest understanding and clarity.

We firmly insisted on calling on the four big Powers to assume their duties and respon¬ sibilities to preserve peace in view of their permanent membership in the Security Council, their international position and their direct interest in the crisis. Our co-operation with the UN Secretary-General and his special representative entrusted with the task of implementing the Security Council resolution was unlimited and unconditional.

This week we reached a cross-road. On the one hand, the enemy continues his occupation of our territory and tries to consolidate this occupation by changing the nature of the ground, especially in Jerusalem, the West Bank, the Syrian Heights, where he is establishing settlements, and the Egypt¬ ian desert of Sinai. On the other hand, we cannot remain idle in view of what is taking place. Our holy duty which nobody can deny us is to liberate the land and to clash again with the enemy.

Contacts at the United Nations have not yet achieved a result which we consider satisfactory because the enemy continues to be stubborn and to defy us, the entire world and the international principles of law from


A to Z. However, several parties are trying to persuade us by various means to extend the cease-fire if even for a few weeks.

Brothers, we now come to the point of giving visible form to our future steps as dictated by the values we represent, the principles in which we believe and our commitments to world peace and the inter¬ national society. I have discussed the aspects of the situation with the political and military leaders and at all the establishments through which our regime thinks and decides. There have been lengthy discussions in the Cabinet, the National Defence Council and the Arab Socialist Union Central Committee. The considerations open to us were briefly as follows:

(1) We cannot and we do not have the right to allow the automatic renewal of the cease-fire while there is no progress in the efforts of Ambassador Gunnar Jarring. If we let such a thing happen, this would mean that the cease-fire lines would become a fait accompli, or political lines, as was the case with the 1949 armistice lines. We shall not allow such a thing to happen under any circumstances.

(2) We can see the extensive and regret¬ tably skilful attempts to mislead world opinion, to depict the problem as other than what it is, and to present it as if it has become less important, as if it has become a question of a cease-fire or opening fire, so that this misinterpretation will create the impression that the party which begins the firing is intransigent.

The core of the problem is the aggression. Aggression is the imposed occupation by some force. But opening fire to end the occupation is a natural, legitimate and lawful right and the sacred duty of everyone who respects and believes in freedom for every land and for every people.

(3) We must frankly admit that there is nothing so far in Israel’s statements and actions at the United Nations in New York or in the land of the crisis in the Middle East to indicate that it is ready to implement the Security Council resolution. Indeed, all indications point to its constant attempts

to make this resolution abortive and render it null and void, and to obstruct all interna¬ tional efforts to find a solution to the crisis. The simplest evidence of this is that there can be no talk of peace while land is occupied, and there can be no talk of peace while threats of arrogance and stupidity of power continue.

Despite this, the UN Secretary-General had a different view which he presented

in the report he submitted to the Security Council, including his appeal to the parties in the dispute. He said in this report that although he admitted the need for more clarifications, he found scope for cautious optimism. He based his cautious optimism, he said, on the fact that these parties had

resumed their contacts with Ambassador Jarring, that some progress had been made in defining the positions of the parties, and that the parties which had expressed a wish to implement the Security Council resolution were now describing in more detail their views on their commitments resulting from this resolution; The UN Secretary-General con¬ cluded by appealing to the parties to continue their role in the discussion in a constructive manner and to co-operate with Ambassador Gunnar Jarring with a view to implementing the Security Council resolution. In con¬ clusion, the UN Secretary-General appealed to the parties to exercise self-restraint in this difficult situation and to renew the cease-fire when it expired on 5th February.

In this atmosphere, a considerable number of Security Council members, whose under¬ standing of our position and sympathy with our struggle we trust, approached us with a persistent call for self-restraint. When the UN Secretary-General made his appeal, we heard these members’ comments on it. They said that for this appeal to come at this serious stage in the Middle East situation meant that the UN Secretary-General, by virtue of his position and responsibility, felt he had reason to believe that there was a possibility for real progress towards the implementation of the Security Council resolution. They felt that it might be better to give the Sec¬ retary-General a favourable atmosphere to help him implement the Security Council

ARAB WORLD 375

resolution, the task entrusted to him by the Council resolution of 22nd November 1967.

As for the third part of my speech, brothers, our deep, faithful and responsible discussions have led us to define our position as follows:

(a) The UAR considers itself bound by one commitment for which there can be no alternative: the liberation of all the territories occupied during the 1967 aggres¬ sion. This is our original commitment for which we have exerted all our political, military, economic and diplomatic activity and for which we offer every sacrifice no matter how high.

The primary commitment of every nation is that of its freedom, within the framework of international law. Nobody can ask it to undertake or can impose on it any com¬ mitment contrary to that sacred commitment. Hence, it is every nation’s right to reserve for itself the right to act freely in dealing with everything it faces.

(b) Despite this primary major commit¬ ment, we accept the appeal of the UN Sec¬ retary-General and decide to refrain from opening fire for a period which we cannot extend beyond 30 days ending on 7th March. During this period, the Secretary-General and the entire world community must ensure that there is genuine progress regarding the heart of the problem and not in its outward manifestations. We feel that it is imperative for the Security Council to hear, before the expiration of this period, a report by the UN Secretary-General on the progress made.

Although from now on we know that Israel, with US help and carte blanche support, will not budge from its present position, we pray to God that practice will prove that our doubts are unfounded.

(c) To all the efforts exerted to solve the crisis, we add a new Egyptian initiative, compliance with which we shall consider as a true yardstick of the desire to implement the UN Security Council resolution. We demand that during the period when we refrain from opening fire that a partial with¬ drawal of the Israeli forces on the east bank of the Suez Canal be achieved as the first

stage of a time table which will be prepared later to implement the other provisions of the Security Council resolution. If this is achieved within this period, we shall be prepared to begin immediately to clear the Suez Canal and reopen it to international navigation to serve the world economy.

We believe that by this initiative, we shall be turning envoy Jarring’s efforts from am¬ biguous words into definite measures for the implementation of the Security Council reso¬ lution that will serve the interests of all countries whose economies have been harmed by the closure of the Suez Canal due to the Israeli aggression and terrorisation.

Brothers, I have asked the Foreign Ministry to submit to the office of the National As¬ sembly chairman a detailed report on all the contacts which have taken place during the past years. I have also asked for the text of the National Defence Council resolution to be provided, because some of its provisions are secret. I have also asked for the minutes of the 3rd February 1971 meeting of the Central Committee of the Arab Socialist Union to be given to the Chairman’s office so that the whole picture with all its details may be before you and so that you may be fully aware of the reasons for every position we adopt.

Finally, I wish to state to you that the whole situation hinges on two facts: (1) The ceasing or not ceasing of fire is not the issue. The issue is the liberation of all the Arab lands and the rest* ation of the legitimate right of the Palestinian people. This is the issue for which we offer everything without reserva¬ tion or hesitation until the end. (2) Regardless of every chance we give the world community out of our respect and appreciation, we must realise that, in the end, things depend on our strength alone. We know our enemy better than anyone else, no matter how interested in the crisis he might be. This is because we are the ones who have faced and are still facing his designs and plots. Only he who has been burnt knows what fire is. Through our knowledge of the enemy, we know that he will not be deterred except by force and will not retreat except under pressure.

Brothers, having ‘spoken to our nation and people, we address a final word across


the border. We have already done our duty to the world and to peace to the best of our ability. It is time others did their duty to the world and peace. Duty is not a tax which some people must pay and from which others are exempted. Duty, particularly on an international level, is a general responsibility.

I say quite clearly that we have satisfied our conscience with regard to what we have been asked to take care of. But we want everyone to know that there is not anything we care more about than our homeland and nation. People do not care about others more than they care about themselves. There¬ fore, I say the time has come for others im¬ mediately to assume their share of the duty in a firm and decisive manner. The whole international community is called upon to adopt a frank and clear stand. The United Nations has the choice to be or not to be. The big Powers have the responsibility to safeguard the existing international system. They cannot evade this responsibility. The whole world’s public is called upon to shatter the smoke-screen of misleading Israeli pro¬ paganda which is published everywhere as¬ sisted by the most modern means of artificial and fabricated influence.

We want the world to know that we have a right which we are demanding. At the same time, we want the world to know that we have the power with which we can demand this right which we shall not beg but demand honourably; we shall not ask but fight and sacrifice.

Brothers: Let us be strong through right, principle, faith, freedom, the fighting means in our hands and our armed forces who, with complete courage, confidence and no¬ bility, are awaiting the signal to move. They are our soldiers and at the same time, through right and faith, are the soldiers of God. They will triumph, God willing, in honour of their immortal nation and to protect its. dignity and prestige among the nations. [Verse from Qur’an.] Peace be with you.

275

U.A.R. Government Statement Issued in Response to the Rejection of Egyptian Peace Proposals by Premier Meir of Israel in a Speech to the Knesset1

Cairo, February 9, 1971

We regard the statement made by Mrs. Golda Meir to the Knesset today as being a clear rejection of the Egyptian peace initiative and as once again affirming Israel’s insistence on imposing its own conditions on the Arabs.

Golda Meir talked a lot about peace and her desire for peace at a time when all Israel’s actions indicate her blatant conduct against peace and the establishment of peace. Israel refused to implement the Security Council resolution and placed every obstacle in the way of Dr. Jarring in the performance of his task. It then rejected the six-point peace plan which the United Arab Republic pro¬ posed to Dr. Jarring a few days ago. And today it frankly rejects the peace initiative announced by President Anwar Sadat in his speech.

In spite of this, Golda Meir talks of peace. But no talk of peace by Golda Meir or any Israeli official can mean anything at all as long as it is not accompanied by full with¬ drawal from all Arab territories, and whatever efforts are made to misrepresent the truth, they will not succeed in disguising the fact that Israel does not intend to implement the Security Council resolution or to relinquish the occupied territory.

1 Translated from the Arabic text of the U.A.R. state¬

ment released by the official spokesman Munir Hafiz,

al-Anwar (Beirut), February 10, 1971. (For Premier

Meir’s speech, see Document 23 above.)

ARAB WORLD 377

276

Statements of Support for the Rights of the Palestinian People and Their Armed Struggle To Recover Them, In¬ cluded in the Speech from the Throne of Shaikh Sabah, Amir of Kuwait1

Kuwait, February 10, 1971

The aggressor state will deceive no one by pretending to desire peace and to accept the Security Council resolutions while it is making unremitting efforts to impede their implementation and to achieve its expansionist ambitions by annexing part of the Arab territories it has been occupying since June 1967, not to mention its continued refusal to recognize the legitimate rights of the Palestinian Arab people. This conduct, based as it is on trickery, deceit and misrepresenta¬ tion, increases our conviction of the worth¬ lessness of a peaceful settlement, and we have more than once explained that we shall not agree to any settlement of the Palestine problem which does not satisfy the Palestinian Arab people whose rights in this matter are paramount. We shall continue to support the armed struggle of this people to recover their legitimate rights in their usurped homeland, and we are still committed to this policy. Honorable Members:

There can be no question that events in another Arab country which affect its ability to endure in the face of our common enemy concern us all; this is why we, like others, have felt concern for the events that have taken place in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in the last few months. The last Speech from the Throne dealt with these events, and with the consequent signing of the Cairo and Amman Agreements and the formation of the Supreme Arab Follow-Up Committee and the Arab Ceasefire Observer Mission to supervise their implementation.


Amir’s Speech from the Throne, read to the opening

session of'the newly-elected National Assembly by the

Premier, Shaikh Jaber al-Ahmad al-Jaber, al-Siyasa

(Kuwait), February 11, 1971.

But unfortunately this did not prevent the renewal of these clashes on an extensive scale at the beginning of this year. We sincerely hope that there will not be a repetition of that tragedy which can only endanger our nation at a time when it is

urgently necessary that we should be united to confront any emergency or any new ag¬ gression by Israel.

277

U.A.R. Memorandum Setting Out the Commitments Egypt Would Make in Order To Bring About a Middle East Settlement, Issued in Reply to a Letter from U.N. Special Envoy Jarring2


The U.A.R. has informed your Excellency that it accepts to carry out on a reciprocal basis all its obligations as provided for in Security Council Resolution 242/1967 with a view to achieving a peaceful settlement in the Middle East.

On the same basis, Israel should carry out all its obligations contained in this resolution. Referring to your aide-memoire of February, 1971, the U.A.R. would give a commitment covering the following:—

1. Termination of all claims or states of belligerency;

2. Respect for and acknowledgement of each other’s sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence;

3. Respect for and acknowledgement of each other’s right to live in peace within secure and recognised boundaries;

4. Responsibility to do all in their power to ensure that acts of belligerency or hostility do not originate from or are committed from within the respective territories against the population, citizens or property of the other party; and

2 English text of U.A.R. memorandum, Arab Report

and Record, No. 5 (March 1 15, 1971), pp. 158-159.


5. Non-interference in each other’s do¬ mestic affairs.

The U.A.R. would also give a commit¬ ment that:

6. It ensures the freedom of navigation in the Suez Canal in accordance with the 1888 Constantinople Convention;

7. It ensures the freedom of navigation in the Straits of Tiran in accordance with the principles of international law;

8. It accepts the stationing of a United Nations peacekeeping force in Sharm el Sheikh.

To guarantee the peaceful settlement and the territorial inviolability of every state in the area, the U.A.R. would accept:

a The establishment of demilitarised zones astride the borders in equal distances; and

b -- --- The establishment of a United Nations peace-keeping force in which the four per¬ manent members of the Security Council would participate.

Israel should, likewise, give a commitment to implement all the provisions of the Security Council’s Resolution 242 of 1967. Israel should give a commitment covering the following:—

1. Withdrawal of its armed forces from Sinai and the Gaza strip;

2. Achievement of a just settlement for the refugees’ problem in accordance with United Nations resolutions;

3. Termination of all claims or states of belligerency;

4. Respect for and acknowledgement of each other’s sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence;

5. Respect for and acknowledgement of each other’s right to live in peace within secure and recognised boundaries;

6. Responsibility to do all in their power to ensure that acts of belligerency or hostility do not originate from or are committed from within the respective territories against the population, citizens or property of the other party;

7. Non-interference in each other’s do¬ mestic affairs.

To guarantee the peaceful settlement and the territorial inviolability of every state in

the area, Israel would accept:— a — The establishment of demilitarised

zones astride the borders in equal distances; and

b — The establishment of a United Nations peace-keeping force in which the four per¬ manent members of the Security Council would participate.

When Israel gives the commitments, the U.A.R. will be ready to enter into a peace agreement with Israel containing all the aforementioned obligations as provided for in Security Council Resolution 242.

The U.A.R. considers that just and lasting peace cannot be realised without the full and scrupulous implementation of Security Council Resolution 242 of 1967 and the withdrawal of the Israeli armed forces from all the territories occupied since June 5, 1967.

278

Tunisian Press Interview Statements by President Qadhafi of Libya, Stressing the Necessity for Arab Unification in Order To Combat Israel1

Tunis, February 15, 1971

The proposal that the battle should be placed on a pan-Arab basis is based on the following considerations:

1. Israel has not been content with Pales¬ tine and will not be content with what it has occupied in addition, but is continuing to engage in a strategic maneuver that is called in military language an “artichoke ma¬ neuver,” which consists of the piecemeal occupation of objectives with the object of attaining the final objective by stages.

2. The United Nations and the so-called great and small powers have been unable to


Qadhafi’s exclusive interview with, the news agency

Tunis Afrique Presse, al-Haqiqa (Benghazi), February

17,1971.

INTERNATIONAL DOCUMENTS ON PALESTINE, 1971 379

solve this problem for more than twenty-two years, while it is the Arab people alone who have suffered direct injury.

3. Israel is by no means a miracle from the military point of view.

4. Israel and its allies will be able to continue imposing their existence as long as they are confronted by Arab countries one at a time, and this individual action makes it impossible to make use of the resources of the whole Arab nation.

5. The enemy’s allies reckon the full strength of the Arabs as being arrayed against the strength of Israel, and support Israel on this basis; in fact, however, the full strength of the Arabs is not mobilized for the battle, although it is reckoned as being so, and this constitutes a great danger which is ignored by the Arabs.

6. The decisive and natural solution is that all Arab strength should be mobilized for a pan-Arab battle against the present enemy, that the battle should start from all quarters at once, contrary to what has happened in the past, and that the battle should be offensive, never defensive, because the enemy is occupy¬ ing Arab territory, which calls for attack. Defense is permissible when the enemy is outside the frontiers; this is the only explana¬ tion of offense and defense to be found in the military dictionary.

7. The Arabs are at present capable of mobilizing a thousand planes, five thousand tanks and a million men, and they will be able to mobilize more than that in the future. This is a sufficient force to defeat the enemy, on condition that it is mobilized in a pan- Arab battle. Otherwise it will have no effect either at the regional or the pan-Arab level.

[In reply to a question as to how far the Libyan Arab Republic can reconcile its agreement with France not to use the Mirages in the Middle East war with its undertakings to the Arab countries]: The fact that we have bought the planes from France does not mean that we have relinquished our national duties or the defense of our rights. We are free to use the weapons that we buy with our

own money. There are also other planes in the world than Mirages, and if necessary we can buy others from any country, and perhaps with greater facilities and at lower prices from other countries.

279

U.S. Press Interview with U.A.R. Presi¬ dent Sadat Agreeing to an International Peace Keeping Force and to Free Passage for Israeli Shipping Through the Suez Canal and the Straits of Tiran, Given Israeli Withdrawal from Occupied Ter¬ ritories and a Just Solution to the Pales¬ tine Problem1

Cairo, Mid-February, 1971

Q_. Israel's Foreign Minister, Abba Eban, says that if you interpreted Prime Minister Golda Meir's speech as a rejection of your proposal for a partial withdrawal from the canal, you should perhaps read it more carefully. After a second reading, what is your conclusion?

A. To begin with, as I told President Nixon, I think we differ on starting positions. The starting point for every Israeli attitude is that we were defeated and they can, there¬ fore, dictate whatever they want. Our starting point is that we lost a battle—but not the war. If their starting point is erroneous, everything else is wrong.

Q. What's the new starting point?

A. If they want peace, we also want peace. But let’s be frank. Can peace be induced while one of the parties occupies one-seventh of the land of the other? The occupying power automatically has a veto. This is no way to bring about a lasting settle¬ ment, which is what we most sincerely want. Let there be no doubt about that. A peace based on justice for all.

1 Transcript of Sadat’s interview, conducted by Arnaud

deBorchgrave, Newsweek (Domestic Edition), LXXVII,

8 (February 22, 1971), pp. 40-41; © Copyright

Newsweek Inc. 1971, reprinted by permission.


Q. Mrs. Meir says she is willing to discuss any suggestions for reopening the canal prior to negotiating other matters. This could include your suggestion as well. She talks about normalization of civilian life in the eanal zone and de-escalation of the military setup. Isn’t this worth exploring?

A. She speaks about normalization. But what authority does she have to speak about civilians in our own country? Would America discuss normalization along the Mississippi with a foreign power? The canal is Egyptian and was founded long before Israel became a state. This is a flagrant intrusion into our own affairs.

Q. Does your proposal include free passage for Israeli ships?

A. Yes, we have agreed to this in our memorandum to Ambassador Jarring. Free passage is clearly spelled out. But first Israel must fulfill its obligations under the U.N. resolution.

Q. How do you feel about U.S. readiness to discuss Big Four guarantees with the other Big

Three?

A. A significant change. An encouraging development. I had always hoped that the U.S., apart from being a friend of Israel, as a major power would demonstrate its respon¬ sibility toward peace based on justice. I never dreamed that the U.S. would be on our side. I ask only one thing: can be U.S. be neutral and objective?

Q. You have said that if Israel does not accept partial withdrawal from the canal, it will be throwing away the last chance for peace. How can your offer lead to permanent peace?

A. Before Feb. 5, the U.S. Government and Israel raised hell all over the world about cease-fire or no cease-fire. The substance of the whole problem got lost in the shuffle. Well, with our proposal we say the problem is not cease-fire but how to dismantle the Israeli occupation in return for a lasting settlement. Let us tackle together real sub¬ stance. If we do that and discuss through Jarring, in practical, concrete terms, the main problem, we are quite ready to cease fire. But a permanent cease-fire will automatically

lead to a permanent status quo and per¬ manent occupation.

Q. The Israelis say no withdrawal without peace and you say no peace without withdrawal. This strikes many outsiders as an exercise in semantics. Since insiders are talking about a package deal, couldn’t you test Israel’s real intentions by com¬ mitting yourself to a peace treaty and then see if the Israelis commit themselves to withdrawal ?

A. That is a very important question. If you read the U.N. resolution very carefully it is an embryonic peace treaty. That is a solemn commitment on our part. But we are still waiting for a solemn commitment on the other side. Why should all the obligations be on us? Try to use elementary psychology. A partial withdrawal will test Israel’s alleged good intentions, open the canal for free navi¬ gation for the whole world, and after that Jarring can work out a timetable to solve the whole problem. Then I can prolong the cease-fire for another fixed date. And then we move toward final peace. The trouble with the Israelis is that they are still dreaming about their victory. If they want real peace, we are more than ready for one too.

Qj You ask for complete withdrawal to the 1967 borders. The Israelis reply they won’t pull back all the way. Would the Arabs be prepared to negotiate minor border rectifications ? For example, if the Israelis gave up all of Sinai in return for a strong U.N. presence at Sharm el Sheikh guaranteed by the Big Four and gave up the Golan Plain, including the Syrian city of El Kuneitra, would you have any objection to minor concessions in the Latrun Bulge, Kalkilya, Tulkarm and on the Golan Heights themselves?

A. It’s for the countries concerned to decide. The problem now is the larger aspect of peace. In our view, the Israeli demand for secure and defensible borders is a pretext for expansion. Some prominent Israeli intellectuals you yourself interviewed in Newsweek last year are of the same opinion. They described their government’s policy as one of creeping annexation that is leading Israel nowhere. I will go even further. The party that needs secure borders is us, not Israel.

ARAB WORLD 381

Q. Does partial withdrawal mean that Israel has to begin by abandoning the Bar-Lew line—or would a thinning out of defenses along this line be acceptable as a first step ?

A. Partial withdrawal means to a line behind El Arish. Israel says we are seeking strategic advantages. I’m afraid Israel is living in the past. This is 1971, not 1967. We’re not interested in making strategic gains. The Bar-Lev line was not even in my calculations. The idea of partial with¬ drawal has been suggested at different times by the French and the Soviets, even by the U.S. at one point. Let’s face it, I don’t have confidence in them and they don’t have confidence in me. Let us try to restore con¬ fidence by testing their real intentions.

Q. If they pulled back behind El Arish, what would you give them in return ?

A. I would guarantee to reopen the canal in six months to international trade. I would prolong the cease-fire to a fixed date to give Jarring time to work out the details. I would guarantee free passage in the Strait of Tiran with an international force at Sharm el Sheikh. Its composition doesn’t matter; the Big Four or other nations—it’s immaterial to us. It would be guaranteed by the Security Council and could not be removed without all four agreeing. We would finally be grap¬ pling with fundamentals and a final settlement would at last be in sight. We are open-minded and open-hearted about the rest of the pro¬ gram. We will be flexible and willing to discuss anything that could lead to lasting peace in this part of the world. But mark this. It must be an over-all settlement for all territories occupied in 1967, not just Sinai.

Q. Some military experts say that Egyptian forces word t be a real threat for the Israelis for several more years. And some of your critics have been saying that by fixing yet another deadline on March 7—the third since last August—you are edging ever closer to a fourth round with the Israelis that you cannot win—-and may lose. What is your answer?

A. Those so-called experts don’t know anything about our new army. We can

absorb whatever shocks, costs and sacrifices that may be in store for us. Whatever the power you are faced with, the will of the people cannot be changed. After ten years in Viet¬ nam, you Americans should understand this. If Israel won’t return our lands, we will have to pay whatever the price is meeded to liberate our country.

Q. The Israelis have made clear they won't fight again according to the ground-rules of last year's war of attrition. If you resume firing, this presumably means massive retaliation. So wouldn't a resumption of Egyptian shelling, in effect, trigger the fourth round?

A. The third round, started by Israel in 1967, is still going on. The Israelis have bombed our heartland, used napalm, with as many as 180 planes in seventeen hours of raids in a single day. The U.S. bombs they dropped cost from half a million to a million dollars a day. All this has only been inter¬ rupted by the cease-fire. Israeli policy is to put fear and despair in our hearts. But this has proved fruitless. It does not bring peace.

Q. Do you feel confident you now have the capability to cross the canal and hold and widen a beachhead on the other side?

A. These are secret military plans. I’m not in a position to speak about them.

Qj Is it true that your missile sites in the canal zone are now entirely manned by Egyptians?

A. Correct. What the Israelis said about Russians in the canal zone was totally untrue. We don’t want anyone else to fight our battle.

Q. I think ifs important that you spell out as clearly as possible what you would be prepared to put in a peace treaty.

A. If Israel returns our land under the Security Council resolution, the inviolability and political independence of every state in the area, including Israel’s. We pledge our solemn word on this. We have no designs on Israel, it is Israel that has designs on us. The terri¬ torial integrity of Israel in secure and re¬ cognized borders will be guaranteed by the Big Four. Israel will enjoy freedom of naviga¬ tion in the. canal and the strait, again guaran¬ teed. For all this to happen, however, there


must be a just solution to the Palestinian problem.

Q. There is still much confusion about the Palestinian problem. What would be your objection to adequate financial compensation for Palestinian refugees coupled with a referendum in the west bank and Gaza to determine whether Palestinians want a separate state, either federated or confederated with Jordan, or remain an integral part of Jordan ?

A. I’m not in a position to decide for the Palestinians but this sounds like a reasonable way to solve the problem—compensation and referendum. They must decide for them¬ selves.

Q. You have saidyou are not prepared to establish normal diplomatic relations with Israel. Could you tell me, specifically, then what you have in mind?

A. Golda Meir once said that peace will only come when she can drive her car from Tel Aviv to Cairo to do some shopping. That is a pipe dream based on the victory complex. America, for example, recognizes China’s territorial integrity but does not have normal diplomatic relations with Peking. The ex¬ change of ambassadors is a technicality. It’s a question of sovereignty. Each nation decides for itself. But Israeli propaganda has used what I said to claim that I wouldn’t re¬ cognize Israel’s territorial integrity. That is absolute nonsense, designed to confuse American opinion.

Qj When I asked President Nasser two years ago whether he would agree to the stationing of units of the Big Four powers at Sharrn el Sheikh as part of an agreement on Israeli withdrawal from Sinai, he said no very emphatically. Your position on this score has changed completely. Why?

A. My proposal is motivated solely by my desire to facilitate a durable settlement. My people won’t like it. That’s why Nasser was against it. But I will take that risk. And after that, if world opinion doesn’t understand our attitude, we can then say we’ve done our level best. It won’t be our responsibility if the Israelis refuse the guarantees that are being offered.

Q. What do you feel the U.S. could do that it hasn't done?

A. The U.S. Administration is the key to peace. If they want peace, they certainly have the means to convince Israel of our good intentions. You have pampered Israel long enough. Why should you treat Israel differently from your other allies? In 1956 we didn’t start the war and you helped get the Israelis to withdraw from Sinai. In 1967, we didn’t start the war either. Three of our cities have been almost totally destroyed. If the U.S. still has a sense of justice and fair play, it still has a great role to play.

Q. To conclude, what can you say that might convince Israel that your aim is no longer its destruc¬ tion through a process to be resumed after a partial peace has been concluded?

A. You have put the cart before the donkey. We are the ones who have to be convinced.

280

Libyan Press Interview Statements by Foreign Minister Masmoudi of Tunisia, Expressing Support for U.A.R. Efforts and Noting That There Are Various Ways of Participating in the Battle Against Israel1

Tunis, Mid-February, 1971

I think that both the political and diplomat¬ ic moves and preparations that the United Arab Republic is making, together with the efforts we are making in Tunis to achieve a peaceful solution, amount to a political battle in which, if we are successful, we shall both put a stop to bloodshed and achieve liberation of the territory. If we fail to find a peaceful solution we are entitled to take all measures capable of realizing the right of the Palestinian people to recover their territory, and I believe that it is essential to provide political and financial support to the United


Masmoudi’s exclusive interview with al-Thazvra

(Tripoli, Libya), February 21, 1971, as reprinted in

al-Amal (Tunis), February 23, 1971

ARAB WORLD 383

Arab Republic as being the pioneer of Arab struggle, situated as it is on the first line of confrontation with the enemy. I also believe it to be essential that all Arab resources should be placed at the service of the battle and the liberation of Palestine.

Certainly the Arab nation possesses human, military and economic resources, in addition to oil, much more abundant than the real resources of the Israeli enemy, all of which must be subjected to the service of the cause, and a scientific, clear and carefully studied plan must be drawn up so that every Arab country in the great Arab homeland may know what its obligations are and what services it can offer.

I believe that there are some who cannot provide military assistance, but these can participate in other fields. For example, some countries have good relations with western countries; this enables them to ex¬ plain the Palestine problem to the West. A division of duties in the battle can be extremely effective, by which I mean that everyorie should offer what he has to offer to the battle, whether in the political or the military field.

281

Statement Addressed to Arab Heads of State by the Jordanian Chamber of Deputies Appealing for Resumption of Financial Aid to Jordan and for Strong Resistance to the Idea of a “Palestine State” on the West Bank1

Amman, February 24, 1971

To their Majesties, Excellencies and High¬ nesses, Kings and Presidents of the fraternal Arab States and Chairmen of the Arab National Assemblies, the Secretary General of the Arab Parliamentary Union, the Sec-

1 Text of Jordanian appeal broadcast on Amman home

Service in Arabic; English translation in BBC Moni¬

toring Service, Summary of World Broadcasts, ME/3620/

A/6—A/7; reprinted by permission.

retary General of the Arab League and his Eminence the Rector of Al-Azhar:

The Jordanian Chamber of Deputies makes a fraternal and sincere appeal to the fraternal Arab States which have stopped or frozen their material aid to Jordan to reconsider their attitudes and to fear God for the sake of this nation’s destiny and the requirements of the higher Arab national interest. The material aid which was decided on by the Khartoum conference was never a gift or a donation but a'national duty dictated by the unity of the common Arab destiny.

The Jordanian Chamber of Deputies also appeals to the other Arab States which are aware of the realities of Jordan not to stand as indifferent spectators on the question of material aid to Jordan. They should exercise their influence to restore this aid. Dignity- loving Jordan, which is the shield of this nation’s honour and dignity, is pained—both people and Army—by this ingratitude and disavowal by some Arab brothers.

The Chamber of Deputies also unanimously approved today the following resolution, which has been sent to the Arab Kings and Presidents and the Chairmen of the Arab national assemblies: The Jordanian Chamber of Deputies denounces the idea of establishing a Palestine State which is now being discussed behind the scenes in several foreign and Arab capitals. The Chamber, while vehe¬ mently condemning this idea, warns the Arab peoples that the Palestine State project is no more than an ugly Zionist plan aiming

among other things at liquidating the Pales¬

tinian people’s rights and the whole Palestine question.

The Chamber appeals to the Arab Govern¬ ments in general, and to the Jordanian Government and the Palestine Liberation Organization in particular, to resist strongly the scheme of establishing a Palestine State. This country’s sacrifices and the Arab nation’s sacrifices must not be allowed to be wasted and forgotten by deviation and in pursuit of the temptations and plans of Zionism and its supporters.

The Jordanian Chamber of Deputies, which represents the people of both banks of the Jordan, affirms that our one people, which


has lived in unity for more than 22 years, will not accept secession. They will remain one people united by blood and destiny.

The Chamber also decided at this session, which was led by the acting Chairman, Muhammad al-Khashman, and was attended by Premier Wash at-Tall and Ministers, to send parliamentary delegations to Arab countries in the Arab East and the Arab West and to the Arabian Gulf amirates to explain the latest developments in the situation in Jordan as part of the political action plan being followed by the Chamber. It is learned that the delegations are expected to leave Amman at the beginning of March.

282

Proposals for the Reconstitution of the Palestine National Council and State¬ ments Opposing Any Acceptance of Set¬ tlement Proposals or a “Palestine State,” Issued by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine1

February 24, 1971

The Palestine National Council is holding its eighth session in Cairo overshadowed by the difficult and grim situation that confronts our revolution, and at a time when solutiqns involving surrender and the liquid¬ ation of our cause have reached a serious and dangerous stage, and when the react¬ ionary subservient regime in Jordan is con¬ tinuing its campaigns to strike at and crush the Resistance and carrying out further massacres of the masses of our Jordanian- Palestinian people. Meeting as it is in this critical period in the history of our revolution, the National Council is required to give clear and frank answers to and provide scientific and revolutionary solutions for the difficulties and obstacles that confront our revolution and point the way to our masses so that they


P.F.L.P. statement issued on the occasion of the Eighth

Session of the Palestine National Council, al-Hadaf

(Beirut), No. 89 (February 27, 1971),pp. 3-4 passim.

may continue their advance towards certain victory.

The fact that the reactionary authorities in Jordan are continuing their serious attempts to crush the Resistance, and that solu¬ tions involving surrender and liquidation have reached a serious and dangerous stage, means that two courses only are open to our cause—either to surrender, submit and accept the final liquidation of our cause and our right to resist Zionist settler colonialism, or to hold out and continue the struggle until we liberate our land and the will of our people is victorious.

The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, which has made its attitude to the previous sessions of the Palestine National Council perfectly clear, and explained exactly why it was content with purely token repre¬ sentation in the Seventh Session by only one member of its command, hereby makes it clear to the masses that this time too it will be content with token representation by only one member. This is because the Popular Front still holds its previous con¬ viction that the Palestine National Council, as at present constituted, with its present method of operating, the lack of clarity in the relations among the forces participating in it, and the obscurity and lack of precision of its attitudes, does not provide the minimal conditions necessary for the establishment of an effective and growing national front that can hold out in the face of all the chal¬ lenges that confront the Resistance in this critical period.

The following are the conditions we regard as essential for the National Council to be capable of performing its role, and if these safeguards are provided we shall participate with full membership:

I. Amendments must be made to the Pales¬ tine National Charter in such a way as to

ARAB WORLD 385

ensure that it meets the requirements of the present stage:

By taking part in the Fourth Session of the Palestine National Council held in Cairo in July 1968, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine played an effective part in amending the Palestine National Charter; for the time being this was an advance on the previous Charter and on the then prevailing situation. Since then there has been such a succession of incidents and such an accumulation of developments that the present amended Charter has ceased to provide answers to the many questions that confront the Resistance. Thus the interests of the revolution and the necessity both for the Council to constitute a framework for national unity and for the Charter to be regarded as providing the theoretical guidelines for the minimum required to ensure coexistence among the various points of view, demand that the Charter be studied with a view to making new amendments to it which will make it capable of meeting the requirements of endurance in the face of the attacks that are being launched by the reactionary Jordanian regime with the object of liquidating the cause and its combatant forces. What must be emphasized above all is that the new amendments must clearly provide for the protection of the revolution and its continuation with sufficient strength to repel the conspirators, and stress the necessity for rejecting all solutions that do not ensure the liberation of the whole of Palestin¬ ian territory and the exercise of Arab sover¬ eignty over it.

The extent to which we adhere to the Palestine National Charter will depend on the nature of the new modifications and amendments that must be made in it so that it may be appropriate to and in harmony with the developments and bloody events which the revolution has had to face since 1968 —from the events of November 4, 1968, February 10, 1970, and June 7 and September 17,1970, to the acts of violence and oppression which Jordanian reaction has been perpe¬ trating since September.

II. A formula for joint action must be

devised for the establishment of an effective National Front on a clear and specific basis:

The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine has more than once made clear its views on this subject, by declaring that the basis which meets the requirements of serious and decisive confrontation at this difficult stage lies in the establishment of effective and serious cooperation among the different sections of the Resistance within the framework of action in the form of a front based on the following principles:

1. A progressive revolutionary program of political and military action that clearly defines the parties of the enemy’s camp and those of the revolution, and their relations at the Arab and international levels, on a basis of which program the different sections of the Resistance will be obliged to define their fundamental political and military at¬

titudes. 2. The formation of a unified political and

military command which will assume the responsibility for planning for the battle and leading the confrontation with subservient Jordanian reaction and Israel.

3. Every section of the Resistance shall continue to enjoy its ideological and or¬ ganizational independence and the right to amalgamate with another section should it

so wish.

III. The Palestine National Council must be reconstituted on the following lines:

The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine is of the opinion that the Palestine National Council, as at present constituted, is incapable of coping with the tasks that confront the Resistance; it must therefore be dissolved and reconstituted in such a way as to ensure the following:

1. Effective representation of the com¬ mando organizations in the Assembly on a basis of equality or near equality;

2. Representation in the Council of the masses’ union—workers’, students’ and women’s—institutions;

3. Exploitation of qualified Palestinians and their effective representation in the Council.


The amendment of the Palestine National Charter, the firm establishment of a National Front on a clearly defined and unambiguous basis, and the constitution of the National Council in conformity with the above princ¬ iples and safeguards, require the performance of the following major tasks which confront the masses of our steadfast people and their combatant vanguard, the armed Resistance, which tasks can be listed under the following headings:

I. The Frustration of Proposals Involving Sur¬ render and Liquidation

All the sections of the Palestine Resistance in particular and all Jordanian-Palestinian nationalist forces must be placed in a state of alert and all their forces and resources must be fully mobilized to frustrate all attempts to implement all settlement resolutions and proposals for liquidation, in particular the Security Council resolution which involves recognition of the colonialist, settler, expan¬ sionist Zionist entity by the Arab regimes which accept the resolution, and the total obliteration of the rights of our people as regards struggle, liberation and return, which the subservient reactionary regimes did not dare to do in 1948. In order to achieve this and subsequent tasks, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine believes that it is necessary:

A. To release all the energies of the Pales¬ tinian masses wherever they may be, and especially in the Arab countries surrounding the occupied territories;

B. To escalate the struggle in the occupied territories to the greatest possible extent;

C. To escalate measures on the part of the Resistance to protect the revolution in Jordan, in view of the fact that the reactionary regime in Jordan is determined to crush our revolu¬ tion and that the Jordanian theater is the prin¬ cipal mainstay of the Resistance’s capacity for endurance and confrontation;

D. To release all the resources of popular Arab action and to strengthen the relations with the Arab masses and their progressive

and nationalist forces in all parts of the great Arab homeland;

E. To strike damaging blows at colonialist interests in general and at American interests in particular throughout the Arab area and the world;

F. To employ all means capable of im¬ peding the implementation of the Security Council resolution and all the plans and proposals for settlement, surrender and sub¬ mission to imperialism and Zionism and their agents in the Arab world.

II. Rejection of the Palestinian State Project

The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine believes that the proposal for a Palestinian state is just one aspect of efforts to perpetuate the Zionist presence in our occupied territory and to liquidate the Pales¬ tine problem as a whole. Therefore to accept it is nothing more nor less than to relinquish the right of our people to liberate and recover the whole of their territory, and to deprive them of their right to return to their homeland.

The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, aware as it is of the dangers in such a proposal for liquidation, as a matter of principle and to avoid any obscurity or ambiguity in the attitude of the Resistance as a whole to this proposal, calls on the Central Committee of the Resistance and the Pales¬ tine National Council, together with all the trade unions and nationalist institutions, to reject the proposal for a Palestinian state and to issue strong, clear and unambiguous statements that leave no ground for doubt or obscurity, so as to close the door to all pressures that may be exerted in an attempt to bring our people to accept this project for treason.

The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine regards acceptance of this proposal, or any slackness and collusion in this direction, as a historical treachery to our cause, our martyrs and our strugglers, and treachery to the right of our masses to liberate the whole of their homeland.

ARAB WORLD 387

III. Holding Out Against the Reactionary Regime in Jordan and Confronting Its Conspiracies, and Struggling for the Establishment of a Demo¬ cratic National Regime in Jordan

The subservient reactionary regime in Jordan, both in theory and practice, and on the evidence of what has happened since 1968, and especially the bloody incidents of September, and the accompanying and sub¬ sequent acts of ugly and savage barbarism against our people and our enduring masses, and as evidenced by the conspiracy of this' regime against our revolution with the object of paralyzing its effectiveness and destroying it, and its continued implementation of its criminal plan, is regarded by the Popular Front as being an instrument of repression used by imperialism and Zionism to strike at our revolution and all nationalist forces in Jordan. The Popular Front for the Libera¬ tion of Palestine also regards the Resistance’s past failure to specifically condemn this regime, the vagueness of its attitudes, the obscurity of its slogans and its lack of serious¬ ness in confronting this regime at the present stage—it regards the failure to condemn specifically in a clear and unambiguous manner, and the failure to participate in serious confrontation to repel it, as the source of the crisis which has beset the Resistance since the events of September.

Our confrontation of this subservient react¬ ionary regime must be based on struggle to establish a democratic national regime

in Jordan which will abide by a democratic nationalist program and advance on the basis of serving the masses and their interests by continuing and escalating the revolution against the Zionist enemy in our occupied territory, on the unity of the Jordanian- Palestinian people and their forces, and on combating particularist trends that try to weaken the unity of this people, which unity has ever been affirmed by events, by the shedding of their blood and the death of their martyrs.

The meeting of the National Council must be an occasion for all sections of the Resistance in general and the leftist sections in particular to recognize that they made a fundamental

mistake when they presented themselves at the political and organizational levels as the revolution of the Palestinian people only, and not the revolution of the whole Arab people against the Zionist and imperialist¬ reactionary presence in our Arab homeland.

The Resistance movement should have ad¬ dressed itself to the masses of the Palestinian people and made every effort to mobilize our

Palestinian and Jordanian masses as being a single people living in a single society, confronting a single danger and having

a single cause.

283

Press Statement Issued on the Occasion

of the Meeting of the Palestine Liberation

Organization Central Committee Called

To Discuss Proposals for the Unification

of the Forces of the Palestine Revolution1


This morning the Central Committee con¬ tinued its discussion of the proposal submitted by Abu Ammar, study of which commenced at yesterday’s meeting which was chaired by Abu Ammar after his return from Damas¬ cus. Ibrahim Bakr stated that those attending the meeting were still discussing the proposal for the unity of the forces of the Palestine revolution, the most important points in which are the following:

1. The Palestine Liberation Organization is the framework which comprises all the forces of the Palestine revolution for armed revolution to liberate all Palestinian territory. This Organization has a Charter which governs its procedure, determines its aims and organizes its activity; it also has a National Council and a command chosen by the National Council which is the Organization’s highest executive authority and, as stipulated by the National Charter, this command lays

1 Translated from the Arabic text of the P.L.O. press statement, al-Dustur (Amman), February 28, 1971.


down general and unified guidelines for Palestinian action in all fields.

2. All the commando organizations, com¬ batant forces and independent national bodies, federations and personalities subscribe to national unity and adhere fully to the Palestine National Charter and the decisions of the National Council.

3. The highest level of unification, which is advocated and sought, is the amalgamation of the organizations, but each organization has the right to maintain its internal organiza¬ tion on condition that all its other institu¬ tions are dissolved and merged with the

Palestine Liberation Organization. 4. The Palestine National Council shall

draw up a political, military, information and financial strategy that shall be binding on all.

5. A command shall be formed to assume responsibility for Palestinian struggle in all its aspects and in all fields.

6. Adherence to the decisions of the com¬ mand shall be a fundamental condition for unity of advance.

The Structure of the Organizational Framework The Palestine Liberation Organization

shall have the following organizational frame¬ work:

1. A National Council; 2. A Central Com¬ mittee; 3. A Political Bureau; 4. Organiza¬ tions, Institutions and Departments; 5. A Military Staff for the Revolution; 6. The Palestine [National] Fund.

1. The National Council a. The National Council shah consist

of about 150 members. b. The National Council shall meet

once a year except when otherwise required.

c. Members of the Council shall be chosen on the basis of revolutionary, struggle and national qualifications, in full conformity with the Palestine National Charter.

d. Palestinian labor and trade unions shall be represented.

e. Representation shall be insofar as possible on a geographical basis.

f. The term of this Council shall be three years as from its first meeting.

g. A special committee shall be respon¬ sible for choosing the members of the new Council, which shall meet not later than June 1, 1971.

2. The Central Committee or the Supreme Council a. Shall assume the functions of the

National Council between its sessions; b. Shall be composed of 21 members

elected by the National Council

from among its members; c. Shall meet once every three months

or when called on to do so by the Political Bureau;

d. Shall, during its meetings, supervise the implementation of the decisions of the National Council, supervise the implementation of the political and organizational program and dis¬ cuss matters submitted to it within the framework of the Charter and the decisions of the National Council;

e. Shall be chaired by the Head of the Political Bureau;

f. Shall choose one of its members as permanent rapporteur of its activities.

3. The Political Bureau a. Shall consist of nine members, includ¬

ing the president, chosen by the National Council;

b. Shall be collectively in charge of day-to-day Palestinian activity;

c. Shall meet every week and whenever necessary;

d. Shall be the highest executive au¬ thority of the revolution.

4. The Military Staff of the Revolution a. The Staff of the Revolution shall

consist of:

(1) The regular forces, (2) The commando forces, (3) The popular militia forces.

b. Its tasks shall be: (1) To command military action

in the interior and on the front¬ iers,

(2) To draw up the necessary mili-

ARAB WORLD 389

tary plans for the forces of the revolution,

(3) To step up and protect military action within the framework of the program and the plan,

(4) To reorganize the forces of the revolution on a basis of unified organization, training, arming and operations,

(5) To develop the combatant forces, (6) To draft a unified budget to be

approved by the National Coun¬

cil, (7) To appoint the General Staff

of the forces of the revolution, (8) To issue military communiques,

c. These forces shall have a commander- in-chief and a chief-of-staff appointed by the Political Bureau.

5. The National Fund The National Fund shall be the fund of the Palestinian people and the Palestine revolution to ensure the unification of the finances, revenues and expenditures of the revolution, on condition that the present finan¬ cial system be changed.

6. Organizations, Institutions and Depart¬ ments The Political Bureau shall establish the following for the performance of its duties and the achievement of its aims: a. The political and information depart¬

ments, b. The administrative secretariat, c. The military departments, d. The organization and mobilization

department, e. A welfare department for the families

of killed, wounded and prisoners of war,

f. The regional committees for the regulation of the powers of all the organizations in special schedules to be approved by the Political Bureau.

The Central Committee will resume its meetings this evening to complete discussion of the proposal so that it may be submitted to the Palestine National Council when it meets today, Sunday.

284

Memorandum Recommending the Formation of a New Palestine National Council Submitted to the Council’s Eighth Session by the High Command of the Palestine Liberation Army1


To the Honorable President and Members of the Palestine National Council,

Greetings:

Article 31 of the Constitution of the Pales¬ tine Liberation Organization stipulates that the National Council shall be elected for two years, and that, if it is not possible to hold elections to the Council that is to follow it, it shall meet and either decide to prolong its existence for a further term or to form a new Council in such manner as it shall determine.

Inasmuch as the term of the presently existing Interim Council, as determined in the Interim Regulations, Chapter Five, Article 31 of the Constitution, has expired, and it has not been possible, nor is it now possible to hold elections to choose members of the Council to follow, and inasmuch as the Palestinian advance is passing through a leadership crisis, the High Command of the Palestine Liberation Army submits this memo¬ randum proposing the formation of a new National Council from which will be ap¬ pointed a new Command, for the following reasons:

1. The present Council was established on the basis of the majority of its members belonging to the organizations, in the hope that this would lead to the establishment of national unity and to the achievement of the unity of Palestinian struggle in the political, military, information and financial fields. These aims have not been achieved during the term of this Council, which means that to maintain it in power would be to maintain and perpetuate plurality and dis¬ unity.

1 Translated from the Arabic text of the P.L.A. memo, signed by its Commander-in-Chief Abd al-Razzaq al-Yahya, Saut Filastin (Damascus), III, 38 (March, 1971), pp. 64-66.


2. All the organizations to which the majority of the members of the present Council belong have maintained their diverse entities and their parallel institutions, which has done great harm to the Palestinian identity, prevented the Palestinian advance from achieving its tactical aims and impeded it in its struggle. Thus to maintain the present Council and the Command derived from it would be to maintain the entities of the various organizations rather than a single Palestinian entity and a single Palestinian identity.

3. This Council has not succeeded, through the Command derived from it, in putting an end to the contradictions among the national forces, contrary to the provisions of Article 8 of the Palestine National Charter, which states that the stage through which the Palestinian people are now passing is the stage of national struggle for the liberation of Palestine, so that the contradictions among the national forces are only secondary conflicts which must be stopped in the interests of the basic conflict, which is between Zionism and colonialism on the one hand and the Palestinian Arab people on the other. These conflicts have continued in spite of the dangers that threaten the Palestinian cause and the Palestinian Arab people. Thus to maintain the present Council and the Command derived from it would mean that these conflicts would continue and deepen.

4. The present Council has not succeeded, through the Command derived from it, in effectively playing its role of mobilizing and organizing all the capacities of people and all the knowledge of the Palestinians, or in achieving cohesion in national struggle among the various categories of the people, and between these and the Arab masses, in conformity with Article 10 of the Palestine National Charter. Many people, have come to regard the present Council as an assembly of various organizations rather than a Coun¬ cil representing all categories of the Palestinian people, and the Command derived from it has remained more effectively a command of these organizations rather than of the Pales¬ tinian people. Thus to maintain the present Council and the Command derived from it

would be to prevent the mobilization of all resources and capacities, contrary to the requirements of the battle of destiny.

5. This Council should have given rise to a collective command, in conformity with Article 15 of the Constitution of the Palestine Liberation Organization, which stipulates that the command of the Organization should be a collective command whose members have joint and individual responsibility. But in most of its activities the Command derived from this Council has been an individual command, and this has given rise to many negative factors which have beset the Pales¬ tinian advance. Thus for this Council, along with the Command derived from it, to continue would mean that individual com¬ mand continued.

6. This Council has, at its successive ses¬ sions, taken a number of fundamental deci¬ sions, the most important of which are those calling for the unification of Palestinian strug¬ gle in all fields and those which require the adoption of a scientific attitude towards the national struggle and call for the drawing up of a comprehensive plan for Palestinian liberation action in all its aspects and fields —military, political, economic, psychological and information—at the strategic level.

But the Command derived from this Coun¬ cil has not followed this path or pursued the course designated by the National Council, and the groups to which the majority of the members of this Council belong have not fulfilled their obligation to implement its decisions. This means that for the Council to continue would mean continued failure to implement its decisions and to follow the course stipulated by these decisions.

7. During the time this Council has been in power, and under the auspices of the Command derived from it, the trials and crises that have beset the Palestinian advance, the most outstanding of which were the bloody events that took place in Jordan in September 1970, and the events that preceded and followed them, have laid grave respon¬ sibilities on the shoulders of this Council and the Command derived from it, and for these responsibilities to be appreciated it is essential that the term of office of this Council

ARAB WORLD 391

should not be prolonged, and that steps should be taken towards the formation of a new Council.

8. The events that took place in Jordan should have led to a fundamental change in the formulae, methods and patterns with which, from time to time, the Command derived from this Council has so persistently confronted the masses under one name or another. But in spite of the events in Jordan, this Command has continued to employ the same formulae, methods and patterns. Thus for this Council, with the Command derived from it, to continue, would mean the con¬ tinued employment of these formulae, meth¬ ods and patterns, which have not proved either suitable or valuable.

9. Article 28 of the Palestine National Charter states that the Palestinian Arab people affirm the authenticity and inde¬ pendence of their national revolution and reject all kinds of intervention, tutelage and subservience. But neither this Council nor the Command derived from it has succeeded in conforming to the spirit of this provision because they have not conformed with the requirements of this Article. Thus for this Council and the Command derived from it to continue would mean continued failure to act in harmony with this Article.

10. This Council has been confronted with situations and occasions to which it has not paid sufficient attention nor made the required response. Thus the continuation of this Council and the Command derived from it would mean continued failure to respond to advice or sympathy.

11. The Constitution of the Palestine Lib¬ eration Organization states that the Organi¬ zation’s Executive Committee is the highest executive authority, that it shall be in per¬ manent session, and that its members shall not undertake any other activities. But the Executive Committee derived from this Council has shirked its responsibilities, and ceased' to meet, and its members have not devoted themselves exclusively to its activities, which means that it is non-existent and that the measures related to the Palestinian ad¬ vance are unconstitutional. This calls for the

establishment of a new National Council from which a new Command can be derived, which will be in permanent session, whose members will devote themselves exclusively to its activities, and which will fully meet its responsibilities.

12. The Central Committee of the Or¬ ganization has established itself as a substitute for the Executive Committee, contrary both to the Constitution and to the decisions of the National Council determining the powers of the Central Committee. This has led to duplication of command, ambiguity as regards responsibilities and infringement of regu¬ lations and decisions, and therefore requires the formation of a new National Council, from which a new Command will be derived, to put an end to the present situation.

In view of these reasons and considerations, the High Command of the Palestine Libera¬ tion Army is of the opinion that the public interest requires that the term of office of the present National Council be regarded as having expired, in conformity with Article 31 of the Constitution.

It also deems it necessary that the new National Council should be formed on the following bases:

1. The majority of the members of the new National Council shall not be members of the organizations, while the principal organizations shall enjoy restricted propor¬ tional representation.

2. The members of the new National Council shall include a group of men of all sorts of qualifications and coming from all sectors of the Palestinian people and all places where Palestinians reside or are con¬ centrated.

3. Organizations represented in the new National Council shall be assumed to agree in advance to:

a. Adhere to the Palestine National Charter and implement the decisions taken by the Palestine National Council at its successive sessions, and accept that any organization infringing the National Charter of failing to implement the decisions of the National


Council be regarded as infringing national unity;

b. The unification of Palestinian struggle at the political, military, financial, inform¬ ation and organizational levels through the Palestine Liberation Organization;

c. The dissolution of the commands of the military formations of the organizations and their being placed under the control of the single military command;

d. The transfer of the organizations’ funds to the Palestine National Fund as soon as they have met the financial obligations they have already incurred;

e. Adherence to the principle of collective Palestinian command, as represented by the Executive Committee of the Palestine Libera¬ tion Organization and as stipulated in the Constitution of the Palestine Liberation Or¬ ganization.

4. The Executive Committee of the Pales¬ tine Liberation Organization shall be con¬ stituted so that most of its members, who should be Palestinians qualified in all fields, do not belong to organizations and the major Palestinian organizations should enjoy limited representation on the Committee.

5. A Preparatory Committee whose mem¬ bers do not belong to the organizations shall nominate the members of the new National Council.

The High Command submits this memo¬ randum to the President and Members of the Palestine National Council with full ap¬ preciation of the historic responsibility at this stage, from its concern for the public interest and with the object of warding off the dangers that threaten the cause and the people and it believes that its proposals are an expression of the popular will and of a national demand on the part of the Palestin¬ ian and Arab peoples.

Respectful greetings.

Brigadier Abd al-Razzaq al-Yahya

Commander-in-Chief of the Palestine

Liberation Army

285

Statements Explaining Egypt’s Partici¬

pation in Diplomatic Activity Aimed at a

Middle East Settlement, Included in a

Speech by U.A.R. President Sadat to

the Eighth Session of the Palestine Na¬

tional Council1


Brothers: I want to define to you certain matters of

principle, and to ask you to excuse me for not speaking in detail about certain problems. This is because we think that, by continuous and strenuous political efforts, we have suc¬ ceeded in putting our enemy on the defensive for the first time in a long period. This started with Gamal Abdel Nasser’s bold and courageous acceptance of the 1967 Security Council resolution and, later, of the so-called Rogers initiative. Gamal Abdel Nasser be¬ lieved that the enemy wanted territory for expansion and, in his role as leader and with his historical responsibility, he undertook largescale political activity, the sole object of which was that the enemy should reveal himself in his true colors, and that he himself might reach the whole world so as to tell it frankly of the enemy’s expansionist ambitions. Gamal Abdel Nasser thought that political activity at this stage would enable him to achieve much, very much indeed, if he succeeded in pressing the enemy so hard that he was obliged to declare his true in¬ tentions. We carried on with this task, and are still doing so, since the death of our immortal leader.

The whole world was pleased with the 1967 Security Council resolution but, as the President of this assembly has said, you have every right to reject it. We have known from the start that Israel does not regard this resolution as realizing the most important objective of its aggression—territorial ex¬ pansion.

1 Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text of Sadat’s

speech at the opening of the P.N.G.’s eighth session,

al-Ahram (Cairo), March 1, 1971.

ARAB WORLD 393

We have placed only two restrictions on our political activity. They are:

First: Withdrawal from all the Arab territories occupied in 1967;

Second: Insistence on the rights of the

people of Palestine as determined by United Nations resolutions. The 1967 Security Coun¬ cil resolution refers to a just solution of the problem of the refugees, but the only basis for a just solution lies in all the relevant United Nations resolutions adopted since

1947. Apart from this, we have given ourselves

freedom of action, in keeping with revolu¬ tionary strategy and not merely out of revolu¬ tionary fervor. Our basic aim has been that Israel should reach the point where it discloses its real intentions and unmasks its ugly ambitions. We have always known that our war with the enemy has to be fought on many different fronts and with all kinds of weapons. We have always rejected any attempt to restrict our activity to one front or our weapons to one kind only. If armed struggle proves to be the one course open to us, we want to be in the most favorable political situation to follow that course with the greatest possible degree of competence and reliability. We have always believed that the political frame¬ work in which we bear arms is no less im¬ portant than the arms themselves or the skill with which we use them. Thus the liberation of the territory was the point we chose on which to make a decisive stand. It was therefore necessary that the enemy should reach the point where he disclosed his am¬ bitions as regards our territory, and that the world should reach the point where it was fully convinced that we had no alternative to fighting in the situation that confronted us, because our people cannot relinquish their territory. We do not want to conciliate anyone, brothers; we do not want anyone to conciliate us; all we want is that all attitudes should be perfectly clear.

We do not, brothers, want to impose tutelage on anyone, but at the same time we do not accept anyone else’s tutelage over us. What we want is joint action based on an agreed strategy and open to political action on the basis of absolute confidence. Either

we have confidence in each other or we do not.

Brothers: I want to define to you certain matters of

principle as regards our attitudes.

1. The United Arab Republic accepts and is faithful to all its obligations to the Arab struggle; in so doing it is acting in accordance with the logic and the exigencies of its national and international commitments, because the United Arab Republic is both a revolution and a state.

2. The United Arab Republic has fought and rebuilt its army for fighting and it will fight in defense of the territory and of justice.

3. The United Arab Republic can only provide the true framework for its legitimate and necessary fight in an atmosphere of world sympathy and international understanding which will make its fight a human cause. We therefore want to make our struggle a cause that concerns the whole world, and this can only be achieved by far-reaching efforts. Others may think that they have only to give orders to the world and it will obey, or that they can impose their will on the world and it will accept. But in all honesty we are not like them. Therefore our aim at this stage, the aim we hope to achieve through our political action, is the following:

A. To bind our friends to us more closely;

B. To neutralize our opponents;

C. To incapacitate our enemy.

4. In this context we believe that the conscientious Arab attitude towards our current problems must not be exhausted by simply being expressed, but that it must influence and interact with the actual situa¬ tion.

Liberation will not be achieved by emo¬ tional outbursts or by the mere desire for liberation. It will be achieved by rebutting the enemy’s arguments and by circumventing his policy. This is the atmosphere in which liberation can achieve its task.

We do not agree that people should be judged by their words; we want deeds to be


the basis of all judgements. We accept nothing else in the case of our comrades in the struggle, and we accept it from these comrades if they apply this criterion to us.

5. I want you to understand clearly that there is no such thing as an Egyptian solution or a Palestinian solution or a Syrian solution or a Jordanian solution. There is only one solution, and that is the Arab solution.

For our part, we have rejected the Egyptian solution, which has been offered to us many times. This is because we believe that there can be no partial solution to an aggression that befell the whole of our nation, and was not directed against one region only.

6. It is possible that there may be a variety of strategies in our confrontation of the enemy, but we believe that it is essential and inevitable that all these various strategies should derive from a single master strategy which will ensure the achievement of the Arab will.

It is essential that the revolutionary Arab mind should determine the stages necessary for continuous achievement and for the linking of the various strategies with the one Arab master strategy, and this is the challenge that now confronts us.

7. We reject the narrow view which sees the Palestine revolution as no more than a reaction to 1967.

In our view, the Palestine revolution—and this is its value and its proper role—is part of a comprehensive movement of Arab politi¬ cal, social and cultural awakening, and this is of course the origin of the special link between the Egyptian revolution and the Palestine revolution; it is a link that derives from their common Arab origin and their awareness of a common destiny.

Brothers: Your presence here in Cairo will provide

us with opportunities for further meetings which I am confident will be advantageous and beneficial for joint strategic planning and the practical implementation of that strategy in all its various aspects and with all the different weapons that will be employed.

We are facing a war that is dangerous and

complicated because it involves ferocious aggressive ambitions inspired by Zionist tend¬ encies. It is also extremely complex because of the nature of the relations between Zionism and imperialism. For both these reasons its confrontation requires of all of us profound analysis and precise planning, for our way is long and we shall always be comrades as we advance along it to victory and what lies beyond victory, God willing. God grant you success, and peace and God’s mercy be upon you.

286

Lebanese Press Interview Statements by Palestine National Liberation Movement (Fateh) Leader Najjar (Abu Yusif), Com¬ menting on the Results of the Eighth Session of the Palestine National Council1

Cairo, Early March, 1971

At its meeting in Damascus, the Central Committee commissioned brother Abu Ammar to devise a formula for the unity of the different sections of the Resistance movement, and he submitted a proposal for unity which was presented to the Central Committee at the meeting it held in Cairo shortly before the meeting of the National Council. It was observed that some of the organizations wanted a political program, and Fateh did in fact submit such a program to the National Council, and it was approved by both the organizations and the National Council, thereby frustrating all those attempts which Fateh regarded as being nothing more nor less than a pretext to ensure that no formula for unity should be reached.

On the strength of the project for unity submitted to the National Council, approval in principle was also obtained for the pro¬ visions of the statement on unity. However, the situation of the National Council and that in which certain Palestinian organizations

1 Translated from the Arabic text of Najjar’s exclusive

interview, al-Nahar (Beirut), March 7, 1971.

ARAB WORLD 395

have been living since the events of September, with a group of both members of the Council and of the organizations believing that a new appraisal should be carried out in the Pales¬ tinian theater so as to set things in their natural perspective, led those who attended the meeting to give the present Executive Com¬ mittee, as a Liberation Organization com¬ mand, the opportunity to perform two tasks. The first is to carry out an operation of ap¬ praisal and examination in the Palestinian theater at the political and military levels. The second task is to choose the members of the new National Council which will meet not later than June 30. When it has completed this appraisal, the Executive Committee will submit a detailed report to the new National Council so that it may assume its responsi¬ bilities for drawing up the main lines of the program for unity submitted by Abu Ammar.

During this interim period the Executive Committee and the Liberation Organization will be responsible for taking immediate measures for the implementation of what was agreed on as regards the unification of the military forces, and submitting the detailed program for the operation of financial and informational unification, together with the unification of all the institutions of Pales¬ tinian action.

Fateh, which bears the main responsibility in the Palestinian theater, at both the military and organizational levels, is of the opinion that the interim period before the new Na¬ tional Council meets is a most important and dangerous one; so, it will make all its resources available to ensure the implementation of all the decisions of the National Council that it has been agreed to abide by.

We believe that agreement on the political program was an important step along the road to unity, because the picture has been made clear to all who are operating in the Palestinian theater. Also, to keep the political command unchanged means, from Fateh’s point of view, that it is still resolutely following the right course towards the achievement of unity at all levels in the Palestinian theater. How¬ ever if, during the interim period, it should happen that factors beyond its control obstruct

the operation of unification, we shall adopt a frank and unambiguous attitude which we shall anounce to the Palestinian masses and the new Palestine Council.

Therefore, until the new National Council meets, we believe that all the decisions taken can be regarded as being in the interests of the Palestine Resistance, if they are adhered to. It is our belief that the failure of any organi¬ zation to adhere to the decisions and to apply itself immediately to the implementation of the military unity that has been decided on will inevitably determine the attitude of the masses and the new National Council towards any party which fails to adhere.

287

Statement by Assistant Secretary-Gen¬ eral al-Aisami of the Baath Party (Iraq), Criticizing the U.A.R. and Jordan for Expressions of Willingness To Negotiate with Israel1

Baghdad, March 3, 1971

The statements by President Anwar Sadat and later by King Hussein and his Foreign Minister on the agreement by the United Arab Republic and Jordan to hold a peace conference with Israel and to end the Palestine problem by peace negotiations have confirmed what the Party has said many times in the past, to the effect that the elimination of the consequences of aggression after the June defeat cannot be achieved by negotiations, but only by armed struggle involving many sacrifices.

This readiness to negotiate on the basis of the Rogers Plan has provided indisputable evidence that the acceptance of this plan, and the above-mentioned statements that followed it, was not merely a tactical move intended to embarrass Israel and to expose its evil intentions to the world, but was intended to pave the way for withdrawal and surrender and to perpetuate the situation

1 Translated from the Arabic text of al-Aisami’s state¬

ment, al-Jumhuriya (Baghdad), March 4, 1971.


of military defeat, the aim of which is to force the Arabs to recognize the Zionist entity.

It is most regrettable that these recent statements should have ignored the slogan “No negotiation, no recognition, no peace with Israel and no independent action as regards the Palestinian cause,” thereby con¬ fronting the Arabs with a worse fate than that which befell them in 1948.

In the critical circumstances that confront our nation in the present stage, we urge all struggling Arab forces to appreciate the gravity of the present situation and to take action to establish a front for endurance and for the rejection of surrender proposals of all kinds and degrees. This is because the danger constituted by Israel and Zionism, and world imperialism that supports it, cannot be confronted by a single Arab country or a single popular force, but only by action based on a front in all Arab countries and at the level of the whole of the Arab homeland.

We are confident that the gallant Arab armies and the struggling masses every¬ where will not accept recognition of Israel, and if these masses are at present misled, frightened and helpless, we are sure that they will not surrender to the schemes of the conspiracy that is being planned by Zionism and imperialism against the Arab nation, but will follow the course of sacrifice and armed struggle, because this is the only course that leads to victory and the recovery of usurped Arab rights.

288

Political Program for the Conduct of the Palestine Revolution Adopted by the Eighth Session of the Palestine Na¬ tional Council1

Cairo, March 4,1971

Ever since, at the beginning of 1965, the

1 Translated from the Arabic text of the P.N.C. program,

Fateh (n.p.), March 30, 1971.

vanguards of our struggling people sparked off the armed revolution against the Zionist political entity established in the land of Palestine by force of arms, these vanguards, along with and supported by the vast Arab masses and all free men in the world, have confirmed that armed struggle is the one and inevitable way to full liberation of the soil of Palestine.

Today the revolution is passing through an extremely critical and dangerous stage of its struggle, confronted as it is with a ferocious operation of liquidation comprising both what happened in Jordan in September and the operations of annihilation and mal¬ treatment that are being carried out in the occupied homeland itself.

This ferocious conspiracy is this time direct¬ ed against the Palestine revolution and the nationalist movement in Jordan; it is also aimed at the liquidation of the revolutionary spirit and the whole of the Palestinian na¬ tional cause. The forces of world imperialism and world Zionism, side by side with the Zionist occupying state and the anti-revolu¬ tionary forces in the Arab homeland, have all agreed that the time has come to embark on this ferocious attack aimed at liquidation so as to guard against the danger of the Palestine revolution escalating and spreading to cover the whole of the Arab homeland, sweeping before it all the enemy’s interests, which would inevitably also lead to the destruction of their common interests in this part of the world.

Furthermore, the explosion of the situation in Indochina and the continuous advance of the revolution in Laos and Cambodia, not to mention the increasing victories of the Vietnamese revolution, have led American circles to seek all possible means to calm down the area by consolidating the military victory won by the enemy in the fighting of 1967.

Thus the Palestine revolution is no longer confronted with oppression, misrepresentation and deception on the front with imperialism and Zionism only; the same challenges have started to confront it on the whole of the anti-revolutionary front in the Arab home¬ land: those forces which have taken it upon themselves to smash the Palestine revolution

ARAB WORLD 397

from within by exhausting its strength in nonessential and internal conflicts.

Faced with this new and dangerous situa¬ tion, all sections and forces of the Palestine revolution have agreed to announce their political program for the present stage, with the intention that it shall provide clear answers to all the questions posed at the present stage and constitute a guide to action for the escalation of the revolution and the increasing of its organized forces, and for the polarization of more extensive sectors of the Palestinian and Arab masses through the victorious advance of their revolution. This political program is as follows:

At the Palestinian Level 1. The Palestine Liberation Organization

is the sole representative of the masses of the Palestinian Arab people, in all their combat and political organizations and all their bodies, federations and societies, whatever their trends and ideas, on condition that they adhere fully to the principles of the Palestine National Charter, the decisions of the legislative and executive organs of the Palestine Liberation Organization and the Organization’s political and military program and internal regulations, and that they also commit themselves to struggle on behalf of the total liberation of the soil of Palestine and the return of the Palestinian people to their homeland.

It is absolutely impermissible to disqualify an individual or group for membership of the Organization except in cases of prejudice to the revolution or infringement of the principles of the National Charter, when the decision to disqualify shall be taken by the Central Committee of the Organization or by the National Council should it be in session.

2. While affirming that the fundamental and central aim of the Palestine revolution is the total liberation of the occupied Palestin¬ ian homeland, the aim at the present stage is to protect the revolution from its enemies, to escalate it and ensure that it advances along the road to the realization of its fundamental aim, by the revolutionary political, military and moral mobilization of the Palestinian masses, and by all of them taking part in the battle of liberation, by escalating the armed

struggle against the enemy and unifying all the forces of the Palestinian masses both inside and outside the occupied homeland to this end.

The Nature of the Palestine Revolution 1. The Palestine revolution is a national

liberation movement. It therefore conforms, in its strategy and tactics, with all national liberation movements, the socialist countries and the revolutionary and democratic forces in the world, inasmuch as these constitute the movement of all the masses that are struggling against foreign occupation, that believe in the inevitability of liberation, and are prepared to join the struggle to achieve it. This means that all classes and national groups of the Palestinian people, and all their organizations and associations whatever their ideas and principles, must unite in a single cohesive rank in their armed national revolution.

2. The Palestine revolution represents the movement of progress in Palestinian Arab society for the following reasons:

a. Because it is combating a racist settler occupation which is part of the forces of injustice in the world that oppose the course of history;

b. Because it is combating world imperial¬ ism led by the United States of America, the protector of Zionist occupation, which is destroying the rights and aspirations of our people;

c. Because it aims to build a Palestinian Arab society governed by the principles of democracy, peace, justice, freedom and equality in which all principles and religions are respected and all rights and freedoms protected, and in which feudal domination, backward social relations and racial or reli¬ gious discrimination are utterly rejected.

Forms of Struggle The armed struggle sparked off by the

revolutionary vanguards of the Palestinian people at the beginning of 1965 (guerrilla warfare escalating into a comprehensive war of liberation) is the principal form of struggle for the liberation of Palestine, and the con¬ junction of regular forces side by side with commando forces in the armed struggle


is the most powerful form of struggle for the achievement of the people’s victorious revolu¬ tion. In addition, all other forms of struggle must run firmly and directly parallel with the line of armed struggle.

The Only Solution to the Palestine Problem The only solution to the Palestine problem

is the total liberation of the soil of Palestine by armed struggle. Therefore the liquidation solution or any other solution liable to pre¬ judice the natural and historical rights of the Palestinian people to the whole of their homeland, is essentially an imposed solution. The Palestine revolution therefore declares its strict adherence, as a matter of principle, to the following:

a. Struggle without quarter against all attempts, efforts, conspiracies and forces aimed at halting the advance of the revolution, impeding it or diverting it from its course, as also against all projects for liquidation under whatever form they may be advanced. This makes it essential to develop the Palestine revolution and increase its effectiveness in all fields;

b. Resolute opposition to those who ad¬ vocate the establishment of a Palestinian statelet in part of the territory of Palestine, inasmuch as efforts to establish such a state lie within the framework of the liquida¬ tion of the Palestine problem;

c. The taking of all resolute measures necessary to protect the advance of the Palestine revolution and Palestinian national existence, in the closest cooperation with the Jordanian nationalist movement and the Arab nationalist movement.

The Democratic Palestinian State Palestinian armed struggle is not a racist

or sectarian struggle against the Jews. There¬ fore the state of the future in a Palestine liberat¬ ed from Zionist imperialism is the democratic Palestinian state, in which all who wish to do so can live in peace with the same rights and obligations and within the framework of the aspirations of the Arab nation to national liberation and full unity [with] emphasis on the unity of the people of both Banks of Jordan.

Action at the Level of Jordan Jordan is linked to Palestine by a national

relationship and a national unity forged by history and culture from the earliest times. The creation of one political entity in Trans¬ jordan and another in Palestine would have no basis either in legality or as to the elements universally accepted as fundamental to a political entity. It would be a continuation of the operation of fragmentation by which colonialism shattered the unity of our Arab nation and the unity of our Arab homeland after the First World War.

But this fragmentation has not prevented the masses, either west or east of the River Jordan, from feeling that they are one people, or from remaining united against the con¬ spiracy of imperialism and Zionism.

In raising the slogan of the liberation of Palestine and presenting the problem of the Palestine revolution, it was not the intent¬ ion of the. Palestine revolution to separate the East of the River from the West, nor did it believe that the struggle of the Palestinian people can be separated from the struggle of the masses in Jordan. It acted in conformity with the exigencies of a specific historical stage, with the object of concentrating on the direction of all forces towards Palestine so as to give prominence to our cause at Palestinian, Arab and international levels.

Our concern for the unity of the Pales- tinian-Jordanian masses, and our knowledge of the role that they can play in escalating the battle of liberation, confirms our belief in the following:

a. That the unity of Palestine and the East Bank of the Jordan is a national duty which it is our duty to protect and strengthen; it is also our duty to combat all attempts to weaken and disrupt it.

b. This regional unity must be embodied in unity of struggle, taking the form of a Jordanian national front, one of whose basic tasks will be to establish a nationalist regime in Jordan which will participate in the liberation of Palestine and support the Pales¬ tinian fighting forces with all its resources. This, in turn, is part of the struggle of the Arab nation for its liberation and unity.

ARAB WORLD 399

At the Level of the Arab Nation Palestine is an integral part of the Arab

homeland, and the Palestinian people are an integral part of the Arab nation.

The Palestine revolution is part of the Arab revolutionary movement; it is its revolutionary vanguard at this historical stage.

Therefore one of the fundamental tasks of the Arab revolutionary movement is to ensure that the masses play their part in fighting and protecting the revolution. Consequently, out of respect for national duty, the masses should work indefatigably to make the Palestine revolution a tangible everyday fact by adopt¬ ing the following attitudes and taking the following measures. They must:

a. Make every effort to frustrate all projects involving liquidation and surrender;

b. Protect the Palestine revolution from the conspiracies of hostile forces, and from all their attempts to restrict or provoke the revolution;

c. Provide all that is necessary for the struggle, specifically material and moral as well as political support;

d. Play an effective part in the Palestine revolution;

e. Make every effort to build a strong Arab front to support the Palestine revolution and the joint Arab struggle against imperialism, Zionism and the counter-revolutionary forces in the Arab homeland.

It must be clear that our relations with the Arab masses are of fundamental importance even if this means breaking with the regimes and fighting nonessential battles with them.

At World Level World imperialism, world Zionism and

Zionist colonialism are among the real enemies of our people and, inasmuch as they are spreading like an octopus in many areas of the world and making use of many and varied forces against us, we must expand the field of our alliances and our action to cover the whole world.

This requires that we establish the closest possible relations with all forces struggling against imperialism, colonialism, oppression, racism and exploitation, and mobilize on our side all forces of justice, liberation and peace in the world.

289

Press Statement Commenting on the Ineffectiveness of the Eighth Session of the Palestine National Council, Made by Political Bureau Secretary-General Hawatma of the Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine1

Cairo, March 6, 1971

Even before the current session of the Council met, it was clear to the [Popular Democratic] Front that it would have nothing new to offer because the Resistance and the Palestinian national movement as a whole had not succeeded in absorbing the basic lessons taught by the experience of the last three years and, in particular, the experience of Black September. We had observed that most sections of the Resistance had published nothing in the way of a comprehensive critical examination of their situations, or their policies, with the exception of a first attempt by the Democratic Front, which published a critical report on its conduct and that of the other sections of the Resistance entitled “The September Campaign: Lessons and Consequences.” All other attempts were made by individuals, and were not binding on their organizations.

It is clear from everything that has been made public since September [1970] that most sections of the Resistance, and in particu¬ lar its right wing, have not learned any of the lessons taught by September, the most important of which are the following:

First: for the thousandth time the reaction¬ ary regime in Jordan has proved that it is deter¬

mined to give priority to the secondary conflict—that with the Resistance and the nationalist movement—over the primary conflict — that with the Zionist enemy. In this way the reactionary regime has overthrown all the objective conditions of the view held by sections of the Resistance that the primary conflict must be given priority over the secondary conflict. It has become clear that

1 Translated from the Arabic text of Hawatma’s state¬

ments made in an exclusive interview, al-Nahar (Beirut) ,

March 7, 1971.


continuing and developing the armed struggle, and preventing the people of Palestine from taking part in any political settlement at the expense of their historic cause, depends on struggle to resolve the conflict with reaction in Amman and to establish a nationalist regime, friendly to the Resistance, which will enable it to aim all its rifles at the Zionist enemy.

The second lesson is that a vertical division has taken place in the body of Jordanian- Palestinian society, so that it is no longer a question of all the nationalist classes and forces being united in opposition to the reactionary class forces united with colon¬ ialism ; since September it has been a question of a Jordanian society in opposition to Pales¬ tinian society and the army in opposition to the Resistance.

It is true that it was reaction that first promoted this vertical division so as to create a wide popular and class base that it could rely on in a battle against the Resistance and the will of the people of Palestine to continue the struggle and reject settlements at their expense. But the particular^ t tendency of the Resistance, which the right wing of the Resistance has persistently promoted by emphasizing the Palestinian aspect of the Palestine problem and failing to understand and apply the law of the mutual links between armed struggle and its development on the one hand, and what is going on in Amman on the other, have also made an effective con¬ tribution to this vertical division.

The third lesson is that the character of Arab relations with the Resistance, which its right wing has conducted through the Arab regimes, instead of establishing relations with the popular forces of the national libera¬ tion movement, has, to a great extent, made the Resistance the prisoner of Arab conflicts and the system of Arab official relations. This in turn has automatically led to the tightening of the stranglehold on the day-by¬ day political and struggle activity of the Resistance with respect to the necessity to take the initiative in resolving the conflict with the ruling regime in Amman.

The fourth lesson: as a consequence of this the Resistance movement has had to maintain

a position of self-defense against both the attacks of reaction and the schemes of im¬ perialism. The result has been that it has been incapable of paralyzing the attacks of reaction in Amman and that all its attitudes, as regards policy, the masses and armed activity, have been adopted on the principle of being content to repel the attacks of reaction without taking the initiative in defensive policy so as to put an end once and for all to the attacks of the official authorities and to resolve the conflict with them.

The above leads us to the following con¬ clusions :

The tasks at present required of the Resis¬ tance and the nationalist movement are that they should understand these fundament¬ al lessons so as to be able to accomplish two things which are at once nationalist and revolutionary in the present situation.

The first is to maintain the basic forces of the Resistance and the nationalist move¬ ment and to ensure that they are not liqui¬ dated, either through disorganized political and military retreat or through armed ad¬ venturism. The latter would be nothing less than suicide, in view of the radical change which has taken place since September in the balance of power in the Jordanian-Palestinian theater. This change did not come about as a result of the upsetting of the military balance of power between the Resistance and the forces of the authorities, for this balance has been tilted in favor of the authorities for the last three years by virtue of the superior¬ ity in numbers and technical equipment of their forces. The real imbalance is the result of the vertical division that has taken place in the body of Jordanian-Palestinian society, giving the reactionary authorities, for the first time in their contemporary history, a Transjordanian popular base from which to fight the revolution.

The second is to maintain the people of Palestine in a nationalist attitude so that they will refuse to take part in any of the current political settlements which are urging them to relinquish their historical and natural right to the whole of the territory of Palestine in return for a political entity embodied in a Palestinian statelet in the West Bank and the

ARAB WORLD 401

Gaza Strip as an integral part of a compre¬ hensive settlement of the Palestine problem. Here it can rightly be said that there is no exclusively Palestinian solution of the prob¬ lem, but only a single Arab solution.

So that it may be possible to perform these two tasks, it is necessary to deduce the im¬ mediate present consequences of the lessons taught by September. These may be summed up as follows:

1. To maintain the forces of the Resistance and to prevent the people of Palestine from taking part in the current settlement, it is necessary to create a Jordanian-Palestinian national front in opposition to the Jordanian- Palestinian front represented by the ruling authorities. One of the items on the list of this front’s agenda must be to cope with the vertical division in the body of society by submitting a program of democratic national liberation covering the national and demo¬ cratic problems both of the people of the East Bank and of the Palestine revolution. In this field what the people of the East Bank seek is the national and democratic interest (the socialist treatment of the problems of the peasants and the nationalist classes in the towns).

2. To provide the people of Palestine with a national alternative, there must be a struggle to establish a nationalist regime in the East Bank which will enable the Resistance and the people to direct all their rifles and all other forms of struggle against the Zionist enemy, instead of sectors of our people taking refuge in the Palestinian state so as to escape from the attacks of reaction and the torments and daily sufferings it inflicts on the people, which are pushing them towards the Pales¬ tinian state.

3. To rectify relations with the Arab world, there must be cooperation with the Arab masses for joint struggle to maintain the Resistance and democratic national liber¬ ation in the East Bank and the conflict against imperialism and the local reaction linked with it in the Arab area.

It was clear, both from the public statements of the sections of the Resistance and from the discussions of the Central Committee, that

most sections of the Resistance, and in particular its right wing, have not absorbed any of these lessons, but still persist in main¬ taining the same attitudes they held before September. Because of this there are indica¬ tions that a “Palestinian June” is about to arise above the horizon now that the subjective inability in the ranks of the commands of the Resistance to understand the present stage and its tasks has been disclosed.

It was against this background that the Resistance came to the Palestine National Council—in an atmosphere of advance towards national unity (in the sense of all the organizations being merged in a single organization)—as if this was the magical solution for both the subjective and objective problems of the Resistance. In fact, however, it amounted to no more than a gathering together of all the contradictions in the ranks of the Resistance and the manifestations of incompetence in its various sections. The advocates of this unscientific trend have exploited the emotional state that arose in the ranks of the people after September and launched a campaign of political demagogy— and this was the magical solution.

This is why we have thought, from the beginning of its session, that the National Council has nothing new to offer. For any¬ thing really new to come about, it must be preceded by new factors in the situation. At all its debates the Council has shown that there are in its ranks two mutually conflicting basic trends as regards the understanding of the fundamental crisis of the Resistance and the Palestine problem. There is one trend that calls for the absorption of the fundament¬ al lessons so that the Council may produce the following new results:

— The building of the Jordanian-Pales¬ tinian front which will offer its program for the democratic national liberation of the East Bank as a remedy for the vertical division of society, and the establishment of a regime that is hostile to imperialism, Zionism and reaction, and friendly to the Resistance and the interests of the people, which lie in rejecting settlements and carrying on the armed struggle.

— The rectification of Arab relations for


the establishment of a broad Arab national front for common struggle against the common enemy: imperialism, Israel and the local Arab forces that are linked with them.

— The rectification of relations with the forces of the world liberation movement and the socialist forces within the framework of solidarity in the common struggle against world imperialism.

For this to be achieved a radical change must be brought about in the relations between the sections of the Resistance and the Jordanian national movement, on the basis of relations in the form of a front linked with a unified program for the mobilization of all forces in the Jordanian-Palestinian theater on a single line. Obviously it is not a question of whether or not the organizations are merged or not, but of a common under¬ standing of current tasks and of the relations in the form of a front to which they give rise.

The other trend is in favor of maintaining the old situation; it employs the slogan of national unity, but without any real meaning. This trend has manifested itself in the following way. It has rejected, in practice, the joint Jordanian-Palestinian na¬ tional front and insisted on maintaining the division in the body of society by insisting on the particularist character of the Palestinian struggle; it has rejected relations firmly established on the basis of a front and refused to rectify relations between the regimes and the Resistance.

The delegates of the Democratic Front stressed that those who call for national unity as a mere figure of speech, without any real meaning, do not, practically and object¬ ively, want unity because of their insistence on maintaining the old situation.

All this leads us to say that maintaining the old situation unchanged can only mean greater paralysis in the ranks of the Resistance which, in turn, will lead to further military withdrawal in the face of the attacks of the reaction that rules in Amman and further political withdrawal in the face of Arab pressures. It also means greater enthusiasm on the part of daily expanding sectors in the ranks of our people for the Palestinian state, as part of the current settlement, in the absence

of a nationalist revolutionary alternative to the present situation.

We have also observed in the National Council a conspicuous trend not only towards continued paralysis, but also towards the shattering of the unity of struggle between sections of the Resistance in an attempt to construct an axis consisting of the independ¬ ent elements, the Liberation Army and Fateh, to the exclusion of other forces. This, in turn, means starting on the course of subjecting the Resistance to current Arab policy in two stages. In the first stage, the progressive forces in the Resistance will be contained and made the particular target for blows by reaction, and in the second stage the progressive forces in Fateh and the Liberation Army will be contained, until there is only a purely formal Resistance, incapable of action and obliged to surrender to the facts of the present Arab situation. In this way there will no longer be any question of a Palestinian solution of the existing problem, but only of a single Arab solution within the framework of the Security Council resolution.

After a series of struggles both inside and outside the Council, the attempts to split the Resistance and to involve it in a battle against itself were frustrated. But the outcome was that the situation that existed before the Council met remained unchanged both as regards its political and military horizons and the relations among sections of the Resistance. In my opinion the resolutions issued were worth no more than the paper they were written on for they meant nothing at all. There are also numerous forces in the Council that do not want them to see the light, not to mention the fact that they did not deal with the current problems of the Palestine cause and the Resistance movement.

From the organizational point of view, the result of the Council’s failure to change things is the perpetuation of the existing situation which has not profited by the lessons of September, and a sort of trick to deprive the resolutions adopted of any signi¬ ficance they might acquire under the auspices of commands that have a true view of the present situation and pay attention to the tasks of the present stage.

ARAB WORLD 403

In my estimate the crisis through which the Resistance has been passing both before and since September will involve further political and military retreat at both Palestin¬ ian and Arab levels, to the extent that after a time we shall find ourselves confronted by a dead end after which either we shall have to surrender to the Arab consequences of the crisis, or be unable to confront. The result will be a “Palestinian June,” as an extension of the Arab June, however much the Resist¬ ance employs its empty revolutionary slogans.

In my opinion the solution to the present crisis of the Resistance will not be found in the halls of the next Council, but in the establish¬ ment of a national front with a program common to all the progressive and nationalist forces in the Resistance and in the Jordanian theater of struggle, so as to perform the three outstanding tasks, which are: to maintain the subjective forces of the Resistance and to close the door to all attempts by the Pales¬ tinian people to enter into a settlement. Until this is possible there must be struggle to resolve the conflict between the Resistance and the Jordanian nationalist movement on the one hand and the ruling authorities in Jordan on the other, in the interests of a nationalist regime that will ensure the solution of the first and second problems in such a way as to ensure that the Resistance continues and develops into a people’s armed revolution.

It is also my opinion that the international and Arab-Israeli political settlement is ob¬ viously on the way, and the Resistance can no longer resist it. All it can do is to keep the Palestinian people away from such settle¬ ments and maintain its armed forces to continue the historical, legitimate and long¬ term struggle of the people and the Resistance on the road to liberation.

290

Press Statement Commenting on the Ineffectiveness of the Eighth Session of the Palestine National Council, Made by a Representative of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine1


For us to be able to appraise the work of the National Council at its Eighth Session, we must first define the tasks it was required to perform; in the light of this definition, and in the light of what the Council actually presented we shall be able to assess the results.

The Council was required to submit to its members a study of the activities of the Executive Committee of the Palestine Libera¬ tion Organization in the period between its sessions, covering the activities of the various departments, including the department for the occupied territory and the popular or information organization, in addition to the

political activities which the Executive Com¬ mittee had been commissioned to, or did,carry out.

It was also required that a report by the Central Committee of the Resistance should be submitted to the Council, containing a comprehensive appraisal of its activities and an outline for the coming stage, forming a basis for a precisely timed program of action.

From the first day, when it became clear

that the only report submitted by the Execu¬ tive Committee was on its own activities and

those of the departments it controls, and be¬ cause the Central Committee also had not submitted the required appraisal, analysis and outline, any observer could see what results this Council was going to lead to.

The stage through which the Palestine problem and the Resistance are passing is an extremely dangerous one, alike at internal, Arab and international levels. It was assumed that the Council would draw up a program of action for coping with the stage through which the cause is passing, but in the event

1 Translated from the Arabic text of statements made

by the P.FX.P. observer at the Palestine National

Council, Ahmad al-Yamani, in an exclusive interview,

al-Nahar (Beirut), March 7, 1971.


the exact opposite was the case. This was the result of the way the Council was composed and the nature of the relations among the sections of the Resistance and the forces participating in the Council.

It can be said in so many words that the only achievement was the political statement —called the Program for Political Action— which can rightly be regarded as a basis for agreement on a more or less common concept.

Apart from this the Council achieved nothing.

At previous meetings of the Central Com¬ mittee, between December 5, 1970 and February 21, 1971, we submitted an outline program for political military action, a formula for relations, in the form of a common front, among the sections of the Resistance and an outline of the role to be played by the Jordanian nationalist movement through a national front capable of recruiting the dif¬ ferent forces and mobilizing the Jordanian masses to perform their national role in the coming stage. But although the Central Committee, at its meetings December 5-8, did accept some of the proposals we made at that time, unfortunately it has done nothing to implement them. This is also the result of the nature of the relations and the difference of concepts.

In the next three months we shall continue to make the utmost efforts to convince others that it is essential to lay strong foundations for unambiguous and clearly defined relations.

291

Radio and Television Speech to the Nation Made by U.A.R. President Sadat Announcing the Government Decision Not To Commit Egypt to a Further Extension of the Middle East Ceasefire1


Noble strugglers in this land which we all hold sacred:

1 Translated from the Arabic text of Sadat’s speech,

al-Ahram (Cairo), March 8, 1971.

Men and women of Egypt: Young people and children of Egypt:

I have preferred to speak to you directly today because we have reached the moment when every Egyptian must do his duty.

The Egypt that you love and for which you are ready to sacrifice yourselves is now1 threatened by a danger different from any that has so far confronted it throughout its history, because part of its sacred soil is now for the first time suffering the tribulation of having been seized by armed Israeli aggression. In the course of our people’s struggle we have known invaders who came and went, who

plundered or ruled, who seized power and collected taxes, but in spite of everything the unity of Egyptian soil remained whole and untouched, continuous and uninterrupted.

But now we are confronted by a challenge of another kind, a challenge to our territory itself, which threatens to destroy the unity of the soil of our homeland. Far from con¬ cealing his ambitions from us and from the whole world, our enemy has arrogantly and overweeningly stated them in an international document which he has submitted to the representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who has been entrusted with the task of ensuring the implementation of the Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967.

This resolution declares that the prin¬ ciple of obtaining territories by armed force is unacceptable, and that, consequently, with¬ drawal from all the territories occupied since June 5, 1967 is essential.

Brothers and fellow citizens, I have done everything in my power to secure peace based on justice.

During the last thirty days during which we have decided to refrain from firing, we have continued a detailed and largescale effort which started some years ago. We started it when we accepted the Security Council resolution [of November 22, 1967] and supported it by fighting in the field so that others might understand that we were prepared to accept danger and difficulty, and we resumed diplomatic activity by agreeing to the proposals submitted by the American Secretary of State, and known as the Rogers

ARAB WORLD 405

initiative. And we helped the representative of the United Nations Secretary-General, who was entrusted with the task of securing the implementation of the Security Council resolution, to succeed by agreeing to the ceasefire. We accepted it for three months, and then extended it for another three months. But all this brought neither the Secretary- General’s representative nor ourselves any nearer to a solution of the crisis, the reason being the aggressive and racist character of Zionism.

This Israeli challenge is not directed against us alone; it is directed against the whole of the international community and against the human values that should govern our world.

But there is a fundamental difference be¬ tween our attitude to this challenge and the attitude of the rest of the world. The challenge directed against the world is a spiritual, moral and political challenge. But the challenge directed against us is a material and national one, a challenge to our destiny. In meeting the challenge that confronts it the world may decide to censure and condemn, even though in its concern for the future of international relations it may go further than that. But we cannot be content with censure and condemnation. We must resist and fight, we must give life so that we may have life, we must sacrifice lives so that the unity of the soil of our homeland may be protected for all time.

We have given warning of this fact, and others have thought that we were fanatical in doing so. But if we follow what has hap¬ pened in the last month only, this should be enough for us and for others.

1. At the beginning of the month, on February 4, 1971,1 announced that we would refrain from shooting for thirty days, to give the international community, the United Nations, the Big Four, the Security Council, the United Nations Secretary-General and his representative, Ambassador Gunnar Jarring, a further chance to exert efforts and concentrate on the problem. I made this announcement the occasion for also announc¬ ing an Egyptian initiative for partial with¬ drawal from Sinai in return for which we

would open the Suez Canal for international navigation. We did not regard this as a solution of the crisis, but it was a practical move towards a start on a solution and a test of intentions. But what we said and offered fell on deaf ears.

2. The representative of the Uni ted Nations Secretary-General found it appropriate, in order to properly channel and concentrate his efforts, to ask us and Israel to provide him with undertakings in conformity with the Security Council resolution and its pro¬ visions. From us he asked an undertaking to provide safeguards for peace in conformity with the Security Council resolution, and we gave him the undertaking he asked for, after we had asked him for clarifications and found his answers to our questions satisfactory.

But Israel procrastinated and in its arro¬ gance and conceit chose not to answer him. It then sent him a memorandum replying to our memorandum to him. And -even more serious—in this memorandum it said with all possible haughtiness and arrogance that it would not return to the pre-June 4, 1967 frontiers.

3. Israel’s reply, as we have all seen from subsequent events, came as a violent shock to the whole world—its governments and international institutions. All the great powers, in spite of their different attitudes to us and to Israel, regard Israel’s reply to Jarring as being negative and hostile to peace rather than serving its interests. The United Nations regards Israel’s reply as an attempt to destroy its efforts and its very existence. And world public opinion as a whole, as expressed in different ways in its press, is angry with and resentful of Israel and can find no excuse for Israel and no acceptable justification for its attitude.

The Secretary-General of the United Na¬ tions then sent an appeal to Israel on March 5, calling on it to respond to Ambassador Jarring’s request that it should undertake to withdraw from Egyptian territory. But Israel ignored the Secretary-General’s appeal be¬ cause it is determined to annex the Egyptian territories and to expand at Egypt’s expense, as part of the Israeli plan for expansion at the expense of the Arab countries.


Time is passing and our enemy will neither listen nor withdraw. He is possessed by the arrogance of strength, dominated by his ambition to expand, and no longer cares for principles, law or order. Brothers:

In spite of all the efforts made by us and by others, no solution has been found for the crisis. But it is right and proper that I should point out that our efforts in the last month have not been in vain, but have had results of great value. The most important of these results is that Israel is now totally isolated from the international community and from world public opinion, and this is no small thing.

Brothers and fellow citizens: As we face these important hours in our

struggle, I want you to join me a while in considering the attitude of the friend who has helped us without hesitation, stood beside us unconditionally and made the greatest and most generous efforts to con¬ solidate our struggle for liberation.

I do not need to tell you anything more about the attitude of the U.S.S.R. from the beginning of the crisis until today, in all fields-—political, military and economic. You all know this attitude—you can see it for yourselves and know its worth and value.

The people and leaders of the U.S.S.R. have stood by us like honorable men and revolutionary strugglers, supporting our rights and strengthening our line with honor and resolution. Our history and our future generations will never forget its attitude to our just cause.

They were with us in the most difficult days in our history, supporting our right to peace based on justice.

The only new thing that I can add to what you already know is to tell you that I thought it proper last week to meet with the leaders of the U.S.S.R. These leaders had sent to me to say that circumstances demanded that we have consultations, so I decided to go to Moscow myself without announcing it.

In fact I left Cairo at dawn on Monday, March 1, and returned on Tuesday evening, March 2.

During those two days in Moscow I had

the opportunity of meeting the leaders of the U.S.S.R., our friends Brezhnev, Podgorny and Kosygin. We talked about everything and discussed all possibilities frankly, clearly and honestly, and I returned to Cairo com¬ pletely satisfied with what had been achieved and confident that the U.S.S.R. will support our rights absolutely and positively. Brothers:

We are studying the steps we take with great care, and no provocation whatever will make us abandon our political and military planning. We shall take the initiative and observe developments and take action in accordance with the dictates of our principles and objectives, the first and foremost of which are liberation, the safety of Arab soil and the rights of the people of Palestine.

Although we have the highest esteem for the United Nations Secretary-General’s ap¬ peal to us to practice self-control and to refrain from firing, we want to establish clearly and honestly to the whole world that we cannot extend the ceasefire longer than we have done already, and that it is not in our power to refrain from firing, when we have already done so for thirty days.

I therefore declare to you and to the world our decision that we not regard ourselves bound by the ceasefire or to refrain from firing.

This does not mean that political action will stop and that there will be nothing but guns firing. What it means is that we shall watch, we shall follow the course of events, and decide for ourselves what we believe to be our duty at the right time and in the right place. Brothers and fellow citizens:

I want you to know that our performance of our duty is neither a luxury nor mere words. Others, far away from the field of battle, have preferred to talk about the struggle, and to use slogans rather than bullets. But we are not like them; we know, and we are entitled to know the meaning of our decision to perform our duty, and to know what this decision will cost us.

The cost can be counted in sweat and blood, and in no other way. At the same time we call on the Big Four powers to continue to

ARAB WORLD 407

keep their eyes on a crisis which, because of its time and place, we believe to be at the very core of the question of peace or war.

We may add to this that we have confidence in the United Nations, in its Secretary- General, and in his special representative who is commissioned to ensure the implement¬ ation of the Security Council resolution, and we truly believe that the principles of the Charter of the United Nations are the one token of security in a world that cannot face the disaster of a third world war.

We address what we have said to all these quarters in the hope that all may realize that there are limits which we cannot pass.

We make only two conditions for a solution of the crisis: withdrawal from all the territories occupied since June 4, and the defense of the legitimate rights of the people of Palestine. We have reached the point where Israel has declared that there can be no return to the lines of June 4, 1967. From this we must make the proper deductions, and understand that anyone who does not want to return to the lines of June 4, 1967 cares nothing for the legitimate rights of the people of Palestine.

After all this and on this basis, everyone of us must do his duty, and what gives us more self-confidence and assurance that we are acting rightly is the fact that we are now carrying on our struggle against what confronts us within a framework that is basically stronger and more appropriate.

We shall perform our duty to the full, even if at the same time we call on others to perform their duty in whatever way they wish. But we believe that no party, at the level of the international community or of its institutions, is entitled to stand aloof. In particular we call on the United States to do its duty; we are not laying on it a burden whose specifications are determined by us, we are only asking it to do what it has undertaken to do.

The United States of America has given us a direct undertaking, especially in the last month, that it opposes and will continue to oppose the principle of obtaining terri¬ tories by force.

The United States cannot evade or escape from this undertaking. We are not asking of it more than is in its power; we are only

asking it to meet the undertaking it made to us. This we believe is not beyond its power as regards Israel, which is entirely dependent on it, and continues to challenge and kill while living at the expense of America as regards both money and arms.

I also want to tell you that I have had contacts with the United States of America, and that we have made our attitude known to the American authorities, clearly and precisely and with an honest appreciation of the responsibilities involved.

Brothers, the enemy will not stop his aggression unless we are in a position to resist him whenever he tries. But however strong and well prepared we are, we must realize in advance that the enemy will succeed in some of his strikes against us, that he will not hesitate, and I tell you that from now on everything in our territory will be in danger. But that is our destiny which we accept along with the honor and dignity of the struggle.

Brothers and fellow citizens, I shall now return to what I was telling you at the start —that we are facing the most decisive and dangerous moment. This is why I have spoken to every one of you, in all positions of responsibility, to every one of you in every house, great and small, in discharge of our undertaking that we shall share our burdens, that we shall endure today together for the sake of a tomorrow together. There is no time for despair, no time for words, all our time must be devoted to toil, all our toil to action, and all our action to one goal, which is the only one—the goal of victory, with God’s help.

The battle will be ferocious, but it is the most honorable battle in life. The battle will be long and stubborn, but that is the destiny of free men. Thank God that we have the advantage. We are urged to the struggle by confidence, hope and the sanctity of every grain of soil on our land, while our enemy is driven to the madness of aggression, by fear of defeat and fear of despair. Brothers and fellow citizens:

Once again I say to you that we know, and we have the right to know, the meaning


of our decision to do our duty and what this decision will cost us.

Today, as we stand on one line in the face of a single danger, I want all your sentiments, all your hearts, all your strength—I want them all to be a matrix that will surround your men, your sons, who are officers and sol¬ diers in our armed forces, surround them with your prayers, your hope, your greetings and your admiration. They are Egypt’s readiness,

its hope and the guardians of its honor and of the glory of its flag.

Lord grant them victory, and inspire us,

O Lord, with wisdom and with courage so

that we may be true to the trust thou hast reposed in us for the glory of our land and the victory of our right, for thou art the Lord of glory and right, supreme over thy worship¬ pers. Peace be upon you and God’s blessing.

292

Yugoslav Press and Radio Interview Statements by President-Elect Assad of Syria, Reaffirming Syrian Dedication to Arab Unity and to the Rights of the Palestinians and Stating Syria’s Accept¬ ance of Diplomatic Activity Despite Her View of the Inevitability of Renewed Conflict with Israel1 Damascus, March 12, 1971

Q. One of Tour Excellency’s first political actions in the Arab sphere was the Syrian Arab Republic’s decision to be the fourth member of the already existing three-nation federation. Does this mean that your country’s attitude to the Middle East crisis will be coordinated with that of Cairo ?

A. We in this region are part of the Arab nation, and it is our duty to struggle to ensure that the different parts of that nation


Assad’s interview with Yugoslav journalist Dara

Janekovic visiting Syria as correspondent for Yugoslav

radio and a number of newspapers, as published in

al-Baath (Damascus), April 2, 1971. (President Assad

was elected president on March 12 and inaugurated

on March 14.)

are united in a single state. For us this is a basic principle, one that is not subject to or affected by any conditions. For us in the Baath Party it is the major goal, the goal of Arab unity. This is what led us to attach

ourselves to the Tripoli Charter States regard¬

less of international incidents, since for us, as I have said, it is a matter of faith. And in accordance with what I have said, we believe

that fragmentation opens the door to all that is detrimental to the interests of the Arab nation.

Unity, however, will close the door in the face of those quarters whose aim it is to damage the interests of the Arab nation.

Qj I am thinking of the basic Middle East issue because this issue is a basic one for all Arabs. But the attitudes of the Arab countries differ. Egypt accepted the Security Council resolution, Syria did not, and it appears that Egypt is going to

> pursue indirect, or perhaps direct, negotiations—I do not exactly know. If Egypt reaches an agreement or a compromise solution, what will Syria’s attitude be?

A. The result of the political struggle carried on by certain Arab countries and certain friendly countries has been increased arrogance and conceit on the part of Israel. There can be no doubt that this struggle has gone far towards revealing Israel’s inten¬ tions to world public opinion. But, though this diplomatic activity has gone on for four years—which should have been long enough to achieve some results had Israel not been the expansionist entity she is—it has not brought Israeli withdrawal from the territories oc¬ cupied in 1967 a single step closer. But the nature of this entity will always constitute an obstacle to all peace efforts: because expansion is the hallmark of this Zionist entity, in the long run we shall have to engage in armed struggle to defend our rights and to liberate our usurped territories. This political struggle, in which our friends in the world and some of our brothers in the Arab coun¬ tries are engaged, is not, however, incompat¬ ible with the requirements of the battle, nor with the exigencies of the liberation of the occupied territory.

ARAB WORLD 409

Qj Do you regard Syria's inflexible attitude, which has been so much talked about, as realistic?

A. We have misgivings about the latest stage we have passed through in, Syria, as regards our internal situation, and perhaps also our situation in the Arab sphere, and consequently the course we must follow to attain what would help end the occupation. As regards a political solution, the fact is that we in Syria say that there can be no political solution, because the Zionist entity, on which such a solution depends, is expansionist and aggressive.

When we say it is an expansionist and aggressive entity, we are not talking at random We say so on the basis of an analysis of the realities and the history of Israel; in all the history of Israel there is not a single indication of its being a peaceable state, as they claim. Zionism occupied Palestine in 1948. The United Nations has adopted many resolutions on Palestine and on the rights of the refugees, but not one of them has been implemented. There were demilitarized zones on both sides of the firing line before 1967, which Israel occupied in successive years, and neither the international organiza¬ tions, nor the United Nations observer corps nor the Secretary-General of the United Nations was able to prevent it.

During the June 1967 aggression the Security Council unanimously adopted a resolution calling for a ceasefire on June 6 which Syria accepted as did Israel. Despite this, however, Israel occupied the Golan territories after this resolution had been adopted and she had announced her accept¬ ance of it. This was [noted in] Resolution 235 of June 9, 1967. Does Israel abide even by the 1967 Security Council resolution? Doesn’t Israel declare that she will never return to the pre-June 5, 1967 frontiers? Only yesterday Abba Eban, addressing the Knesset, said that Israel will never return to the pre-June 5, 1967 frontiers.

Not long ago Golda Meir told Newsweek's correspondent that the settlements estab¬ lished in the occupied Arab territories are there to stay. She said she did not recognize that there was any place in the world where Jews did not have the right to live. Of course

it is not a matter of Jews as indivi¬ duals but of the Jews who represent a move¬ ment of settler colonialism, the Zionist move¬ ment.

Yesterday when Dayan was asked which he preferred: peace or Sharm el-Sheikh, he replied Sharm el-Sheikh. Before that Dayan told his forces: 4 The past generation achieved the 1948 frontiers; our generation achieved the 1967 frontiers; it is up to you to achieve the future frontiers.”

This is the history of Israel in relation to the international organizations and the world. Can we possibly say it is a peaceable state? Therefore we in Syria say: Our attitude is not an extremist one, as certain newspapers in the world try to represent it; it is the result of an analysis which leads to the conclusion that a battle is inevitable, though we are aware that the battle will be a hard one and we know that our enemy possesses immense resources and enjoys the support of the United States.

We are defending right and justice; we are defending our right to be left to live in peace as honorable men in our territory and as free men in our homeland.

Q. Supposing Egypt accepted certain frontier adjustments, what would your attitude be ?

A. For the reasons I have mentioned and because Israel is aggressive and has opposed all the efforts made by the United Arab Republic and its friends in the world, President Sadat announced that there could be no extension of the ceasefire. He also announced that Israel had closed the door on all peace

attempts, and our friends in the world, including our Yugoslav friends, are aware of

this.

Qj We [Yugoslavs] are aware that diplomacy is still active and will continue to be active and that two major forces, the United States and the U.S.S.R.,

who of course have great differences between them, must be considered.

A. The Israeli authorities say that the United States has not exerted any pressure on them, and American statements affirm America’s commitment to defend Israel and to maintain the balance of forces. The balance of forces of course means that the United


States intends to maintain Israel’s military superiority over the Arabs.

Q. How do you think the Palestine problem can be solved, in view of the fact that there are com¬ plications: the Palestinians, Jordan, the King, Israel and the Arab countries too, each of which has its own interests? How do you hope that this problem will be solved?

A. No solution of the Palestine problem which does not take into account the essence of the problem—the Palestinian people—can be of any use. As regards our view of Israel

as a state that is making every effort to take possession of Arab territory and to expel the Arabs who live in it, the Arabs agree.

Any solution that takes into account the essence of the problem—the Palestinian people—will have to be proposed by the

Palestinian people themselves. The Palestine Resistance has proposed

that there should be in Palestine a secular

state consisting of both Arabs and Jews. We in Syria have not decided on such a solution, nor have we discussed such a subject. But from my point of view it seems that such a solution as the one proposed by the Resistance

could well be discussed, especially in the light of experience. There are Jews living

in all the Arab countries, and the history of this area bears witness to the coexistence of all religions.

Q. But Israel will never accept this solution. A. What are we to do with this dispersed

Palestinian people? They are living a mark¬ edly sub-human life in the camps, far from their homeland; they are a dispersed people in a state of revolution, and no one can stop their revolution. They feel that they are being unjustly treated and the only thing that can stop this revolution is a just solution that is an embodiment of the right. I want to affirm that the rights of a people never die, however much time passes. Individuals may die, but the rights of peoples never die.

This is the situation. Of course it is no easy matter.

(P No, it is a very complicated situation because attempts are being made by officials in Jordan and by Israel to destroy the Palestinians.

A. It is impossible to wipe out a whole people. We should do well to remember that the Palestinians did not revolt when they left Palestine twenty years ago; they have only begun to do so in the last few years. This means that their sense of injustice is growing with the passage of time.

As for the authorities in Jordan, and as for Israel, it is not a question of an individual, for there are feelings that have started to pervade the heart of every Palestinian.

293

Lebanese Press Interview Statements by Iraq Revolution Command Council Vice-Chairman Hussein, Opposing an Arab Summit Conference and Criticizing All Who Accept So-Called Peace Pro¬ posals, Including Some Elements of the Palestine Resistance1

Baghdad, Mid-March, 1971

(P Does this mean that you are linking the proposed surrender solutions for the Palestine prob¬ lem with the stand of the communists vis-a-vis the regime in Iraq and the pressures to which it is being subjected?

A. We shall answer this question frankly as well, in the light of our understanding of things. When one keeps silent about the most reactionary and dictatorial governments but concentrates on Iraq, out of all the coun¬ tries of the Middle East, only two explanations can be found for that fact. The first relates to the question of peaceful solutions and our rejection of such solutions; in fact we reject surrender solutions and not peaceful solutions, for the solution that has been proposed amounts to surrender. When we speak of what is peaceful and what is not, it appears to some people that we are advocating war,


Saddam Hussein Takriti’s interview, al-Dustur (Beirut),

No. 22 (March 15, 1971).

ARAB WORLD 411

whereas we advocate neither war nor the shedding of blood, rather we are demanding the [restitution of] rights that have been for¬ cibly taken from us. It is our belief that the formula that has been proposed for dealing with Israel is a formula that cannot give us back our rights. In rejecting peaceful solutions, which we term surrender solutions—and day by day it is becoming clearer that we are right in the belief that they are surrender solutions and not peaceful solutions—we are not seeking to challenge the policies of other states that are attempting to impose peaceful solutions. We are deeply apprecia¬ tive of the efforts of the Soviet Union in supporting our causes. When the Soviet Union comes out in favor of peaceful solutions but we reject the [proposed] formula, it does not mean that we are trying to attack the Soviet Union, we only mean to insist on our rights. It would seem, however, that the matter is seen in a different light and consequently an insistent information and propaganda campaign is being waged against Iraq. It is strange that everyone should be attacking Iraq and saying that it is the only belligerent state in the Middle East. When we read the papers and listen to radio broadcasts, which will attract anyone’s attention, and inasmuch as we are a progressive and revolutionary party, and our party seeks to implement socialism and to set up socialistic ties in society, not only in Iraq but throughout Arab society as a whole, one might come to believe that we are carrying out the true wishes of the Arab people, which is something we are proud of. In fact, this is our position.

If we had even one percent doubt about our basic principles, we would have shifted our position and adopted other, sounder prin¬ ciples. However, our absolute faith and trust in the soundness of our principles makes it certain that we shall continue on the path we have chosen for ourselves. It could be that certain people are aware that the soundness of our principles will cancel out or considerably weaken the role that they have to play. This means that we face a heavy attack for two reasons: the first has to do with the peaceful solution, and the other is connected with

this explanation, for how else could one explain it?

Q. Why did Iraq reject the call for an Arab summit conference?

A. Iraq took part in some of the Arab summit conferences, and at these conferences decisions were taken, but what can we assume to have been gained? The last Arab summit conference was held a few days before the Rogers Plan was accepted by certain Arab countries; at the conference a clear plan was adopted for the recovery of Arab rights, liberation being accepted as the way to achieve these rights. Then we were surprised by the acceptance of the Rogers Plan, which was really a clever colonialist game which divided the Arab people and the Arab governments, and made the Arabs fight each other from two opposing trenches instead of fighting the enemy from a single trench. The results of the Rogers Plan game are now clearly visible in the Arab theater in the form of the international moves now being made.

As for the aspect related to the present, what things have been offered as new formulae, as a fresh start and a new indication that there really are intentions different from those in the past? And have these intentions a serious aim, have they reviewed their previous positions and are they guiding the resources of the Arab nation on the course of liberation? There is nothing encouraging—on the con¬ trary. Statements are made day after day on the question of direct negotiations with Israel and recognition of Israel. What I ask is: After all this, are we to agree to an Arab summit conference so that it may bestow legality on the initiatives—the initia¬ tives that are taken in one country or another, in one place or another—for the recognition of the legality of Israel’s existence? What I mean is, are we to agree to an Arab summit conference so that we may confer legality on these so-called initiatives?

The other thing is connected with the regimes of the countries that take part in the summit conferences, for these conferences, in themselves, if we regard them from the point of view of a revolutionary scientific


analysis, and in the light of the nature of the majority of the Arab regimes, lead us to the foregone conclusion that it is impossible to obtain any results [from them].

In the past when we attended the summit conferences, and especially the conferences attended by all the Arab countries without exception, we certainly did not believe that they would provide a formula or a basis for liberation, because it was not reasonable that these conferences, constituted as they were, should provide a base for liberation; even the minimum decided by these confer¬ ences—which constitutes the minimum aspir¬ ations of the Arab people—even this was not adhered to before the Tripoli conference. The Tripoli conference, of course, was dif¬ ferently composed, and it took decisions which were clarified by the Iraqi information media, but in spite of this it was soon replaced by acceptance of the Rogers Plan.

Q. Now that some of the confrontation countries have agreed to peaceful solutions3 what is the fate of the Eastern Front?

A. The nature of the question provides the answer. The Eastern Front is a military formula. The existence of a group of Arab armies in Jordan, Syria and Lebanon quite simply means their existence in this sector and the existence of a command for these armies to strike at Israel in the light of the goal of liberation—but when things are being solved through direct negotiations and recognition of the existence of Israel, what grounds are there for the existence of the Eastern Front and of a command for the group of Arab armies that exist in this area? I think that there is no longer any justification for their existence: I mean this was the last hope even after the Rogers Plan, but the last formula for adherence to this plan has been rejected by those of our brothers who are concerned with the affair, in spite of Iraq’s insistence on it at the time and its emphasis on the importance of this formula.

Q. This area is passing through a critical situation. What do you predict will happen to the Palestine revolution?

A. This subject requires frank treatment, because now that some have recognized Israel

or are on the way to recognizing that it is entitled to some of the territory it usurped in 1948, as is clear from statements by Israel and others, we must be frank with ourselves and with others. The Palestine Resistance was basically a collection of trends which the majority of the Arab regimes took up with, in conformity with their conflicting views. For example, when the Rogers Plan was recognized, some people in the Resistance recognized it. This is astonishing, because the Resistance came into existence for liberation, and the whole idea of the Resistance is organized armed action for the recovery of usurped sovereignty by force of arms. And now this armed revolutionary set-up is re¬ cognizing the Rogers Plan, which certainly leads us to think that there must be something really wrong with the composition of the Resistance. Another thing is that, according to the evidence of its combatant members, part of the Resistance, or part of its activities and part of its set-up, has been turned into an office set-up. Resistance depends on a basic principle, which is flexibility of movement; this flexibility requires that there should be [no] fixed base, for there cannot be this flexibility of movement if there are offices, telephones and cars.

The Arab Resistance was born spoiled, that is to say it came into existence in an atmosphere of luxury, rather than under the

auspices of the formulae of revolutionary war, as was the case in Algeria, when our

Arab people fought with old sporting guns and odd cartridges stolen from the foreigner and then turned against him. The Arab Resistance should have been like this from the start, and because every regime adopted a group of trends, when a man wanted to belong to the Resistance he had to have a

specific rank, a fine new rifle and sufficient ammunition. The Arab Resistance in its

general character has been a manifestation of luxury, and this has applied to all the combatant members of the Resistance. Class distinctions arose within the Palestine Resis¬ tance, and the class mentality is inevitably easy-going and leads to formulae other than

that of armed struggle, which depends on

ARAB WORLD 413

endurance. This is a factor that forms part of the calculations of every aware and progres¬ sive Arab revolutionary and every man who loves his people and is determined to recover the usurped rights of the Arabs, if not at this stage then in the future, to give a

scientific and realistic diagnosis of things. The Resistance must understand this fact,

and be aware of another fact—that it must act on the basis of a theoretical appraisal of the situation based on principles, on the assumption that there is no Arab regime

capable of giving it direct support, and that

if it does get such support, it must be regarded

as a bonus payment. But to have the idea that it is possible to fight Israel under the auspices of the unanimous agreement of the Arab regimes is an illusion, because it is impossible that the Arab regimes in their

present form should achieve unanimity on

fighting Israel.

Q. How might the Iraqi government respond to the Rogers proposal given that it embodies a

surrender solution to the Palestine problem?

A. The latest statement by the Assistant

Secretary-General of our Party affirmed that

Iraq is trying to form an Arab front, com¬ prising the whole of the Arab homeland, for endurance and rejection of surrender solutions.

This front will consist of the countries that reject a peaceful solution and of the progres¬ sive parties and movements which agree on the same question: the struggle against

Zionism and imperialism. Our aim is to unify the struggle and to direct it towards endurance; we do not regard war with Israel as an easy operation, because we are not fighting Israel so much as the forces of im¬

perialism. If some of our brothers have

only now realized this fact, we do not blame

them; we are only surprised that they did not realize it and act on it before now. Some of our brothers are now theorizing about the idea of submitting to the formulae proposed by Israel, now that they have discovered the truth about the links between imperialism

and Israel, while we have long realized this

fact and acted on it. The confrontation with Israel in total war

is a difficult operation, but it is not impossible, meaning that we need patience and plenty of time, but we must not submit to surrender solutions; we must reject them all and spread a spirit of rejection among our people. The dissemination of a spirit of surrender can only lead to acceptance of the reality of Israel, and this is just what imperialism wants. Some people call themselves Arabs and patriots and, building up a theory on the idea of defeat, such and such a regime, for example, says: Brothers, with my present resources I cannot fight. This is much less dangerous than theorizing about the defeat by according Israel a halo of greatness and representing it as an invincible bogey. Such action has a direct influence on the Arab mentality and restricts the capacity to resist and endure. This kind of theorizing about the defeat is the most dangerous thing that confronts us in our present situation.

Then there is another thing: the old tune that is being struck up once again: You are Palestinian, you are Lebanese, you are Egyptian, you are Iraqi, and each one of you ought to concern himself with the affairs of his own country. This tune was composed by colonialism and we all know its object

divide and rule. This particularist refrain was heard after the treacheries of the Arab rulers which led to the disaster of Palestine in 1948, and now we have become accustomed to hearing it again. The object is to make the Arab people despair and isolate themselves within the regional frontiers of their countries. There are some people in Iraq who have picked up this tune, but they are a minority. There are some people in Jordan who are influenced by it, and also some in Egypt,

but the conscience of our Arab people and the conscience of the whole of this nation cannot be influenced;' our nation rejects everything liable to lead it to surrender.

There is another important point. The idea of taking the cause away from the people and handing it over to the governments is a conspiracy. The people must be allowed to play their part in everything, and the capacity of the Arab people must by no means be underestimated. It is they that have made revolutions and can make other revolutions


if they find that their rulers and regimes have deviated from the required revolutionary and nationalist line.

294

Lebanese Press Interview Statements by

President Assad of Syria, Expressing the

Syrian Belief That the Solution to the

Middle East Conflict Will Be Military

and That the Only Viable Settlement

Is the Secular Democratic State in Pales¬

tine1

Damascus, Mid-March, 1971

Q. And now what is the solution for Palestine? You must have a plan because Israel is not a new

factor, something that has happened suddenly; it has been a cancer in our body for twenty-three years.

A. The only solution is fighting.

Q. And after the fighting? A. The unified secular democratic state

for all religions—Muslim, Jewish and Chris¬ tian.

Q. Fateh’s theory?

A. Exactly.

Qj And the other Palestinian state—the minia¬ ture state that the great powers are fashioning for us?

A. We do not accept it.

Qj And an international force? A. We have not heard of it officially, but

when we do hear we shall be against it. It would be another occupation.

Qj And the United Nations resolution of No¬ vember 22, 1967?

A. It is marginal and not in the interests of the Arab people.

Qj Is it true that America does not want the

1 Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text of Assad’s interview, al-Nahar (Beirut), March 17, 1971.

Suez Canal reopened, so as to stop arms reaching Vietnam and Southeast Asia?

A. When America thinks about the Mid¬ dle East, it thinks exclusively of the interests of Israel.

Qj Do you think that the Russians and the

Americans have agreed on some solution? Or

that the Arabs are the victims of the conflict between them?

A. I do not think that there can be any agreement between the Soviets and America on the Arab problem, because their differences are fundamental and essential in this field.

The U.S.S.R. is a friendly country that adopts a just attitude to the Arabs, and gives us support. The United States is the friend of Israel, and gives it more than support. I think that the U.S.S.R. is striving at the

international level to reach a just solution for the Arab problem.

Qj Your term of office started with a journey to Russia. What was the secret of that journey? To settle accounts, to discharge an obligation, or what?

A. My journey to the U.S.S.R. was a step along the course we embarked on a long time

ago, the course of strengthening the friendship between us. Between the U.S.S.R. and Syria there are relations based on mutual respect. Our visit was successful.

Qj New arms? Loans to be repaid by instal¬ ments?

A. The U.S.S.R. constantly gives us valu¬ able support in all fields—economic and military aid.

Qj Do you believe that America is unable to exert pressure on Israel? Or that it is unwilling to do so?

A. America is a country that is capable —more than capable—of making Israel do what it wants. But it is obviously in America’s interest that Israel should maintain its su¬ periority over the Arabs and, consequently, that Israel should retain the territory it has occupied, and occupy further territory too. As an Arab citizen I say that America is mistaken in this course of action and that it is not in its interests to stand by Israel.

ARAB WORLD 415

295

Cable from Palestine Liberation Or¬ ganization Central Committee Chair¬ man Arafat (Abu Anunar) Calling on Arab Heads of State To Intervene To Halt New Fighting Between Palestinians and Government Forces in Jordan1

March 28, 1971

Greetings from the revolution. The Jordanian authorities have started in

Irbid, and before that in Mafraq, a new massacre of our people and the refugees in the camps; they are now carrying out an abomi¬ nable new operation of coercion and violation in steadfast Irbid, and the plan has started to operate everywhere and in all directions.

The situation is grave. Shoulder your responsibility to prevent the annihilation of our people who are faced with injustice and oppression in the occupied territory and Jordan. There can be no doubt that what is happening in Irbid and elsewhere is a brutal operation intended to wipe out and annihilate our refugees especially in view of the fact that the town has been in the grip of security men for months; there is no commando base there, and the arms of the militia have been deposited in six places in the town.

We call on you to stop this terrible blood¬ shed and continuing massacre.

296

Statement Issued by the Provisional Regional Command of the Baath Party (Syria), Announcing That Events in Jordan Indicate Intentions To Liquidate the Palestine Resistance2

Damascus, March 29, 1971

For the third successive day the Jordanian authorities continue firing at the Resistance groups and the masses of the Arab Palestinian

1 Translated from the Arabic text of Arafat’s cable, Fateh (n,.p.), March 30, 1971.

2 Text of Baath Provisional Regional Command state¬

ment as broadcast on Damascus Home Service in

people. This shelling of the Resistance bases and the Palestinian camps is taking place while the Jordanian authorities are issuing statements about their concern for the Resist¬ ance and their efforts to put an end to clashes and bloodshed.

The Ba’th Party Provisional Regional Com¬ mand in Syria, which is following the situation with great concern and keeping close track of the events, and which is eager to see an immediate end to bloodshed, thereby saving every Arab resource for the battle, announces to the Arab nation that the events in Jordan —resulting from contrived clashes with the Resistance and continuous shelling of both the Resistance bases and the Palestine revolu¬ tion’s masses—indicate intentions to liquidate the Resistance movement.

The Ba’th Party, which from the very beginning has regarded the Palestine Resis¬ tance movement as a practical expression of our Arab Palestinian people’s rejection of the reality of homelessness and extermination, and a basic element in the battle of destiny between the Arabs and their invading enemy, considers it its primary duty to continue supporting the Resistance movement and protecting it from every attempt at liquidation and extermination. While appealing to all Arabs to move rapidly to put an end to these side-battles which benefit only the enemy, we declare that our Party— the Ba’th Party— will remain the strong supporter of the Resistance and the Palestine revolution, and will give it all assistance to protect its existence and enable it to perform its duties in the occupied Arab territory.

The Party and its revolution in Syria, while reserving for themselves freedom of action to guarantee the Resistance’s con¬ tinuation, support and protection, is pre¬

pared to make evety effort to achieve imple¬ mentation of the provision of the Cairo agreement by all the parties concerned. Long live the Arab Palestine Resistance. Glory and immortality for our noble martyrs.

Arabic; English translation in BBC Monitoring Service, Summary of World Broadcasts, ME/3648/A/8—A/9; re¬

printed by permission.


297

Statements on the Clashes Between Jordanian Security Forces and Palestine Commandos Made to the Chamber of Deputies by Premier al-Tall of Jordan1

Amman, March 29, 1971

As is well known, we concluded a series of agreements with the [P.L.O.] Central Com¬ mittee, which has implemented some but not others.

More than twenty days ago minor prob¬ lems arose, especially in the city of Irbid and in the eastern quarters of Amman. The Liaison Office followed up these problems

and tried to solve them gradually. The reason for employing this method rather

than that of force is obvious, for those who caused these problems were a few dozen, or at the most a few hundred, so in our view it was sounder to deal with them by persuasion and constant pressure rather than by the use of force.

The lies, exaggerations and speeches you hear from certain quarters have become only too familiar to us, but they are all belied by the facts. Any citizen of this country can go to Irbid and find out that what has been said

about the massacre of Irbid and the shelling of the refugee camps is all lies and slanders.

Our problem, in fact, is with our brother Arabs who, for one reason or another, believe one side without taking the trouble to verify the facts. What our brother Arabs ignore is that according to the agreements concluded, it is forbidden for armed men to be in the towns and villages.

When a bomb is thrown, a rocket is fired or explosives are let off, the security forces take action to restore security, and what those who make speeches against us forget is that


al-Tall’s speech, al-Dustur (Amman), March 30, 1971.

Premier al-Tall made many of the same points in an

interview, conducted by Edouard Saab, published

in French in Le Monde, April 7, 1971, pp. 1, 2.

these explosives are forbidden in towns,

villages and camps; to my knowledge, none

of our Arab brothers will tolerate rocket or bomb attacks on police posts. This has been a continuous problem for two weeks, and when the security forces take action to deal with an

incident it is said that the intention is to wipe

out the Palestinian people and destroy com¬

mando action. If we really wanted to destroy commando

action we could do so, and for five months

I, as the one responsible, have put up with criticism from you and others; I have put up with it with the intention of maintaining

commando action. If we wanted to finish

with commando action, it would be ended in a

matter of hours. Commando action creates no military problem for us, but we have been patient'So as to give it the chance to follow the right course. But in Irbid things went too far, and as a state we can no longer endure attacks on police posts and assaults on security men. So I gave orders to the

Irbid garrison to reinforce the security forces in the town.

It is clear to me that it was not only a matter of infringing the security of the town, but also a conspiracy against the state and against commando action itself, and this drew the

commandos into clashes with the army. We are much more concerned about com¬

mando action than are those who make fiery speeches.

When the conspiracy failed the pressure on us was turned into information pressure

and into a war of rumors about the economy and other things. We have put an end to all these conspiracies, and this country will never be brought to its knees so long as we have a single shot to fire.

On the other hand, the Central Committee is not completely in control, and there is no quarter with effective influence that we can deal with in this matter. After the Irbid incidents we were told that such and such a quarter was the cause of the problem, and you know what that quarter did.

As I said, it is a simple matter of providing the country with security and stability, for no country in the world can agree to the

ARAB WORLD 417

holding of armed demonstradons, and no country in the world can allow its economy to be subjected to shocks.

For a month we have been asking for four killers who committed the crime of killing an official of the Premier’s Office; the Central Committee has the information relative to this incident, and no self-respecting govern¬ ment can allow known killers to go untried.

I know of no military establishment in the world that has borne such provocations as this army or such brazen propaganda, but it will continue to be a steadfast fortress unmoved by the croaking of frogs.

This, in brief, is what we are facing. We have surmounted all the conspiracies, and we are ready to face new ones. We have survived the stage of weakened resolution.

Whatever government [we have] in this country is a national government if our people are content with it; and this has nothing to do with the temperament of any particular group. We do not want to quarrel with our brothers, but at the same time we do not want to return to our former sub¬ servience.

We now have no security problems with the exception of certain areas of Amman. These we shall deal with after allowing them as long a time as possible, and we shall try to deal with them as kindly as possible.

298

Statement Issued by the U.A.R. National Assembly Reaffirming Egyptian Deter¬ mination To Preserve National Sover¬ eignty and the Rights of the People of

Palestine1


The National Assembly is following with the greatest concern our present fateful situa¬ tion and the events that are taking place from day to day. The thoughts of its members are with the working forces of our people wherever

1 Translated from the Arabic text of the statement,

al-Anwar (Beirut), March 30, 1971.

they are engaged in their daily task of building and strengthening our socialist society and preparing with all their strength for its protection and for the battle of liberation. The Assembly has every hope and confidence in our armed forces which it regards as the symbol of determination to protect our social¬ ist society and as the instrument of the battle, in which the people stand behind them, for the liberation of our territory. It therefore resolves the following:

1. It affirms the support of the Assembly and the whole people for the statement and affirmation of President Anwar Sadat, the successor of the great leader Abdel Nasser, that under no circumstances shall we relin¬ quish a single inch of our territory or a grain of our soil, whatever the circumstances and whatever battles this involves, and that there shall be no question of relinquishing or bargaining over the rights of the people of Palestine.

2. We shall never accept, under any cir¬ cumstances, the demilitarization of Sinai, and the Assembly believes that any idea of making Sinai a demilitarized zone is an attempt to destroy the sovereignty of Egypt and its territories, to place Egypt, its people, its territory and all it represents as a center for Arab liberation at the mercy and under the control of Israel, and to pave the way for Israel so that it may in the future gradually realize its expansionist policy in Arab terri¬ tories, which policy the Israeli leaders are constantly reiterating. As well as rejecting the above, the Assembly affirms that what President Anwar Sadat has declared in this connection fully expresses the views of the whole people.

3. While expressing the people’s belief in the inevitability of the battle to liberate the territory, whatever the cost and however great the sacrifices, the Assembly confirms what our command has said to the effect that in this battle we must rely on ourselves, on our own will and on our own calculations. It also expresses it conviction that the United States, which sends Phantoms to Israel could, if it wished, exert pressure on Israel, whereas, on the contrary, it is allowing itself to be


subjected to pressure on the part of Israel, which insists on winning the fruits of aggres¬ sion.

This strengthens our people’s belief in the inevitability of the battle and makes them, in the light of the exigencies of history, increase their caution ana vigilance and redouble their efforts for the battle of liberation and for the protection of socialism.

299

Statements by President Boumedienne of Algeria Noting That Israel Still Holds the Territories Occupied in 1967

and Reiterating Algeria’s Position That the Solution Lies in Armed Struggle, Included in an Address to the Congress of Municipal Councils1

Algiers, March 29, 1971

All these causes are linked with one another; they are just causes, human causes which must be supported, there must be struggle for these causes until the day comes when victory is won. As regards these peoples, we may perhaps differ from some in our analysis of events, we may differ from our Arab brothers in our analysis of events in the Arab East, but when we differ our only motive here in Algeria is faith and good intentions. We said in the first days of the battle of the Arab East that the only solution, for which there is no alternative, is struggle, fighting and sacrifice until the Palestinian people recover their rights and the Arabs recover their honor. But since then, brothers, Algeria has been accused of adopting an extremist attitude, of not taking local situations into account, even of overbidding. But what is the bitter truth, what is the situation today? Has the situation changed after four years? Have the Palestinian people recovered their rights? Have the Arabs recovered their


Boumedienne’s speech to the Fifth Congress of Muni¬

cipal Council Chairmen, al-Shaab (Algiers), March

30,1971.

honor? Have they liberated their territories? These questions answer themselves, and the answer, of course, is No. The answer is that the Zionists are still occupying the places they took by force in 1967—this is the truth which remains unchanged. It may be said that we have convinced world public opinion, but the Arab territories, Palestine and Jerusa¬ lem will never be liberated, either tomorrow or the day after tomorrow, by world public opinion. The history of all peoples that have been liberated and the painful situation in which many peoples are living today prove this. The resolutions on the people of South Africa, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations with a nearly over¬ whelming majority, have not been applied, nor has the 1967 resolution [on the Middle East], even though the Arabs, headed by the Palestinians, regard it as unjust.

And what about the Security Council resolution on the Holy City (Jerusalem) calling on Israel not to Judaize Jerusalem? It has not been implemented. That is why yesterday, brothers, we said that the lesson of the defeat must be learned courageously and remorselessly, if this is necessary to the confrontation of this grave situation which the whole of the Arab nation is passing through. We called for this yesterday because we believe that it is the only solution, and we called for the battle to be comprehensive in the economic, military and cultural fields, in all fields, so that we may experience a resurrection when we come out of this battle. Then attempts were made at one summit meeting after another, at one ministers’ meeting after another, but the lesson was not learned. When we said this, it resulted in our people and our country being criticized on many occasions by our Arab brothers and our allies, but did we mean any particular country by this analysis? No. Our only object in this analysis, and the political line which the country has followed as regards the problem of the Arab East for four years—- our only object has been the higher interests of the Arab nation and the interests of the people of Palestine.

ARAB WORLD 419

We have said before now that we could offer a policy, but are the governments concerned capable of going along with us in this policy? I am doubtful of this, for the simple reason that many of the governments have strong and organic links with those who created Israel. Some of these govern¬ ments have vast sums of money in the banks of Britain, America and Europe, but at the service of what? Is this money at the service of the Arab economy? Or the Arab revival? No, it is at the service of foreign economies. Let us take an example of those governments which we say are organically linked with the colonialist countries—the government of Amman, which America has decided to protect, just as it protects the government of Tel Aviv, and is ready to go to war to protect the Hashemite throne.

Is it through these people that the Arabs will be victorious over Israel, over their enemies ?

We should be deceiving ourselves, our people and history if we believed this, when we have seen, we have experienced as Arab freedom fighters such massacres as those carried out by the Jordanian army on the Palestinians—massacres which the Palestin¬ ians admit were worse than any they have experienced at the hands of the Zionists. A government like this is still talking in the name of the Arabs and Arabism, and as long as this goes on the Arabs will never win. Thou¬ sands of people were massacred; guns and tanks attacked camps. As the Arab poet says: “A mighty lion, but in war an ostrich.” They are as brave as lions only against the defenseless Palestinian refugees, but yesterday they did not die in Jerusalem, they did not die for the West Bank, and whatever the mouthpieces of colonialism may say, statistics prove that there were not more than two hundred casualties in the fighting in Jeru¬ salem. The stories you heard in 1967 that there had been fierce fighting in Jerusalem— there is not a grain of truth in them, because if there is fierce fighting it leaves its traces in the country, as in Vietnam, but where are the traces [in this case]?

Brothers, we have talked of this and it is in our power to offer a solution for this

problem, but we are afraid that this solution will not satisfy everyone—it will probably not satisfy those who are most concerned with the matter.

They say that the Rogers Plan and the 1967 Security Council program can provide a solution for the problem. We say that if this policy is just a tactical move to gain time for building up armed forces and preparing for the battle of liberation, that is reasonable, as long as it does not go on too long. But if this policy is to be adopted as a strategy leading to the recognition of Israel -we cannot agree to a policy the essence of which is the recognition of Israel, and this is the point of difference and division between us.

Let us then differ and be divided, because

there is no Arab government, however strong, that can impose a specific policy on the Arab people. The 1948 defeat—there are lessons to be learned from the 1948 defeat, and if any of the Great Powers still believes that a government can sign an agreement to put an

end to the problem at the expense of the Arabs, we say it is mistaken.

For tomorrow another government may

come and tear up the agreements that have been concluded, and not recognize them. This is the Arab reality, and if it does not recognize the right of the Arab nation to sovereignty and honor and the right of the Palestinian people to freedom and sovereignty,

the solution will be worthless.


300

Cable Message from Palestine Libera¬ tion Organization Central Committee Chairman Arafat (Abu Ammar) Ap¬ pealing to U.A.R. President Sadat To Intervene To Halt Attacks on Palestin¬ ians by Government Forces in Jordan1

March 29, 1971

The situation is very serious. The authori¬ ties began a massacre in Amman tonight after the end of Irbid massacre. The authorities sent forces into the city in all directions. We appeal to you in the name of our people to assume your historic responsibility and to intervene immediately to stop the alarming bloodbaths our people are being subjected to besides what they are encountering in the occupied territory.

301

Statement by a Jordanian Official Spokesman, Criticizing the Cable Mes¬ sage on the Situation in Jordan Sent to U.A.R. President Sadat by Palestine Li¬ beration Organization Central Commit¬

tee Chairman Arafat2 *

Amman, March 30, 1971

I do not intend to discuss to what extent the claims in which Mr. Yasser Arafat has embroiled himself are false; it is enough for me to say that unfortunately we in this country have become accustomed—as have the Arab masses everywhere—to his infamous practice of manufacturing problems and then scream¬ ing and shouting for help for the revolution and the revolutionaries in Amman and Irbid.

Mr. Yasser Arafat’s cable to President Sadat contains allegations that are without

1 Text of Arafat’s cable broadcast on “Voice of Fateh”

(Cairo) in Arabic; English translation in BBC Moni¬

toring Service, Summary of World Broadcasts, ME/

3648/A/4; reprinted by permission.

2 Translated from the Arabic text, al-Dustur (Amman),

March 31, 1971.

precedent in political morality. He says that the army started a massacre in Amman yester¬ day evening, but everyone in Amman, in¬ cluding the Arab embassies, knows that this did not happen. It is quite obviously im¬ possible that the movement of military forces should not be noticed by people: it is not a magical operation that can be carried out secretly at any moment.

The question now is: What was the object of this cable from Mr. Arafat?

It is to be observed that Mr. Arafat’s cable says: “Our people”—meaning the Palestinian people—“are being made the victims of a blood bath in Amman. ’5 The only explanation of this claim is that Mr. Arafat is determined to smash national unity in Jordan by suggesting that citizens of the West Bank are being massacred. It is as if he were telling them that they are a separate group and that they should protect themselves against the other group, to enable him to smash the internal front, from which no one but the enemy will benefit.

If Mr. Arafat’s intention in so persistently making such statements and sending such cables is to justify his dereliction of his fun¬ damental duty, we should like to draw atten¬ tion to the fact that never in the history of revolutions and liberation movements have revolution and liberation been achieved in this way, and he would do better to deal with his weak points than to ignore them and try to justify them.

By the mere fact of saying that the revolution in Amman and Irbid is in danger he is accusing himself, because he is admitting that his revolution is in the Jordanian towns only, and not where it ought to be. We should like to know, as would all our fellow citizens and all honorable men, what is the secret of his determination to stay in the towns—for this, it is clear, is his ultimate object in collecting money and training men.

Finally we regret that, by believing such claims, the Arab countries are not helping commando action as they should and this can only perpetuate the deviations of com¬ mando action rather than help to set it on the right path. We say this because the Arab countries know the true situation, just as

ARAB WORLD 421

they know how seriously the leaders of com¬ mando action have deviated—or if they do not know, their embassies in Amman certainly do. Moreover, Jordan is not a remote coun¬ try in the Pacific; it is right in the middle of the Arab world—anyone who has doubts can easily come here himself to verify the facts before passing judgement and adopting an attitude that can only injure this coura¬ geous and steadfast country and indirectly assist the conspiracy for a Palestinian state.

We also feel compelled to ask why these voices that are raised in support of falsehoods and fabrications are not to be heard when armed men wanted by the law are closing our shops and killers are endangering the lives of our infants and children, attacking our guard-posts and stabbing our men in the back. Why are they deaf to the voices of our people who condemn these actions and demand that they be stopped?

We wish to ask them one question only: Would any of them accept that the law of the jungle should prevail in his country at the expense of law, order and the security of its citizens and its economy? Would any of them condone any of the anarchistic and irresponsible activities with which our country is confronted?

We cannot but regret these attitudes for which Mr. Yasser Arafat is responsible, and hope that he himself will remember that Israel is still occupying our territory and, what is more, every day provides us with a new assurance of its determination to stay in our territory. If he remembers this, let us hope that Mr. Arafat will once more start thinking along responsible and patriotic lines in the service of the cause and the goals of liberation.

302

Press Statement by Supreme Arab Follow-Up Committee Chairman al- Adgham Explaining the Impossibility of Continuing the Committee’s Work in Jordan1

Tunis, Early April, 1971

Eventually the Higher Committee found itself at an impasse. When I was convinced that there was no possibility of reconciling the attitudes of the two parties, even on unimportant matters, and when I was also convinced that the two sides could not agree on any of the provisions, I left Amman,

after having given both Jordanians and Palestinians many warnings of the conse¬ quences of a new escalation. I thought at the time that my task could be regarded as finished and that, in view of the way the prob¬ lems had developed, it was necessary to devise

another formula. This was because the Com¬

mittee, which had so far consisted of myself, as representative of the Arab Heads of State, and of a Jordanian and a Palestinian repre¬ sentative, had, in my view, done all it could. I therefore submitted proposals, the first of which was that a formula should be devised according to which the representative of the Arab Heads of State should act as arbiter. But the Jordanian government did not consider itself obliged to accept this, and in this it was acting within its rights.

Thus the only thing to do was for me to submit to the Arab Heads of State, who had appointed me as their delegate, a proposal in which I asked for the assistance of two more representatives of two other Arab countries, which would mean that the Committee would consist of five instead of three members. King Hussein, who was in London at the time, accepted this proposal, as did the Palestinians. However, I received a reply from only one country.

1 Translated from the Arabic text of the statement by

al-Adgham (referred to in some sources as Ladgham)

to the United Press correspondent in Tunis, as published

in al-Amal (Tunis), April 7, 1971.


Once the first difficulties had been sur¬ mounted, the Jordanian government made me feel that it only grudgingly accepted the good offices of the Committee, which in its view constituted a sort of tutelage which was incompatible with Jordanian sovereignty. In my view there is absolutely no justification for this reproach, which can only be regarded as ingratitude to the Committee and to the military observers who had assisted in putting an end to the anarchy that prevailed in Jordan and who had, against their will, been obliged to share in settling certain problems which, though internal ones, were of vital importance.

The fundamental difference concerns the destiny of the Palestinians themselves -what future awaits them within the framework of a peaceful settlement being reached, what role they will play should there be a war, and what serious talks they would take part in. All this has been neglected, both by public opinion in general and by the Arab countries. The important thing is not re¬ cognition of the Palestinians’ right to self- determination in the future, but that they should be allowed to play a part in forming their own destiny as from now. But instead of this the Jordanians started to keep a watch on their actions and movements and prevented them from taking any initiative on the pretext that this infringed the sovereignty of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. As a result of this, my mission reached an impasse, so I left Amman and submitted to all the Arab countries proposals to the effect that an arbiter should be appointed or that the Supreme Arab Follow-Up Committee should be ex¬ panded. But I have received only one reply, and Jarring’s mission and fear of a renewal of fighting have relegated the Palestine ques¬ tion to a position of secondary importance.

303

Statements by King Hussein of Jordan Denying Any Intention of Destroying the Resistance and Explaining His Position on the West Bank and Jerusalem In¬ cluded in a Speech to Jordanian Senators and Deputies1

Amman, April 3, 1971

We accepted Security Council Resolution 242 and continued to coordinate and co¬ operate. For our part we interpret the resolu¬ tion, as far as we are concerned, to mean the ending of the occupation of all the territories occupied in June 1967, and first and foremost Jerusalem. People have said, and it is true, that our position in Jordan is different from that of the other territories which have been subjected to aggression and occupation by the enemy. Our positions in the West Bank are military positions at which the fighting stopped in 1947, but as far as our brothers are concerned, theirs are territorial frontiers with Palestine. Our answer to this was that the line must be the line of June 5, if there must be adjustments then there must be reciprocal adjustments, and they must be very minor ones made with our approval. As regards Jerusalem, it is occupied territory and must be returned; without Jerusalem there can be no peace. Jerusalem which is ours, that of our fathers and forefathers; our presence in it was the continuation of a situa¬ tion that had lasted more than a thousand

years. The right of the Muslims to the city is clear, as is that of the Christians. When the question of internationalization was raised we said that this went back to the United Nations Partition resolutions, and if interna¬ tionalization was to be discussed at all it must be complete internationalization, and that if this was to be part of what we were to discuss we demand a return to the Partition


Hussein’s speech made at a meeting at the Basman

Palace attended by the Prime Minister, Senators and

deputies and other Jordanian officials, al-Dustur

(Amman), April 4, 1971.

ARAB WORLD 423

resolution and full implementation of the Partition resolutions, most of which Israel disregarded in 1948. We also said that our Palestinian brothers must get together. This is our interpretation of the resolution.

Our attitude is that there must be total withdrawal from all the occupied Arab territories, that the Palestinian people must obtain their rights in conformity with the United Nations resolutions. We have believed in these rights and defended them.

As for us, in the face of all the attempts to misrepresent things, of the provocation and questioning, and perhaps of a certain feeling on our part, we have said and we still say, that when all the Arab territory is returned and we liberate the people living in it, we shall let them choose what they want either to return to the situation we were living in before and which we were building up and improving, or to establish some kind of federation or anything else they should choose in complete freedom. I did not actually discuss this subject—by freedom I mean being free from expulsion and fear; it is neither right nor permissible that Israel’s rifles should be withdrawn only to be replaced by others, so that the people would be deprived of the right to self-determination. The day when the occupation comes to an end and the people are rescued they will be given the chance to exercise their right to self-determination in full freedom. This is what I have to say on this subject. This is our attitude—there is no other along with preparation and the build¬ ing up of strength, because without strength we can have no effect on the enemy. We frankly believe that to cast the blame on this or that quarter in the world was probably right. We must ask the various countries to adopt specific attitudes, but the essential question is here. It has been widely repeated in our Arab homeland that the state intends to put an end to commando action, but if anyone were to search for a logical justification for this allegation he would be unable to find it. Because we believe that force is the way to liberation of the territory, putting pressure

on our enemy, and making the world under¬

stand that there is a problem that must be dealt with and that it should change the

attitudes of certain countries, and since nothing we hoped for has been achieved, why should any man or any quarter in this country want to put an end to something that we regard as being from us and for us, and whose

strength is part of our strength? Has Israel so far agreed to implement the Security Council resolution [of November 22, 1967] ? Has Israel so far agreed to give us back our land and with¬ draw? Has anything we demand and seek been

achieved with this dispute between us and

some of our brothers? I myself cannot find the answer to this question, and I don’t

suppose anyone else can either. But most regrettably, all the conflicts of the Arab nation, all the conflicts of the world, have been introduced into this theater, to the land of the martyrs, and they are doing much

to tear us apart, as regards our efforts and our energies, in a way which nothing but the

awareness of the people of this country and the

genuinely Arab reaction of its sons, Palestin¬

ians and Jordanians alike, could stop. The letter we recently sent to our brother Arab leaders was in fact a continuation of the dis¬

cussion which was in the letter broadcast

a few days ago and which was sent at the end of last year. I profoundly regret and am

deeply pained by what is going on, by the

attempts to make this country a scapegoat, to bring impermissible accusations against it.

I referred a short time ago to the role that I think the Resistance could have performed

and that any resistance movement should

perform in the occupied territory. This role, unfortunately, as is being performed in this country itself, attempts to split national unity, the pupil being prevented from going

to school, the man being prevented from

feeling secure about himself and his wife if she goes out of the house, and about his son

and his daughter—a state of alarm and terror—and the soldier and the officer coming on leave from the front line—our bridges, our culverts, our oil refinery and our railways.

In the past it was the enemy’s forces that carried out the raids; now we ask what is the


reason and the justification. I want to go back with you to the period between 1948 and 1967 and recall how the enemy attacked remote villages, and what a fuss there was

everywhere because the army wasn’t there,

so that we were obliged to distribute our forces

all over the place, thereby providing the

enemy with the opportunity to advance and get what he wanted more easily in June 1967.

It is obviously the same thing all over again—attempts to wear down our strength, attempts to turn us aside from our training and equipping, from our preparation and

confrontation of the enemy in the most dangerous circumstances, at the most dan¬ gerous stage.

The situation on the Suez Canal may explode at any moment, it may explode here.

Once again I must reaffirm to all our brothers

that we feel that unless this country is ready

in the full sense of the word, it will be a very great loss to our nation. We are aware and heedful of this, we constantly call attention to it, but there is a campaign of misrepre¬ sentation and distortion of the facts and perversion of meanings being directed against this country, both throughout the whole of the Arab homeland and abroad. Because our enemy does not want to return to the lines he started out from in 1967, he and those who sympathize with him are trying once more to change the situation in the territory in his interests.

So that when the time comes he may withdraw much less than we desire and hope for—and there are many indications that he is making a plan that will be carried out at our expense. It is being said that we are dealing with the situation with violence. We have been unspeakably pained that we should have to deal violently with anyone in this country—we use violence to deal with our enemies, the enemies of our nation —but what we have to put up with, what every one of us has had to put up with is not mentioned. We are continuing to put up with a great deal, but there are limits, and I must say with all frankness and quite clearly that we cannot bargain over the security and stability of this country, over its laws and regulations, over the security of the

soldiers and the citizen- under no circum¬ stances can we permit this.

The situation that confronts this country is painful. Our enemy had long been planning to destroy national unity and to solve the problem on the basis of its being a purely Palestinian one. Of course it is connected with the Palestinians and certainly the people of Palestine are in the vanguard, and we are concerned that their rights should be fully implemented. But it seems that there is a contrary current encouraging such ideas and trends, at a time when the whole of Palestine is occupied by our enemy, when the whole of Palestine, in addition to other Arab territories, is occupied by enemies. Once again, the thing that I have felt for a long time is the fact that our nation is not doing all it could to ensure the outcome of this battle. It may be that for one reason or another people may find short ways of solving the problem and being rid of the consequences and the respon¬ sibilities. It pained me deeply when I went abroad recently and, as a result of the contacts I made, I realized that the talk about the state or the statelet or an entity, whether in the West Bank or in the West Bank and part of the East Bank, with the exception of Jerusa¬ lem or perhaps including parts of it, was extremely serious, and that Arab contacts were being made at international level—with the great powers in fact—in this connection. This was the reason why before I went away, as a result of the information at my disposal, I sent the letter that was broadcast a few days ago—the reason why I called again for a summit conference. We cannot imagine that there could be a graver situation than that through which we are now passing. I don’t know what the outcome will be, but I have always hoped and I still hope that we shall confront this with complete frankness in our Arab homeland and know exactly what is intended, and if any of our brothers holds other views, we will make them clear in all frankness, so that we may know the way and what it is like and only bear those burdens and conse¬ quences that it is our duty to bear, except here at home—you can see what the situation

ARAB WORLD 425

is like and how we are all living. Unfortunate¬ ly there are some people who like to stir things up from time to time and to create an abnormal and unnatural atmosphere, and the strange thing is that our enemies abroad, the information media that are hostile to us, to our nation and our cause, follow the same

line, say the same things, follow the same trends as some of those who are of us and ought to have been for us. During the recent deterioration we were also in touch with

some of our brothers; we prepared a letter and sent it to the Kings and Heads of State.

With our brothers in Syria, of course, things are much better than they were, and my brother went to Damascus and was very warmly welcomed by our brothers there.

On the same day a responsible person came

to this country, who was, of course, in direct contact with the Resistance and as soon as he

arrived he sent cables of warning to all

groups and sections of the Resistance, saying

that the state was after them in Irbid and in such and such a place, so that they must be

in the highest state of alert and readiness and

preparedness. After this action the only

explanation we could find was that attempts were being made to isolate and injure this

country, attempts to follow a course that could only be of service to our enemies and the enemies of every man who claims to be con¬ cerned for Palestine and for action on behalf

of Palestine. As for Irbid, things went on for 24 hours

without any kind of counter measure being

taken, until it reached the stage where people made such an uproar that the garrison

that was there was sent in, and the affair was

ended quickly and simply, and people were

greatly relieved. I was greatly pained when

I saw how low some people stooped to justify

certain actions. . . .

may be concluded without any kind of violence and that we may rid Amman of armed men and arms once and for all. It was something that should never have happened in view of all the agreements concluded be¬ tween us and them and the fighting should

have stopped in a very short time, for there certainly should never be fighting between brothers and relatives. Things have now got to the stage of attempts at sabotage in all parts of the country. As you know yesterday it was the refinery, the railway, and many other places—bridges, culverts, ambushing

of armed patrols on the front lines. Also at the Arab level, once more I repeat

that it is not a question of either a peaceful

or a military solution. There is only one

possible solution we can accept—the recovery of our territory, the rescue of Jerusalem and the rescue of our people. But un¬

fortunately the whole question is the result of the introduction into our theater of all

Arab and world conflicts, and these include elements actually linked with our enemy. The Arab leaders will have to admit this when we meet them and talk to them, and

all this demands that we should be on the alert, that every one of us should work in his

own sphere and cooperate in warding off the schemes being made against this country, against our nation and our cause.

But real attempts are being made by those

in authority to contact those in charge on the other side, and of course [attempts must be

made] by us too, as is always our way when there is one hope in a million that the position


304

Statement Issued by the High Command of the Forces of the Palestine Revolution Emphasizing Palestinian Adherence to the Cairo and Amman Agreements and Deploring Violations on the Part of Jordan1

April 4, 1971

Masses of our people, heroic revolutionaries: In view of the deliberate escalation of the

bloody fighting by the subservient separatist authorities against the members of our long- suffering people throughout the East Bank and against the bases of our revolutionaries provided for by the Cairo and Amman Agreements; in view of this deliberate escala¬ tion going on within the framework of an ugly colonialist plan, and causing the killing and wounding of hundreds of members of our people every day, it is necessary to state the following:

1. The command of the Palestine revolution has adhered fully and meticulously to the spirit and letter of the Agreements, and imple¬ mented all their provisions with a view to

1 Translated from the Arabic text of the statement, Fateh

(Damascus), April 6, 1971.

The Cairo Agreement calling for a cessation of the

fighting between the Jordanian army and forces of the

Palestine Resistance and establishing the Supreme

Arab Follow-Up Committee to supervise the ceasefire,

was concluded in Cairo on September 27, 1970. The

signatories were King Faisal of Saudi Arabia; the

Amir of Kuwait, Shaikh Sabah al-Salim al-Sabah;

President Nasser of the U.A.R.; President Qadhafi

of Libya; President Numairi of the Sudan; King

Hussein of Jordan; Premier al-Adgham of Tunisia;

President Franjieh of Lebanon; Republican Council

Member Shami of Yemen (Sanaa) and Palestine

Liberation Organization Central Committee Chairman

Arafat (Abu Ammar). (The text of the agreement

is published as Document 504 in International Documents

on Palestine 1970.)

The Amman Agreement, the supposed “final agree¬

ment” for ending the Jordan Civil War, included

clauses providing that the Jordanian government

would in no way work against the Palestine revolution.

It was signed by King Hussein, Yasser Arafat and

Premier al-Adgham in Amman on October 13, 1970.

(The text is published as Document 514 in International

Documents on Palestine 1970.)

saving the people and the homeland from a disaster planned by those who are anxious to kill the Palestine revolution and to liquidate the Palestinian people.

2. The Palestine revolution has bent over backwards and gone much further than was required of it in implementing the Agreements; this we thought would lead to the authorities curbing their defiance, desisting from their plans for liquidation and abandoning their

criminal intentions. But the exact opposite has happened; the massacres perpetrated at Jerash, al-Rusaifa, Mafraq and al-Buq’a, and the massacre in the town and camp of Irbid, were all carried out under the protection of the Agreements. These restricted us be¬ cause we adhered to them, and gave the subservient authorities freedom of action against our people and our revolution because they did not adhere to them.

3. At the moment when an Arab con¬ ference at the level of Heads of State and Kings is about to meet, the authorities continue to implement their plans which were drawn up by American intelligence circles; they are continuing with the imple¬ mentation of the remainder of their plans, as is shown by the following:

a. At this historic moment, for five days the heavy artillery and automatic weapons of the authorities have been shelling Gaza Camp and our bases in the Jerash and Jordan Valley areas, from the areas in which they are stationed in the Radar area and the Dair al-Layan areas. Every moment dozens are being killed and wounded in intrepid Gaza Camp, while at the same time the Zionist enemy is practicing the cruellest kinds of terrorism against steadfast and heroic Gaza.

b. The forces of the authorities are mo¬ lesting all our patrols and supply convoys along the lines of communication guaranteed us by the Agreements. This has happened for three consecutive nights at the entrance to Ramtha, where the authorities have tried to capture our supply convoys. They are also constantly molesting our bases in the northern areas, and the authorities’ forces have pre¬ vented access to sources of water to our

ARAB WORLD 427

revolutionaries in the Jordan Valley in the hope that they will die of thirst.

4. The authorities have so expanded their campaign of arrests and imprisonment that the number of those in prison has risen to thousands, although the Agreements stipu¬ lated that detainees should be released and that the persecution and intimidation of citizens should cease.

5. The authorities have dismissed hundreds, indeed thousands of Palestinians and Jordan¬

ians, both civilians and military men, in an attempt to place our people in such desperate financial straits that they would be forced to submit and surrender to the colonialist schemes aimed at the liquidation of the people and the cause.

Masses of our steadfast people, heroic revolu¬

tionaries : In the light of the above the following

is clear to all members of our people and to the masses of our Arab nation:

1. That the subservient authorities in Amman are carrying out a scheme of liquida¬ tion that is completely in accord with Zionist plans, and that they are determined to implement this scheme even if the revolution

goes further than adhering to the past agree¬ ments, and even if we make further con¬ cessions.

2. There is no guarantee that our people and our revolution will be protected now

that the agents have trampled underfoot

the Agreement signed by the Kings and Heads of State and all the agreements derived from

it. Therefore, faced as they are with this bloody and regrettable tragedy, it is now incumbent on the forces of the revolution

to resist, and firmly, in defense of the members of our people who are under attack and of our

steadfast bases, and to strike hard at all who

try to impede our steadfast revolutionary advance.

Revolution until victory.

305

Declaration of Support for the Palestine Resistance Issued in the Final Statement of the Sixth Session of the Central Com¬ mittee of the Socialist Constitutional Party of Tunisia1

Tunis, April 4,1971

The Central Committee fully supports the Palestinian liberation movement in its legitimate struggle for the freedom of the Palestinian people and for their self-determi¬ nation in their usurped territory.

It believes that the countries of the Mediter¬ ranean basin should continue their efforts to make [the Mediterranean] a lake of peace, an area of prosperity and a point of radiation for cooperation and action for the achieve¬ ment of peace and the safeguarding of interna¬ tional understanding.

306

Press Interview Statements by Baath Party (Iraq) Assistant Secretary-General al-Aisami, Reiterating the View That Armed Struggle Is the Only Means to the Liberation of Palestine2

Baghdad, April 5, 1971

Qj How is it possible to def ine the scope of

the battle in which the Arab nation is at present engaged?

A. The present battle is without the slight¬ est doubt a battle of destiny, because the ferocious attack which Zionism and imperial-


Destour Socialist Party Central Committee’s statement,

al-Amal (Tunis), April 6, 1971.


al-Aisami’s interview granted to the Iraqi News

Agency on the occasion of the 24th anniversary of

the founding of the Baath Party, al-Jumhuriya

(Baghdad), April 6, 1971.


ism are concentrating against the Arab nation is aimed not only at liquidating the Palestine problem, but, through its liquidation, at smothering and stifling the spirit of steadfast¬ ness and revolution in the Arab nation.

Q. Ever since the \Baath] Party was founded, its literature has always expressed the idea that the way to liberate Palestine is through armed struggle, and the truth of this has been confirmed by history. How can the scope of the Arab battle be defined in the light of the Party3s concept of our battle in Palestine?

A. It is now obvious that Palestine cannot be liberated by peaceful and political methods, because it was usurped by force and aggression, and what was taken by force can only be recovered by force. This principle has been confirmed by the experiences of all struggling peoples. It is not too much to say that the history of the Palestine problem itself confirms this fact more than anything else, because the repeated revolutions in which the Arabs of Palestine have engaged since the end of World War I would not have failed had not the effete politicians intervened and stopped the advance of the revolution so as to deal with the problem by political means and com¬ promise solutions. Therefore the commands of the Resistance have a great historical responsibility at this particular stage, when certain Arab rulers have brought the Palestine problem to the brink of liquidation. This responsibility requires of them that they should lose no time in unifying the forces of the Resistance in accordance with solid, serious and effective formulae for unity. They must also learn the lessons of their own cause, and take advantage of the ex¬ periences of other peoples and revolutions in the world that have struggled for liberation. The only way is revolutionary war, and there is no alternative to it as a decisive retort to effete solutions involving liquidation and to ensure the recovery of Palestine.

Q. The Palestine problem has brought the Arab progressive forces to the parting oj the ways and the revolutionary identity has beeen unambi¬ guously defined so that there is no possibility of its being confused with anything else. What is the effect of this question on the Party and its

relations with the organizations and regimes? A. Erroneous and exaggerated conceptions

of the situation before June 5, the concealing of errors and negative attitudes, the continued misleading of the masses by powerful pro¬ paganda, the elimination of their role, the imposition on them of tutelage and the fragmentation of the popular revolutionary organizations—all these led to the June defeat, which disclosed how false were the claims of the regimes to be revolutionary. These regimes which provided opportunities for the reactionary regimes and the leaders

who are up to their necks in subservience, like the rulers of Tunisia, place themselves on an equal footing with them. A truce was made between the reactionary and the pro¬ gressive regimes and agreement was reached on the methods to be employed to deal with the Palestine problem--the method of a peaceful solution, which is, in fact, surrender, and will lead to the Zionist entity being more firmly rooted and to the liquidation of the Palestine problem. This is why the forces of endurance and revolution had to lose no time in closing their ranks and confronting this policy, and to struggle obstinately to make these projects miscarry. In my opinion the Palestine problem is now the touchstone of all the forces, which will really disclose the extent to which they are revolutionary, because the methods, means, claims and slogans in existence before June cannot in these days continue to exist in the minds of the masses in the same form as before, the reason being that the problem has taken on

an unambiguous character and placed all the forces in one of two positions—either stead¬ fastness, confrontation and the adoption of the method of popular armed struggle, or advance

along the course of peaceful solutions which in fact means acceptance of the fait accompli, the perpetuation of the June defeat, recogni¬

tion of the Zionist entity, liquidation of the Palestine problem, regional self-sufficiency and compliance with the forces of imperialism

and reaction.

ARAB WORLD 429

307

Press Statement by Palestine National Liberation Movement (Fateh) Leader Khalaf (Abu Ayyad), Denying Any New Agreement Between the Central Com¬ mittee and the Government of Jordan and Demanding Full Implementation of

the Cairo and Amman Agreements1


Certain news agencies have said that the statement issued yesterday by the Central

Committee was the result of an agreement between the Central Committee and the authorities. We deny this and declare that there is no new agreement between the Resistance and the authorities.

We demand the implementation of the Cairo and Amman Agreements because we, for our part, have implemented everything related to them so that the Central Committee might not give the authorities any justification for entering Amman and carrying out a new

massacre of its citizens. We removed the small quantities of arms that remained as a uni-

1 Translated from the Arabic text of Khalaf s Statement,

Fateh (Damascus), April 6, 1971.

The Cairo Agreement calling for a cessation of the fight¬

ing between the Jordanian army and forces of the






President Nasser of the U.A.R.; President Qadhafi of

Libya; President Numairi of the Sudan; King Hussein

of Jordan; Premier al-Adgham of Tunisia; President

Franjieh of Lebanon; Republican Council Member

Shami of Yemen (Sanaa) and Palestine Liberation

Organization Central Committee Chairman Arafat

(Abu Ammar). (The text of the agreement is published

as Document 504 in International Documents on Palestine

1970.)









lateral measure, and not as the result of a new agreement, and we do not link this mea¬ sure with any agreement for the release of the detainees or anything else. This has absolutely no connection with the statement of the Central Committee.

At this very moment as I am meeting you, the authorities are carrying out an artillery

bombardment of our bases in the Jerash area begun at 3 o’clock this morning and still continuing. Their tanks are moving and, in

my belief, an extensive military operation is

going on in Jerash and the Ajlun woods. I should not be surprised if this proves to be the prelude to entering the city of Amman, as Amman radio has prepared for this with a number of trumped up justifications.

There are many indications that it is not a security matter. All the statements of Riyad al-Muflih, those issued on March 31, 1971, and those in the cable he sent to the Conference of Kings and Heads of State or in the form of the King’s message to the Kings and Presidents—all of them confirm that it is not a matter of security but of striking at the Resistance, a matter of whether it is to exist or not to exist. We know that many attempts are being made, including contacts with those connected with the authorities, to establish something to be known as “Honor¬ able” Commando Action, and to regard the Palestine revolution as being non-existent in Jordan. The reason why the Central Com¬ mittee issued its statement was to deprive the government of any justifications by which it might try to mislead Arab and world opinion, for there are neither arms nor commandos

in Amman. We declare that Amman is open, and any security forces can enter it. But in spite of all this, it is very possible that the Army may enter Amman at any moment, especially after the incidents that have taken place in Jerash and Ajlun.

What is required at the present juncture? The situation is extremely grave and may well develop at any moment into a civil war which will not be settled, as the authorities think, overnight, but will be a prolonged conflict. If the authorities do not withdraw and announce that they are prepared to

430

implement the Cairo and Amman Agree¬ ments, the massacre will take place; then civil war is to be expected and will come about. What is required is that the government

should announce that it will abide by the decisions, and this people must have a new national government which is able to imple¬ ment these agreements and all the commit¬ ments announced by the authorities, such as a general amnesty and national conciliation. These things must be implemented, and in our view if the government does not issue an official statement to the effect that it

intends to implement the Cairo and Amman

Agreements, things will get worse. If the authorities’ attack on our bases in

Jerash and Ajlun does not stop, it means that

the attack on Amman will take place and that

the conspiracy to liquidate the Resistance will

run its full course. We of the Central Com¬

mittee have made all the concessions we could, to the extent of being accused by the masses of

feebleness and treason. All this we have done

to avoid further bloodshed and a new mas¬

sacre. Further than this we cannot go. Let

everyone be responsible for the measures he

takes. We regard the attack on Jerash and

Ajlun, and the justifications put out by the

authorities this morning and this afternoon as meaning that they are going on with the implementation of their plan. Our Arab

brothers must hear us. Unfortunately the Arab meeting called a week ago has not yet

taken place. All the Arab countries must move, because the object of this operation is complete liquidation. We do not hold the Jordanian government alone responsible for

this, but also all the Arab governments that are unwilling to intervene to stop these

massacres.

308

Memorandum to the U.A.R. Embassy in Amman from the Foreign Ministry of

Jordan, Stating Jordan’s Refusal To

Attend the Cairo Meeting of Represent¬ atives of Arab Heads of State and Reiterating King Hussein’s Call for an

Arab Summit Conference1


In his letter to Their Majesties and Excel¬

lencies, the Kings and Heads of State, on November 25, 1970, His Majesty the King

called for the convening of an Arab summit conference and he repeated this call on April 1,

1971, in the hope that there might be frank and full discussion of everything that affects and surrounds the Palestine problem in all fields

and from his conviction that this was required

by the situation and the grave circumstances

through which that cause is passing.

Moreover, the Jordanian state is, for its part, meticulously implementing the Cairo and Amman Agreements and the agreements

derived from them as it maintains its unwav¬

ering attitude of determination to sustain

the noble Resistance of its people—that Resistance that is resisting the occupation which oppresses Palestine and the territory of several other Arab countries. It never has

abandoned and never will abandon this attitude as long as occupation, aggression, and tyranny continue to confront us, and

when they have passed away, it will never

abandon its determination that the Pales¬

tinian people shall exercise their right to self-determination, secure from all kinds of influence, pressure, intimidation and attempts to impose a situation they do not consent to by any quarter whatsoever, in absolute free-

1 Translated from the Arabic text of the memorandum,

al-Dustur (Amman), April 8, 1971. (Al-Dustur reported

that the Jordanian Foreign Ministry received a memo¬

randum on this subject from the U.A.R. Embassy on

the same morning.)

States represented at the meeting in Cairo were Algeria,

Libya, Lebanon, Kuwait, Yemen (Aden), Yemen

(Sanaa), Sudan, Syria and the U.A.R.

ARAB WORLD 431

dom. However, the Jordanian state rejects any bargaining over its laws and regulations as absolutely as it rejects any bargaining over the security of any of its citizens in the towns and villages or any part of Jordanian territory, or over the honor and safety of either the state

or the citizen. The state also totally rejects the claim that any other quarter can be more

concerned than it is over the shedding of a single drop of Arab blood or more determined that this blood should only be shed on the field of struggle in defense of the destiny of our Arab nation and the right of our Pales¬

tinian Arab people to recover all their rights in the occupied territory. Similarly the Jordanian state rejects any claim that any quarter whatsoever is more concerned than Jordan for honorable commando action. The Jordanian state also rejects any suggestion of tutelage over it on the part of any quarter whatsoever, and refuses to allow aspersions to be cast on the sincerity of its Arabism and of its sacred struggle, which the deaths of armies of martyrs have dedicated to a single, proud Arab people stationed on the longest line of confrontation which threatens both our Arab nation and its honor. The Jordanian state similarly refuses to bear the consequences of the blunders of the Resistance caused by the penetration into its ranks of all the conflicts of the Arabs and the world; the command of the Resistance is entirely responsible for allowing this to happen, as are certain other quarters outside this steadfast country. The state also refuses to set the honor of its soldiers,

the safety of the rear of its armed forces and its security men in the balance.

The Jordanian state wishes to draw atten¬ tion to the fact that Arab attitudes to Jordan, based on false claims or on the desire of some Arabs to shirk their responsibilities as regards support for Jordan, or resulting from an attempt to destroy its national unity as a prelude to proceeding with suspect and hostile plans, aim at creating a puny entity to satisfy occupying Zionism and to enable it to evade the implementation of Security Council Resolution 242 calling for withdrawal from the occupied territory and, first and foremost, Jerusalem. Faced with the continued employ¬ ment of this method, the Jordanian state adds

that it finds itself obliged to draw attention to the dangers involved therein to the Arab nation and its destiny; the Jordanian state also affirms that it regards this procedure as encouraging certain groups which live in security and order in this country to continue on their course of provocation of the homeland and its citizens, which is a matter that the state must deal with in a decisive manner. The aim of this course of action was to make commando action liqui¬

date and destroy itself through a clash with the state. After this the blame was to be cast on Jordan, which was to be held responsible for what happened, as a prelude to the further dissolution of the political and military posi¬ tion of the confrontation states in their con¬ frontation of the enemy, after which a start was to be made on the implementation of partial solutions which could do no possible good to Palestine or any of the other countries.

In the light of all this Jordan repeats the call of its leader for a summit meeting of the Kings and Heads of State and makes its excuses for not attending the meeting of the representatives of the leaders, some of whom are in Cairo. It believes that the atmosphere and form of the meeting can only lead to impermissible accusations being made against Jordan. Jordan holds these leaders responsible before God, man and history for such decisions as they may take, and calls on them always to follow the dictates of their consciences. At the

same time it welcomes any or all of them, or any Arab who will take the trouble to come to

Jordan to acquaint himself with the situation and the facts.


309

Lebanese Press Interview Statements by President al-Bakr of Iraq, Deploring, the Disintegration of the Eastern Front and

Reiterating Iraqi Opposition to Accep¬ tance of Proposed “Peaceful Solutions”

in the Middle East1

Baghdad, April 8, 1971

Q. Within what framework are Iraq’s relations

with Egypt, Jordan and Syria respectively to be

viewed? A. Our relations with the Arab countries

that surround Israel, are in all respects defined

by the views held by the ruling regimes of the Palestine problem and the Zionist occupation that has oppressed its territory since 1948.

For we see the aggression of June 5, 1967, as nothing more or less than an extension

and expansion of the imperialist-Zionist ag¬

gression which started with the illegal estab¬

lishment of the Israeli entity in our usurped

Arab territory.

We have always been concerned that our

relations with these countries should be good and fruitful, because we make a distinction between the attitudes of their governments

and the interests of the Arab people in those

countries. It is the established regimes in

the United Arab Republic, Syria and Jordan that define our attitude to them in all respects because the revolution in Iraq has from the start regarded the problem of Palestine as being the crux of its Arab and international policy. Consequently its relations with other countries are defined in the light of their attitudes to the Palestine problem.

Q. What is your view of the proposed union

between Egypt, the Sudan, Libya and Syria? A.. Our Party has always given its blessing to any serious step towards union, on con¬ dition that it was of service to the goal of the


al-Bakr’s exclusive interview, al-JVahar (Beirut), April

9, 1971.

total liberation of occupied Arab territory,

and that the people should be allowed to give full expression to their will, ambitions and aspirations, and that such a step should play its part in supporting popular armed struggle

and should reject all formulae and solutions

involving liquidation and surrender. It is on this basic principle that we establish

and define our attitude to the proposed union of the four countries.

Arab unity has foundations, conditions and safeguards that protect it from attempts at backsliding and separatism, and such a union,

imposed from above on the basis of axes, being isolated from the toiling masses, could only help the enemies of unity to strike at the

genuine concept of the comprehensive unity that is desired and which our people aspires to achieve on socialist, democratic and revo¬

lutionary foundations.

Qj What are your comments on the article by Mr. Michel Aflaq published in the magazine al-Ahrar in Beirut a few days ago, on the necessity

for immediate union between Iraq, Egypt and Syria, on the grounds that their respective regimes

are similar? A. Arab unity is one of the most important

goals of the Baath Party; it is the pivot of its creed and the basis of its long struggle.

The pioneer experience of union in 1958 taught us that there must be objective founda¬ tions and conditions that will ensure its success and survival, and that there must be no neglect of those safeguards that gua¬ rantee its continuation and prevent a repetition of backsliding and secession. Moreover, unity, in our Party’s view, must be based on the revolutionary masses and be guided by a popular socialist demo¬ cratic regime, which eschews every kind of claim to superiority, bureaucracy and domi¬ nation of the masses.

This is why we hasten to answer any call to unity which fulfills these conditions and can give the Arabs strength in their battle of destiny against imperialism, Zionism and reaction.

Qj What has happened to the idea of the Eastern Front? And what is Iraq’s attitude to it?

ARAB WORLD 433

A. The Iraq of July 17 threw all its weight and all its resources on the side of the estab¬ lishment of a strong Eastern Front under a single military command, which would be capable of meeting its national obligations

in full. With this end in view, Iraq stationed the

majority of its armed forces on the Front, providing them with the most modern arms and equipment and developing their combat capacity, in accordance with the slogan “All

for the battle.” But unfortunately, from the start the East¬

ern Front was confronted with all sorts of

fabricated impediments and obstacles which became more serious with the acceptance by some Arab regimes, of the Rogers Plan and Security Council Resolution 242, and culmi¬ nated in the decision, taken by the Com- mander-in-Chief of the Arab Forces following the Tripoli Conference, to dissolve the Eastern Front command.

The disintegration of the Eastern Front was a grave blow to the unified Arab con¬ frontation of Israel and her imperialist mas¬

ters, and a service to world Zionism.

Q. What does Iraq think of President Anwar Sadafs attitude since his speeches of March 7 and February 5 and subsequent new attitudes as regards

Israel? A. From the start we definitely and deci¬

sively rejected Security Council Resolution 242 and all the proposals, formulae and solu¬ tions based on it, because we firmly believe that they cannot lead to the realization of the

legitimate demands and rights of the people of Palestine and the Arab nation, and that, basically, their aim is to perpetuate the aggressive Zionist entity in our great homeland and ensure its survival which, in turn, would ensure the survival of imperialist influence and safeguard its inordinate and illegitimate

interests. There was nothing new in President Sadat’s

speeches of February 5 and March 7; they were a continuation of the United Arab Republic’s policy of accepting peaceful solu¬ tions. In rejecting all solutions involving

liquidation and surrender we are affirming that the only way to recover our rights in

full is the way of force supported by the shed¬ ding of our blood and the sacrifice of our

lives.

Qj How are Iraq's relations with Palestinian

commando action? A. The commands of the Party and the

revolution have provided all kinds of support to the Palestinian commando organizations, and made every effort to develop commando action and ensure its unification and inde¬ pendence, as being the vanguard of the Arab revolution in its violent clash with the forces of imperialism, Zionism and reaction.

In spite of all efforts to decry Iraq’s attitude,

our relations with the forces of the Palestine revolution remain normal, for the commando organizations realize that the Iraq of July 17 and its leading Party are the true allies of the sections of the armed struggle, and that

it has stood by them in all conditions and given

them every kind of support they have re¬

quested. The visit to Baghdad of the delegation of

the Palestine Liberation Organization and the discussion with the Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, indicate

how strong the relations and how close the

cohesion between our Party and revolution

and the forces of the Palestine revolution are

in the service of rejection and steadfastness in

the face of the plans to effect liquidation and to perpetuate the defeat.

Q. Why have the Iraqi forces withdrawn from

Jordan ? A. Our gallant army went to the front to

fight, in the performance of a sacred national duty, and when certain Arab regimes aban¬

doned the concept of the battle being an all-Arab one and proceeded along the course

of defeat and surrender, and when the Tripoli Conference adopted its resolution dissolving

the Eastern Front command, there was no

longer any justification for our forces- re¬ maining outside Iraq. We hope that our

forces may be able to perform their national role in the near future, when the logic of

steadfastness and liberation has prevailed over the mentality of surrender to the fact of


Zionist occupation. Our army and our people will respond to the call to battle as soon as it is sounded.

310

Statement by Chief-of-Staff Tlas of Syria, Announcing the Formation of a New Committee of Syrian, Jordanian and Palestinian Representatives To Effect

the Implementation of the Cairo and

Amman Agreements and To End Clashes

Between the Palestine Resistance and

Government Forces in Jordan (Excerpt)1

Damascus, April 9, 1971

... I met Jordanian leaders headed by

King Husayn and conveyed to them a verbal message from President Hafiz al-Asad. I informed them of his eagerness to preserve

1 Excerpted text of Tlas’ statement to the Syrian News

Agency on his return to Damascus broadcast on

Damascus Home Service in Arabic; English translation

of excerpt in BBC Monitoring Service, Summary of World

Broadcasts, ME/3656/A/3-:-A/4; reprinted by permission.
















on Palestine 1970.)








Document on Palestine 1970.)

the Palestine Resistance and the Jordanian

Arab Army and said the Arab nation’s interests dictated an immediate end to the

fighting among the brothers because continua¬ tion of the clashes could only serve the Zionist enemy.

I also informed the Jordanian authorities

on Lt-Gen. Hafiz al-Asad’s behalf that Syria was completely ready to co-operate with Jordan in all fields in the service of the supreme

Arab interest and for the prosperity of the two fraternal peoples. I found complete

understanding of the situation and complete readiness to co-operate on the part of the Jordanian authorities. At the end of the meeting agreement was reached on the for¬

mation of a six-man committee to formulate measures to put the Cairo and Amman agreements into effect and for their implemen¬ tation and complete respect by both sides. This Committee will be empowered to settle all problems between the two sides. Agree- was also reached that the aforementioned committee be formed in accordance with the following principles: (a) Two members, one of ministerial rank and one an officer of general’s rank, to be appointed by the Syrian Government; (b) two members, one of ministerial rank and one of general’s rank, to be appointed by the Jordanian Govern¬ ment; (c) two members to be appointed by the Palestine Resistance Central Com¬ mittee.

This morning I met four brother members of the Palestine Resistance Command in Amman. I conveyed to them the agreement reached between us and the Jordanian autho¬ rities and they showed satisfaction at the results achieved....

ARAB WORLD 435

311

Cable Message to the Representatives of Arab Heads of State from King Hussein of Jordan Asserting Support for the Palestine Resistance, Rejecting Arab “Tutelage,” and Calling for an Arab Summit Conference1


To the representatives of the Arab Kings and Heads of State assembled in Cairo:

We in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, King, government and people alike, along with the armed forces which are an embodi¬ ment of, among other things, the solidity of our national unity in all its unstained purity, which unite in struggle the flower of our youth and grown men, and are the hope of our people and our nation on the longest and most dangerous line of confrontation with the enemy.

We and everything we represent are all of us zealous for the right of our people to resist occupation, oppression and aggression wherever they beset us; this we regard as our destiny, and also the noblest and most sublime thing that a resistance, as it is directed against the positions of the enemy who has usurped and is occupying our land, can represent. Our zeal for the Resistance in this struggle is unbounded, and no one, whoever he may be, can surpass us in our zeal. For the Resistance derives exclusively from us and is of our very essence. In this connection I absolutely refuse, as do all members of our people, to accept any explana¬ tion implying that there are problems between two parties in our land for, in all truth and frankness I cannot conceive of problems arising between us and ourselves. Moreover, we have always been and shall always be the shield of the Resistance; we have been its protectors and provided it with fuel for the battle of destiny. And we regard Arab

1 Translated from the Arabic text of Hussein’s cable,

al-Dustur (Amman), April 11, 1971.

States represented at the meeting in Cairo were Algeria,

Libya, Lebanon, Kuwait, Yemen (Aden), Yemen

(Sanaa), Sudan, Syria and the U.A.R.

blood as being too dear and precious to be shed elsewhere than on the field of honor and of struggle on behalf of our loftiest goals and those of our nation, and in defense of the rights of all of us.

We believe that the occupation by the enemy of the whole of Palestine and of the other Arab territories usurped from other Arab countries can only be reinforced and made permanent by the repeated attempts that are being made to impair the sacred unity of our people here in Jordan, even before we have achieved our goal of liberating our Jerusalem and all the Arab territory occupied since June 1967, and before the total recovery of the right of our Palestinian Arab people to self-determination free of any kind of intimidation or pressure after liberation is achieved.

It pains us greatly to see and hear steadfast and struggling Jordan being constantly at¬ tacked and deprived of all the support and aid to which it is entitled in the battle it is fighting, a battle whose outcome will affect the destiny of the whole nation. It pains me, too, that there should be men who constantly make every effort to split and splinter unified Arab action in the political and military fields and in the field of struggle, and endeavor to rend apart our one people by introducing into their ranks all the conflicts that beset the outside world.

To all who are zealous for that which inspires our zeal we have responded and shall continue to respond in a genuinely and purely Arab spirit. The consequence of our response was the Cairo and Amman Agree¬ ments and the subsequent agreements they gave rise to. This was also the reason for continuous efforts on our part to organize the theater of struggle in conformity with the sanctity of the battle we are fighting. All this has been governed by a fervently Arab and nationalist spirit that is aware of the

magnitude of the peril that threatens us and our nation. At the same time we reject all kinds of tutelage and incrimination, just as we refuse to bargain over the security of the homeland, the safety of the national unity of our people, the laws and regulations of the land, our national honor or the safety of the


citizen. Nor shall we ever agree to bargain over the right of our armed forces, which triumphed at Karameh, to be appreciated and esteemed and to feel confident that their rear is secure. They are also entitled to expect that the people and all our resources will back them in the battles they are fighting and in the protection and succor they are providing to those engaged in the struggle, in the manner of the armies of their martyrs who have laid down their lives for the honor and glory of this nation.

All of us have appreciated and responded fully to the Syrian national initiative, for it is the initiative of one brother towards another, of one comrade in the battle towards another, for the coordination, organization and sound mobilization of all righteous resources in the field of battle and, with God’s help, this is our common destiny.

As for all that hinders our cause of destiny and the dangers that surround it, allow me, with my truest and profoundest respect for you, to affirm that the only way it is possible to decide how this problem is to be dealt with in the future is for all the Arab leaders to hold a meeting in a spirit of absolute frankness, after which they will assume their responsi¬ bilities to the full. For some time we have been calling for such a meeting, which is an urgent national necessity for the confronta¬ tion of all the perils and challenges.

In conclusion, things are proceeding as we, and every genuine Arab, wish that they should proceed, towards unmasking those who are tampering with our destiny and that of our nation. Throughout our course we have molested and challenged only those who challenged or injured us. It is mere hypothesis to demand the discussion of impending clashes in our territory, as you have said, were it not that hidden hands are preparing a clash with us in the service of the enemy; I beg that you will allow me to express my absolute confidence that steadfast Jordan will not be destroyed as its enemies and the enemies of our nation have planned and would wish.

Peace be upon you and God’s mercy and blessings.

312

Appeal for a Stop to Clashes in Jordan,

Addressed to King Hussein of Jordan

and Palestine Liberation Organization

Central Committee Chairman Arafat

(Abu Ammar) by the Representatives

of Arab Heads of State1

Cairo, April 10, 1971

The representatives of the Arab Kings and Heads of State now meeting in Cairo, having received with the greatest regret the reports of the recent clashes between the Jordanian forces and the forces of the Palestine Liberation Organization, and in the light of the concern of the whole of the Arab nation that the Palestine Resistance should continue its holy war as the noblest and most sublime mani¬ festation of gallant resistance, and on the basis of the Cairo and Amman Agreements, call on the two parties to put a stop to present or imminent clashes in order to provide an atmosphere favorable to dealing with the causes which led to the situation deteriorating, to preserve precious Arab blood and prevent its being shed in vain, with a view to reaping the fruits of the constructive Syrian initiative and to preserving Arab efforts and saving them for the day of the decisive battle with the enemy of the Arab nation.

We who attend the conference are confident that you will intervene immediately, from your position of national responsibility, to respond to this call without procrastination or delay, for we are convinced that war between brothers can be of benefit only to the Zionist-imperialist enemy who is preparing terrible plans to destroy Jordan as a base of steadfastness and liberation, and inasmuch as there are agents of this enemy who are creating incidents and trying to ensure that the blind strife continues, and from our belief that the cohesion of the armed forces and the forces of the Palestine revolution in

1 Translated from the Arabic text of the representatives5 appeal, al-Akram (Cairo), April 11, 1971.

States represented at the conference in Cairo were Algeria, Libya, Lebanon, Kuwait, Yemen (Aden), Yemen (Sanaa), Sudan, Syria and the U.A.R.

ARAB WORLD 437

the face of the Zionist enemy can ensure victory, as happened at Karameh, when honor was recovered by brotherhood in arms and the mingling of the blood of martyrs on the held of battle.

313

Declarations by the Kuwait National Assembly Supporting Kuwaiti Govern¬ ment Determination To Reject Any Pro¬ posed Middle East Solution Unaccept¬ able to the Palestinian People and Not To Provide Aid to Jordan in the Event of Continued Clashes with the Resis¬ tance1

Kuwait, April 11, 1971

Your Highness:

This Assembly shares the government’s belief that the aggressor state, in spite of its deceitful and misleading claim that it desires peace and intends to accept Security Council resolutions, is in fact making unremitting efforts, secretly and publicly, to impede their implementation, in the hope of realizing its expansionist ambitions by annexing parts of the Arab territories it has occupied since 1967. This is confirmed beyond all possibility of doubt by its continued refusal to recognize the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people. For all these reasons this Assembly fully supports the government in its refusal to recognize any solution of the Palestine prob¬ lem which is unacceptable to the Palestinian Arab people, who alone have the right to take decisions in this case. It also fully supports the government in its continued support of the armed struggle of this people, as embodied in its gallant commando move¬ ment in all the occupied Arab territories,


National Assembly’s draft reply to the Amir of Kuwait’s

Speech from the Throne read to the newly elected

National Assembly on February 10, 1971 by Premier

Sheikh Jaber al-Ahmad al-Jaber, al-Ray al-Amm

(Kuwait), April 12, 1971.

and especially in its heroic actions in the area of steadfast Gaza, to recover its legitimate rights in its usurped homeland. This Assembly likewise supports the government in every¬ thing that may lead to its adhering to this right policy, and calls on it to continue its support of the steadfastness of the Arab countries situated on the frontiers with the enemy. However, it must be understood that Kuwait’s attitude to the aid it provides to the government of Jordan must be clear and unambiguous, such aid not being renewed unless that government stops its war against the commandos and affirms its serious inten¬ tion of fighting the usurping enemy, so that Kuwait may not be accused of contributing to this bloody and regrettable tragedy. This Assembly has been caused the profoundest regret by the painful incidents that have taken place in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in recent months, and are still taking place, and which have caused, and are still causing the useless shedding of precious Arab blood at the hands of Arabs; thereby cutting every Arab to the quick and inflicting a wound which still makes their hearts bleed. We sincerely hope that this tragedy which exposes our nation to such danger will not continue at a time when we are in such urgent need of full unanimity and unity of ranks for the confrontation of any emergency or any new perfidious aggression on the part of the unjust and criminal enemy.

In this connection this Assembly condemns

in the strongest terms the attitude of the United States of America, which is one of flagrant alignment against the whole Arab

nation and the cause of Palestine in particular, and its support for the Zionist oppressor. It also condemns America’s general attitude to the problems of war throughout the world while her own war in Vietnam destroys her vaunted claims to love peace and the freedom of peoples. This Assembly furthermore con¬ demns Britain’s underhanded policy both as regards the Palestine problem and in the [Arabian] Gulf, South Africa and Rhodesia, and also the policy of West Germany. This Assembly therefore calls on the government to review its economic policy as regards these three countries. On the other hand this


Assembly wishes to express its gratitude for and appreciation of the honorable attitude of the government of the U.S.S.R. and its friendly people in their support for and solidarity with the Arab nation in its just causes, at the forefront of which is the just cause of Palestine, and the right of the people of Palestine who have been evicted from their country, though there can be no shadow of doubt that they are its real owners, having lived on its land throughout the ages. This Assembly also wishes to mention the attitude of France and the countries of Eastern Europe, the non-aligned countries and other nations that really love peace and really work to support peace, justice and the freedom of peoples throughout the world, for their under¬ standing of the just causes of the Arab nation and the just cause of Palestine.

314

Letter to Arab Heads of State from Palestine Liberation Organization Cen¬ tral Committee Chairman Arafat (Abu Ammar) Pointing Out That the Confron¬ tation Between the Palestinians and the Jordan Army Tests the Commitments of the Arab World1

April 11, 1971

I received your message and read it, along with my brother revolutionaries, at a time when we were engaged in savage battles in northern Jordan in the face of barbarous attacks by Jordanian government forces on

our combatants and revolutionaries. We have complied with the Cairo and Amman Agreements for six months and we shall continue to do so. We have complied with all we undertook to comply with like men, and we shall continue to do so, even though the Jordanian authorities have complied with none of the provisions of the agreements and protocols; on the contrary, they have con¬

tinued to implement their planned conspiracy against our people and our revolutionaries. The massacres, violence, intimidation and violations of the sanctity of the home that have taken place in Mafraq, Irbid and the Jordan Valley are yet another black mark against this regime.

Crimes are being committed incessantly and the plan drawn up by the American intel¬ ligence services and disclosed in statements made by American officials, and the arms and equipment that are pouring into Jordan have nothing to do with fighting the Zionist enemy. On the contrary, this military activity being mobilized against our people and our revolutionaries has been welcomed by the Zionist leaders who have expressed their satisfaction and their approval. All this shows how dangerous the situation is and puts all honorable men in the Arab nation to the test as regards their attitude to our revolu¬ tion and our people, who are being massacred and humiliated in the sight and hearing of our Arab nation, not only in the occupied territory, the West Bank and Gaza, but also in Jordanian Amman and Irbid, Zarqa, Mafraq and the Jordan Valley. The criminal activity has reached the point of our com¬ batants being prevented from crossing the river to fight the enemy in our occupied territory: Our revolutionaries going to and coming from our occupied territory are faced with fire from both sides.

Faced with this historic position, from their awareness of the greatness of the trust re¬ posed in them and the gravity of the events that confront not only our people but the whole of our Arab nation, our people and our revolutionaries have decided to remain steadfast in the face of this barbarous imperialist-Zionist attack; the least we can do is to die with our boots on. No one in the world can snatch this weapon from the hands of our revolutionaries, and our hands will re¬ main firmly on our rifles in all determination, faith and resolution.

1 Translated from the Arabic text of Arafat’s reply to a

cable from the Arab heads of state, Fateh (Damascus),

April 12, 1971.

ARAB WORLD 439

315

Letter from Supreme Arab Follow-Up Committee Chairman al-Adgham, Re¬ porting to Arab Heads of State on the Deterioration of the Situation in Jordan and the Impossibility of the Continued Functioning of the Committee1


To Their Majesties and Excellencies, the Arab Kings and Heads of State, Greetings and respects.

The letter I addressed to Their Majesties and Excellencies, the Arab Kings and Heads of State, and the memorandum which ac¬ companied it, on January 9, 1971, explained the position as regards the situation in Jordan and as regards the mission of the Supreme Arab Follow-Up Committee. The letter concentrates on the following two funda¬ mental points:

1. The necessity for the early imple¬ mentation of the recommendations contained in the memorandum I submitted on December 28, 1970 to the Government of the Kingdom of Jordan and the Central Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization.

2. The necessity for joint efforts to be made on a different basis from that so far followed by the Committee in the performance of its mission.

At the meeting I held in Cairo with the delegates of the Aratb countries on January 10, 1971, and also at the press conference I held in Cairo on January 11, 1971, I disclosed the conditions that I regard as essential if the Committee is to continue its activities to their natural conclusion. They were:

1. That the situation should be cleared up with His Majesty King Hussein in London, where he was undergoing treatment.

2. That a ceasefire should be observed in all parts of Jordan where, as soon as I left Amman, bloody incidents flared up, starting in al-Rusaifa and spreading to other places and going on until January 11, 1971.

1 Translated from the Arabic text of the letter from

al-Adgham (referred to in some sources as Ladgham),

al-Amal (Tunis), April 16, 1971.

3. That there should be speedy imple¬ mentation of the measures previously taken with the approval of both sides in accordance with a short-term time schedule.

4. That the activities of the Committee should be resumed for a specific period of time, that it should be expanded by the addition of two members representing two of the countries that signed the Cairo Agree¬ ment, and that both sides should undertake to facilitate the performance of its task.

These proposals were submitted to His Majesty King Hussein ibn Talal in the course of my second meeting with him in London on Thursday, January 1, 1971. He accepted them, promising to assist in their implemen¬ tation as soon as he returned to Jordan.

On January 13, 1971, agreement was reached between the Jordanian and Pales¬ tinian parties, after discussions lasting two days, during which they reached temporary solutions for the various problems which had so far been impossible to settle. A feature of this agreement was the revival of a liaison Office with the task of supervising and facili¬ tating all the measures stipulated by the provisions of the Agreement. This office consists of representatives of the two con¬ tracting parties, but not the Supreme Arab Committee.

On January 31, 1971, I sent Ambassador al-Tayyib al-Sahbani [Vice-Chairman of the Supreme Arab Follow-Up Committee] to Amman to examine and inquire into the situation and to take the measures necessitated by the Committee’s activities, especially those involving the military aspect and problems of relief, and to deal with such current problems as might require attention. It was my intention, in the light of the information supplied to me by Ambassador al-Tayyib al-Sahbani, to write a final report to be submit¬ ted to Their Majesties and Excellencies, the Kings and Heads of State.

But it became clear that the agreement of January 13, 1971 was meeting with the same obstacles as had been encountered by the Supreme Arab Committee when it was performing its task, as a result of the failure of the two parties to agree on the objectives of the struggle, and of the continuous in-


fringement of the agreements that had been concluded.

It also became clear to me that the dif¬ ference between the two parties had become a matter of principle and that coexistence based on brotherhood in arms and unity of goals existed only in words.

The reason for this difference was that the concept of sovereignty prevalent in Jordanian government circles was set above all other considerations. It was clear that the privileges and exceptional treatment allowed to the Palestinian side by the Cairo and Amman Agreements were now only grudgingly ac¬ cepted by the Jordanian side, and it was no secret that the circumstances that preceded the September 1970 incidents were a major factor in establishing this conduct towards the Palestinians.

In my view these circumstances had al¬ ready changed, and there was no longer any justification for the Jordanian government to resort to such measures of repression in coping with offenses committed by individ¬ uals, even though they belonged to the Palestine Resistance.

On the Palestinian side, I had observed a feeling of lack of confidence in the Jordanian authorities, and especially in the security forces whether civilian or military. As a result this side was in a constant state of fear and eagerness to be armed and, in particular, to obtain individual arms for legitimate self- defense. It is this, in my view, that explains the difficulties experienced by the Palestinian command in removing their arms from the towns. This is to be attributed to the legacy of the September tragedy, and to continued fears of repression and various kinds of persecution felt by large numbers of Pales¬ tinians.

On the other hand, in coping with current problems, I followed the course of wisdom, calm, and humanity, striving throughout my stay in Jordan to contain the incidents that flared up from time to time so that the reaction might not lead to a series of incidents, and for a long time I called on the two parties to follow this course. But unfortunately the Jordanian government did not respond to my wishes; on the contrary, the opposite

was the case, as I observed. Interference in minor incidents soon turned into the use of heavy armaments, then to major military operations that infringed the Cairo Agree¬ ment’s stipulation of a ceasefire and the end of all military operations.

Whatever the offenses committed from time to time by certain Palestinian elements, I cannot measure the actions of individuals and those of the state by the same criteria.

It is very important that I should observe

that it was not possible for the Supreme Arab Committee to perform its task of stopping bloodshed and allotting responsi¬ bility for incidents because, on most occasions, it was confronted with a fait accompli.

I am still receiving from the Central Committee reports and complaints of aggres¬ sion by the Jordanian army against the commando forces or the refugee camps, and of obstacles being placed in the way of the Resistance moving its men and equipment or performing its duties. Then on February 1, 1971, Mr. Riyad al-Muflih, the Jordanian representative on the Supreme Arab Com¬ mittee, contacted me in Jedda and asked in writing to submit a report to the Kings and Heads of State of the Arab countries informing them that all the problems between the

Jordanian government and the Palestine Liberation Organization had been solved, that life had returned to normal, that the Jordanian armed forces had started to return to their positions, and that this operation was almost completed—which by no means accords with the situation as seen daily by the military observers. The incidents which took place recently in Irbid and elsewhere provide absolute proof of this.

The Jordanian Premier informed us of his desire to put an end to the Arab Ceasefire Observer Mission set up by the [Supreme Arab Follow-Up] Committee and to send its officers home in view of the fact that, in his opinion, the situation no longer required their presence, and that the two parties had set up a liaison office to perform the same task that the Arab officers had been carrying out.

Then certain restrictions were placed on

ARAB WORLD 441

the activities of the Arab officers, which made it impossible for them to perform their duties. I decided to reduce the number of these officers by stages and in conformity with circumstances, until the Arab Ceasefire Ob¬ server Mission-consisted of only five officers, in view of the diminution of the task of the office, and in conformity with the wishes of the officers themselves to maintain their honor. But this reduction did no good, as the Arab officers were forbidden to make any move in order to carry out inspection or control.

From all this it can be deduced that the Jordanian government is no longer willing that the Supreme Arab Committee should continue to carry out its task. It believes, as its representatives have repeatedly stated, that the Committee’s task constitutes an in¬ fringement of the sovereignty of the Jordanian state and an intervention in its affairs. It also holds the view that the incidents that flare up from time to time in Jordan are no more than internal domestic incidents which the government and the government alone has the right to pass judgement on and to decide what measures should be taken to deal with them. There can be no stronger evidence of the deterioration of the situation than the incidents reported in detail in the report of the Head of the Arab Ceasefire Observer Mission Brigadier Ahmad Abd al-Hamid Hilmi. In this connection I feel myself obliged to praise in the highest terms the integrity and self-sacrifice of this officer and his assistants in the performance of the delicate tasks entrusted to them.

In view of the fact that the documents I submitted to Their Majesties and Excellencies in January 1971, which contained an accurate description of the renewed deterioration of relations between the Jordanian government and the Resistance, with an explanation of the reasons for this deterioration, and a review of certain definite proposals for dealing with this situation, including the expansion of the Supreme Arab Committee and the reorganization of its activities, have aroused no response from the Arab countries which signed the Cairo Agreement, the task of the Committee itself is virtually at an end.

Also, in view of the fact that the task of the Arab Ceasefire Observer Mission is now frozen, I have decided to submit this letter to Their Majesties and Excellencies, the Kings and Heads of State of the Arab countries so as to acquaint them with the developments which have taken place in connection with the missions with which they entrusted me, and so that they may decide what is right as regards the deteriorating situation in Jordan, for the consequences of which the Chairman of the Supreme Arab Follow-Up Committee cannot bear the responsibility.

I trust Your Majesties and Excellencies will accept my greetings and respects.

316

Cable Message to the Presidents of the Tripoli Charter States from Palestine Liberation Organization Central Com¬ mittee Chairman Arafat (Abu Ammar), Appealing for Support in the Face of Attacks by the Jordan Army1

April 13, 1971

Revolutionary greetings. While you are meeting in Cairo, our

people throughout Jordan, and in Amman in particular, are being subjected in the most odious way to violence, terrorism, humiliating arrests, killing and torture.

The Jordanian army has entered Amman although the heavy armaments and the commandos have been removed from the city and they have done as they wished in the city on the pretext of security and internal sovereignty.

We are one Arab nation, and since 1948 our people have been a trust laid on the shoulders of the leaders and peoples of that Arab nation. The historical responsibility rests on your shoulders, and our people look

1 Translated from the Arabic text of Arafat’s cable to the

presidents of the U.A.R., Libya, Syria and the Sudan,

meeting in Cairo, April 13 and 14, Fateh (Damascus),

April 13, 1971. (For an explanation of the Tripoli

Charter, see Footnote 2 to Document 323 below.)


to you to support them in this terrible and bloody time of tribulation through which they are passing and in this barbarous war whose aim is annihilation, which was planned by American and Zionist intelligence circles and has been implemented, regrettably, by Arabs in heroic and steadfast Jordan. May God grant that at your meeting you decide what is good for Arabism and its future in this struggle for Arab civilization.

317

Final Communique Issued by the Confer¬ ence of Representatives of Arab Heads of State, Expressing Anxiety Over the Reports Submitted by Supreme Arab Follow-Up Committee Chairman al-Ad- gham on the Situation in Jordan and Calling for the Implementation of the Cairo and Amman Agreements1


In their eagerness to protect the supreme Arab interest and the unity of struggle in Jordan, and in their belief in the sacredness of Palestine fida’i action to preserve blessed Arab blood, and in response to the kind invitation of the UAR to convene a con¬ ference of representatives of Arab Kings and

1 Text of communique broadcast on Cairo Home Service

in Arabic; English translation in BBC Monitoring

Service, Summary of World Broadcasts, ME/3660/A/2

A/3; reprinted by permission.






signatories were King Faisal of Saudi Arabia; the Amir

of Kuwait, Shaikh Sabah al-Salim al-Sabah; President

Nasser of the U.A.R.; President Qadhafi of Libya;

President Numairi of the Sudan; King Hussein of

Jordan; Premier al-Adgham of Tunisia; President




(Abu Ammar). • (The text of the agreement is published


1970.)

Presidents to discuss the recent clashes between Jordanian and Palestinian revolution forces, the representatives of the Heads of State of the Democratic and People’s Republic of Algeria, the Democratic Republic of Sudan,

the Syrian Arab Republic, the Libyan Arab Republic, the UAR, the Yemeni Arab Re¬ public, the State of Kuwait, the Lebanese Republic, the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen met in Cairo from 14th to 19th Safar 1391, corresponding to 10th to 15th April 1971. The Hashimite Kingdom of

Jordan declined to attend despite an appeal to it to take part in this good effort on the part of the Arab brothers.

The conference studied the two reports by the Chairman of the Supreme Arab follow-up committee to Their Majesties the Kings and Their Excellencies the Presidents of the Arab

States issued on 9th January and 11th April 1971, and reports and letters the chairman had received in connection with the recent

events in Jordan. The conference expresses

anxiety over the contents of these reports on the Jordanian Government measures which prevented the committee from exercising its duties and suspended the work of the military office. These measures included suppression

by use of heavy weapons and major military operations blatantly contravening the Cairo agreement and what emanated from it. The conference condemns this.

The conference appreciates the nature and seriousness of these events at this momentous stage in the Arab nation’s struggle against the usurping enemy; at this serious turning point and in these decisive days in the Arab nation’s brave struggle against international imperialism and Zionism; and at this time when the enemy occupier is intensifying his

ferocity and is determined to devour the Palestinian soil and other Arab territory, liquidate the Palestinian people and violate


ment55 for ending the Jordan Civil War, included







ARAB WORLD 443

their rights and sacred shrines. The con¬ ference sees that everything happening in the Jordanian arena in particular is not confined

to this arena but extends throughout the entire Arab area all its countries in the east

and west. Any preoccupation or pretended preoccupation with anything other than the battle or mobilising in this arena for any other reason or under any other slogan at this particular time is considered an unforgivable crime against the entire Arab nation. Seeing that there is a plan to liquidate the Palestine

Resistance the conference condemns this plan and considers it imperative to foil it. The conference affirms its full eagerness to preserve the Palestine Resistance as the noblest mani¬ festation of Arab sacrifice and to strengthen it so that it can contribute effectively and positively to liberating the land and achieving the return of the Palestinian people.

The situation calls on the sons of the entire nation to meet their responsibility and face the fact that there has never been a comparable period in the nation’s history. It is imperative that they should mobilise military and fighting potential on the Arab battle-fields confronting the enemy, especially

along the Jordanian front. The conference believes that this is the truth which must take precedence over any side differences which may create unjustifiable hindrances in this mobilisation for liberating the usurped territory.

The conference considers the continuation of these events and the resulting bloodshed among Arab brothers and the exhaustion of Arab strength outside the framework of the historic battle which must be waged against the Zionist enemy will weaken the Arab people’s resistance and steadfastness in con¬ fronting the imperialist-Zionist challenges and expansionist ambitions.

In view of the above:

(1) The conference expresses its deep anx¬ iety over the bloodshed the victims of which are honest struggling Arab youths. The conference demands that all military oper¬ ations against the Palestine Resistance cease immediately to preserve Arab strength, in¬

stead of exhausting it in a manner benefiting only the Zionist enemy.

(2) The conference stresses the necessity to adhere to the Cairo agreement signed on 27th September 1970 at the highest Arab level. This agreement objectively stresses the responsibility of’ all the Arabs and their concern about the Jordan events which are directly connected with the cause of liberation. The conference also stresses the necessity to adhere to the Amman agreement signed on 13th October 1970, the protocols attached to it, and to the decisions and recommenda¬ tions of the supreme Arab follow-up com¬ mittee.

(3) The conference places on record the guarantee of the Jordanian Government and the Palestine Resistance to adhere to the Cairo and Amman agreements and the protocols deriving from the agreements to which"H.M. King Husayn and Yasir Arafat bound themselves out of conviction in the objectives and aims of the agreements.

(4) The conference notes that during the time the committees formed under these agreements exercised effectively their duties, they participated fruitfully in sparing the blood of Arab brothers in Jordan. The con¬ ference expresses full appreciation to them for the mission they performed. The confer¬ ence considers it necessary to create suitable conditions for the immediate return of these committees to perform their duties.

(5) The conference recommends that the Kings and Presidents of the Arab States bound by the Cairo agreement, seek to imple¬ ment it sincerely by applying the provisions of the agreement in full.


318

Lebanese Press Interview by Premier al-Tall of Jordan Commenting on Jor¬ danian Policy As Regards the Occupied Territories and the Palestine Resistance1

Amman, Mid-April, 1971

Q. Mr. Prime Minister, attention in Beirut and in the capitals of the countries on the line of con¬

frontation with the enemy is at present focused on Amman, not so much because of the crisis it has passed through with the leaders of the commando organizations as regarding what plans King Hus¬ sein's government has for the Palestine problem in general. What is the answer, if there is one?

A. Everyone knows what the plans are. Our attitude is that we insist on Israel’s withdrawal from Jerusalem and all the oc¬ cupied territories-—the West Bank, Sinai and Golan.

We are partners in political effort with the United Arab Republic as regards the Security Council resolution and the Rogers initiative.

Moreover, we in Jordan are the cornerstone

of the Eastern Front, and our political and military planning is based on and derives from this position.

As for the attention of the Arab capitals being focused on us, in fact, as I see it, some of the attention is being focused on planning and action; this is the right sort of attention, so the answer is that Jordan’s attitude is firm, as usual.

But it is plain to me that recently there have been kinds of attention that are not entirely innocent, which want to renew the clash between us and the Resistance and to incite such a clash. This kind of attention is a screen for conspiracy or is, willingly or un¬ willingly, following the line of a conspiracy to upset Jordan and, consequently, to upset the whole of the Palestinian cause.

In certain Arab capitals accusations are being made which have nothing to do with the facts or the truth, and which we can only explain as being aimed at renewing the clash and thereby destroying the Resistance or

1 Translated from the Arabic text of al-Tall’s exclusive

interview, al-Hayat (Beirut), April 17, 1971.

overthrowing the regime in Jordan, which would inevitably lead to the weakening of the Eastern Front.

You have been in Amman and had the opportunity of comparing the facts with the accusations that are being made by certain information set-ups.

During the last two weeks Jordan has passed through a stage in which persons outside have succeeded in instigating or manufacturing a clash with the Resistance. Things in Jordan have proceeded with the

cooperation of all the parties concerned and

the most important loophole allowing access

to clashes, disturbance and convulsion has been closed. This loophole was the problem

of security, stability and order in the capital, Amman.

In spite of this the course that Jordan will follow from now on will be that of concentrat¬ ing on its fundamental line as regards political effort, military mobilization and full coop¬ eration with the commando forces.

Q. I think that it is now clear that what hap¬

pened in Amman was the result of the attitude of

certain commando leaders. Now does the coopera¬ tion with the Palestinian forces you have referred to mean cooperation through the commands them¬ selves or through the Liberation Army? This is

particularly relevant in view of the recent calls in Beirut for the removal of the commando leaders on the grounds that they are responsible for the mistakes of the rapid escalation in creating the organizational cadres.

A. What happened in September and afterwards in Amman and in Jordan was a largescale conspiracy to liquidate the Palestine problem at the expense of Jordan and to accuse it of responsibility for the liquidation. I should not be surprised if Arab quarters have,willingly or unwillingly, played a part in this conspiracy, nor should I be surprised

if certain Arab quarters were partners in or paved the way for this conspiracy.

Jordan’s attitude, as King Hussein has repeatedly stated, has always been that the Resistance is of us and for us and that it is a weapon that is being used for us and for our cause. So if it places itself in the context in which it performs its true task we shall grant it

ARAB WORLD 445

our unlimited support, cooperation and pro¬ tection, regardless of all the differences and dissensions that beset the Resistance itself.

The duty of the Resistance is to “revolu¬ tionize” the occupied area. If it does this it will have our full support.

Qj Mr. Prime Minister, while observing the operation of search for arms and explosives in Wahdat Camp I saw slogans written on the offices of some of the organizations saying “Revolutionary violence is the only road to Palestine.” Some people think that this “revolutionary violence” has only resulted in the revolution feeling hatred for those it should not hate, and so was one of the reasons for the recent clashes. Has Tour Excel¬ lency another slogan for the revolution?

A. Revolutionary violence is a good enough slogan if it is directed against the occupying enemy. If it is directed against the base it is destructive, and this, most regrettably, is what has happened in some cases.

The revolutionary slogan is first the libera¬ tion of the land, and secondly, the conflicts arising from contradictions, if there are any, after liberation.

Revolution is action, not slogans.

Q. Do you think, as is being reported, or as certain quarters are predicting, that the enemy is capable of, or is actually planning, another expan¬ sionist attack?

A. I should not be surprised.

Q. Major General Tlas’s visit to Amman, and what it led to, led me to believe that there is now

a trend towards the problems of the countries on the Eastern line of confrontation being solved by their own people. Is this trend the start of a new line comprising resistance and preparedness for the dangerous intrigues of the enemy?

A. The consequences of President Assad’s initiative and Tlas’s visit and the proposal

for a six-member committee for the purpose of coordination and cooperation between the Syrian and Jordanian armies and the forces of the Resistance are a correct and practical trend. Everyone knows that we and Syria are the basis of the Eastern Front and that cooperation between us is essential, both for obvious national reasons and obvious military reasons. What we here in Jordan hope is that

this Syrian initiative may be the start of real and unlimited cooperation in all fields be¬ tween the two countries. In particular we pin our hopes on this six-member committee as a positive means of ensuring greater coopera¬ tion, benefit and support, not merely as a committee for the solution of such differences as may arise, although we sincerely hope they will not.

319

U.A.R. Press Interview with Chairman of the Supreme Arab Follow-Up Com¬ mittee al-Adgham Explaining His Resig¬ nation and Criticizing the Actions and Attitude of the Government of Jordan (Excerpts)1

Cairo, Mid-April, 1971

Q. Why did you leave Amman and return to Tunis?

A. I returned to Tunis because I felt that the government of Jordan did not want the Committee to continue. We were told this by the Jordanian Premier.

I returned to Tunis after submitting the necessary reports on the stages that had been implemented, and I thought that our one hope was the continued existence of the Arab Ceasefire Observer Mission. But this military committee was completely abolished, and the Jordanian authorities know who was responsible for ending its activities.

Q. What is the picture of the situation as regards the start of the recent incidents in Jordan? What happened in Irbid?

A. As soon as I heard of the bloody incidents in Irbid two weeks ago, I called on the Arab Ceasefire Observer Mission over the radio to go at once to Irbid and provide me with a complete picture.

1 Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text of an

exclusive interview with al-Adgham (referred to in

some sources as Ladgham), al-Ahram (Cairo), April

13,1971.


Some hours later I received the reply of the Observer Mission in the form of a cable saying, “We have tried to reach Irbid. . .but were unable to do so... . The Jordanian govern¬ ment prevented us.”

Once again I sent a radio message to the Observer Mission telling them to try again, and some hours later I received the same reply: “We have tried and been stopped.”

Moreover, we received reports to the effect that the Jordanian military authorities had forbidden the Arab Observer Mission to fly its flags on its cars.

I say to the Jordanian authorities that it was thanks to the Arab Observer Mission, which was formed in conformity with a resolution of the Conference of Kings and Heads of State, and with the approval of the highest Jordanian authorities, that we were able to put a stop to the bloodshed in Jordan after the September incidents....

Even supposing that the information pub¬ lished about the situation in Irbid was exaggerated—as the Jordanians say—was it not logical that the Jordanian government should allow the Observer Mission to go to Irbid to submit a true report on what had happened ?

Q. What is the position, then, and what is the way out of the crisis?

A. Now, after these incidents, I can truly say that anything is possible.

As a result of the interference with the activities of the Supreme Arab Follow-up Committee, I was obliged to issue my state¬ ment in which I held the Jordanian govern¬ ment responsible for violating the Agreements.

I did not submit a report but, being respon¬ sible for the Supreme Arab Follow-Up Com¬ mittee and for all the bodies derived from it, I did issue a statement to the Kings and Heads of State in which I called attention to the gravity of the situation.

The attitude of the Jordanian authorities to the Observer Mission suggests that much graver incidents took place in Irbid than were reported by the news agencies and much graver than were published by the Resistance. If this was not so, how can the attitude of the Jordanian government be explained?

To sum up: We are confronted with a difficult and bloody trial in which the cream of Arab youth is being sacrificed and

their blood being squandered for the wrong purpose.

Qj How do you propose the Supreme Arab Follow-Up Committee should recover its powers and resume its activities? Are you still in favor of the powers of the Supreme Committee being made

more extensive? A. The proposals you mention were made

in a memorandum which I submitted to the Arab Kings and Heads of State at the time of the last crisis.

But I believe that things have gone too far to be dealt with by my proposals. All the same, a search must be made for a new means of confronting this grave situation.

Qj How can the continuing bloodshed in Jordan be stopped?

A. What has happened in Jordan has not surprised me at all. I expected everything that has happened. To avoid a repetition of these incidents, effective and severe measures must be taken to confront the deteriorating situation in Jordan.

I said all this in the reports I submitted to all the Arab countries. In these reports I called on them to face up to their responsi¬ bilities to the full, as otherwise the Arab struggle in general and the Palestinian struggle in particular would suffer the cruellest tribu¬ lations. But unfortunately no attention was paid to what I said. This is probably what led the Jordanian authorities to go so far.

There is now a new situation. The whole affair must be reviewed and appropriate measures must be taken. All this depends on the approval of the Jordanian government. We do not have the strength to force all parties to respect the agreements they have signed. The essence of the matter and the goal are one, and we are agreed on them; but an effective and decisive manner of implementation must be found.

No one can bear responsibility at national and Arab level, if he does not have the powers and the responsibility to act. I cannot bear the responsibility for all that has happened in Jordan, whatever the reasons.

ARAB WORLD 447

Qj There was every indication that there were going to be incidents in Jordan. How do you explain all that has gone on between Jordan and the Resistance after the signing of the Cairo Agree¬ ment?

A. To sum up, I can say that I arrived in Amman on September 28, and we made every effort to devise a formula for coexistence between the authorities and the Resistance. And in fact the result was the October [Amman] Agreement, which was signed by King Hussein and Mr. Yasser Arafat the basic agreement regulating relations between the two parties. I can say that we restored calm, security and normal life in Jordan.

Then came the surprise. What I say is that the bodies that supervised

the implementation of the agreements did not take part in the activities of the conference of Kings and Heads of State held in Cairo last September. The least that can be said of the mentality of these bodies is that they were not fully in the picture as regards the immensity of the effort expended at the Cairo conference, to which the great leader, President Abdel Nasser fell a victim. They were not filled with the spirit that prevailed at the conference, and they interpreted the Cairo Agreement in a manner completely incompatible with its spirit.

I affirm that the Jordanian government has not complied with certain essential matters, although they were stipulated by all the Agreements.

Qj Has the Jordanian government carried out its undertakings to return the armed forces to their positions?

A. It is impossible to affirm definitely that it has done so.

320

Statement Issued by the Official Spokes¬ man of Jordan in Response to the Resolu¬ tions on Implementation of the Cairo and Amman Agreements Adopted by Representatives of Arab Heads of State1


Certainly the statement contains positive aspects, and these we cannot but appreciate for their positive qualities, for they are in harmony with our attitude, from which we have never deviated—our attitude of constant insistence on the necessity for the unification of Arab efforts and Arab forces for the con¬ frontation of the one enemy.

But most regrettably the statement also contains judgements based not on the truth and the facts but on a series of illusions and misrepresentations propagated by Mr. Yasser Arafat in a number of cables; it would seem that he believes them from the number of times he has repeated them, and they have also been repeated by certain Arab informa¬ tion media. Obviously judgements based on illusion, or conclusions reached on a basis of misrepresentation, can only arouse in the

1 Translated from the Arabic text of the statement,

al-Dustur (Amman), April 17, 1971.


ing between the Jordanian army and forces of the Pales¬

tine Resistance and establishing the Supreme Arab Fol¬

low-Up Committee to supervise the ceasefire, was con¬

cluded in Cairo on September 27, 1970. The signatories

were King Faisal of Saudi Arabia; the Amir of Kuwait,

Shaikh Sabah al-Salim al-Sabah; President Nasser of

the U.A.R.; President Qadhafi of Libya; President

Numairi of the Sudan; King Hussein of Jordan;

Premier al-Adgham of Tunisia; President Franjieh

of Lebanon; Republican Council Member Shami of

Yemen (Sanaa) and Palestine Liberation Organization

Central Committee Chairman Arafat (Abu Ammar).

(The text of the agreement is published as Document

504 in International Documents on Palestine 1970.)










minds of our citizens here and of the Arabs everywhere grief and pain at what Arab political action has come to, especially at the present stage, when it is necessary to assess things—all things, whether political or military—with the greatest precision, hon¬ esty and sincerity. If this is not done what I fear is that this improvised policy will once more plunge us into the abyss of a setback or a new disaster.

It is known that the Jordanian government and the Central Committee came to an understanding that all armed men, and along with them all their arms, with the exception of the arms of the Militia, should be withdrawn from Amman. This was four days before the conference met. Although everyone knew this and expected that it would no longer be necessary for the confer¬ ence to meet, certain quarters, headed by Mr. Yasser Arafat, insisted that it should meet, with wearisome repetition of such fanciful stories about massacres, confisca¬ tions and liquidations as have never before been heard in modern Arab history.

It is extremely strange that on the day when the commandos started their voluntary withdrawal from Amman by the hundreds, in columns seen by all the citizens and by the Arab embassies in Amman, the conference met to discuss what they called the blood¬ letting in Amman, as if the convoys of vehicles

leaving Amman loaded with armed men and explosives were a stream of blood which must be staunched. Everyone was amazed at their action, but the delegates insisted on holding their conference all the same.

As for the quantities of heavy arms, rockets and explosives that were taken out of Amman, and which were enough to arm a whole division, in addition to the vast quantities which were seized and confiscated—these were seen by the Arab diplomatic missions. Did the honorable delegates take into account the fact that the commandos were in posses¬ sion of these vast quantities of arms in Amman ?

When their conference met and they wrote their statement, did it occur to them to ask themselves if any of them would have permit¬ ted even a quarter of this quantity of arms

in the capital of his country or in any of his cities?

Had not the delegates received reports from their diplomatic missions in Amman on what they had seen and heard on Amman radio and television of what the members of the Militia were saying in Amman? Or had they not taken the trouble to read these reports? Or was it that the intention of the conference was to have no regard at all for the truth and the facts?

Jordan is commando action, because the commandos are Jordanians from both Banks, and from the gallant Gaza Strip, and they are our sons because they are our citizens, and no one could show more concern for our citizens than we do. The same applies to support for commando action: we support it in fact; we do not just boast of doing so, because this land is theirs and it is their base and point of departure. They have received and are still receiving from us all possible material and moral support, and we shall never allow any quarter to regard us as two parties, because we are they and they are we,

a single party united in existence and in destiny.

The people who are liquidating commando action are those who have persistently turned it aside from its basic task by political entice¬ ments, by unparalleled ideological misrep¬ resentation and for considerations which are no longer a secret even from commandos who take the trouble to ask what these men want of them, and why they want to drag com¬ mando action into the labyrinth of political dealing.

Attacking Jordanian villages, outposts and police stations in the North from commando bases situated in Syria cannot be represented as concern for precious Arab blood. The people who claim to be concerned for this precious blood are those who encouraged one of the parties to shed it. And is not the blood of our soldiers, our people and our citizens precious in your sight?

ARAB WORLD 449

321

Egyptian Press Interview Statement by Shaikh Zayid of Abu Dhabi Emphasizing the Necessity for All Arab Nations To Oppose Zionism1


Israel’s policy of expansion and the racist plans of Zionism are directed against all the Arab countries, and in particular those that are rich in natural resources.

If Israel has so far concentrated her aggression against the United Arab Republic, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon, after having usurped the Palestinian homeland, evicted its people, and established on its soil commun¬ ities of various races, this is only because in her expansionist schemes Israel gives priority to aggression and domination. If the Arabs do not cooperate with faith and sincerity to repel this aggression, disaster will befall them, as it befell their brethren.

No Arab country is safe from the perils of the battle with Zionism and Israel if it does not play its role and bear its responsibilities for confronting the Israeli enemy.

322

Proclamation of the Establishment of the Federation of Arab Republics2

Benghazi, April 17, 1971

1. The Arab people in the United Arab Republic, the Libyan Arab Republic and the Syrian Arab Republic have decided, on a basis of free choice and equality of rights, to establish a unionist state to be called the Federation of Arab Republics.


Shaikh Zayid bin Sultan al-Nahayan’s interview,

originally granted to the Cairo daily Akhbar al-Tom

and republished in al-Anwar (Beirut), April 18, 1971.

2 Translated from the Arabic text of the proclamation,

al-Ahram (Cairo), April 18, 1971.

2. The obj ect of establishing the Federation of Arab Republics is to work for the achieve¬ ment of comprehensive Arab unity, to pro¬ tect the Arab homeland and defend its independence, to build an Arab socialist society, to work for the liberation of the occupied Arab territories, and to support the Arab national liberation movement and na¬ tional liberation movements throughout the world.

3. The people of the Federation of Arab Republics are part of the Arab nation.

4. The Federation of Arab Republics shall have one flag, one emblem, one national anthem and one capital.

5. The form of government in the Federa¬ tion of Arab Republics shall be democratic and socialist.

6. This Federation shall be open to all other Arab states that believe in Arab unity and work for the achievement of a unified Arab socialist society.

7. The Federation of Arab Republics shall have jurisdiction in the following fields:

a. Establishing the basis of foreign policy. b. Questions of peace and war. c. Organization and command of the de¬ fense of the Federation of Arab Republics, including the establishment of a military command responsible for training and operations, the movement of forces between the Republics being by the decision of the Presidential Council or those whom it empowers to do so during operations. d. Protection of national security and the setting up of bases for ensuring the safety of the Federation. In the event of distur¬ bances, either from within or without,

The Federation of Arab Republics is the final outcome

of the agreement concluded in Tripoli, Libya on

December 27,1969 by Libya, the Sudan and the U.A.R.

This agreement, subsequently referred to as the Tripoli

Charter, provided for economic, military and political

cooperation among the original signatories. (An

excerpt from the joint communique announcing the

agreement appears as Document 462 in International

Documents on Palestine 1969.) On November 8, 1970 it

was announced that the three countries had agreed

to form a union and on November 27 that Syria too

was to join a “unified four-power command.” By the

time the F.A.R. was proclaimed, the Sudan had

postponed its adherence to the federation.


which may threaten the security of one of the Republics or of the Federation, the government of that Republic shall notify the Federal government immediately so that it may take the necessary measures, within the limits of its powers, to maintain security and order. In the event that the government of one of the member Republics is unable to ask for the aid of the Federal government or that the security of the Federation is endangered, the Federal au¬ thorities concerned shall intervene, un¬ asked, to maintain security and restore the situation to normal. e. Planning of the national economy and the drawing up of joint plans for develop¬ ment and guidance of federal economic institutions. f. Formulation of an educational policy aimed at building an Arab nationalist socialist and believing generation. g. Formulation of a federal information policy incorporating the aims of the Fed¬ eral State and its strategy in peace and war. h. Formulation of a unified policy for scientific research and coordination of the

organizations of the different Republics. i. Admission of new members into the Federation by unanimous decision of the Federal Presidential Council. 8. The following institutions shall be estab¬

lished in the Federation of Arab Republics: a. The Federal Presidential Council, which shall be the supreme authority of the Federation, and shall consist of the Pres¬

idents of the Republics. This Council shall elect one of its members president and take decisions by majority vote. b. A number of Ministers, to be appointed by the Presidential Council, to which they shall be responsible. c. The Federal National Assembly respon¬ sible for federal legislation, consisting of representatives of the popular assemblies of each of the Republics. Each will have an equal number of members, elected by the popular assemblies of each Republic. d. A Federal Constitutional Court ap¬ pointed by decree of the F ederal Presidential Council, composed of two members from each of the Republics. Its jurisdiction will

be confined to ruling on the constitutionality of laws and giving judgement in disputes between the institutions and authorities of the Federation and the Republics.

9. The establishment of the Federation

shall in no way affect the provisions of the treaties and agreements concluded between member Republics of the Federation, or between any of them individually and other countries, which treaties and agreements shall remain in force within the framework determined for them when they were con¬

cluded in accordance with the principles of international law.

10. Each Republic may, within the limits of its legislative jurisdiction, conclude trea¬ ties and agreements with foreign states, and exchange with them diplomatic and consular representation.

11. The Supreme Command of the armed forces in each of the member Republics of the Federation shall be entrusted to the President of the Republic or whomever may be designated by the rules and regulations in force in each of the Republics.

12. The Republics shall have jurisdiction in all matters not falling within the compe¬ tence of the Federation by virtue of these basic provisions.

13. Until a single Arab movement is established in the Federation, the political leadership of each of the Republics shall be responsible for organizing political activity in that Republic, and no political organization in any one of the Republics shall be permitted to engage in political activity in the other Republics except through its representatives in the leadership of the political front, which will include the commands of the political organizations of the Republics of the Federa¬ tion.

14. The proclamation of the establishment of the Federation issued in Benghazi on Safar 21, 1391 (April 13, 1971) shall be an integral part of the fundamental provisions of the Federation of Arab Republics.

15. The fundamental provisions of the Federation of Arab Republics shall be amend¬ ed only with the unanimous approval of the Federal Presidential Council and when, hav¬ ing been submitted to popular referendum,

ARAB WORLD 451

such amendment obtains a majority in each of the Republics.

16. The fundamental provisions of the Federation of Arab Republics shall be rat¬ ified by the Higher Executive Committee of the Arab Socialist Union, the Council of Ministers and the National Assembly of the United Arab Republic, by the Revolutionary Command Council of the Libyan Arab Republic and by the Regional Command of the Baath Party and the Council of Ministers

and the People’s Assembly of the Syrian Arab Republic before being submitted to plebiscite.

323

Broadcast Address to the Nation by U.A.R. President Sadat on the Proc¬ lamation of the Federation of Arab Republics1


Brothers and fellow citizens: I praise God who has accorded me the

honor of announcing to you tonight the

establishment of the Federation of Arab Republics, which the United Arab Republic, the Libyan Arab Republic and the Syrian Arab Republic have agreed to set up. This is a great step along the road to the greater unity of our Arab nation. It will provide immense support to the ability of this nation

1 Translated from the Arabic text of Sadat’s speech,

al-Ahram (Cairo), April 18, 1971.

2 The Tripoli Charter refers to an agreement concluded

in Tripoli, Libya on December 27, 1969 just after the

Rabat Arab Summit Conference. This agreement

provided for economic, military and political coopera¬

tion among the original signatories: Libya, the Sudan

and the U.A.R. (An excerpt from the joint com¬

munique announcing the agreement appears as Docu¬

ment 462 in International Documents on Palestine 1969.) It

was announced on November 8, 1970 that the three

countries had agreed to form a union and on November

27 that Syria too was to join a “unified four-power

command.” The final outcome of the Tripoli Charter

was the Federation of Arab Republics proclaimed in

Benghazi on April 17, 1971, by which time the Sudan

had postponed its adherence to the federation. (For

the text of the proclamation, see Document 322 above.)

to fight the battle of destiny that confronts it. It is an act of reverence to the martyrs and heroes who have fought the battles of this nation throughout its glorious history of struggle for freedom, socialism and unity and the realization of a great hope for which the hero of this nation, Gamal Abdel Nasser, worked and laid down his life.

I praise God who has made the establish¬ ment of the Federation of Arab Republics a reality, as a result of our meeting with our Brothers Muammar Qadhafi and Hafiz Assad in the city of Benghazi, whose name will forever be coupled with that of Tripoli, the scene of the declaration of the Tripoli Charter, which constituted the framework and the basis of the Federation of Arab Republics.2

I praise God who has reinforced the struggle of our nation, in a most difficult and critical stage, through this immense Arab base, from which and with which it can wage its just and honorable war against the gravest danger that has confronted its advance.

The enemy wanted us to grow weaker, but God has increased our conviction and our strength.

The enemy wanted us to be disunited and isolated, but God has strengthened the links and the unity which bind us together.

The enemy wanted to fill our hearts with despair, but God has made us firmer, more certain and more hopeful. Brothers:

At this very moment Muammar Qadhafi is himself announcing the establishment of the Federation of Arab Republics in the Libyan Arab Republic.

At this very moment in the Syrian Arab Republic, President Hafiz Assad is announc¬ ing the establishment of the Federation of Arab Republics.

I am proud to perform this task here in the United Arab Republic.

Before I read to you the declaration of the establishment of the Federation of Arab Republics which we agreed on and signed early this morning, and before I read to you the fundamental provisions of the Federation of Arab Republics, and before I communicate


to you our agreement on the date on which the establishment of the Federation of Arab Republics is to be submitted to plebiscite;

Before that, may I permit myself to echo the splendid words in which Gamal Abdel

Nasser announced the establishment of the first union:

A great state has been established here in the Middle East, a state which is neither an intruder nor a usurper in the area, which is neither aggressive nor hostile, a state that protects and does not threaten, that preserves and does not squander, that gives strength rather than weak¬ ness, that seeks peace but does not disregard [its rights], that supports friends and repels the wiles of enemies, that is neither bigoted nor partisan, that neither deviates nor aligns itself, that upholds justice and supports peace, ensures prosperity for itself and for those around it, and for the whole of humanity, to the extent of its power and ability.

324

Statement Issued by the Palestine Lib¬ eration Organization Central Commit¬ tee, Reiterating Its Adherence to the Cairo and Amman Agreements and De¬ manding Their Implementation by the Government of Jordan1


We made sincere efforts to implement the Amman Agreement, rising above our wounds and the blood of our martyrs who fought so gallantly in defense of their right to live and their free will to revolution. But the author¬ ities from the very first moment insisted on proceeding with their plan to liquidate the revolution, pursuing a policy which was expressed both by their information media and in their conduct, and was based on three main courses of action.


statement, read by Salah Khalaf (Abu Ayyad) at a

press conference in Amman, Fateh (Damascus), April

29, 1971.

1. Intimidation of the masses by persecu¬ tion, arrests and imprisonment and attempts by intrigue, misrepresentation and the spread¬ ing of rumors [have been carried out] to win by terrorism a victory that they were unable to achieve by force of arms.

2. Despite the uproar created by the information media and the repeated state¬ ments about national unity, the organs of the state are engaging in particularist persecution of the Palestinians with the object of smashing the unity of the Palestinian-Jordanian people.

3. The small fires that have broken out in a number of industries and the battles that the regime so diligently manufactures have the object of kindling resentment and hatred among comrades-in-arms in the army and the revolution.

This frantic policy reached its climax in the Irbid massacre and the frenzy, insolence, bloodthirstiness and blind particularism that accompanied it. In this way it has become possible to proceed with plans to liquidate the revolution by a new massacre in which the people of Amman are to be slaughtered in a new September which, in accordance with an imperialist-Zionist plan to be carried out in our beloved Jordan, they hope will
















on Palestine 1970.)










achieve for them what they failed to achieve in the September massacre.

With the help of all the information media at their disposal and at the disposal of their allies, of all the hostile forces of the London and Israeli broadcasting services, and of all the subservient press, they have tried to represent the Central Committee’s decision to end all military manifestations in Amman as a surrender by the Resistance and a victory by the authorities. In fact, however, the Central Committee’s object in making this decision was to be faithful to its undertakings under the Agreements, to avoid further bloodshed among the commandos and in the army and to protect the masses from killing and terrorization. All those in authority at all levels played their part in a round of visits, parades and processions, and in state¬ ments, rumors and whispering campaigns to manufacture a fraudulent victory and to create an atmosphere of persecution, man¬ hunts, arrests and isolation of the masses so as to shake their morale and their faith. It was as if [the authorities] had already liberated the occupied territory from the Zionist enemy who has it in his grip.

Jordanian policy has recently been con¬ centrated on the following three main prin¬ ciples :

I. Ignoring and liquidating the political identity of the Palestine revolution as being the sole legitimate and real representative of the Palestinian people’s will to self- determination, and as imposing restrictions on the Jordanian regime’s freedom to take what action it likes as regards Palestinian rights and the future of the Palestinian people: the regime is also trying to claim to represent the Palestinian people, in an at¬ tempt to disregard basic facts, the most important of which are that the revolution is the representative of the Palestinian people . . . and that anyone who persecutes the masses has no right to represent them. They also forget that their persistent plotting against the political identity of the Palestinian people may well, by a process of historical inevi¬ tability, result in that identity being protected at an early date by means of a material political entity; that to attack what is called

the projected state is not the right way to confront the impasse they have brought about, and that the right course for them to follow is not to manufacture an artificial information outcry, but to improve their conduct in their dealings with the masses of the Palestinian people.

II. Isolationism and rejection of Arab con¬ cern for the problems between the revolution and the authorities, and slandering and misrepresentation of this concern as being a sort of external tutelage imposed on Jordan by the Arab states: this is despite the fact that it is obvious that the Arabs have to inter¬ vene in such an important national matter which affects not only Jordan but all the Arabs and that this Arab concern was initiated at the request of the Jordanian authorities at the Tripoli Conference and later regularized by the Cairo Agreement signed by the Kings and Heads of State and by the King as the Head of the Jordanian government, so that this Arab presence might ensure faithful adherence to the agreement.

III. An attempt to misrepresent the revolu¬ tion and persistent charges that it is deviating into a purely internal revolution inside Jordan instead of being a revolution behind the lines: this attempt clearly reflects the thinking and the ambitions of the authorities who want the revolution behind the lines to be a group

of combatants sent behind the lines by the army when it chooses, their existence in the East Bank not being accepted because of the extensive reaction it creates among the masses, arousing the will to fight in the country. Those who are behind this attempt forget that it calls into question the extent and nature of the interdependence of the two Banks and that half of our people live in the East Bank and are entitled to strike at the enemy from outside. They also forget the rights, duties and burdens imposed by this presence and interdependence.

These are the most important of the matters that the authorities, with the assis¬ tance of their various organs, are trying to establish firmly in the minds of the masses by liquidating the political identity of the Pales¬ tinian people, representing the Palestine rev¬ olution as consisting of groups of combatants,


and by isolating themselves from the Arab world to prevent any intervention in the liquidation that is now in progress; and for this end, which governs their behavior and conduct, the organs are absolutely ignoring the clear provisions of the Agreements, in the

following ways: I. Restricting the freedom of the Com¬

mando bases to exist and expand in the Jordan Valley, especially in the north of the Valley, by establishing a cordon of mine¬ fields and Jordanian regular army and militia ambush attacks on our patrols which cross the River into the occupied territory: our patrols going to and returning from the occupied territory still risk engagements with the forces of the authorities, and they are in greater danger of being killed, persecuted, hunted down and arrested in the East Bank than they are in the West Bank.

II. Restricting freedom of movement and travel: the Agreements provide for complete freedom of movement and travel in the areas west of the Amman - R am tha road, and both sides are forbidden to erect barricades and positions on the roads. But the authorities have established a series of search points and patrols which constitute a blockade of the revolution’s bases, molesting combatants and preventing supplies arriving and contacts being made between their bases. They have also closed the frontiers against combatants and supplies and arms convoys and placed such restrictions on the movement of com¬ batants as threaten their security and freedom.

III. Prohibiting dealings with the revolu¬ tion and restricting political freedom: govern¬ ment organs are persecuting all citizens who have dealings or sympathize with the revo¬ lution and warning the inhabitants of areas in which there are commando bases not to sell them provisions or have any relations with them. In the towns and villages the repressive intelligence services have been active in disseminating an atmosphere of terror by spreading rumors and persecuting, hunting down or arresting all who have relations with or sympathy for the revolution.

Recently there has been a wave of dismis¬ sals from jobs and institutions, especially government ones, on a basis of clear and

deliberate discrimination, and the authorities’ prisons are still packed with about two

thousand detainees and condemned prisoners, both commandos and citizens accused of

cooperating with them. Having disclosed these facts about the

conduct of the Jordanian authorities in the last six months, as a last serious attempt on our part, let us say that we regard the Cairo Agreement of September 27, 1970 and the Amman Agreement of October 13, 1970 as still being the basis for the detailed relations between the revolution and the authorities being regulated in such a way as to maintain the revolution and the unity and stability of the country through faithful and scrupulous adherence to and honest application of their provisions without trickery or procrastination.

While insisting on strict adherence to and implementation of the provisions of the Agreements, as being the basis regulating relations between the revolution and the authorities, in a way that will ensure us freedom of movement to fight our enemy and to mobilize and organize our masses, we believe that the implementation of these Agreements by the authorities will inevitably have repercussions on the financial, political and military situation of Jordan and hence its ability to face up to its fundamental duties in regard to the present occupation of the West Bank.

So that all may shoulder their responsi¬ bilities and perform their duties, we address this statement to the masses in Jordan and to the Arab masses, with a view to ensuring the scrupulous implementation of these Agree¬ ments, to avert fighting and massacres so that no more Arab blood may be lost in the wrong way, and so that all efforts and all rifles may be directed against the occupying enemy.

We also address this statement to the Arab states and to those who signed the Cairo Agreement, so that we may hear their views on how they want the Jordanian authorities to meet their obligations, the revolution, for its part, having fulfilled all its obligations. We expect these governments to adopt an unambiguous and open attitude; and silent or negative attitudes will in themselves be


regarded as attitudes to the Palestine revolu¬ tion and to honoring the commitment entered into by signing this Agreement.

We also demand that the Jordanian au¬ thorities adopt an unambivalent and honest attitude to these Agreements, an attitude that will be reflected in practical conduct and in the faithful and scrupulous application of their provisions.

325

Lebanese Television Interview State¬ ments by Premier al-Tall of Jordan Commenting on the Formation of the Federation of Arab Republics and on the Cut in Arab Financial Aid to Jordan1

Amman, Early May, 1971

Q. Tour Excellency, it is of course well known that a new state, or a new federal state, has been established—the Federation of Arab Republics. May we know Tour Excellency's view of this federation?

A. My view is that the federation—-any federation—is really the right and natural reply to aggression and to Zionist invasion. Therefore any move towards federation has our blessing and we support it with all our hearts. In spite of all differences and in spite of all sensitivities we believe that unity is something eternal; the sensitivities and the differences pass away, but unity of effort remains, as does unity. I have stated my opinion on this and it has been published in the press. We believe that unity of effort and effort to achieve unity are essential, and that they must assume a logical form. We hope that every part of this union and every country that has joined it may in itself be a beacon of unity. What I mean is, we hope that it will not be turned into an axis; we want it to be a true unity, because unity means


al-Tall’s interview broadcast on Lebanese television,

al-Dustur (Amman), May 7, 1971.

effort, resolution and strength and we benefit from this resolution and strength by virtue of our position in the confrontation of ag¬ gression.

Q. Mr. Prime Minister, is it possible that Jordan might think of joining?

A. As is well known, Jordan is an extension of the Arab revolution. The Arab revolution has frank and unambiguous views on the subject of unity. The Arab revolution’s view is that the Arab world is not a geographical unit from the Ocean to the Gulf, but that it is in fact made up of large units—the Arab Maghrib, the Nile Valley, the Fertile Crescent and the Arabian Peninsula.

The movement towards unity must be subject to a universally accepted, economic, social and geographical logic, because we believe that union is not merely a question of joining areas of land and sections of population. We believe that the unionist operation is a creative interaction which gives rise to much more than the mere adding to¬ gether of figures. This is what we believe, so that naturally, as regards unity of effort we are ready to take part in any embodiment of unity. But a real movement towards union —we believe that, for it to succeed and become that creative interaction which we mean by unity— must come about through these units. We, Syria, Iraq and the [other] countries of the Fertile Crescent must combine our efforts in whatever form the countries of this part of the Arab world desire, and at the same time encourage any union in, for example, the Nile Valley area. That is why I personally

was extremely enthusiastic about the union of Libya, Egypt and Sudan. I believe that such a union fulfills all the conditions of geographical, economic and social logic and will create an extremely strong Arab entity. The same applies to the Maghrib, to the Fertile Crescent and to the Arabian Peninsula.

What I mean is, the concept of unity is not merely the gathering together of inhabitants, territories and materials. We believe that there must be an interaction that creates a new entity which is much greater than the mere arithmetical adding together of people and land.


Qj Tour Excellency, what about Arab aid, or the Arab aid that has been withdrawn from Jordan ? Could you tell us if this is really affecting the economic situation in Jordan ?

A. Of course it is. But it must be made clear that our high expenditure is the result of our effort as a country at war so that Arab aid is going, in the first place, to affect the extent to which we can help our brethren

in the occupied area, and after that the extent to which we can help those of our brethren who have left the occupied area. Our pro¬ grams of military development are certainly going to be affected by this Arab aid, all of which was originally earmarked for this field. But as for economic survival or basic economic construction, I think we are capable of coping

with this problem. If we were selfish and wanted to concern ourselves with the problems of Jordan only, regardless of our destiny and our duty as an Arab outpost, we should have no financial problems at all. But if Jordan bears in mind, as she must, her destiny as an [Arab] outpost, then of course we need

support, and we are going to make super¬ human efforts to ensure that we get such help from whatever quarter, on condition that we continue with our programs and with the performance of our duty. Our present budget includes foreign financial aid, and this of course has happened because Arab aid has been cut off.

Moreover, these days it is not difficult to get aid from the quarter you want.

326

Statement Issued by the Lebanese Branch of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine—General Command, Pro¬ testing the Middle East Visit of U.S. Secretary of State Rogers (Excerpt)1

Early May, 1971

Rogers’ visit after all this conspiracy is


defiance of the sentiments of the Arab people and their progressive movement which has resisted and struggled, and is still resolutely struggling for the liberation of the land and its people.

The masses who have rejected all forms of liquidation and peaceful solutions express their anger at and disapproval of the visit of the envoy of imperialism.

Let us shout at the top of our voices; Rogers go home!

Let us go on with the mobilization and organization of the masses against the con¬ tinuation and escalation of the conspiracy by fostering armed resistance and promoting the revolution.

327

Statement Issued by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine Protesting the Middle East Visit of U.S. Secretary of State Rogers (Excerpt)2

Early May, 1971

The object of Rogers’ visit to the area is to bring to a conclusion the conspiracy which started with the submission of the proposal, and our basic answer to this visit is continued rejection and persistence in struggle and com¬ bat against all projects which constitute an obstacle to our revolution and our liberation in alliance with the Arab masses and their progressive forces and the forces of liberation and socialism throughout the world.

May we see greater determination to fight for the revolution and for liberation.

P.F.L.P.-General Command statement, Ila al-Amam

(Beirut), No. 348 (May 7, 1971), p. 16.


P.F.L.P. statement, al-Hadaf (Beirut), No. 99 (May 8,

1971), p. 5.

ARAB WORLD 457

328

Statement Issued by the Popular Demo¬ cratic Front for the Liberation of Pales¬ tine, Protesting the Middle East Visit of U.S. Secretary of State Rogers (Ex¬ cerpt)1

Early May, 1971

The Palestine Resistance movement, the progressive forces in Lebanon and the Arab revolutionary masses, who have rejected the Security Council resolution from the start, are called on to reject the visit of Rogers and to express their rejection by protesting in every possible manner.

The Democratic Popular Front, which rejected the Security Council resolution and showed up and laid bare all the suspect sur¬ render solutions brought to the area by Fisher and Sisco, and which regards as its duty the uncovering of all the schemes and conspiracies that are concocted against our people and our national causes, protests against the welcoming of the envoy of American destruc¬ tion, rejects all imperialist conspiracies and calls for serious and unremitting action to

ustrate all the schemes of imperialism and its agents.

329

Statements on Superpower Involvement in the Mediterranean, French Arms Sales to Libya and the Possibility of a Middle East Settlement, Made in a French Press Interview by President Qadhafi of Libya2

Tripoli, Early May, 1971

Qadhafi: The Arab nation values its inde-


P.D.F.L.P. statement, al-Hurriya (Beirut), No. 566

(May 10, 1971), p. 15.

2 Excerpted and translated from the French text of

Qadhafi’s interview, conducted by Eric Rouleau,

Le Monde, May 6, 1971, p. 6.

pendence; it refuses to live under the influence of either the East or the West. From now on any power that tries to draw it into either of the two camps will, in our view, be pursuing imperialist objectives.

Q. Aren't you going against the wishes of your Egyptian and Syrian partners when you demand the departure of the Soviet and American fleets from the Mediterranean at a time when the presence of Russian naval units would seem to be indispensable to the defense of the Arab world in its conflict with Israel?

A. Certainly we believe—quite as much as our brothers—that the Soviet fleet is a force of dissuasion whose entry into the Med¬ iterranean was provoked by the presence of the Sixth Fleet. But when we demand the withdrawal of both of the naval powers we

are defending a position of principle whose goal is to avoid a confrontation which would be catastrophic for world peace.

Qj Is it true that President Nasser recommended that no Soviet weapons be bought, but rather French Mirages or failing these, American Phantoms?

A. I don’t remember. Before answering you I should have to question Mr. Haikal, the Editor-in-Chief of al-Ahram,who reported this matter. I should also have to consult the documents on the talks I had with the late President.

As for the Mirages, the French government, just like ours, understands perfectly the true motives of those who keep up the agitation against this transaction. Israel, which won the 1967 war thanks to these machines, wants to be the only country in the area to have them. Great Britain and the United States were expecting us to buy their fighter planes. The U. S. S. R. also hoped to be our sole supplier, after the fall of the monarchy. So there were many unsatisfied appetites....

Qj It is none the less true that some people contest the viewpoint of Paris that Libya is not “a country on the field of battle. ” A. The French government’s position is perfectly correct. It is a matter of geogra¬ phical evidence. We have no, common frontiers with the countries occupied by the Zionists....


Qj However, it seems that you reject all peaceful solutions of the Palestine problem, in particular the one based on Security Council Resolution 242....

A. This resolution has been completely overtaken by events and it is curious that you should question me on this subject. Doesn’t Israel’s present conduct provide an eloquent answer to your question? Moreover, the combat we are engaged in against Zionism affects the very destiny of the Arab nation. For us it is not a matter of petty frontier ques¬ tions or strategic positions. Our goal is to restore their land and their dignity to a people who have been dispossessed and dispersed in tents.

(A Mr. President, does this not run counter to Egypt, which has formally accepted the principle of recognition of the state of Israel?

A. No, because Egypt has never said that it will conclude a peace treaty (in Arabic sulk), but a peace agreement (in Arabic salamj. This distinction is fundamental.

Qj Supposing that Israel withdrew to the 1967 frontiers and that, in return, Cairo agreed to conclude a settlement based on the terms of Resolution 242, would Libya agree to subscribe to such an agreement?

A. Egypt is free to do what she likes. As for us, God is great.

[Before closing the interview, Colonel Qadhafi advised us to read Sura 17 of the Koran, entitled “The Night Journey or The Children of Israel.” To the latter God says: “Ye will surely commit evil in the earth twice, and ye will be elated with great insolence.” However, the day will come when the Lord will send His servants “to afflict thee, and to enter the Temple, as they entered it the first time, and to destroy utterly that which is insolent. ’ ’ The sura adds: “Peradventure thy Lord will have mercy on thee, but if ye return to transgress we also shall return to chastise thee, and we have appointed Hell to be the prison of the unbe¬ lievers.”

The message of the Libyan Head of State could hardly be clearer.]

330

May Day Speech by U.A.R. President Sadat Reaffirming Egyptian Readiness To Conclude a Peace Based on Israeli Withdrawal from Arab Territory and Calling for a Clarification of U.S. Pol¬ icy in the Middle East (Excerpts)1

Helwan, May 1, 1971

If [Rogers’ visit] is on the subject of the Suez Canal initiative, we are quite clear, and I want through you to repeat what I said once more so that the people may hear, America may hear and Israel may hear, and know how far we shall go. We will not bargain or give anything up.

Firstly, the basic principle that the [United] Arab Republic adheres to, and will always adhere to, under all circumstances, is that there can be no peace as long as Israel continues to occupy Arab territories, and as long as the enemy continues to display expansionist tendencies, which are so clearly shown in the whole of Israeli policy and in the public statements and official documents issued by those who direct that policy, which contain affronts not only to the Arab position and Arab rights, but also to the United Nations itself, its Charter and its resolutions.

Secondly, the United Arab Republic has opened every door to peace and is still doing so, as is shown by the following two moves it has made:

1. The United Arab Republic accepted Ambassador Gunnar Jarring’s proposals, while Israel refused to so much as reply to them.

2. President Anwar Sadat came out with an Egyptian initiative in the speech he made on February 4. This initiative mentions the possibility of the Suez Canal being opened to international navigation in return for a partial withdrawal by the Israeli forces.

Thirdly, let us be precise. The Egyptian initiative still exists, although it must be observed and understood by all parties that

1 Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text of Sadat’

speech, al-Ahram (Cairo), May 2, 1971.

ARAB WORLD 459

the proposed partial withdrawal in con¬ formity with it is not a separate solution nor a partial solution, but a procedural move organically linked with a total solution on the basis of the implementation of all the provisions of the Security Council resolution, the first of which is withdrawal from all Arab territories occupied since June 5, 1967.

Fourthly, so that things may be clearly defined during the implementation of this proposal—and this is important, because we want to make ourselves clear—the United Arab Republic reaffirms its conception as

follows: 1. As soon as the partial withdrawal starts,

it being the first stage of total withdrawal,

the [United] Arab Republic is prepared to start clearing the Suez Canal.

2. With this as a beginning the United Arab Republic would agree to the ceasefire being

prolonged for a specific period during which Ambassador Gunnar Jarring could draw up a time schedule for the implementation of the Security Council resolution.

3. The armed forces of the United Arab Republic will cross the Suez Canal to assume their national responsibilities on the East Bank of the Canal. Let me repeat this so that they may hear: The armed forces of the United Arab Republic will cross the Suez Canal to assume their national responsibilities on the East Bank of the Canal.

But out of its concern for peace the United

Arab Republic would be prepared to accept practical measures that would ensure that the warring forces were separated, during the specific period of the ceasefire—the period that would be given to Ambassador Gunnar Jarring to draw up all the provisions of the solution of the crisis and the time schedule for their implementation, the first provisions being total withdrawal from all Arab terri¬ tories in Syria, Jordan, Gaza and Sinai.

4. If this period comes to an end without tangible progress, the Egyptian armed forces will have the right to maintain freedom of action on the basis of full commitment, both legal and as a matter of principle, to the necessity for the total liberation of all the

occupied Arab territories. 5. The United Arab Republic absolutely

rejects any discussion of the demilitarization of Sinai but, in accordance with the Security Council resolution, it is prepared to accept demilitarized zones on condition that they are on both sides of the frontier.

6. The United Arab Republic will not allow any party to talk to it about an Israeli presence in Sharm el-Sheikh in any form whatsoever. It regards the dubious proposals that certain individuals have been circulating as regards the leasing of Sharm el-Sheikh to Israel for a specific period, or for Israeli forces to form part of an international emergency force, as a sort of joke which cannot and should not be discussed in the context of a crisis as serious as the Middle East crisis or with reference to a homeland like the United Arab Republic which has engaged in unyielding national struggle throughout its long history.

I read you this so that our agreement may be absolutely clear and precise, and so that we may know, because at this stage, as I have told you, I shall welcome him and talk to him. But I have not forgotten past history and I have a definite attitude before our whole people. As I have said, the battle is not on the battlefield only, the battle has many aspects—there is the battlefield, but there is also the political aspect I have told you about.

I have already spoken about America’s

attitude. I shall ask Mr. Rogers when he comes to give a clear definition of it. We thank America for her efforts, for she wants to reach a peaceful solution. If these efforts are really* sincere, we thank her with all our hearts. But we want America to explain her attitude absolutely clearly and to define it absolutely definitely.

As for our Egyptian initiative that America says she will work on, we have said how far we will go. Israel has given America her answer, but America has not told us what it was. I am interested in knowing, and of course this will happen when Rogers comes. What interests me most is not Israel’s answer, because I know it in advance; what interests me is America’s attitude, and I shall disclose it to the people quite frankly, as always. As for the rest of the Big Four, France still


maintains her honorable attitude which is in conformity with the principles of peace based on justice. I take this opportunity and this occasion—-there has been correspondence between me and President Pompidou, the President of France—I take this opportunity of sending him, and the people of France in his person, our sincerest thanks and gratitude for their attitude, which is characterized by justice and by aware understanding as a great power in this world.

The third is Britain. There has been a really tangible change in Britain’s attitude —- Britain’s statement of her agreement to take part in the international peace force in the area, although Britain knows that Israel is desperately opposed to this change, is a

radical change from the attitude adopted by the previous Labour goverment.

Certainly the Conservative government —and I said so to a delegation of Labour members of the British House of Commons— I said to them: “The Conservative govern¬ ment has been more courageous than you were and than your government, the Labour government, because it has succeeded in adopting an independent policy for Britain.”

There has certainly been a change in Britain’s attitude, and we welcome and encourage that change.

The U.S.S.R. is maintaining its honorable attitude unconditionally. People outside make propaganda about the Soviet presence. They say that the Soviets want to occupy the country, the Soviets dominate the economy of the country, the Soviets this, the Soviets that. It’s all nonsense. It’s quite uncondi¬ tional. All our lives we have known—from the day of our Revolution, from the day we liberated our will—we have always known that our will was not for sale, and we shall never sell our will. The U.S.S.R. is a friend and gives its support to a friend quite un¬ conditionally.

These are the attitudes of the Big Four. This is one aspect of the battle. As I told you, there is the military aspect and the political aspect. I have been talking about the foreign affairs aspect of it and the attitudes of the Big Four.

I now come to a very important aspect— the Arab aspect. In my estimate the Arab aspect is one of the gravest and most important aspects in the call to the battle today, and we have all agreed that there is no call more sacred than the call to the battle today. Of course you know that I have been charged by the constitutional and political institutions to go ahead with the Tripartite Federation to the extent that it is of service to the battle of our nation and achieves the aspirations that Abdel Nasser struggled for for so long. And I want to tell you the story of the Tripartite Federation, but before I tell it to you I will go back to the time when Gamal died, may God have mercy on^him. In October a class graduated from the Israeli Military Academy, and Chaim Bar-Lev spoke at the passing out ceremony of this class, and what he said was published throughout the world and written about by the news agencies. He addressed the class that was passing out in October 1970, some weeks after the death of President Nasser.

He said to them: “Israel’s future is very bright, so rejoice- the Eastern Front has disintegrated and ended for good—Iraq has left the battle. King Hussein has liquidated the Palestine Resistance—the Resistance is no longer effective. Syria is occupied with her internal affairs—so the Eastern Front is finished. On the Western Front Abdel Nasser has died and Egypt will never again be as strong as she was in the days of Abdel Nasser. So rejoice, new officers of Israel who are passing out in October 1970. The future is bright, and the battle is now only a matter of time for Israel to impose her will or for Israel to get what she wants.”

This happened in October 1970, some weeks after the death of Abdel Nasser. The picture Bar-Lev gave—let us be honest with ourselves—was a true picture at that time— the Eastern Front really had disintegrated and it is still disintegrated today. When I say the Eastern Front I mean Jordan, Iraq and the Palestine Resistance, because we call Syria the Northern Front, and the Eastern Front is still in a state of disintegration up to this moment. We must admit the truth.

Iraq has withdrawn completely, the Pales-

ARAB WORLD 461

tine Resistance has been attacked twice— the first time in September in the days of Abdel Nasser and the conference called by Abdel Nasser. The second time started in October. It was slow but carefully planned, and this is the cause of my difference with King Hussein. I personally—there is nothing bet¬ ween me and King Hussein personally, on the contrary, we still appreciate his attitude on June 5. We shall not forget his stand on June 5, 1967. We are not hostile to King Hussein, but the problem is the friction, and what is happening to the Palestine Resistance and the attack on the Palestine Resistance—and our constant warning about what is happening to the Palestine Resistance. We have continued on our course since Abdel Nasser’s death as we agreed and as the people decided, and I state in your presence that there is absolutely no hostility between me and King Hussein, and I don’t want any hostility or conflict. On the contrary, I believe that at this stage there must be concentrated Arab action with every man who can do so playing his part in the battle. The only point of difference, as I have told you, arises from the operation of liquidating the Resistance and the destruction of it and the provocative elements that surround King Hussein and try to make him believe that at one moment we are conspiring against him, at another that we want the Palestinian state, and at still another that we want goodness knows what. Every day they make some new suggestion to him about us.

Every day they make new suggestions to him. The Jordanian army, which we hold in such esteem, is not on the firing line, not in its natural place on the firing line confront¬ ing Israel. The Resistance has been attacked and is not allowed to take action. This is the whole of our difference. I hope and pray that we may be able to find a solution of this problem in the coming stage. As I said, there is absolutely no personal hostility to King Hussein, there is absolutely no intention of relations being strained with King Hussein personally for any reason at all; the only trouble is what has been caused by these elements, the provocative elements that sur¬ round him.

I now return to what we were talking about and Bar-Lev’s speech that I told you about. The Eastern Front, alas, is still disintegrated, because the Jordanian army is still not on the firing line, and the Iraqi army has completely withdrawn. The Palestine Re¬ sistance has been attacked and has lost its effectiveness; it is carrying out operations, but they are not as influential and effective as could have been hoped. So what Bar-Lev said is true. But he forgot something. Bar-Lev forgot that here in Egypt after the death of Abdel Nasser there is a people who have filled the vacuum left by Abdel Nasser—34 million of them. Abdel Nasser was not alone. Bar-Lev left this out. And President Hafiz Assad in Syria was able very rapidly to carry out the magnificent operation of rectification which he carried out in Syria and Syria has come in to perform her Arab duty in the battle. Very well, Syria has taken her place in the battle, and we, since the death of Abdel Nasser—34 million of us—have stood firm and carried on and said “We will carry on with the job until it is finished, all 34 million of us, with all we possess.” One of the fundamental lines that Israel has built her strategy on and stated in her books is no secret—it is well known in the world—that the Arabs are always divided among themselves and in conflict with each other. This is one of the articles of Israel’s strategy- -that the Arabs are divided and more than that, in conflict with each other, and the only quarter to benefit from Arab division or conflict is Israel. It is not unity or federation that annoys Israel, but just Arab solidarity. Just Arab solidarity between two Arab states annoys Israel; how much more if there is union or federation.


331

Press Conference Statements by Foreign

Minister Saqqaf of Saudi Arabia, Sup¬

porting the U.A.R. in Any Steps To

Recover Her Territory and Reiterating

Saudi Demands for Withdrawal from

Occupied Territory and Support for the

Rights of the Palestinians1

Riyadh, May 2, 1971

Qj Does Saudi Arabia approve in principle of a solution, if only an interim one, for the opening of the Suez Canal?

A. It is impossible to answer yes or no. Because if I say yes, I shall have to lay down conditions and if I say no, I shall have to provide justifications. What I do want to say is that there is a thorny problem and that there is aggression against the Palestinian people, that there is aggression against Arab states, and that a solution to this problem exists, but this solution must not be divided into parts. When I say divided into parts I do not mean that the forces should be withdrawn in one day, for that is impossible in practice. And when we talk of opening the Canal, we do not mean that we do not agree to its being opened or its not being opened, but the problem is one of finding total solutions and then ensuring that they are implemented in accordance with a carefully prepared plan. In any case this concerns our brethren in Egypt; it does not concern us as much as it concerns them. It does in fact concern us, but not as much as it concerns them, and, of course they know, we are with them and under no circumstances shall we stand in their way.

(f Can you tell us exactly what Mr. Rogers proposed in the way of a solution ?

A. I cannot answer in English, for this is presumably going to be broadcast and the Saudi people should know it as well as you. I need make no comment, because here we do not hide things from the people and this is the method adopted by His Majesty in


Saqqaf s press conference with Arab and international

press correspondents, al-Bilad (Jedda), May 3, 1971.

his wisdom and in his treatment of the people of this country.

To return to the question, when Mr. Rogers came here I cannot say that he brought a solution; he came to investigate the facts, as I understand it, and to learn the various points of view on this subject. I am

not in a position to say what passed between him and His Majesty, nor am I in a position to speak of President Nixon’s message to His Majesty. What I can say is that Mr. Rogers had discussions with us here and learned our point of view and told us America’s point of view, and I can say that we both understood each other’s point of view entirely.

Qj To keep the peace in a demilitarized zone? A. Mr. Rogers has proposed this idea,

and no doubt he repeated it to you during his visit. In any case, if there is a settlement the United Nations has decided that there should be international forces stationed in territories between the two conflicting parties, and the states concerned have accepted this. But if the question is just an attempt to lead to the question of communism and the Russians, I will not evade it. We are against communism and combat communism because it is against our beliefs and our religion, so naturally we do not want it in our country or in our region. This leads us to say that the thorny problem of Palestine and the question of Zionist aggression in Palestine are not being dealt with effectively. There was aggression by the Jews, by the Zionists, against Egypt and Jordan, and after that aggression things were so presented so as to provide a justification for not withdrawing, because the Russians were in the area.

Q. Does Tour Excellency support Egypt3s demand that her forces must occupy the areas evacuated by Israel?

A. Frankly and clearly, we support Egypt in everything that can help her to recover her territories that have been attacked.

Q. Do you agree to efforts being made to secure the presence of the Israelis as a guard?

A. To guard what?

Q. To observe in the territories that will then

ARAB WORLD 463

not be occupied and to see if moves are being made to rebuild military strength or anything like that.

A. In the first place I do not believe that Egypt has agreed to evacuate the territories and let them be demilitarized, and even if she did agree there would have to be demil¬ itarized territories in Israel that were observed in the same way.

Q. Of course you reviewed with Mr. Rogers the latest developments in the crisis in the area. Is there any hope of overcoming Israelis obstinate refusal to withdraw from the occupied Arab territories?

A. You know Israel’s attitude, as it is declared by her leaders- it is an obstacle to any solution. But we pray God that the picture may have changed and that they may once more be thinking soundly and rightly about the situation.

Qj Does Tour Excellency mean that the solution or the interim settlement can only be part of a com¬

prehensive settlement? A. As a Saudi Arab, Yes. And Egypt has

frankly declared that she will not accept a partial solution which is not integral, but has said . . . that there should be partial solutions to be implemented in a specific period of time, and this is acceptable to our brethren in the countries which are Israel’s neighbors.

Qj That implies that you do not agree to this interim settlement unless Israel agrees to the principle of total withdrawal.

A. In the first place I am talking about Egypt, and Egypt has announced this; Saudi Arabia does not need to restate her attitude to the problem. As far as we are concerned, withdrawal is fundamental. The rights of Palestine, of the Palestinian people, mean that withdrawal is fundamental. This is something that Saudi Arabia believes in and is working for. As far as Saudi Arabia is concerned, Jerusalem comes at the top of the list -the situation that existed before the aggression of June 5 must be restored there.

Qj As regards Jerusalem, does Tour Excellency think that it would be possible to accept a proposal

for the internationalization of Jerusalem, with the holy places administered by religious representatives?

A. What Jerusalem do you mean?

Qj Is he referring to the holy places in particular ? A. We do not accept that; Jerusalem must

be as it was before. We believe that the holy places in Jerusalem are Christian and Muslim; even the Wailing Wall, which the Jews claim is theirs, is a wall built by Muslims. Anyone who doubts this should study the documents of the League of Nations, which provide evidence that the ulema were sent to Jerusalem by the Commission and established that the Wall was built in the Islamic era. In any case, the Jews say that the clock cannot be put back more than 25 years. For Heavens sake, is it possible, is it permissible for the Zionists to say that the clock cannot be put back 25 years and expect us to put it back more than two thousand years ? I am talking quite objectively, not emotionally. Are there any further questions?

Qj Looking at the future, can you see any gleam of hope or possibility of cooperation between Israel and the Arab states?

A. It is very difficult to answer this question. It is not a question of the ability to answer; it is a good question and considerably predates the time we are living in. But I do think that if Zionism thinks properly and in an enlight¬ ened manner and gets to know the area it is living in and learns that in the present age so-called secure frontiers or permanent peace exist only on paper, because in such matters tactics and technology have put an end to these things, and if they realize that even if their population rises to six million, by that time the Arabs will be 160 million; if they think in this way and accept a state called the State of Palestine in which Jews and Arabs live together then perhaps it will be possible to talk business.

Q. Do you mean a binational state? A. A state to be established and called

State of Palestine....

Qj How much material aid is your government giving the Palestinians, and to what organizations?

A. We are supporting genuine Palestinian commando action; I cannot tell you the amount. In addition the Saudi people are contributing a great deal everywhere; you can obtain the details of these contributions,


because the newspapers publish them every day.

332

Press Statement by Commissioner Gen¬ eral Mahjub of the Regional Offices for the Boycott of Israel in the Arab Coun¬ tries, Commenting on the Success of the Economic Boycott of Israel1

Beirut, May 8, 1971

Israel is aware of the impact of the boycott and the extent of the great losses it has inflicted on her economy. This has been the case especially since the Arab boycott developed its methods of action, which made Israel resort to various means, both inside and out¬ side the Arab countries, to destroy the boycott, making use of all her friendships with the West and of the information media which she influences.

In 1964 Israel wanted to strike at the Arab boycott through her ally, America, and increased pressure on the American Congress, which forced the government to pass a law preventing exporting companies from pro¬ viding the Boycott with the information it required to ascertain the nature of their relations with Israel unless they obtained permission from the American government. This move was successful at first, as these companies were bound by the law, but the Arab Boycott Office imposed a total boycott on companies which refrained from answering any question put to them, and eventually they submitted, so that the Israeli scheme was a failure.

After that Israel tried to put pressure on France, Britain and West Germany, but they refused to respond.

In the last four years Israel has been exerting her influence in another way—by exerting pressure on chambers of commerce in Europe and the United States, in an attempt to stop

1 Translated from the Arabic text of Mahjub’s statement

to al-Nahar (Beirut), May 9, 1971.

them attesting the reports required by the Arab Boycott Office from foreign companies, the most important being the certificate of origin of the goods they export, to ensure that they include no Israeli materials or merchan¬ dise. We then asked these companies to register their replies at a notary public and obtain approval from the Arab embassies, and thereby frustrated the Israeli plan.

The most important step taken by the Arab Boycott to improve Arab-foreign commercial relations was the establishment of joint cham¬ bers of commerce with certain Western countries, which were empowered to certify the documents required from the foreign countries. The Arab Boycott now has an American-Arab Chamber of Commerce in New York with numerous branches in the United States, another in France and a third in Turkey, and we are in the process of establishing three more in Britain, Austria and Yugoslavia.

In 1966 Israel realized the failure of her political pressures on the Arab Boycott, which was having an increasing effect on her. She therefore established an Israeli anti¬ boycott office, for which a budget of more than 20 million dollars per year was allotted. This organization started its activities in a variety of ways, the most important being its informa¬ tion activities. There were misleading pub¬ licity campaigns to the effect that the Arab Boycott was based on racial and religious discrimination, but we made it clear beyond all shadow of doubt that the Boycott had dealings with Jewish companies proved to have no relations with Israel, and that it had put on its black list companies owned by Muslims and Christians which had deal¬

ings with Israel. In the last few years Israel has been threat¬

ening companies which respond to the Arab Boycott that she will wage a trade war against them and prevent the United States from consuming their goods. But these companies, and especially the French ones, have paid no attention to this threat, especially as the Boycott Office has recommended that Arab and friendly countries should increase their dealings with these countries, and this in fact is what has happened. For example, three

ARAB WORLD 465

French companies have increased their pro¬ duction by 5 per cent, according to their own calculations, as a result of this measure.

Recently Israel adopted a new method, choosing an anti-Arab and pro-Zionist news¬ paper to publish articles which attempt to represent the Arab Boycott as futile, and those responsible for it as lacking both integrity and competence.

We realized this when we read an article in the anti-Arab Der Spiegel, the real aim of which was to destroy the Arab Boycott from inside the Arab countries by certain Arab newspapers copying the article, which is designed to confuse Arab public opinion and cast aspersions on the integrity of those responsible for the Arab Boycott.

It came out that the writer of this article is an Israeli living in Israel. He is the cor¬ respondent of Der Spiegel and works for Israeli intelligence . I consider it my duty to draw the attention of the press to this so that it may not publish anything that will further the ends of world Zionism, and check everything before publishing it.

333

Press Statements by Defense and Avia¬ tion Minister Prince Sultan of Saudi Arabia, Protesting Israeli Control of the Holy Places and Commenting on the Use of Oil To Exert Pressure in the Service of Arab Interests1

Beirut, May 11, 1971

[As regards Saudi Arabia’s attitude to current Arab problems, and in particular the problem of Palestine and Israel’s aggressions against the Holy Places]: Saudi Arabia’s attitude to this sensitive point is, in my view, the attitude of all who sincerely believe in God, whether Christian or Muslim. The


Prince Sultan Ibn Abd-al-Aziz’s statements to the

press, made during a visit to Lebanon, al-Nahar (Beirut),

May 12, 1971.

crimes Israel is committing and the way it is defiling our Holy Places in Jerusalem have evoked reactions not only from Arabs, for the United Nations has set up committees to inform the world of how Israel is offending against revealed religions in that noble place. Therefore our attitude on this point is that things should be restored to normal, that every religion should look after its own sites, and that Jordan should protect and take care of the Holy Places as it did for dozens of years, providing facilities for worship to adherents of all the religions, including Judaism. There¬ fore, as regards this matter, we can only accept that the situation that existed in the past should be restored.

[On the role oil could play in exerting pressure to ensure the implementation of the Security Council resolution]: Oil is a resource of the Arab nation, and it has therefore been used in Arab endurance and to ensure that the Arab nation has no need to resort to asking help from any foreign state. Arab oil has also been used to pressure the producing companies to raise prices and increase national income so that we can do our duties of ensuring the continuation of Arab endurance and Arab aid and the development of the Arab citizen so that he may live like others. None of this is pleasing to imperialists or tendentious persons, either in the West or the East.

Therefore, my advice as an Arab is that we should continue to exploit our resources and our gifts, intellectual, economic and social, in every way, and expend them with a view to benefiting and promoting our nation in the military and social fields in the interests of our present cause and our existence and of increasing our might in the future.


334

Press Interview Statements by Premier Naaman of Yemen (Sanaa) Urging That the Palestinians Be Allowed To Decide for Themselves on the Proposals for a Peaceful Solution in the Middle East1

Sanaa, Mid-May, 1971

Q. What do you think of a peaceful solution of the Middle East problem?

A. It is up to those who are fighting the war to choose the solution that suits them, regardless of the spectators who are like the spectators at a bullfight. If the Yemenis had not courageously solved their problem by themselves, the civil war would still be going on today.

Qj But do you not think that a peaceful solution would do away with the rights of the Palestinian people?

A. No, not at all. The Palestinians would have been able to obtain their full and undiminished rights if they had been left to themselves from the start and if the Arabs had really helped them, without intervening directly and without making their problem a pretext for political overbidding and cheap heroics. At present the rights of the Pales¬ tinians are becoming clearer to the world than ever before, and we hope from the bottom of our hearts that they will overcome their differences among themselves and with their brother Arabs so that the total Arab effort may be made available for the recovery of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian Arab people.


Naaman’s interview (shortly after the formation of his

new government), al-Nahar (Beirut), May 13,1971.

335

Statement Reiterating Syrian Determi¬ nation To Recover Occupied Territory and To Support the Palestine Resistance, Made by Premier Khleifawi of Syria (Excerpts)2

Damascus, May 17, 1971

We hold fast to the legitimate rights of the Palestinian Arab people in their territory and their homeland, and shall not agree to any of these rights being relinquished; we support the struggle of the Palestinian Arab people to obtain their legitimate rights and recover their usurped territory; we provide full sup¬ port and unconditional aid to the Palestine revolution and to commando action, and we believe that the Palestine revolution is a sacred right of the Palestinians, and regard it our national duty to support and protect it without reservations. As the President of the Republic said: “We are unchanged in our support for the Palestine revolution and our attitude against all attempts to liquidate it and in our support of all efforts to achieve unity of Palestinian action.”

We shall take action within the framework of our goals for the present stage to liberate the occupied Arab territory and to reinforce popular endurance, being remiss in nothing, and we shall accept no solution whatsoever which does not enable us to recover our territory. We shall therefore reject all sur¬ render solutions involving the usurpation of a single inch of the soil of the homeland, well aware though we are of the difficulties that lie ahead of us. The liberation of our territory is a sacred duty, and we shall perform that duty and carry out every task that may serve it; and whatever the views and plans of our enemy and those who are behind our enemy, we shall never be negligent in this matter, and the goal of liberation will remain the absolute pivot of our policy.

In the field of international policy the


Abdul Rahman Khleifawi’s policy statement to the

People’s Council, al-Baath (Damascus), May 18, 1971.

ARAB WORLD 467

government will take action to ensure the success of the policy of non-alignment in its new sense of hostility to imperialism and colonialism and resistance to the schemes of neo-colonialism, in alliance with the peoples and their sacred right to self-determination and to achieve their economic and political liberation. The government will also support and ally itself with liberation movements throughout the world, for we regard our¬ selves as an inseparable part of the anti¬ colonialist and anti-imperialist liberation front.

The character of our struggle for liberation and the development of our society, the interests of our masses and the nature of the struggle now in progress in the world—all these stress the necessity for us to strengthen our relations with the socialist countries, headed by the friendly U.S.S.R., in economic, political and other fields.

As a part of the Third World, we shall do all we can to strengthen our relations with the developing countries with a view to serving our national and economic goals, and we shall join with them in diminishing the disparity between the advanced world and the backward world.

We shall also determine our attitude to the capitalist countries in accordance with their attitudes to our national problems, with due regard for the interest of our masses and our nation.

336

Statement Issued by the Palestine Na¬ tional Liberation Movement (Fateh) Re¬ futing Accusations in the Jordan Govern¬ ment Memorandum to Arab Ambas¬ sadors in Amman1

May 18, 1971

When we obtained the full text of the

1 Translated from the Arabic text of the Fateh statement,

Fateh (Damascus), May 19, 1971. For the English

text of the Jordanian Foreign Ministry’s memorandum,

issued May 16, 1971, see BBC Monitoring Service,

Summary of World Broadcasts, ME/3687/A/12-A/13.

message delivered by the Jordanian Foreign Minister to the Arab ambassadors in Jordan, we decided not to comment on it immediately, but to let it, and the lies and slanders it contains—which have become the hallmark of the present government— refute themselves. We therefore published the message and distributed it to all news agencies so that it might uncover the new plan adopted by the authorities under the umbrella of what it called “Fateh’s destructive plan.” But now that the government has fallen into the trap and disclosed its criminal methods, it is necessary to explain the fol¬ lowing facts to the masses:

I. For more than two weeks the subservient authorities have in an infamous manner, been assiduously spreading the rumors that are contained in the message. The Premier and his Director of Intelligence have been telling stories in all quarters about the plans that Fateh intends to carry out, and at the official meetings of the Liaison Office the Premier and his aides have mentioned “the grave information they had obtained,” and tried to make light of it, as if everything were under

their control and in their hands. At the last meeting of the Liaison Office, to be precise, [that held] after the Wahdat conference on the anniversary of May 15, the Premier said:

1. The assassination of one of our side will mean the assassination of a hundred members

of your commands, wherever they may be--in Jordan, Damascus or Beirut.

2. In the event of a strike from the Syrian frontier, we shall strike at the Syrian forces and strike hard. He added colonialism has sup¬ plied us with new long-range artillery with

which we can hit the Yarmuk forces and their other forces.

3. An attack on any of our vital installations will mean total war and the occupation of Debbin, Ajlun and the Jordan Valley.

This summary of what the Jordanian Premier said confirms what was said in the message and the significance of the plan that the government intends to carry out.

II. Although the message speaks at length about the plans and the reasons and motives for them, if only for the purpose of covering up the conspiracy, it makes no mention at


all of the Cairo and Amman Agreements or the government’s readiness to abide by them. We are also surprised that the Jordanian government should acquaint the Arab embas¬ sies with such internal matters when it rejects Arab tutelage, rejects Arab inter¬ ference, as its information media and officials have been screaming for months!

III. The crux of the message is clearly revealed by the threats contained in it: “We shall allow no one to play fast and loose”;

“we shall confront the position with the greatest firmness”; “we shall strike with a hand ,of iron.” These are references to the government’s new plan, the aims of which are as follows:

1. To justify keeping the army in Amman and other towns far from its proper place on the frontier;

2. To turn the army into a public security force during Rogers’ recent visit, so that the forces of the Jordanian Arab army might not molest Zionist settlements on the frontier;

3. To undertake a large-scale campaign of arrests in the ranks of members of the revolution and sympathizers with commando action and the revolution;

4. To prepare the way for a new conspiracy on behalf of the battle for the final liquidation of commando action and the revolution in the Jordan Valley and the mountains of Jordan, the reason for these plans mentioned in the orders of the day of the army command as being to ensure that the Jordanian army continues to be injected with shots of hatred for the commandos and to justify their being killed in the sight of officers and men.

IV. At Abu Ayyad’s Amman press con¬ ference, the revolution declared: “We have sure information to the effect that the author¬ ities and their intelligence services intend to manufacture incidents in Amman to jus¬ tify the army’s remaining in Amman and to justify a large-scale attack on the commando forces in the Jordan Valley, Debbin and Ajlun.” This means that the authorities started to implement their plan as soon as the message was delivered to the Arab embas¬ sies, and we are not surprised that such opera¬ tions should be carried out to justify all the measures we have mentioned.

V. This is the first time that the authorities have faced themselves and spoken of the real nature of their hatred of Fateh, though they have long slandered the other organizations, claiming in the past that Fateh was moderate and that its leaders were moderates. How can such moderates suddenly have become the authors of criminal plans which threaten the existence of Jordan and its army?

VI. ... Those who conspire in the darkness and plan crimes against the people and the revolution have started to realize that the blood they have shed in Jordan has started to find them out, and that the masses whom they have humiliated, insulted and killed are bound to seek vengeance and hunt down the criminals and traitors, because the people cannot forgive the killers their massacres and their crimes against the revolution and the revolutionaries.

VII. Regardless of the vengeance that the masses will wreak on the authorities who humiliate and insult them in their attempt to destroy the noblest of mass revolutions, and regardless of whether the masses punish the agents and traitors, Fateh will stand up to this new conspiracy as one man, along with all the revolutionary commando organizations involved in the revolution against this bar¬ barous new attack, and will not let the agents feel secure behind their desks in their palaces as they go on with their conspiracy. We shall not allow the agents to liquidate the revolution of the Palestinian people and the Arab masses as they confidently steal the wealth of the people, conspire against their cause and try to liquidate their revolution.

The government’s message breathes a spirit of arrogance, conceit and conspiracy. We call on the Arab masses and all free men in the world to take a stand against the conspiracy that is being prepared by the authorities. It remains for us to call on our masses in Jordan, our combatants in the Jordan Valley, Debbin and Ajlun and our revolutionaries everywhere, to take a resolute stand in defense of the revolution and the masses.

ARAB WORLD 469

337

Statements Made by U.A.R. President Sadat to the Egyptian National Assembly Reporting on His Talks with U.S. Secre¬ tary of State Rogers and Calling for a Clear Definition of U.S. Policy in the Middle East1

Cairo, May 20, 1971

I met Rogers with an open mind and an open heart. I am not in favor of holding back. I do not go in for holding back. I know what I want— not an inch of our territory is to be relinquished and there is to be no bargaining over the rights of Palestine. So we talked with an open mind and an open heart. We dis¬ cussed for a long time— two and a half hours. With me was the Foreign Minister. “I don’t ask anything of you because you haven’t gone to Israel, but when you have gone I want you, after you return to the United States, I want America to define her attitude, because the [other] three Big Powers have now defined their attitudes.”

There remains America’s attitude, and we must not ignore the fact that America is an essential element in the problem, because she supplies Israel, as I have said and say, with everything from a loaf of bread to a Phantom. He went to Israel and sent me what Israel said, and we analyzed it at a meeting with the Premier Dr. Mahmud Fawzi and the Foreign Minister, and Mr. Husain al-Shafli, the Vice-President of the Republic, also joined us at the meeting. I have given instructions to the Deputy Premier and the Foreign Minister

to send our answer to America today, directly after this session, along the following lines, which I now make known to you, the people and the world.

The question of opening the Canal is not a separate problem nor a partial solution; it is one stage of total withdrawal according to a timetable. We shall never agree to discuss the question of our Egyptian forces crossing over to the East Bank.

We shall not agree to the ceasefire being extended indefinitely as long as there is a single foreign soldier in our territory.

Our territory is what it was before June 5 as far as we are concerned, and this applies to all Arab territories. The Foreign Minister has prepared our reply and directly after this session he will deliver it to America; it asks America to define her attitude; there have been enough exchanges of memoranda.

Rogers came to us and heard what we had to say and saw us, and we discussed every¬ thing with extreme freedom and with open minds and hearts. He went to Israel and saw them. It is now up to America to define her attitude clearly.

It is a question of war or peace; there is no need of another exchange of memoranda to and fro. We have had enough of philo¬ sophical discussions, playing with words and

that sort of thing. I told Rogers, and I hope he won’t be

angry if I tell the secret, but I really must tell you and I think perhaps I told it to the parliamentary committee—I told him: “I cannot accept it when you say that you are going to convince Israel; I cannot even accept

that you are putting pressure on Israel. I officially ask you to inform President Nixon that what is wanted today—while we are

talking of peace, and you have come to us and seen us and seen that we really seriously want peace—I ask President Nixon officially to put pressure on Israel properly if it is really a matter of peace.”

If they want peace, we are for peace; however, what came from Israel, brought by Sisco, doesn’t touch us at all, because Israel is still beset by the arrogance of victory, by Nazi arrogance, and they are still trying to live in the dreams and fantasies of the past. None of this interests me. What does interest me is that America should define her attitude because we are today faced by historic attitudes which must be properly defined —because it is a question of war or peace.

Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text of

Sadat’s speech, al-Ahram (Cairo) , May 21, 1971.


338

Statements by U.A.R. President Sadat Reiterating Egyptian Insistence on the Return of All Occupied Arab Territory and Recognition of the Rights of the Palestinians As Conditions for a Middle East Settlement1

Cairo, May 26, 1971

As all the world can bear witness, we have done all in our power to find a peaceful issue to the crisis. We have made two conditions:

1. [The return of] the territory, all the Arab territory occupied since June 4, 1967. By this I do not mean only Egyptian territory —before Egyptian territory we insist on the return of Arab Jerusalem, the West Bank of Jordan, Gaza, the Syrian Heights and Sinai.

2. [Respect for] the rights of the Palestinian people, and it is the joint responsibility of all the peoples of the Arab nation, along with the Palestinian people, to maintain and defend them. These rights of the Palestinian people are more than a question of human sympathy for the refugees; they are national rights; we cannot agree that they should be decided on a charitable basis—they rest on a political and legal basis.

We have responded in full, not only to Security Council Resolution 242 of 1967; we have also responded to the initiatives of Ambassador Gunnar Jarring, the represen¬ tative of the United Nations Secretary - General, who is entrusted with the task of following up the implementation of that resolution.

What is more, we ourselves took a step after that with an Egyptian initiative in which we proposed a first stage of total withdrawal in return for a step by us in the form of opening the Suez Canal to international trade.

But colonialism and its tools are making a


Sadat’s speech at a banquet he gave in honor of U.S.S.R.

President Podgorny on an official visit to the U.A.R.,

al-Ahram (Cairo), May 27, 1971.

great mistake if they imagine that our desire to get things moving comes from a fear to confront the responsibilities of fighting should we be required to take up arms in defense of the homeland and of our principles.

Israel has responded to none of these initiatives—neither ours nor those of the international community, and it is clear that what Israel wants is not peace, but expansion. This is what we reject and what we are prepared to fight against.

The United States has made efforts which we have not rejected, although we are well aware of Israeli-American relations, and we have made clear our fundamental attitudes, and we have waited with open minds and hearts.

We want everyone to know that we are not prepared to relinquish territory or rights in return for a mirage, nor are honeyed words a proof of good intentions.

We have clearly defined our attitude to the United States in a recent official memo¬ randum in which we said “We regard con¬ tinued American material and military sup¬ port for Israel as American participation in the occupation of our territories and the aggression against the sovereignty of our homelands.”

339

Statement by King Faisal of Saudi Arabia Expressing Hope for American Concern To Rectify Injustice in the Middle East, Made at the Start of His Official Visit to the United States2

Washington, May 27,1971

The real aggression to which our countries and our peoples are being subjected should arouse the concern of Your Excellency, your


King Faisal’s speech replying to U.S. President Nixon’s

White House welcome speech, al-Bilad (Jedda), May

28, 1971.

ARAB WORLD 471

government and your great people. This aggression, which is embodied in the occupa¬ tion of our territories and holy places, and aggression against one of our peoples, is the cause of the tension between this country and the Arab and Islamic countries.

The love of the good and of justice, and the desire that truth may prevail, which grace your great people, yourself, Your Excellency, and your wise government, lead me to hope that you may surmount these difficulties and restore things to their normal course so that truth may prevail, justice be spread abroad and peace be preserved in the area.

340

Statement Issued by King Faisal of Saudi Arabia’s Special Adviser Prince Nawaf, Reporting the King’s Talks with U.S. President Nixon1

Washington, May 28, 1971

His Majesty King Faisal at this meeting affirmed Saudi Arabia’s total commitment to its responsibilities vis-a-vis the problems of the Islamic and Arab nations, and made clear to His Excellency [President Nixon] the dimensions and the gravity of the stage through which the Arab nation is at present living, in view of the ambitions of Zionism and the continued Israeli occupation of Arab holy places and territories. He referred to the need to take action to find a solution that will ensure that the Arab nation recovers its usurped legitimate rights, and affirmed that Saudi Arabia will go to all lengths in meeting its obligations to our Islamic and Arab nations. The speech made by His Majesty King Faisal on his arrival at the White House was a clear and frank expression of Saudi Arabia’s policy vis-a-vis the Arab and Islamic states, and of its awareness of its duty to play a part in solving their problems. [His Highness

1 Translated from the Arabic text of Prince Nawaf

Ibn Abd al-Aziz’s statement to the Saudi News Agency

correspondent, al-Bilad (Jedda), May 29, 1971.

concluded his statement by saying that the two parties had exchanged viewpoints on all aspects of the situation in the Middle East and all world problems.]

341

Interview Statements by Palestine Re¬ sistance Spokesman Shaath Rejecting the Idea of a “Palestine State” on the West Bank and Advocating a Democratic State for Arabs and Jews in All Palestine2

May, 1971

Qj What about . . . a ‘Palestine State’ on the West Bank, for example, which some people advocate.

A. Those who support the idea of a quasi- Palestine, a quisling state, are a few ‘notables’ which Israel, and America in particular, have been cultivating. The young people don’t share their views. The quisling state would be a solution to the whole problem; Israel would be entrenched forever. It would retain full power over the West Bank and extend its economic exploitation without having to absorb the West bankers as citizens, without being burdened by the demographic problem that the expanding West Bank population presents.

Any talk about ‘two Palestines’ is really to talk about a South African situation. Israel is saying: ‘What we have we hold and what you have is negotiable’. We are there to stay and you will have a Bantustan beside us. We shall carry out our (mission civilisatrice’. We’ll help you along. You’ll be the junior partner. If all you want is a flag, you can have it. Malawi has a flag! This is completely at odds with the idea of a democratic State of Palestine for both Jews and Arabs, which is our aim.

ifi v *!'

Excerpts from Shaath’s interview with David Hirst,

Middle East correspondent of The Guardian, as published

in Middle East International, I, 2 (May, 1971), pp. 23,

24, 25.


[In the course of the discussion Dr. Shaath agreed that the guerrilla movement had lost “a good deal of popular support”, and said one cause was the exaggerated expecta¬ tions of the Arab people. He explained that the Arab individual had been basically a spectator, never contributing to the policy¬ making of any Arab country. He found new hope in guerrilla movement after the 1967 war but expected the movement to liberate Palestine overnight.]

Qj It seems that the spectators included, most significantly, many West Bankers.

A. The West Banker had an additional misery. Besides being an Arab, he was under occupation. He didn’t know how long he would have to wait and suffer and felt that if this standstill continued the West Bank would inevitably be absorbed into Israel like other parts of Palestine were.

All this made him look to President Nasser, who had accepted the Rogers proposals, and entertain the hope, or illusion, that at least for this stage, something could be done to release him from immediate bondage so that he could carry on the struggle.

❖ ❖ ❖

Q. Could not your democratic State be achieved by peaceful evolution, with a West Bank State as a stepping stone towards it?

A. No. Israel cannot be held where it is, side by side with what I call a ‘Palestinostan’. What happens is that the rich become richer and the poor poorer. It is the Gunnar Myrdal vicious circle. It is the powerful society which infiltrates the weaker one. So Israel will become more powerful, more racist, more capable ol crushing any attempts to integrate these two areas—except on its own terms. The democratic State can only be achieved by the liberation struggle which will eventually involve the Jews of Palestine.

Qj When the guerrilla leadership adopted the ideal of a democratic State to incorporate all Jews now in Palestine, did it have difficulties propagating this humane solution among the Pales¬ tine people?

A. It was very difficult. On the one side

there is a victor, on the other side a vanquished. The Palestinian was robbed of his land, expel¬ led, uprooted. Who did this? The Jews. The Jew came to him as a conqueror, the European invader, the colonialist settler. True, that very conqueror was persecuted where he came from. And the majority of Jews who came to Palestine did not view themselves as conquerors, as colonialist settlers. Many of them were literally thrown out of Europe; they were desperate and came to Palestine to survive.

But the Arabs never experienced the Jews as persecuted people. The Palestinian now has to reconcile himself to a new fact, a revolu¬ tionary fact: the fact that he can actually go back to that land, liberate it, and yet not liberate it from the Jewish individuals who came there, but from that particular system that made them, no frightened Jewish settlers, but conquerers, oppressors, occupiers. He is to liberate them as well as himself from colonialist Zionism. He is being told they are not his enemies, not inherently vicious. He can go and live with those who threw him out and kept him out, leave them in their houses and build his own alongside. He is giving them chances equal to his; he doesn’t even insist on a majority.

He accepts them all whereas in the past he was told that, if he accepts anybody it would probably be the descendants of those who came in 1918 or 1947. This is new. It is changing the very make-up of Palestinian perception.

Qj Are the guerrillas making persistent efforts to instil this idea?

A. In the past two years Fatah has been spending a lot of time and effort on education, This education has to go into fantastic, completely unpredictable things.

It has to start, step by step, eradicating every little bias that has crept into the Palestinian mind against ‘the Jews’. Even the use of the word Tuhuud to describe Israelis has been constantly checked. So have little identifications of Jewishness with the enemy State, or Zionism.

The fight involves the teaching of Hebrew to children and adults, the teaching of Jewish

ARAB WORLD 473

history. We also make continuous efforts to bring Jewish people to the camps - at present none of the visitors are Israeli Jews.

Q. Isn't there a contradiction between your aim of creating a democratic Palestine, where Jews live in harmony with Arabs, and the fact that Fatah sometimes strikes not merely against soldiers, but civilians?

A. This is paradox. But a paradox means only a seeming contradiction. On the one hand we have to persuade the Israelis the new thing we are offering is feasible, plausible, credible.

On the other, it is not just by painting a rosy picture of the future that we shall succeed. We can paint the rosiest picture, and the Israeli, enjoying the tranquillity of the state

he is now living in, will say: ‘OK, but why should I abandon what I have for, at best, a venturesome future?5

We have got to show him that he cannot have the tranquillity of an oppressor state.

342

Lebanese Press Interview Statements by Representative al-Hasan of the Pop¬ ular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, Reporting on the Visit to China of a Palestine Liberation Organi¬

zation Delegation1

Early June, 1971

Q. Were there official negotiations during the visit [to China by a P.L.O. delegation] a?id if so what were their results?

A. The Palestinian delegation had several meetings with the Chinese authorities, at various levels. At all these meetings the Palestinian delegation concentrated on the following points:

1. The imperialist conspiracy to impose a political settlement is becoming daily more serious. Rogers5 recent trip, which he made while the delegation was visiting Popular


al-Hasan’s exclusive interview, al-Hurriya (Beirut),

No. 571 (June 14, 1971), p. 17.

China, was just one indication of how the scope of this conspiracy is expanding.

2. The imperialist conspiracy to impose a political settlement is now, and this is something very serious, proceeding hand in hand with the conspiracy of local reaction to strike at and liquidate the Palestine Resistance, the reason for this is that the liquidation of the Resistance is a fundamental condition if the settlement is to be pushed through, and that imperialist conspiracy and Zionist terrorism have not proved sufficient to put an end to the Resistance, so that the local agents had to be set in motion to carry out this task. It is in this light that we understand the massacre of September 1970.

3. In spite of the extremely difficult cir¬ cumstances (both subjective and objective) which surround the Palestinian struggle, the will to endure and continue, along with an attempt to build it on sound political lines, are what we pledge ourselves to and hold to

firmly. 4. Our friends5 support for us, and especial¬

ly the support of Popular China, which is based on a sound political attitude of absolute refusal to recognize the existence of Israel and of absolute understanding of her aggres¬ sive character and her organic links with world imperialism, constitutes an effective element in the Palestinian struggle’s ability to endure and continue.

The Chinese always had the following points

in mind: 1. Our attitude to the Palestinian cause

is a matter of principle and our support is dictated by our international duties, and is never subject to political considerations.

2. We regard your battle against impe¬ rialism in the Middle East as of direct concern to Popular China, and we hope that, through your struggle, you will be able to bring American imperialism and Zionism to the stage of collapse that now confronts it in Indochina, Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos.

3. Your national unity (and your Arab unity) are an extremely important element in your ability to reach this level.

4. You can always be confident of our support for you and you can be confident that our support for you is unconditional,


as it has been in the past and will always be.

Qj What can he regarded as new in these talks?

A. I observed more than one new point in the talks. The first was our Chinese comrades5 insistence that although imperial¬ ism and its instrument Israel are our principal enemy in the area, these forces may employ reaction to strike at us from within. Should this happen, reaction will have to be placed in the forefront of our enemies, and we will have to have plans to confront it. The second point is that it is not enough to talk of national unity in the abstract; this unity must be based on a sound political line. If there is no sound political line we will have to fight theoretically and persevere in this fighting until practice demonstrates the truth of the points of view that have been rejected, when the political line will be able to prevail. Our Chinese comrades pointed out that if we compare the situation of the Palestine revolu¬ tion with that of the Chinese revolution (from the point of view of adopting a sound political line) our situation is more difficult, because in China the differences were within a single party, whereas our differences arise in a front in which there are conflicting intel¬ lectual and political trends.

The third new important point in these talks was the Chinese attitude, of which we were informed officially, and which may be summed up as follows: Popular China will henceforward provide its aid and support to the Palestine Liberation Organization, so that this aid may reach every combatant com¬ mando detachment; this is the kind of participation by which they are helping to promote Palestinian national unity. I think that this attitude, which expands the sphere of cooperation between Popular China and all the commando detachments, will lead to a strengthening of relations, and there can be no doubt that these three points are an expression of Popular China’s understanding of the development of the situation in the area and of the nature of the internal situation of the Palestine Resistance especially at the present stage.

343

Press Interview Statements by Former President Helou of Lebanon, Reviewing Measures Taken by Lebanon at the Outbreak of the June War of 19671

Beirut, Early June, 1971

Qj Did you expect the [1967] war? A. In calling these meetings I did not

forget what a foreign observer had said to me after the Sharm el-Sheikh crisis — that the withdrawal of the international force from Sharm el-Sheikh would leave the field clear for Israel to realize her expansionist ambitions.

Q. Did you acquaint the Arab capitals with this view?

A. President Abdel Nasser knew it. But he depended on the estimates of certain military commanders in Egypt, especially in the air force, on the measures taken and the assured defensive capacity to repel aggression. There were also the representations made to him by the great powers, as he explained after the war. All this enabled the enemy to carry out its aggression.

Qj At the Lebanese levelwhat happened? A. Before June 5, I had made tours of

inspection on the Lebanese frontiers with Premier Rashid Karami and some officers. I visited the sectors to ascertain their prepared¬ ness and their morale. I visited the eastern, western and central sectors.

I still remember what General Jean Nujaim said to us when we visited his sector he was then a brigadier. He said that the orders given by the command were: No withdrawal. This was not just talk. These really were the orders. This means that every officer and man was intent on defense to the death.

Q. When you learned of the aggression what measures did you take?

A. I called Premier Karami to the Sinn al-


Helou’s interview, al-Nahar (Beirut), June 5, 1971.

ARAB WORLD 475

Fil Palace, and after discussion with him we decided to hold an extraordinary meeting of the Council of Ministers.

Before the meeting was held I sent for the Egyptian Ambassador to Lebanon, Major General Abd al-Hamid Ghalib, and in the presence of Karami and Ghalib I telephoned President Abdel Nasser and told him that Lebanon would not fail to do her duty, and that I called for coordination with the Arab countries on behalf of the battle, and especially with Egypt, and I asked for an Egyptian commander to be sent to Beirut for this purpose.

Abdel Nasser replied that in the present situation, the scope of the war having already expanded, he could not accede to my request. But he asked me to contact the Syrian authorities, adding that Syria had immense forces and massive war equipment, and that Lebanon could depend on cooperation with her in this connection.

So at once, with Karami and Ghalib still there, I contacted the Syrian President, at that time Dr. Nur al-Din al-Atasi, and told him of my talk with President Abdel Nasser. I added that Lebanon was absolutely ready to cooperate.

Qj What was al-Atasi’s reply? A. The Syrians’ answer was always that

they were not afraid that the enemy would pierce the Eastern Front; it was extremely strong and could not be penetrated. What they were afraid of was that the enemy might penetrate through the Marjayoun axis and encircle the Syrian forces from the rear.

I then assured him that the Lebanese army would defend this axis with all its strength, determination and faith.

Qj What time did you get in touch with Abdel Nasser and al-Atasi?

A. Not later than 11:30, I think.

Qj How did Abdel Nasser sound? Was he happy?

A. The reports of the fighting were con¬ tradictory and the facts had not become clear by then.

Q. And al-Atasi? A. His tone was very strong and it was

clear that he was confident that the Eastern Front would not be pierced. I repeated to him that we were prepared for mutual under¬ standing, cooperation and coordination.

Immediately after our talk, as an affirma¬ tion of our undertakings, I, along with Premier Karami, drafted a law permitting the govern¬ ment, in case of need, to allow Arab forces to enter Lebanese territory, the military com¬ mand to be consulted and necessary arrange¬ ments to be made, within the limits of Leban¬ ese sovereignty.

When the drafting of the law was completed, I asked for the Chamber of Deputies to be called to meet in extraordinary session to ratify the draft law, and at an emergency session which ended before 5 p.m. on the Monday evening the Chamber passed the law.

In the evening, at about 6 p.m., the army command contacted me and said that the military authorities in Syria had asked the Lebanese army command to allow Syrian forces to enter Lebanese territory immediately. The command naturally answered, as did Premier Rashid Karami, that there were certain prerequisites for coordination, and that certain conditions applied to the entry of Syrian forces, including the drawing up of an agreement, however rapid and simple, between Syria and Lebanon, explaining the object of the forces entering and the regula¬ tions governing the stay of Syrian forces in Lebanon, and defining their political and military privileges, and the timing of their withdrawal.

To avoid delay and to prevent anything that might affect the course of cooperation and coordination, we, along with Premier Karami, drew up a document based on the provisions we had previously sent to the Unified Arab Command, and which it had adopted.

That evening, the evening of June 5, I again contacted President al-Atasi and gave him some idea of these obligations, and asked him to fix an early date for a Lebanese delega¬ tion to meet a similar Syrian one to draft a form of final agreement acceptable to both parties in the light of which Syrian forces should enter Lebanon.


I then sent for Ambassador Ghalib, who had been sending me information about the Egyptian front, and thanking me for Le¬ banon’s noble and brotherly attitude.

That evening too, I kept an appointment, made before the Israeli aggression started, with the American ambassador in Lebanon, Mr. Porter, and took the opportunity of expressing to him Lebanon’s condemnation of the aggression and of the indignation of the Lebanese and the Arabs at the attitude of America, without which Israel would not have been encouraged to launch her attack.

Q. Then what happened with Syria? A. President al-Atasi did not fix a date for

the signing of the agreement on the entry of Syrian forces. We repeatedly reminded him; for three days we contacted Damascus with this end in view, but the date was not fixed and the agreement was not signed.

Q. Did you depend on broadcast news? A. I did not listen to the radio. I received

constant reports from the army command, from the Ministry of Information and from certain Lebanese ambassadors abroad, and from certain Arab ambassadors in Lebanon.

The next day the Council of Ministers met to follow up the developments in the war. At the end of the day we took a decision to ask our ambassadors in London and Washington to return to Beirut, in view of reports that were being received and of the rupture of relations between the Arab states and these two countries. We did not break off relations, but adopted a middle-of-the-road attitude.

344

Letter from King Hussein of Jordan to Premier al-Tall5 Alleging Treachery on the Part of Those Espousing the Idea of a West Bank State and Calling for a Resolute Stand Against Them (Excerpts)1

Amman, June 2, 1971

In moves made recently the hostile scheme reached its evil extreme and its vicious climax in the suspect call secretly launched by those who are working in the service of that scheme for the establishment of a state, a government or an entity. These people did not care where the state was established, when the government came into existence or how the entity was formed: their only aspiration was to come to power, or to achieve some measure of power.

Our officers, men and citizens are accus¬ tomed to dying for Palestine with honor and courage, as our enemies themselves know better than anyone else, and are unable to deny. If there are today in our ranks agents of our enemies who allow themselves to be seduced into killing heroes with the mines of perfidy and the bullets of treachery, or if there is in our land a handful of men whose profession is conspiracy, whose trade is deceit and who delight in criminal actions against the fields, the peasant, the worker, the student, the merchant or the citizen, or if there has arisen in our path a group that wants to sell the homeland and liquidate the cause to establish a government and forget Palestine, we want our stand against them to be resolute and intrepid, leaving no room for hesitation, leniency or settlements.

We are continuing our advance—one people, one goal and one road—everyone who is of our people and loves and cherishes it, whoever believes in our goal and works for its achievement, whoever has trod our path and not relinquished his chivalry and honor


Hussein’s letter, al-Dustur (Amman), June 3, 1971.

ARAB WORLD 477

is of us, and we are his, and we shall set him in the highest place among us.

As for him who disbelieves in our people, denies our goal and betrays our course, there is no place for him in our ranks.

It is our duty to disclose all this to all Arabs. It is also our duty to continue to be the hope of our people in the occupied part of our land and to protect with our lives our sacred unity until God grants us liberation, and Jerusalem becomes free and Arab once again and our rights are restored, full and undiminished. It is then that the people, who have endured and rejected, will say what they have to say about self-determination; it cannot be permit¬ ted that their part should be said today, untruthfully, by those who have made it their task daily to commit crimes in their name.

My greetings and best wishes to Your Excellency.

345

Letter from Premier al-Tall of Jordan to King Hussein Undertaking To Main¬ tain Law and Order and To Purge the Ranks of the Palestine Resistance (Ex¬ cerpt)1

Amman, June 2, 1971

Therefore we shall purge the ranks, all the ranks, of those who make a profession of crime under the veil of commando activity so that we may rescue commando activity from the evil being plotted against it, and in doing so we shall not hesitate, show leniency, or come to terms with any who have chosen the ranks of our enemies and recruited themselves for the destruction of our advance —the advance of all Arabs.

I beg Your Majesty to be confident that, just as security and stability have been achieved in our beloved country, and law and order have returned to our public life


al-Tall’s letter replying to one from King Hussein,

al-Dustur (Amman), June 3, 1971.

thanks to the true awareness and firm loyalty of your loyal people, so this awareness and loyalty will continue to be the first safeguard ensuring that we attain our goals and aspira¬ tions under the protection of your faithful and intrepid command.

I am entirely confident that the day is coming very soon when genuine commando action will deliver itself from all errors and deviations and from everything that dis¬ figures it and impedes its advance. Nor is the day far off when our arms join in an embrace so that all may be directed where they should be and used for the cause and not against it, for right and construction, not for wrong and bloodshed.

May God keep Your Majesty and watch over you: it is He who hears and answers.

346

Speech Hailing the U.A.R.-U.S.S.R. Trea¬ ty of Friendship and Cooperation, Made by President Sadat to the Egyptian Popular Assembly (Excerpt)2

Cairo, June 2,1971

One of the most important and conspicuous of the positive developments in the recent period has been the signing of the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between the United Arab Republic and the U.S.S.R.

We wanted this treaty and insisted on its being signed because it provides our general struggle with new safeguards which had not been previously determined.

There are many aspects of cooperation

between us and the Soviets that have been

established over the years, and any references to them in the provisions of the treaty are merely reaffirmations. By this I mean the field of cooperation on behalf of world peace

and the right of peoples to self-determination, respect for the principles and the Charter of


Sadat’s speech, al-Ahram (Cairo), June 3, 1971.


the United Nations, and economic, cultural and technical cooperation.

But there is something new in this treaty that is fundamental, and it is this that, as I said,

made us want this treaty and insist on its being

signed, and I am certain that this fundamental

thing is embodied, above all, in the provision in Article Eight which says—and I ask you to give the closest attention to every expression and every point in it. This paragraph says:

“To strengthen the defense capacity of the

United Arab Republic, the high contracting

parties will continue cooperation in the mili¬ tary field on the basis of the appropriate agree¬ ments between them, and this cooperation will

include, in particular, help in training the members of the armed forces of the United

Arab Republic so as to increase their capacity

to eliminate the consequences of aggression

and also to increase their capacity to confront aggression in general.55

This is what is new. This is what we want and what we hold fast

to, in our belief that the battle will be imposed on us and that the last word in the struggle will be said on the field of battle.

We are still trying at the political level, we have closed no door and we shall let no oppor¬

tunity pass; if there is a one percent hope of a peaceful solution we shall not hesitate to work for it. But in the end—whatever the circum¬ stances—we shall fight for the liberation of our

territory. This is a duty for us, just as it is a

legitimate right. Our will and our determination to put this

in the form of a treaty have a basic significance that we want all parties in the world to under¬ stand.

The whole of the western press and western propaganda have tried to represent certain of our internal affairs as being a change in our political line which was determined and laid down by the masses of our people. This line is the liberation of all our territory.

The development of our economic and social life on the basis of the Charter and the statement of March 30: Friendship with those who are friendly to us and hostility to those

who are hostile to us. National independence and maintaining

an attitude of non-alignment in its positive, not its negative sense, which deprives it of all meaning and significance.

They have tried to convince themselves

with their hints that a change has taken place in our policy, that our friendship with the U.S.S.R. is just a single phase, merely a tactic.

I am confident that I am expressing your will and the will of the masses of the whole of our nation when I tell you the following:

Friendship with those who help us—and no

one else is helping us—to build, is not the friendship of one phase only; it is a friendship for all stages; it is not a mere tactic but a firm strategy.

We are doing this from a position of national independence.

We are doing it from a position of national

will. Because there can be no independence as

long as our territory is occupied and there can be no will if there is backwardness.

We have set our will, our determination, on this treaty, so that we may say to all: Yes, we are friendly to those who are friendly with us and hostile to those who are hostile to us.

No, we shall never move from the goal of liberation, through peace or through war. Yes, we are determined to achieve progress and to build the modern contemporary state.

We trample on all the propaganda of psychological warfare that is directed against us, because we know its goals.

It wants us to be without a single friend as we fight the battle and as we build. It wants us to be unable to confront the military challenge. It wants us to be ineffective in confronting the challenge to our civilization. If they think that by the psychological warfare they are directing against us they can put us on the defensive, we say to them: You are mistaken; we are in offensive positions.

We are not at all indebted to them. We have one debt and we shall pay it. That debt is our loyalty to our usurped and occupied territory in which the enemy has been station¬ ed for four years. This is our only debt; a debt to our territory, a debt to our honor, a debt to independence, and God willing we shall keep our promise, honestly and sincerely.

ARAB WORLD 479

The United States of America declares that it has a firm policy, the policy that it officially announced—the policy of maintaining the balance of power in the area. What this policy means is that Israel should always be stronger than all the Arabs together. This is the per¬ manent policy of the Republican Party and the Democratic Party; it is that Israel should always be in a position of superiority over the Arabs, this situation being called the balance of forces. As a politician I have to make my calculations not on the basis of the battle that confronts us today—I must draw up policy with regard to the future of the coming generations of our children. It is my duty to hand on the trust of this country to the next generation confident that it is secure. This was the policy of Abdel Nasser who died while he was building the army and who made it possible for us to say to Israel today: Depth for depth and napalm for napalm.

When the United States talks of Israel’s military superiority it is not a question of superiority in numbers of tanks and planes, for if it gave every Israeli a tank and a plane we could defeat them. But the United States is supplying Israel with all the latest inventions and electronic instruments of war, and all the technique and science of war, which are advancing and developing every day, every

minute. In addition to this, Johnson announced

in 1968 that the American Sixth Fleet is Israel’s strategic reserve, and that he was ready to intervene should Israel be attacked.

It is my duty as a politician to see the picture as a whole, not merely the picture of the battle that is coming soon, but the picture of the whole of the present and the whole of the future. The Zionist invasion to which we are subjected will not end when we recover our territory; it is a new crusation invasion which will last for our generation and and the genera¬ tion of our children, and it is our responsibility as a generation, before we abandon the respon¬ sibility, to arm the new generation so that it may be strong enough to continue the battle after we are gone.

This is our duty, so that we may not allow

the coming generation of our children to be

refugees, and we have not forgotten our duty.

I say to you that when our immediate battle is ended, the battle for the recovery of our territory, I shall not get a wink of sleep unless we have a whole army trained in the use of electronic equipment, for this alone can protect our homeland against a new Zionist attack.

It was for all these reasons that I insisted on the conclusion of the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the U.S.S.R. Science and technology are complementary at both military and civilian levels in both countries, the U.S.S.R. and the United States of America, one of which is friendly and honorable and has stood beside us in our darkest hours, while the other declares that it will safeguard the balance of power in favor of Israel forever.

In view of this I shall not hesitate to ask our

friend to give us science and progress to confront this great challenge.

It was the U.S.S.R. that for ten years helped us to build the High Dam. This was the decisive answer to the statement of Dulles,

the Secretary of State of the United States in 1956, that Egypt was a bankrupt country that could not build the High Dam. With the help of the U.S.S.R. our economy was able to bear the cost of building the High Dam, and with the same help our economy was able to bear the cost of building 1200

factories. In recent months the U.S.S.R. conclud¬

ed with us the latest economic agreement for five years, the implementation of which represents the strategy of the future and which will enable us to achieve military and civilian self-sufficiency.

It was for the sake of our future and of com¬ ing generations that we urged the U.S.S.R. to conclude this treaty. The help provided by the U.S.S.R. has always been honorable, and it has never asked anything at all from us. We are still prepared to talk to anyone about peace, but we are not prepared to abandon our

coming generations either in the battle of today or in the future. We are not afraid of anything; our will is ours and the only authority in the country is ours, and the only will in our country is ours. But it is not


only the battle of today that preoccupies us but the battle of the future that stretches out before us.

To those who are accustomed to working in the dark I say that this treaty has no secret annexes. It is our custom to face things in the light of day and to face up to our responsibility. We are friendly with those who are friendly with us and hostile to those who are hostile to us. The friend who offers his friendship without terms or conditions—we must grasp him firmly by the hand and make sure of his friendship. Our will will always be free and our relations with the U.S.S.R. are the relations of one honorable friend with another. And the U.S.S.R. is assisting us in our battle for the liberation of our territory and for the building of the modern state to strengthen our independence and maintain our will.

347

Lebanese Press Interview Statements by Premier al-Tall of Jordan, Comment¬ ing on Government-Resistance Rela¬ tions and the Economic Sanctions Impo¬ sed on Jordan by Other Arab States1

Amman, June 5,1971

Qj After the incidents of last September you said that the relations then existing between the Jordanian government and the commandos were “hypocritical ” What is the nature of the relations existing between the Jordanian government and the [Palestine] Resistance now?

A. Relations between us and the Resistance now are sincere, clear, and frank; there is no concealment about them. What I mean is that all the government’s intentions are quite clearly known by the Resistance. For example, we say to the commandos: You may concen¬ trate in such and such an area, on condition that your being there does not worry the people who live there, and on condition that


al-Tall’s exclusive interview, al-Nahar (Beirut), June

6, 1971.

full discipline is maintained and that conduct is good.

Qj What is the Jordanian governments view on reports that a Palestinian government in exile is to be formed?

A. It is our conviction that some groups of them want a Palestinian government, even if it only governs twenty acres. But this will not succeed; although we know that they are being encouraged in this by various parties, they will not succeed. The reason why there has been so much talk about such a govern¬ ment is that many of them suffer complexes, complexes of prestige, of rule, of knowledge, of army parades, none of which help the cause of liberation.

Qj Is the dialogue between the Jordanian govern¬ ment and the Resistance still going on ?

A. The time is past for dialogue in the sense of negotiations. We are now in agreement about basic principles, and the King has given clear instructions in this connection. Every¬ thing is referred to the Liaison Office. As for the holding of continuous meetings and so on, that is not happening. There are a lot of meetings on side issues; that is all. There is contact, even if from time to time they say that they have cut off contacts with the govern¬ ment. At the moment the government has nothing to say to them. It has told them what is required and they have agreed, and we are implementing it to the full. This is not the job of the government, but of subsidiary organizations of the government.

Qj Commando sources keep saying that the Jordanian government is not abiding by the Cairo Agreement and the Amman Protocol.

A. The Cairo Agreement and the Amman Protocol are based on two points: the sover¬ eignty of the Jordanian state and freedom of genuine commando action. This is our basis and this is the basis of the Cairo Agreement. But to go back to the formalities and details, how many offices, how many armed men and so on—it would be as if there were two states negotiating with each other, and this is really not practical and, what is more, is

ARAB WORLD 481

prejudicial to our national unity. Moreover, the circumstances in which we concluded these details no longer exist. The basis of the Cairo Agreement and the Amman Protocol are: the sovereignty of the Jordanian state and freedom of commando action.

Q. But the commando leaders (including Mr. Salah Khalaf—Abu Ayyad) are always saying that the Jordanian government prevents the commando patrols from crossing the Jordan to their operations in the occupied territories.

A. Liars.

Q. But they say that they have made contacts with the Jordanian government on this matter.

A. Liars, liars, they have made no contacts.

Q. The Arab political blockade of Jordan— what steps is the Jordanian government taking to deal with it?

A. We are trying to explain things to our Arab brothers. We are trying to ensure that our relations with them are always good. We believe that they will see the truth in the end.

Q. What has the Jordanian government in view for the near future?

A. The problem of security and order is ended; all that is necessary is a little retouching here and there. We are proceeding in the direction of setting commando action on its right course. Our political and diplomatic effort as regards the Middle East is unceasing.

Q. What about the budget deficit [amounting to 8,170,000 dinars—about 73 million Lebanese pounds] ?

A. We can cope with it.

Qj And if the flow of Arab aid is delayed [Arab aid has been denied to Jordan by Kuwait— about 140 million Lebanese pounds, and Libya— about 8 million pounds; the only Arab aid that has not been cut off being that from Saudi Arabia— about 145 million Lebanese pounds.] ?

A. Arab aid is basically directed to our effort in the battle, our effort in connection with the displaced persons, our military efforts and our effort to increase armaments. The economic blockade will not hurt us as an economic establishment, but it will hurt our effort.

Qj It is being said in Amman that the government is thinking of stopping the payment of the salaries of officials in the occupied West Bank [a total of about 45 million Lebanese pounds].

A. This has not been decided yet, but if we did decide to reduce expenditure, and this is, of course, something that is of concern to us, we shall consider priorities. If we have to choose between our military effort and the salaries of officials in the West Bank, we shall certainly choose our military effort.

Q. But if the cutting off of Arab aid to Jordan continues, will Jordan resort to foreign aid?

A. Of course, although most regretfully. We do not like to depend on foreign aid.

Qj Is there anything new as regards the Rogers initiative ?

A. I have nothing to add to what we have published, because we have published every¬ thing that passed between us and Mr. Rogers. The thing is that we warned him against di¬ viding up the problem into parts especially as he intends to solve the problem as a whole. If the problem of the Suez Canal is solved alone, that would mean that the whole of the Palestine problem would be shelved. That is to say, we must not start surrendering the weapons we can use for exerting pressure one by one.

348

Statement Issued by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, Including Analysis of the Shortcomings of the Palestine Resistance Movement and a Call for the Coordination of Theory and Action with Progressive Elements in Jordan and Throughout the Arab World (Excerpt)1

June 5, 1971

However, in addition to all its positive


P.F.L.P. statement, issued on the fourth anniversary

of the 1967 war, al-Hadaf (Beirut), No. 104 (June 12,

1971), pp. 8-9.


aspects, the Resistance has suffered from ills that have prevented its being completely absorbed in the major tasks that confront it. The reason for this is not its restricted military capacity as compared with that of others; the real reason lies in other factors of weakness that have made it fall short of the level of the requirements of its tasks. What then are these factors that have played a negative role in the advance of the Resistance and which must be surmounted ?

I. The Resistance on the Plane of Class Although it is the workers, peasants and

other toilers who constitute the human struc¬ ture of the sections of the Resistance organiza¬ tions and bear the burdens of the fighting which have clearly embodied the ability of our masses to challenge their enemies and their readiness to fight a long-term battle; in spite of this, the majority of its commands are formed from the petty bourgeois alliance. This kind of command is not naturally qualifi¬ ed to command a battle as difficult as ours is. The experiences of peoples have confirmed that a people’s war of liberation requires above all the endurance demanded by the extended length of such a war, and bourgeois and petty bourgeois commands do not possess this endurance. Our experience during the last four years has confirmed that many of these commands have begun to show signs of fatigue, and the heroic combatants have clearly seen and heard some of these com¬ mands wilting in the face of the pressures exerted by the difficulties and the rigorous new situation which these commands are partially responsible for leading us into.

The incapacity from which the ruling petty bourgeois commands are suffering has made itself felt in certain of the Resistance com¬ mands. This is very natural, for these com¬ mands can only express the character of their class structure. The most important charac¬ teristic of Vietnam is the nature of its com¬ mands.

Our people have proved that they are capable of acquiring a persistent fighting spirit which on many occasions has enabled our combatants, both male and female, to rise above the level of their impotent commands.

Our people are just as prepared as the people of Vietnam for sacrifice and just as ready to fight until victory is won.

One of the most important causes of the crisis in which the Resistance finds itself lies in the character of its commands, which are still in control of the masses and are imposing themselves on their destinies in a way that has impeded and is still impeding the release of [the energies of] our masses and has checked their revolutionary initiatives against the regime of the agents in Jordan.

II. The Resistance in the Ideological and Political Spheres

By its idealistic thinking and its political slogans, which are in conflict with its strategic goal, which is the liberation of Palestine, the bourgeois and petty bourgeois character of the Resistance commands has determined the nature of their battle and their method of action. The slogans of “no interference in the affairs of the regime of the reactionary agents,” “all rifles aimed at the heart of the Zionist enemy,” “we are all commandos,” and so on, inasmuch as they express the mentality and the class structure of these commands, have helped to mislead the masses and have paralysed their initiative. At a time when reaction in Jordan [was preparing] to liquidate the Resistance because of its aware¬ ness of the danger to it constituted by the existence of the Resistance and the fact that the masses were armed, the bourgeois and petty bourgeois commands were in such a state of uncertainty and idealism that they behaved as if there were a possibility of coexisting with reaction, which is inevitably aligned with imperialism and Zionism.

It is true that reaction is superior to us in its ability to take advantage of Arab and international official policy. Therefore the existence of a command of a more radical and revolutionary character will perhaps not completely invalidate the results we have achieved, but the existence of a Marxist- 1, eninist proletarian command would have reduced the negative aspects of the Resistance and put it in a better position than it is now in.

We do not claim that a command of the working class and its Marxist-Leninist party

ARAB WORLD 483

can do the impossible. But such a command and such a party can, by giving the masses a true picture of the situation that surrounds them, put them in a situation which will make their mobilization more effective, more capa¬ ble of holding out, with a greater possibility of winning victory over the enemy.

Our rifles are no longer aimed only at the Zionist enemy, as the bourgeois and petty bourgeois commands wanted, but also at the breast of reaction, in reply to the revolutionary violence practiced by the agents. They are doing this by virtue of the fait accompli in which they are living and which was imposed on them by reaction, as the commands should have realized when the Resistance started and as a result of the battles of November 4, 1968 and February 10 and March 7, 1970.

Your Popular Front has always stressed this fact which the situation has imposed on the Resistance, although the commands that control the Resistance have accused your Front of extremism and lack of commitment.

III. The Resistance in the Military Sphere

The Resistance has possessed arms as have other popular resistance movements, although their commands, subject as they were to the thinking and methods of the bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie, have not accorded arms their proper status as one of the forces that create revolution. Arms, as the instrument of revolutionary violence whose task it is to implement the political strategy of any revolu¬ tionary movement, play the role of the tool in the hands of the masses that enables them to depend on themselves and talk to their enemies in the language they understand.

Arms cannot be a substitute for action by the masses, and through their restricted mentality, some of the bourgeois and petty bourgeois commands have hampered the movement and the initiatives of the masses by their saber-rattling.

The result of this has been that those who are armed are now bearing the burden of confronting the army of the agents, practically alone, without being able to take advantage of the immense resources and the great impetus inherent in the masses, and which can only be called into the service of promoting the

revolution through revolutionary organization guided by revolutionary ideology.

The steadfast stand of our masses in Jordan in this period, which has reached a higher level than that of their leaderships, is only one indication of the lack of a plan for struggle, capable of mobilizing the masses for the battle. It also proves the inability of these commands to lay down a plan capable of mobilizing the masses and enabling them to play their role in battles of destiny such as the battle we are fighting today.

IV. The Resistance in the Arab Sphere

The Resistance has offered itself as the vanguard of the Arab masses without per¬ forming the tasks that a vanguard should perform vis-a-vis the masses. While talking of the unity of the Jordanian and Palestinian peoples, and ignoring—even refusing to rec¬ ognize the existence of —Jordanian political forces other than itself, its actions, slogans and programs, in the political field and the field of struggle, have not embodied the contents of its slogans. At the level of the Jordanian masses, for example, it refused to consider recognizing the Jordanian national movement and let reaction go to extremes in its exploita¬ tion of the masses of the workers and peasants and all of the poor and the toilers. The result of this was that, in the eyes of the Jordanian masses, it was a regionalist Palestinian move¬ ment that was both unable to express the will of the Jordanian masses and unwilling to allow Jordanian political forces to do so.

At a time when the Resistance should have been encouraging the rise of Jordanian orga¬ nizations and enrolling their resources to this end, it has been governed by the mentality of its commands. The Resistance did not, for example, raise its voice in defense of the vanguard forces of the Arab masses and in condemnation of the campaigns of violence and maltreatment to which they were sub¬ jected by some of the ruling organizations. This movement has also been unable to establish solid organic relations with the vanguards of the struggle movements in the Arab homeland, which are a part of its advance.

Here special attention must be drawn to


the extreme reluctance felt by the Resistance to abandon its regionalism and to strengthen its links with the Jordanian masses who were fighting, in its midst, a common enemy.

Toiling masses of our Arab nation: Throwing all the blame for the conse¬

quences on the bourgeois and petty bourgeois commands inasmuch as they state the respon¬ sibilities that they ought to shoulder, leaves the picture one-sided with no room for the leftist sections in the ranks of the Resistance or for confronting them with the conse¬ quences of their action and their share in the responsibility for what has happened.

It is true that the left of the Resistance is characterized by theoretical clarity and the

rejection of the slogans of the rightist com¬

mands which have ignored the dialectical relationship between the Palestine problem and Arab problems, but, in addition to the disunity that beset it, this left has been unable either to diminish the influence of the rightist commands or to put an end to their domination. It has also been incapable

of laying down a plan for struggle which would

make its role in the fighting distinctive, and

of strengthening relations with the Palestinian, Jordanian and Arab masses. It has also been incapable of unifying the programs of the leftist sections, which has led to some of its sections employing their resources in the

service of the rightist sections of the Resistance to reinforce the bourgeois and petty bourgeois commands.

For all these reasons the leftist sections must courageously stand up in front of their

masses and conduct a critical examination. This will, firstly, confront the masses with their

historical responsibilities and, secondly, con¬ stitute a solid base for the continuation of

the Resistance and for the mobilization of the masses so that they may play their role in replying to reactionary violence with organized revolutionary violence. Heroic fighters: Free sons of our people:

Your Popular Front, speaking to you frankly as it has always done, believes it to be its basic duty in this critical period of its advance, to have no hesitation in admitting

its share of the responsibility for the errors into which the leftist sections fell.

Certainly the Front has played a prominent

role, both in the political field and in the field of struggle, in opposing subservient Jordanian reaction, and in the field of

combat in Gaza, the West Bank and occupied

Palestine. It has constantly urged the Jor-

danian-Palestinian masses to seize their legit¬ imate rights, played a vanguard role in

leading labor strikes, and achieved successes in forcing the exploiters to grant many of the economic demands of our intrepid workers in

Jordan. It has attempted to employ the methods of guerrilla warfare in confronting the reactionary attack. Its attitude to the

problem of national unity has been based on ensuring that the masses and their leftist sections should feel proud of the vanguard role they have played, and it has promoted

the advance of our people. But all this does not prevent it from seeing the shortcomings in which it has shared.

In spite of its initiatives and its clear¬

sightedness, the Popular Front has been unable, for both objective and subjective reasons, fully to translate this theoretical view into action. It has been unable to resist being swept along, if only partially, by the plans drawn up by the then commands of the Resistance, and accepted the formulae for national unity and common action pro¬ posed by the bourgeois and petty bourgeois commands. Although these formulae were better than the formula for action embodied in the Charter of the Liberation Organization and the Armed Struggle Command, this was the case only at formal and theoretical levels, and the Front did not succeed in making

them the prelude to the drafting of a political and struggle program which would enable the Resistance to endure and to vanquish reaction. Moreover, the Front’s material and military resources have not enabled it to act alone to protect the Resistance and prevent the victory of reaction.

The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine calls on all combatants and the masses and those of their members who are really eager to benefit from their errors, to

ARAB WORLD 485

hasten to review and criticize their programs and practical activities and to share in clarifying their views on what must be done now, in the light of the difficult circumstances which confront all of us.

The Front is therefore of the opinion that all sections of the armed Palestine Resistance and all parties of the Jordanian national

movement should as soon as possible: 1. Share in drawing up a political and

struggle program appropriate to the nature of the new circumstances, on the basis of which all forces and elements prepared to protect the revolution and continue the fight against Israel and the reactionary agents in Jordan, can agree, and to confront reactionary vio¬ lence with organized revolutionary violence which will put an end to the excesses of reaction and its repeated massacres of our people, and which will not be restricted to enabling the masses to take part in the battle against the agents. On the contrary, the hallmark of the content of this program and its class, ideological and political purpose must be the toppling of the subservient reactionary regime.

2. Form a Jordanian-Palestinian national front in which all progressive and nationalist forces will be mobilized to engage in an intrepid, merciless, uninterrupted and un¬ ceasing struggle. This must be a progressive revolutionary front which will engage in all forms of political struggle side by side with military struggle, with the aim of providing the violent response necessary to rout the agents and topple their historically worn out and collapsed regime. It must be a front based on an iron will which is superior to the will of the regime and overcomes its challenge to our revolution and to the will of the masses that the revolution should continue and that the fight against the Zionist enemy should go on.

3. Gall on all parties of the Arab national liberation movement, including the nationalist regimes, and confront them with the respon¬ sibilities, so that the masses of our Arab nation may know the truth of the claims that are made and disclose all that is spurious in the attitudes that are adopted. In this way the Resistance will play the role of the

vanguard that can give judgement on any force or any elements by the criterion of readiness to fight against our imperialist, Zionist and reactionary enemies, a judgement which will provide the masses and their vanguard forces with a standard for their attitudes to this force or that, this regime or that, and support for their revolutionary struggle to show up the fraudulent, the deceivers and those who act in collusion.

4. Escalate combat activity inside the oc¬ cupied territories and strike constant blows at the Zionist and imperialist enemy. Heroic masses:

The events of the last four years have shown beyond all shadow of doubt that if the Resistance commands continue to follow the same methods and adopt the same strategy and tactics, this can only mean advance along the course of surrender to the will of impe¬ rialism, Zionism and reaction.

The only course open to us is to respond to our enemies in the ways available to us and with our latent forces, which will enable us to endure and triumph.

349

Statement of Egyptian Conditions for Reopening the Suez Canal and of Hopes

for U.S. Pressure for a Peaceful Settle¬ ment, Made by U.A.R. President Sadat in an Address to Troops1

June 8,1971

As you know, in February I produced an

initiative and said that I was prepared to open the Canal if the Israelis were prepared to withdraw in a first stage as part of total withdrawal.

I made three conditions, which I told

Rogers about, and I will now tell you what they are, because they were conditions on


Sadat’s speech, al-Ahram (Cairo), June 9, 1971.


which I could accept no discussion. The first was that my forces must cross over to the East Bank, the second was that the ceasefire should last six months only and that a date should be fixed for it to end, as long as there was a single Israeli soldier in our ter¬ ritory. I was not going to make an open- ended ceasefire—only six months; if after the six months there had not been complete withdrawal, the solution would be up to my forces to liberate their territories completely. The third condition was that not an inch of our territories could be given up, either in the form of a lease, or by bargaining. My frontiers are the international frontiers with Palestine and not an inch can be given up.

These were the three conditions I made for opening the Canal, and my initiative still stands.

When Rogers visited me I asked him “What do you want of us?”

He said that Egypt had shown that if peace was possible she was eager for it.

I said to him: “When you have finished here you are going to Israel and then back to the United States. When you go back I want America to define her attitude quite clearly.

It is a question of peace or war. Either Israel really wants peace, and there is implementation of the first phase and Jarring comes in and starts on his task. Or Israel wants territory, wants conditions and wants strategic positions, and that can only mean war.

Israel doesn’t concern me; what concerns me is the attitude of America.

In December 1967, the United States sent us a paper in which it recognized that the frontier between Egypt and Israel is the international frontier.

I asked Rogers: “Do you still hold the same view?” And he said: “Yes.”

“We shall not give up an inch of our territory. Israel has been living at your expense in everything—from a loaf of bread to a Phantom plane; you give Israel a check for $500 million. It isn’t reasonable that a people of two million and a half should carry out raids with 200 planes for seven hours

daily when even the Great Powers cannot do this.”

I was frank with Rogers and he was con¬ vinced by me.

I am awaiting America’s reply and I shall announce it to you and to the people.

If America supports Israel in her occupa¬ tion of our territory, I shall treat her as if she were Israel’s partner.

If she has other views, let her tell me so, and we will go back to the heart of the matter.

As you see, we are proceeding along two parallel lines.

There is the military line, which you are engaged in—effort and sweat in the trenches and in all kinds of weather, and severe training and clashes and raids, a great battle of honor which will later be written about for the people here and for the Arab world.

I announced it on May 1. They thought that the defeat had finished us. By your efforts and your sweat we have

become strong. On May 1 I said: “An eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth, depth for depth and napalm for napalm.”

We no longer accept the fable that Israel is the force that decides everything, that she is the only military force in the area.

I say this to you before all the world, and I said it to Rogers.

An eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth. If Israel strikes us in depth we shall strike Israel in depth. If Israel uses napalm we shall use napalm—they have already had a taste of it in Sinai.

When they hear what I am saying now they will know what I mean; they have already had a sample of what we have.

There is still a one percent hope of a peace¬ ful settlement.

It is this hope that keeps me waiting; I don’t want to give you the order yet.

America has not finally defined her attitude, "•and has asked for a delay before giving her answer. I am giving this delay. If nothing comes from this delay, we shall fight.

Israel is playing for time, and the present situation suits her best.

There is no firing or anything—they are occuping our territory and waiting for our internal situation to collapse so that they can

ARAB WORLD 487

impose their conditions, but I shall not allow time to be on Israel’s side.

350

Statement Issued by a Spokesman for

the Popular Democratic Front for the

Liberation of Palestine, Including Rec¬

ommendations for a Majority Represen¬

tation of Active Combat Organizations

in the New Palestine National Council

(Excerpt)1

June 10, 1971

The Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine submits to the masses the following basic points with respect to the formation of the new Council:

1. The majority should consist of repre¬ sentatives of the combatant forces who bear the historical and day-by-day responsibility in the Palestinian-Jordanian theater. It is these forces whose destiny is totally linked to the national revolution and to the masses who are fighting and struggling against the enemy and in defense of the right of the Palestine revolution to survive and to continue its armed struggle, and to ensure that the people may retain their arms to safeguard the continuation and protection of the Resistance against the national enemy.

2. The size of the representation of the combatant forces in the Council will determine vital day-by-day practice; the Front is there¬ fore of the opinion that the basic groups in the Assembly must be of equal size.

3. All members of the Assembly should be elements that are active in the ranks of the revolution and have direct responsibility. The Council must include no reactionary elements or elements whose relations with the question of revolution are merely seasonal, starting when the session of the National

1 Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text of the P.D.F.L.P. statement, al-Hurriya (Beirut), No. 571 June 14, 1971), p. 2.

Council starts and ending when it ends. This means that the unaffiliated members should have political and technical qualifications and be active in the ranks of the revolution.

4. That the overwhelming majority of the new Council should be drawn from the prin¬ cipal theaters which have to bear the con¬ sequences both of day-by-day struggle and

of the struggle of destiny, first and foremost being the Pales tinian-Jordanian theater.

In forming the Council, care must be taken to avoid all particularist and chauvinist tendencies; it should be open to any struggler in the ranks of the revolution throughout the Pales tinian-Jordanian theater. What deter¬

mines Palestinian national identity is affilia¬ tion and commitment to the cause of the revolution, not racial (Ottoman Palestinian parents) or geographical origin.

These basic points are the most important principles which must be observed in forming

the new Council. Otherwise, all we shall have is a Council which is in no way new except

for some or all of the names, while its practical

and objective structure will be no more than a reproduction of that of previous assemblies.

351

Statements Warning That Continued

U.S. Disregard of the Arab Nation and

Assistance to Israel Would Prejudice

American Interests, Included in an Evac¬

uation Day Speech by President Qadhafi

of Libya2

Uqba Bin Nafi Airbase, Libya, June 11,1971

Brothers: We hoped that after the evacuation [of

the former Wheelus Airbase] America would

2 Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text of Qadhafi’s speech marking the first anniversary of the evacuation of U.S. troops from the former Wheelus Field in Libya, al-Haqiqa (Benghazi), June 12, 1971.


turn over a new leaf so that we could deal

with each other as equals, with the feelings and interests of the American people being respected. But most regrettably, brothers, what has happened is that all the well-inten¬ tioned and serious attempts that have been

made to persuade America to take due account of the Arab nation and to appreciate the feelings of the Arab nation and not to continue to despise the Arab nation and not to ignore the great interests it has in the Arab nation— [despite all this] America has continued to go to extremes in supplying Israel the ag¬

gressor, which is still occupying Arab terri¬

tories. America has continued to supply her

with weapons of destruction. Even though

Israel is the aggressor and is still occupying Arab territory, America is still supplying her with all sorts of arms.

Why is this? It must be for some serious reason, because Israel has occupied enough: she has occupied more territories than she can cope with. What is the meaning of supplying her with arms when she has reached this stage? It means that there is a major international conspiracy of which the Arab nation is to be the victim, and it is intended that Israel shall implement this conspiracy. This means that they want Israel to extend the Zionist presence so as to overwhelm the

[Arab] presence. We know that this area is

not large enough for two nationalities at the same time. This means that the struggle is now between us and Israel and the countries that support Israel and all those in the world who conspire against the Arab nation. The struggle today is a national struggle, a struggle for a civilization, a struggle for existence. The members of the Arab nation, wherever they are, must realize that the battle will be fierce and dangerous and that it is intended that the Arab nation—I repeat—be the victim of a major international conspiracy. So it must pay attention to this danger; its masses from the [Atlantic] Ocean to the [Arabian] Gulf must awaken so that the battle may be made a pan-Arab one which will frustrate all attempts by our enemies.

Brothers: After the evacuation we wanted to have

good relations with America, but we have always affirmed that these relations must not be at the expense of the Arab nation or of the Palestine cause.

We are part of the Arab nation, and the freedom of the Arab nation is our freedom, and the freedom of this people is imperfect as long as the freedom of the Arab nation is imperfect elsewhere.

Arab territory is a single territory from the Ocean to the Gulf and any occupation of any part of it diminishes the independence of all the other parts.

Let the colonialists understand these facts; let the East and the West understand this.

Brothers: America has continued in its injustice and

in its contempt for the Arab nation, and we have warned it many times, and now we for our part will start making light ofAmerica’s interests in the area, and all its relations, for it has continued in its injustice and in its contempt for the Arab will.

Brothers, when America went out Russia could not come in because our dealings with Russia are those of a friend with a friend and the U.S.S.R. is a people friendly to the Arab nation and they have kept up this friendship. And as long as the U.S.S.R. keeps up this friendship and treats the Arab nation as an equal, we shall be its friends although there have not been relations between the Libyan Arab Republic and the U.S.S.R. But in view of the fact that the U.S.S.R. has links of friendship and respect with other parts of the Arab nation, we have had to have good relations with it, and this will continue as long as the U.S.S.R. continues to respect the Arab nation and stand by it and help it and treat it as an equal.

ARAB WORLD 489

352

Communiques Issued by the Popular

Front for the Liberation of Palestine

Announcing Its Attack on the Israeli Oil

Tanker Coral Sea, Alleging That Arab

As Well As Iranian Oil Reaches Israel

and Elucidating P.F.L.P. Determination

To Strike at “Imperialist” and “Reac¬

tionary” Interests Everywhere As Well

As at Israel Itself1

June 13, 1971

Communique No. I At 1.45 p.m.'on Friday, June 11, 1971,

a special unit of the Popular Front fired five missiles at an Israeli tanker called Coral Sea which was passing through Bab al-Mandeb to the Red Sea with a cargo of 65,000 tons of “Iranian” oil destined for the port of Eilat, where it was to be pumped to Ashkelon and from there to Western Europe.

The missiles hit the tanker in two places, igniting its cargo of oil. It stopped, and soon developed a list to the side where the missiles had hit. The Popular Front has kept silent for the last two days, waiting for Israel to admit not only the blow inflicted on her, but also the secret alliance that exists between her and subservient reaction.

The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, whose special marine unit carried out this operation, setting out from its base

in Aqaba, announces its full responsibility for this operation, and at the same time

reaffirms its adherence to its strategy which demands that it should strike at the Israeli enemy, his interests and his links with impe¬ rialism and reaction everywhere.

The Popular Front will later issue a detailed communique on this operation, with which it struck a warning blow at the Israeli alliance

with reaction, to disclose the role played by reaction in supporting the Israeli enemy.

Communique No. II In implementation of the plan drawn up

by the Popular Front for the Liberation of

1 Translated from the Arabic text of the P.F.L.P. com¬

muniques, al-Hadaf (Beirut) No. 105 (June 19, 1971),

pp. 5-6.

Palestine to strike at the Israeli enemy everywhere, and to strike at his interests, which are linked with the interests of impe¬ rialism and subservient reaction both inside and outside the Arab homeland, a special marine unit of the Front shelled an Israeli oil tanker in the Red Sea with five rockets,

causing extensive damage and setting fire to

two of the large tanks in which oil is carried, which resulted in extensive damage which will take a long time to repair.

The Popular Front’s special marine unit

received a battle order from its command to leave its base in Aqaba and make for the

target area. The unit was supplied with fuel,

ammunition and provisions at the contact points it dealt with in more than one place

on the Saudi coast, while the tanker Coral Sea,

which recently started running on the Eilat line, was leaving the Iranian loading port onKharj Island on its way to the Red Sea.

The unit encountered its target in the

prescribed locality where, for certain reasons, the tanker had to follow a particular course

and reduce speed; the rockets registered direct

hits, and the unit left the scene of the operation unharmed.

The confrontation took place about five

kilometers north of al-Buraim Island off the North Yemeni coast.

This operation was timed to take place when it did for the following reasons:

1. [It was intended] to affirm the strategy of

the Popular Front which requires that it should strike at the enemy and his interests everywhere, and especially at the points where the strategic interests of the Israeli enemy

coincide with the interests of imperialism and reaction.

The oil tanker Coral Sea, with its cargo of 65,000 tons of oil, was a point in which the interests of the Israeli enemy coincided with those of imperialism, as represented by the monopoly oil companies, and with the interests of Iranian reaction, both of which act in

collusion with the Israeli enemy and supply the Eilat-Ashkelon pipeline with the oil it requires.

The treachery of Arab reaction, which the Popular Front discloses in detail in its Com-


munique No. 3, and which, in cooperation with Iranian reaction, employs every strata¬

gem to supply the Israeli enemy with Saudi oil, can no longer, as has been the case since

February 1970, when pumping Saudi oil through the Israeli pipeline started, go un¬ disclosed and unpunished.

2. Again, this operation was carried out to. administer a slap to those shirkers and

enemies who have been spreading reports of the Resistance’s alleged impotence and retreat.

The resurgence experienced by the reac¬ tionary enemy, and the delusion he concocts about his conspiracies, which are aimed at liquidating the Palestine cause and bringing

the masses to their knees, and his insistence— along with all sections of his camp that

advocate surrender—on disregarding the will of the Palestinian and Arab masses are all part of the campaign by imperialism, the Israeli enemy and subservient reaction to coerce the masses of our nation and force them to surrender.

This operation was a resounding slap in the face to those who propagate defeatism and neglect to arouse the will to fight in our masses, and to those reactionary, Zionist and imperialist enemies who think that they can decide the destinies of peoples against their

will. Masses of our great people:

The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, which the masses acknowledge as being in the vanguard of the battle of destiny, promises them that it will proceed with armed struggle, through revolutionary violence, against all their enemies, wherever their influence, their interests and their strongholds

are to be found. The Popular Front for the Liberation of

Palestine, which is leading the ferocious popular struggle against the occupiers in Gaza, and has indefatigably escalated its operations in usurped Palestine in the last few months, promises you to continue to strike at the enemy wherever he may be, and to strike at his reactionary liaisons which take the form of infamous collusion with the enemy to consign oil from exploited and humiliated Arab territory to the arteries of the imperialist and Zionist enemy.

Victory to the armed struggle against the enemy wherever he may be ... . Infamy to subservient reaction.

May the dirty oil which the agents and traitors suck up to inject into the veins of exploitation and the Zionist enemy go up in flames!

Communique No. Ill The ten brief points made by the Popular

Front for the Liberation of Palestine in the following communique disclose the signif¬ icance, in the political and military fields and in the field of the struggle, of the slap in the face administered to the imperialist-reactionary-Zionist alliance by the commandos when their rockets hit an Israeli oil tanker which had been supplied at an Iranian port with oil that is pumped with the blessing of Saudi reaction.

These ten points, which expose one of the ugliest crimes that is being committed against the struggle of the people of Palestine and the masses of the Arab nation, should be firmly fixed in the mind of every struggler in the Arab homeland, because they provide an excellent picture of the dirty, Octopus-like enemy whom we confront, and whom we shall continue to hunt down and clash with in whatever form he appears.

1. From the beginning of next month, July 1971, the Israelis intend to increase the throughput of the Eilat-Ashkelon pipeline to about 26 million tons of oil per year, by employing a temporary pumping station, and to do this successfully they must ensure the existence of:

a. The quantity of oil necessary to cover this throughput, part of which is used by Israel while the remainder goes to refineries in

Western Europe, especially in Italy and Rumania.

b. Tankers capable of transporting these quantities of crude oil to Eilat, and others to transport it from the port of Ashkelon to Europe.

2. Because the ensuring of the necessary oil and tankers is of immediate prejudice to matters related to the enemy’s military strat¬ egy and his relations with Iranian and Saudi reaction, in March 1970 a law was passed

ARAB WORLD 491

forbidding the publication of reports about tankers in Israeli ports, their movements, sailings and dates of arrival or departure, under pain of penalties (in accordance with Article 23 of the Israeli Penal Code, the section relative to the security of the state, foreign relations and official secrets, which was published in the Israeli Official Gazette on March 19, 1970).

3. In the meantime Israel started planning to become “one of the greatest countries in the world in the field of transporting and marketing oil” (according to the government- inspired Davar on December 24, 1969). She therefore announced that by the end of

1972 she would have a fleet of tankers with a total tonnage of two and a quarter million tons.

4. From what source is Israel going to

bring this oil to Eilat? There are only two sources in the area east of Suez = Iran and

Arab, particularly Saudi, sources in the Gulf.

Iranian oil supplies the Israeli pipeline with 550 thousand barrels per day, while the major companies constituting the Consortium (Bri¬ tish Petroleum, Shell, Gulf, Standard Oil of New Jersey, Socony-Mobil, Standard Oil of California, Texaco and the French company)

which control production of oil in Saudi Arabia account for the remaining capacity of

the pipeline—about 600 thousand barrels per day.

5. This Arab oil which pours into the tanks of Eilat is conveyed by means of a series of

commercial frauds which are known to every¬

one engaged in oil production, and which can

only be put into effect through the collusion

of Iranian reaction with Saudi reaction, under the supervision of the major monopoly oil companies in the imperialist countries. This agreement was reached in early February

between the Shah of Iran, when he was in

St. Moritz, Switzerland, and one of the largest oil refining companies in Italy, which receives the greater part of the Iranian and Saudi oil that is pumped through the Israeli pipeline.

6. For this deal to become effective and be put into effect by the reactionary traitors in collusion with the imperialist and Zionist

enemy, the two parties employed large num¬ bers of go-betweens to engage in misrepre¬ sentation and deceit. This operation of mis¬ representation is supervised by the Israeli company “Transasiatic Oil,” together with

the international oil companies which control not only Arab oil but also the reactionary Arab governments which are so deeply im¬ brued in treachery.

7. The fact that Israeli tankers flying the flags of other countries are supplied with oil in the harbor of the Iranian island of Kharj in the Arab Gulf and sail for “an unknown destination” to await orders, as is alleged, cannot disguise the fact that a large part of

this oil is Arab which, for purposes of mis¬ representation, is sold through a third party. The Israeli company, “Transasiatic Oil,” has established a complicated network of agents with a view to misleading any attempt to follow up the traces of this secret alliance between Saudi Arabian reaction and Israel and the monopoly world oil companies. The London Sunday Times, on December 13, 1970, and the American journal Oil and Gas, on June 8, 1970, disclosed in detail that one barrel in two of the oil loaded on to Israeli tankers in Kharj is Arab oil shipped from Ras Tanura in Saudi Arabia.

8. So that the world monopoly companies may be able to supply the quantity of oil required for the increased throughput of the Israeli pipeline—the quantity required for a large fleet of tankers totalling two and a half million tons, which is to be ready by the end of 1972—Aramco in Saudi Arabia has decided to increase the production of Saudi oil by three hundred per cent in the next three years, to a total of three billion tons [Le Monde, June 5, 1971)!

9. The odious camouflage used to conceal this deal between the Israeli enemy and Iranian reaction, the measures taken by the Israeli enemy to conceal the treachery of Arab reaction, and the false claims made by Iranian officials denying that the reactionary regime in Iran supports the Israeli enemy, amount to one of the most odious blows struck by the triple enemy of the masses— Israel, imperialism and reaction—at the


interests of the Arab nation and their future dignity.

10. The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine directed its missiles against this triple enemy not only to uncover this con¬ spiracy which is a blow struck at the very heart of the interests of the Palestinian and Arab struggle, and the role of subservient reaction, deep-dyed as it is with treachery, but also to announce to the masses of our people its determination to follow up the enemy wherever he appears and on all fronts.

353

French Press Interview by U.A.R. For¬

eign Minister Riad, Criticizing U.S. Pol¬

icy in the Middle East, Commenting on

the U.A.R.-U.S.S.R. Friendship Treaty

and Reiterating Egyptian Determination

To Liberate Her Territory1

Cairo, Mid-June, 1971

Qj What are the chances of negotiations on the reopening of the Suez Canal?

A. In fact, there have never been any negotiations. Once again it is American propaganda which has led people to think so. Today, Secretary of State Rogers talks of an “interim solution.” That reminds us of the 1949 armistice convention, where the armi¬ stice plan was presented so as to be attractive to the Arabs and the Palestinians. I was there, and I can tell you that at the end of the Rhodes talks, one could have had the impression that the Palestinians were soon going to be able to go home. In fact, it was sugared poison. Today, there are the same tactics, the same propaganda, the same deception. We then asked Mr. Rogers three questions and received in reply what we now call “the three no’s”: Will you exercise pressure on Israel? He answered: No. Will you stop your military and civil aid to Israel? He answered: No.

1 Translated from the French text of Riad’s interview,

conducted by Roland Delcour, Le Monde, June 18,

1971, pp. 1,2.

Will you support the activity of the four Great Powers in the Security Council to force Israel to give in? He answered: No. Then we asked him: “Why don’t you go to Israel first and then bring us the results of your efforts?” Mr. Rogers immediately re¬ plied: “It wouldn’t make any difference.” In fact, you see, Mr. Rogers’ mission was to delude us, to delude world public opinion, to give the impression of a change of direction, while in reality there was nothing of the kind. That was all to gain time and prolong

the ceasefire.

Q. What was in the Israeli counter-proposals

Mr. Sisco brought back? Was there any trace of Israeli concessions?

A. When Mr. Sisco came back, he brought what he called Israeli thinking. Very simply, this thinking meant the capitulation of Egypt. We were to agree to reopen the Canal without any commitment to evacuate the occupied territories; the ceasefire would be indefinite; Egyptian troops would not cross the Canal;

Israeli shipping could use it; the Bar-Lev line would be kept and maintained. At most we would have been able to have three or four thousand Egyptian civilians on the East

Bank. We asked if it would be the same as in the agreement of 1954 with the British

when we allowed several thousand British

civilians to stay in the Canal Zone. [Sisco] replied Yes.

What should we do? I left Mr. Bergus (American charge d’affaires in Egypt) a

memorandum restating the Egyptian position as defined by President Sadat on February 4,

and several times by Egyptian diplomats. The main question is, of course, that of Israel’s total withdrawal from the occupied territories. Could anyone imagine for one moment that

we would fall into the trap of a partial solution which would allow our adversaries to keep the bulk of their conquests in exchange for reopening the Canal? That reminds me of the story of the peasant who, seeing the conductor on the Underground, asked him if he could buy the train.

Then, at the end of last month, Mr. Bergus tried again. He sent us a new memorandum. This time, it was no longer a proposal for

ARAB WORLD 493

an interim settlement but an arrangement

to be signed. Once again, we left a document summarizing our position on Mr. Bergus’ desk. We made no new proposals. We repeated the question: “Is Israel or is she not prepared to withdraw from all occupied Arab territories?” That is the whole point. We have yet to receive an answer. That is the unvarnished truth.

Qj Did the Soviet-Egyptian treaty result from the negative attitude of the United States?

A. Chance brought it about that [a number of Egyptian] cabinet ministers resigned on

May 13. This event was seen as being related

to our policy towards the United States. It was reported that Mr. Sadat was going to follow a policy different from Nasser’s. This is ridiculous. It was also said that the resigning ministers were accredited intermediaries be¬ tween Egypt and the U.S.S.R. But am I not just as much so? I have been to the U.S.S.R. nine times: four times last year, once so far this year. I am returning this month for the exchange of instruments of ratification for the treaty. Am I not just as good an intermediary as those people? As for the treaty, it was signed on May 27 because the Soviets and ourselves found we were ready.

One cannot rewite history. It is a fact that

the idea of the treaty is a longstanding Egyptian idea, one of Nasser’s ideas. But

obviously, the time the idea was implemented was determined by events.

Qj Why was President Sadat so critical of the U.S. in his June 10 speech to the Egyptian people, while two days before he was telling the troops that he was still waiting for a reply from the United States to his message of May 20?

A. President Sadat didn’t want to be the one to end the dialogue, the one to shut the door. This is why he used this formula in front of the soldiers. But he couldn’t leave the people with illusions. He had to tell the truth, and the truth is that we have received no reply from America. Personally I have no illusions. I never have had. Already last summer, when the ceasefire was concluded and the whole world was rejoicing, when many people in France, Great Britain and even in

the U.S.S.R. believed in the good faith of the Americans, I doubted that they would keep their promises concerning the implementation of United Nations Resolution 242. But I said to myself: we are going to put them to the test, force them to show their hand. Today, they have already done so.

Qj What can Egypt do in such an impasse? A. We are not in a desperate situation,

since public opinion is on our side. France’s help in this regard has been valuable. One of Israel’s aims was to polarize the world into two camps, the Eastern camp supporting Egypt, the West entirely on Israel’s side. Today, that’s over. Following France’s example, Great Britain has changed her attitude. And what about Greece or Spain, who are on our side? Aren’t they Western countries?

Qj Are we headed for renewed tension? A. We are in fact at war. We shall be

at war for as long as our territories are occupied. Egypt, if she is forced, can renew the firing. She can choose the time; and, of course, she reserves the right to liberate her territory.

354

Statement by Foreign Minister Abu Hamad of Lebanon Reiterating Lebanese Support for a Middle East Settlement Based on Full Israeli Withdrawal from Arab Territory and on Recognition of the Rights of the Palestinian People1

Beirut, July 6, 1971

As you know, too, the President of the Republic sent for the Deputies and heard their views before Mr. Rogers arrived in

1 Excerpted and translated froifi the Arabic text of

Abu Hamad’s statement reporting to the Foreign

Affairs Committee of the Lebanese Parliament on the

visit of U.S. Secretary of State Rogers, al-Anwar (Beirut),

July 7, 1971.


Lebanon on May 3. The statements made by the American Secretary of State in the capitals he visited reached us before he did; they were to the effect that he had brought no new proposals, but had come to hear and become acquainted with the viewpoints of the parties concerned on the spot. So we took this opportunity to explain to Mr. Rogers Lebanon’s point of view, which is in agreement with the views of the Deputies, and can be summarized as follows:

Lebanon adheres to the 1949 Armistice Agreement, and believes that no agreement, of whatever kind, can be sound unless the following two fundamental conditions are met: first, total withdrawal of Israeli forces from all the occupied Arab territories, and second, recognition of the rights of the Palestinian people. Lebanon has also persist¬ ently requested the United States of America to take the appropriate measures, as far as it is concerned, to ensure the fulfillment of these conditions. We drew the attention of Mr. Rogers to Israel’s unyielding attitude, which is impeding political efforts.

Believing as we do that the aim of the American Secretary of State’s visit was, as he stated, to become acquainted close at hand with the attitudes of the parties concerned in the area and to hear the viewpoints of them all, and that he brought with him no specific solution and did not expect any surprise developments, we feel that this visit provided a favorable opportunity for responsible Arabs to explain to Mr. Rogers personally the present situation and state to him their attitudes to the crisis, so that he might appreciate the danger that threatens the whole of this area,

reflect on the matter and understand which of the two sides is sincerely striving to achieve

peace and which of them is being obstinate and putting obstacles in the way of peace and in the way of the United Nations envoy Dr. Jarring.

355

Statements Emphasizing Arab and Egyp¬ tian Commitment to the Palestine Cause and the Necessity for Unity Within the Resistance, Included in a Speech Deliv¬

ered by U.A.R. President Sadat to the

Palestine National Council1

Cairo, July 7, 1971

If, to the Arab conscience, the Palestine problem has become an integral part of the struggle of any one people of our nation, it is the Egyptian people for whom it is an

integral part of their very life. Thus, as I talk about you, I find that I am

not talking about someone else; I am almost talking about myself.

In the light of this, I hope that you will open your hearts to what I want to tell you

in all frankness and honesty. I. The Palestine problem, the struggle of

the Palestinian people and the unanimous

agreement of the Arab nation on the vital

importance of their cause have never. been clearer than they are today.

One of the most prominent positive aspects

of the setback [of 1967] was that it raised the veil of oblivion or silence from the Palestine

problem. While the enemy thought that he had

buried the whole of history and removed the traces of the crime by occupying the whole of Palestinian territory, the Palestinian ele¬

ment in the Middle East crisis flared up throughout the area. It came into the world

alive, firm, entrenched, steadfast and ex¬

tremely strong. Since the setback all humanity has become

many times more aware of the tragedy than before, and this in itself is a great gain.

II. Afterwards, this great moral effect had to be translated into material action that would strengthen and consolidate mankind’s commitment to Palestinian rights so that it


Sadat’s speech at the opening of the ninth session of the

P.N.C., al-Ahram (Cairo), July 8, 1971.

ARAB WORLD 495

might become an actual political influence capable of producing active attitudes.

The United Arab Republic has done much in this field, and if it is now evident that the enemy is isolated and condemned in the

world arena, this is the result of the arduous and strenuous efforts in which we have all taken part, each of us to the limits of his ability, his circumstances and his means.

In this connection, I can say without boasting that I am proud of the United Arab Republic’s share in achieving this result, meeting all the material and moral costs involved, at a time when others have con¬ tented themselves with calls and claims which do not defeat enemies so much as they embar¬ rass friends, and this was the last thing we wanted.

III. After that, you of the Palestine Revolu¬

tion had, by your positive action and in the field against the enemy, to bridge the immense distance between the world’s recognizing the right and forcing the enemy to accept it.

I do not deny that you have done a great deal which will always be a source of honor to any standard of Arab struggle. But we must all accept that we could have done more

than we have done. This is the true evalua¬

tion which the combatants should frankly admit to themselves in their unremitting efforts to serve the goal in which they believe and for which they are giving with such unbounded generosity.

IV. To be fair to you and to existing conditions, I must say that there were obstacles in your way, and the first of these was that the Eastern Front, in which the Palestine Revolution should have been one of the striking forces, has never come into existence.

Thus the efforts of the Palestine Revolution

have remained isolated, vulnerable and ex¬ posed. Furthermore, the Palestine Revolution has been confronted with complications in Jordan, the very place circumstances had chosen to be its main base. Although, from my zeal for the many brotherly efforts which I hope will succeed and hit their mark, I do not want to go into details of what has happened, I can see no alternative to insisting once again that there is no way open

to any of us except the sincere and practical implementation of the 1970 Cairo Agreement, and the subsequent additional arrangements made in Amman.

This is perhaps the place to recall that the Cairo Agreement was the last paper to be signed by Gamal Abdel Nasser, and the last great action he achieved. You know, indeed, that it was the last beat of his heart, that heart which was always large enough to absorb all the sufferings of his nation, and constantly ready to share all its pain.

V. To be honest it is my duty to add that the factors which have stood in the way of the unity of the will of the Palestine Revolution have played a great part in bringing about the situation from which we suffer today and the shortcomings we complain of. This is some¬ thing that we cannot conceal by silence, nor can we accept it for any reason or excuse.

You are the vanguard of the revolution in this nation, and consequently it is your duty to face the truth. As I have told you, these are moments of decision and resolve. As I have also told you, your struggle is clear; the world sees it in a good light and with admira¬ tion. Your enemy is isolated and condemned by mankind. Your responsibilities are a sacred trust to history and destiny and, as I have said, you enjoy the unlimited support of your nation on the basis of the Cairo and Amman Agreements.

Then what are we to do? In the end I find myself coming to the point of my talk. Prompted by brotherhood, love and that splendid unity that is created by comradeship in arms and struggle, I say to you that the unity of the will of the Palestine Revolution must come before anything else. In the name of your nation this is what is required.


356

Palestine Liberation Organization In¬ terim Report on Its Activities, Submitted by the P.L.O. Executive Committee to

the Ninth Session of the Palestine Na¬

tional Council1

July 7, 1971

The Executive Committee warmly wel¬ comes the members of the Palestine National Council and hopes that, in this extremely grave stage, the Honorable Council may shoulder its immense historic responsibilities for achieving the unity of our people and leading their march towards our sacred goals of return and liberation.

The term of the previous Palestinian Na¬

tional Council expired at the beginning of March, 1971, and at its Eighth Session this

council recommended that the new National

Council should be composed of 100 members, that it should sit for three years from the date

of its first meeting, and that it should meet once a year. The resolution also stipulated that the members of the Council should consist of:

A. Representatives of the fighting forces; B. Delegates from the labor unions, pro¬

fessional federations and [other] mass orga¬

nizations ; C. Men with intellectual and specialist

qualifications committed to the revolution, representation being as far as possible on a geographical basis and the fundamental con¬ dition being adherence to the Palestine Na¬ tional Charter.

In implementation of these resolutions the

Executive Committee formed a subcommittee to carry out preparatory consultations and contacts and to discover the general trends

of the Palestinian masses in the various Arab countries. The most important factor discovered by this committee during its contacts with all sectors of the Palestinian people was their firm insistence on the

1 Translated from the Arabic text of the Executive Com¬

mittee’s report published in two parts, Fateh

(Damascus), July 9, 1971 and July 11, 1971.

achievement of national unity in the ranks of the forces of the revolution which are pervaded by the urgent desire that the present Council should represent all forces and trends, so that it may be able to perform the fundamental task of the present stage— the task of achieving national unity and of fully responding to the wishes of the people, in conformity with Article IV of the organizational framework of the program of political and organizational action approved by the National Council

at its Eighth Session. The Committee charged with constituting the National Council held a continuous series of contacts and meetings with the aim of ensuring that the revolu¬ tionary and popular working forces are represented in this Council.

This was not easy, in view of the multiplicity of interpretations and the difficulty of reaching a formula ensuring effective democratic repre¬ sentation. However as a result of unflagging efforts and of the sense of responsibility of all parties concerned, the committee succeed¬ ed in working out the composition of the present Council in the following manner: 41 independent members with technical qualifi¬ cations ; 85 members representing the fighting forces; and 25 representing the unions and federations [making] a total of 151.

It will be observed that by this distribution of seats the trade union forces of the people

have been allotted more than twice as many seats as they had in the previous Council. Many members of the Executive Committee felt that the trade union forces should be given greater scope but for a number of reasons it was not found possible to allow these forces more extensive representation, espe¬ cially as some of the federations are in the first stages of development and therefore unable to effectively represent their trade union sectors.

The Executive Committee, in recalling to you the complicated political and social circumstances that hold sway over our people who are dispersed throughout the length and breadth of Arab territory and in other parts of the world, is extremely proud of the demo¬ cratic spirit that was the prime mover in building this Council, with the result that all the various Palestinian forces are repre-

ARAB WORLD 497

sented in it, regardless of whether they support or oppose the present political leadership.

This insistence that all forces should be represented was an affirmation of the steps taken by the Palestine National Council at its Eighth Session with a view to achieving national unity, and you doubtless realize that the achievement of national unity, in circumstances such as those which surround our people, is an extremely complicated goal with many aspects.

During the last four months the Executive Committee, on the commission of the National Council, has been making important efforts to achieve this lofty goal. The Chairman of the Executive Committee has participated directly in all these efforts, and will himself submit a detailed review of the efforts, concomitants and results relative to this subject immediately after this report is read.

Concentration on the questions of the composition of the Palestine National Council and the achievement of national unity must by no means be allowed to distract us from the basic challenge that has confronted the forces of the revolution during the last four

months. It is a challenge that has two parts:

/. Steadfastness in Jordan Our steadfast forces in Jordan have insisted

on establishing their right to fight in the Jordan theater and have held out in the face of continuous colonialist attempts to impede, blockade and liquidate them, just as our great people have held out in the face of attempts to degrade and humiliate them, and have insisted on their right to live and fight for the liberation of their homeland, and intrepidly resisted the forces of the authorities with a rare capacity for endurance. To those who cast doubts on the capacity of our great people, nine months after the start of the September massacre, we say: Go and look at the search points between Zarqa and Amman; that will give you an idea of the state in which the reactionary royalist regime is living as a result of the steadfastness of our men.

Recently our people and our commandos have not only given proof of their steadfastness, but also disclosed a number of historic points which show that their steadfastness will

continue and escalate until the will of the people to create a revolutionary atmosphere and a people’s war of liberation is realized.

In connection with the steadfastness of our people in Jordan, it must be recalled that the way the revolutionaries of the Jordanian National Front started their struggle for their noble goals was a new indication of national unity and an affirmation of the will to hold out on the part of the masses of our people, and of their rejection of the artificial division between Palestinian and Jordanian. The revolution hereby declares that it supports the Jordanian National Front and will spare no effort to ensure that its programs and goals are represented.

II. Armed Struggle Against the Enemy in Occupied Territory

In the last four months we have seen how our people in Gaza have persisted in resisting the occupation in the streets, the tents, the roads and the fields, and Gaza has been able to force the enemy to take further violent security measures. The result is that the situation there resembles that during the last days of the Nazi occupation of Western Europe: the Zionist occupation forces are living in a state of complete terror, now that the popular masses have stood firm with all the burdens of their ordinary life and struggle against the occupying enemy has become part of their daily routine. Recent months have also witnessed successful operations in Hebron and other areas in the heart of the

occupied homeland. There have been re¬ peated commando operations over the frontier in affirmation of the fact that the Palestinian people have the right to engage in struggle

from the areas adjacent to occupied Arab territory, and of their determination to deploy themselves in the principal theater of struggle, regardless of all internal and external factors. A report of this kind must also mention the efforts made by the different departments of the Palestine Liberation Organization to continue the Organization’s regular activities,

especially in view of the present abnormal

circumstances. There follows a brief review of these efforts:


A. In the Political and Information Field Political activity in the Arab field has

continued to make it its first objective to establish that the Palestinian cause is the most important political problem confronting the Arab nation, and to confirm the revolu¬ tion’s right to mobilize and recruit the Pales¬ tinian people in all Arab countries in which there are Palestinians, especially in the Jordan¬ ian theater, which is the principal theater of the battle. In the field of external political activity the Organization has taken part in important international conferences held dur¬ ing the last four months, the most important being:

1. The World Peace Conference held in Budapest on June 13, 1971, where the Pales¬ tinian delegation submitted a memorandum explaining the Palestine problem, made the necessary contacts, and ensured the adoption of a resolution mentioning the right of the Palestinian people to employ armed struggle to liberate their homeland and to practice self- determination in the whole of Palestinian territory.

2. The Tenth Session of the Afro-Asian Peoples’ Solidarity Council held in Damascus from June 23-24, 1971. This conference was transformed into a demonstration of support for the Palestinian cause and took a number of successful detailed resolutions of a kind entirely new in the history of international conferences dealing with the Palestine problem. These resolutions affirmed the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination in their own territory and their right to employ armed struggle or any other means to achieve their goal of liberating their homeland. The Con¬ ference also condemned the reactionary roy¬ alist regime in Jordan, and its resolutions explicitly mentioned the right of the Pales¬ tinian people to engage in armed struggle to liberate their homeland in the Arab areas in which they live, and especially in Jordan.

3. Delegations of the Organization at¬ tended the Palestine Weeks organized by the Arab League in various world capitals, and explained the Palestine problem and clarified the present situation. It is to be observed that the Palestinian delegations were wel¬ comed and supported in many parts of the world, especially in Peking, where the delega¬

tion of the Palestinian revolution was re¬ ceived with a huge demonstration of support.

B. In the Field of Popular Organization Action has been taken to complete the

building up of federations that did not really exist in order to develop the existing ones so that they should be capable of meeting the combat requirement of the present stage. An important step taken in this field was the establishment of the Supreme Council of Palestinian Federations whose aim is to draft a general policy for the activities of the federations and to promote their efforts and achieve their commitment to armed struggle, to organize their relations with the Arab and non-Arab masses and to take the appropriate material, moral and social action necessary for the revolution, on the basis of adherence to the resolutions of the Palestine National Council and the Executive Commit¬ tee related to popular organization and its implementation, with a view to achieving national unity. At its conference held from May 15-22, 1971, the Supreme Council of Federations adopted important resolutions aimed at organizing the energies of the Palestinian people and mobilizing them for the battle. Here it is to be observed that the Palestinian federations shared effectively in dealing with the effects of the 1970 incidents in Jordan.

C. In the Field of Culture and Education Although so recently established, the Cul¬

tural and Educational Affairs Department has been active in dealing with cultural and educational problems in the various Arab countries. These problems are closely con¬ nected with the re-creation of the Palestinian personality and the mobilization of the new Palestinian generation to confront the res¬ ponsibilities of the battle. The Department has also made a point of taking part in the meetings and activities of educational and student committees and conferences in the Arab League building, the most important of these being:

1. The Permanent Council for Educational Planning for Palestinians;

2. The section responsible for drawing up the educational programs broadcast to Arab students in the occupied territory;

ARAB WORLD 499

3. The Arab Organization for Education, Culture and the Sciences.

The Department is also making exhaustive efforts to ensure that scholarships and educa¬ tional missions organized by the governments of the Arab countries and friendly countries are awarded to Palestinians. Unfortunately the Department has not been as successful as could be wished in this field because of the ever-increasing chaos which besets the ques¬ tion of scholarships and because of other factors, both Palestinian and non-Palestinian.

The Department is making continuous efforts to establish a supreme council for scholarships, and is at present asking for more scholarships' for Palestinians in Arab universities, especially for Palestinians from the occupied territories. The question of education for Palestinians in Kuwait has engaged even greater efforts on the part of the Department, in cooperation with the Supervisory Council for the Organization’s Schools in Kuwait, which was recently estab¬ lished by the Organization. Only last week the Organization finished drawing up plans for the direction of activities, raising the educational standard in the schools in the coming year, and providing the necessary funds.

Recently also the Department has been coordinating relations between the Organiza¬ tion and the Palestine Research Center.

It is to be observed that the Center has published a number of books on the Palestine problem in various languages, and is now con¬ ducting a census of Palestinians and their situation in all parts of the Arab area, which study will be of great importance for the plans and projects of the revolution.

D. The Department for Occupied Homeland Af¬

fairs The Department is making contacts in the

occupied territory and the Gaza Strip, pro¬ viding limited aid to evicted persons and facilitating things for those who return in the Gaza Strip through the International Red Cross in Cairo. It is also continuing to publish monitoring reports and revolutionary research work and studies related to the occupied homeland. Unfortunately the inci¬ dents in Jordan had a negative effect on the

activities of the Occupied Homeland Affairs Department, and on other departments in the Organization, which have been unable to engage in their usual day-to-day activities in the Jordanian arena, and the Departments of the Organization are continuing their efforts to ensure direct contact in Jordan and the occupied territory, if only to increase the minimum. Brothers:

This report is restricted to the new develop¬ ments that have taken place in the interim period that has just passed, and only contains passing references to the normal activities of the Palestine Liberation Organization and its various agencies. Another reason for writing this report is to stress that the Organization’s agencies need to be supported, consolidated and reorganized so that they may be able to perform their revolutionary tasks at the level required for the confrontation of the challenges

of the present stage and the plans of the counter-revolution.

357

Statement Issued by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine Analyzing the Problems Facing the Resistance,

Addressed to the Ninth Session of the Palestine National Council (Excerpts)1

July 7, 1971

What are these basic problems that face the Resistance and which the masses of our people, wherever they may be, expect the National Council to study with serious con¬ cern before adopting decisive attitudes to them? Urgent Problems Facing the Resistance

In our view among the most important of these problems are:

I. Taking a critical and courageous look


P.F.L.P. statement, al-Hadaf (Beirut), No. 108 (July

10, 1971), pp. 3-7 passim.


at the Resistance movement and defining the major errors that have led to the present consequences;

II. The attitude to the reactionary subser¬ vient regime in Jordan;

III. The unity of the Jordanian-Pales- tinian national movement and its activities;

IV. Liquidation and surrender proposals, in particular [that of] the proposed Palestinian state, and how they are to be confronted and resisted;

V. The escalation of commando activity in the occupied territory;

VI. Striking at imperialist and Zionist interests outside the occupied territory;

VII. Palestinian national unity and the question of relations between the different sections of the Resistance movement, and the military, financial, information and admini¬ strative problems arising therefrom;

VIII. Resistance outside the occupied ter¬ ritory and outside Jordan and the rejection of attempts at containment and of violent response to liquidation conspiracies;

IX. The Resistance movement and Arab and world revolutionary action.

I. Making a Critical Review

II. The Attitude to the Regime in Jordan

In this period, when the slogan of the enemy camp in effect says that the Resistance must be contained, encircled and deprived of all its revolutionary content and combat effectiveness, it is becoming a matter of ever increasing urgency that the Resistance should adopt a decisive attitude to the reactionary regime in Jordan by cutting off all relations with it and working for its overthrow. We warn against the dangers inherent in con¬ tinued failure to adopt a strong attitude in this respect and in reluctance to take the historic and conclusive decision to overthrow the reactionary subservient regime in Jordan through armed violence, which will place the revolution on the start of its true course.

We warn that failure to settle this matter will lead to the Resistance movement making

further concessions and withdrawals and ac¬ cepting Arab mediation. This may result in the establishment in Jordan of a new govern¬ ment whose aim is to absorb the violent resentment felt by the masses against this regime and to make a temporary truce with the Resistance movement.

The overthrow of the established regime in Jordan through revolution and armed vio¬ lence is now a historical demand of our masses who aspire to freedom and liberation, and it is up to the commands of the Resistance movement to respond to the will of the masses of the revolution.

III. The Unity of the Jordanian-Pales- tinian National Movement and Its Ac¬ tivities

The basic condition for the success of the Jordanian-Palestinian national front is that the nationalist forces should conduct a critical and scientific study of all developments that have taken place in the national movement against colonialism, Zionism and reaction, with the object of analyzing the positive and tangible circumstances of the political, eco¬ nomic and military situation of a society that is fighting on its own territory, and of the enemy it is fighting. In the light of such study and analysis it should produce a pro¬ gram of joint action. The most important step to be taken towards mobilizing extensive sectors of the masses for violent resistance to their national and class enemy is that they should clearly recognize the link between the problems of their everyday life and the poli¬ tical battle which is aimed at that link. This will achieve the objective linkage between their day-to-day struggles to solve their problems and their struggle within the frame¬ work of the strategy of the people’s war of liberation which is aimed at liberation and finding the radical solution to all these pro¬ blems. This stresses the importance of mass and trade union organizations on the one hand, and also emphasizes the importance of the political program presented to the masses by the revolution, through which the masses

ARAB WORLD 501

can clearly see the linkage of their day-to-day struggle with political struggle aimed at liberation, democracy and unity.

IV. Liquidation and Surrender Proposals,

Including That of the Palestine State, and How To Resist Them

Finally, the central point in the plan of

the Resistance movement to frustrate sur¬ render solutions is that it should continue to be militarily and politically effective in the occupied area and in Jordan, for there will certainly be no political solution with a revolutionary Jordan and while the Resistance continues to be effective in all the occupied territories Israel will not see much point in any settlement.

Our view of the battle must always be a long-term historical one. On this basis the struggle of our people is a continuous struggle towards liberation, combatting every conspir¬ acy against their cause, because it is through continuous struggle that the cause of liberation

continues to exist, and that the advance towards it continues, in spite of all circum¬

stances. All who try to make it appear that the

surrender solution is on the way and that everything is finished, must be shown up, exposed and combatted. What is historically

important is that the armed resistance of the Palestinian people to their enemies should

continue incessantly. What is important is that the enemy should be kept in a state of

constant dismay by ardent resistance in Gaza, that there should be ever growing resistance

in the West Bank and that there should be escalating revolution in all the territory.

It is also important that in Jordan a revolution

should continue to bear arms and to combat

the reactionary subservient regime.

V. The Escalation of Action Inside the

Occupied Territory 1. The battle against Israel and against the

reactionary regime in Jordan is a single

battle. The masses of our people in occupied Palestine are fighting against Israel, and the

masses of our people in Jordan are fighting against the reactionary regime.

2. If the Resistance fights against Israel, and if its fight is made increasingly effective

and is firmly based on sure historical prin¬ ciples, this will strengthen the Resistance movement in its battle against Jordanian reaction and in all its other political battles.

3. It is of particular importance at this stage that fighting against Israel should con¬ tinue and that serious action should be taken to increase its effectiveness. The reason is that in this way the character of the revolution as a national liberation movement will be clearly maintained, whereby the Resistance will win the support of more extensive sectors of the Arab masses, and such extensive support will be of benefit to the Resistance movement in all its other battles.

4. The central commands of the Resistance

movement outside occupied Palestine must take care that the fact of their being outside the occupied territory does not result in their failing to interact sufficiently with the struggle

of the masses in the occupied area. These commands must, indeed, be intent on the

battle against the subservient regime in

Jordan and on the other problems of the Resistance in the Arab theater. But they must be no less intent on performing their duty as the command of the revolution of a million or more of our people against Israeli occupation.

5. For the Resistance in occupied Palestine to be brought to a higher level where it can meet the requirements of the new stage, firstly, Israel’s plans for the confrontation of

the Resistance in the occupied territory must

be thoroughly understood, then the experience of the Resistance in occupied Palestine must be examined and criticized, and thirdly, in the light of the foregoing, plans of action for the new stage must be drawn up.

6. The central point in the Israeli plan for the confrontation of the Resistance in the occupied territory lies in creating normal living conditions for the majority of the

masses so that people may apply themselves to the problems of their daily life. In this way it is hoped that the Resistance may


become no more than a vanguard force without the support of the masses, with which the intelligence and repression organizations will be able to cope. This is the reason for the open bridges policy, the employment of [Arab] workers, and all the various other policies directed to this end, which both benefit the Israeli economy and are of service to Israel’s policy of rendering the Resistance abortive.

7. The central point in the appraisal and criticism of the resistance in the interior is that in general it has taken on a military character of a primitive kind—the prepara¬ tion and equipment of groups so that they may carry out military strikes.

8. Our people must apply themselves to establishing a revolutionary organization which will face up to the enemy and his plans and also face up to the situation of our masses

in the occupied territory, and produce a suitable political and military program en¬ abling mobilization and concentration of the persecuted, oppressed and exploited masses, who must hand over their cause to the program and embark on a long, harsh and conscious historical struggle, based on revolutionary violence, against the enemy who is occupying their land and exploiting their resources and the fruits of their labor.

VI. Striking Imperialist and Zionist Inter¬

ests Outside Occupied Territory

The interests of imperialism are scattered throughout the world, as are the Zionist organizations which constitute the arteries that provide Israel with her life-blood and the lungs through which she absorbs the components of her strength. Thus it is our duty to turn our attention to striking at these arteries.

The Resistance movement knows that the greater part of the profits of the exploiting oil companies and of our vital resources go

to Israel—millions of dollars in cash, millions of dollars’ worth of arms and equipment and hundreds of planes and missiles—which are directed against us to annihilate us and to perpetuate our enslavement.

The Resistance must therefore give proof to all the parties of the enemy camp (Zionist Israel, imperialism and Arab reaction) that it is capable of striking in all directions and to such an extent that the forces of the enemy will be unable to guard against it.

VII. Palestinian National Unity and the

Relations Among the Different Sections of the Resistance

VIII. Resistance Outside Occupied Ter¬ ritory and Outside Jordan and the Rejection of Liquidation or Containment

IX. The Resistance Movement and Arab and World Revolutionary Action A. Arab Revolutionary Action 1. The Resistance will remain in a difficult

situation if it continues to confront the camp

of Zionism, imperialism and reaction alone, and the Palestinian people by themselves can hardly be expected to win final victory over Israel and her military establishment, the

subservient regime in Jordan and its military establishment, and all the strength and re¬

sources of their Zionist and imperialist sup¬ porters. In fact, seen in historical terms, if the Resistance is to escape from its predica¬

ment, the Arab liberation movement must grow to the extent that the Resistance becomes part of the vast and broad movement of the Arab masses that is capable of obtaining the human and geographical depth that will enable it to triumph.

2. The existent Arab national liberation movement is no longer capable of continuing the national democratic revolution and real¬ izing its conditions; consequently this move¬ ment needs to be radically revolutionized or

reestablished, to enable it to continue the advance and achieve the tasks of national liberation, first and foremost of which is the

task of a people’s “war of liberation aimed at uprooting imperialism, Zionism, Israel and reaction from our homeland.

3. By rectifying its subjective situation the Resistance will become one of the factors that

ARAB WORLD 503

gives rise to such a movement. At the same time the Resistance movement cannot replace the Arab national liberation movement, al¬ though it is entitled to aspire to assist the birth of such a movement and fuse with it, in the event of its coming into existence, in embodiment of the principle of unity of the instruments of Arab revolution, the revolution of the one nation.

B. World Revolutionary Action

358

Final Communique" Issued by the Ninth Session of the Palestine National Council, Stressing the Necessity for Unity and

Rejecting Any Settlement Failing To Assure Restoration of the Full Rights of the Palestinian People1

Cairo, July 13, 1971

It was in extremely difficult circumstances, with the conspiracy against the Palestine revolution increasing in scope, that the Pales¬

tine National Council met in its Ninth Session

in Cairo from July 7-13, 1971. The members of the Council continued discussion of the

exigencies of the Palestine revolution at the

current stage, with the Jordanian authorities engaged in aggression against the bases of the Palestine revolution and attacking its heroic men in Ajlun, Jerash and Gaza Camp.

In addition to the task it had assumed, the Council took all appropriate measures to cope with the situation; these were published at the time.

The Ninth Session of the Palestine National

Council was marked by numerous special features which constituted steps towards na¬ tional unity, the most prominent of these being:

1. The composition of the new Council was

an expression of the fact that it represented a more comprehensive sector than had pre-

1 Translated from the Arabic text of the P.N.C. statement,

Fateh (Damascus), July 15, 1971.

vious Councils. All the commando organiza¬ tions without exception participated in it, and the trade union organizations were more extensively represented.

2. The Council reaffirmed the formula for national unity it had already established at its Eighth Session and in the light of it took new practical decisions on the unity of the forces of the revolution in all fields of com¬

mand, organization, training, arming and combat affairs.

It also decided to establish a unified council for information and a unified system for the collection and expenditure of revenues.

3. On the basis of these moves and of the unanimous assent to them in the Executive Committee, which was elected as the supreme command of the Palestine revolution, the commando organizations were more exten¬ sively represented to ensure collective, rather than individual, action and also to ensure that all forces should participate in confronting the grave situation which threatens the Palestine revolution and the Palestinian people.

The Council first considered the grave situation faced by the revolution in Jordan, and in view of the determination of the Jordanian authorities to strike at the revolu¬ tion and render it ineffective, the Council condemned the policy of repression and ter¬ rorism pursued by the Jordanian authorities and the particularist fanaticism it gives rise to, for the gravely negative effects this policy has had on jordanian-Palestinian national unity in the Jordanian theater. The practical result has been that the unity of the masses has been weakened and that the right of the revolution to represent the Palestinian people and to realize their aspirations to the liberation of their usurped territory has been denied.

The Council condemned the Jordanian authorities for constantly placing obstacles in the way of the revolutionaries in their attempts to enter the occupied territory. These obsta¬ cles have included the blockading of the revolution’s bases, the molesting of their supply convoys and armed attacks on men returning from military operations in the occupied territory.

The Council also condemned the constant disregard of the right of the Palestine revolu-


tion to perform its fundamental duty, which was precisely determined by certain clauses of the Cairo and Amman Agreements. The Council demands that these agreements be adhered to. It also calls on the Arabs states that signed them to adopt the attitudes to which they committed themselves to ensure the implementation of the Cairo and Amman

Agreements, and to withdraw financial aid from the Jordanian authorities who have continued to disregard and failed to honor these agreements, so that this aid may be employed for the objective for which it was

allotted—the liberation of Palestine and the repulse of the imperialist attack from Arab territory.

The Council decided to support the efforts being made by the Jordanian nationalist forces to build a coherent national front to take action to support the advance of the Palestine revolution and to protect it from all who conspire against it.

One of the aims of the Palestine revolution in fulfilling its obligations to defend the national rights of its people in Jordan, is to strengthen the unity of the two Banks. It therefore affirms, through its National Coun¬ cil, that this unity cannot be strengthened by the policy being pursued by the Jordanian authorities, which fosters regional and sepa¬ ratist tendencies. It can only be strengthened on a national democratic basis which will consolidate cohesion among the people and unify their efforts for liberation.

Then there was the Council’s stand as regards the danger of political settlements. In this connection it discussed the increasing efforts that are being made at present to ensure the implementation of a settlement, and in particular American imperialism’s efforts to impose itself on the Middle East area by creating a deceptive situation which will in fact lead to the liquidation of the

Palestine problem. The Council affirmed its attitude of constant

insistence on the full rights of the Palestinian people to liberate their territory through armed struggle and to reaffirm their decisive rejection of all surrender solutions and pro¬

posals which conflict with the natural and historical rights of the Palestinian people,

including their rejection of Security Council Resolution 242 of November 22, 1967.

The Palestine National Council expressed the will and determination of the Palestinian

people to continue their armed struggle until

they achieve all their national objectives, in

spite of the ferocious attack by the conspiracy

to which the Palestine revolution is being subjected.

As it pursues its struggle at the cost of so many sacrifices, the Palestine revolution con¬ stantly looks to the Arab masses and their national forces and to national liberation movements throughout the world, in the expectation that they will do their duty in what is^ one of the most ferocious battles that is being fought by a peaceable people against Zionism and the forces of imperialism and

its agents in the Arab world.

359

Cuban Press Interview with Palestine Liberation Organization Central Com¬ mittee Chairman Arafat (Abu Ammar), Commenting on the Political Situation of the Palestine Resistance1

Mid-July, 1971

Q. What is the real situation of the Palestinian

revolution at the present time ? A. We believe that our revolution is now

stronger than ever, after the furious clashes between us and the Jordanian authorities. They thought that they could crush the Palestinian revolution in six months—accord¬ ing to the estimates of the CIA. That is

what the computers had indicated. However, as you can see, ten months have

elapsed, and our revolution is now stronger then ever; we have increased and doubled our military forces. We have obtained a very

rich experience.

1 English text of ArafatVihterview at the closing of the

Ninth Session of the Palestine National Council,

conducted by Osvaldo Ortega, Tricontinental (Havana),

VI, 66 (September, 1971), pp. 28-35.

ARAB WORLD 505

Our political situation is now stronger. The cohesion between us and our people is closer than it has ever been, and we have learned a very important lesson: there is no doubt that before last September we incurred in a series of errors.

It is true that we suffered over 20,000 casualties among our troops and the civilian population. Although this is a very high number of casualties in comparison with our small population of only three million, our people are ready to pay even more for victory.

Qj Let us discuss the very important aspect of Palestinian unity. At what level is this yearn for unity now?

It is important to know that some people speak of unity, unity. They do not use this word to save our revolution. It is true that unity among our organizations is very impor¬ tant—I would say essential—but we must understand the situation of the Palestinian revolution. There is interference between the Palestinian revolution and the Arab systems, because we are not facing a special enemy. We fight Zionism, imperialism and colo¬ nialism.

The danger is not facing only the Pales¬ tinian people, but we confront it with the help of the Arab people. These interferences cause a certain cloudiness in the relations among the Palestinian groups. Some of these groups have very strong ties with some of these Arab systems. Regardless of this, we believe that the Palestinian revolution has achieved unity; not a good unity, but rather a front through the Central Committee.

We have decided to follow the democratic system in order to establish this unity and are conscious that the construction of this system will require more time, but regardless of this delay, we are certain that we shall be able to establish our unity on a firmer and

more concrete basis; with a greater effort we shall be able to advance on the road towards our unity. Unity means that all the organiza¬ tions share in the cost of the struggle. Those who are not willing to sacrifice themselves do not have the right to speak.

A1 Fatah is now leading the Palestinian revolution, therefore it must pay a heavier

price and exert more efforts to consolidate this unity.

Q. You are stating that unity does not rest on formal aspects?

A. That is correct. It rests on real facts and strong basis.

Qj Is there an action program on which this unity would rest?

A. Yes. In the previous National Pales¬ tinian Congress. All members, all the organi¬ zations, accepted the plans submitted by A1 Fatah to attain unity. The political program and the framework of the organi¬ zational structure have been accepted by the congresses.

Qj After the tragic events of September 1970 we have learned through the press agencies and newspaper reports, of the restriction imposed on the commandoes on military movements and attempts to infiltrate and operate in territory occupied by Israel.

A. It is true. After the confrontation between our fighters and the Jordanian authorities, our military operations against Zionism-imperialism on the Jordanian-Israeli frontiers have decreased, but the actions within occupied territory have increased. Perhaps you have heard recently of the operations carried out by our volunteers, in which Tel Aviv was bombed and two buildings in Jerusalem destroyed. This is only an example. The operations inside occupied territory have increased while those on the frontier have diminished. The situation is similar regarding the other frontiers. During the last ten months, large military operations have taken place between ourselves and the Jordanian army of King Hussein, and even now great battles are going on in Jerash and Ajloun. This means that we are fighting on two fronts against Israeli-imperialist-Zionism and the Jordanian authorities and imperial¬ ism. Six thousand of our fighters are currently confined in the Jordanian prisons, and 29,000 Palestinian volunteers are held prisoner in occupied territory.

Qj You mentioned the brutal repression of the Jordanian troops and two large fronts—that of


Israeli-imperialist-Zionism and the other, the Jor¬ danian.

A. [.. . interrupting us with a smile, Arafat says:] Jordanian-imperialist.

Qj We are aware that due to the nature of the Palestinian cause, many soldiers in the Jordanian

army have deserted and joined the resistance. A. Yes, some soldiers have done so.

Qj Likewise, the Western press has reported a

possible reincorporation of the Jordanian army to the

Eastern front, perhaps considering this or other

factors. Something similar was suggested by Anwar

El Sadat during his inaugural speech at the Ninth Session of the Palestinian Congress.

A. One of the principal aims of this

conspiracy is to destroy the Eastern front. They started their attacks against the Pales¬ tinian revolution and at the same time, the Iraqi army was ordered to withdraw from Jordan. The result of this was that the Eastern front was broken. I consider that the first requisite for the rebuilding of this Eastern front is to allow the Palestinian revolution freedom of movement and, later on, permit

the Iraqi Army to return to its former positions in Jordan.

(f The Ninth Palestinian Congress held in Cairo made news throughout the world.

A. Undoubtedly. It is important to know that this Congress had a new character. There were conspiracies aimed at preventing its celebration. The fact that this Congress took place was very important for the Palestinian revolution: it was a great triumph to at last be able to have all the organizations, all the important figures within the revolution and inside the Palestinian peoples join this Con¬ gress. Among the first matters for discus¬

sion were the extension of our operations, our revolution within occupied territory and the finding of ways and means for a greater unity among our organizations and groups.

Q. We have heard that during the Congress a

number of small groups joined Al Fatah. A. That is correct, three joined: the Pales¬

tinian Arab Organization, the People’s Strug¬ gle Front and the Front for Liberation Action.

Q_. What similarity do you find between the Palestinian liberation struggle and the struggle waged by the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America ?

A. We wish all our comrades to see our

revolution within this framework. We occupy the same trench as the fighters of Asia, Africa and Latin America, and are likewise side by side with those fighting for freedom in the United States. It is true that there are different trenches, but it is all one single

battle. We are a part of this international

liberation movement. The victory of the Vietnamese people is our victory. The victory of the Tupamaros is our victory. The victory of Al Fatah is that of Laos. We are all in the same battle against imperialism, colonialism

and Zionism.

Qj Do the differences among the Palestinian organizations rest on tactical or on strategic aspects of the struggle?

A. In my opinion, they are of a tactical nature. I think that as the political program

was agreed upon during the last Eighth Congress this may give you an idea that the differences between these organizations were not strategic. They cooperate and participate on other aspects; all military forces are under the same command.

Qj Referring specifically to the Al Fatah move¬ ment, there is an event that represents a milepost —I am referring to the Kerameh battle. Would you like to tell us something regarding this battle, the conditions of the movement at that time and how the organization started to develop afterwards?

A. It was a battle against very superior forces, but, of course, I am not the most adequate person to speak of that.

I do not like to speak much of Al Fatah. I prefer to speak of the Palestinian revolution. In 1965, everyone considered us a nation of refugees. However, at that time we were already working underground, training in the use of different weapons and in 1965 —after the Jordan River was deviated, which was considered of tremendous importance— we received instructions to penetrate into occupied territory. From that date on, the history of our people started to change. We changed from refugees into fighters.

ARAB WORLD 507

1 remember that those days were very difficult, very difficult indeed. We were only a few fighters with a few arms and small resources. What we really did have was a very strong will. That is why we were able to continue. After the June war, which was a tragic surprise for the Arab nation, every¬ thing was sunk in a dark and hopeless fog.

Qj Are there contradictions between the eastern and western Jews? In what measure can this situation contribute to the objectives of the Pales¬ tinian resistance?

A. We do not expect to obtain immediate results from this^ conflict. It is evident that there is a schism between these two sectors of Israel. We used to say that there were two nationalities in Israel; the Israeli nationality and the Arab. There are really three: the European Jews (Ashkenazim), the oriental Jews (Sephardim) and the Arab nationality.

Q. Some kind of class struggle in Israel? A. Especially economic, and also, second

in importance, racial. The Palestinian revolu¬ tion offers the solution to this problem, since its aim is the establishment of a Palestinian state, where Jews, Christians and Muslims may live in peace, with freedom and equality for all.

Q. In case of a hypothetic political solution to the Middle East crisis, what would be the principal conditions of the Palestinian resistance?

A. It is my belief that the Israelis are more concerned over the occupied territories than over peace. On behalf of the Palestinian revolution we would say that the only possible solution for us would be the establishment

of a democratic Palestinian state, which is rejected by the other side.

Although there are several small groups in Israel, like the Matzpen, who are beginning to understand our principles, there is no political or military solution. There should be a just solution for the Palestinian people. We have been evicted from our homes and our lands. The largest part of our people live as refugees. That is the reason why we have the right to fight with all means at our disposal.

Our revolution started before the June 1967 war.

Instructions were given to penetrate into occupied territory and start once more; we believe we were right in taking that decision at this critical time for the Arab world. Kerameh was an example, a symbol for the prosecution of the struggle, for the determina¬ tion not to die ever. In this battle we con¬ fronted a well-equipped army which had been able to defeat the Arab forces. We faced them with our small group, and gave them a very hard lesson. In my opinion, this was the first victory obtained against a superior army.

To be more precise I will say that it was superior only numerically and considering its weapons. I have participated in very hard battles against this army. I participated in

the battle of Kerameh and in that of Arkub in Lebanon, which lasted 24 hours. We also met the enemy in Sarafand on the Lebanese coast, only five months ago. We are able to win in these battles with only a small group, deeply confident in themselves, and in their arms and the objective of the struggle. We must understand that after the battle of Kerameh—which was the true birth of the

Palestinian revolution—we have secured many other important victories. Among them, that of Amman. In this battle we confronted 45,000 Jordanian soldiers, tanks and armored cars during 11 days. During all that time, only small portions of the city fell into the enemy’s hands, for example, the aristocratic suburbs, where we did not have members of the militia, but in the other zones where we did have them, they were unable even to approach near those zones.

Q. To what extent do you feel that the victories obtained by the Fedayeen in their battles against the Zionist and Jordanian troops are due to the fact that the guerrillas constitute a popular army ?

A. Without a doubt they are. That is the principal reason. That is the revolution of the people, whom no one can conquer. They may defeat our troops in tactical battles,

but in perspective, the victory is on our side.

They used 120,000 tons of ammunitions against us in Amman.

Q. Which were the refugee camps most intensely bombed?


A. Whadat, the Hussein camp and the

General Headquarters in Acharafie, located in a populous area.

Qj Which corps of the Jordanian army fought more fiercely against the Palestinians?

A. The Bedouins.

Qj That is precisely one of the things we wanted to ask you: the composition of the Jordanian army.

A. A fourth is Palestinian. The rest are Bedouins of the Eastern part of Jordan. It is

important to know that 5000 officers and soldiers of that army joined our revolution and are at present with us.

We have great confidence in our Cuban friends. We know that they are very close to our cause. Support is something very important for the kind of struggle we are carrying on. We look firmly toward the Cuban Revolution. Our fighters are learning much from it, from its experiences. We have very good friends in Cuba. It is possible to find in our bases and camps many of our

guerrillas who identify each other among themselves with the names of Guevara or Castro.

To the people of Latin America I can say

that we are in the same trench and in the same battle and we want to increase our cooperation and unity, coming closer to each other. There is no sense in distance. Inside, we are close—very close to each other.

Together with the fighters of Asia, Africa and Latin America we shall achieve our purposes and objectives and we are certain that we will obtain our victory in the future.

The Palestinian fighters and volunteers vow to continue their struggle until victory is obtained.

360

Statement of the Necessity for Struggle Against Zionism and Imperialism, In¬ cluded in a Radio and Television Speech by President Bakr of Iraq1

Baghdad, July 17, 1971

Our attitude to the question of Zionist and imperialist aggression has been clear and decisive from the start. We said that the problem did not start on June 5, but that it had existed since the start of the Zionist invasion of Palestine with the support of

colonialism, and that the new invasion and usurpation that took place on June 5 must provide us with a strong incentive to discard the futile methods of the past and to engage in a struggle that will not stop until all Arab territories have been liberated from every kind of occupation and usurpation. This was especially the case inasmuch as the emergence of the Palestine Resistance has provided the objective reasons for impressing all the combat potential of the masses alongside those posses¬ sed by the Arab states. When we said this we were well aware of the sacrifices and dangers involved, but is any other course open to our nation if it is to preserve its freedom and its honor and protect its land from invasion and usurpation ?

When we have refused so-called peaceful solutions, it was not because we sought war. On the contrary, our Arab people most ur¬ gently need peace to eliminate the traces of backwardness they have inherited from years of enslavement, and so we may build a new progressive homeland. But can we build progress in the shadow of a constant threat of aggression ?

The experiences of twenty years have proved that imperialism is entrenching the Zionist entity in our Arab territory with the sole object of threatening our liberation, our unity and our progress. Therefore there can be no freedom, no unity and no progress


al-Bakr’s speech on the third anniversary of his coming

to power, al-Jumhuriya (Baghdad), July 18, 1971.

ARAB WORLD 509

except through revolutionary struggle against the Zionist enemy and imperialism.

361

Declaration Deploring Jordan’s Viola¬

tions of the Cairo and Amman Agree¬

ments and Hailing Syrian Efforts at

Mediation, Included in the Final Com¬

munique Issued by a Meeting of Repre¬

sentatives of the Tripoli Charter States1

Mersa Matruh, Egypt, July 17, 1971

From Jumada al-Ula 21-24, 1391 (July 14-17, 1971), a meeting was held in Mersa


statement, al-Ahram (Cairo), July 18, 1971.


ing between the Jordanian army and forces of the Pales¬

tine Resistance and establishing the Supreme Arab

Follow Up Committee to supervise the ceasefire, was

concluded in Cairo on September 27, 1970. The

signatories were King Faisal of Saudi Arabia; the Amir

of Kuwait, Shaikh Sabah al-Salim al-Sabah; President

Nasser of the U.A.R.; President Qadhafi of Libya;

President Numairi of the Sudan; King Hussein of

Jordan; Premier al-Adgham of Tunisia; President




(Abu Ammar). (The text of the agreement is published


1970.)


ment55 for ending the Jordan Civil War, included clauses

providing that the Jordanian government would in no

way work against the Palestine revolution. It was

signed by King Hussein, Yasser Arafat and Premier

al-Adgham in Amman on October 13, 1970. (The

text is published as Document 514 in International


The Tripoli Charter refers to an agreement concluded

in Tripoli, Libya on December 27, 1969 just after the

Rabat Arab Summit Conference. This agreement

provided for economic, military and political coopera¬

tion among the original signatories: Libya, the Sudan

and the U.A.R. (An excerpt from the joint communi¬

que announcing the agreement appears as Document

Matruh [Egypt] of the heads and represen¬ tatives of the Tripoli Charter states.

The meeting was attended by President Anwar Sadat, the President of the United Arab Republic; President Muammar Qadhafi, the President of the Revolutionary Command Council and Prime Minister of the Libyan Arab Republic; Mr. Mahmud Ayyubi, Vice President of the Syrian Arab Republic; and Major Zain al-Abidin Muhammad Ahmad Abdel Qadir, Member of the Revolutionary Council and Deputy Prime Minister for Agricultural Affairs of the Democratic Re¬ public of Sudan.

In the course of their meetings the repre¬ sentatives of the Tripoli Charter states dis¬ cussed and studied the recent regrettable bloody incidents which have been renewed in Jordan, and which have reached a pitch intolerable to the conscience of the Arabs and of mankind. They viewed what is

happening as a clear violation of the Cairo and Amman Agreements, for the implementa¬ tion of which the Arab Kings and Heads of State assumed responsibility.

In the course of these sessions there were meetings with leaders of the Palestine Resis¬ tance, and through a telephone call to Mr. Hafiz Assad, the President of the Syrian Arab Republic, the representatives learned of the situation of the Palestine Resistance in Jordan

and of its request to all to make efforts to stop the massacre and the operations of liquidation going on there.

In the light of the above those attending the meeting declare their absolute support

for the Syrian Arab Republic’s compliance with the request that it should send a commis¬

sion to Jordan to devise an appropriate formula for action. They await the results

462 in International Documents on Palestine 1969.) It was

announced on November 8, 1970 that the three coun¬

tries had agreed to form a union and on November

27 that Syria too was to join a “unified four-power

command.55 The final outcome of the Tripoli Charter

was the Federation of Arab Republics proclaimed in

Benghazi on April 17, 1971, by which time the Sudan

had postponed its adherence to the federation. (For

the text of the proclamation, see Document 322 above.)


of President Hafiz Assad’s efforts with the greatest concern and anxiety, hoping that

they may be crowned with success and that there may be no further shedding of Arab blood which should be saved for the coming battle of the Arab nation.

Those attending the meeting expressed the opinion that another meeting should be held in the near future so that an appropriate attitude may be adopted in the light of the outcome of the recent incidents in Jordan.

362

Declaration of Policy on the Palestine Problem Included in a Policy Statement Made by Deputy Chairman al-Ata of the

New Revolution Command Council Set Up After a Temporarily Successful Coup d’Etat in the Sudan1

Khartoum, July 19, 1971

The Sudan hereby affirms that it will offer all its resources for the liquidation of Zionist-colonialist aggression against Arab territory, will protect the Egyptian people

from the south and offer all that is required

by the Palestine revolution for the liberation of its territory and the restoration of its democratic state. It rejects any solution that is not approved by the people of Palestine as represented by their democratic commando

organizations, and in no way sets itself up as a guardian of the Palestinians in such a way

[as would prejudice] their right to self- determination.


al-Ata’s statement, al-Anwar (Beirut), July 20, 1971.

Major Hashim al-Ata was one of the leaders of the

pro-communist coup which overthrew President

Numairi on July 19 and was reversed in a counter-coup

carried out on July 22, 1971, which restored Numairi

to power.

363

Cable Message from Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine Central Com¬ mittee Secretary-General Habbash Con¬ gratulating the New Revolution Com¬ mand Council Chairman Babikir al-Nur on the Coup d’Etat in the Sudan2

July 21, 1971

In the name of the masses of the Pales¬ tinian workers and peasants who are engaged

in bitter struggle in Gaza and the other occupied Arab territories, and are facing

terrible and brutal massacres at the hands of subservient reaction in Jordan, which are being carried out in implementation of the imperialist-Zionist plan, and in the name of

all the revolutionary strugglers who are

members of the Popular Front for the Libera¬ tion of Palestine, we offer you, the members of the Revolutionary Command Council and the Sudanese people, our congratulations on the step taken to correct the advance of Sudan’s national democratic revolution.

The historic communique which defined the goals and the course of the revolution at local, Arab and world levels, has set [your aims] and the Arab revolution on a new course, the course of the workers and peasants and all who are ground down [by oppression]. The communique also clearly defines the progressive attitude to the problem of the Southern Sudan and to that most important problem of the Arab masses, the Palestine problem, and the rights of the people of Palestine, in such a way as to make clear both the revolutionary nature of the change you have made at this stage in the struggle of the Arab nation and the importance of continued struggle against imperialism, Zion¬ ism and reaction.

The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, which is linked to the masses of Sudan and their revolutionary commands by bonds of brotherhood and common struggle,

Translated from the Arabic text of Habbash’s cable

to al-Nur (executed by firing squad on July 26 after a

counter-coup restored President Numairi to power),

al-Hadaf (Beirut), No. 110 (July 24, 1971), p. 5.

ARAB WORLD 511

is confident that the people of Sudan and their revolutionary and democratic commands will be able to surmount all the obstacles set in their path by hostile forces.

364

Statements Denying Any Jordanian Vio¬

lation of the Cairo and Amman Agree¬

ments and Rejecting Any Interference

in Jordanian Internal Affairs, Included

in a Letter Addressed to Arab Heads

of State by King Hussein of Jordan1

Amman, July 22, 1971

I. The situation in steadfast Jordan is natural, normal and calm. Its one people are living in brotherly concord, assiduously and actively working and building for the sake of their sons and for the sake of all Arabs. Security and order are firmly established, watched over by the Jordanian Arab armed

1 Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text of Hussein’s letter to the Arab Kings and Presidents, al-Dustur (Amman), July 23, 1971.

The Cairo Agreement calling for a cessation of the fighting between the Jordanian army and forces of the Palestine Resistance and establishing the Supreme Arab Follow-Up Committee to supervise the ceasefire, was concluded in Cairo on September 27, 1970. The signatories were King Faisal of Saudi Arabia; the Amir of Kuwait, Shaikh Sabah al-Salim al-Sabah; President Nasser of the U.A.R.; President Qadhafi of Libya; President Numairi of the Sudan; King Hussein of Jordan; Premier al-Adgham of Tunisia;

President Franjieh of Lebanon; Republican Council Member Shami of Yemen (Sanaa) and Palestine Liberation Organization Central Committee Chairman Arafat (Abu Ammar). (The text of the agreement is published as Document 504 in International Documents

on Palestine 1970.)

The Amman Agreement, the supposed “final agree¬ ment” for ending the Jordan Civil War, included clauses providing that the Jordanian government would in no way work against the Palestine revolution. It was signed by King Hussein, Yasser Arafat and Premier al-Adgham in Amman on October 13, 1970. (The text is published as Document 514 in International Documents on Palestine 1970.)

forces and by the citizen himself, both day and night.

II. The talk about an alleged massacre is nothing but slander, lies and alarmist talk, in view of the fact that what happened was no more than a security operation which was only carried out because the other side deliberately committed an endless series of acts of terrorism against peaceable citizens and an endless series of deliberate and flagrant violations of the Cairo and Amman Agree¬ ments. The real extent of the losses has been ascertained and, thank God, they are quite inconsiderable as compared with the lying and slanderous claims that have been made.

III. The one major consequence of what happened has been the elimination of the impurities represented by intruders into the Resistance who, as the facts have proved, were working with the enemy. Consequently the party that has really benefited from the security operation is the genuine Resistance, now that it has been purged of the impurities and divisions which were daily leading to bloody clashes between the Resistance and the citizens.

IV. Thus the ground is now prepared in Jordan for the Resistance to reorganize itself on true and sound foundations which will ensure its effective strength, growth and continuity. Jordan is prepared to play the major and most important role in this field, because it is the country of the cause and its people are the people of the cause, and because of its belief in their right, the right of its people, to resist occupation, and oppose injustice and aggression. As usual, it is determined to support this action with all its resources and in its own territory, in coordination with all its brothers, especially those in the confrontation countries, because it believes that, had there not been a Resis¬ tance, it would have had to create and establish one itself.

V. At the same time Jordan, and its one people, while believing in the sanctity of the Resistance, which springs from its very self, believes that it has no right to interfere in any way in the internal affairs of any of its brothers. By the same token it cannot accept that anyone whoever he may be, should


interfere in [Jordan’s] internal affairs, and if its national honor is infringed by so much as a jot or tittle it is prepared to protect its honor and defend its actions and its sacrifices with all the strength and power at its disposal.

VI. Jordan holds those who have insin¬

uated themselves into the ranks of its sons and willingly or unwillingly executed the plans and conspiracies of the enemy, respon¬

sible for all the blood that has been shed and

all the losses that have been sustained in the

ranks of its people and its armed forces, and for the consequent damage done to Jordan

itself and to the whole Arab nation. VII. Jordan has neither abandoned nor

disavowed either the Cairo Agreement or the subsequent agreement with the Palestine

Resistance. On the contrary, it fully believes

in the two mainstays of that Agreement—the sovereignty of the state and freedom of com¬ mando action—from its spontaneous and natural belief in the sacred right of its people to resist occupation in the occupied territory. Those who should define their attitude to

this agreement are those who have been violating it every day and tearing it up every hour by their continuous defiance of the sovereignty of the state and their constant aggressions against the life, security and stability of citizens, and by the way they perverted commando action when they made

Jordan, its people and its army, their goal and target instead of the enemy who is oppressing the people in the occupied ter¬ ritories.

365

Palestine Liberation Organization Call for Arab States To Sever Ties with Jordan and Recognize the Resistance As the Legal Representative of the Pales¬ tinian People, Included in an Executive Committee Memorandum to Arab Heads

of State (Excerpt)1

July 22, 1971

Arab Kings and Heads of State: The Amman government has trafficked in

the question of security and employed all its information media to concentrate public opinion on this question. To deprive the

regime of the opportunity to carry out another massacre, the revolution initiated a series of military measures in Amman. Then, in spite of the fact that this was in contravention of all the agreements and contrary to what was agreed on, the army entered Amman and searched it inch by inch and house by house. We have been patient and kept silent about all this to avoid a battle between the com¬ mandos and the army in which Arab blood would be shed. But the response of the regime to all these positive steps on our part has been to make further plots and to carry through its conspiracy to the end. We have warned against the treachery of the regime, its failure to honor its signatures and to respond to all the appeals and good offices of the Kings and Heads of State, and its defiance of these appeals with further repressive measures against the revolution, the last of which was the recent massacre in Jerash and Ajlun.

We shall not describe what happened, nor shall we reply to the base lies told by the Jordanian regime to justify and explain what happened. What we say to you is that we have been patient for more than twenty-five years with this hireling regime which colonialism imposed on us, on our people and on the Arab nation, to kill the spirit of fighting and struggle in our people.


memorandum from the newly formed P.L.O. Executive

Committee, Fateh (Damascus), July 23, 1971.

ARAB WORLD 513

Today, now that we sincerely and honorably realize that we are alone in the battle, and that the Jordanian regime has become a real obstacle to continued advance along the course of armed struggle and revolution, we hereby request you, in the name of our stricken people who are living through the cruellest tragedy since the disaster, and in the name of the Arab masses who have taken the vanguards and revolutionaries of Palestine to their bosoms, to take the following action:

1. Inasmuch as the Jordanian regime is an obstacle to liberation, and inasmuch as that regime has itself severed all its Arab relations by its disavowal of the Cairo and Amman Agreements, we believe that the Arab states should sever all their diplomatic and economic relations with the Jordanian regime, and that the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan should be expelled from the Arab League.

2. Acknowledgement by an official docu¬ ment that the Palestinian people are repre¬ sented solely by the Palestine revolution and its commands as embodied in the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Orga¬ nization and its Palestine National Council, the contents of this document being com¬ municated to all states and to all organizations, both Arab and international.

3. Acknowledgement of the right of the Palestine revolution and the Arab masses’ support for it to rectify and build the unity of the two Banks on the following bases:

a. The right of the Palestinian people to continue their revolution and their armed struggle against the Zionist enemy for the liberation of all Palestinian national territory;

b. Full freedom for the forces of the Palestine revolution to move against the Zionist enemy;

c. The full right of the Palestinian people in Jordan to bear arms to fight the enemy and defend the revolution;

d. The right of the masses in Jordan to mass and organizational mobilization to sup¬ port the revolution;

e. The right of the Palestinian people to self-determination in their own territory;

f. The establishment of a democratic na¬ tional regime to ensure the unity of the peoples of the two Banks and to safeguard all

the national rights of the Palestinian people. 4. Protection of Palestinian existence in the

East Bank and adoption of a resolute attitude in the face of all attempts to subject our people to further massacres, killing, eviction and

arrest. Arab Kings and Heads of State:

These are the broad outlines of the tragedy through which our people are living at present. The Palestine revolution, which arose in the most difficult circumstances, is capable of forging ahead and continuing along its course of struggle despite all obstacles, and it will define its attitude to each Arab state on the basis of that state’s attitude to the revolution and to the Jordanian regime.

Our greetings and the greetings of our people to you.

366

Statements by U.A.R. President Sadat Criticizing the Deliberate Attempts To Liquidate the Palestine Resistance in Jordan, Stressing the Need for Arab Unity, Defending Egyptian Diplomatic Activity and Warning That 1971 Must Witness a Middle East Settlement Either Peaceful or Military1

Cairo, July 23,1971

King Hussein sent me a letter yesterday. It arrived today, I’ve brought it with me. Here it is. There’s nothing unusual in my saying this—since the days of Gamal it’s been our custom to put our people in the picture about everything.

I don’t want to go into it, because it’s in the same tone, the same sort of talk and overbidding.

But something very strange caught our


Sadat’s speech, on the 19th anniversary of the Egyptian

revolution, at the opening of the second General

National Congress of the Arab Socialist Union, al-

Ahram (Cairo), July 24, 1971.


attention. In the letter he explains to me that he wants to reaffirm the following facts.

What does he say? That Jordan has not abandoned or denied either the Cairo Agree¬ ment or the subsequent agreement with the Palestine Resistance, and that, on the contrary, he firmly believes in the two fundamentals of that agreement, the sovereignty of the state and freedom of action for commandos [which grow] out of his spontaneous and natural belief in the sacred right of his people to resist occupation in the occupied territory.

I5m not going to read you the rest because it is worthless; when I read it I was puzzled.

He says that Jordan is abiding by the Cairo and Amman Agreements, but only three days ago his premier gave an official press conference and declared to the whole wqrld that Jordan rejects the Cairo and Amman Agreements. Whom am I to believe?

But I want you, the people of the Arab world and the whole world, to hear the story from the beginning.

King Hussein came here last December, and we had a meeting at the Qubba Palace for official talks. There was a Jordanian delegation headed by King Hussein and an Egyptian delegation headed by me. The microphones were on the table and not under it, so that what we said was recorded with our knowledge.

What happened at this meeting? At the time I had withdrawn our ambas¬

sador from Jordan, after Wasfi al-Tall had been appointed premier.

King Hussein was on his way to London, Washington and Paris.

During our talks we discussed everything. We talked about the Palestine Resistance and about the future. My own view -which was taped, and I am going to tell you about his view, which is also on the tape in his own voice—was that we were entering on a decisive stage in the history of the Arab nation—the year 1971—and I will tell you about it when I talk about the external situation.

I told him that we Arabs should get to¬ gether, and that the Eastern Front, which

consisted of himself and the Palestine Resis¬ tance and Iraq, should be unified under his command.

He said: “Iraq doesn’t want to be under my command.” I told him: “Iraq is free; we will make efforts to persuade it, but it is free. There will be you and the Resistance and the Jordanian army on the line.” He said to me: “But you have withdrawn your ambassador.” I told him: “We shall cooperate.” He said: “I am ready.” Right, what was his opinion of the Resistance? He said: “I believe that there are good elements in the Resistance, and they must be given the chance of carrying out commando action so the Palestine Resis¬ tance can become a reality in our battle.” I said to him: “May you not be shamed. I agree with you on that.” Moreover, I told him: “I know that there are subservient and deviating elements in the Resistance, and I am prepared. Perhaps you are embarrassed, but don’t be. I have courage to say here in Cairo and to declare to the Arab world the incrimination of these deviating elements of the Palestine Resistance. I am with you in that, particularly regarding the Popular Front, which occupied our embassy in Stockholm three days ago as well as those of Saudi Arabia and Tunisia on the pretext that we are against the Palestine Resistance. It was an operation carried out by agents.” It was in December that this happened. I told him that I was prepared to declare from here at the top of my voice, I have the courage—I will incrim¬ inate them before the whole Arab world. But he should give the good elements the chance to work, and I mean Fateh in particular. He said: “All right, I agree. How do we begin?” He said to me: “Send your ambas¬ sador back again.” I said: “Wait for two days, and on the third my ambassador will be back with you, although I know what kind of a person your Premier Wasfi al-Tall is.” And he did in fact go to London.

I sent our ambassador three days later, just as I had said, with the idea that we should cooperate to give a chance to the clean com¬ mando elements, such as Fateh, to take their proper place and clean up commando action, and so that we might incriminate the subservient and suspect elements in com¬ mando action. All right, our ambassador went back. But the moment King Hussein went away, first to London, then to Washing¬ ton, then to Paris, I found something strange

ARAB WORLD 515

going on. There was a plan afoot to liquidate commando action step by step. It was not like what happened in September [1970] when the late Gamal was alive — liquidation at one blow. No. Wash al-Tall was working piecemeal. For the first time I declare to you, to the Arab world and to the whole world, that I contacted King Hussein in London, then in Washington, and then in Paris, saying to him: “Brother Hussein, the situation is really getting worse.” More¬ over, a report had come to me from Bahi al-Adgham’s [Supreme Arab] Follow-Up Committee. It had come to me in my private capacity. I sent it to him in its entirety, telling him: “I trust you, brother Hussein. But the situation is deteriorating.”

The people he left in Jordan—his brother and the premier—were going ahead with an operation to eliminate the commandos com¬ pletely. I sent him messages when he was in London and Washington and Paris, and he replied to me. I am declaring this matter— to you, the people, and to all Arabs, for the first time. What I mean is, if I had wanted to attack him, or if I had wanted to accuse him, as he says in this letter of his, I could have shown him up long ago. But what I say is that I don’t want to stir up problems with anyone. I want to bring the [Arab] world together. We want to direct our battle against the enemy. I sent him a message and insisted, but in vain. Eventually he sent a letter from London to Wash al-Tall and his brother, telling them not to intervene, and that Jordan this and Jordan that, and talk about this and that. The least that can be said of the message is that it is lacking in tact and taste. I contacted you secretly, brother [Hussein]. I didn’t broadcast what I was doing. I never told anyone that I was contacting him until I told you, just now. Do I want to embarrass you? I have not embar¬ rassed you, I have not daily announced that I sent you a cable saying things to put you in an awkward position. No, not at all. I sent you the message because I had hope in you. He immediately sent a message to his brother telling him not to interfere in Jordan and no, no and no. Also in this cable he sent me he talked about no intervention in Jordan.

And after all this he still tells me that Jordan acknowledges the Cairo and Amman Agree¬ ments. All right, am I to believe you or your premier who is doing everything? In this connection I must praise the attitude of King Faisal. King Faisal has declared that he adheres to the Cairo and Amman Agree¬ ments which were signed by the Arab Kings and Heads of State. King Faisal’s attitude is the attitude of a man who is zealous for Arab interests. King Hussein is prevaricating. My reply to King Hussein is a simple one and I make it in your presence. “Now that all this information has come out I am not prepared to believe you at all.” He must bear his responsibility for what is going on: for the crimes committed in Jordan, the massacre of the commandos, the wedge he has driven between his army and the commandos, the wedge he has driven between his people in Jordan and the Palestinians and the Pales¬ tine Resistance, the liquidation of the Pales¬ tine Resistance. Today King Hussein boasts that he has 2,900 members of the Palestine Resistance in prison, and that such and such a number of them have taken refuge in Israel to escape from him. I am putting all these facts before the Arab world so that it may pass judgement on King Hussein. I’m not going to describe him with the description he

deserves; my very tongue shrinks from using

such words. I will leave him to the Arab nation, I will leave him to his people. But there is something I want to say to him in the presence of the Arab nation and of America. Hussein cannot increase his weight even if America is behind him. His weight will remain the same.

Egypt is Egypt. Its weight is no greater and no less, even if we are in a battle. Our weight is known to all to America and others who support Hussein. Our weight is what it is, and we shall never renounce the rights of the people of Palestine and we shall never bargain over them.

What we here in the Arab nation need more than anything else is unity, but in accordance with a formula drawn up after learning our past experience with Syria. Each state must


keep all its own constituent factors lest there be sensitivities. All of us could be joined at the top by a presidential council and coor¬ dinate our policy. It is no longer a question of one language, one history and one destiny. No, it’s much more important than that— it’s Israel—Israel which is in the heart of the area, and as long as we are not a single entity we shall never be able to confront this ferocious attack by Zionism. It took Saladin eighty years to rid the area of the Crusaders and before them there were the Tartars; we have learned our lesson both from the Tartars and Saladin. Egypt and Syria must be together and there must be Arab unity. Without this the Arabs cannot triumph. I went and explained this to the Central Committee, but no one responded, no one took any notice; they were all waiting to see how the voting went, because the group in question had arranged the opera¬ tion.

Right, today, as I have told you, the world is no longer a world of small entities. Large entities must arise in order to survive and defend themselves, economically, or in any other way. Small entities cannot live. You see how America, with all her might, goes to China today. We welcome this. We welcome this step, and pray that it is not merely an electioneering move for electioneering pro¬ paganda purposes. Why is this? Because if it is a genuine move it will be good for world peace. We want peace; we support peace. Even America is turning to China.

Then, thank God, there is the Federation of Arab Republics, including Egypt, Syria

and Libya. Brother Husain al-Shafi’i, the Vice-President of the Republic, has completed the constitution along with our brothers in Syria. In the future, God willing, we three Heads of State shall meet to examine these provisions and prepare the constitution for a plebiscite on September 1. Most probably we shall agree, because brother Husain has worked hard to make sure that all the problems between us and our brothers that needed solving are solved. This Federation will be established, God willing, and the plebiscite will be held on September 1. The battle is the starting point of this federation.

I now come to my last point, which is the situation today, because there has been talk about the situation in the battle today. You will remember that on March 7 I announced that we were not committed to the ceasefire or to refraining from firing, and that we were free to choose the timing of the battle as we liked. After that America asked to exert efforts. We said we had nothing against that, and I still say we have no objection. Some of the plotters have insisted that I should not talk to the Americans. Anyone who says that I mustn’t talk to the Americans is like an ostrich, hiding his head in the sand. Who is it who gives Israel everything from Phantoms to a loaf of bread? I say, and I said to Rogers, and they can hear now: “You give Israel everything from a loaf of bread to a Phantom.” The Americans are the ones in the battle. If America wants to talk to me, it’s most welcome. I will talk because I never stop searching for any possible way to peace, if there is a possibility of peace. But is there is no possibility of peace there must be a battle. There can be no argu¬ ment about it. But I have not exhausted everything. The Americans said they want to come—all right, let them come. Rogers, the U.S. Secretary of State, came here and I told him my attitude, and I repeat it in your presence, so that our people may hear it, so that the Arab people, and King Hussein may hear. When I put forward my initiative for the opening of the Canal, I said exactly what I am saying now; the Americans can hear me now as I say it to all the world. I said that my conditions for the opening of the Canal are that my forces cross over to the east Bank of the Canal, and that the ceasefire should be for six months only; and that if the problem was not solved, with Israeli withdrawal from the Arab territories— not only from Egypt, King Hussein, from all Arab territory -our forces should have the right to start the battle. And I said that my frontier was known—the international fron¬

tier between Egypt and Palestine. I am repeat¬ ing my conditions so that you may hear them, so that the Arab people may hear them, so that people in the whole world may hear them.

ARAB WORLD 517

We are broadcasting today on short and medium waves to the whole world. America hasn’t answered yet. At first it gave some sort of an answer, but it was still discussing things, and still putting on pressure and hadn’t yet come to a decision, and then it asked for time to think things over, and I gave them time, and the time I gave them is not up yet.

I want to say to the people concerned that we must be extremely wise when we take the decision of peace or war, we must understand the responsibility perfectly. What could be easier than just saying: I shall take the decision tomorrow and that is that—to enter the battle. No, there is a world opinion, many circumstances, great powers. When Sterner came recently, in the last two weeks, there was such a fuss, and they said: “He has brought new proposals.” I told them: “Ask the Foreign Ministry; it will tell you there were no proposals.” And if there were proposals, is there any reason why we should

be afraid? We don’t work in the dark. They said the Soviet-Egyptian Treaty had secret clauses; but why should I make secret clauses? Whom am I afraid of that I should make secret clauses? I make open clauses for everyone to see; if I need clauses I make them public. I mean, there’s no need—if I have to do anything, my people must approve of it and know about it.

They caused confusion, saying that it was a partial agreement, a partial solution. But it is perfectly clear. As I have said, they are to complete the first stage of withdrawal.

My forces will cross. I will extend the ceasefire for six months only; I have no objection. We shall clear the Canal, we shall go ahead with the operation; if nothing happens, then there is no solution but battle. I must tell you and tell the people frankly through you: the decision on the battle will be ours; it will be our own national decision, and we must be ready for it. At military level everything is going ahead—you may be confident of that—and my sons at the front know this very well. But it is our decision. The battle is first and foremost our battle, not anyone else’s. It is we who shall fight it, and this must be quite clear to us as a

people. In this connection I must report to you that the U.S.S.R. has honorably and unconditionally given us aid without which we could not have held out as we have for these four years and stood up and made ourselves heard today. On the other hand America gives Israel everything—everything, unconditionally. Indeed, according to intel¬ ligence reports America is manufacturing arms especially for Israel to use in the battle. I have these reports with me. I must tell you what the situation is today. I have already announced to our forces on the Canal since May 15, and I repeat the announcement to you and through you to the entire people,

the Arab nation and the world, to our friends and our enemies: I shall not allow the year 1971 to pass without this battle being decided. This means that I am giving Israel time, because the best possible situation from Israel’s point of view is the present one, of no war and no peace. Israel is sitting on the East Bank without losses and waiting for an internal explosion, for someone to come and make an explosion. It came out in the inquiry—Ali Sabri said he wanted to make an internal explosion.

[If the objective is to maintain the present state of no war and no peace so that my internal front and armed forces will grow tired, then I say “No.” I have said and I repeat that 1971 will be a decisive year. If the battle demands the sacrifice of one million, then we are ready to sacrifice one million.]1

America must understand that our people are no longer hesitant. Our armed forces— your sons—if you could see them you would be proud of them all your lives. They are real men who are thoroughly aware of their responsibility. They have been under hard and rigorous training for twenty-four hours a day on the front lines, in the sand for four years, and not one of them complains. The last time I saw them, after May 15, the only complaint about me or to me was: “Why

1 This paragraph, omitted from the Arabic text in

al-Ahram, is taken from the English translation of

Sadat’s speech as broadcast in Arabic on Cairo Home

Service and “Voice of the Arabs,” BBC Monitoring

Service, Summary of World Broadcasts, ME/3744/A/17.


don’t you give us the order to cross?” No one asked a special favor of me or complained to me or submitted a petition to me. These are our sons on the Canal; we are behind them with all our love and honor and everything

we possess. Everyone must know that the year 1971 will not pass without this battle being decided, either by peace or by war. We cannot accept the situation of no war and no peace, however great the sacrifices.

So much for the military field, and I hope that what I say will reach everybody and that they will hear it. As for political action, I also want to praise the U.S.S.R.’s role in giving us political support just as it has given us military support since the beginning of the aggression. It really is standing by us loyally. Then there are the non-aligned countries, for example Yugoslavia, Ceylon and India. I must praise their stand beside us to you and to the people. Then there are the Islamic countries, headed by Pakistan. I must, also praise to you the role they are playing in support of us. As for Europe, and France in particular, I truly and wholeheartedly salute President Pompidou; I salute the French people and government for the attitude adopted by France, as a great power, on the side of right and justice.

Britain too—her attitude has improved. Certainly. Certainly, as I said on a previous occasion. There is no doubt that the Conser¬ vative Party has changed the policy of the Labour Party in a really courageous way.

I want to state our attitude today so that the whole world may hear. So far we have accepted the Security Council resolution, and we say that the withdrawal mentioned in its first paragraph is withdrawal from all the territories. I say “all the territories,” not „ “territories,” as some people say. We accept the resolution, our attitude today is that we accept the Security Council resolution, and the withdrawal mentioned in it from all the territories. We support Jarring’s mission. The initiative I proposed still holds good. But as I said, everything has an end. We shall not allow 1971 to pass without the battle being decided, by peace or by war. I say all this, I say that we accept the Security Council resolution and Jarring, and we still propose

our initiative, because we don’t want to complicate things. Let it be Israel that complicates things. We don’t want to com¬ plicate things, we have confidence in ourselves. But America must realize, Western Europe and the whole world must realize—and I repeat it—we shall not let the year 1971 pass without deciding the matter, politically or militarily.

367

Statement Issued by the Government and Revolutionary Council of Algeria, Pledging Continued Support to the Pales¬ tine Revolution and Suspending Algerian Relations with Jordan1

Algiers, July 29, 1971

Algeria, faithful to its revolutionary prin¬

ciples continues to support all the Arab causes, first and foremost the cause of Pales¬ tine, which it supports militarily, materially and morally in her belief that armed struggle is the only means for the recovery of usurped Palestine and all the stolen Arab territories, and in her conviction that the Palestine Revolution is the only legal representative

of the Palestinian people. This means that Algeria rejects any form of trusteeship over the Palestine Revolution and that it rejects mediation between the Revolution and its enemies. On this basis Algeria declares once again that the success of the Palestine revolu¬

tion and its overcoming all obstacles depends upon the achievement of unity in the ranks of the Resistance, upon making use of the territories of neighbouring countries for its base camps and upon the supply of material and moral support from all Arab countries. Algeria also declares that the mass killing of the Palestinian people is part of a

1 Translated from the Arabic text of the Algerian govern¬

ment statement broadcast on Algiers Home Service

in Arabic; English translation in BBC Monitoring

Service, Summary of World Broadcasts, ME/3749/A/2-A/3;

reprinted by permission.

ARAB WORLD 519

plan for the all-out liquidation of the Palestine cause.

The Council of the Revolution and the Government during the course of this meeting

studied the Note submitted by the Palestine Revolution to the Presidents and Kings of the Arab states. In reply to the Note the Council of the Revolution and the Government resolved as follows:

(1) To suspend relations in all fields with the present regime in Jordan.

(2) To consider the present regime in Jordan to be incompatible with the contin¬ uation of the struggle of the Palestinian people and with the interests of the Arab nation.

(3) To reaffirm the principle of recognition of the Palestine Revolution as the sole lawful representative of the Palestinian people.

(4) To continue to support the Palestine Revolution militarily, materially and diplo¬ matically.

(5) To facilitate the arrival of supplies and assistance dispatched to the Palestine Resis¬ tance.

(6) To declare that the real solution of the Palestine problem consists in the pursuance of the struggle on all fronts and in the rejection of peaceful solutions.

(7) The need to define the position in relation to the Palestine Revolution with utmost clarity in terms of being for it or against it.

The Council of the Revolution and the Government consider that the implement¬ ation of those principles is an essential con¬ dition for the clarification and elucidation of the ambiguity and for making possible new upsurges for the Palestine Revolution. This is because the ordeal suffered by the Palestin¬ ian people since 1948 has continued to create

adverse effects upon the development of affairs in the Arab countries, particularly after the defeat of 1967, which led to the exacerbation of Arab incompatibilities. These incompati¬ bilities will endure as stumbling blocks in the way of all efforts towards effecting internal development and construction and liberation for as long as the heart of the problem is not tackled and it is not subjected to a funda¬ mental solution.

368

Resolutions Adopted at the Tripoli Con¬ ference of Arab Presidents Pledging Continued Support for the Palestine Resistance and Criticizing Jordan for Failing To Implement the Cairo and Amman Agreements1

Tripoli, July 31, 1971

The assembled presidents resolved:

I. To regard anything that prejudices the Palestine revolution and its honor as offending the honor and the conscience of the Arab nation.

II. To support any action leading to the


conference statement, Fateh (Damascus), August 1,

1971.

Participants in the conference were President Sadat

of the U.A.R., President al-Iryani of Yemen (Sanaa),

Presidential Council Chairman Rubayyi of Yemen

(Aden), President Assad of Syria, P.L.O. Executive

Committee Chairman Arafat, and President Qadhafi

of Libya; President Numairi was expected to attend,

but was detained by events in the Sudan.
















on Palestine 1970.)


ment' for ending the Jordan Civil War, included








implementation, in letter and in spirit, of the Cairo and Amman Agreements and to the establishment of practical safeguards to ensure that these Agreements are not again violated, in order that all efforts may be united and directed against the enemy.

III. To support all the measures taken by the Arab governments to confront the Jordan¬ ian authorities in their violation of the Cairo and Amman Agreements and their actions in liquidating the revolution in Jordan, and to support the development of these measures in conformity with the development of the situation.

IV. To keep a watch on the attitude of the Jordanian government, and if it is clear that it is persisting in refusing to implement the Cairo and Amman Agreements it will be the duty of all Arab governments to take such practical measures as they deem appro¬ priate, both individually and collectively, to protect the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination and to continue their legitimate struggle, and to ensure freedom of action for the Palestine revolution in Arab and Jordanian territory until complete libera¬ tion is achieved.

V. To undertake to provide the Palestine revolution with financial, moral and military support to enable it to continue its struggle and protect its existence in Jordan, as being the natural base of the Palestine revolution.

VI. To regard the Libyan initiative of calling for volunteers to allow the Libyan Arab masses to play a part in the Palestine revolution as a splendid example that should be followed.

While proclaiming their profound belief in the inevitability of the victory of the Palestine revolution, the Presidents assembled in Tripoli salute and express their appreciation of the heroic steadfastness of the people of Palestine in the occupied territories, which has won the admiration of the whole world and is an expression of the devotion to struggle of the Palestinian people and of their determi¬ nation to carry on with their revolution until victory is won.

369

Cable Message from President Nnmairi of the Sudan Congratulating President Qadhafi of Libya on the Resolutions Adopted at the Tripoli Conference of Arab Presidents1

Khartoum, Early August, 1971

To my brother Muammar al-Qadhafi, President of the Revolutionary Command Council and Premier, the Libyan Arab Republic.

I congratulate you on my own behalf and on behalf of my brothers of the Revolu¬ tionary Command Council, on the success of the emergency Arab summit conference. We have been greatly moved by the pioneer Libyan initiative to support the Palestine revolution with volunteers from intrepid Libya.

The historic and decisive decisions taken by you and our brothers the heads of state, at the summit conference, are a true expression of the firm advance of the Arab nation along the road of the great revolution for liberation. The Sudanese people, who have been with you in their hearts, their thoughts and their emotions, as they followed the course of your great conference, clasp your hands with boundless aspiration and support in the hope that this may enable the Palestine revolution to intensify its struggle, consolidate its exis¬ tence and smash the perfidious conspiracies aimed at liquidation that are being executed by the agents of colonialism.

May you and our righteous brothers live long as the bulwark of the Arab nation. Long live the Palestine revolution in its inflexible struggle, along with the masses of our Arab nation, for the realization of their mighty hopes on behalf of which so much blood is being shed, so many lives are being lost.

1 Translated from the Arabic text of Numairi’s cable,

al-Haqiqa (Benghazi), August 8, 1971.

ARAB WORLD 521

370

French Press Interview with King Hussein of Jordan, Explaining His Dif¬ ferences with Other Arab Nations and His Clashes with the Palestine Resis¬ tance1

Amman, Early August, 1971

Hussein: I think that in the present cir¬ cumstances any peace would be equivalent to capitulation. We must first unify Arab ranks and agree on a common strategic policy capable of deterring the enemy from annexing the territories conquered in June 1967. How¬ ever, even these minimal conditions are not met today, and I don’t understand how certain Arabs can envisage a political solution to their conflict with the Hebrew state while they are no more able to take on peace than war.

Qj Tet it has been said that you have gone so far as to meet Mr. Tigal Alton, the Israeli

Vice-Premier, to discuss certain forms of political settlement.

A. I have not met Mr. Allon. Those are calumnies to which I have always preferred not to reply. Besides, it is easy to denounce the motives and intentions of those who spread them. Jordan considers itself bound by Security Council Resolution 242 in the same way as the other Arab countries who accepted the U.N. as arbiter. It is in this spirit that we cooperated with Dr. Gunnar Jarring and later subscribed to Mr. William Rogers’ plan, after Egypt, by the way, had taken the initiative of accepting it without consulting us. Need I recall here that our first differences with the fedayeen go back to this measure? In any case, there was no reaction from Israel. We weren’t even granted a declaration of intent. And yet some people keep on urging peace. If they rely on international pressures alone to obtain justice, they won’t get very far.

1 Translated from the French text of King Hussein’s

interview, conducted by Edouard Saab, Le Monde,

August 11, 1971, p. 5.

Qj In the meanwhile, have you done everything to open the way to apolitical solution?

A. How do you mean?

Qj The Palestine Resistance has been liquidated. And without the commandos, who can harrass the enemy or threaten the security of the Jewish state?

A. We are still seeking those commandos to whom you refer, those willing to fight in Palestine and not elsewhere. This must be understood: a genuine resistance would do more for Jordan than for any other Arab country. That is why it would be absurd to think that we could have considered liqui¬ dating a resistance movement which was prepared to fight where they should have been fighting; the one we were dealing with only wanted to destroy Jordan.

[Expressing the view that the people of the West Bank are relieved that stability and order have finally won over anarchy]: We are the object of a conspiracy as serious as that which lost the Arabs Palestine. The troubles in Jordan have quite simply served to sanction the fait accompli of Israeli occupation. What¬ ever happens—and our Palestinian brothers are witness to it—we did the impossible to coexist with the commandos, to put up with their abuses and even their crimes. It was too much. In the end people criticized us for resignation and weakness. I don’t think that it was humanly possible to be patient any longer, to do any more to avoid armed con¬ frontation. On that we have a clear con¬ science, and no one will be so cynical as to make us responsible for fighting which we never wanted.

[Asked if he knew what would become of the Hashemite Kingdom if the Palestinian people were to be granted the right of self-determina¬ tion, King Hussein replied that three formulae should be kept in mind: the reestablishment of Jordanian sovereignty on the West Bank of the Jordan River, a federation of two autonomous states, or total separation.]

But all these hypotheses can be envisaged only once our territory is liberated. That, in my opinion, is the urgent priority and, taking account of our common desire to recover the usurped homeland, the one and only objective which should stimulate our efforts.


Q. And if\ to take charge of this straggle which you predict, a provisional Palestinian govern¬ ment should be formed, how would you receive it?

A. Who would it include?

Qj Representatives of the Palestine Resistance organizations.

A. But what do these actually represent? To find out, the Palestinian people themselves —those who live in their country, those in Jordan and of course those in the occupied territories must be consulted. The people of the West Bank think that they are in a far better position to speak in the name of the Palestinian people than those gentlemen who hold court in Damascus, Beirut or Cairo. I wonder if it isn’t in the enemy’s interest to negotiate with these people now that they have revealed their powerlessness.

[The King commented on the failure in

his eyes of Saudi attempts at mediation and the fact that he is in no hurry to resume relations with the commandos.]

Q. In Tour Majesty?s opinion, what is it that justifies the massive aid which the United States is granting to the Hashemite Kingdom ?

A. It is a fact that our open policy towards the West brings us aid from the United States. Others have chosen the Soviet Union. They profit from it and that is their right. The Arabs lose nothing from mobilizing the greatest [possible] number of men in the world to struggle against Zionism; indeed they need them badly. There are only a few countries left who are self-sufficient economically. Besides, when the United States helps Jordan, they know that we are one of the rare countries of the region to have maintained a dialogue with the West both before and since the war of June 1967. That should count. As for those who reproach us for our relations with the Americans, they would do better to clarify their own position with regard to the East as well as the West. We certainly wished to rely on our Arab brothers after the catastrophe of June 1967. The Khartoum Summit of September 1967 decided to grant aid to Jordan to help it carry on the war effort, since it defends the largest part of the Arab-Israeli front. Several months later, we were deprived of two-thirds

of the aid promised us. It could well be asked if behind these maneuvers people were seeking to destroy our country.

d But in whose interest?

A. No doubt in that of Zionism. Obviously we defended ourselves and today we are more confident than ever about the future and the unity of our people. From now on no decision will be taken regarding the kingdom which doesn’t first and foremost take account of the interests and dignity of the Jordanian people. It is high time that Arab leaders undertook an examination of conscience.

Qj There is a lot of talk here about the Jordanian army, its striking force, defense potential and its courage. How did it happen that in June 1967 it lost Jerusalem in such a short time ?

A. A week before the outbreak of hostilities, we had to abandon our own plans to integrate with the overall strategy of the unified Arab command. That is really the secret of the fall of Jerusalem and the loss of the West Bank. I can’t say definitely that we could have saved anything except, of course, our honor. And even so, the enemy took longer to reach the walls of the Old City than to reach the East Bank of the Suez Canal. Our misfortune was to believe blindly in inter-Arab co¬ operation and military coordination.

371

Saudi Arabia-U.A.R. Joint Working Paper Setting Forth Principles for the Settlement of the Crisis Between the Government of Jordan and the Palestine Resistance1

Early August, 1971

1. The Jordanian authorities should declare their full commitment to the implementation

1 Translated from the Arabic text of the working paper

reportedly delivered to Jordanian government officials

by Saudi Foreign Minister Saqqaf and Egyptian

President Sadat’s special representative, Hassan Sabri

al-Khauli, and reported by Amman Radio on August

14 as being unacceptable to Jordan, as published in

al-Ahram (Cairo), August 12, 1971.

ARAB WORLD 523

of the Cairo Agreement signed by the Arab Kings and Heads of State on September 27, 1971, and the implementation of the Amman Agreement signed by King Hussein and Mr. Yasser Arafat (the head of the Palestine Liberation Organization) in the presence of Mr. al-Bahi al-Adgham, the Tunisian Chairman of the [Supreme Arab] Follow-up Committee for the implementation of the agreements between the two parties.

Egypt and Saudi Arabia believe that the implementation of the Agreements will es¬ tablish the sovereignty of the Jordanian state over its territory and ensure freedom of Resistance action.

2. The Arab political and military com¬ mittees should resume their activities in Jordan and supervise the sound implementa¬ tion of the Agreements.

3. The Jordanian government should release the Palestinian commandos it has arrested.

4. The command of the Palestine revolution should suppress all secret organizations.

5. All information campaigns by the Jordanian authorities and the Palestine Resis¬ tance directed against each other should cease.

6. National conciliation should be declared so that security and stability may be restored in Jordan and Palestinian commando action may resume the performance of its basic tasks against the Israeli enemy.

372

Statement Issued by the Palestine Liber¬ ation Organization Outlining the Main Points of the P.L.O. Working Paper Presented to Arab Officials Attempting Mediation in the Conflict Between the Palestine Resistance and the Govern¬ ment of Jordan1

August 16, 1971

I. The study of the working paper, and the

1 Translated from the Arabic of the P.L.O. Executive

Committee’s statement, Hisad al-Asifa (Beirut), No. 2

(September 14, 1971).

talks that are being held in connection with it, are being carried on in the name of the Executive Committee and within the frame¬ work of the decisions it has taken to ensure the interests of the Palestine revolution on a basis of adherence to the Cairo and Amman Agreements. There is no question of political maneuvering aimed at evading the text or the provisions of these agreements, the en¬ forcement of which requires the implementa¬ tion of the effective Arab guarantees which are clearly and unequivocally set out in the memorandum unanimously approved by the Executive Committee. This memorandum, which was submitted to Messrs. al-Saqqaf and al-Khauli, emphasizes the following points:

A. That the working paper should be accepted in principle as constituting full implementation of the Cairo Agreements in both letter and spirit;

B. That the Jordanian official and semi¬ official interpretations are to be regarded as incompatible with the working paper and the Cairo and Amman Agreements;

C. That the Palestine revolution, as repre¬ sented by the Palestine National Council and the Executive Committee, is the sole representative of the Palestinian people and their natural right to self-determination;

D. Profound belief in Jordanian-Pales¬ tinian national unity and serious action to establish it on a sound basis;

E. Freedom of commando action in the military, administrative and popular spheres, as stipulated by the Cairo and Amman Agreements;

F. Emphasis on the necessity for effective Arab guarantees to obviate all possibility of new massacres being carried out against our people and our revolutionary strugglers, in conformity with the elucidations contained in the Central Committee’s memorandum to the envoys;

G. The release of all members and sup¬ porters of the revolution, both military and civilian, who are in detention and the re¬ scinding of all sentences passed against them, either in their presence or in absentia.

II. The Executive Committee affirms to the masses of the Palestinian people and the


masses of the Arab nation, that it will never renounce or bargain over any of the rights of the Palestinian people—neither their right to continue armed struggle until liberation and return are achieved, nor the natural right of the Palestinian people to [exercise] self-determination, to maintain all national rights and to take all measures to surmount obstacles so as to ensure the continuation and the freedom of the Palestine revolution. Moreover, the Jordanian authorities have been concentrating on having Arab aid to Jordan resumed and the campaigns against it stopped, as if the interruption of aid and these campaigns were the reason why the regime attacked the revolution. The revolu¬ tion replied that these were the results, not the causes, of Jordan’s attack on and con¬ spiracy against the revolution, and that when the regime stops its attack on the revolu¬ tion these consequences will also cease.

We are confident that the coming days will reveal to the masses the real attitudes

of both the revolution and the regime.

373

Statement Issued by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine Rejecting Any Mediation in the Conflict Between the Palestine Resistance and the Govern¬ ment of Jordan (Excerpts)1

August 18, 1971

The massacres of September 1970, and the subsequent incidents, ending with the recent slaughter at Jerash and Ajlun and the meetings of the subservient regime with the Israeli leaders, have clearly disclosed the conspira¬ torial face of the Jordanian regime and its subservience to American imperialism, and the fact that it is the compliant instrument for the achievement of the aims and ambi¬ tions of Zionism.

The blood of our people that flowed in Black September; the blood of our strugglers that has been shed at Jerash and Ajlun, the thousands of our citizens who are detained in the prisons of the subservient regime, and the gallows that have been erected in Amman for our heroes—all these have revealed the plan of the reactionary regime in Jordan to crush the revolution of our people and to wipe them out to make way for the conclusion of a separate peace.

We of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, in defining the nature of our conflict with this regime, reject any kind of mediation with it, for our bitter experience in the past has taught us that, in the end, such mediation is always in the interests of the regime which has been entrusted with the task of crushing the Resistance, which is the last remaining party to reject all solu¬ tions involving surrender and liquidation, and to be capable of showing up slackers and those who are ready to surrender.

We of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, opposed as we are to adventurism and overbidding, can see no way of coexisting with the reactionary regime in Jordan and we believe that we are capable of initiating a struggle against it which, beginning by severing all relations with it and refusing to coexist with it, will end by overthrowing and crushing it.

We of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine reaffirm our rejection of all kinds of mediation with this regime, from whatever source, and we persist in affirming that this regime constitutes a fundamental obstacle to our liberation of Palestine, so that we must direct all our efforts to smashing and elim¬ inating it.


P.F.L.P. statement, al-Hadaf (Beirut), No. 114 (August

21, 1971), p. 3.

ARAB WORLD 525

374

Damascus Declaration Issued by Presi¬ dents Qadhafi of Libya, Assad of Syria and Sadat of the U.A.R., Hailing the Establishment of the Federation of Arab Republics (Excerpt)1

Damascus, August 20, 1971

In the course of the discussions among them and of their meetings with the delegations that accompanied them, which centered on the battle and the appraisal of the situation and all its aspects and eventualities, the three presidents affirmed that the confrontation with the Zionist enemy occupying our Arab territory has reached a decisive point and that, realizing this, the enemy has increased his ferocity, savagery and determination to perpetuate his occupation through the use of the most odious methods of coercion and fury against the Arab citizens of the occupied territories. In addition to this there is the escalation of their conspiracies by the forces of world colonialism, led by the United States of America, which is hostile to the Arab nation and the Arab future, in a frenzied effort to weaken our front of confrontation with the enemy, to shatter its unity in struggle and rob it of its ability to settle by military means the battle with the enemy in favor of legitimate Arab rights. The attempts now being made to liquidate the Palestine Resis¬ tance and to render its movement abortive


statement, al-Baath (Damascus), August 21, 1971.



December 27, 1969 by Libya, the Sudan and the

UA.R. This agreement, subsequently referred to as

the Tripoli Charter, provided for economic, military

and political cooperation among the original signatories.

(An excerpt from the joint communique announcing

the agreement appears as Document 462 in International

Documents on Palestine 1969.) On November 8, 1970

it was announced that the three countries had agreed

to form a union and on November 27 that Syria too

was to join a '‘unified four-power command.” By the

time the F.A.R. was proclaimed, the Sudan had post¬

poned its adherence to the federation.

are part of the large-scale Zionist-colonialist plan aimed at protecting the Israeli occupa¬ tion of Arab territory, and safeguarding, strengthening and protecting it against the great upheaval for which the Arab people are preparing throughout the length and breadth of the Arab homeland.

The three presidents affirm that this Zionist- imperialist plan is doomed to failure in the face of the determination of the Arab people to liberate their land and recover their honor, and that the Arab nation possesses sufficient decisive resources and arms for it to engage in the battle of destiny against the most arrogant of challenges and to settle the conflict in favor of right and peace.

The three presidents regard the unionist action achieved by the Benghazi Declaration and the establishment of the Federation of Arab Republics, in this difficult period when the enemy believes that he has come close to imposing surrender on the Arab nation, as constituting the decisive answer which affirms the resolute Arab will to pool its resources to confront its enemies and to frustrate their conspiracies.

375

Statements by President Assad of Syria Stressing the Necessity in the Face of the Zionist Threat for die Step Towards Unity Represented by the Establish¬ ment oftheFederation of Arab Republics2

Damascus, August 30, 1971

I want to add that unity is not a response to a grave danger or to a challenge. It is a return to the natural state of affairs in the Arab nation, although it is true that the


Assad’s broadcast speech to the nation in which he

urged a positive vote at the plebiscite to bo held on the

proposed federation of Syria, Libya and the U.A.R.,

al-Baath (Damascus), August 31, 1971.


challenges do increase the need for rapid steps along the road to unity, and thus affirm that unionist action can brook no postpone¬ ment or delay, now that it has become clear how immense is the Zionist peril and the ambitions and determination of the enemy to consolidate this position in that part of our Arab territory that he has usurped in anticipa¬ tion of further expansion at a later stage. The battle of destiny that confronts us is at once a military, political and economic battle, which we can only win through

resources as great or greater than those of the enemy and the American support he receives. These resources are the resources of the Arab nation, and unionist action is the sound and solid framework for mustering these resources and directing them into a single channel that will make them a single striking force that will yield the best returns for our Arab nation,

In our preparation for this battle there is a clear commitment which is mentioned in the proclamation of the establishment of the Federation of Arab Republics, and also in the historic Damascus Declaration the com¬ mitment that the liberation of occupied territory should be the goal to which all ener¬ gies and resources must be devoted; that there is to be no peace, no negotiation and no relin¬ quishing of a single inch of Arab territory; that there shall be no dissipation of the Pales¬ tinian cause and no bargaining over it. Within the framework of this commitment we shall act with absolute freedom, in all fields of struggle, everywhere in the world, now that we have smashed the deathly state of inaction that prevailed before No¬ vember 16, 1970. Nothing shall restrict or check our freedom but our commitment to the principles of our great Party, the Baath Party, which is the embodiment of the interests of the homeland, and to the goals mentioned in the Benghazi Declaration, the Damascus Declaration and the basic provisions of the Federation.

376

Statements by U.A.R. President Sadat Stressing the Importance of the Step Towards Unity Represented by the Es¬ tablishment of the Federation of Arab Republics1

Cairo, August 30, 1971

Some people are crying out and asking what effect Arab unity has on the battle, what effect the federation of republics that has been established is going to have on the battle. What I want to say is that the Federa¬ tion of Arab Republics, which, God willing, we shall vote in favor of in two days time, is one of the fundamental mainstays of the battle. Speaking frankly, as I always have done with you, there is no longer anyone on the front against Israel but ourselves and Syria.

We form the Southern Front and Syria forms the Northern Front. Libya forms our [strategic] depth in the battle. The Sudan also constitutes [strategic] depth. Libya to the west and Sudan to the south constitute [strategic] depth for the battle. There is no longer anyone else but us in the battle. Why is this? Where have the confrontation countries gone? Jordan is completely out of the battle. We all know what Jordan is doing today. Its forces are concentrated against Syria, not against Israel. Iraq has completely withdrawn its forces from Jordan. King Hussein has completely destroyed the Resis¬ tance inside Jordan and regards this as a victory, and unfortunately boasts about it. Quite simply there is no longer anyone in the battle except us. Of the confrontation countries only we and Syria are left, and we have depth in the west, that is Libya, and depth in the south, Sudan.

Today the Federation of Arab Republics is something absolutely vital for the battle.


Sadat’s broadcast speech to the nation in which he

urged a positive vote at the plebiscite to be held on the

proposed federation of Syria, Libya and the U.A.R.,

al-Ahram (Cairo), August 31, 1971.

ARAB WORLD 527

It is not only, as I said, that we and Syria are the only confrontation countries in the battle, with depth behind us, and with the Sudan also participating in the front with one addi¬ tional brigade. No, it is more than that. All of you realize that in the latest stage the Arab nation has passed through an extremely bad stage of disarray. King Hussein strikes at the commandos and his premier holds a press conference at which he announces victory over the commandos. We all know what has happened in Morocco; we all know what has taken place in the Sudan. Some of our Arab brothers, God forgive them, are outbidding us, sitting thousands of kilo¬ meters and miles away from the front. But they want to outbid us with words only. There is a state of disarray. The Federation of Arab Republics that we are establishing is not only for the battle and the confrontation countries. No, it’s a response to the state of disarray that exists in the Arab nation today. It’s so that we may say to every Arab, to our friends, and to our enemies, that the Arab nadon never dies; that on the contrary, when disarray is at its worst there emerges a solid core, a federation of three states including half the Arab nation or more, with one single will, one policy, one single plan, and with the determination that we shall live free. This is why when we go to vote the day after tomorrow, God willing, for the Federation of Arab Republics, it won’t be only for the battle; we shall be saying No to our enemies, who thought that the Arab nation had died, forgetting 1969 when there was the revolution in the Sudan and the revolution in Libya—in 1971 we say to them Never, that the Arab nation constantly renews its youth. Yes, the greater the bitterness and pain and disarray, [the more strongly] the Arab nation comes out of it with a new form, with a new will, with new resolution and determination—as is demonstrated by the Federation of Arab Republics.

377

Proposed Charter for the Jordanian National Union Explaining the Need for Such a Political Organization and Stress¬ ing the Unity of the Two Banks of the Jordan (Excerpt)1

Amman, Early September, 1971

From our conviction that simply expressed ideas are the truest, most authentic and most profound, we say that:

1. Both Banks of Jordan, and the people of both Banks, are today passing through a crisis in their destiny and their existence.

2. Jordan is in a state of conflict with a strong and clever enemy.

3. Our economy is in the first stages of

growth and formation.

4. We are passing through a stage of intel¬ lectual, moral and social disintegration as a result of having lost our self-confidence and of

having strayed in the mazes of alien thinking. This disintegration is being fostered by our enemies with all the weapons of perfidy, intrigue and the sowing of dissension at their disposal.

5. We are suffering from a childish aliena¬ tion from our national and spiritual heritage, ignoring the fact that this heritage is part of

human civilization and one of its mainstays. 6. Many groups of our people have taken

to acting in accordance with political and social concepts derived from abroad which give those who accept them the idea that our small people is incapable of promoting its own experience, which in fact may be said to

play a vanguard role in the Arab world, or at least to make a substantial contribution to the

experience of our brother Arabs. These groups have adopted the method of receiving guid-


draft charter, distributed at a meeting of some 300

prominent Jordanians convened as a steering committee

charged with producing a final form of the charter for

the Union, announced by King Hussein on September

7 to be the only authorized political organization in

Jordan, al-Dustur (Amman), September 9, 1971.


ance, prompting, aid and remuneration from outside our homeland, forgetting that every national movement has its own climate, and that revolutions cannot be imported and exported.

It is in the light of this extremely compli¬ cated and difficult situation that we are taking action. What we wish to originate is not a mathematical equation with ourselves squeez¬ ed in between its two terms, but a general framework and a broad and spacious road based on intelligence and belief, which our people can fill with their personality, their experience and their peculiar circumstances. This framework is the Jordanian National Union which will organize all the forces of the people in the political, economic, social and cultural fields in conformity with intellectual factors and general ideological guidelines that are humane in content and objective.

Section Three General Principles 1. The Jordanian people is an integral part

of the Arab nation.

2. The system of government in Jordan is a constitutional monarchy.

3. Any conspiracy against the entity and existence of Jordan is a conspiracy against the Arab cause and in particular against the Palestinian cause.

4. The unity of the Jordanian people in a single rank is a national necessity for the confrontation of all challenges and perils.

5. Struggle by all methods to liberate the occupied territory is an absolute national necessity for the recovery of usurped Arab rights in Palestine.

6. The unity of the Arab states and the subsequent unity of the Arab nation require, first and foremost, the unity of the people’s forces in every Arab region, provided that this unity is achieved by aware democratic processes, due regard being paid to objective circumstances, social, economic, political and geographical, and to the time factor and the stages of development, so that no union may be proclaimed and no unity be born which bears within itself the seeds of its own dissolu¬ tion.

7. The unity of the people of both Banks of Jordan is an original and destined unity, stemming from their unity of history, territory, objectives and destiny, their tragedy of today and their hopes for tomorrow.

8. The unity of the line of confrontation with the enemy absolutely requires that Arab forces should be mobilized for the battle, and that their commands, planning and operations should be coordinated and unified, to prevent the enemy striking at each of them separately.

9. The unity of the political line of confron¬ tation in the conflict requires a unified foreign policy for the Arab states directed against the plans of the enemy in all international fields.

10. The only fundamental conflict in the Arab theater is the conflict with the enemy. It is therefore the duty of all the Arab regions to stand in a single rank against the common danger. This requires the mobilization of all Arab energies, the resolution of differences through quiet dialogue and the adoption of manly and responsible attitudes of brotherly and positive cooperation so as to create an atmosphere of mutual confidence and self- confidence.

11. Inasmuch as many other Arab regions are passing through the same stage as Jordan and confronting similar internal and external problems, and in view of the fact that the stage we are passing through requires the establishment of national federations deriving from a situation similar to our own, the Jordanian National Union will work to strengthen its relations with these organiza¬ tions, whatever they may be called and by all the means at its disposal, because we believe that this is the sound basis for the establishment of a union of the Arab states and the unity of the Arab nation.

12. So that we may appraise our forces in the battle of destiny against Zionism, its allies, and its state of Israel, it is essential for us to determine the characteristics of the enemy, the reasons for his strength and the elements of his weakness, so that the action we take may not consist, as it has in the past, merely of reactions to the actions and plans of the enemy.

13. The principal danger that threatens us in this stage is the Zionist danger, and we

ARAB WORLD 529

must confront this danger united in hands and hearts; whoever fails to perform his national duty belongs neither to a specific group nor to this homeland, but to a rotten group which harms itself before it harms the homeland, and which society casts to the side of the road as the people continue their advance.

378 Statements on the Significance of the Federation of Arab Republics, Made by President Qadhafi of Libya1

Tripoli, September 1, 1971

Brothers, those who have offered nothing, those who have not responded to the call to make the battle a pan-Arab one—there is no place for such as these in the Federation of Arab Republics. Those who have not re¬ sponded to the call for the pan-Arab battle of the Arab nation have obliged their masses to

resort to revolution to make the battle a pan-Arab one.

Brothers, today we must tell Arab reaction not to deceive itself into believing that we


Qadhafi’s speech on the second anniversary of the

September 1 revolution, al-Haqiqa (Benghazi), Sep¬

tember 2, 1971.



December 27,1969 by Libya, the Sudan and the U.A.R.

This agreement, subsequently referred to as the Tripoli

Charter, provided for economic, military and political

cooperation among the original signatories. (An

excerpt from the joint communique announcing the

agreement appears as Document 462 in International

Documents on Palestine 1969.) On November 8, 1970

it was announced that the three countries had agreed

to form a union and on November 27 that Syria too was

to join a “unified four-power command.” By the time

the F.A.R. was proclaimed in Benghazi on April 17,

1971, the Sudan had postponed its adherence to the

federation. (For the text of the proclamation, see

Document 322 above.)

shall bargain or offer it the hand of friendship. The Federation of Arab Republics adds new strength to the Arab revolution; it is a new

stage which advances the Arab revolution from the stage of slogans and hopes to the stage of the fundamental realization of those slogans. The Federation of Arab Republics will be a force that protects Arab revolutionaries every¬

where ; it will be a force that fosters the Arab revolution and sets it ablaze. The Federation of Arab Republics will be a new center of gravity that will polarize the unionist forces of the Arab homeland.

379 Statement Issued by the Newly Elected National (Pan-Arab) Command of the Baath Party (Syria) Reporting on the Work of the Party’s Eleventh National Congress (Excerpts)2

Damascus, September 5,1971

Arab policy Masses of our Arab people:

Having conducted a scientific and objective analysis of the present situation of the Arab homeland, the Conference expressed the view that backwardness and political fragmentation have always been the principal instrument used by colonialism to curb the Arab movement towards liberation and progress. It has always been and still is the political class framework which Arab reaction uses as a shield to defend its territorial positions and to perpetuate its exploitation.

The Arab nationalist movement, which is a movement of liberation, progress and unity, has achieved important gains and transforma¬ tions on behalf of the masses within the regional framework. But it has proved impos¬ sible for these gains to attain their full dimen¬ sions at national level and to support the

Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text of the

(Syrian) Baath Party’s National Command statement

on the congress held in Damascus in late August,

al-Baath (Damascus), September 6, 1971.


struggle for liberation and progress in the other Arab regions. The Arab revolution suffered a cruel setback after the aggression of June 1967, and withdrew to defensive positions in the face of the vicious imperialist- Zionist attack, in which the Zionist state was the spearhead, and which made it clearer than ever before that in establishing a state for the Zionists in Palestine, colonialism hoped to achieve the following aims:

1. That the Zionist state should be an obstacle to the Arab unionist struggle and a stumbling block in the way of the Arabs’ yearning for unity; and that it should con¬ stitute a geographical barrier between the Arabs of the East in Asia and those of the West in Africa.

2. That it should be an armed base for colonialism and a stick to be brandished in the face of the Arab liberation movement and when necessary used to stem the Arab revolu¬ tionary tide by armed aggression.

3. That it should be the means by which colonialism perpetuates Arab backwardness because, on the one hand, the Zionist state is a basic obstacle to the achievement of Arab unity, and consequently consolidates backwardness, because of its organic rela¬ tionship with fragmentation, and because, on the other hand, acting as it does like a cancer in the body of the Arab nation, the Zionist state leads to much of our nation’s economic capacity being exhausted in its self-defense against the Zionist peril, thereby becoming a basic obstacle to its economic plans in the field of development. To sum up: Inasmuch as the aims of the Arab masses from the [Atlantic] Ocean to the [Arabian] Gulf can be summarized as unity, freedom and socialism, the Zionist state is the principal instrument in the hands of colonialism and imperialism for the perpetuation of fragmenta¬ tion, domination, colonialism, exploitation and backwardness, and the Zionist peril to the

Arab nation becomes increasingly grave when¬ ever the Arab revolutionary tide flows more

strongly and mass struggle to achieve the aims of the masses of the Arab nation gains impetus.

For all these reasons the Eleyenth National Congress stresses that the Palestine problem is

still the pivot of Arab struggle and that the

attitude adopted by any regime or any political movement to this problem is the true criterion of its national and socialist commitment.

The Conference also stresses that the Palestine problem is the first and foremost

Arab problem, and reaffirms the attitude of the Party, as expressed in the resolutions of its successive Conferences, of rejecting all propos¬ als aimed at liquidating the Palestine problem.

The Conference also declares that the Palestine revolution is the culmination of the struggle waged by the Arab masses, that qualitatively it transcends that struggle, and that through it the defeat that befell the honor of the Arab nation in June 1967 is being avenged. The Conference therefore demands that a practical formula be found for the realization of the slogan of the unity of combatants in the field of resistance. The Conference also declares its support and admiration for the efforts made by the Syrian Arab Region to protect the Resistance, and condemned the policy of the subservient Jordanian authorities which is aimed at the liquidation of the Pales¬ tine Resistance; it also calls on all nationalist forces in the Jordanian Arab Region to stick together and unite their ranks in a unified national progressive front. The Conference resolved that the principal objective on which the strategy of the unionist and socialist struggle must concentrate at this stage is the liberation of the occupied territory. The Conference therefore called for the enlistment of all the resources and energies of the Arab masses and for the mobilization of all human, military and economic efforts for the battle of liberation. The Conference expressed the opinion that it was essential to establish a broad Arab nationalist and progressive front to buttress the waging of this battle, and that the establishment of such a front in every Arab region is a national necessity imposed by the circumstances of the battle with colonialism, Zionism and reaction.

In the light of the above the Conference welcomed the serious action that is being taken by the Baath Party, and announced its support for the resolutions adopted in this connection by the Fifth Syrian Regional Conference and the measures currently being

ARAB WORLD 531

taken to devise a formula for action in the form of a front. It also expressed the view that the establishment of such a front in the Syrian Arab Region will provide support to the struggle of the Arab masses in the other regions and be a model to be followed in the establish¬ ment of similar fronts in those regions.

The Conference and International Problems

International Zionism, because it is an organized racist and aggressive movement in alliance with world imperialism, and because of its economic forces and political influence, is a danger not only to Arab existence but also to the majority of the national and progressive interests of the peoples of the world, and the dangerous colonialist role it is performing in our Arab homeland, in the Third World and even in the socialist world through its political and economic sabotage, is a tangible fact that must be resisted, combated and eliminated.

The Attitude to Imperialism Continued imperialist support of the Zionist

presence in our homeland is the natural con¬ sequence of the alliance that exists between Zionism, which aims at expansion and at maintaining our backwardness, on the one hand, and world imperialism, in particular the United States of America, which is striving to maintain its economic and military domination of this important area of the world, on the other. Therefore the conflict between our people and their will for libera¬ tion and to build a unified Arab socialist society, on the one hand, and imperialism, on the other, is a fundamental conflict which requires greater struggle against imperialism and its supporters and against the Zionist presence in our homeland, so that this conflict may be resolved in favor of our masses as well as the world liberation movement.

380

Comments Criticizing the Role Played by the Palestine Resistance in Jordan and Reaffirming Jordanian Solidarity with Egypt, Made by King Hussein in a Speech Announcing the Establishment

of the Jordanian National Union1

Amman, September 7, 1971

Resistance generally arises where there is occupation. We have always believed that we should support this kind of resistance, and also support the right of our people to resist the occupier. But, most regrettably, what has happened is that the conflicts of the Arab world and of the whole world have found their way into our ranks here, and are chang¬ ing this weapon into one which, instead of performing its duty in the occupied territory, has performed almost the same role here in our theater, by destroying our national unity, dissipating our strength, molesting our armed forces, impairing their morale and their opportunities to train and to raise themselves to the required level and adversely affecting our economy and our morale. We have been living in a maelstrom of destruction. We have tried to do the impossible—to put things right before it is too late, and to protect all that is most dear to every soul, to every man. But our moves, our appeals and our attempts have been interpreted as arising from weakness instead of, as is really the case, from our zeal that the advance may continue and that Arab blood may be shed only on the field of honor and self-respect. We have had much to put up with. Our coordination and cooperation with our brethren the United Arab Republic continued until they accepted the American initiative. This came as a complete surprise to us here; explaining it, the late President said that he had tried and desired to bear all the responsibility for this step himself. We said


Hussein’s speech to a committee of some 300 prominent

Jordanians charged with preparing a draft charter for

the proposed Jordanian National Union, al-Dustur

(Amman), September 8, 1971.


to him: “We accept what you accept and reject what you reject, from our zeal for continued coordination and cooperation.55

Our Palestinian people alone, with the whole of Palestine under occupation, cannot recover their rights from our usurping enemy. We and they together cannot do much more; our chances of achieving anything are limited. But along with our brethren in the United Arab Republic we may have a better chance, and along with our brethren in the whole of the Arab homeland we will certainly have much

better chances. The question is that of the efforts made by this nation as against the

efforts made by our enemy, and the means that are constantly being made available to him to

build greater strength and to continue along

th,e course he is following. Following the disaster of 1967 none were

closer than we were to our brethren in the United Arab Republic. There was wide¬ spread expression of malicious pleasure in the misfortunes of others. Together we were abandoned to our fate, there was slack¬ ness—but in the face of all this we always stood beside them, and spoke out on their behalf throughout the world and served one cause and one objective.

Many attempts were made to influence

their attitude, attempts which were in con¬

formity with the feelings even of many Egyptians, that they must follow their course

alone. [There were] attempts to isolate Egypt from the Arab world; when we accepted

the American initiative, we did so to prevent that happening.

It was a surprise because, in brief, from the time we accepted Security Council Resolution 242 there had been a great difference of opinion as to the interpretation of the resolu¬ tion. We understand it in one way, and others understand it in another. We have been in constant contact with the United States, the great power that has so much influence in this area, asking it for its interpretation of the resolution it shared in drafting. We told [the Americans] that what concerned us was the essence, that we should know that we are in agreement with them on an in¬ terpretation satisfactory to us, so that we may

be able to take action. I can say that the picture is still not clear, and we have not received frank and unambiguous replies. This is why, when our brethren in the United Arab Republic took a step, it came as a surprise to us. But, as I have said, we chose to adopt the same attitude without hesitation, and to

take the same steps.

Here the situation exploded and the battle was in fact a battle in coordination with our brethren in the United Arab Republic. It

was their battle just as it was ours. I regret to say that the Resistance was not

in its right place in our towns and villages, our fields and forests; it was not in its right place behind the ranks of our armed forces;

it was not in its right place among women, children and men; it should have been over

there, in the occupied territory, which lives in our hearts and which we protect with our

lives and with all our might.

In the period that has just passed, during the last year, in which we have healed the wounds and started to advance, I have constantly met our brethren and we have

examined and discussed many things. The incidents and experiences disclosed many facts, the most important being the need to establish a public organization embracing all the sons and daughters of our people to organize the energies and resources of society and direct them towards clear and specific goals with an impetus that cannot be checked by obstacles or surprised by shortcomings and deficiencies. The Charter we are submitting to you and to all our fellow citizens is, in fact, the embodiment of the constructive ideas of all we have heard, of all we have believed in, all we have felt, all we have spoken of so continuously in all fields. 11 is not an organiza¬ tion, it not an organized party in the generally accepted political and social sense; it is a general framework for the organization of human beings and their lives in our beloved

country. It is an immense melting pot in which all our various kinds of energies will fuse to create the Jordanian miracle which will open up to us the road to victory, and build a better and more noble future for our sons who

ARAB WORLD 533

come after us. It will be the light that enters every house and every heart to illuminate for every one of us the way of sincere service and honorable action for Jordan, the Arabs and the cause.

381

Statements Accusing the United States of Failing To Fulfill a Promise To Define Clearly American Policy on the Middle East Conflict, Included in a Speech by U.A.R. President Sadat1

Cairo, September 16, 1971

We accepted the Rogers initiative and there was a ceasefire—once and then again and then a third time; we voluntarily refrained from firing. Then we declared that we were not committed to a ceasefire and to refrain¬ ing from firing.

Rogers, the American Secretary of State, asked if he could visit us. I told him he was welcome, so he came and visited us. We had talks lasting two and a half hours. I asked him what he wanted us here in Egypt to do? He said that nothing at all is wanted of Egypt at present now that she has come forward with her initiative and after her recent move when she gave a positive answer to Jarring, and the constructive attitude she has adopted. All right, nothing is wanted of us. What about the initiative that I took, what about its back¬ ground? Western Europe is suffering from the closure of the Suez Canal, and the price of oil has risen twice, once because of the diversion round the Cape of Good Hope when the Canal was closed, and the second time when [O.P.E.C.] took the decision to raise the price. All right, we are prepared to open the Suez Canal, but on condition that everything starts moving. What I mean is that Israel should carry out the first stage of withdrawal within the framework of a program for comp¬ lete withdrawal—not a partial settlement, but


Sadat’s speech, al-Ahram (Cairo), September 17, 1971.

a first stage within the framework of complete withdrawal or within the framework of a complete program for complete withdrawal from Arab territory, and the settlement of the problem. I declared at that time the condi¬ tions of our initiative, namely that our forces must cross over to the eastern side of the Canal and that a ceasefire would be observed for a maximum of six months so that Jarring might be able to find a solution during that time, after which the second stage of with¬ drawal from the Arab territory occupied on June 5 [1967] to the international frontiers

should take place. We made ourselves perfectly clear in all this, and when Rogers came here I frankly explained the situation to him and told him what our position was. Then Rogers went to Israel and after he had gone there he sent Sisco here. Sisco said ~that the Israelis were still reluctant and didn’t want troops to cross [ the Canal] and still wanted discussion and

talks. I told him our final position was quite

clear and that there could be no argument

about it. Our forces must cross over to the east side of the Canal to perform their na¬ tional duty and to protect the Canal and the cities on the Canal. The ceasefire must be for

six months only. As for a permanent ceasefire, or an indefinite one, we should never accept it, as long as there was a single foreign soldier in

our territory. I have fixed the length of the ceasefire - I fixed it at six months, and for a

definite date. When we conclude the agree¬

ment the date will be fixed. If the settlement is not completed by that date, my forces that cross have the right to complete their task of purging Egyptian territory.

There is no discussion or argument to be had over our frontier—the international

frontier. As for Sharm el-Sheikh, and the talk there is about it, and the dreams and the

daydreams—all that talk—I told him we don’t agree to so much as discussion and we

won’t relinquish a foot, not an inch of our territory or of Arab territory.

This is what I said to Rogers and Sisco. Then last July 6, about two months, and ten days ago, the Head of the Middle East desk or

the Director of the Egyptian section in the


American State Department came to me with a message from the American President and Mr. Rogers, the Secretary of State. He met me here. What was the message? The role of Rogers and Sisco, and the role of America had been what you might call the role of a postman until that date; one would come and sit with us and we would talk, then he would go to Israel and talk there and then come back to us and bring the answer, just like a postman. You will re¬ member that at that time I said that I wanted America to define her attitude. I want to know what her attitude is. I’m not angry; I won’t say I’m angry with America. I just

want her to declare her attitude to the whole world and to the Arab nation in particular.

As I told you, on July 6, two months and ten days ago, the Director of the Egyptian section in the American State Department brought me a message from President Nixon and Rogers. The message said that the United

States and the American President himself had decided to adopt a specific attitude to the problem. This was good news; this was what we had been saying to them for a long time —to tell us what their attitude was. They also said that all this postman business was finished, that they wouldn’t go on with it. Now they were going to have a specific attitude, but before that they wanted certain explanations, they wanted to ask me for them. I said that was all right, [to] go ahead.

[They asked if we] agreed that America should play this role, should define its attitude. I said that is exactly what I have been asking for for a long time; I really want America to define her attitude. [They asked if] the Soviet-Egyptian Treaty had changed relations or had any effect—that means, of course, according to their way of thinking: Were we or were we not free to do as we choose? I said to them that the Soviet-Egyptian Treaty has changed nothing in our situation. The Soviet- Egyptian Treaty has formulated Egyptian-

Soviet relations within a framework, the framework of the Treaty. But we are free to do as we choose—we always have been and we are now, and, God willing, we always shall be. Because this is our problem with the whole world, and with West¬

ern colonialism in particular—we Egyptians insist on being free to do we choose. All right. They said that Sisco was going to Israel on July 26, and that after that he would either come back here or go back to the United States. In any case after Sisco returned to America she would define her attitude in a clearly phrased document and would declare her attitude quite clearly. I said [that was] excellent; we are ready and prepared and waiting to see.

As I said, this was on July 6 of this year, 1971, but from that date until September 16—two months and ten days—America has never contacted us at all, except when we insisted and asked what had happened with the Sisco business. Then they sent a mem¬

orandum saying that Sisco had gone to Israel and had three long meetings with Mrs. Meir and Allon and Dayan and Eban all together, and also had a separate meeting with Eban to discuss bilateral relations, and that Mr. Sisco had concentrated in his discussions on the following points:

1. The relationship between the phased settlement and the comprehensive settlement;

2. The question of Israel’s using the Canal; 3. The nature of the ceasefire; 4. The question of the Egyptian presence

east of the Canal;

5. The extent of the area from which Israel would withdraw;

6. The nature of the manner of supervision.

That was all. Sisco had these three meetings and discussed all this. But what is America’s attitude? What does Israel say? What are America’s views on a solution? What has happened to the American President’s deci¬ sion to stop doing the postman’s job and to

replace it with a specific attitude on the part of America?

Nothing was said about all this or, in other words, for two months and ten days relations and contacts between us and America have been at a complete standstill.

I said at the beginning of my speech that I had looked and found that at the present time a major process of misrepresentation and deceit was going on, before our people first of all before the Arab world and before the world. What is the reason? America is

ARAB WORLD 535

spreading it about everywhere that there is constant contact between herself and Egypt, that there is ground for optimism, that a solution is on the way. Indeed America has gone further than that and said that Egypt has accepted a partial solution. America has said this even to the U.S.S.R. The American alternate delegate told the last meeting of the Big Four in effect to relax and keep quiet: uWe have contacted Egypt, and Egypt goes along with us in the solution; we are in contact and the solution is on the way.”

Very well, I hereby declare to our people as being the first and principal party to the cause, to the Arab nation as being party to the cause, and to the whole world, that contacts between us and America have been at a complete standstill for two months and ten days. There

is no agreement, and America has not offered us anything definite. Our attitude is as I

have said, and America’s attitude is as I have said. Sisco went [to Israel] and chatted a bit

about six points. These six points I regard as being a retreat from the position we reached with Rogers and Sisco when they visited Egypt, because when Rogers and Sisco visited Egypt

we defined things for them as regards the first

stage of withdrawal quite precisely, and now they are again talking about the chat that Sisco brought from Israel, about the list of ways in which the phased settlement relates to the total settlement. Our views on this are perfectly clear—and Rogers admits it and knows that we will not accept a phased settle¬ ment without a comprehensive settlement. The second point, Israel’s use of the Canal, is

rejected until Israel implements all its obliga¬

tions under the Security Council resolution, and America knows this.

They also know the nature of the ceasefire

for we have told them that we do not accept a permanent ceasefire. Indeed, even if they deny it in America I say here that the Ameri¬ cans said: “You are right. You cannot allow the ceasefire to go on indefinitely so long as

there is a single foreign soldier in your territo¬

ry.” Rogers and Sisco may deny it today, but that is what happened. Even today they are repeating these words.

As for the question of Egyptian presence

east of the Canal, I made our attitude to this clear to them, and they know that there can be no discussion of it. The east of the Canal is not Israeli, it is Egyptian territory and cannot be discussed with Israel; an Egyptian presence east of the Canal is our right.

The extent of the area of withdrawal, the nature of the means of supervision—to all that chatter of Sisco’s we say quite simply that America has not given up the role of postman just because, as they said, they were going to define their attitude. No, she hasn’t even played the postman, she has relinquished the role of postman and now there is nothing but chatter. Sisco went to Israel and [back] to

America and would not reply to us for two months and ten days. That is why I declare to our people, to the Arab nation and to the whole world, and to the United Nations that is meeting in a few days, that America has again resorted to deceit and misrepresentation. There have been no contacts between us and America for two months and ten days; there

have been no agreements between us and America.

America hasn’t given us any paper defining her attitude. What is the need for the talk that America is filling the world with, to the effect

that America is making contacts, or the statement by the alternate delegate to the meetings of the Big Four to the effect that all

is finished and Egypt has reached agreement, or is about to do so, and their statement to the U.S.S.R. that Egypt has accepted a partial solution. All this is absolutely untrue. It is deliberate deceit and misrepresentation on behalf of Israel. They want 1971 to pass. They also want 1972, the year of the elections, to pass so we may enter on another decade ^o that the day may come when the matter will have become a fait accompli and when we keep quiet or accept Israel’s terms. As I declare this today, I add that they were asking for “quiet diplomacy” and said that there was no need for us to say anything or to declare anything. We said, “All right, we won’t,” and said nothing. I told them we wouldn’t say or declare anything, but that we were putting our house in order at home. But today, in the face of the campaign of deceit and misrepresentation launched by America


throughout the world, I must tell the truth to our people, to the Arab nation, to the world and to the Big Four, and to the United Na¬ tions, which is to meet in a few days. The Big Four must face up to their responsibilities; the Security Council must face up to its respon¬ sibilities; the Secretary-General of the United Nations must face up to his responsibilities.

I want the Secretary-General of the United Nations to submit a report to the Security Council on Israel’s attitude and our attitude. It is about time he did; the United Nations is going to meet. Today I want Jarring to submit a report to the Security Council and the Secretary-General on Israel’s attitude and ours.

I want the Security Council at some stage to meet at Foreign Minister level, so that we may know people’s definite attitudes, so that everyone may define his attitude, so that America may come and state her attitude before the Security Council at Foreign Minister level.

We have waited a long time, and our inten¬ tions have been perfectly good, and we still have perfectly good intentions, but everything has limits.

I have given instructions to the Foreign Minister that we should go to the United Nations and explain all this frankly to the international community so that it may face up to its responsibilities.

382 Cable Message from the Palestine Lib¬

eration Organization Executive Com¬

mittee Calling on U.N. Secretary-

General U Thant To Take Action To

Halt the Excesses of Israeli Occupation

in the Gaza Strip1

September 17, 1971

The people of the Gaza Strip have suffered from years of continuous curfew, the killing

1 Text of the P.L.O. telegram to the Secretary-General as transmitted by Egyptian Permanent Representative

Zayyat; U.N. Document A/8395 and S/10328.

and maiming of scores of young men and women under detention, arbitrary arrest and imprisonment without trial, the taking of women and children as political hostages and the systematic banishment of communal leaders. The latest measure in this policy of terror and colonization has been the callous bulldozing of thousands of homes and the forcible eviction of over 15,000 of their inhabitants in conditions of indescribable cruelty. We protest in the strongest terms these blatant violations of the basic precepts of human decency and civilized behaviour jus¬ tified by the Israeli authorities on the false pretext of security and so-called town plan¬ ning, and urgently request Your Excellency:

1. That Israel cease all forcible population transfer and return immediately those people already made homeless.

2. That the Israeli occupation authorities stop immediately the killing and maiming of innocent people by their trigger-happy armed forces.

3. That the United Nations dispatch an investigating committee to look into assault upon the lives, rights, and property of the people of Gaza.

4. That Israel be ordered by the United Nations to cease immediately her calculated policy of terror and oppression on pain of sanctions and expulsion from the United Nations.

383 Statement Issued by the Third Con¬

ference of the Organization of Arab

Cities, Condemning Measures Taken by

Israel To Change the Status of Jeru¬

salem2

Tunis, September 22, 1971

The Organization of Arab Cities, at its

2 Translated from the Arabic text of the letter, sent to U.N. Secretary-General U Thant and the Security Council on the occasion of the Security Council debate on the Jordanian government’s complaint on the Judaization of Jerusalem, al-Amal (Tunis) , September 23, 1971.

ARAB WORLD 537

third conference held in Tunis, strongly condemns the wanton administrative and legislative measures of usurpation which the Israeli occupation authorities are continuing to take to change the character of Jerusalem.

These measures include excavations around the Haram al-Sharif, the destruction and confiscation of real estate, the expropriation of Arab lands and the eviction from them of their Arab inhabitants, and the erection of housing, industrial, tourist and student estab¬

lishments with the object of increasing the Jewish population for political objectives, the violation of Islamic and Christian holy places, aggressions against cultural features, and violation of human rights, all of which infringe the United Nations Charter and all the international laws which insist that occupation forces should refrain from chang¬ ing the character of the areas they occupy.

The General Assembly and the Security Council of the United Nations, and UNESCO, have all condemned Israeli measures, actions and violations in Jerusalem, but the Israeli occupation authorities have disregarded all these resolutions and are continuing with their plan for the Judaization of Jerusalem, thereby not only threatening peace in the Middle East but undermining the cause of peace throughout the world.

The Conference of the Organization of Arab Cities calls on the United Nations, the Security Council and UNESCO, which were created to protect peace and the rights of peoples and to ensure the observance of international pacts and resolutions, to take decisive measures to check Israel’s improper action in changing the character of Jerusalem and to put a stop to the measures for Judaization and the eviction of the Arab inhabitants from their homes in the city.

384 Danish Television Interview Statements by King Hussein of Jordan, Admitting the Possibility of Jordan’s Concluding a Separate Peace with Israel and Stating His Willingness To Allow the People of the West Bank Self-Determination After Liberation from Israeli Occupation1

Late September, 1971

Q. What are the peace terms of Jordan with Israel?

A. ...Security Council Resolution 242, all the principles it contains, which we accepted, and more recently the American [initiative].

Qj But are you willing to make a separate peace with Israel?

A. The point is: what is Israel prepared to

1 Excerpted from the English transcript dated September

26 of Hussein’s Danish TV interview conducted by

Ole Sippel as provided, on request, by Danmarks

Radio; (transcript was edited in the interest of coher¬

ence) .

The bulk of the remainder of the lengthy interview is

not published here; the main topic covered was the

Jordan Civil War of September 1970 and subsequent

Jordan government relations with the Palestine Resis¬

tance. Comments by King Hussein on this topic are

included in this volume in Documents 364, 370 and

380 above.

Israel Home Service in Hebrew reported on September

25 that Hussein had said that “he does not rule out a

separate peace with Israel on the basis of the 1967

U.N. Security Council resolution” (see BBC Monitoring

Service, Summary of World Broadcasts, ME/3798/A/10).

Subsequently, an “authoritative spokesman at the

Hashemite Royal Court” made the following statement:

“There has been some distortion of the statement

made by His Majesty to the said correspondent. The

King answered a question on this subject by saying:

Jordan and the Arab Republic of Egypt have accepted

UN Security Council Resolution No. 242 and the US

initiative. For its part, Jordan is still prepared to

implement Security Council Resolution No. 242

because the US initiative and the basis for the resolution

are the only things which, when implemented, can lead

to permanent and just peace in the area.” (Relevant

paragraph excerpted from statement broadcast on

Amman Radio in Arabic; English translation in BBC

Monitoring Service, Summary of World Broadcasts,

ME/3798/A/11.)


give us for peace? Or . . . anyone else, for that matter?

And that is where the problem lies. . . . You can say: Why don’t you make moves? We’ve accepted [Resolution] 242; we’ve

accepted the American [initiative]. We’ve accepted all the principles they contained. These are the only foundations for a just and durable peace. If Israel doesn’t accept them, then what kind of solution could be found?

Q. No, but if Israel tomorrow offered a separate peace with Jordan, would you start indirect negotia¬ tions with Israel on this basis?

A. On the basis of242 and the American...

d Yes.. .. A. . . .initiative? Well, if that was the

case I’m sure that we wouldn’t lack the courage to do whatever is necessary to save our people and our land. And we would approach

it openly and probably present it to the Arab world, present it to our people and probably move.

Qj But, 1 our Majesty, isn't this a bit of [a] change in Jordanian policy? Because I think before you have said you won't make peace without the Egyptians making peace as well.

A. Well, I believe that the main concentra¬ tion of effort in any event now is on the Egypt¬ ian side. .. [passage unclear]. We obviously believe that on our own we won’t get very much. [Passage unclear.] And so, collectively as a whole, we might have better chances of establishing a just and durable peace.

This has always been our feeling and our belief.

d Speaking about an eventual political solution, how do you see a solution for the Palestinians ?

A. Obviously, the solution is the liberation of the occupied territories—occupied in June of ’67, and action to resolve the problem of the refugees in terms of U.N. resolutions to that effect. And after that, what they choose— but after that time. We are fighting their cause—they’re our people. And in parti¬ cular, I’m speaking, obviously, of the West Bank of [the] Jordan.

Q. You say “choose. ” Choose between what?

A. Well, whichever way they wish. We believe that we still are one family and one people, and we will remain so. There may be some ideas that could be developed in terms of our way of life in the future, in terms of our relationship. But obviously, all this is premature until such time as we recover their rights for them, and are reunited.

Q. Do you think in the terms of a general vote [i.e. referendum] for either going back under the

Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan or setting up their own independent state?

A. After the liberation, I have said in the past, that we are willing to give them their choice: whether we remain as one- and I believe this is the basic objective of all Arabs, whether we have some form of union which

would preserve their identity in the area west of the river and ours here in the East Bank in terms of our people, or whether we’d return to something similar to what existed up to June

of ’67, but with many improvements. This is

what we would have to decide after the liberation and after a solution is reached.

d But how do you look upon present endeavorings in the West Bank among the leaders there to set up a political body? I think . . . an Executive is planned; and this Executive Committee should lead to some form of a parliament as far 1 understand.

A. I think this is a product of despair,

probably. Occupation has lasted too long. The situation there [cannot remain?] as it is. There have been many serious attempts to try to break up the unity of our people.

However, if the solution were forthcoming,

I’m sure that there [would] be a lessening of these activities to a very, very large extent. This is my feeling.

ARAB WORLD 539

385 Statements Emphasizing the Necessity of Commitment to the Palestine Cause by All Arabs, Included in a Speech by Shaikh Zayid of Abu Dhabi, Delivered at the Opening of the Country’s National Consultative Assembly1

Abu Dhabi, October 3, 1971

I herewith salute in your name our heroic brothers stationed on the front line in con¬ frontation of the Israeli enemy on all Arab fronts, defending our nation and sacrificing themselves for its honor and glory and affirming Arab rights. For the cause of Palestine is a sacred Arab cause which lays on all Arabs the responsibility for making sacri¬ fices on behalf of the recovery of the usurped territory. Brothers, Members of the National Con¬ sultative Assembly:

Our Arab nation is today passing through a historic and decisive stage in which it requires pure hearts, self-denial and the placing of higher Arab interests above every other consideration. This is doubtless the goal of my brother Arab leaders, which will ensure us a broad Arab front capable of confronting, repelling and defeating every aggression when the time comes. Brothers:

I believe that it is important that there

should be continuous and direct Arab meetings to ensure such constant and uninterrupted dialogue as will enable us to study the prob¬ lems and attitudes that confront us, so that we may unanimously adopt attitudes that are

effective and influential at world level, and are capable of presenting the truth we advocate for the achievement of peace based on justice and the restoration of legitimate rights to their legitimate owners.


Shaikh Zayid Ibn Sultan al-Nahayyan’s speech, Abu

Dhabi on the Fifth Anniversary of the Shaikh’s Accession

(Abu Dhabi: Documentation and Study Center of the

Ministry of Presidential Affairs, n.d.) p. 152.

386 Magazine Interview with Palestine Na¬ tional Liberation Movement (Fateh) Leader Khalaf (Abu Ayyad) Commenting on the Effects on the Resistance of Opposition on the Part of Arab Govern¬ ments and of Ideological Differences Within the Movement2

Mid-October, 1971

Qj What lessons has the Resistance learned from the September [1970] civil war and the subsequent slide towards defeat in Jordan?

A. We were not seeking a trial of strength with the Jordanian regime. I understand the term on the theoretical level as well as in its ordinary sense. I believe that coexistence with the Jordanian regime is impossible, but I know that the Resistance did not consider as decisive either attempts to achieve coexistence or an attack on the regime. A firm position one way or the other would have been more worthwhile for us. Instead, there was no clearly defined political line. We were indecisive and this fostered the chronic divisions within the movement.

On the one hand there was a tendency to act very aggressively without the means to do so and on the other a powerful tendency which never managed to make use of its power. I am not talking about [differences among] the Resistance organizations but rather of the tendencies which, in varying degrees, have existed within most of the organizations. We were obsessed by tactical problems; if we had

had a strategy, however, then our choice of tactics would have been easy. Instead, tactics took the place of strategy. Thus we were challenging Hussein’s power without really trying to take it from him. On the other hand, however, the Jordanian regime proved to be very determined. They had a strategy and they won the first round which began in September [1970] and ended last July in the forests of Ajloun and Jerash. I don’t think that we have yet profited from this lesson.

2 Translated from the French text of Khalaf s interview,

conducted by Abdullah Schleifer, Jeune Afrique, No.

563 (October 19, 1971), pp. 24-26.


Otherwise, we would not have taken part in the attempts at mediation at Jedda.

Of course it can be argued that there was no objection to our going to Jedda, this meeting being just a form of political struggle in our relations with the Arab regimes which allowed us to gain time—a breathing space to prepare ourselves. But the question of our coexisting with the Jordanian regime can no longer be raised. We cannot; and we must evince the same spirit of decision as the Jordanian regime.

I am aware of the outside pressures from the Arab regimes which forced us to negotiate despite the opposition of an overwhelming

majority within the Resistance and among the groupings of Fateh, but these negotiations were at best no more than an insignificant maneuver which won’t do us any good. The congress of Fateh gave the movement’s leader¬ ship a free hand to act within the framework of the congress’ general opposition to coexistence.

I am not sure we can compare the Jedda talks

with the Rogers talks which have lasted more than a year and which have brought about division among the Arab regimes. It has been suggested though that the Jedda meeting was organized for the purpose of dividing the guerilla groups.

Q. Who speaks for Fateh? Who is its head?

A. Fateh has always been based on a collective leadership, but at times there have been individual efforts or initiatives. When the movement came out in the open after the June War of 1967, we chose an official spokesman; but there is no specific leader....

There is only the collective leadership. Yasser

Arafat is a member like the others of this

collective leadership with one vote like the other members.

Qj Why has the Resistance not been able to

get a general strategy underway ? A. There are three basic reasons. During the first Palestinian operations, ele¬

ments more dedicated to certain Arab regimes than to the revolution were able to infiltrate and they have acted in this manner from within the Resistance. For example, Saika and the Arab Liberation Front are

much more interested in (and in fact are a

part of) the general strategy of Syria and Iraq

respectively than in the strategic necessities of the Resistance. And while Fateh has always represented the major independent force within the Palestine Resistance, our movement was greatly concerned with the geography

of the region and didn’t wish to come into

conflict with Syria or Iraq. Certain groups involved overbid their

hands. The Popular Front and the Popular

Democratic Front launched slogans which the present state of the struggle did not justify. The Palestinian masses were confused. Were we involved in a class struggle or in a national struggle?

Fateh held the belief that it was a struggle for national liberation and that those who called it a class struggle lacked realism,

particularly in Jordan where this choice meant that the emphasis had to be put on strikes and class conflict in a tribal society and in a country with barely three factories in all its territory. Jordan, an important base for the Resistance, was not at the stage for class

struggle. The third major problem became apparent

when Fateh, as a leading group, launched the slogan of “non-interference’’ in Arab politics

and at the same time interfered without interfering. A paradox, a contradiction? No, because, from the military point of view, Fateh was convinced that the Resistance needed a belt of staging zones or bases for retreat encircling Israel, which meant the presence of armed forces in the territories bordering Israel, forces which would be

independent of the authority of the govern¬ ments of these territories. To protect these bases, we needed the popular support of the masses which would prevent the governments from attacking us. So, seeking such support and making use of it, that was interference. The struggle which Fateh waged in Lebanon (October 1969) is an example. The failure of Fateh to explain the full significance of its

slogan of “non-interference” contributed to the creation of this problem.

Qj But I can’t imagine on what basis other than

ARAB WORLD 541

that of social struggle you could have hoped to rally the villagers and Bedouins of eastern Jordan. . . . Certainly not in talking to them about the return to Haifa or Jaffa. If your struggle were a national struggle for the Palestinians, what did they have to do with it?

A. I was talking about the Palestinians in Jordan. As Palestinians, we know that our movement is part of a movement for Arab liberation and we think that the social or class struggle is a part of that movement. But class struggle in Jordan should have been initiated by East Bankers, by a Jordanian national front. We wished for close ties with such a front and we would have helped it. But our specific watchwords were the national liberation of Palestine.

Unfortunately other Resistance groups op¬ posed the creation of such a front because they themselves wanted to play this role and because the initial impetus of the Resis¬ tance and the popularity of the commandos during the first years following the 1967 war acted like a magnet drawing to the Resistance just those elements which could have or¬ ganized and fought within a Jordanian nation¬ al front.

The situation in Jordan mustn’t be forgotten either. It isn’t only the Jordanian regime which depends on its army. If you add to the regular forces of the royal army (75,000 men) the civilian employees, the security and espionage services and the social services, you have more than 100,000 people, East Bankers for the most part, in the service of the royal army. This means that the great majority of East Bank villagers and all the Bedouins live thanks to the royal army.

We had the support of the East Bank villagers up to and into the civil war of September 1970. But when 15 boys of a village who served in the royal army were killed during that civil war and their bodies were secretly mutilated by the Jordanian secret service before being returned to the village for burial, then those villagers turned against the Resistance.

Q. Strategy in itself expresses a state of mind or an ideology. There are three major ideological currents which have animated the organizations or the individual militants of the Resistance: nation¬

alism, Marxism and Islam. Why has the Resistance proved incapable of integrating these currents?

A. Fateh has succeeded in doing so. These three tendencies have existed within it. But the Arab governments and the leftists of the

Resistance wouldn’t leave Fateh alone. With¬ in Fateh the principal current is nationalist, but the nationalists have neither complexes about nor hostility toward the other currents, and I still maintain that Fateh is very close to the Algerian experience as well as to. the Vietnam experience.

Q. These currents may exist in Fateh, but during the Algerian revolution they were consciously integrated; there was a platform rather than an ideological vacuum.

A. In Algeria you had one front. We ourselves were a movement of individuals coming from different backgrounds. Even so, the main problem was outside Fateh. We tried through the P.L.O. to regroup all the other organizations, but this experiment has not yet succeeded, and I believe that the experience of the P.L.O. must be deepened in order to be able effectively to unite within itself the P.F.L.P. and the P.D.F.L.P. You must also remember that when we joined the P.L.O. (at the end of 1968), it was for us

only a matter of avoiding a danger. We were afraid that certain Arab governments would make use of the P.L.O. against us. So we joined the P.L.O., not because we had faith in the organization but rather to neutralize it. We planned to stay in it only temporarily. Fateh has also tried to create its own public services rivaling those of the P.L.O. and the result was what you have on other occasions called the bureaucratization of Fateh and the Resistance. There were two of every¬ thing: offices, social projects and even conventional military units. Now, we are trying, despite all the difficulties, to integrate and to work only, so far as the public is concerned, within the P.L.O.

Once I earnestly begged Nayef Hawatma to

join Fateh. He could have done much more effective work from inside Fateh than with his Popular Democratic Front. Yes, the Chinese have understood this. They aid Fateh as the

organized expression of the masses rather than the self-styled Marxist groups; but there


were secret and far-reaching ideological dis¬ cussions between us and the other groups, which in the past were frustrated for complex

reasons, but which lost all meaning when the

situation of the whole of the Resistance became critical.

Q. Does it seem true to you that politics in the area have been marked by a swing to the right since the Rogers mission in June [1970] ?

A. Yes, the rightist tendency is certainly there. And we have unceasingly warned the progressive movements of the region that every blow dealt to the Palestine Resistance would be the prelude to the liquidation of the

left. But this rightist orientation is a defeatist tendency: it can’t last. The history of the Palestinian struggle in particular shows that

after each setback, the struggle resumes with

yet more vigor and on a higher plane.

We are at the edge of a cliff. Until now, the masses have not reacted because they

have accepted all the official expressions of willingness to reach a compromise with Israel that they have heard from the Arab leaders as

being tactical. What Israel is asking is far too

difficult to accept, even for the most reac¬

tionary regimes. But if these regimes attempt to impose peace in the area by force, a popular revolt will break out.

I am convinced that this region is pregnant

with new revolutionary possibilities. The beginning of the change will be marked by still more attacks on the Arab liberation movement and the Palestine Resistance. But this time, we expect attacks from the most unexpected of directions and places. The attack is indispensable to the attempt to

impose a peaceful solution by force since, in effect, only the liquidation of the Resistance could demoralize the Arab masses to the point where they would, in despair of the cause, accept a settlement with Israel.

We must overcome past errors due to the absence of a plan of action; we must recover from the blows we have been dealt. The enemies of the Palestine revolution are like the links of a chain which begins with American imperialism, leads to the Arab regimes attached to it and finally to Israel

itself. These links form a front and if we mean to succeed, we must maintain contact with all the forces both within and outside the Arab world which stand against this counter¬ revolutionary front.

387

Statements on the Necessity for Unified Arab Military Action in the Face of Israeli Intransigence, Contained in a Speech from the Throne by Shaikh Sabah, Amir of Kuwait1

Kuwait, October 26, 1971

Although events have proved the inefficacy of the resolutions adopted from time to time by the General Assembly and the Security Council in condemning Israel and denouncing her attitude to various aspects of the so- called Middle East problem, the Security Council has again discussed the matter of Jerusalem, and last month adopted a new Resolution reaffirming the contents of its previous resolutions. As usual, Israel immedi¬ ately rejected this resolution both as a whole and in detail. Kuwait, through its Foreign Minister, declared at the General Assembly that the United Nations had gone beyond the stage of adopting resolutions of condemnation and denunciation and that since the aggressor state would continue in its defiance as long as it enjoys material, political and military support from certain great powers, in particular the United States of America, it was now in¬ cumbent on [the U.N.] to resort to the imposi¬ tion of sanctions on Israel to make her imple¬ ment these resolutions. In his latest report the Secretary-General warned that if Israel con¬ tinues to maintain this attitude there will be another round of fierce fighting in the area, graver and more ferocious than the previous

1 Excerpted and translated from the Amir’s message, as

read by Prime Minister Shaikh Jaber Ahmad Jaber

al-Sabah at the opening of the Second Session of the

Third Legislative Season of the Kuwaiti National

Assembly, al-Ray al-Amm (Kuwait), October 27, 1971.

ARAB WORLD 543

rounds. The truth is that after the Arab efforts that have been expended, and in spite of recent proposals and maneuvers, there can no longer be any doubt that the Israeli enemy is procrastinating and will only submit to the logic of force. We therefore believe that the only way to ensure the realization of the goals of our nation as regards the recovery of the usurped territory and the restoration to the people of Palestine of their legitimate rights, is for the Arab countries, and in particu¬ lar the confrontation countries, to complete their military preparations, with full coordina¬ tion among them, in disregard of all differences liable to impede such coordination. It is on this basis that Kuwait has approved the plan of Arab action, outlined in the recommenda¬ tions of the Political Committee of the Arab League last September, for the coordination of Arab efforts and energies. And we hope that these recommendations may be seriously implemented.

Kuwait has followed with concern and regret the renewal of clashes in Jordan

throughout the month of July of this year between the Jordanian army and the Palestine Resistance movement, and the results of those clashes, the most important of which was that the Palestine Resistance was paralyzed and prevented from performing its duty in the desired manner. We have declared and we still affirm that the Cairo and Amman Agreements which were signed last year to

prevent the further shedding of Arab blood constitute a basic safeguard of stability in Jordan and that it is the duty of both parties concerned to take action to implement them honestly and sincerely. We still hope for the success of joint Saudi-Egyptian mediation

between the two parties, believing as we do that it is essential that armed struggle

should continue and be supported by all Arab quarters so that it may be possible to direct all Arab efforts and energies to the service of the battle of destiny that is to be forced on us and to stand up to all the challenges that confront our nation.

388

Statement by Palestine Liberation Or¬

ganization Executive Committee Chair¬ man Arafat (Abu Ammar), Reporting on

His Visits to the G.D.R. and the U.S.S.R.1

Beirut, Early November, 1971

The visit paid by the delegation of the Palestine Liberation Organization to the U.S.S.R. and East Germany achieved impor¬ tant results which can be summed up as follows:

1. The visits to the two countries were made within the framework of a broad plan to establish extensive relations at the interna¬ tional level, especially with the socialist coun¬

tries. 2. The Soviets displayed full understanding

of the point of view of the Palestine revolution and there was identity of viewpoints in parti¬

cular as regards the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination in their land. They declared their solidarity with the intre¬ pid and just struggle in which the Palestinian Arab people are engaged against the occupi¬ ers, whatever form this struggle takes.

3. Full aid and support on the part of the U.S.S.R. and East Germany for the revolu¬

tion at all levels, political, military and informational, [can be expected].

4. The visit confirmed that the Palestinian

people, thanks to their struggle and their martyrs, have become a force that cannot be disregarded in the international sphere and at the level of the Middle East problem.

5. The visit provided confirmation of the international sympathy enjoyed by the Pales¬ tine revolution and of its capacity for rapid and extensive movement to establish relations aimed at securing support for the revolution and the protection of the rights of the Pales¬ tinian Arab people.

1 Translated from the Arabic text of Arafat’s statement,

Hisad al-Asifa (Beirut), No. 47 (November 4, 1971).


389

Radio Interview Statements Made by Palestine National Liberation Movement (Fateh) Leader Qaddoumi (Abu Lutf),

Reporting on the Visit of a Palestinian Delegation to the U.S.S.R. 1

November II, 1971

Q. Have you observed, brother Abu Lutf, that there is a perceptible change in the attitude of the U.S.S.R. towards the Palestine revolution and the

people of Palestine? A. I would not say a change, but a develop¬

ment for the better—that is to say that rela¬

tions in their present form have started to become better and better; indeed, they have grown stronger. Here I must say that the improvement and escalation of these relations

at all levels—political and military—is one of the most urgent requirements of the Arab cause and its relations with the world pro¬

gressive and socialist camp. For we as a Palestinian revolution are part of the world

liberation movement and our interests are part of its interests. Thus both from our point of view and that of the forces of liberation throughout the world it is

essential that we should enhance our links with it, so that we may be able to eliminate all the bases of colonialism and imperialism in the world. There can be no doubt that increased understanding and development has come about in the U.S.S.R. as a result of popular mobilization there, where the Zionist movement has been condemned from the start and where Israel, with all its aggressive trends and policies, is also now condemned. The U.S.S.R. therefore felt that there must be a firm alliance with the forces that are hostile to those imperialist trends. That is why the U.S.S.R. has begun to strengthen its relations with all the progressive forces in the area and first and foremost, with the Palestine revolu¬ tion.

1 Excerpted and translated from the Arabic transcript

of Qaddoumi’s Saut al-Asifa interview, Fateh (Damas¬

cus), No. 312 (November 17, 1971), p. 16.

CL As regards the most important political subjects discussed during your visit, we should like to know something about these matters: in particular, was there renewed discussion of the revolution’s attitude to Security Council Resolution [242] during your talks?

A. Certainly the revolution put forward a number of issues on which it sought greater understanding on the part of the U.S.S.R., while the U.S.S.R. also put forward various matters on which it sought further clarification as regards the attitude of the Palestine revolu¬ tion. The Twenty-fourth Conference of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, adopted a clear and unambiguous resolution of support for the legitimate national rights of the Palestinian people. This, in our view, required clarification; we succeeded in ob¬ taining such clarification from the U.S.S.R., and it was extremely satisfactory. This is one point; there are also other points. Certainly the U.S.S.R. accepts the Security Council resolu¬ tion. Meanwhile it also realizes that the Palestine revolution rejects this resolution, because it is not even remotely connected with the vital interests of the Palestinian people, it doesn’t fulfill even the minimum of these vital interests. Thus, the U.S.S.R. realized that we reject this resolution and wanted to know whether there was any change in this attitude. Certainly there has been no change in our attitude. However, we say that we consider that allies do not necessarily agree on all

issues under discussion. Meanwhile we know that we are in agreement with allies and friends when it comes to general strategy. We also know that some Arab countries have approved the proposal. However, we again explained our attitude to this resolution. The basic issue that we discussed in detail and in which both sides were very much interested was, as I said, the legitimate national rights of

the Palestinian people, their right to self- determination and the necessity for them to return to the whole of Palestinian territory. These were the political problems we con¬ centrated on, and there was a perceptible response on the part of our friends as far as these problems were concerned. As for the problems of material and military aid, I can tell you that I am very optimistic

ARAB WORLD 545

that the U.S.S.R. is ready to stand beside the Palestine revolution at all levels and to cooperate and coordinate action with us as regards all problems that concern the Pales¬

tinian and the need for him to obtain his legitimate rights and his right to self-deter¬ mination. Among the political issues we discussed was our attitude to the coming battle. We felt that there was a perceptible trend towards realizing the necessity for action by all basic means, and this, in our view, is part of the remarkable attitude we observed on the part of the U.S.S.R. Arab strength and the unity of Arab strength are a basic factor in winning the battle, and the U.S.S.R. is anxious to avoid an inter-Arab conflict of whatever kind. That is why the U.S.S.R. appreciates our escalation of armed action in the interior, and realizes how necessary it is for us to avoid any kind of inter-Arab conflict. It also appreciates the role we are playing in unifying Arab forces to strike at the imperialist scheme.

390

Statement Criticizing the U.S. As Hav¬ ing Impeded Progress Towards a Mid¬ dle East Settlement and Reiterating Egyptian Insistence on Israeli Withdraw¬ al and on Recognition of the Rights of the

Palestinians, Made by President Sadat of Egypt in a Speech to the Popular Assembly1

Cairo, November 11,1971

Although we were extremely vexed at some

of the things the United States has tried to do,

we chose to watch and wait so as to get the complete results as incriminating evidence for all the moves.

The United States of America set aside the Security Council resolution. We waited.


Sadat’s speech opening the new Popular Assembly,

al-Ahram (Cairo), November 12, 1971.

Then the United States bypassed the role of the Secretary-General of the United Nations and his special envoy to the area. We waited.

Then the United States ignored the role of the Big Four and their responsibility for implementing the Security Council resolution.

We waited. The United States then confined its efforts

to an initiative to start the first stage of withdrawal in return for the reopening of the Suez Canal, and once again we waited and watched with the greatest patience and the greatest caution.

The American Secretary of State, William Rogers, came to Cairo and I explained to him my initiative in detail and directly, in a way

that left no room for speculation, as follows: 1. I proposed a first stage of withdrawal in

implementation of the Security Council resolution in return for the reopening of the

Suez Canal to world shipping. 2. The first step that I proposed must be

clearly linked to a comprehensive solution in

accordance with the Security Council resolu¬

tion. 3. For us, withdrawal means withdrawal

not only from Egyptian territory but with¬ drawal from all the Arab territories occupied since June 5,1967.

4. Egyptian forces must cross over to the

East Bank of the Suez Canal to assert Egyptian sovereignty over Egyptian territory.

5. In conformity with the provisions of this initiative the ceasefire must be limited to no more than six months, as anything else means accepting a permanent ceasefire or, to be more precise, accepting new armistice

lines in the middle of Sinai. I explained all this frankly to the Secretary

of State, Mr. Rogers, when he was in Cairo. Then the American Secretary of State went

to Israel, and two days later he sent me his assistant with the observations of the other side, and I repeated to him the basic principles of our attitude.

I should like to add in your presence that when he met me, the American Secretary of

State said to me verba tin: “I have nothing to ask of you; all I have to ask is of the other

side.”


After that we did not hear from the United States for a long time, until an official message came to me from President Nixon and from his Secretary of State, William Rogers, asking me if my attitude had changed after the Egyptian-Soviet Treaty. My reply was that

Egyptian policy is laid down in Cairo and nowhere else, and that my position, based on the principles I had declared and explained,

had not changed. Contact was then interrupted again for

more than sixty days, but we were following

what was going on. At one moment it seemed that the United

States was trying to put pressure on Israel, but immediately afterwards it transpired that it was Israel that was putting pressure on the United States.

The American pressure on Israel was insignificant, but the Israeli pressure on America was immense. Some of the attitudes were really unbelievable! Israel, the small protege of the great power, the United States, had reversed the roles.

It was as if Israel was the great power and America the small protege living as a burden on her and at her expense.

This was something unbelievable, for how could a great power allow itself to be treated in this way by a small party depending on it for everything, from a loaf of bread to a Phantom plane:*

But in fact the question is more complicated than that.

Zionist pressure on the United States is not the whole of the matter. In addition to this there is the fact that the United States considers Israel as its tool for achieving what it sees as its own interests in the area.

The United States regards Israel as the greatest means of coercion and intimidation to check inevitable development in Arab terri¬ tory.

This is the fundamental source of Israel’s strength vis-a-vis the United States, in addi¬ tion, of course, to potential Zionist pressure.

We believe that the United States has three objectives in the area.

—The first is to get the U.S.S.R. out of the area. We find in the U.S.S.R. a friend in both war and peace.

The second is to isolate Egypt from the Arab nation. But in terms of history and destiny we cannot accept this, because Egypt is part of the Arab nation as regards both its destiny and its future.

—The third is to destroy the socialist experi¬ ment in Egypt. But we believe in our path to

development and are resolved to follow it to the very end.

Brother and Members of the Popular As¬ sembly :

Ehe attitude of the United States is now clear, and we believe that, in view of this, one of the most essential things for us is to determine our attitude decisively and firmly.

The United States is now trying to exploit our initiative and turn it into something that has nothing whatever to do with what we intended by it.

The United States is talking now about an agreement about the Suez Canal. We are not prepared to talk about an agreement on the Suez Canal.

The Suez Canal is not the problem; the problem is the territory occupied since June 5 and the lost rights of the people of Palestine.

Our attitude now has been decisively determined.

1. The whole world now knows what we want and what the others want. We want peace and the others want expansion. That is to say, we want a solution and the others want war, because that is the sole consequence of expansionist pretensions.

2. We are not prepared to downgrade the solution we want to the level of an agreement on the Suez Canal. What we are talking about is a comprehensive solution in ac¬ cordance with the Security Council resolu- ion and what it implies with respect to two principles:

a. full withdrawal; b. the legitimate rights of the people of

Palestine. 3. That is why our acceptance of the

Security Council resolution still stands, and why the initiative we announced here on February 4 also still stands, in the sense in which I proposed it, but not in any other.

4. In order to guarantee this and so that there may be no ambiguity, there is now an

ARAB WORLD 547

indispensable condition before any other step is taken. This condition is that Israel should give an affirmative answer to what Ambas¬

sador Jarring asked of her on February 8, 1971.

This is what is required before anything else. Without this affirmative answer from Israel there can be no discussion or debate.

5. We are fully prepared to bear the

responsibility for and the consequences of any attitude we adopt, and we believe that our prime, supreme, sole duty in these circum¬ stances is to liberate our Arab territories that are now under Israeli occupation whatever the difficulties and sacrifices involved.

We shall not allow the United States to distort and undermine the truth any longer.

We shall not allow the United States to dissociate itself from or evade its respon¬ sibilities.

We regard the United States as being the

prime factor responsible for Israel. The flood of money that pours into an

Israeli economy which is strained beyond

endurance all comes from the lIni ted States. All the arms in Israel’s hands now come

from the United States. The Phantoms that raided our towns,

factories and schools were not only of American manufacture; they were a gift from America to Israel.

The Skyhawks which constitute the largest

numbers in the Israeli air force are not only of American manufacture; they were a gift from America to Israel.

The long-range guns and sophisticated missiles, from Hawks to Shrikes, are not only of American manufacture; they were a gift from America to Isreael.

Israel would not have been able to make any military move but for aid from the United States of America. Nor would she have been able to make any political move in the form of maneuvers, deceit, lying and defying the United Nations and public opinion throughout the world without American collusion, be it through actual plotting or by simply remaining silent.

For our part, in view of future prospects,

we warn that we shall not yield to any pressure, nor shall we waver in the face of any danger.

Nor shall we be afraid to defy any danger. We shall accept all losses, but we shall

inflict on our enemy losses which are greater than he imagines and more serious than he thinks in his arrogance and conceit.

Similarly the United States will have to bear the burden of the crimes it is committing or the crimes that others commit with American

arms. We say this clearly, so that the whole

world may know and be fully aware. I have already stated and I now repeat in

your presence today that 1971 must be a decisive year because we cannot remain for¬ ever suspended in this state of no peace and no war.

We must take our decision at the right time,

in appropriate circumstances and in the proper manner. Brothers and fellow citizens, Members of the Popular Assembly:

I do not want to go into details of what decisions we shall make, but I pray God, as did Gamal Abdel Nasser, that He may so inspire

us that we may make our decision not a moment before and not a moment after the right time. For it is a great decision, a decision of destiny.

Fortunately, in the situation that confronts them, our people rely on fixed rules when they make their decision.

They rely firstly on their confidence in God, in themselves and in their armed forces which, with God’s help, will prove that we are right to pin our hopes on them, and that they

are our mainstay and our bulwark. Our people also rely on cooperation with

the U.S.S.R. which has given proof of its truthfulness, its integrity and its firmness in all circumstances.

They also rely on an Arab nation which today knows that the one choice before it is to exist or not to exist.

They also rely on greater world under¬ standing of our cause than has ever existed before.

In the last few weeks I have been in touch with almost the whole of the world. I have been to several capitals—to Moscow, Damas¬ cus, Tripoli, Teheran, Jedda and Kuwait.

In Cairo I met many parties that are con-


nected with the crisis, particularly our friend, the Yugoslav President Josip Broz Tito and Sir

Alec Douglas-Home, the British Foreign Sec¬ retary. And recently I had the good fortune to have detailed meetings with the four African Heads of State representing the Organization of African Unity.

I have been in constant contact by corres¬ pondence with all the leaders of the contem¬ porary world who are capable of contributing to work for peace based on justice.

Finally, I could not be more confident of the soundness of our attitude. Brothers, fellow citizens, Members of the Popular Assembly:

We shall go forward with confidence in God, in ourselves, in our friends and in those who are close to us, with confidence in right and justice. And Almighty God will guide our advance and keep it under His protection.

Peace be upon you and God’s mercy and blessings.

391

Provisions for Arab Policy Emphasizing the Necessity for Unity and for Protec¬ ting All Arab Territory, Included in the National Charter Proposed for Iraq by the Baath Party (Iraq)1

Baghdad, November 15, 1971

In the Arab field the revolution’s policy is determined by its unionist, progressive and popular democratic identity and by its belief in socialism. The historic task of the revolution is full, effective and vanguard participation in the Arab struggle movement and in achieving its goals, which can be summed up as the building of a unified Arab democratic and socialist society.

With a view to giving expression to this


proposed National Action Charter aimed at preparing

for a permanent constitution for Iraq, as presented by

President Bakr in a broadcast and televised speech on

November 15, al-Jumhuriya (Baghdad), November

16,1971.

policy and achieving its goals, the Charter calls for:

1. Resolute and comprehensive struggle, by all means, against imperialism, its influence and its supporters; the liberation from im¬ perialism of every part of Arab territory, and violent opposition to its attempts to infiltrate, either directly or indirectly, into the Arab homeland.

2. Resolute opposition to foreign attempts to usurp any part of the Arab homeland, to impose hegemony on it or to sever any part of it; and inasmuch as the Arab Gulf is at present being exposed to incessant attempts organized by imperialist quarters and the

puppet government of the Shah of Iran to eliminate its Arab character and to usurp part of it, the struggle against these attempts is a sacred national duty.

3. Struggle by all available means to achieve comprehensive Arab unity on a liberationist and popular democratic basis, and on a basis of the masses being the effective instrument in bringing about the historical process of unity;

likewise struggle against spurious forms of unity, which must be shown up and laid bare because their goal is to distort the essential nature of unity and they constitute one of the ways of conspiring against it.

4. The problem of liberating Palestine from Zionist usurpation is a central problem in Arab struggle, and is dialectically linked with the struggle for liberation, unity and the building of socialism, and on the basis of the right of the people of Palestine to return to their land once it is liberated and to exercise to the full their right to self-determination in

that land. This means condemning all sur¬ render solutions and proposals aimed at

liquidating the Palestine problem or weaken¬ ing it through partial solutions.

ARAB WORLD 549

392

Press Conference Statements by Presi¬

dent al-Bakr of Iraq, Emphasizing the Pan-Arab Nature of the Struggle Against Zionism and the Necessity for Resisting So-Called Peaceful Solutions1

Baghdad, November 17, 1971

Q. What were the reasons for Iraq's withdrawing

its army from the Eastern Front: What are Iraq's conditions for returning to the Front, and what is the advanced formula proposed by Iraq for establish¬

ing the Front in a more effective and positive manner? " A. We have repeatedly stated our views on

the question of the Eastern Front, saying that it should be established on the basis of the battle being an all-Arab one and on the basis that there should be an actual battle.

At the first Tripoli Conference in June 1970, we submitted a complete proposal for libera¬ tion including an effective formula for the

Eastern Front. As regards the withdrawal of our army from Jordan, we did not withdraw from the battle; we withdrew from the

atmosphere of no-battle and from the situation

that was undermining our army, turning it aside from its basic task of fighting against the Zionist enemy, and therefore intended to

secure the implementation of plans aimed against the revolution in the Iraqi region.

We still believe that the Eastern Front must be established on the basis we mentioned at the first Tripoli Conference, and Iraq is fully prepared to meet its pan-Arab obligations. However, we have emphatically affirmed that

we shall not allow our army to be employed on the Eastern Front or anywhere else as an instrument to push through so-called peaceful

solutions.

Q. What is Iraq's point of view on the Middle

East crisis, and what is its attitude to the slogan of the pan-Arab character of the battle?


al-Bakr’s statements at a press conference with 160

Arab and international correspondents, at-Jumhuriya

(Baghdad), November 18, 1971.

A. Iraq has explained its point of view on the Middle East crisis, pointing out the aggressive nature of the Israeli entity and the role played by world imperialism and Zionism in occupying Arab Palestine and evicting our

people from it, and in creating constant

tension in the area in favor of Israeli expan¬

sionist thinking and at the expense of the Arab people and their territories. We have repeat¬

edly affirmed that it is no simple matter to

remove the traces of aggression because the

foundations on which the Israeli entity was established consisted, fundamentally, of per¬ manent aggression against the people of Pales¬ tine and their rights to their land, and the

aggressive character of Israel is being daily established by much evidence. As for our

attitude to the slogan of the pan-Arab charac¬ ter of the battle—it is we who proposed this slogan, inasmuch as Israeli aggression is not concerned with the people of Palestine only; it has occupied Arab territories in the Arab

regions neighboring the occupied territory.

We are doing all we can, in cooperation

with Arab forces, to transform the slogan of the pan-Arab character of the battle into

something practical, into a comprehensive pan-Arab mobilization that will fulfill the tasks of the struggle for liberation, and this is

what we proposed at the firs,t Tripoli Con¬

ference.

Q. What is the use of submitting the Palestine problem to the United Nations?

A. Our basic goal, represented in the

struggle to liberate Palestine and the occupied Arab territories, is a pan-Arab goal which

polarizes and encompasses all our pan-Arab goals.

To achieve this goal we regard it as essential to adopt all serviceable ways and means to

achieve this goal or to pave the way for its achievement.

In our estimate, which is inspired by the

basic principles of the revolution, armed struggle is the basic course for liberation. In addition to this course we regard it as essential

to take the greatest possible advantage of the United Nations, so that it may be a tribunal


for the defense of the rights of persecuted peoples, and in particular the rights of the Arab people of Palestine.

Q. Do you think that war will break out in the Middle East at the end of this year ?

A. Basically war is unleashed by the Israeli entity which is basically aggressive in nature. Acting in the light of present facts in the Mid¬ dle East, we draw attention to two matters: the first is that Israel is a racist and Fascist entity which does not and can never halt its aggression. A simple catalogue of new occupa¬ tion of extensive Arab territories reveals her nature completely.

The second is that the forces of the Arab revolution cannot remain passive or indifferent in the face of this aggressive war which is being countered by a popular armed struggle which will radically end the question of aggression.

War in this sense exists; it may appear in

different forms, and the people’s war of liberation is the policy that we advocate to confront the Zionist war of aggression against our Arab nation.

We are in fact greatly concerned with the attitudes expressed by the government of the Egyptian region, which are reflected in the speeches and statements of Egyptian officials. Israeli aggression has inflicted great losses on the sister Arab region—Egypt. The occupa¬ tion of Sinai, the pressures on Suez, and the constant declaration of war against the sover¬ eignty of Arab Egypt are things that determine Egypt’s special attitude in resisting this aggres¬ sion.

We unconditionally support all Arab efforts aimed at repelling Israeli aggression and the protection of Egypt’s sovereignty and her right to her territories.

Qj What about Egyptfs efforts to ensure a meeting of a new summit conference? Would Iraq attend it?

A. A new Arab summit conference is conditional on the approval of the Arab

Kings and Heads of State. As for Iraq’s participating in summit con¬

ferences, I have already explained her attitude

to the question of the Zionist occupation of

Arab territory and the way to achieve its full liberation through the complete proposal I submitted to the first Tripoli Conference held in 1970, which adopted the pan-Arab charac¬ ter of the battle as being the basis of liberation.

The development of events in the Arab

area has proved how right were the July Revolution and the Party which led it, in

their assessment which led them to reject so-called peaceful solutions, because they end

in an impasse, require that we pay an exorbi¬

tant price in our honor and our rights, and

are at the expense of the people of Palestine and their right to self-determination.

To follow the course of the complete liberation of the Arab territories occupied before and since 1948 requires the mobiliza¬

tion of Arab energies and “everything being placed at the disposal of the battle” of destiny against the imperialist and Zionist enemy. Our latest pan-Arab initiative emphasized

the necessity of creating an atmosphere favorable to the establishment of a unified

Arab confrontation to repel the ambitions and

aggressions of the enemies of Arabism and to win total victory.

393

Speech Made by President Sadat of

Egypt Announcing to His Front-Line Forces That U.S. Procrastination and

Israeli Intransigence Were Forcing Egypt into Renewed Military Action1

Suez Canal, November 20, 1971

In the name of God, brothers and sons,

1 Text of Sadat’s speech to the troops broadcast on

Cairo Home Service in Arabic; English translation

in BBC Monitoring Service, Summary of World Broadcasts,

ME/3845/A/6-A/7; reprinted by permission. The

following day, November 21, Sadat addressed Egyptian

Air Force pilots on 11 i c• sa m < * 111 < -n 11 • see Summary of World

Broadcasts, ME/3846/A/1).

ARAB WORLD 551

I am happy today to come to you and meet you. In fact I have come first to say many happy returns of the day to you. Second, to tell you that the time for battle has come. There is no longer any hope whatsoever of peaceful or other solutions. Perhaps it is God’s wish that I should have this opportunity of meeting you now to tell you that our decision is to fight and to hear from you what going on in your minds and to answer all your questions.

During the past eight months we made the utmost efforts for the one per cent of a hope that our forces would cross the Canal without an assault battle—we were convinced that the battle was coming; our belief in this did not change -until it became certain to us that the one per cent hope had died and there was no argument about it.

When I met the Armed Forces Supreme

Council I put to them all the details concern¬ ing the situation and explained the results of the journey I made to the Soviet Union and Syria and informed them of my final decision—battle.

The latest contacts with the United States in

the last few days were four days ago. I agreed to meet the officer in charge of US interests in Cairo. When he asked me about the position

in accordance with instructions he had

received from the US Government, I told him:

It is really a regrettable thing that you inquire now about the position at a time when you must proclaim your position. Our position was announced to you during Rogers’s visit

to Cairo and in the contacts and meetings held in recent months. I also told him that I had no confidence in the United States after eight months of procrastination. Now, when they have returned to the point from which they began with the Rogers initiative and have retreated from all their attempts and succeed¬ ed in freezing the Security Council and the Big Four meetings, they have asked us to send a delegate to New York so that they can ask Israel to send a similar delegate, and they have said that Sisco will carry out the role of conveying the views of one to the other for the reopening of the Suez Canal.

The United States says that the disputing

parties should make concessions so that the problem can be solved. How can I make concessions while my land is occupied. The aim of the United States is to give Israel what it could not obtain by fighting. Their ways, attempts and policy are to give Israel what it did not get in 1967. The Americans imagine that we have lost our fighting spirit. They speak therefore about an agreement for the reopening of the Suez Canal while discussion on the withdrawal is deferred.

I have asked the officer in charge of US interests to inform his Government that there is no further room for discussion. All that has come to an end unless Israel answers Jarring’s paper of 8th February and accepts complete withdrawal. After that the dialogue can be

resumed on the basis of a crossing by our forces and a cease-fire for six months, provided that if Israel does not withraw in this period our armed forces will carry out their duty of expelling the enemy.

Israel will not accept Jarring’s paper. Israel is demanding Sharm ash-Shaykh and is demanding a permanent cease-fire and nego¬ tiations—negotiations which will, of course, drag on for 10 years while the land remains under occupation, and then the question will freeze, the world will forget it and occupation will became an established fact.

There is only the battle before us to defend our homes, answer the challenge and prove that we are worthy of living on the soil of Egypt. Your duty is grave and historic before your country, the armed forces, the people, the Arab nation and the world both enemy and friend.

The coming battle is a battle of the will to fight, a battle of the resolution of the fighter. It will differ from all other battles which have come before. Israel is no longer a legend or a

ghost as it has been trying to depict itself. The military command made a mistake and issued an order for withdrawal—hence the Israeli victory appeared bigger. Israel is afraid to confront you. The men whose training was supervised by General Sadiq,

who entered [occupied territory] and fought, saw what the enemy is like in confrontation. Our people have placed their hopes on you. They have full confidence and are standing


behind you in one steadfast front. Plans to prepare the internal front for the battle were drawn up during the month of Ramadan. Implementation of these plans will begin today. While you wait for the order to cross, I request you to carry out hard and fierce training. The road to the crossing is a one-way road. The next time we shall meet in Sinai, God willing. May God grant you success.

394

Egyptian Memorandum Transmitted by President Sadat of Egypt to Chairman Senghor of the Organization of African Unity Subcommittee on the Middle East, in Response to That Committee’s Set¬ tlement Proposals1

Cairo, November 23, 1971

Your Excellency, In reply to the request voiced by the

Subcommittee of the Heads of the Four States, I have pleasure in submitting to you

the attached memorandum, which explains the attitude of the Arab Republic of Egypt in

regard to the talks with the Subcommittee in Cairo and on the points that were raised during the talks.

I am anxious once again to express my thanks to you, Mr. President, and through you to the members of the Subcommittee, for

the efforts you have made to secure the

implementation of the Security Council reso¬ lution adopted on November 22, 1967, and to help the Secretary-General of the United Na¬ tions in his task.

I beg Your Excellency to accept this assurance of my profoundest affection and my highest esteem.

With my best wishes,

Anwar Sadat

1 Translated from the Arabic text of Sadat’s letter

to Senghor (President of the Republic of Senegal)

and the Egyptian reply to the O.A.U. memorandum,

al-Nahar (Beirut), January 19, 1972.

The Arab Republic of Egypt welcomes the Committee of the Heads of African States and expresses its gratitude for the efforts it has

made to secure the implementation of the

resolution approved by the Organization of

African Unity in Addis Ababa on June 23, 1971, stipulating the immediate withdrawal

of Israeli forces from all the Arab territories to the June 5, 1967 lines, in conformity with

Resolution 242 adopted by the Security

Council on November 22, 1967. The resolu¬ tion of the Organization of African Unity

expresses, among other things, the full support

accorded by the Heads of the African States

to the efforts made by the special envoy of the Secretary-General of the United Nations to secure the implementation of the Security Council resolution and, in particular, his peace initiative of February 8, 1971.

The decision stresses the solidarity of the African Heads of State with Egypt and

praises her positive attitude as expressed in her reply to the initiative of the special envoy of the U.N. Secretary-General on February 15, 1971. The Organization of African Unity’s decision condemns the defiance with which Israel met this initiative, and calls on her to give an affirmative answer to Ambassador Jarring’s memorandum immediately, as Egypt has done.

The Arab Republic of Egypt expresses its gratitude to the Acting President of the Or¬ ganization of African Unity and the members of the Committee of Ten for the efforts they have made to secure the implementation of the decision of the Organization of African Unity,

which stipulates that the Acting President be

commissioned to hold consultations with African Heads of State and Prime Ministers so that they may use their influence to secure the total implementation of the said decision.

Egypt, anxious to establish lasting peace in the Middle East, has made proof of her total cooperation with the Subcommittee, at all stages of their work, being convinced that the success of this work will assure implementation

of Security Council Resolution 242, and free Ambassador Jarring’s mission from the im¬ passe created by Israel’s refusal to respond positively to his memorandum.

ARAB WORLD 553

The Subcommittee, through the meetings it held in Cairo, affirmed that the task com¬ prises the implementation of Security Council Resolution 242, in conformity with the resolu¬ tion of the Organization of African Unity. It expressed its full support for Ambassador Jarring in the performance of his task, inasmuch as his memorandum of February 8 to the parties set as its objective the implementation of the Security Council resolution. The Subcommittee made it clear, among other things, that it has no intention of putting itself in the place of Ambassador Jarring but that, on the contrary, its task is to assist the envoy of the Secretary- General and ensure the implementation of the Security Council resolution in conformity with his initiative in that respect.

The President of the Arab Republic of Egypt, in the course of his talks in Cairo with the Subcommittee of African Heads of State, intimated that Egypt was quite ready to implement Security Council Resolution 242 to the letter and that it accepted Dr. Jarring’s initiative as set out in his memorandum of February 8,1971.

In reply to the request of the Subcommittee, the Arab Republic of Egypt gave the following clarifications of its attitude to the points raised during the talks:

1. Acceptance of indirect negotiations under the supervision of Dr. Jarring for the imple¬ mentation of all the provisions of Security Council Resolution 242 and also of the initiative of Ambassador Jarring for reaching a peace agreement.

2. Egypt is prepared to take the necessary measures to reopen the Suez Canal in return for Israeli withdrawal as a first step in con¬ formity with the initiative as defined by the President in his speech of November 11, 1971, on condition that Israel gives an affirmative answer to Dr. Jarring’s initiative of February 8,1971.

3. We agree that the peace agreement should provide for secure and recognized frontiers, on the basis of the resolution of the Organization of African Unity which stipu¬ lates the necessity of withdrawal of Israeli troops from all Arab territory, and on Ambas¬ sador Jarring’s initiative which stipulates the

necessity of Israeli retreat to the Egyptian international frontiers.

4. Acceptance of the following guarantees of peace:

— United Nations guarantees; — the creation of demilitarized zones on

both sides of the frontier; — the presence of international forces at

certain strategic points. 5. Egypt accepts the presence of interna¬

tional forces in Sharm el-Sheikh to safeguard freedom of navigation in the Straits of Tiran.

395 Broadcast Statement by King Hussein of Jordan Announcing the Assassina¬ tion in Cairo of Jordanian Premier al-Tall1

Amman, November 28,1971

God has willed that I see more than one father, brother, friend and companion fall on the road we have chosen and which we have found is more honourable, nobler and more lasting than life itself. Those who preceded us walked this road, and our martyrs in the land of Palestine also walked this road. In our political life, there have walked on it Hazza [al-Majali, former Premier] and all those who struggled for the cause, for stability—for the security and safety of the young and the old in our country—for the dignity of citizens and the homeland, for the dignity of the soldier, the safety of the student, and to ensure the continuation of the march, and to hold the mission high like a flying banner.

This afternoon I was on my way to convey condolences and sympathy when I received the tragic news about the martyrdom of Wash and the wounding of Abdullah Salah

1 Text of Hussein’s statement broadcast on Amman

Home Service in Arabic; English translation in BBC

Monitoring Service, Summary of World Broadcasts,

ME/3852/A/7-A/8; reprinted by permission.


while they were returning from Arab League headquarters in Cairo to their hotel. Wash lived the life of a soldier who dedicated him¬ self to serving his country and the nation. He struggled honourably and in a manly fashion for them and for their sacred cause. He died like a brave soldier struggling for them with manliness and honour.

If the hand of treachery and treason willed today to strike at him, we know that this hand is aimed against the domestic unity of our one people in the dear homeland. We know that this hand is planning to kill that unity, because it is our enemies5 aim to kill that unity. This hand is serving those enemies.

While our distress as a result of this flagrant crime is unlimited, the distress to honour and manliness over what that treacherous hand represents, is also unlimited. There is one answer to all these crimes—I ask it from all of you, man and woman, soldier and civilian—increased faith in domestic unity, increased adherence to it and increased safeguarding of it. Then our ship will sail with determination and faith, no matter how many beloved comrades pass away.

My condolences to Wash’s family, his relatives, brothers, and the people—sons of the one Jordanian community in both banks.

Reassured soul, return to your God satisfied and satisfying to God. Enter his paradise. Almighty God is truthful.

396 Review of U.S. Secret Diplomacy in the Middle East and Replies to Questions on the Military and Diplomatic Dead¬ lock, Given by President Sadat of Egypt in an Interview with a U.S. Publication1

Cairo, Early December, 1971

I still have the feeling [that the U.S.

1 Text of Sadat’s statement and of the interview with

him conducted by Arnaud de Borchgrave, Newsweek

(Domestic Edition) LXXVIII, 24, December 13, 1971,

pp. 43-47.©Copyright Newsweek Inc. 1971; reprinted

by permission.

Administration is the key to peace]. But unfortunately, we are now back to where we started from eight months ago. We have lost almost a year. Top U.S. officials have always said to me, “Please have con¬ fidence in us, bear with us, we are a world power and, as such, we will assume our responsibilities.” But the whole story has ended very sadly. When I made my initiative last February, it was warmly welcomed by the U.S. I told Washington it was a real test of the other side’s intentions. And Washington told me that my initiative had provided an outlet for U.S. diplomacy to demonstrate its effectiveness. The stalemate, they said, had finally been broken. And when I declared that we no longer felt bound by the cease-fire [which officially expired in March], Washington asked me to exercise restraint because it was working on a solution based on my initiative and because the U.S. was the only power that could get anywhere with Israel.

I decided to wait. Secretary [of State William] Rogers came to Cairo [in May]. We talked for two and a half hours. We felt at ease in each other’s company. Mr. Rogers told me that the Israelis had contended all along that we would never agree to a final peace agreement and that I had now refuted Israel’s basic premise. Mr. Rogers— sitting where you are sitting now—said he had nothing more to ask of me. “You have done your utmost,” he said. Toward the end of our talk he had not even raised the matter of the Soviet presence in Egypt, and I asked him why. He said he didn’t want to embarrass me. No embarrassment, I said, and I told him the whole story. Yes, we have officers and soldiers of the Red Army in their own uniforms on our soil. But they are not on the canal. Mr. Rogers interrupted me to say, “Yes, I know.” They are in SAM sites to defend our heartland and they only came after Israel began bombing our heartland. That’s when Nasser went on a secret mission to Russia in fanuary 1970.

The Soviets told us it would take eight months to train Egyptian crews for the SAM Ill’s. So we needed Soviet SAM crews

ARAB WORLD 555

on the ground until our own people were trained. In fact, as I explained to Mr. Rogers, their training was not completed until after the cease-fire went into effect in August 1970. But instead of sending the Soviet crews home and replacing them with Egyptians, we asked Moscow to send more batteries for the Egyptian crews they had just trained, thus doubling our air-defense capability. This was-—and still is—quite a sacrifice for us, because we agreed that all the Soviet officers and men be paid in hard currency, not Egyptian money. We are paying through the nose for the maintenance of these Soviet SAM crews in Egypt.

Bill Rogers then asked me whether we would agree, after the first phase of the Israeli withdrawal from Sinai, that Soviet forces would return to their country. I didn’t have to be talked into this. We are suffering from a terrible shortage of hard currency. I promised Bill that after the Israelis pulled back under the first phase, Soviet SAM crews would leave. At that point, I said, we would also restore full diplomatic relations with the U.S.

A whole regiment of Soviet SAM crews, incidentally, went back to Russia last week on the same ship that brought into Alexandria an Egyptian regiment trained in the Soviet Union. Going back to the narration of this whole sad story, I told your Secretary: 4‘You don’t have to ask me because I am eager to send the Soviet units home.” On another aspect—the Soviet fleet in the Mediterranean I told Mr. Rogers, “You are both superpowers and it really is not our responsibility.” In a handwritten letter, I told President Nixon that we have given the Soviet fleet facilities because they have stood by us in our darkest days. Not bases, mark you, only facilities. Your President replied he had no objections and that he didn’t want to cause problems between us and our Soviet friends.

After all this, Bill said he was going to tell Mrs. Meir that President Sadat had taken up her challenge and had agreed to a permanent peace agreement. Because, don’t forget, Mrs. Meir had said over and over again that if Egypt was willing to sign

a peace agreement—as I told you last February we would—then she would put all her cards on the table. Rogers said he was going to ask Mrs. Meir to do just that. Then he added that he would send [Assistant Secretary of State Joseph] Sisco back to Cairo to tell me about the results of the Secretary’s mission to Israel. Sisco came back two or three days later, and in this very room we talked privately for two hours. He told me the Israelis had reservations and that they were opposed to my initiative on three points.

First, the Israelis didn’t want our forces to cross the canal. Second, they wanted an unlimited cease-fire and, third, they wanted no mention of the international borders of June 5, 1967. “What’s your idea, Joe?” I said to Sisco. Regarding the stationing of Egyptian forces on the other side of the canal, Joe said the Israelis were very stubborn. I said, I’m quite willing to be flexible [but on] the principle itself there could be no discussion. After all, it’s my country we’re talking about. How are you going to be flexible? Joe asked. I said I was ready to compromise. So Joe drew two theoretical lines—Egyptian forces, he said, would be on line A to B on the east¬ ern side of the canal and Israeli forces on line X to Y also on the eastern side. This was his own terminology. I said I was perfect¬ ly willing to accept that armaments should be equal on both lines. Artillery of only such-and-such a caliber in equal numbers on both sides or whatever other arrangement based on equality that Joe could work out. More than that, I said I was ready to agree that between these two lines U.N. forces or troops from the four powers [the U.S., Britain, France and the Soviet Union] should take up position. Sisco said: “I think we can work something out on this basis. It sounds reasonable to me.”

Then he said the Israelis don’t want a cease-fire limited in time. I had specified six months so that [U.N. mediator Gun- nar] Jarring would have time to go to work again. But here again I told Joe I was willing to be flexible. How ? he asked. If Ambassador Jarring asks for a prolongation and things


seem to be progressing, I replied, the cease¬ fire could be stretched into a year.

I forgot to tell you that I said to Bill Rogers that if the first phase of the withdrawal was completed, a whole new atmosphere would be created. Our cities on the canal would come to life again and the canal would be reopened. A real momentum for peace would be under way. But as long as a for¬ eign soldier is on my soil, I said to Sisco, I could not agree to an indefinite cease¬ fire. Joe said:. “You are quite right on this point. We agree with you.55

On the third point, Sisco said the Israelis flatly refused to agree to any mention of the June 5 borders. Do you agree, Sisco asked me, that the U.S. should make some declaration about the international borders between Egypt and Israel—along the lines of the Rogers plan of December 1969—but that in the interim agreement we will only say the international borders will be in accordance with U.N. resolution 242? No, I told him, I cannot agree. I want either the Security Council or the four powers to state this for me. Don’t forget, I reminded Sisco, that the Israelis have already rejected the Rogers plan, so I need a guarantee. Joe said he felt something could be worked out. He asked me to hold everything while he went back to the U.S. to sort things out. “Have confidence in us,” he said as he left.

One day, Mr. [Donald] Bergus, your man in Cairo, submitted to the Egyptian Foreign Ministry a paper which, he said, was a summary of our exchanges drafted on his own initiative. This paper included every word I discussed with Sisco in this room, the A-B and X-Y lines and everything else. We noticed minor discrepancies with our own text and amended it accordingly, but we certainly didn’t refuse it. The Israelis found out about it a week later and Sisco promptly denied that the State Department had any knowledge of this paper. Don Bergus became the fall man. Yet I must say, for the historical record, that every word in this paper had been discussed between me and Sisco in this same room.

There followed another long period of silence from Washington. Then on July 6, President Nixon and Mr. Rogers sent me

Mr. Michael Sterner [chief of the Egyptian desk at the State Department]. Sterner informed me that your President had taken a major decision. The U.S., he explained, would now take an active role in the Mideast crisis and cease to play the part of the mailman between the two sides. Sisco, said Sterner, would be sent to Israel on July 28. But before the U.S. took an official stand, President Nixon needed some clarification. “The President is waiting for my telegram,”

Sterner said to me. “And if the answers are satisfactory, the President’s plan will be in effect as of this evening.”

“Shoot,” I said. Nixon wanted to know if the treaty [of

friendship and cooperation] between us and the Soviet Union had changed anything in our position since I last talked with Bill Rogers. No, I replied, the treaty was only a new frame for already existing relations—nothing reallv new. I pulled my pen out of my pocket and told Sterner to bring me something along the lines we discussed with Rogers and Sisco and I would sign it immediately. The President’s second question to me that night was whether I would still hold my promise to restore diplomatic relations with the U.S. after the first phase of an Israeli withdrawal. Yes, I said. Perhaps even before that phase is actually completed. And the third question was whether I still intended to send Soviet personnel home at the end of phase one. I said, yes, because I’m just as keen as you [on that], as I’m the one who has the financial difficulties. Sterner left after saying: “You may consider that the decision of the American President becomes effective tonight”—the decision, that is, to play an active role. After sending Sisco to Israel, I was informed, the U.S. position would be formally put to both sides.

I was very happy. Joe went back to Israel and stayed a week. And then we had a 70-day blackout from America. Absolutely nothing from anyone. We were never told what Sisco had done in Israel. Nothing from Don Bergus, nothing from our embassy in Washington.

Sterner had said that we must give the U.S. time to work something out with Israel. I told him I would be patient until

ARAB WORLD 557

Aug. 15. But we allowed 70 days to go by and then I saw Bergus and asked what was new. Nothing, he conceded. At that time, it was quite obvious that Sisco’s mission had been a complete failure.

I went on TV Sept. 16 and told my people something was seriously wrong. Then came my trip to the Soviet Union Oct. 11. Bergus came to see me and even though he still could not tell me what proposals the U.S. had put to Israel or what Israel had replied, he was clearly under instructions to squeeze more concessions out of us, even though Bill Rogers had told me he had nothing more to ask of us.

It was at that point that Rogers gave his speech at the U.N. General Assembly and listed six basic principles [for negotiating a Mideast settlement] for example, that any interim agreement must be connected with an over-all solution. But he was sly when it came to the critical point about the crossing of the canal by our forces. The two parties, he merely said, were adamant— despite the fact that the U.S. had already approved our basic position. It was clear that his main intention was to bring us into negotiations with the Israelis.

Bergus then gave me a message from Rogers asking me to send a special representative to the States because the U.S. wanted to take an active role as a go-between. He should have a “broad mandate,” the message added. I will agree to the latest U.S. idea, I replied, provided 1971 is regarded as the decisive year. Bergus said Washington agreed with me and that’s why it wanted my man to have a broad mandate so that the U.S. could successfully complete “an intensive effort to reach a solution by the end of the year.”

We agreed to the so-called “proximity” talks [a scheme under which representatives of Egypt and Israel would occupy nearby hotel rooms in New York and Sisco would shuttle between them]. My decision was relayed to Bergus by Hafez Ismail, my Kissinger, even though Bergus admitted that Israel had not yet been contacted on the proximity idea, let alone approved it. I even designated my emissary, Minister of State Murad Ghaleb.

I then asked Bergus what precisely would be Sisco's role between the two sides. Wash¬ ington replied he would be active and strive for rapid agreement. Two weeks later, Bergus met Ismail and said Sisco would be the “catalyst.” I asked for a definition. Instead, I was given an explanation about chemi¬ cal processes. And a few days later, further amplification arrived, via Bergus and Ismail, that Sisco would not be a passive mailman but an active one. It all seemed like a rather thin reed to me.

When I visited my troops last week, I said quite frankly that I had lost confidence in the U.S. We are now back to square one. But this time it seems to be worse. I protested vehemently through Bergus about Rogers’s recent interview in which he said the two parties must make concessions. Once again, we are being put on the same level as the aggressor who is occupying one-seventh of Egypt’s territory. I told Bergus to tell President Nixon and Rogers that while we lost a battle we are far from defeated.

The other message I sent was about the Lance ground-to-ground missiles that you were reported about to give to the Israelis. If this happens, I said, it will be a step up on the escalator. It would also mean that the U.S. is taking part in the occupation of my land, which, in turn, means a partner¬ ship in aggression. Today, I received a message from your President that the Lance is not yet serviceable and won’t be delivered to U.S. forces until 1972. That brings you up to date to the present moment.

De Borchgrave: Are shipments of Soviet war materials to Egypt threatening to upset the Mideast military balance ?

Sadat: Mr. Rogers himself said that Soviet arms shipments to Egypt had been “very moderate.” And reports from Washington on Nov. 5 indicated that your intelligence people believe that the Israeli Air Force is still far ahead in capability.

Q. Recently, Egypt acquired additional Soviet TU-16 bombers equipped with air-to-surface missiles as well as a new squadron of MIG-23s flown by Soviet pilots. Aren’t those important changes?

A. There are always military changes and improvements going on. But to talk of


this as a threat to Israel is ridiculous. Israel says that if we try to get our own—I repeat our own—land back, she will strike at Egypt’s heartland once again. They have already bombed our factories and schools with napalm in January 1970. Naturally, we have to be prepared to pay them back in kind. If they hit our heartland, we will hit theirs—and we have developed a capa¬ bility to do so. Some of your leading senators who are part of the Israeli lobby in Congress are now demanding that President Nixon take over directly Mr. Rogers’s key role in America’s Middle East policy. Why? Because Mr. Rogers has tried to show neu¬ trality between the two sides. Now the Jewish financiers feel they can manipulate political campaign funds to force Mr. Nixon to return to a policy of all-out support for Israel.

Q. What would you hope to gain out of a war? Wouldn't you be triggering something you could not win?

A. First let me say we don’t want war. But after exhausting every conceivable avenue to get Israel to withdraw from our country we have come up against a stone wall of intransigence. If you think there is another way and that there is still any hope of Israel’s voluntarily leaving the part of Egypt she has taken over, and the other occupied territories, you would make me a very happy man.

Q. Do you have any fresh ideas on how the deadlock might be broken?

A. Israel claims it wants a permanent settlement. I don’t claim anything. I want one. The sooner the better. I am ready to meet the Israelis in the Security Council, or with the four powers, in the presence of Ambassador Jarring, to implement the resolution that was designed by the world community to bring permanent peace to the Middle East—-and that peace includes Israel, of course.

Q. Are you still interested in an interim agree¬ ment—linked to a permanent settlement to be negotiated later—that would permit the reopening of the Suez Canal?

A. Most definitely. Let’s get on with it.

Q. Would an Israeli pullout to the Mitla Pass in Sinai be acceptable as part of an interim settlement?

A. The Mitla and the other two main Sinai passes. But I must have control of the passes as I will be responsible for reopen¬ ing and operating the Suez Canal.

Q. If Israel committed itself to withdrawal under the U.N. resolution, would you then be willing to agree to direct negotiations for the drafting of a peace treaty ?

A. Yes. But note this. I shall never agree that the occupation of our land shall be used as an instrument to impose conditions. If Israel agrees to withdraw to international borders, I am ready to negotiate the details and clauses of the final, permanent peace agreement.

(I What will you do if nothing is achieved bj your end-of-year deadline?

A. I shall do what any nation does to liberate its land. Because this will mean that Israel is closing all doors for a peaceful settlement. And it will then be my duty to try to liberate Arab soil whatever the sacrifices.

Q. What advice are the Soviets providing on how best to achieve peace between Egypt and Israel ?

A. I wrote President Nixon that the Soviets are far more keen for a peaceful settlement than the U.S. On the other hand, they condemn any seizing of territory by force.

Qj But don’t the Russians have any ideas? A. No, we don’t get any ideas from them.

Qj Is it true that Russia will pull its military forces out of Egypt once a peace settlement has been reached?

A. Brezhnev told Tito that and Tito told Nixon. There’s no secret about it. Of course they will leave.

Q. Why did you personally take over command of your armed forces a few weeks ago? Are your generals getting impatient with the lack of diplomatic progress?

A. Not at all. But in times like these I am the one who is ultimately responsible. And the time has come for me to coordinate between the political and military sides.

ARAB WORLD 559

I have no other alternative than to get ready for whatever happens.

Q. Are you confident of being able to liberate the occupied territories by force?

A. You Americans have learned a lesson from Vietnam. It is the will of the people that decides the battle. My people, fortunate¬ ly, have the will. Military technology is only a part of it. If history has taught us anything it is that, on the military side at least, the will and solidarity of a nation to liberate its land is decisive.

397

Statements Emphasizing Jordanian De¬

votion to the Struggle for Palestine and

the Need for Unity, and Rejecting the

Proposals for a West Bank State, In¬ cluded in a Speech from the Throne

Made by King Hussein of Jordan1

Amman, December 1, 1971

Honorable Senators and Deputies,

In spite of the clouds that have darkened the sky of Arab relations as a result of differences of interpretation and views, my government has continued its sincere efforts to serve our great cause and every Arab cause, and a number of Arab foreign ministers and officials have visited our country.

Similarly, our foreign minister and *a

number of Jordanian officials have visited a

number of Arab countries, and among the

results of these moves were the convening of

the Conference of Arab Foreign Ministers in Cairo, its agreement with our appraisal of the

international situation, a consensus on the necessity to support the line of confrontation with the occupying enemy, and affirmation of the need for in ter-Arab relations to be restored


Hussein’s Speech from the Throne at the Opening of

the Ninth Parliament, al-Dustur (Amman), December

2, 1971.

to their proper course (on the belief that the minimum requirement for making prepara¬ tions to confront the perils and challenges is that these relations should be unclouded). We have no doubt that it was an inevitable result of the dissipation of Arab efforts that

the United Nations resolution, which we accepted as a formula for a peaceful settle¬ ment, should remain a dead letter in the lobbies of the United Nations. There was no one to influence Israel to accept and implement it, as long as those whose cause it

was remained divided in views, exerted different degrees of effort and differed in their

view and assessment of responsibility. This is the reason why the occupation has continued to this day and why the perils threatening our Arab right to Palestine have grown graver.

The struggle has been and will continue to be our raison d’etre and the emblem of our advance until our Arab right in Palestine is restored. This will continue to be our destiny, which we shall follow with sincerity and which will clearly define our roles in all fields and at all levels. For us work means bearing arms:

production is the mainstay of steadfastness;

construction here and there is the means for mobilization; order is the weapon of victory; security and stability are the source of sacrifice and the ability to give, and national unity is the basis of all the hopes and objectives we aspire to realize.

It has been ordained that this country

shall continue to protect its homeland and defend its rear; it has been the first bastion in

the face of danger. It has never turned aside from discharging the mission of the great Arab Revolt—the mission of unity, freedom and a better life. This fact explains this country’s achievement of an ideal illustration of the significance of unity, the unity of both banks of the Jordan. This fact also explains Jordan’s initiative in giving its blessing to any form of unity between one Arab country and another, out of a belief that comprehensive

unity must inevitably come about no matter how long it takes and how long the way. This fact also explains why our Jordan has so

strongly condemned all attempts to deceive our people in the stricken West Bank, first


luring them towards the pitfall of autonomy, and then throwing out hints of a misbegotten state to be fabricated in part of the occupied homeland. We regard such calls as a discord existing only in the dreams of those who advocate them in the corridors of fickleness, opportunism and darkness. It has been our duty to reject these calls. We declare today what we have always declared—that after the liberation of the territory the Arab people of Palestine will have the right above all else to decide their own future and to choose the course that satisfies them. Honorable Senators and Deputies,

My government’s interest in achieving the greatest possible extent of mobilization for the battle is illustrated by our home front, by our quest and by our support, along with the home front, for the foundations and elements of national unity, in accordance with general principles which rally the sons of our home¬ land, each in the field where he can serve and give. This was the source of our call for the Jordanian National Union and the prin¬ ciples and objectives set out in its Charter. These principles and objectives have lived up to our wishes. They are the well-springs of our

civilization and are backed by our authentic experience. We are a nation that has given to and taken from the world the best that could be given and taken. We hold fast to our Jordanian experience which we have wanted to serve as an example in view of its authen¬ ticity and constant regeneration; which we have wanted to keep constantly open to the whole world, ever forging ahead, armed with faith in God, the right and the good, and employing knowledge, work and the ability to give. We also keep before our eyes the requirements and challenges of this world that confront our generations, our youth and our society in this world. Honorable Senators and Deputies,

My government has successfully established security, sovereignty of law and respect for order, and restored the flourishing picture by which our homeland has been known through¬ out the ages as a haven for honesty and brotherhood and a oasis of confidence and security. We should never have attained this goal but for the vigilance of our people,

the response of the sons of our homeland and the way every citizen has contributed to this end.

398

Statements Emphasizing the Unity of

the Two Banks of the Jordan, Included in the Response of the Parliament of Jordan to King Hussein’s December 1 Speech from the Throne1


Your Majesty: The Jordanian Chamber of Deputies, the

legitimate representative of the people of both Banks of the Kingdom, joins you in sending its greetings, accompanied by the profoundest pride and the greatest esteem, to our steadfast and long-suffering people in the stricken West Bank of our beloved Jordan and in every part of the occupied Arab lands. The Chamber of Deputies regards every claim and pretention to represent the Pales¬

tinian people as nothing more nor less than a conspiracy aimed at destroying national unity and arousing division and dissension among the sons of the one homeland. It declares in the name of the people that the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, in both its banks, con¬ stitutes a single people within a single state, who are represented by His Majesty the King and the. legitimate authorities of the state.

This is why Jordan has so strongly con¬ demned all attempts to deceive our people in the stricken West Bank, first luring them towards the pitfall of autonomy, and then throwing out hints of a misbegotten state to be fabricated in part of the occupied home¬ land. We are confident that our people are fully on their guard against such tendentious calls, the sole object of which is to serve the enemy and to realize the ambitions of de¬ featists.

1 Excerpted and translated from the Chamber of Deputies

reply, al-Dustur (Amman), December 9, 1971.

ARAB WORLD 561

Your Maiesty: This Chamber, which is so proud of your

leadership, has the highest appreciation for the efforts of the late Wasfi al-Tall and those of the intrepid Arab Jordanian forces and the public security forces, to entrench security, stability and the sovereignty of law and order, strengthened and reinforced by the vigilance and support of our long-suffering struggling Jordanian people. This would never have been achieved for us but for the wisdom, courage and faith of our guide and leader.

In this context we join Your Majesty in offering our greetings and the expression of our esteem to the intrepid members of the armed forces and their brethren in the public security forces.

399

Statement Issued by the Government of

Jordan Rejecting the Decision of the

Israeli Authorities To Hold Municipal

Elections in the Occupied West Bank1


Adhering to the legitimate sovereignty of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan over all its territories; abiding by the principles, spirit and provisions of international law, the 1949 Geneva Convention, the United Nations Charter and the resolutions and recommend¬ ations adopted by the General Assembly, the Security Council and other agencies of the international organization on the Arab ter¬ ritories that have been under illegitimate Israeli occupation since June 1967;

Affirming the absolute right of the Hash¬ emite Kingdom of Jordan to insist on the necessity for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from all the occupied Arab territories and their return to the constitutional and legit¬ imate position that prevailed before the said aggression;

1 Translated from the Arabic text of the Jordanian state¬ ment, al-Dustur (Amman), December 9, 1971.

Exercising its sovereignty over the West Bank and expressing its zeal for the interests of its citizens there and for their sound rights and demands;

The Government of the Hashemite King¬ dom of Jordan:

1. Affirms that the decision of the Israeli occupation authorities to hold elections to the Municipal Councils of the West Bank is absolutely invalid because it is not based on a shadow of law or legality and is incompatible with international law, the Geneva Conven¬ tion and the Charter and resolutions of the United Nations.

2. Regards the said decision as constituting a flagrant aggression against the sovereignty of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan over the West Bank, a violation of the rights of its citizens and an interference in their affairs.

3. Is confident that the above decision was taken within the framework of a plan aimed at perpetrating Israeli domination of the oc¬ cupied Arab territories.

For these reasons, the Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan declares that it:

1. Does not recognize the decision of the Israeli authorities to hold elections to the Municipal Councils in the West Bank;

2. Regards the existing Municipal Councils of the West Bank as the sole legal Municipal Councils and calls on them, in conformity with Paragraph 2 of Article VIII of the Jordanian Municipalities Law, to continue to meet their responsibilities and perform their duties;

3. Warns citizens of the West Bank against the objectives and schemes that lie behind this Israeli decision, calls on them not to ac¬ knowledge it, and exhorts them to adopt such resolute attitudes to foil the conspiracy as are required by the dictates of duty and the national interest;

4. Expresses its absolute confidence in the citizens of the West Bank, and in their vigilance, their sincerity and their loyalty, and assures them that it will not hesitate to exercise all its legal rights and constitutional powers against all who deviate from the right course and cooperate with the enemy in implement¬ ing the above decision.


400

Statements and Recommendations on the Role of Writers in the Arab Struggle

Against Zionism and Imperialism, Is¬ sued by the Eighth Conference of Arab Writers1

Damascus, December 15, 1971

The battle of destiny in which the whole of the Arab nation is involved, with the Arab writer in its vanguard, constitutes an all-out challenge to its civilization. In this battle, therefore, it is essential that the Arab nation should be victorious in the social, economic and cultural fields, as well as at the level of the political battle.

In spite of the calamity that befell our usurped Arab homeland in Palestine more than twenty years ago, and in spite of the fact that more than four and a half years have passed since the Zionist-imperialist aggression was launched on June 5, 1967 by the forces of expansion, usurpation and fascism repre¬ sented by Israel and world imperialism, it is still the duty of Arab writers and thinkers to continue to play their historical role, along with the Arab vanguards, of bearing their great responsibilities and mobilizing their energies, resources and talents for victory in the battle of destiny.

The Eighth Conference of Arab Writers was held from December 11-15, 1971 under the slogan “The Arab Writer in the Battle of

Destiny.55 The conference was attended by delegations from the following twelve Arab countries: Bahrain, Tunisia, Algeria, Syria, Iraq, Palestine, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Egypt, Morocco, Yemen as well as the Arab League; delegations from certain organiza¬ tions and friendly countries attended as observers.

The Arab writers realize that the battle of destiny lies in resisting the forces of imperial¬ ism, Zionism, colonialism and racism in order to establish the principles of freedom,


Conference of Arab Writers’ statement, al-Baath (Da¬

mascus), December 16, 1971.

progress, socialist construction, peace, social justice, and spiritual, cultural and civilizational prosperity for mankind.

The Arab writers fully realize that by taking part in the struggle on this anti-imperialist and anti-Zionist front the Arab people are supporting not only the Arab cause and the Palestinian cause, but also the struggle of the peoples of Vietnam, Indochina, South Africa, and Chad, the Portuguese colonies of Angola, Mozambique, Guinea Bissau, and every place where the battle against the common enemy is necessary.

The Arab writers realize that the battle of destiny which the Arab people are fighting for victory, is linked with the elimination of the imperialist presence from Arab territory; that Zionist occupation, which is directed against the Arab spirit as much as against Arab ter¬ ritories, depends on imperialist aggression and the exploitation by monopoly capitalist com¬ panies of the material and human resources of the Arabs; and that the armed struggle in which the people of Palestine and the whole of the Arab nation are engaged, especially on the lines of confrontation with the enemy, plays an effective part in this interlinked struggle for the liberation of occupied Arab territory, the recovery of the right of the Palestinian Arab people to their homeland, the smashing of the artificial barriers left behind by colonialism in the Arab world, the bridging of the gulf of civilizational backwardness and the achieve¬ ment of a future brilliant with freedom, security, justice and prosperity.

The Arab writers undertake to support Palestinian armed struggle, to support the role that is being played by the Palestine revolution and to take a resolute stand against the conspiracies aimed at liquidation that are being hatched and implemented by imperialism, Zionism and Arab reaction.

Recommendations Adopted by the Arab Writers on Freedom and Commitment in the Battle of Destiny :

1. Freedom to become acquainted with world thought;

ARAB WORLD 563

2. Association of the masses in appraisal of the literature of the battle of destiny and coordination between Arab writers5 federa¬ tions and information organizations to make the masses more aware;

3. That Arab writers be urged to take part in the real role of the information media;

4. Commitment to the use of classical Arabic;

5. Commitment to the line of the Arab revolution, which is the only way to progressive

unity; 6. Seminars to present and elucidate the

basic concepts of commitment to the battle

of destiny. As regards the role of the Arab writer

vis-a-vis the heritage and participation in the

battle of destiny, the Conference makes the following recommendations:

1. Arabic should be the official language of higher education in Arab universities.

2. The Federation of Arab Writers should adopt the idea of holding a conference on the Arab heritage every two or three years to discuss anything new, and that a seat at the

Arab League should be devoted to the Arab heritage.

As regards the defence of Arab writers in the occupied territory the Conference recom¬ mended the following:

1. Congratulations should be sent to Pales¬ tinian writers in the occupied territory on their vanguard struggle, and on their perform¬ ing the true mission of the writer, which is to kindle the spirit of resistance to Zionist- colonialist occupation.

The Conference salutes these writers and calls on their brother Arab writers to bear the same banner and to cooperate fully with them

in the defense of freedom and progress. 2. A day should be appointed every year

for moral and literary solidarity with writers in the occupied territory, and to call on free writers5 federations throughout the world to continue to support them in their just struggle and to take action to protect them against the campaigns of defamation and slander to which they are subjected because of their attitude of struggle against the occupation authorities. This solidarity should be as wide as possible;

3. The literary and material rights of the writers in the occupied territory when their work is published should be safeguarded. The Conference believes that the Federation of Palestinian Writers should deputize for them in protecting these rights, in cooperation with the Arab Federations and the General Federation of Arab Writers, and that these federations should take action to print and publish the literature of the occupied territory in Arabic and to translate it, and make it their task to provide centers of oriental studies and other interested institutions with these transla¬ tions and their Arabic orginals.

4. The Palestinian Arab writers5 full right to write should be protected, the Arab federations being called on to adopt this cause and to defend the freedom of all Pales¬ tinian and Arab writers.

5. The role played by Arab broadcasting

services in the service of the Palestinian cause and the devotion of greater interest to radio programs and efforts to ensure that the literature of the occupied territory reaches the masses both in the Arab homeland and elsewhere, should be strengthened.

6. A day should be fixed every year for world solidarity with the Palestinian Arab people in their struggle, free writers through¬ out the world being called on to take part in this day.


401

Resolutions and Recommendations Rel¬ ative to Economic Relations Between Arab and Non-Arab States, Adopted at the Seventeenth Ordinary Session of the Arab Economic Council1

Cairo, December 18, 1971

The Economic Council, having reviewed the report of the Secretariat General on economic interests between Arab and foreign

countries, Recommends the following: First, that the Arab states should persist in

their economic and commercial policies to strengthen their relations with foreign states that support the Arab attitude towards Israeli aggression and to influence the attitudes of

foreign states that oppose the Arab attitude; Secondly, that the importance of imple¬

menting this principle should be stressed at the present grave stage in the confrontation

with aggression, along with preparedness for such developments as may come about in the near future requiring the adoption of

clearly defined attitudes towards the states

which adopt an attitude of hostility to the requirements of the battle.

Resolves the following: First, that a comprehensive and detailed

study of the economic interests between Arab and foreign states be prepared in accordance with the following system: I. Definition of the economic interests between

Arab and foreign states:

A. The interests of Arab states in foreign states:

—Commercial interests (exports and im¬ ports) with details of the kinds of mer¬ chandise which are of strategic impor-


resolutions and recommendations adopted at the

17 th session of the Arab Economic Council meeting in

Cairo, December 14-18, 1971, Arab Economic Report

(Beirut: General Federation of Chambers of Commerce,

Industry and Agriculture of the Arab Countries,

January, 1972), pp. 139-142.

Member states of the Arab Economic Council are:

Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Sudan, Syria, Egypt and

Yemen (Sanaa).

tance and of the principal companies and groups that do business with them;

—Financing interests (loans and financial aid);

—Other economic interests (immigration, technical expertise, etc.).

B. The interests of foreign countries in the Arab countries:

—Commercial interests (exports and im¬ ports) with details of the kinds of mer¬ chandise that are of strategic importance and the principal companies and groups that do business with them;

—Financial interests (investments in the Arab countries, investment of funds in foreign markets by Arab states);

—Other economic interests, if any. II. Definition and appraisal of the means of

influencing the attitudes of foreign states: A. Positive means: —Commercial policies (conclusions of com¬

mercial and customs agreements and the

direction of Arab imports); —Monetary and financial policies (direc¬

tion of the investment of Arab funds in foreign markets);

—The listing of foreign companies and interests that benefit the Arab world with a view to enlisting their help in supporting the Arab cause in their mother countries.

B. Negative means:

—Reduction of imports from unresponsive countries;

—Possible forms of boycott and their effects on both parties.

III. Appraisal of the existing economic organiza¬ tions common to the Arab countries and foreign countries and the means of strengthening them or establishing additional organizations:

—-Joint chambers of commerce; —Joint companies; —Federations.

IV. A study of the situation of Israeli economic power as regards its ability to influence foreign countries: —-Israeli participation in joint companies; —Israel’s employment of Jewish economic

colonies; —Joint chambers of commerce and federa¬

tions.

ARAB WORLD 565

V. Proposed policies and measures to influence the attitudes of foreign countries and means of pursuing them: A. Shortterm; B. Long term.

Secondly: I. That the Secretariat General of the

League of Arab States be requested to supervise the preparation of this study, with the help of such experts and subsidiary organizations of the League of Arab States as it sees fit, and to ensure that the study is completed (at the latest) by the end of

March 1972. II. That the Ministries of Economy of the

member states be requested to provide the information and statements necessary for the study at specific dates, and appoint a liaison officer to submit such information and statements.

III. That the Secretariat General be re¬ quested to allocate the sum of ten thousand dollars to meet the expenses of preparing the required study.

Thirdly: I. That a follow-up committee, consisting

of the Ministers of Economy of the Syrian Arab Republic, the Lebanese Republic and the

Arab Republic of Egypt, be formed to follow up the preparation of the said study and to review it when it is completed, in preparation for its being submitted to the Arab Ministers of Economy at a session held specially for that purpose, and to follow up the measures taken by the member states to implement this resolution.

II. That the follow-up committee hold a meeting with those charged with the task of preparing the study in the first half of January 1972 to review the executive measures relative to the preparation of the study.

(The Minister of Economy of the Syrian Arab Republic expressed the view that men¬ tion should be made of an Arab economic attitude to the United States of America and the possibility of a total boycott should it maintain its present attitude.)

( The head of the Saudi Arabian delegation stated that he did not approve of the two

recommendations, or of Section B of Article 2 of the resolutions entitled “Negative Means” until such time as his government expresses its view thereon.)

402

Address by Foreign Minister Khaddam of Syria to the People’s Assembly, Sur¬ veying the Goals and Strategy of Syrian Foreign Policy (Excerpts)1

Damascus, December 22, 1971

1. The basic problem that constitutes the crux of our struggle is the problem of the Zionist presence on Arab soil and the con¬ frontation of that presence.

2. Unionist action is the principal course to be followed for the realization of our people’s aspirations to build a unified Arab socialist society.

3. The problem of confronting the Zionist presence is an Arab problem, and this requires that action be taken to mobilize all possible economic and military resources for the battle.

4. Our relations with other Arab countries are determined in the light of their attitude to the battle.

5. The Palestine Resistance is a fundamen¬ tal and important part of the Arab revolution, and must therefore be supported.

6. [We must] strengthen our relations with all the countries of the socialist camp, and first and foremost the Soviet Union.

7. [We must] strengthen our relations with the peoples and countries of the Third World and with the Islamic peoples and countries, to ensure support for our national causes, first and foremost of which is the Palestine cause.


Khaddam’s statement to a meeting of the Syrian Arab

Region’s People’s Assembly called to elect 20 of its

members to serve in the National Assembly of the

Federation of Arab Republics, al-Baath (Damascus),

December 23, 1971.


8. [We must] take advantage of the present conflict within the capitalist camp and develop our foreign relations with the countries of the Western world with a view to ensuring that these countries adopt a better attitude to the Palestinian cause.

9. [We must] constantly affirm that Zionism

and imperialism are the principal enemies of

the Arab nation in its struggle to build its Arab socialist society.

In the light of these basic principles which

the revolutionary government of this region has adhered to, the following have been achieved:

In Arab policy: In the light of the strategic goal of the

revolution in this region, which is the goal of liberation, we have taken action on the following axes:

1. The unionist axis, from our belief that Arab unity is the natural reply to the presence of Zionism and imperialism and to their constant plotting against our people and our homeland. The revolution has achieved an important success in this field: the Federation of Arab Republics has been established, the Constitution has been submitted to plebiscite, the Presidential Council has been

formed and preparations are being made for the establishment of all the institutions provid¬ ed for by the Federal Constitution.

The establishment of this Federation is an important step not only on the course of unionist action, but also on the course towards

liberation. The mobilization of military, human and

economic resources in the Federal State, in conformity with a clear strategy which was set out in the Benghazi Proclamation and was submitted to plebiscite along with the Con¬ stitution, is an important and fundamental

matter, and this strategy clearly affirms that there is to be no peace and no negotiation

with the enemy, no relinquishing of a single inch of Arab territory, and no waiving of [the rights of Palestinians] or bargaining over

the Palestine problem. 2. The second axis is based on the fact that

the responsibility for confronting the Zionist presence is an all-Arab responsibility, even

though the principal burden falls on the

Syrian and Egyptian regions. It is therefore necessary to take action with all available means, in spite of the present Arab situation, to implement the slogan of the mobilization of

human, military and economic resources for

the battle, it being made perfectly clear that our attitude towards any region is determined in the light of that region’s attitude towards

the battle. In the light of this basic principle, this

region has set about creating an atmosphere in the Arab world that would enable us to

take serious action to mobilize Arab resources.

With this end in view steps were taken to end the diplomatic estrangement between [Syria] and the Arab regions that had come to con¬ gratulate the President of the Republic on his

assuming the Presidency after the popular referendum. As a result of these meeting and exchanges of visits with the other Arab regions, this region was able to recover its natural position in the leadership of Arab action after years of stifling isolation. It is to be observed that the unambiguous Arab policy laid down by this region, and the practical activities carried out under the direction of the President of the Republic helped to make it possible to hold the meeting of Arab Foreign Ministers in Cairo on September 13, 1971, where we made proposals based on the following points:

a. The creation of a positive Arab atmo¬ sphere by mobilizing Arab military, economic and human resources for the battle;

b. The convening of a meeting of the Arab Defense Council to define the needs of the

battle and its financial requirements; c. The convening of a meeting of Finance

Ministers with a view to taking advantage of all Arab resources in the battle of confronta¬ tion;

d. Support for the Palestine revolution. The Foreign Ministers approved these

principles, and on November 27, 1971, there was a meeting of the Arab Defense Council in the course of which the report of the Assistant Military Secretary-General was discussed, the

question of the financial requirements of the battle and of placing Arab efforts at the

ARAB WORLD 567

disposal of the confrontation was debated and several extremely satisfactory decisions were taken, which we are making every possible effort to implement.

On November 15, 1971 a meeting of the Arab Economic Ministers, which had been approved by the Foreign Ministers and sanctioned by the Arab governments on October 1 of this year, opened in Cairo to discuss matters of concern to them.

Brothers, our appreciation of the gravity of the present stage and the immensity of the responsibility leads us to take constant action to realize our policy, whatever obstacles we may encounter as a result of the present situa¬ tion. It also leads us to continue to make every

possible effort and if we fail in one effort we must make new efforts, for despair, in our view, is a great step towards ruin and surrender.

3. The third axis is the axis of the Palestine Resistance; this region has adopted a clearly defined attitude of support for the Resistance for the following reasons:

a. The Resistance embodies Arab rejection of the Zionist presence;

b. It makes the Palestine cause a living cause for the Palestinian people and attaches the Palestinian to his homeland;

c. The Resistance plays a military role against the enemy on the field of battle;

d. The existence and continuation of the Resistance is an affirmation to the international community that the Pales¬ tinian people, although nearly a quarter of a century has passed since they were evicted, are a people that live and exist, and no power on earth can dis¬ regard the existence of a living people.

It is natural, brothers, that the first problem to occupy the minds of all of us should be the problem of the Zionist presence on Arab soil and the real dangers that threaten our existence, because the question that must be answered is: Are we to exist or not to exist? For the threat is not only to the land, but to our national and human existence in that land.

This region has therefore adopted the following unambiguous attitudes:

1. Rejection of all formulae involving perpetuating the Zionist presence and re¬ linquishing of the Palestine cause.

2. The inevitability of confrontation with the enemy who is planning to build a state stretching from the Nile to the Euphrates.

Our attitude to all these attempts has always been perfectly clear. It is as follows:

1. Any solution must be based on two basic principles:

a. Recognition of the full national rights of the Palestinian Arab people to their territory and their homeland;

b. Complete and unconditional withdrawal from all the occupied Arab territories.

2. We have opposed all attempts to reach a partial settlement because we are convinced that this would lead to untold national injury.

403

Policy Statement Presented by Premier al-Lauzi of Jordan, Setting Forth Fun¬ damentals of Jordanian Policy Regarding Resistance Against Israeli Occupation of Palestine (Excerpt)1

Amman, December 27,1971

There are basic mainstays that no official or citizen can bargain over, renounce or neglect. They are:

I. The security and stability of this country. This is an essential mainstay that the govern¬

ment will employ all ways and means to make deeper and stronger, and it will not allow it to be impaired in any way.

II. The unity of Jordan is something sacred that cannot be waived or bargained over, the unity of the land and the community is the solid base of all effort, mobilization and build¬ ing, and if it is the duty of a man to sacrifice himself and his blood for his homeland, he


al-Lauzi’s policy statement, al-Dustur (Amman), De¬

cember 28, 1971.


will not be forgiven for harming that homeland for his own interests or personal ends.

III. The steadfastness which we have explained in detail does not mean inaction, nor does it mean silence; on the contrary, it is the firm foundation of movement, the strong basis of genuine effort. We in this country have not lagged behind any joint Arab effort in either war or peace. We have been the first to abide by the Arabs’ pacts ever since they had pacts, and today we again offer our hand to every Arab hand in any Arab country from our belief that our nation has a single destiny and

that its future, as far as we are concerned, is above all differences and above all other goals and objectives.

IV. We in Jordan were the first to believe in the legitimate right of our people to resist the occupier and we shall continue in this belief until God grants us victory. We have believed in this right for ourselves, for the people of Palestine and for all the members of our nation, and we have embodied our belief in our battles of steadfastness and in with¬ standing the attacks on our towns, villages and

mountains, the climax of which was the battle of Karameh, which will ever be a great landmark in our history of resistance to aggression. But the people who have abused the right of their nation are those who have diverted resistance from resisting the occupier into the mazes of misrepresentation, oppor¬ tunism and side issues, into contradictions, crimes, assassination and interference in the internal affairs of our country. They alone bear the burden of the crimes they have per¬ petrated against our nation in the sight of God and of history. This is why we give support only to honorable resistance which has rifles aimed against the occupier and which operates in those areas where the enemy is stationed and which are groaning under occupation; there is no place for it in our ranks if its aim is to threaten the security and life of the citizen and the safety and stability of the homeland.

404

Egyptian Press Interview Statement by

Foreign Minister al-Suwaidi of the Unit¬ ed Arab Emirates, Stating the Federa¬ tion’s Duty To Take Part in the Struggle Against Israel1

Cairo, Late December, 1971

III. Cooperation with the Other Arab

Countries The extent of this cooperation has been

determined by the provisions of the Charter of the Federal State, which is part of the Arab nation, and in this field we have two respon¬

sibilities : The first is that we should persist, along

with our brothers, in the performance of our duties in regard to our enemy, for we are partners in the responsibility to liberate Arab territories from our enemy, and this part¬ nership requires that we share in bearing the burdens of the fighting if Israel persists in her attitude of occupying Arab territories and in her policy of expansion and aggression. There is no need to state this, but we wished to mention it because duty is necessarily duty.

1 Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text of al-

Suwaidi’s exclusive interview, al-Ahram (Cairo), De¬

cember 29, 1971.

United Nations

PART I: DOCUMENTS

Annual Documents Submitted to the General Assembly

405 Introduction to the Annual Report of the United Nations Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, 16 June 1970 15 June 1971 (Middle East Section)1

September, 1971

217. More than four years have now elapsed since the outbreak of the June 1967 hostilities in the Middle East, and yet a peaceful and agreed settlement is still not in sight. 218. A year ago the situation took a turn for the better. Following the acceptance by Israel, Jordan and the United Arab Republic of a United States peace initi¬ ative, quiet was re-established along the Suez Canal on 7 August 1970 after 16 months of fierce fighting, thus opening the way for the resumption of the peace talks under the auspices of my Special Representative to the Middle East, Ambassador Gunnar V. Jarring. Unfortunately the high hopes raised by this turn of events were short-lived. The talks began on 21 August 1970, but shortly thereafter Israel refused to continue to participate in them because it alleged that the United Arab Republic had violated the cease-fire standstill agreement in the Suez Canal area. The talks were resumed in January 1971 and continued until the beginning of March, when they were forced once again into abeyance. 219. While the resumed talks did not achieve the break-through that had been hoped for, some progress was made. In February, Ambassador Jarring took the important ini¬ tiative of breaking the existing deadlock by seeking from Israel and the United Arab

1 Middle East section excerpted from Chapter IV,

“The Middle East and Cyprus,” of “Part Two:

Current Issues” of the Introduction to Secretary-

General U Thant’s 1970-1971 annual report; U.N.

doc. A/8401/Add.l, paras. 217-229.

Republic parallel and simultaneous commit¬ ments that seemed to him necessary as precon¬ ditions to progress in the talks. In brief, he sought a commitment from Israel to withdraw its forces from occupied United Arab Republic territory to the former international boundary between Egypt and the British Mandate of Palestine, and a commitment from the United Arab Republic to enter into a peace agreement with Israel with various undertakings and acknowledgements arising from the relevant principles mentioned in Security Council resolution 242 (1967). The United Arab Republic accepted the specific commit¬ ments requested of it, but so far Israel has not responded to the Special Represent¬ ative’s request. Ambassador Jarring feels, and I agree with him, that, until there has been a change in Israel’s position on the question of withdrawal, it would serve little useful purpose to attempt to reactivate the talks. It is still my hope that Israel will find it possible before too long to make a response that will enable the search for a peaceful settlement under Ambassador Jarring’s auspices to continue. 220. It is a matter of gratification that, despite this impasse, the quiet which was re-established in the Suez Canal sector on 1 August 1970 has continued to this day. It began with an agreement for a 90-day cease-fire as part of the United States peace initiative, and although this cease-fire agree¬ ment was allowed to lapse, after two ex¬ tensions, in March 1971, quiet has nevertheless been maintained. In the Israel-Syria sector there have been almost daily exchanges of fire, but these have generally been minor isolated incidents, and by and large quiet also prevail¬ ed in that sector. The United Nations has no observation machinery in the cease-fire sectors between Jordan and Lebanon, but all the available information indicates that these sectors, too, have generally been quiet during the period under review, although there

571


were reports of incidents along the Israel- Lebanon border involving activities of Arab guerrilla groups based in Lebanon against Israel and incursions by Israeli forces into Lebanese territory. 221. It is not possible to predict how long this quiet will last, but there can be little doubt that, if the present impasse in the search for a peaceful settlement persists, new fighting will break out sooner or later. Since the parties have taken advantage of the present lull to strengthen considerably their military capabilities, it is only too likely that the new round of fighting will be more violent and dangerous than the previous ones, and there is always the danger that it may not be possible to limit it to the present antagonists and to the confines of the Middle East. 222. I see no other way to forestall such a disastrous eventuality than by intensifying the search for a peaceful and agreed settle¬ ment. I believe there is still a chance of achieving such a settlement. I do not over¬ look the formidable difficulty of the problems to be tackled, but there exist several important assets on the side of peace efforts as well. The Security Council’s cease-fire resolutions of June 1967 and its resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967, if implemented simul¬ taneously and fully, should provide the frame¬ work for achieving a peaceful and agreed settlement of the present conflict. To promote agreement for such a settlement, we are fortunate to have the services of Ambassador Jarring, who is uniquely qualified for this almost impossible task. 223. Ambassador Jarring has clearly defined the minimum conditions that are required to move the peace talks ahead and, until those conditions are met, it is hard to see what else he can do to further his efforts. Steps to ensure that those conditions are met must be taken by the parties concerned and, failing this, by the Security Council itself or by States Members of the United Nations and, particularly, the permanent members of the Security Council, both because of their special responsibility within the United Nations and of their influence on the parties concerned.

224. The United States Government, whose peace initiative last year led to the re-establish¬ ment of the cease-fire in the Suez Canal sector in August 1970, recently took a second initiative with the objective of securing an interim agreement from Israel and the United Arab Republic for the reopening of the Suez Canal. In this connexion, the United States has assured me that its initiative aims at promoting and facilitating the resumption of Ambassador Jarring’s mission and is within the framework of Security Council Resolution 242 (1967). The information so far available does not indicate that an agreement can be reached in the near future. 225. But time is of the essence. I feel that if moves for even a partial solution do not bear fruit before too long, the United Nations, and particularly the Security Council, will have to review the situation once again and find ways and means to enable the Jarring mission to move forward. 226. Despite many difficulties, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Pales¬ tine Refugees in the Near East has continued to provide assistance to refugees. Of the many difficulties encountered during the past year, two were particularly serious. The Agency’s operation in East Jordan was disrupted during the armed clashes that erupted between the Jordanian Army and the jedayeen in the autumn of 1970 and again, though on a much lesser scale, in July 1971. The Agency, however, was able to resume its services to the refugees after brief periods of suspension. More recently the Agency was confronted with another serious problem, this time in the Gaza Strip, when the Israeli authorities decided, for what they considered as compelling se¬ curity reasons, to demolish large numbers of shelters in three refugee camps and to remove the occupants, some of them to places outside the Gaza Strip. The Com¬ missioner-General of the Agency has protested against these measures, not only because of the personal hardship inflicted upon the refugees and the resulting disruption of the Agency’s services, but also because they are contrary to certain provisions of the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949

UNITED NATIONS 573

relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War and to General Assembly resolution 2675 (XXV), which affirmed a number of basic principles for the protection of civilian populations in armed conflicts. On 18 August, I approached the Israeli Government through its Permanent Represen¬ tative to the United Nations and requested that it undertake promptly all measures necessary to ensure the immediate cessation of the destruction of refugee homes in the Gaza Strip and to halt the removal of the refugee occupants to places outside the Gaza Strip. According to the information received from the Commissioner-General, the Israeli operation was suspended as of 26 August. 227. The persisting financial difficulties of the Agency are also a matter of great concern to me. Last year the General Assembly set up a working group to look into this problem. Thanks to the efforts of the Chair¬ man and the other members of this group, to the assistance provided by the specialized agencies concerned, and to the generous response of *a number of Governments, the deficit for 1971 has been considerably reduced and the Commissioner-General has been able to defer new reductions in the Agency’s services. However, the long-term problem remains unsolved. If new resources are not found, the deficit for 1972 will probably exceed $6 million and the Agency will have no alternative but to reduce some of its essential services to the refugees. Once again I must commend this problem to the serious attention of the General Assembly. 228. I cannot conclude my comments on the situation in the Middle East without making a reference to the question of Jeru¬ salem. This question is of direct concern to me not only because it is one of the most complex and difficult problems in the Middle East conflict, but also because both the General Assembly and the Security Council have requested me to report to them any developments which tend to change the City’s legal status. 229. During the year under review, there were many reports from the Press and other sources concerning a master plan prepared by Israeli authorities for the construction

of housing projects in the Jerusalem area, including the sector controlled by Jordan before June 1967 and the area between the Armistice Demarcation Lines. As soon as I heard of those reports, I sought from the Israeli authorities detailed information of the reported master plan, but the Israeli authorities have not yet responded to my request. Thus I have not been able to fulfil the reporting responsibilities laid upon me by the General Assembly and the Security Council. In this connexion, I have also been in correspondence with the Israeli authorities concerning the United Nations premises at Government House.

* * *

406 Review of the United Nations General Assembly Twenty-Fifth Session Debate on the Middle East, Included in the Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, 16 June 1970 15 June 19711

August, 1971

B. Consideration by the General Assembly At its twenty-fourth session, the General

1 Text of Section B “Consideration by the General

Assembly,” Chapter I “The Situation in the Middle

East,” of “Part One: Political and Security Questions,”

of Secretary-General U Thant’s 1970-71 annual

Report on the Work of the Organization, the foreword of

which is dated August 7; U.N. doc. A/8401, pp. 5 -10.

The section of the report published here reviews

the Middle East debate of the twenty-fifth session

of the General Assembly (October 26-November

4, 1970) which led to the adoption of General Assembly

Resolution 2628 (XXV) Calling for a Three Month

Extension of the Ceasefire and for Talks Under the

Auspices of the Secretary-General’s Special Represent¬

ative with a View to Implementing Security Council

Resolution 242, November 4, 1970 (published as

Document 330 in International Documents on Palestine

1970).

(The remainder of calendar year 1971 will be covered

in the report for 1971 1972, relevant portions of

which are to be included in International Documents

on Palestine 1972.)


Assembly had decided that the debate on the item relating to the situation in the Middle East should be deferred to the twenty-fifth session and, that the item be included in the provisional agenda of that session. On 18 September 1970, the General Assembly included the item “The situation in the Middle East” in its agenda and decided that it should be discussed in plenary meetings. The item was discussed at thirteen meetings held between 26 October and 4 November 1970.

The debate was opened with a statement by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the United Arab Republic, who said that his Government had asked for a resumption of the consideration of the situation in the Middle East by the General Assembly in view of Israel’s rejection of all international efforts towards a settlement during the past three years and its insistence on following an expansionist policy, thus creating an ever increasing threat to international peace and security. His Government had felt that the General Assembly should play a positive role in assisting the Security Council to implement its resolution 242 (1967). Israel had not only consistently refused to co-operate in all efforts to have that resolution imple¬ mented, but by its withdrawal on 6 September 1970 from the contacts with Ambassador Jarring it had further emphasized its determi¬ nation to undermine the efforts to establish peace in the Middle East. In contrast, the United Arab Republic had not only accepted resolution 242 (1967) but as early as Decem¬ ber 1967 had expressed to Ambassador Jarring its readiness to fulfil all its obligations under that resolution.

The United Arab Republic had accepted the United States initiative in full and had designated its representative for talks with Ambassador Jarring. Israel, on the other hand, had not made one single substan¬ tive contact with Ambassador Jarring after accepting the American initiative and had justified its position by alleging violations of the cease-fire arrangements by the United Arab Republic.

The fact, however, was that early that year Israel had embarked upon a new

stage in its aggression by carrying out air raids against the civilian population of the United Arab Republic and had extended that aggression to Jordan, Syria and Lebanon. The United Arab Republic’s motives were primarily self-defence. It was regrettable that the United States had assisted in that aggression and had provided Israel with Phantom and Skyhawk aircraft, as well as massive economic aid. Indeed, following Israel’s declaration not to withdraw from the territories occupied by it in the 1967 war, the United States had announced the delivery of additional weapons to Israel, including 180 of its most advanced tanks, as part of the $450 million credit facilities for arms purchases. By taking that hostile position towards the Arab peoples and by supporting the aggressor, the United States was obstructing the realization of peace in the Middle East. At the Third Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non- Aligned Countries, held at Lusaka in Septem¬ ber 1970, the international community had adopted resolutions calling for the with¬ drawal of Israeli troops from all the occupied Arab territories to the lines of 5 June 1967, in implementation of Security Council resolu¬ tion 242 (1967).

In asking the General Assembly to consider the situation in the Middle East, the United Arab Republic had felt that the United Nations should give that situation its close attention and follow constantly the efforts that were being made until peace was secured by the withdrawal of Israel’s forces from all the occupied Arab territories.

The representative of Israel stated that the United Arab Republic had violated the cease-fire standstill agreement through the construction and forward movement of a great missile system. As a result of that, the equilibrium of the 7 August agreement had been broken and that factor, together with Egypt’s propaganda campaign, had undermined the chances of an understanding being established. Israel, on the other hand, had agreed to indirect talks under Ambassador Jarring’s auspices. It had also acquiesced to a limited cease-fire and had declared its readiness to accept and seek agreement

UNITED NATIONS 575

on the implementation of resolution 242 (1967). Furthermore, it had stated its will¬ ingness to withdraw its troops to agreed, recognized and secure borders to be determin¬ ed in the peace negotiations. Israel’s decision in that respect had been conveyed to Ambas¬ sador Jarring on 6 August 1970 in the form of an affirmative response to the United States peace initiative. The central point of that initiative, however, was the cease¬ fire standstill agreement under which the parties had undertaken to refrain from chang¬ ing the status quo within a zone extending fifty kilometres to the east and west of the cease-fire line, and specifically, to do nothing but maintain installations at the then existing sites and positions. Contrary to those precise undertakings, Egypt had established between 500 and 600 operational SA-2 and SA-3 missiles in the standstill zone, in violation of the agreement of 7 August. Those were not defensive measures, as claimed by the United Arab Republic, but offensive preparations designed to change the cease-fire lines by renewed war. The violations had continued daily and the United Arab Republic had refused even to address itself to requests for rectifications. 11 was impossible to consider negotiating a new agreement while the existing one had been shown so little respect. The most urgent task was to restore the trust necessary for all peace dialogues. The repre¬ sentative of Israel then said that the General Assembly should not destroy the existing consensus among the parties on Security Council resolution 242 (1967) by adopting measures which might give a new formulation or balance to that resolution by putting emphasis on one part or the other. Moreover, the Middle East situation was still being actively considered by the Security Council and, therefore, any recommendation by the Assembly implying a change in the balance maintained by the Council resolution would be in violation of the spirit of Article 12 of the Charter. In those circumstances, the General Assembly should urge the parties to observe strictly the cease-fire standstill agreement to which they had agreed, and call for the restoration of the situation as it had existed on and before 7 August 1970 in order that

the Jarring mission could make progress in all sectors.

On 29 October, a draft resolution was submitted by Afghanistan, Burundi, Came¬ roon, Ceylon, Guinea, Equatorial Guinea, India, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Mon¬ golia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Senegal, Somalia, Uganda, the United Republic of Tanzania, Yugoslavia and Zambia. Under its operative part the General Assembly would (1) reaffirm the inadmissibility of the acquisition of terri¬ tories by force, and consequently territories thus occupied must be restored; (2) recognize that full respect for the inalienable rights of the Arab people of Palestine, as affirmed in the General Assembly resolutions, was a prerequisite to a just and lasting peace in the Middle East; (3) urge the speedy imple¬ mentation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967), which provided for the peaceful settlement of the situation in the Middle East; (4) express its full support of the efforts of the Special Representative of the Secretary- General in carrying out his mandate for the implementation of resolution 242 (1967); (5) call upon the parties directly concerned to instruct their representatives to resume contact with the Special Representative in order to enable him to carry out, at the earliest possible date, his mandate for the implementation of the Security Council reso¬ lution in all its parts; (6) request the Secretary- General to report to the Security Council within a period of two months, and to the General Assembly as appropriate, on the efforts of the Special Representative and on the implementation of resolution 242 (1967); and (7) request the Security Council to consider, if necessary, taking steps, under the relevant articles of the Charter, to ensure the implementation of its resolution.

In the discussion that followed, the repre¬ sentative of the United States said that ever since the adoption of resolution 242 (1967) his Government had made every effort to help achieve its objectives. It was because of its concern that it had taken an initiative that had led to the developments reported by the Secretary-General on 7 August 1970. As a result of an intensive period of quiet diplomacy, an arrangement had been worked


out with the countries concerned whereby they had stated explicitly their willingness to carry out resolution 242 (1967) in all its parts and had committed themselves to pursuing the goal of reaching agreement on a just and lasting peace. Moreover, the observance of the cease-fire had replaced the daily shelling on both sides of the Canal, and the escalating danger of a great Power confrontation had also eased.

After pointing out that it had taken almost three years to get from the States directly concerned explicit agreement to carry out resolution 242 (1967) in all its parts, the representative of the United States said that the General Assembly should be careful not to adopt any resolution that might appear to add to, subtract from or distort the careful balance of resolution 242 (1967). That was the problem that the United States delegation had found with the nineteen-Power draft resolution, which, by overemphasizing only one part of resolution 242 (1967)—the part concerning the withdrawal of troops and the non-acquisition of territory by force—could very well run the risk of altering the carefully worked-out balance of the Council resolution. Therefore the United States Government, which valued the roles of both the Assembly and the Council in dealing with the problem of the Middle East, would urge the Assembly to avoid taking any unrealistic action and to assist in the efforts to bring about a resumption of the discussions between the parties and to ensure an extension of the cease-fire arrange¬ ments between them. The United States was ready to pledge all its support for the successful conclusion of those discussions, hoping that all those concerned with a peaceful settle¬ ment of the Middle East conflict would make similar necessary efforts. To that end, the United States delegation was submitting a draft resolution, whereby the General As¬ sembly would (1) endorse Security Council resolution 242 (1967) and urge that it be carried out in all its parts; (2) recommend to the parties and all concerned to exert their efforts, taking into account the obstacles and difficulties which had arisen since the cease¬ fire standstill agreement had gone into effect, to create, in accordance with that agreement,

the conditions necessary to establish the confidence in which the parties could resume discussions promptly, under the auspices of the Secretary-General’s Special Representative, in accordance with the proposal contained in the Secretary-General5s note of 7 August 1970; and (3) endorse the Security Council resolu¬ tions of 1967 on the cease-fire and recommend that the observance of the cease-fire, as con¬ tained in the note by the Secretary-General of 7 August, be extended for at least three months in order to facilitate the promotion of an agreement as set forth in resolution 242 (1967).

The representative of France stated that since the Charter had conferred on the Security Council the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, there was no question of the Assembly assuming the role of the Council or making an attempt to weaken a Council resolution. However, it would be appropriate for the Council to seek the Assembly’s views, and because of the exceptional circumstances the whole moral force of the Assembly would have to be expressed in its decision. The majority of the Assembly members also believed that a just and peaceful settlement of the Middle East [conflict] would have to be based on resolution 242 (1967). Moreover, the United Arab Republic, Jordan and Israel had publicly confirmed their acceptance of that resolution. The four permanent members of the Security Council had concentrated their efforts as well, each one making very constructive proposals. However, the objec¬ tive of those efforts had not been achieved and in the view of the French delegation this was due to a lack of determination to accept or to force acceptance of the Security Council’s recommendations. It was on that point that the moral pressure of the General Assembly might be exerted and, if necessary, there might be a new action by the Security Council in the light of the lessons that had been learnt from the difficulties involved in the efforts to implement resolution 242 (1967). The United States initiative, which deserved full support, had called for a resumption of the Jarring mission and for a renewal of the cease-fire with standstill arrangements. It had

UNITED NATIONS 577

been said that those arrangements had been violated, but, while deploring any failure to fulfil one’s commitments, the French delega¬ tion would point out that those arrangements had not had a broad enough basis. In the same way, the confidence that was supposed to have been shaken by the violation of those arrangements could be restored by a resump¬ tion of negotiations within the framework of the Council’s resolution. Therefore, at the present time three steps were necessary for a settlement—the resumption of talks, the extension of the cease-fire and the imple¬ mentation of all the provisions of resolution 242 (1967). It was in the light of those consid¬ erations that France would determine its position towards the draft resolutions before the Assembly.

The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics stated that Israel’s con¬ tinued aggression against the Arab countries had impeded the establishment of a just peace in the Middle East and compelled the United Nations to adopt further steps to make Israel accept a settlement on the basis of resolution 242 (1967). Israel’s continued defiance of the United Nations had been made possible by the support given to it by the imperialist and neo-colonialist forces, whose aim was to hold back the progress of the States in the Middle East. In pursuance of that policy the United States had taken such measures as the deployment of its Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean, the delivery of new Phantom aircraft and the extension of credit to Israel for the purchase of American technology and equipment. The United States had also given support to Israel’s expansionist policy by making the withdrawal of Israeli troops conditional upon the recti¬ fication of borders, which was in contradiction to the principles of resolution 242 (1967) and a violation of the Charter of the United Nations. Furthermore, when Israel had re¬ cently interrupted its contacts with Ambas¬ sador Jarring, using as its pretext the so- called violations of the arrangements report¬ edly made under the unilateral United States initiative, the United States had followed suit and had used Israel’s negative position, to stop its participation in the practical work of the

working group at the four-Power talks. That united action of Israel and the United States was aimed at blocking the progress of the Jarring mission. Similarly, the United States had submitted its draft resolution in order to assist Israel in its defiance and block the implementation of resolution 242 (1967). The United States draft resolution had asked for the establishment of confidence, but confidence could not be established without the withdrawal of Israel’s troops. Moreover, the difficulties and obstacles in the way of a settlement referred to in the United States draft were of Israel’s making and were sup¬ ported by United States insistence on military superiority for Israel in the area. Israel had been refusing to withdraw its troops, stating that it could do so only to recognized and safe borders. However, safe borders could not be achieved by a policy of expansion but only through international legal recognition and consolidation. They could be guaranteed by the setting up of demilitarized zones on both sides and by the presence of the United Nations at various points in those zones. Direct guar- rantees could also be given by the four permanent members of the Security Council or by the Council itself as a whole. All these elements of settlement could then be included in an agreement mutually binding on the parties and presented in the form of an inter¬ national act, with corresponding guarantees for the implementation of its provisions. It was, therefore, necessary that Ambassador Jarring’s mission be resumed, as had already been suggested by the Secretary-General, and endorsed by the Foreign Ministers of the four-Powers, who had urged that all steps be taken to ensure a peaceful settlement on the basis of resolution 242 (1967).

The representative of the United Kingdom said that, as the Secretary-General had pointed out in his statement of 23 October after his meeting with the four Foreign Ministers, resolution 242 (1967) provided the only basis for the settlement of the Middle East situation. However, a settlement could not be imposed on the parties— it would have to be contained in an agreement binding, according to international law, on all the parties and endorsed by the Security Council.


The two most important elements in the package agreement would be commitments to peace, on the one hand, and the withdrawal of troops and the determination of boundaries, on the other. First, the Arab States and Israel must agree to establish a genuine state of peace between them and must respect and recognize each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Secondly, on the question of withdrawal of troops and the determination of boundaries, the Assembly must be guided by the principle of the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war. Therefore Israeli forces must withdraw, with the pos¬ sibility of minor rectifications, from territories occupied in 1967. Concerning Jerusalem, any settlement of the status of that city must incorporate as an essential part an agreement providing for freedom of access to all the Holy Places. The agreement should be endorsed by the Security Council and, as a guarantee thereof, a United Nations presence in the area could be established. Other prere¬ quisites should be the establishment of demili¬ tarized zones under the supervision of the UnitedNations, freedom of navigation through the Suez Canal, the Gulf of Aqaba and the Strait of Tiran. Furthermore, any settlement must take into account the Palestinians, whose support should be enlisted by the Arab Governments concerned, and must provide for a just solution of the refugee problem in accordance with United Nations resolutions. The United Kingdom, while understanding the reasons for which the Middle East situation was brought before the General Assembly, could not, however, support any resolution which might in any way alter the carefully worked-out balance of Security Council reso¬ lution 242 (1967).

The representatives of the Arab States, in supporting the request of the United Arab Republic for consideration by the General Assembly of the situation in the Middle East, stated that some action by the Assembly was necessary in support of resolution 242 (1967), particularly on the question of Israel’s withdrawal of troops from occupied territories. They also gave their support to the Pales¬ tinians in their fight for the right of self- determination, adding that the Palestinian

people had the same rights as others under the Charter of the United Nations.

The representative of Algeria, in particular, said that only the Palestinians, through their legitimate representatives, could decide about the future of their country and that there could be a positive discussion of the Middle East situation only when the General As¬ sembly recognized the legitimate and inalien¬ able rights of the Palestinian people to liberate their homeland and to maintain its territorial integrity. The representative of Saudi Arabia declared that, since the Palestinians formed the core of the problem, the Assembly should not ignore them if it wanted to find a just solution of the Middle East problem.

Several Arab representatives also deplored the United States military support of Israel which, they considered, had helped Israel in its aggression and in its defiance of the United Nations. The representative of Moroc¬ co, after referring to the reported delivery of 200 tanks and two squadrons of Phantoms to Israel by the United States, stated that those new weapons in the hands of Israel posed a great threat to the chances for peace in the Middle East. The Arab representatives also warned against making the Middle East a special arena for the playing of Power politics and against attempting to solve the problems of that area outside the United Nations.

Several representatives from African and Asian countries and from socialist States emphasized the need for a resumption of the Jarring mission and felt that Israel’s demand for a rectification of the so-called violations of the standstill arrangements was only a pretext for sabotaging the mission.

A majority of the representatives participat¬ ing in the debate thought that Security Council resolution 242 (1967) provided adequate grounds for the resumption of the talks and eventually reaching a settlement, and they added that it was incumbent upon the United Nations to take effective action to translate the provisions and principles of that resolution into reality. In that respect the representative of Brazil recalled the suggestion made by his Government in April 1970, in a memorandum to the

UNITED NATIONS 579

Secretary-General and the Security Council, concerning the desirability of the establish¬ ment by the Council of subsidiary organs, with the participation of the interested parties, to deal with the essential aspects of disputes. He added that there was no reason why the Council should not, in the case of the Middle East, give serious consideration to such a possibility. He added that it would be within the Council’s powers to associate the Special Representative of the Secretary- General with the work of a subsidiary organ that it might decide to establish. He felt that the General Assembly might consider making a recommendation to that effect.

On 3 November, the representative of Nigeria, on behalf of the sponsors, introduced a revised text of the nineteen-Power draft resolution of which the People’s Republic of the Congo and Sierra Leone had also become sponsors. The revised text contained a new operative paragraph 2 by which the General Assembly would reaffirm that the establishment of peace required respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political indepen¬ dence of every State in the area; the original paragraph 2 was revised and under it the Assembly would recognize that respect for the rights of the Palestinians was an indis¬ pensable element in the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East; the original paragraph 4 was deleted and a new paragraph 6 was added by which the General Assembly would appeal to the parties to cease fire for a period of three months in order to facilitate the task of the Special Representative.

On the same day the representative of Argentina submitted a draft resolution co¬ sponsored by Argentina, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay and Venezuela. Under the operative paragraphs, the General As¬ sembly would (1) express its full support of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) and affirm the need for the speedy implement¬ ation of all its provisions, in the spirit of

justice and equity with which it was imbued; (2) also express its full support of the efforts of the Special Representative of the Secretary- General to the Middle East to carry out his mission to promote agreement for the imple¬ mentation of resolution 242 (1967); (3) request the parties directly concerned to instruct their representatives to resume dis¬ cussions with the Special Representative in order to enable him to carry out as soon as possible his mission to promote agreement for the implementation of resolution 242 (1967) in its entirety; (4) support the Security Council resolutions of 1967 concerning the cease-fire and recommend, in order to facilitate promotion of the agreement envisag¬ ed in resolution 242 (1967), that the cease¬ fire mentioned in the Secretary-General’s note of 7 August 1970 should be scrupulously observed and should be extended for three months, with the addition of suitable measures for the proper supervision of its observance, including, if possible, the use of United Nations observers now stationed in the region; (5) request the Secretary-General to report to the Council within a period of two months and to the Assembly as appropriate, on the efforts of the Special Representative and on the implementation of resolution 242 (1967).

In submitting the above draft resolution, the representative of Argentina, on behalf of the sponsors, stated that neither the United States draft nor the first twenty-one-Power draft before the General Assembly had the requisite impartiality needed to meet the present situation and also the approval of the Assembly. The sponsors had drawn the in¬ spiration for their draft from the traditional position of the Latin American group, which had always tried to approach the situa¬ tion in the Middle East constructively and in a balanced way; they had been guided by the wish to maintain the balance of resolu¬ tion 242 (1967) and to assist the Jarring mission to achieve its objective by securing a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.

On the same day the representative of France submitted amendments to the first twenty-one-Power draft resolution. Under the French amendments: (1) the third pream-


bular paragraph would be deleted; (2) in the fifth preambular paragraph, the words “by the armed forces of Israel” would be deleted; (3) operative paragraph 2 would be replaced by a new paragraph in which the General Assembly would reaffirm that the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East should include the application of both the following principles, (a) withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict; (b) termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledge¬ ment of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force; (4) the fourth French amendment had already been in¬ corporated in the revised text of the twenty- one-Power draft resolution; (5) a new opera¬ tive paragraph 6 should be added by which the Assembly would recommend to the parties that they extend the cease-fire for a period of three months in order that they might enter into talks under the auspices of the Special Representative with a view to giving effect to Security Council resolution 242 (1967); and (6) in operative paragraph 8 the words “taking steps” would be replaced by the words “making arrangements”.

On 4 November, Ghana joined as a co¬ sponsor of the twenty-one-Power draft resolu¬ tion. On the same day the representatives of Senegal and Nigeria stated that the sponsors of the twenty-two-Power draft resolution had accepted the amendments submitted by France and that those amendments had then become part of the draft resolution. Under the amended text, the General As¬ sembly would (1) reaffirm that the acquisi¬ tion of territories by force is inadmissible and that, consequently, territories thus occupied must be restored; (2) reaffirm that the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East should include the applica¬ tion of both the following principles: (a) withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict; (b) termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknow¬

ledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized bound¬ aries free from threats or acts of force; (3) recognize that respect for the rights of the Palestinians was an indispensable element in the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East; (4) urge the speedy implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967), which provided for the peaceful settlement of the situation in the Middle East in all its parts; (5) call upon the parties directly concerned to instruct their representatives to resume contact with the Special Representative of the Secretary- General in order to enable him to carry out, at the earliest possible date, his mandate for the implementation of the Security Council resolution in all its parts; (6) recommend to the parties that they extend the cease-fire for a period of three months in order that they might enter into talks under the auspices of the Secretary-General5s Special Represen¬ tative with a view to giving effect to resolution 242 (1967); (7) request the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council within a period of two months and to the General Assembly as appropriate on the efforts of the Special Representative and on the imple¬ mentation of resolution 242 (1967); and (8) request the Security Council to consider, if necessary, making arrangements, under the relevant articles of the Charter, to ensure the implementation of its resolution.

On 4 November, the General Assembly proceeded to vote on the three draft resolutions before it. The representative of the United States announced that his delegation did not wish to press its draft resolution to a vote. The twenty-two-Power draft resolu¬ tion was adopted by a roll-call vote of 57 to 16, with 39 abstentions, as resolution 2628 (XXV). The Latin American draft resolution was rejected by a roll-call vote of 49 to 45, with 27 abstentions.

UNITED NATIONS 581

407 United Nations Security Council Report on the Situation in the Middle East, 16 June 1970 15 June 19711

November, 1971

CHAPTER TWO: THE SITUATION IN

THE MIDDLE EAST

A. Communications, reports of the Chief of Staff and discussion by the Council concerning the status of the cease-fire

1. Complaints by Jordan and Israel

Communications to the Council from 16 June 1970 to 15 June 1971

3. In a letter dated 30 June 1970 (S/9852), Jordan charged that Israel jet aircraft had attacked and strafed a bus carrying civilians on a main road in the northern part of the Jordan Valley. As a result of that attack, two persons had been killed and thirteen wounded. Jordan further charged on 13 July (S/9864) that Israel jets had attacked an Arab village of Kufr Awa and the suburbs of Irbid with rockets and heavy machine-guns, killing 7 persons and wounding 27.

4. In a letter dated 16 July (S/9869), Jordan stated that thirteen farmers had been wounded during a raid by Israel jet aircraft on the market place of a village in the northern part of Jordan.

5. In a letter dated 20 July (S/9879), Israel stated that, following an agreement signed on 7 July between Jordan and the terror organizations, attacks launched from Jordanian territory against Israel villages in the Jordan and Beit Shean Valleys had increased, totalling 114 during the period from 7 to 20 July, and that Israel had been compelled to act in self-defence against the bases of those attacks. Israel added that Jordan’s complaints to the Security Council (S/9864 and S/9869) were designed to serve

1 Text of Chapter Two, “The Situation in the Middle

East.” of the 1970-71 annual Report of the Security

Council; U.N. doc. A/8402, paras. 3-128. (The re¬

mainder of calendar year 1971 is covered in the report

for 1971-1972, relevant portions of which are to be

included in International Documents on Palestine 1972.)

as a smoke-screen to conceal Jordan’s res¬ ponsibility for the continued bloodshed and suffering on both sides.

6. In a letter dated 29 July (S/9894), Jordan charged that mines laid on 28 July by an Israeli patrol, which had crossed the border in the area of a village in the northern part of the Jordan Valley, had exploded the following day under two civilian cars and had caused injuries to twelve civilians.

7. In a letter dated 18 August (S/9912) Jordan submitted to the Security Council a list of further Israeli violations of the Armistice Agreement and stated that more than 100 attacks had been carried out be¬ tween 11 April and 28 July by shelling, bombing, strafing, infiltration and mining. Those attacks, which had resulted in the killing of 28 Jordanians and the wounding of 111, reflected a deliberate policy on the part of Israel to undermine and sabotage recent international political efforts.

8. In a reply dated 24 August (S/9916), Israel stated that, since 20 July, 225 additional acts of aggression against it had been carried out from Jordanian territory and that 105 of those attacks had taken place since 7 August, when a new international effort had been initiated to maintain the cease-fire to which Jordan was a party. After reserving its right to act in self-defence, Israel stated that the observance of cease-fire was binding on all who were a party to it.

9. In a letter dated 28 August (S/9921), Jordan charged that Israel jet aircraft had carried out raids against areas in the Jordan Valley, resulting in civilian casualties, in a further effort to undermine international political efforts.

2. Reports of the Secretary-General con¬

cerning the Israel-United Arab Republic

sector

10. From 16 June to 8 August 1970, the day when the standstill cease-fire agree¬ ment entered into effect in the Suez Canal sector, the Secretary-General issued sup¬ plemental information received on an al¬ most daily basis from the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), containing reports


on the observation of the cease-fire in the Suez Canal sector. Those reports (S/7930/ Add. 778, 780, 782, 784, 786, 788, 790, 792, 794, 798, 800, 801, 803, 805, 807, 809, 811, 815, 817, 819, 821, 823, 825, 829, 831, 833, 835, 837, 839, 840, 842, 844, 846, 848, 850, 852, 854, 856, 858, 860, 862, 864, 866, 868, 870, 872, 875, 877, 879, 881, 883, 885 and 887) related to firing incidents in which artillery, mortar, machine-guns and rifles had been used by both sides. They also

indicated that aerial activity in the Suez Canal sector had been intensified. In most cases, the reports identified the aircraft as Israel forces Phantom and Skyhawk jet aircraft, which had carried out attacks with bombs, napalm and cannon fire against targets on the West Bank. During those attacks there had been anti-aircraft fire from the United Arab Republic forces. The reports also stated that there had been shots at or near United Nations observation posts on either side of the Canal, although no military personnel of either side had been at the vicinity of the post at the time of the incidents. As a result, damage had been inflicted on some of the United Nations observation posts, equipment and installations.

11. In supplemental information dated 16 July (S/7930/Add. 839), the Secretary- General, after having received a report from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, stated that he had to announce with deep shock and regret the tragic death of Lt.-Colonel J.E. Bogvad of Sweden, a United Nations military observer in charge of the Kantara Control Centre, who had been killed that day when a reconnaissance party led by him had come under small-arms fire from the United Arab Republic forces’ positions in the area of Observation Post Blue. At the same time, Major R.S. Fox of New Zealand, an Opera¬ tions Officer in UNTSO Headquarters, had received wounds in his left arm. In sup¬ plemental information dated 4 August (S/ 7930/Add. 874), the Secretary-General issued a further report, incorporating the report of the Board of Inquiry that had been set up to examine the circumstances surrounding the death of Lt.-Colonel Bogvad.

12. In its report, the Board of Inquiry

stated that at 1130 GMT on 16 July, Lt. Colonel J.E. Bogvad of the Swedish Army, Officer-in-charge of the Kantara Control Centre on the East Bank of the Suez Canal, had led a reconnaissance party consisting of three UNTSO officers and three Israeli liaison officers to select a new site for the possible reopening of Observation Post Blue on the East Bank. The Senior United Arab Republic Liaison Officer had been notified on 11 July of the reconnaissance mission, and his concurrence had been received on 15 July. On its way back from the former location of the Observation Post Blue, the reconnaissance party had stopped to discuss the possible new site for that post when, at 1145 GMT, a single shot had been fired from the West Bank, followed shortly by machine-gun fire, which had been directed at the party and had lasted until 1153 GMT. Major Fox had been wounded in his left arm and Lt. Colonel Bogvad had died in the course of duty as the result of being hit in the throat by a bullet. From the evidence before it and from its own independent inquiries, the Board concluded that the bullet had come from a machine-gun position on the West Bank in an area manned by United Arab Republic forces that had directed fire at the reconnaissance party.

13. In a note dated 7 August (S/9902), the Secretary-General informed the Security Council that the Governments of Israel, Jordan and the United Arab Republic had informed his Special Representative, Ambas¬ sador Jarring, that they had agreed to observe strictly the cease-fire resolutions of the Security Council effective 7 August until at least 5 November.

14. During the period from 8 August 1970 to 10 March 1971, the reports issued by the Secretary-General on the situation in the Suez Canal sector related mainly to the relocation or reopening of United Nations military observation posts that had been closed temporarily in that sector. In sup¬ plemental information dated 25 August 1970 (S/7930/Add. 907), the Chief of Staff of UNTSO announced the reopening of Obser¬ vation Post Blue, which had been closed on 7 June 1970. In supplemental information

UNITED NATIONS 583

dated 1 and 23 September (Add.915 and 938), he announced the reopening of Observa¬ tion Posts Charlie and Mike, which had been closed respectively on 7 August and 25 September 1969. In supplemental in¬ formation issued respectively on 11 January and 2 February 1971 (S/7930/Add.l043 and 1066), he announced the relocation of Obser¬

vation Post Hotel and the Ismailia Control Centre, and in supplemental information dated 22 February (S/7930/Add.l085), he announced the reopening of Observation Post Pink, which had been closed temporarily on 6 February 1970.

15. During the same period, only one complaint from Israel (S/7930/Add.893) of a cease-fire violation in the Suez Canal sector was reported.

16. In supplemental information dated 10 March 1971 (S/7930/Add. 1104), the Secretary-General stated that the situation in the Suez Canal sector had been quiet since 8 August 1970, although during that period there had been a number of overflights by one party or the other. He felt that in the circumstances, it was advisable to resume the practice of reporting to the Security Council concerning the Suez Canal sector which had prevailed before 8 August 1970. It was the Secretary-General’s hope that his reports might be helpful during a period when the maintenance of quiet was crucial to efforts that were being made then to find a peaceful settlement in the whole area. He then reported that although there had been no ground activity in the Suez Canal sector, Israel aircraft and one uniden¬ tified aircraft had crossed the Canal from east to west and that the Israeli overflights had been confirmed by several United Nations observation posts.

17. In supplemental information from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO issued between 19 March and 15 June (S/7930/Add.l 111, 1115, 1117, 1120, 1128, 1130, 1134, 1138, 1144, 1153, 1154, 1162, 1164, 1166, 1168, 1174, 1179, 1182, 1186, 1188, 1209, 1211 and 1220), little or no ground activity was noted, but, from time to time, there were reports of some aerial activity over the Suez Canal sector involving the crossing

from east to west by Israel jet aircraft and their recrossing minutes later from west to east; similarly, there were reports of overflights by United Arab Republic jet aircraft over Israel’s positions on the East Bank. Some of those aerial incidents were reported by United Nations military observers, and oc¬ casionally they were the subject of complaints by one party against the other.

3. Complaints by Israel and Lebanon

(a) Communications to the Council and request for a meeting

18. By a letter dated 4 September 1970 (S/9924), the representative of Lebanon trans¬ mitted to the President of the Security Council the text of a letter from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Lebanon. After charging that Israeli armed forces had committed fifty-eight acts of aggression against Lebanon during the preceding two weeks, the Foreign Minister stated that Israel’s aggressive actions were increasingly assuming the dimensions of actual military hostilities and were no doubt a prelude to the resumption of hosti¬ lities on the other fronts. They were directed not only against Lebanon and the other Arab countries but against those of the great Powers that were trying to preserve world peace against a possible extension of the Israeli-Arab conflict. The tragic experience that Lebanon had been undergo¬ ing on its frontiers was a test of the effectiveness of the Security Council’s efforts to ensure that right should prevail. Although Israel claimed that it respected Lebanon’s frontiers, it was, in fact, constantly violating those frontiers, and those violations were calculated to imperil the social, political and economic stability of Lebanon.

19. In a letter dated 5 September (S/9925), the representative of Lebanon stated that at 1300 hours, local time, that day, two infantry companies of Israel armed forces, under heavy air support, had penetrated Lebanese territory to a distance of 7 kilo¬ metres, bombing civilian installations and opening roads for Israel military use. In view of that grave situation, endangering the peace and security of Lebanon, he request-


ed the convening of an urgent meeting of the Security Council.

(b) Consideration at the 1551st meeting (5th September 1970)

20. At its 1551st meeting on 5 September 1970, the Council included the complaint by Lebanon in its agenda. The representatives of Lebanon and Israel were invited, at their request, to participate in the discussion with¬ out the right to vote.

21. At the beginning of the meeting, the Secretary-General informed the Council that he had received two cabled messages from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO concerning the matter on the Council’s agenda. The first message reported that on 5 September the Chairman of the Israel-Lebanon Mixed Armistice Commission had received from the Lebanese authorities a message to the effect that on 4 September Israel aircraft had attacked the Lebanese region of El- Arkoub, which it had subjected to heavy artillery bombardment, causing material damage. When the bombardment had ceased, an Israel mixed infantry and armoured force had penetrated the region, destroying the road network in the area and blowing up several houses. Up to 0930 GMT, the Israel forces had not withdrawn from the territory. Lebanon had requested the Chief of Staff of UNTSO to have its charges confirmed by United Nations military observers and called for the immediate with¬ drawal of the Israel unit from Lebanese territory. The Chief of Staff had instructed the Chairman of the Israel-Lebanon Mixed Armistice Commission to provide two United Nations military observers for on-the-spot enquiries. However, up to 1500 GMT on 5 September, the Assistant Israel Defence

Force Liaison Officer had not had any in¬ formation on the alleged incident. In the second message, the Chief of Staff of UNTSO reported that the Assistant Israel Defence Force Liaison Officer had informed him, at 1705 GMT on 5 September, that all Israel forces had withdrawn from Lebanese territory. The Secretary-General recalled that, during the meeting of the Council on 12 May 1970 on a similar question, he had stated that he

had long sought to increase substantially the number of United Nations observers on both sides in that area but without success. That, he added, accounted for the fact, among other things, that he could not provide the Council with detailed information of actions such as those that were then in progress in the area.

22. The representative of Lebanon stated that a few hours after he had transmitted to the President of the Security Council the letter from Lebanon’s Minister of Foreign Af¬ fairs, Israel ground and air forces had launch¬ ed an attack on Lebanese territory and had reached the village of Kfarchouba, 4 kilo¬ metres within Lebanon’s borders. The Israeli forces were continuing their aggression and had penetrated another 7 kilometres within the borders, bombing civilian centres and populations. In face of that aggression, the Lebanese army had entered into action against the Israel forces and, according to a message he had just received, they were still engaging them on Lebanese territory. Israel’s unwar¬ ranted attack on Lebanon had resulted in two civilians being killed and others wounded, in addition to causing considerable material damage to civilian installations. The situa¬ tion created by Israel’s aggression constituted a test of the Security Council’s ability to ensure the security and independence of small nations. In the past, when aggression had been committed against it, Lebanon had sought guarantees as promised by the Charter. It therefore asked the Security Council to discharge its responsibility by calling for immediate and complete withdrawal of all Israel forces from Lebanon and by strongly condemning Israel’s acts of aggression against Lebanon in violation of the Charter and the pertinent resolutions of the Council. Since by paragraph 3 of resolution 280 (1970) the Council had warned Israel that it would consider taking effective measures in case of a repetition of armed attack, Lebanon de¬ manded further the application against Israel of Chapter VII of the Charter.

23. The representative of Israel stated that Lebanon had merely attempted to dramatize a minor patrolling incident that was justified by the free hand given to the terrorists by the Government of Lebanon. The adoption by

UNITED NATIONS 585

the Security Council of resolution 280 (1970), which was inequitable and one-sided, had given encouragement to the terrorist organi¬ zations. Since then, more than 200 acts of aggression had been committed from Lebanese territory against Israel, resulting in the killing of fifteen Israeli civilians and five military personnel, and the wounding of thirty-eight civilians and fifty-five military personnel. The terrorist activity in the area corresponded to the proclaimed design of terrorist leaders to sabotage the diplomatic efforts then being made to reach a peaceful solution of the Middle East crisis. Members of the Security Council were aware of the Cairo agreement between Lebanon and the Palestinian com¬ mandos that had provided the terrorists in Lebanon with a base for their activities against Israel. That agreement had declared that the armed struggle of the Palestinians was in Lebanon’s interest and, accordingly, Lebanon had undertaken to co-operate in the installation of supplies and rest and aid posts for the commandos. In view of the continuous attacks from Lebanese territory and the admitted helplessness of Lebanese authorities, Israel had been compelled to exercise its right of self-defence. It had sent a small unit of its forces to carry out a search- and-comb mission in the foothills of Mount Hermon. Those units had been evacuated from Lebanon’s territory after having com¬ pleted their mission. In that minor action, the Lebanese army had not been directly involved. It was incumbent upon Lebanon to prevent the use of its territory by irregular and regular forces for aggression against another Member State of the United Nations.

24. The representative of Spain stated that from the statements of the Secretary-General and the representatives of Lebanon and Israel it was evident that an invasion of Lebanon had taken place and that Israel had not denied it. After recalling that when, in a similar situation last May, his delegation had submitted a draft resolution calling on Israel to withdraw its armed forces from Lebanon, assurances had been given that the withdrawal had been completed when the Council took up the question. However, the facts later proved that the withdrawal had not been

completed. Bearing in mind that an invasion had occurred in violation of the Charter and even though a withdrawal might have been initiated, the Council could not remain inactive because of its past experience. There¬ fore his delegation was proposing a draft resolution which it would ask to have put to a vote immediately. The draft resolution submitted by Spain (S/9928) read as follows:

“The Security Council, “Demands the complete and immediate

withdrawal of all Israeli armed forces from Lebanese territory.” 25. The representative of France supported

the Spanish proposal. 26. The representative of Israel stated that,

inasmuch as he had already informed the Council that Israeli forces had evacuated Lebanese territory, the draft resolution pro¬ posed by Spain was divorced from reality. It would be unfortunate if the Council should vote and adopt a draft resolution that was marked not only by an absence of equity but by a refusal to take cognizance of the plain facts of the situation.

27. The representative of Spain reiterated that the penetration by the armed forces of a State into the territory of another State was a violation of Article 2, paragraph 4, of the United Nations Charter. Therefore, the Council should proceed to a vote and call for the immediate and complete withdrawal of the Israeli forces from Lebanon.

28. The representative of the United States considered that the Spanish draft resolution was being presented in haste and before there had been an opportunity to ascertain through

UNTSO what the precise situation was along the border. In view of the conflicting evi¬ dence, his delegation would abstain on the Spanish draft resolution, making it clear, nevertheless, that his delegation’s abstention in no way detracted from his Government’s continued and full support for the mainte¬ nance of the territorial integrity of Lebanon.

Decision: At the 1551st meeting, on 5 Sep¬ tember 1970 the draft resolution submitted by Spain (S/9928) was adopted by 14 votes to none, with one abstention (United States), as Security Council resolution 285 (1970).

29. After a vote, the representative of the


United Kingdom stated that despite the conflict of evidence, it was appropriate to adopt the draft resolution, inasmuch as the armed incursion into Lebanon had not been denied. If the Israeli forces had withdrawn, all would welcome it; if they had not, then there was every reason for the Council to demand their immediate withdrawal. Never¬ theless, his delegation deplored all actions that were likely to impede the progress of Ambassador Jarring’s mission and negotia¬ tions for an eventual settlement, including breaches of the cease-fire by the fedayeen.

30. The representative of Lebanon thanked the members of the Council for their support and expressed regret that one delegation had been unable to support the principle of with¬ drawal of foreign armed forces from the ter¬ ritory of independent and sovereign States, particularly when that delegation professed to be working for peace in the Midlle East.

31. The representative of the United States, exercising his right of reply, stated that the abstention of his delegation was not related to the principle of withdrawal. The facts about the withdrawal were unfortunately in dispute. If the Israeli forces had withdrawn, that would be welcome. If not, then it was the view of his delegation that they should withdraw immediately.

32. In a report dated 7 September (S/9929), the Secretary-General informed the Council that he had received a cable from the Chief of Staff ofUNTSO stating that the Lebanese authorities had informed UNTSO officially that Israeli forces had withdrawn from Leba¬ nese territory as of0700 GMT on 6 September 1970 and that, in the absence of United Nations observers in the area, there could be no direct observation by them of the circumstances of that withdrawal.

(c) Subsequent communications to the Council 33. In a letter dated 28 December (S/10063)

addressed to the President of the Security Council, Lebanon stated that, early that morning, a company of Israeli forces, carried by two helicopters, had attacked a village in southern Lebanon, killing two civilians and wounding two others, besides destroying sever¬ al houses. The letter added that, since its

attack two years earlier on the International Airport at Beirut, Israel had repeatedly attacked Lebanese territory with the aim of disrupting the peaceful life of the population and deliberately extending the area of conflict.

34. In a letter dated 30 December (S/ 10067), Israel stated that although Lebanon, under the cease-fire agreement, was com¬ mitted to prevent the use of its territory for attacks against Israel, it was a matter of common knowledge that Lebanese territory, particularly villages in southern Lebanon, were being used as bases for terrorist aggression against Israel. On several occasions through¬ out 1970, Israel had drawn the attention of the Council to such acts. In recent weeks there had been serious increase, and since 26 November 18 attacks by Lebanese-based saboteurs had taken place. It was against one of those bases that Israeli defensive action had been taken on the night of 27 December. As had been indicated previously to the Security Council and to Lebanon, Israel’s policy regarding Lebanon continued to be based on scrupulous maintenance by both sides of the cease-fire, but Lebanon was continuing to facilitate terrorist activities against Israel.

35. In a letter dated 15 January 1971 (S/10078), Lebanon stated that helicopter- borne Israeli armed units had attacked a village located about 43 kilometres north of the Lebanon’s southern borders and, after having been engaged by Lebanon armed forces, had withdrawn at three o’clock that morning. The Israeli authorities had attempt- ted to justify their action by alleging that on 2 January six fedayeen coming by boat from that village had landed just south of Lebanon borders and that five had been captured. However, investigation by Lebanese author- ties had established that Israel had engineered the whole plan. Thus, Israel had first initiated an incident and then used it as a pretext for military action against Lebanon.

36. In a letter dated 19 January (S/10081), Israel stated that since 30 December there had been a further intensification of sabotage raids and of shelling attacks on Israeli villages carried out from bases inside Lebanon. In all their activities, the terrorists had full support

UNITED NATIONS 587

and encouragement from the Lebanese Gov¬ ernment. As for the complaint made by Lebanon in its letter of 15 January, Israel stated that, on 2 January, five raiders coming from the Lebanese harbour of Sarafand, which served as a base of operation against Israel, had attempted to land in northern Israel but had been captured. During the night of 14/15 January, an Israeli unit had acted to disable that terrorist base and, in the ensuing encounter, had killed ten saboteurs and wounded many others. Six Israeli soldiers had been injured. Thus, Israel’s action had not been against a civilian village, as alleged by Lebanon.

37. In a letter dated 5 February (S/10101), Lebanon stated that on 1 February Israeli patrols had crossed the Lebanese border and attacked villages in southern Lebanon, blown up some houses and abducted some civilians in another premeditated encroachment upon the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Lebanon.

38. In a letter dated 8 April 1971 (S/10172 and Corr.l), Lebanon charged that on 5 April an Israeli patrol, in violation of the Armistice Agreement and in defiance of relevant United Nations resolutions, had crossed the borders at three points and had blown up several houses in three different villages.

39. By a letter dated 12 April (S/10075), Israel drew the attention of the Security Council to the intensification of attacks committed against it from Lebanese territory and stated that, between 11 March and 10 April, 19 such attacks had been carried out by terror organizations from bases in Lebanon against Israeli villages, compelling Israel to to take self-defence measures to protect the lives and property of its citizens.

4. Complaints by Israel and Syria

Communications to the Council and reports of the Secretary-General on the observance of cease-fire from 16 June 1970 to 15 June 1971

40. In supplemental information issued during the latter part of June 1970 containing reports on the situation in the Israel-Syria sector (S/7930/Add. 779, 781, 783, 785, 787, 789, 781, 793, 795 and 796 and Corr.l),

the Secretary-General indicated that firing incidents involving the use of machine-guns, mortars and small arms had taken place in that sector.

41. In supplemental information on the Israel-Syria sector dated 25 June (S/7930/ Add. 797), the Chief of Staff of UNTSO reported intensification of fire exchanges involving the use of heavy and light weapons along the cease-fire line. On the following day, he reported (S/7930/Add. 799) that the Officer-in-charge of the Tiberias Control Centre had informed him that Israeli tanks, supported by armoured personnel carriers, had crossed the cease-fire line and had been seen up to 5 kilometres inside Syrian territory. At the same time, a heavy exchange of fire had been observed accompanied by raids carried out by Israeli aircraft along the cease-fire line. The report added that Israeli forces had occupied Observation Post Sierra that day at 1230 GMT and had asked the United Nations military observers to cease radio transmissions. Protests had been filed with Israeli authorities. Later that day, Israeli forces had withdrawn from the area of the post. A further report (S/7930/Add.802) indicated that, as a result of the intense firing exchange, the installations and equip¬ ment at several United Nations observation posts had been damaged. The Chief of Staff stated in the same report that there had been further intensification of aerial activity in the Israel-Syria sector, involving the flight of Israeli jet aircraft over Syrian lines attacking Syrian positions and troops. During those attacks, the observers reported that anti¬ aircraft fire from the Syrian forces had been heard. The report added that Israeli authori¬ ties had informed the Chief of Staff that during those incidents ten Israeli soldiers had been killed and 32 wounded, in addition to one aircraft lost. Cease-fire arrangements pro¬ posed by the United Nations military observ- vers, although accepted by the parties on several occasions, had not been effective.

42. In further supplemental information issued by the Secretary-General from the end of June until the end of December 1970 (S/7930/Add. 804, 806, 808, 810, 812, 814, 816, 818, 820, 822, 824, 826, 828, 830, 832,


834, 836, 838, 841, 843, 845, 847, 849, 851, 853, 855, 857, 859, 861, 863, 865, 867, 869, 871,873,876,878,880,882,884,886,888-892, 894-906, 908-914, 916-937, 939-1030), the Chief of Staff of UNTSO indicated that sporadic firing incidents in the Israel-Syria sector had continued to take place almost daily, and that, in almost all cases, the firing had been initiated by Israeli forces. During the same period, there had been light aerial activity and, on some occasions, installations and equipment of United Nations military observation posts had received slight damage as a result of the firing.

43. In supplemental information dated 7 January 1971 (S/7930/Add.l038), the Secre¬ tary-General circulated a report received from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO regarding an incident that had taken place at United Nations Observation Post Four in the Israel- Syria sector. At 2305 GMT on 2 January, United Nations military observers had been held up in their living caravan by three persons carrying sub-machine-guns of an unidentified type. Before leaving 20 minutes later, the three intruders had taken a number of items from the caravan and had ripped the radio communication set. Subsequently, the Chairman of the Israel-Syria Mixed Armistice Commission had reported the incident to the Syrian delegate, who had promised to inform the Syrian authorities. All inquiry conducted by UNTSO on 3 January, the report con¬ tinued, had failed to establish the identity of the intruders and the UNTSO findings had been communicated to the authorities of Syria and Israel with the request that they provide the results of their inquiries. On 5 January, Israel had reported that, a search conducted on 3 January at the site of the post, had revealed tracks of three persons wearing regular Syrian boots leading towards Syrian territory. The Israeli investigators had found some of the items that had been taken from the United Nations caravan. On the following day, the Syrian authorities had informed the Mixed Armistice Commission that, as a consequence of their investigations, they could assure the Commission unreserv¬ edly that the intruders had not been members of the Syrian regular army. The Chief of

Staff reported that, despite inquiries con¬ ducted into the incident, it appeared that the identity of the intruders could not be established. In forwarding the report to the Security Council, the Secretary-General ex¬ pressed his concern about that type of incident and warned against the serious implications it could entail for the cease-fire observation operations in the sector. The United Nations observers, he added, did not carry arms and depended for their safety on their special status and on the protection provided by the parties to the cease-fire. The Secretary-General concluded by appealing to all concerned to take all possible measures to prevent a recurrence of such incidents.

44. By a letter dated 18 January (S/10080), Syria denied a charge, broadcast by Radio Israel, to the effect that, on the night of 2/3 January, three regular Syrian soldiers had entered United Nations Observation Post Four and stolen some items from the room. In a letter dated 23 January (S/10088), Israel stated that an investigation carried out by Israeli authorities following the raid on the observation post had revealed that tracks of three persons wearing regular Syrian boots had led investigators towards Syrian territory. Those findings had been published in document S/7930/Add./1038. As the Syrian lines were well guarded by a network of military positions, Israel’s letter stated, no armed elements could operate from within the Syrian military zone without the knowledge of the Syrian authorities. Syria’s responsibility for all violations of United Nations observation posts by elements operating from within its lines were clearly evident. By a letter dated 26 January (S/10090), Syria stated that the “investigation” carried out by Israel and its allegation that Syria had been responsible for violations of United Nations observation posts were one-sided and constituted an attempt to distort facts. Furthermore, the supplemental information report of 7 January referred to by Israel had denied the Israeli allegation and had, in fact, concluded that the identity of the armed intruders could not be established.

45. During the period from 1 January to 15 June 1971, the Chief of Staff continued to

UNITED NATIONS 589

issue reports containing supplemental infor¬ mation (S/7930/Add. 1031 1037, 1039 1042, 1044-1065, 1067-1084, 1086-1103, 1105— 1110, 1112-1114, 1116, 1118, 1119, 1121- 1127, 1129, 1131-1133, 1135 1137, 1139— 1143, 1145 1152, 1155-1161, 1163, 1165, 1167, 1169-1173, 1175-1178, 1180, 1181, 1183-1185, 1187, 1189-1208, 1210, 1212- 1219, 1221, 1222). Those reports indicated that light and sporadic firing incidents had taken place in the Israel-Syria sector and that, in almost all cases, the firing had been initiated by Israel. The reports also indicated that aerial activity in the sector had been very light and that no damage had been inflicted upon the United Nations observation posts or their installations and equipment.

B. Question concerning the treatment

of civilian populations in Israeli-oc¬

cupied territories and related matters

Communications to the Council from 16 June 1970 to 15 June 1971

46. During the period covered by this report, the Security Council and the Secre¬ tary-General received a number of com¬ munications from Arab countries protesting Israel’s policies regarding the treatment of the civilian population in the territories it occupied, alleging the arrest, detention, dis¬ possession and expulsion of civilians and the confiscation or expropriation of Arab lands. Israel rejected some of these charges and made other charges.

47. In a letter dated 18 June 1970 (S/9841), addressed to the Secretary-General, Israel referred to its letters of 9 June (S/9832 and S/9833) concerning the composition of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Prac¬ tices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories and reiterated its stand that the Committee was irregular and biased in character, inasmuch as two members of that Committee, Somalia and Yugoslavia, had fully identified them¬ selves with Arab belligerence against it. It further stated that, on 14 June, the third member, Ceylon, had announced its decision to suspend diplomatic relations with Israel.

48. By letters dated 16 and 23 July, 12 and 27 August 1970 and 8 January 1971 (S/9868,

S/9885, S/9904, S/9919, S/10013andS/10073), addressed to the Secretary-General, Jordan charged Israel with having forcibly expelled Arab inhabitants from the occupied territories in violation of Security Council resolution 237 (1967) and the Geneva Conventions of 1949. With each letter, Jordan submitted a list that included the names, ages and the villages or towns of those who had been expelled by Israel, some after arbitrary deten¬ tion and torture; and with its letter of 8 January 1971 (S/10073), Jordan submitted a cumulative list of 329 civilians who it stated, had been expelled during the year 1970 from Gaza and the West Bank of Jordan.

49. By a note dated 27 July (S/9888), the President of the Security Council drew the attention of members of the Council to resolution 10 (XXVI) on the question of human rights in the territories occupied as a result of hostilities in the Middle East, including the report of the Special Working Group of Experts, which had been adopted on 23 March 1970 by the Commission on Human Rights. In that resolution, the Com¬ mission had requested the Secretary-General to bring to the attention of the Security Council the text of that resolution and the report of the Special Working Group of Experts established under the Commission’s resolution 6 (XXV) to investigate allegations concerning Israel’s violation of the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949 in the occupied territories.

50. In a letter dated 3 August 1970 (S/9897), Jordan stated that on the previous morning Israeli tanks had opened a barrage of artillery fire aimed at the Coptic convent and other neighbouring convents in the occupied area of Jericho, resulting in the destruction of parts of the convent and damage to other properties. Jordan added that Israeli authorities had been forcing Moslem worship¬ pers to evacuate the Ibrahimi Mosque in Al-Khalil (Hebron) to make room for Jewish fanatics and Israeli soldiers and, as part of the policy of changing the character of the occupied area, had taken over two Islamic shrines, the Mosque of Rachel’s Tomb on the Jerusalem-Al-Khalil road and Joseph’s Shrine in Nablus.


51. In a reply dated 17 August (S/9913), Israel denied the Jordanian charge, stating that, since 1968, Christian monasteries in the area of the Baptism Site on the Israeli side of the cease-fire line had been harassed by firing from saboteurs. The Coptic convent had been the target of an attack on 24 May 1969 and had later been damaged by explosive charges laid by saboteurs from Jordan on 4 August and 11 December 1969. As a result, the monastery had been abandoned, and, on the night of 1/2 August 1970, it had been occupied by a terrorist squad which had been driven out by Israeli forces.

52. By a letter dated 16 September (S/ 9941), representatives of 14 Arab States stated that reports in the world press had indicated that hundreds of men and women had been arbitrarily arrested in the Israeli- occupied Arab territories and that the entire population of those areas was being threatened with further measures of repression. They pointed out that, in view of the persistent refusal of the Israeli authorities to permit international fact-finding missions to visit the occupied territories in fulfilment of their mandate under various United Nations resolu¬ tions, press reports remained the principal means by which the world community could be informed about Israeli measures. They added that Israeli actions constituted a grave escalation of its violations of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and all relevant United Nations resolutions.

53. In a letter dated 23 September (S/9948), Israel rejected the charges of the Arab States and stated that, during the month of Sep¬ tember, five attempts at hijacking civil pas¬ senger aircraft had been committed by mem¬ bers of an Arab terrorist organization opera¬ ting in and from Arab countries bordering on Israel. The four planes successfully hi¬ jacked had subsequently been blown up in Arab countries, and their passengers had been held hostage. Faced with that situation, Israel had no choice but to take precautionary measures against the activities of the terrorist organizations and apprehended suspected associates for questioning, all of whom had been freed by 18 September.

54. By a letter dated 15 October (S/9963),

the representative of Syria transmitted the text of an article published on 11 October in the Sunday Times of London which stated that a report released by the International Committee of the Red Cross had accused Israel of blowing up Arab towns, villages, camps and houses in the occupied territories in defiance of the Geneva Conventions, acts which the International Committee of the Red Cross had protested to Israel.

55. By a letter dated 8 February 1971 (S/ 10105) addressed to the President of the Security Council, the representative of the United Arab Republic charged Israel with acts of repression and indiscriminate attacks against the civilian population in Sinai and the Gaza Strip. In support of his charges, he transmitted the text of an article published on 2 February 1971 in The New York Times, as well as excerpts from articles published in an Israeli newspaper and from the Israeli Parliament Protocol.

56. In a reply dated 9 February (S/10107), the representative of Israel described the charges of the United Arab Republic as unfounded and unsubstantiated. His Govern¬ ment’s policy was to ensure normal life and development for all the inhabitants under its control, including those of the Gaza Strip and Sinai, despite the efforts of Arab terrorist organizations to make life intolerable for the local populations.

57. In a letter dated 10 February (S/10111), the representative of 14 Arab States charged that Israel was intensifying its oppressive measures against the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip by imposing long and intolerable curfews on several areas, including a refugee camp called “Beech Camp”, which had been under total curfew since the end of December 1970. Moreover, several thousand Arab inhabitants had been arrested and taken to detention areas in the Sinai desert, where they had suffered cruel interrogation and inhuman punishment.

58. In a reply dated 11 February (S/10113), the representative of Israel again rejected the charges and stated that the repetition of allegations by the 14 Arab States had not brought those allegations nearer reality.

59. By a letter dated 12 February (S/ 10119), the representatives of Jordan and

UNITED NATIONS 591

Lebanon transmitted excerpts from a dispatch published on 11 February in the French news¬ paper, Le Monde, which reported that 10 Israeli soldiers had been tried for “unjustified violence” in the Gaza Strip and that three officers had been reprimanded for having failed to quell “excesses committed by sol¬ diers” belonging to their unit.

60. In a reply dated 19 February (S/10128), the representative of Israel stated that the Arab Governments, particularly Jordan and Lebanon, had been directly responsible for the acts of terror and murder carried out in the Gaza area because they allowed the existence of bases on their territory from which terr¬ orist operations had been carried out. That had been admitted by many captured terr¬ orist squads; thus, the Israeli Government had no choice but to take measures to ensure the safety, welfare and security of the popula¬ tion of the Gaza area and to maintain public order there.

61. In a letter dated 26 February (S/10133), the representative of Jordan stated that Israel had carried out arbitrary measures of confiscation of lands and mass transfer of population within the occupied territories. The Israeli Military Governor had informed leaders of the few villages north of Ramallah that his Government intended to confiscate lands with the aim of resettling a number of Palestinian refugees from Gaza. Such mea¬ sures were against the will of the people, in total disregard of United Nations resolutions and in violation of the Geneva Convention of 1949.

62. In a reply dated 3 March (S/10142), the representative of Israel stated that no confiscation or expropriation of lands had occurred in the areas cited by Jordan and that his Government had no intention of taking such steps in the future.

63. In a letter dated 26 March (S/10165), the representative of Jordan, referring to his letters of 8 January 1971 (S/10073 and S/ 10074) pertaining to the forcible deportation by Israel of Arab inhabitants from the occupied territories, stated that from 8 Decem¬ ber 1970 to 24 February 1971, 111 Arab inhabitants from Gaza and the West Bank ofjordan, whose names he attached, had been

forcibly expelled and deported to the East Bank ofjordan under inhuman conditions.

64. In a letter dated 21 May (S/10203), the representative ofjordan said that Israel continued to intimidate, harass and suppress the inhabitants of the occupied territories, to confiscate their property and to deport them in great numbers to the East Bank of Jordan. The letter gave a list of names of 28 persons who had been expelled by Israel on 18 March and 20 April and requested that the matter be brought to the attention of the Commission on Human Rights and of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Prac¬ tices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories.

65. In a letter dated 25 May (S/10210), the representative of Israel stated that, be¬ cause of its policy of ensuring the safety, welfare and security of the inhabitants of the areas referred to in the Jordanian letter, Israel had taken steps to prevent terrorism and to hinder individuals engaged in terr¬ orist activities from disturbing peace in those areas.

66. By a letter dated 28 May (S/10213), the representative of Syria stated that, in violation of relevant United Nations resolu¬ tions and of article 49 and 53 of the Geneva Convention for the Protection of Civilians in Time of War, Israel had continued its policy of colonizing Arab lands with intensive settlement, coupled with the demolition of Syrian towns and villages in the Golan Heights and the forcible eviction of the inha¬ bitants from those areas. Citing an official Israeli publication and press reports on Israeli building activities in the area, Syria requested that its letter be brought to the attention of the Commission on Human Rights and the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Prac¬ tices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories.

67. In a further letter dated 8 June (S/ 10219), the representative of Syria stated that, according to reports published by com¬ petent organizations, Israel had been bar¬ ring the distribution by the International Committee of the Red Cross of medicaments to the population in occupied territories. That report had been confirmed by resolution


WHA 24.33, adopted on 18 May 1971 by the Twenty-fourth World Health As¬ sembly, which had drawn attention to Israel’s violation of the basic human rights of the refugees and the inhabitants of the occupied territories, constituting a severe impediment to their health, and had called upon Israel to refrain from any interference with the activities of the International Committee of the Red Cross in the occupied territories. After stating that Israel’s actions in the occupied territories constituted acts of genocide in terms of Israeli legislation itself, Syria requested that its letter be brought to the attention of the Commission on Human Rights and of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories.

68. In a letter dated 10 June (S/10220 and Corr.l), the representative of Israel stated that the charges contained in the letters from Syria only reflected the belligerent attitude of Syria towards Israel and towards the peace-making efforts under the auspices of Ambassador Jarring. In rejecting the Syrian letter of 28 May, Israel stated that its true character was illustrated by its charge that four students from the Syrian University had been arrested by Israel but its failure to mention that the captured students were members of the Al-Fatah organization. With regard to the letter in which Syria referred to resolution WHA 24.33 adopted by the World Health Organization (WHO) on 18 May 1971, accusing Israel of barring the distribution of medicaments, Israel denied the charge and stated that the resolution had been adopted by only 43 member States and that the majority of the WHO member¬ ship had dissociated itself from its text. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) had also denied that charge in a letter to WHO, a copy of which was at¬ tached to Israel’s letter.

69. In a reply dated 15 June 1971 (S/ 10224), the representative of Syria stated that Israel’s policy of lawlessness had been condemned or deplored in no less than 39 United Nations resolutions since 14 June 1967. On 15 March 1971, the Commission

on Human Rights had condemned Israel for its continued violations of human rights in the occupied territories, including its policies aimed at changing the status of those territories. Moreover, since 1 July 1970, the Chief of Staff ofUNTSO had reported, in no less than 320 supplemental information reports to the Security Council, acts of aggression invariably committed by Israel against Syria. Unable to reject any of the facts brought to the attention of the Security Council concerning its activities in the occupied Golan Heights in violation of the fourth Geneva Conven¬ tion, Israel had sought to veil them by refer¬ ring to Arab resistance to its occupation of the West Bank of Jordan and by attacking the Christian leaders of Syrian churches. In transmitting a letter from the International Committee of the Red Cross to refute the WHO resolution, Israel had overlooked the fact that the ICRC letter had not contested paragraph 3 of the resolution, which had drawn Israel’s attention to the violation of basic human rights of the refugees, displaced persons and inhabitants of the occupied territories that constituted a serious impedi¬ ment to their health.

C. Conrniiinications and reports con¬

cerning the situation in and around

Jerusalem and its Holy Places

1. Communications to the Council from

15 June 1970 to 18 February 1971

70. During the period covered by this report, the President of the Security Council and the Secretary-General received a number of communications related to the status of the city of Jerusalem. The Arab countries in general, and Jordan in particular, protested changes in the status of the city, charging that Israel had violated the resolutions of the United Nations on the matter. Israel, for its part, denied those charges. The Secretary-General issued two reports on the subject. These communications and the reports of the Secretary-General are noted briefly below:

71. In a letter dated 22 July 1970 (S/ 9883), addressed to the Secretary-General,

UNITED NATIONS 593

Jordan protested the levying by Israel of defence taxes on Jordanian citizens in the occupied city ofjerusalem, as well as measures taken by Israel to change the Arab character of the city. Jordan pointed out that in viola¬ tion of Security Council resolution 267 (1969), which had condemned all measures taken by Israel to change the status of the city, Israel had neither rescinded those measures nor refrained from taking new measures to change the political, legal and demographic status of the city. In view of Israel’s non- compliance with that resolution, Jordan added that the Security Council must take effective measures to stop such irresponsible behaviour.

72. By a letter dated 28 October (S/9969), Jordan, after reiterating that Israel was continuing its defiance of General Assembly and Security Council resolutions on the status of Jerusalem, forwarded the text of an article published in the International Herald Tribune of 17/18 October, depicting some of Israel’s construction plans in the Arab part of the city ofjerusalem. Jordan added that the only way that those illegal measures could be stopped was to end Israeli occupation of Jerusalem.

73. In a joint letter dated 8 January 1971 (S/10075), Jordan and the United Arab Republic protested Israeli measures to change the character of the city ofjerusalem and drew attention to a so-called “master plan” of jerusalem providing for the settlement of 200,000Jewish people in the occupied lands in and around Jerusalem, which had been criticized by such leading journals as the Economist and The Times of London. They also pointed out that the process of establishing Israeli settlements was not limited to Jerusa¬ lem and the area around it but was being extended to the rest of the occupied territories with the intention of making them permanent Jewish villages. After quoting from state¬ ments of Israeli authorities as reported in the press, they pointed out that those state¬ ments made it clear that Israel had no inten¬ tion of withdrawing from the occupied ter¬ ritories and was doing everything to obstruct Ambassador Jarring’s peace mission.

74. In a letter dated 17 February (S/10123), Jordan stated that, according to information

it had received, Israel had bulldozed parts of the premises of Government House, the headquarters of UNTSO situated in no-man’s land in Jerusalem, and requested a report by the Secretary-General on that violation, in accordance with Security Council resolutions 252 (1968) and 267 (1969).

75. In a reply dated 18 February (S/ 10126), Israel stated that the United Nations headquarters in Jerusalem had not been affected in any way by development activities being undertaken in Jerusalem. In another letter dated 19 February (S/10127), Israel recalled that it was Jordan, in fact, which, on 5 June 1967, had violated and occupied the United Nations headquarters in Jerusalem and that the Secretary-General had reported on that issue to the Security Council during its 1347th meeting.

2. Report of the Secretary-General

76. On 18 February, the Secretary-General, in pursuance of Security Council resolutions 256 (1968), 267 (1969) and 271 (1969) and General Assembly resolution 2254 (ES-V), submitted a report (S/10124) concerning Jerusalem that included texts of his notes to the representative of Israel and Israel’s replies thereto.

77. In his note of 10 December 1970, the Secretary-General stated that, after publica¬ tion of a press report on 19 August 1970 concerning a master plan for an area within and outside the Old City walls in which the Government House area had been class¬ ified as a residential area, the represent¬ atives of UNTSO, on instructions from the Secretary-General, had approached the Israeli authorities on the matter and, on 12 No¬ vember, had been informed that the plan in question had not yet been made public. The Israeli authorities, however, gave no reply to the question whether the plan affected the Government House premises. In order to meet his responsibilities to the Security Council and to the General Assembly in relation to the status of the City ofjerusa¬ lem, the Secretary-General requested Israel to supply him with detailed information and a copy of the reported master plan. The Secretary-General underscored the im-


portance he attached to the status of the United Nations premises at Government House and requested clarification from the Israeli authorities on whether the reported master plan envisaged any development af¬ fecting those premises, either in its current limits or those before June 1967.

78. In a reply dated 8 January 1971, Israel indicated that its position as regards Government House continued to be the same as in August 1967 and that no changes were contemplated in the arrangements made then.

79. On 26 January, the report continued, the Secretary-General had sent two further notes to Israel. In the first note, after referring to his request of 10 December 1970 for a copy and information on the reported Jerusa¬ lem master plan, he recalled that, in its reply of 8 January, Israel had not responded to that request. After calling Israel’s attention to his reporting responsibilities under the relevant Security Council and General As¬ sembly resolutions, the Secretary-General again requested a copy of the plan, together with detailed information thereon.

80. The second note dealt with the United Nations premises at Government House. The Secretary-General stated that in so far as the assurances proffered by the Govern¬ ment of Israel in reply to his note of 10 De¬ cember did not safeguard the right of the United Nations to possession of the whole of the Government House premises as con¬ stituted on 5 June 1967, they did not cover the obligations of the Secretary-General in that matter. The Secretary-General had been informed by UNTSO that, on 3 January 1971, a bulldozer had commenced working on the south-eastern side of those premises. That activity, together with the recent press reports about the immediate implementation of a housing project in the area, indicated a further and serious violation of the invio¬ lability of the United Nations premises under the Charter of the United Nations and the Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations. In view of the irrepa¬ rable physical change that the work currently undertaken might bring to those premises, the Secretary-General, while reserving the

right of the United Nations to claim com¬ pensation for any ensuing loss or damage, requested suspension of those works. The Secretary-General continued to maintain that there was no basis for any curtailment of United Nations rights to Government House as constituted on 5 June 1967. Accordingly, in the exercise of his responsibility in the matter, he requested the unreserved return to the United Nations of the remainder of its Government House premises. The report stated that no reply had been received by the Secretary-General to the above two notes as of 18 February 1971.

3. Communications to the Council from

19 February to 19 April 1971

81. By a joint letter dated 23 February (S/10130 and Corr.l), Jordan and the United Arab Republic addressed the Secretary- General concerning Israel’s continued con¬ fiscation of Arab land and property and construction of settlements, housing, hotels and industrial projects in violation of relevant General Assembly and Security Council re¬ solutions. They stated that, according to Israeli press reports, Israel was planning to build 3,000 housing units and 13 hotels on confiscated Arab land in East Jerusalem and that Arab inhabitants of East Jerusalem were being evacuated to be replaced by Jewish families. Those measures appeared to be a prelude to the so-called master plan for Jerusalem, which envisaged the construc¬ tion of a total of 35,000 units on confiscated private and public Arab lands. They were designed to accommodate 122,000 new Jewish immigrants and to make Jerusalem a 4 Jewish city”. Israel’s declared intention to annex Jerusalem and its environs was in disregard of the will of the people and in complete defiance of the United Nations.

82. In a reply dated 1 March (S/10138), Israel stated that, contrary to the charges in the above letter, Jewish and Arab lands alike had been expropriated without dis¬ crimination for public development and housing and that some Arab and Jewish owners had already received full compensa¬ tion. With regard to the existence of a4‘master plan” for Jerusalem, the preparation of a

UNITED NATIONS 595

development plan for any city was a customary procedure of planning throughout the world, and the municipal authorities of Jerusalem were doing their best in that direction through consultations with world-renowned experts and architects.

83. In letters dated 2 and 8 March (S/ 10139 and S/10149), Jordan charged Israel with further confiscation of Arab property. It stated that, according to an Israeli press report, Israel authorities had issued an order transferring the shares of the Electricity Company of the District of Jerusalem be¬ longing to the Jordanian municipality to the Israeli municipality. That action con¬ stituted a change in the status of Jerusalem forbidden by United Nations resolutions.

84. In a reply dated 5 March (S/10146), Israel stated that it had been necessary to change the status of certain elements of the public ownership of the Electricity Company in order to ensure the continuity and operation of electrical services to the people of Jerusalem. However, no change had taken place in the ownership status of private persons.

85. In a letter dated 2 March (S/10140), Syria recalled the request made by the Secretary-General to Israel for information and a copy of the “master plan” for Jerusalem and stated that Israel had so far failed to reply to the two notes of the Secretary- General. Moreover, Syria protested, accord¬ ing to press reports Israel was continuing to implement the “master plan” in Jerusalem, including work being carried out within United Nations premises.

86. By a letter dated 9 March (S/10152), Indonesia, Jordan, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Tunisia and the United Arab Repu¬ blic transmitted to the Secretary-General the text of a resolution on the Palestine question adopted at a joint meeting of the Interna¬ tional Muslim Organizations held at Mecca, Saudi Arabia, from 11 to 15 February 1971. The resolution, after urging that efforts should be continued for the liquidation of all traces of Israel’s aggressions, expressed the fullest support for the Palestinian com¬ mandos. It also appealed for “a halt to the continuance of the inhuman Zionist aggres¬

sion, specially to save the Holy City of Jerusa¬ lem from Judaization and to save the Arab citizens of the Holy City from becoming refugees”.

87. In a reply dated 16 March (S/10158), Israel stated that the seven-Power letter contained allegations that were misleading and reflected the belligerent policies pursued by the Arab States against Israel. Despite the abnormal conditions in the region and the security problems caused by those policies, Moslem institutions in Jerusalem and its Moslem residents and visitors enjoyed the liberty and facilities to pursue their normal activities. After rejecting the charge that it was “Judaizing” Jerusalem, Israel stated that for generations Jews had constituted the majority of the population of the City, where the Jewish ethos was deeply marked. Israel had been treating with reverence all that was related to the Holy Places of all faiths and had made great efforts to ensure their improvement and safety.

88. In a letter dated 15 March (S/10159), Spain took the position that Israel’s continued occupation of Jerusalem could not justify certain measures of assimilation designed to change the nature and alter the status of the city, and urged that Israel should be required to comply with the relevant United Nations resolutions, in particular resolution 267 (1969). Spain’s concern, it was stated, arose from its traditional interest in the situation and problems of the Holy PlaCes

89. In a reply dated 19 March (S/10160), Israel stated that Spain’s letter reflected a persistently pro-Arab policy; it denied having taken any measures of assimilation in Jerusa¬ lem and stated that urban improvements were designed to serve all its residents.

90. In a letter dated 23 March (S/10163), Spain, recalling its support of the implemen¬ tation of resolution 242 (1967), stated that Israel, contrary to relevant United Nations resolutions, had been taking advantage of its occupation of Jerusalem in order to alter the status and character of that city through so-called urban improvements.

91. In a reply dated 29 March (S/10167), Israel stated that Spain had overlooked


aggression against Jerusalem by Jordan and the United Arab Republic and the uprooting of the Jewish population and destruction of the Jewish quarter of the Holy City during the Jordanian occupation. Ignoring those facts, Spain had continued to pursue a pro- Arab policy in the Middle East.

92. In a reply dated 30 March (S/10168), Spain stated that Israel had not cited examples of any United Nations resolutions violated by Jordan or the United Arab Republic in so far as they related to the character and status of Jerusalem. Spain’s expression of concern about measures to change the true nature and alter the status of Jerusalem was in agreement with a comment made in rOsservatore Romano.

93. In a letter dated 1 April (S/10169), Jordan stated that excavations by Israel adjacent to the southern and western walls of Haram-Esh-Sharif were endangering Al- Aqsa Mosque, the Moslem Museum and El-Fakhriyya Minaret. Jordan also cited reports that Israel might enact a law confining the Moslem Holy Places in the Haram-Esh- Sharif area to Al-Aqsa and the Dome of Rock Mosques, thus placing the Plaza of Haram- Esh-Sharif and other religious and cultural places, which were held sacred by Moslems all over the world, outside the designation of Holy Places and subject to Israeli regula¬ tions and excavations. Israel’s excavations and the contemplated legislation violated the Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict of 14 May 1954. They were also contrary to the resolution adopted on 10 October 1962 by the Executive Board of UNESCO with regard to cultural properties, particularly in the Old City of Jerusalem, calling on Israel to desist from any archaeo¬ logical excavations, transfer of such properties and any change of their cultural and historical character.

4. Further report by the Secretary-

General

94. On 20 April, the Secretary-General issued an addendum (S/10124/Add.l) to his report of 18 February concerning a further exchange of communications between

him and Israel concerning the status of Jeru¬ salem and the United Nations premises at Government House. He stated that on 8 March he had received a note from Israel in reply to his two notes of 26 January, in which Israel stated that its position remain¬ ed as it had been conveyed to the Secretary- General in previous communications on the subject. The Israel Government placed on record its reservations to the various legal and other considerations advanced by the Secretary-General, particularly to claims of the United Nations to the occupancy and possession of the whole of the premises of Government House. The addendum also set forth the reply that the Secretary-General had addressed to Israel on 12 April noting that, presumably because of the reservations referred to in its note of 8 March, Israel had not provided a copy of the reported Jerusalem master plan or any information about it and that Israel’s reply had contained neither a direct response to his request to return the whole of the United Nations premises at Government House as constituted on 5 June 1967 nor any precise information on the exact terms of the reservations held by Israel with regard to that request. Further¬ more, the Secretary-General observed that the reservations made in Israel’s note had been raised for the first time and had not been mentioned when part of the Government House premises had been returned to the United Nations. In fact, in its letter of 22 August 1967, Israel had not mentioned any reservations, although the Secretary- General had expressly preserved the rights of the United Nations to the occupancy and possession of the whole of the Government House premises as constituted when UNTSO had been forced to evacuate them on 5 June 1967. He further observed that it was in reliance on the preservation of those United Nations rights that he had authorized the return of the UNTSO staff to a lesser area. He added that as Israel’s reservations related in part to legal considerations, one way of resolving any differences would be to resort to the procedure of settlement provided for in the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations. In view

UNITED NATIONS 597

of Israel’s current works within and bordering upon Government House property as con¬ stituted on 5 June 1967 and the absence of a direct reply to his specific request in his notes of 26 January 1971, the Secretary- General was constrained to reiterate his request for the unreserved return to the United Nations of the remainder of its Govern¬ ment House premises.

95. By a letter dated 1 June (S/10215), Syria transmitted the text of an appeal made by the spiritual leaders of the Christian community of Syria, drawing to the attention of the Christians of the world the illegal measures taken by Israeli authorities in order to “Zionize” the City of Jerusalem and to expel its Christian and Moslem inhabitants in violation of United Nations resolutions. In a reply dated 10 June (S/10220 and Corr.l), Israel stated that the visits of 80,000 Arabs to Israeli-held territories and Jerusalem the previous summer did not lend credence to the Syrian charges.

D. General statements and other

matters brought to the attention of the

Security Council in connexion with the

situation in the Middle East

96. During the period covered by this report, general statements concerning the situation in the Middle East were brought to the attention of the Security Council, which are briefly noted below.

97. By letters dated 21 July, 22 and 24 September and 9 October 1970 (S/9881, S/9947, S/9949 and S/9958), the represent¬ ative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics transmitted to the Security Council the texts of statements made on the situation in the Middle East by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, TASS and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR.

98. In its statement on 21 July, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, after expressing its concern at the situation in the Middle East, stated that Israel, with encouragement from imperialist Powers, had not complied with a single United Nations resolution and thus was obstructing all efforts towards a political settlement.

99. In the statements transmitted on 22 and

24 September, TASS and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, respectively, expressed concern at the reported concentra¬ tion of the United States Sixth Fleet in the eastern part of the Mediterranean in con¬ junction with the clashes then taking place in Jordan between Jordanian army units and Palestinian detachments and warned that any intervention in Jordan from outside would be a threat to the independence of the countries of the Middle East and would complicate the international situation.

100. In the statement transmitted on 9 October, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR stated that the campaign of slander launched against the Soviet Union in the United States with regard to alleged violations of the cease-fire agreement in the Suez Canal sector was a deliberate attempt to mislead the world public opinion and to provide Israel with another pretext for break¬ ing its contacts with the Special Represent¬ ative of the Secretary-General to the Middle East.

101. By a letter dated 9 October (S/9962), the representative of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to the United Nations transmitted to the Secretary-General the texts of the resolutions adopted by the As¬ sembly of Heads of State and Government of OAU at its meeting in Addis Ababa from 1 to 3 September 1970. In one of those resolutions, OAU had called for Israel’s withdrawal from all occupied Arab territories and appealed to all States members of OAU to support the efforts made by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to implement Security Council resolution 242 (1967). In another resolution, OAU con¬ demned the illegal arrest and detention of two Algerian citizens by Israel authorities in violation of international conventions on civil aviation and requested their immediate and unconditional release.

102. In a letter dated 8 December (S/ 10031), the representative of the USSR transmitted the text of a statement on the Middle East situation that had been adopted in Berlin on 2 December by the participants in the Conference of the Political Consultative Committee of the States Parties to the


Warsaw Treaty. The statement expressed concern about the increased tension in the Middle East as a result of Israel’s policy and urged effective support for the Arab peoples, including the Palestinians, in their struggle to liberate their occupied territories.

103. In a letter dated 28 February 1971 (S/10136), the representative of the USSR transmitted the text of a statement of the Soviet Government concerning the situation in the Middle East. The statement noted that, in its reply dated 21 February to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the Middle East, Israel had refused to commit itself to withdrawal from all occupied ter¬ ritories, thus showing its unwillingness to assume a part of the commitments required for a political settlement in accordance with Security Council resolution 242 (1967).

104. In a letter dated 4 March (S/10144 and Corr.l), the representative of Bulgaria transmitted to the Secretary-General the text of a statement issued by the Bulgarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in which it was stated that the United Arab Republic’s readiness to conclude a peace treaty with Israel and its constructive proposals provided a basis for a political solution of the Middle East crisis. On the other hand, Israel’s rejection of those proposals and its refusal to withdraw its troops from occupied Arab territories had shown that Israel was persisting in its policy of aggression and its defiance of the relevant United Nations resolutions.

105. By a note dated 11 March (S/10154) addressed to the Secretary-General, the repre¬ sentative of Iran transmitted the text of a statement made by his Government on the situation in the Middle East. After pointing out that the withdrawal of Israeli forces from occupied territories was an essential factor for the establishment of peace in the Middle East, the statement welcomed the Rogers plan of 1 October 1970 and the positive attitude taken by the Government of the United Arab Republic towards implementa¬ tion of Security Council resolution 242 (1967). Iran hoped that Israel would reci¬ procate by taking similar steps, so that an agreement might be reached and warned that if Israel were to persist in maintaining

its negative attitude, Iran would have no alternative but to condemn Israel’s unconci- liatory attitude.

106. By a letter dated 6 May (S/10188), the representative of Iraq transmitted the

text of a letter addressed to the Secretary- General by the Grand Rabbi of the Jewish community in Iraq, in which it was stated that Israel had been waging a vicious cam¬ paign against Iraq and its Jewish citizens. The Grand Rabbi confirmed the loyalty of Jewish-Iraqi citizens to Iraq and stated that Zionism was a political and racial ideology and had all too often done Judaism and its followers disservices by distorting its conceptions and history and even resorting to violence against Iraqi Jews in order to force them to emigrate to Israel.

E. Activities of the Special Representa¬

tive of the Secretary-General to the

Middle East

107. In a note to the Security Council dated 7 August 1970 (S/9902), the Secretary- General stated that a peace proposal initiated by the Government of the United States of America had been accepted by Israel, Jordan and the United Arab Republic. Ambassador Jarring, his Special Represen¬ tative to the Middle East, having received confirmation of those acceptances, had, ac¬ cordingly, informed the Secretary-General by letter that the United Arab Republic, Jordan and Israel had advised him of their agreement (a) that having accepted and indicated their willingness to carry out resolu¬ tion 242 (1967) in all its parts, they would designate representatives to discussions to be held under his auspices, according to such procedure and at such places and times as he might recommend, taking into account as appropriate each side’s prefer¬ ence as to method of procedure and previous experience between the parties; (b) that the purpose of the aforementioned discussions was to reach agreement on the establishment of a just and lasting peace between them based on (1) mutual acknowledgement by the United Arab Republic, Jordan and Israel of each other’s sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence, and

UNITED NATIONS 599

(2) Israeli withdrawal from territories oc¬ cupied in the 1967 conflict, both in accordance with resolution 242 (1967); (c) that, to facilitate his task of promoting agreement as set forth in resolution 242 (1967) the parties would strictly observe, effective 7 August until at least 5 November, the cease¬ fire resolutions of the Security Council. The Secretary-General and Ambassador Jarring therefore believed that there was a reasonable basis on which to renew immediately the Special Representatives’ contacts with the parties.

108. In a report dated 4 January 1971 (S/10070), the Secretary-General described the activities of his Special Representative to the Middle East since the Security Council’s adoption of resolution 242 (1967). After recalling his previous reports on the subject issued on 22 December 1967, 17 January, 29 March, 29 July and 3 December 1968 (S/8309 and Add. 1-4), the Secretary-General stated that, in the first meeting between the parties and the Special Representative in December 1967, Israel had expressed the view that a settlement of the Middle East question could be reached only through direct negotiations and that there could be no question of withdrawal of its forces prior to such a settlement. The United Arab Republic and Jordan had insisted that there could be no question of discussion between the parties until Israel had with¬ drawn its forces to positions prior to 5 June 1967. Faced with those conflicting positions, Ambassador Jarring had sought to obtain from the parties an assurance that they would implement resolution 242 (1967), in the hope that such a declaration would be regarded as a basis for discussions. Subse¬ quently, he had received from the parties a number of formulations of their position on the issues. Although Israel considered direct negotiations the best way to achieve the objectives of resolution 242 (1967), it was willing that that be done in a meeting convened by the Special Representative. The United Arab Republic would accept indirect negotiations, provided Israel first declared clearly that it would implement the resolution. Jordan had expressed a similar

view. After consulting the Secretary-General at Headquarters, the Special Representative had returned to the area at the beginning of March 1968 and made efforts designed to hold conferences within the framework of the Security Council’s resolution in Nicosia or elsewhere. Returning to New York, he had pursued his contacts with the representatives of the parties. However, those contacts had failed to break the deadlock between the parties both as regards the interpretation of the resolution and the manner in which it should be implemented. After a short visit to various capitals in Europe, where he had met with the Foreign Ministers of Israel, Jordan and the United Arab Republic, he had returned to New York on 22 July, then had again returned to the Middle East, where he had undertaken a second round of discussions in August 1968, which had taken the form of an exchange of questions and comments between the parties through him. The opening of the twenty-third session of the General Assembly in New York had provided the Special Representative with another opportunity to hold meetings with the Foreign Ministers of the parties, who, however, had restated the posidons of their respective Governments.

109. After resuming for a time his duties as Ambassador of Sweden to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Ambassador Jar¬ ring had returned to Headquarters on 29 January 1969 and undertaken personal con¬ tacts with the permanent representatives of the parties and of other Member States. In a further visit to the Middle East in March and April 1969, he had submitted to the parties a series of questions designed to elicit their attitudes towards Security Council resolution 242 (1967). The texts of the questions and replies were annexed to the report. However, the replies he had received from the parties continued to show serious divergencies between them. He had therefore been compelled to conclude that the con¬ ditions for convening a useful series of meetings at that time did not exist. Consequently, he had returned to Moscow to resume his duties. However, he had returned to Head¬ quarters from 12 September to 8 October


1969 and from 10 to 26 March 1970 but had found no new elements that would permit him to organize active discussions with the parties.

110. On 3 April 1969, the Permanent Representatives of France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United King¬ dom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America had begun a series of meetings on the Middle East question that had continued at various in¬ tervals up to the date of the report. After each such meeting, the Chairman had report¬ ed to the Secretary-General on the substance of the discussions, and the Secretary-General had kept Ambassador Jarring informed.

111. The report also gave an account of the United States peace initiative under¬ taken in June 1970 and of its acceptance by the parties in August, as noted above, and also referred to the arrangements made by the United States Government and ac¬ cepted by the United Arab Republic and Israel for a standstill cease-fire.

112. Subsequently, Ambassador Jarring had invited the parties to take part in discus¬ sions opening at New York on 25 August and had met on that day with each of their representatives. However, the representative of Israel had stated that he had been instructed by his Government to return to Israel. On his return on 8 September, he had informed Ambassador Jarring that Israel’s acceptance of the United States peace initiative was still in effect but that, in view of Egypt’s grave violation of the cease-fire standstill agree¬ ment and inasmuch as the strictest observance of the cease-fire standstill agreement was one of the central elements of the American peace initiative, Israel would be unable to participate in the talks under the auspices of the Special Representative so long as the cease-fire standstill agreement was not observ¬ ed in its entirety and the original situation restored.

113. While the Special Representative’s talks with the representatives of the Arab States had continued, they could not be productive because of lack of contact with the Israeli representative. However, he had held.a wide range of contacts with representa¬

tives of the parties and of other Member States during the commemorative session of the General Assembly and during the Assembly debate on the Middle East.

114. After the adoption of General As¬ sembly resolution 2628 (XXV) the Special Representative had invited representatives of the parties to resume talks under his auspices. Although the representatives of Jordan and the United Arab Republic had informed him of their willingness to do so, the representative of Israel had stated that the matter was under consideration by his Government. On 19 November, the Special Representative had addressed a letter to Israel’s Foreign Minister formally inviting the Israeli Government to resume its participa¬ tion in the discussions. On 30 December, Ambassador Jarring had received in Moscow, where he had returned to resume his duties as Sweden’s Ambassador, a letter from Israel’s Foreign Minister stating his Government’s readiness to resume its participation in the talks. The texts of those communications were annexed to the report.

115. In letters dated 20 and 25 January 1971 (S/10083 and 10089), the representatives of the United Arab Republic and Jordan transmitted to the Security Council the texts of an aide-memoire and a statement submitted respectively by their Governments to Ambassador Jarring. After reiterating their willingness to implement resolution 242 (1967) in all its parts, they stated that it was essential that Israel should also express such willingness, particularly with respect to its withdrawal from the Arab territories occupied by its forces since 5 June 1967. In order to reach a lasting settlement in accordance with resolution 242 (1967), Israel must repudiate its policy of territorial ex¬ pansion and must agree to a just settlement for the Palestine refugees, in accordance with United Nations resolutions; the termina¬ tion of all claims or states of belligerence; and respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of all States in the area. The two States considered that the Security Council should provide security to all States in the area through establishment of a United Nations peace-

UNITED NATIONS 601

keeping force, with the possible participa¬ tion of the four permanent members of the Security Council, and of demilitarized zones astride the borders.

116. On 1 February, the Secretary-General reported (S/10070/Add.l) to the Security Council that his Special Representative had resumed his discussions with the parties at Headquarters on 5 January. At the request of the Israeli Government, meetings had been held in Jerusalem with the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister from 8. to 10 January. The Israeli Government had presented to Ambassador Jarring, for transmission to the Governments concern¬ ed, papers containing its views on the “essentials of peace”, and, subsequently, the United Arab Republic and Jordan had presented papers containing their views con¬ cerning the implementation of resolution 242 (1967). Ambassador Jarring had also held meetings with the Permanent Represen¬ tative of Lebanon, whose Government was directly concerned with the Middle East settlement.

117. The Secretary-General stated that while recognizing that the resumed discussions were still at an early stage, he had found grounds for cautious optimism in the fact that the parties had resumed the talks through his Special Representative in a serious manner and that there had been some progress in the definition of their positions. The parties, who had already indicated their willingness to carry out resolution 242 (1967), were describing in greater detail their view of their obligations under that resolution. After expressing the hope that the talks would continue in a constructive manner, the Secretary-General appealed to the parties to withhold fire, to exercise military restraint and to maintain the quiet that had prevailed in the area since August 1970.

118. By a letter dated 2 February (S/10098), the representative of the United Arab Republic transmitted to the Security Council the text of an aide-memoire he had com¬ municated the previous day to the Special

Representative of the Secretary-General, con¬ trasting the United Arab Republic’s readiness to implement resolution 242 (1967) as a

“package deal” with Israel’s continued refusal to implement that resolution and its evasion of the issue of total withdrawal. It was therefore incumbent on the Security Council to take the necessary measures required to assist the Special Representative in the discharge of his mandate.

119. In a letter dated 2 March (S/10141) addressed to the Secretary-General, the repre¬ sentative of the United Arab Republic, after referring to the appeal by the Secretary- General to the parties to withhold fire and excercise military restraint, stated that, in that connexion, he was forwarding relevant portions of a statement made on 4 February by the President of the United Arab Republic. In that statement, the President, declaring that the United Arab Republic could not let the cease-fire be renewed automatically as long as no progress had been made in Ambassador Jarring’s efforts, but noting the “cautious optimism” of the Secretary- General and the views of some members of the Security Council that there was a possibi¬ lity of achieving real progress, stated that he had decided to maintain the cease-fire for a period not exceeding 30 days, ending 7 March.

120. In a further report dated 5 March 1971 (S/10070/Add.2), the Secretary-General, after referring to his report of 1 February, in which he had appealed to the parties to withhold fire, to exercise military restraint and to maintain the quiet that had prevailed in the area since August 1970, stated that, in response to that appeal, Israel had an¬ nounced on 2 February its intention to preserve the cease-fire on a mutual basis and that the President of the United Arab Republic had declared his decision to refrain from opening fire for a period of 30 days ending on 7 March. The Secretary-General further stated that his Special Representative shared his cautious optimism that the parties had seriously been defining their positions and wished to move forward to a permanent peace, but noted with growing concern that each side had been insisting that the other should make certain commitments be¬ fore it would formulate the provisions of a final peace settlement. Israel had insisted


that the United Arab Republic should give specific, direct and reciprocal commitments that it would be ready to enter into a peace agreement with Israel and to make towards it the various undertakings referred to in paragraph 1 (ii) of Security Council resolution 242 (1967). When agreement had been reached on those points, it would then be possible to discuss other points, including the refugee problems, questions relating to secure and recognized boundaries and with¬ drawal and other arrangements. The United Arab Republic had continued to maintain that resolution 242 (1967) contained pro¬ visions to be implemented by the parties and for its part had once again expressed its readiness to carry out its obligations on a reciprocal basis. In the view of the United Arab Republic, Israel had persisted in its refusal to implement resolution 242 (1967), inasmuch as it would not commit itself to withdraw its forces from all Arab territories occupied in June 1967; nor would it commit itself to implement the resolutions relevant to a just settlement of the refugee problem.

121. The papers received by Ambassador Jarring from Israel and Jordan had shown similar divergence of views. Israel had stressed that Jordan should enter into a peace agree¬ ment that would specify each party’s direct and reciprocal obligation; and Jordan, after emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisi¬ tion of territory by war, had expressed the view that an Israeli commitment to evacuate all Arab territories was the essential first step towards peace.

122. At that stage of the talks, the Secretary- General stated, his Special Representative had reached the conclusion, which he shared, that the only possibility of breaking the im¬ minent deadlock arising from the different views of Israel and the United Arab Republic as to the priority to be given to commitments and undertakings was for him to seek from each side the parallel and simultaneous commitments that seemed to be the inevi¬ table prerequisites of an eventual peace settlement. Thereafter, it would be possible to proceed to formulate the terms of a peace agreement not only for the topics covered by the commitments made by the parties

but for other topics, in particular the refugee question.

123. In an identical aide-memoire to Israel and the United Arab Republic on 8 February 1971, Ambassador Jarring had requested them to make to him certain prior commit¬ ments. His initiative was on the basis that the commitments should be made simultaneously and reciprocally and subject to the eventual satisfactory determination of all other aspects of a peace settlement. Israel would commit itself to withdraw its forces from occupied United Arab Republic territory to the former international boundary between Egypt and the British Mandate of Palestine. The United Arab Republic would commit itself to enter into a peace agreement with Israel and to make explicitly therein to Israel, on a reciprocal basis, various undertakings and acknowledgements arising directly or in¬ directly from paragraph 1 (ii) of resolution 242 (1967).

124. In an aide-memoire received by the Special Representative on 15 February, the United Arab Republic indicated that it would accept the specific commitments requested of it, as well as other commitments arising directly from resolution 242 (1967), and that it would be ready to enter into a peace agreement with Israel, provided Israel would likewise give commitments covering its own obligations under resolution 242 (1967), including commitments for the with¬ drawal of its armed forces from Sinai and the Gaza Strip and for the achievement of a just settlement for the refugee problem in accordance with United Nations resolutions.

125. On 17 February, the Special Re¬ presentative had informed Israel of the United Arab Republic’s reply to his aide-memoire, and, on 26 February, he had received from Israel a paper in which, without reference to the commitment that he had sought from Israel, it was stated that Israel had viewed favourably “the expression by the United Arab Republic of its readiness to enter into a peace agreement with Israel” and had reiterated its readiness for meaningful negotia¬ tions on all subjects relevant to a peace agreement. Israel also had given details of the undertakings which, in its opinion,

UNITED NATIONS 603

should be given by the two countries in that peace agreement. Israel considered that the stage had been reached when the two sides should pursue the negotiations in a concrete manner without prior condi¬ tions. On the crucial question of withdrawal, on which the Special Representative had sought a commitment from Israel, the Israel position was that it would give an under¬ taking to withdraw from “the Israeli-United Arab Republic cease-fire line” to secure, recognized and agreed boundaries to be established in the peace agreement and that it would not withdraw to the lines existing prior to 5 June 1967. Israel’s reply had been communicated to the United Arab Republic on 28 February.

126. After pointing out that, as a result of the above initiative, the problems to be settled had been more clearly identified and that there had been general agreement on some, the Secretary-General stated that he wished to note with satisfaction the positive reply given by the United Arab Republic to Ambassador Jarring’s initiative. However, the Government of Israel had not so far responded to the request of the Special Representative that it should give a commit¬ ment on withdrawal to the international boundary of the United Arab Republic. In view of that, the Secretary-General ap¬ pealed to Israel to give further consideration to that question and to respond favourably to Ambassador Jarring’s initiative.

127. The Secretary-General concluded his report by appealing again to the parties to withhold fire, to exercise military restraint and to maintain the quiet that had prevailed in the area since August 1970.

F. Information concerning the con¬ sultations among the representatives of the four permanent members of the Security Council on the question of a peaceful settlement in the Middle East

128. During the period under review, the representatives on the Security Council were regularly informed by the presiding member at the consultative meetings of the represent¬ atives of the four permanent members of

the Council—France, the USSR, the United Kingdom and the United States—on the progress of those consultations on the question of promoting a peaceful political settlement in the Middle East on the basis of the imple¬ mentation of Security Council resolution 242 of 22 November 1967 in all its parts. In such cases all representatives taking part in the four-Power consultations were present.

408 Annual Report of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency Commis¬ sioner-General, 1 July 1970 30 June 1971 (Introduction)1 *

September, 1971

1. In May 1971, the Agency completed twenty-one years of aid to the Palestine refugees,2 under a mandate from the General Assembly,3 amid continuing uncertainty about

1 Introduction, summarizing the contents of the full

report, to the UNRWA Commissioner-General’s Re¬ port as transmitted by Sir John Rennie on September 11; U.N. doc. A/8413, paras. 1G35. (The remainder of calendar year 1971 is covered

in the Commissioner-General’s 1971-1972 annual report, relevant portions of which are to be included in International Documents on Palestine 1972.)

2 A Palestine refugee, by UNRWA’s working definition, is a person whose normal residence was Palestine for a minimum of two years preceding the conflict in 1948 and who, as a result of this conflict, lost both his home and means of livelihood and took refuge, in 1948, in one of the countries where UNRWA provides relief. Refugees within this definition or the children

or grandchildren of such refugees are eligible for agency assistance if they are (a) registered with UNRWA, (b) living in the area of UNRWA’s operations, and (c) in need. [This and subsequent footnotes are part of the report.]

3 Information concerning the origin of the Agency and its mission and work will be found in the following annual reports and other United Nations documents:

A. Final report of the United Nations Economic Survey Mission for the Middle East (28 December 1949) (A/AC. 25/6, parts I and II).

B. Report of the Secretary-General on Assistance to Palestine Refugees: Official Records of the General


its ability to maintain its essential pro¬ grammes. Finance was, as in the previous two years, a persistent preoccupation of the Commissioner-General, and developments in the financial position are described below (see paragraphs 5 to 10 below). Latterly, the Commissioner-General was able to share this preoccupation with the Working Group established by General Assembly resolution

Assembly, Fourth Session, Ad Hoc Political Committee,

Annexes, vol. II (A/1060), p. 14.

C. Proposals for the continuation of United Nations

assistance to Palestine refugees. Documents submitted

by the Secretary-General to the fourteenth session

of the General Assembly (A/4121).

D. Report by the Secretary-General under General

Assembly resolution 2252 (ES-V) and Security Council

resolution 237 (1967) (A/6787).

E. Reports of the Director (Commissioner-General)

of UNRWA and special reports of the Director and

Advisory Commission to the General Assembly:

(i) Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifth

Session, Supplement Mo. 19 (A/1451/Rev. 1);

(ii) Ibid., Sixth Session, Supplements Nos. 16 and 16A

(A/1905 and Add.l);

(iii) Ibid., Seventh Session, Supplements Nos. 13 and 13A

t (A/2171 and Add.l);

(iv) : Ibid., Eighth Session, Supplements Nos. 12 and 12A

. (A/2470 and Add.l);

(v) Ibid., Ninth Session, Supplements Nos. 17 and 17A

(A/2717 and Add.l);

(vi) ilbid., Tenth Session, Supplements Nos. 15 and 15A

(A/2978 and Add.l);

(vii) Ibid., Eleventh Session, Supplements Nos. 14 and 14A

(A/3212 and Add.l;;

(viii) Ibid., Twelfth Session, Supplement No. 14 (A/3686

and A/3735);

(ix) Ibid., Thirteenth Session, Supplement No. 14 (A/3931

and A/3948);

(x) Ibid., Fourteenth Session, Supplement No. 14 (A/

4213);

(xi) Ibid., Fifteenth Session, Supplement No. 14 (A/4478);

(xii) Ibid., Sixteenth Session, Supplement No. 14 (A/4861);

(xiii) Ibid., Seventeenth Session, Supplement No. 14 (A/

5214);

(xiv) Ibid., Eighteenth Session. Supplement .No. 13 (A/5513);

(xv) Ibid., Nineteenth Session, Supplement No. 13 (A/

5813);

(xvi) Ibid., Twentieth Session, Supplement No. 13 (A/6013);

(xvii) Ibid., Twenty-first Session, Supplement No. 13 (A/

6313);

(xviii) Ibid., Twenty-second Session, Supplement No. 13

(A/6713);

(xix) A/6723 and Add.l and Add.l/Corr.l. For the

printed text, see Official Records of the Security

2656 (XXV) “to study all aspects of the financing of the Agency”; “to present an interim report to the General Assembly, not later than 14 December 1970, containing its recommendations on possible measures to be taken to prevent a reduction of the Agency’s services in 1971”; “in the interval between the twenty-fifth and twenty-sixth sessions of the General Assembly, to assist,

Council, Twenty-second Tear, Supplement for April, May

and June 1967, documents S/8001 and Add.l;

(xx) A/6787 and Corr.l;

(xxi) A/7060;

(xxii) Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-

third Session, Supplement No. 13 (A/7213);

(xxiii) Ibid., Twenty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 14

(A/7614);

(xxiv) Ibid., Twenty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 13 (A/

8013);

(xxv) Ibid., Twenty-fifth Session, Annexes, agenda item

35, documents A/8084 and Add.l.

F. Report of the Working Group on the Financing of

• UNRWA (A/8264).

G. Pertinent General Assembly resolutions:

194 (III) of 11 December 1948*; 212 (III) of 19 Novem¬

ber 1948;

302 (IV) of 8 December 1949; 393 (V) of 2 December

1950;

513 (VI) of 26 January 1952; 614 (VII) of 6 November

1952;

720 (VIII) of 27 November 1953; 818 (IX) of 4

December 1954;

916 (X) of 3 December 1955; 1018 (XI) of 28 February

1957;

1191 (XII) of 12 December 1957; 1315 (XIII) of

12 December 1958;

1456 (XIV) of 9 December 1959; 1604 (XV) of 21

April 1961;

1725 (XVI) of 20 December 1961; 1856 (XVII) of

20 December 1962;

1912 (XVIII) of 3 December 1963; 2002 (XIX) of

10 February 1965;

2052 (XX) of 15 December 1965; 2154 (XXI) of

17 November 1966;

2252 (ES-V) of 4July 1967; 2341 (XXII) of 19 Decem¬

ber 1967;

2452 (XXIII) of 19 December 1968; 2535 (XXIV)

of 10 December 1969;

2656 (XXV) of 7 December 1970; 2672 (XXV) of 8

December 1970;

2728 (XXV) of 15 December 1970.

H. Pertinent Security Council resolutions:

237 (14 June 1967); 242 (22 November 1967).

I. Pertinent Economic and Social Council resolution:

1565 (L) of 3 May 1971.

UNITED NATIONS 605

as appropriate, the Secretary-General and the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East in reaching solu¬ tions to the problems posed by the Agency’s financial crisis,” and “in consultation with the Secretary-General, the Commissioner- General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East and the specialized agencies, to present a comprehensive report on all aspects of the financing of the Agency to the General Assembly at its twenty-sixth session.” Since the Working Group’s estab¬ lishment, the Commissioner-General has maintained close contact, either directly or through the Agency’s Liaison Office at United Nations Headquarters in New York, with the Chairman (Ambassador Nuri Eren of Turkey) and representatives of the other Member States in the Group (France, Ghana, Japan, Lebanon, Norway, Trinidad and Tobago, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America). In May 1971, Dr. Laurence Michelmore retired as Commis¬ sioner-General after more than seven years’ service in this capacity and 25 years’ service with the United Nations. He was succeeded by Sir John Rennie, who had been Deputy Commissioner-General since November 1968.

2. The Commissioner-General hopes that the Agency’s financial crisis and the concern for the Agency’s future it has generated may have led to a wider understanding both of the plight of the Palestine refugees and of the nature of the Agency’s opera¬ tions. An emphasis on “UNRWA camps” and on “relief,” while correctly conveying

an impression of the refugees’ displacement from their traditional homes and of their continuing need for help, has also contributed to certain misconceptions. It has not always been realized that UNRWA provides services in rather than administers “camps” (in which only 40 per cent of registered refugees live); that the “camps” are not extra-terri¬ torial areas under United Nations jurisdic¬ tion; that the inhabitants are normally free to move in and out now, as in the past; and that the responsibility for the maintenance

of law and order rests not with UNRWA, but with the Governments of the host countries of Jordan, Syria and Lebanon and with the Government of Israel, as the occupying Power, in the occupied territories of the West Bank and Gaza. Emphasis on “relief,” on the other hand, has sometimes been taken to imply that the Palestine refugees have been maintained in idleness, a misconcep¬ tion that should have been dispelled by chapter III, section “O,” of the annual report of the Secretary-General on the work of the Organization for 1967 1968.1 This emphasis has also tended to obscure the Agency’s constructive programmes of educa¬ tion and training, which in 1971 account for about 47 per cent of expenditure and which both form the foundation for individual rehabilitation and contribute to economic and social development in many Arab coun¬ tries. The threat to these programmes present¬ ed by the financial crisis has at least made better known their scale and their importance to the Palestine refugees.

3. The cease-fire along the Suez Canal, the resumption of Dr. Jarring’s mission and other moves towards the negotiation of a peaceful settlement, the varying fortunes

of the fedayeen movements and the reactions of Governments in the region, the death of President Abdel Nasser, the continuing Israeli occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip; these events and others that stirred the emotions of the Palestine refugees, raising or dashing their hopes, formed the background against which the Agency pursued its task. As is now usual, on several occasions during the year the Agency’s operations were disrupted by violence.

4. Despite more frequent public recogni¬ tion of the need to take account of the legitimate rights of the Palestine refugees in any political settlement, and the adoption of resolution 2672 C (XXV) by which the General Assembly recognized the entitle¬ ment of the people of Palestine to “equal rights and self-determination in accordance

1 Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-third

Session, Supplement No. 1 (A/7201), chapter III, section

O.


with the Charter of the United Nations55 and declared that “full respect for the inalienable rights of the people of Palestine is an indispensable element in the establish¬ ment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East,55 there was by the end of the year little to lessen the frustrations of the refugees. The General Assembly at the same session called again on the Government of Israel to take immediate steps for the return of those displaced from their homes and camps but, although many were able to visit the occupied West Bank from east Jordan, there was, apart from the issue of a limited number of permits in cases of family reunion or special hardship, no change in the situation as regards return for residence; and a fifth year of separation from the West Bank, Gaza and the Quneitra area of Syria began in June for over 200,000 registered refugees (and for large numbers of other displaced persons) in east Jordan and in Syria. The day seemed as distant as ever when effect would be given to the General Assembly’s resolution (paragraph 11 of resolution 194 (III)), adopted over 20 years ago, on 11 December 1948, and referred to in subsequent resolutions, “that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible....55

Finance 5. The nature of the Agency’s financial

problem was described in paragraphs 22 and 23 of the report for 1968—19691 and paragraph 9 of the report for 1969— 1970:2 a growing school population and rising unit costs set against an income which had been increasing less rapidly and a declining work¬ ing reserve, with, as a result, a precarious

1 Ibid., Twenty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 14 (A/7614).

2 Ibid., Twenty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 13 (A/8013).

cash position and the threat of substantial reductions in services. In view of the conse¬ quences for the Palestine refugees, the Govern¬ ments of the host countries and the Agency if this threat became a reality, the Commis¬ sioner-General welcomed the establishment by the General Assembly of the Working Group whose terms of reference are given in paragraph 1 above.

6. The Working Group made an interim report3 to the General Assembly at its twenty- fifth session after having held five meetings between 9 and 14 December 1970. The Group agreed that there should be con¬ centration on the formulation of recommenda¬ tions on possible measures to prevent reduc¬ tion of the Agency’s services. It noted the existence of a cash or liquidity crisis as well as a longer-term budgetary problem and recom¬ mended, inter alia, that the General Assembly should make a renewed appeal to Govern¬ ments to contribute for the first time or to increase their contributions and to make early payments; that the General Assembly should authorize the Secretary-General to make advances from the Working Capital Fund for short-term assistance to meet the liquidity crisis; that the Secretary-General should be requested to make available to the maximum extent possible facilities of the Office of Public Information in order to disseminate information on the Agency’s humanitarian work; and that the General Assembly should urge all organizations of the United Nations system to study ways by which they might assist UNRWA or undertake activities helpful to the refugees which would lessen the financial burden of UNRWA, and also should request the Working Group to continue consultations with executive heads of other international agencies and United Nations programmes. The General Assembly, in resolution 2728 (XXV), endorsed the Working Group’s recommendations.

7. On 1 January 1971, the Director-General of UNESCO, with the authority of the Executive Board of UNESCO, launch¬ ed an appeal for the funds necessary for

3 Ibid., Twenty-fifth Session, Annexes, agenda item 35,

document A/8264.

UNITED NATIONS 607

maintaining and expanding the education services for Palestine refugees, which he described as “the most ambitious educational undertaking under international administra¬ tion”; and in which UNESCO has been associated with UNRWA for over 20 years, “in order to provide these refugees with the education to which they have a right and thus equip them intellectually and morally to assume their basic human dignity and freedom despite the adverse circumstances in which they are fated to live.5 51 The Director- General appointed, as a Special Consultant in connexion with his appeal, Ambassador Mansour Khalid (Permanent Representative of the Sudan to the United Nations), who has since been undertaking a series of visits to solicit contributions from Governments and private organizations. By 30 June 1971, contributions amounting to $ 964,083 had been received or pledged in specific response to the appeal, in addition to other contri¬ butions on which the appeal may also have had an influence.

8. The Agency’s financial year 1970 even¬ tually closed with a deficit of nearly $4.9 million,1 2 * income being above earlier estimates, but expenditure also being higher because of increased prices and wages and unforeseen emergency costs arising out of local distur¬ bances. Thanks to early payment by a number of Governments of all or part of their con¬ tributions for 1971, the threatened cash crisis at the beginning of 1971 was averted, but the Agency entered the new financial year with a prospective deficit of about $5.5 million.2 By 30 June 1971, on the best estimate then possible, the deficit had been reduced to about $2.4 million.2 This en¬ couraging improvement was the result of the various appeals made in the course of the twenty-fifth session of the General Assembly, action by UNESCO, and the efforts of the Chairman and his colleagues on the Working

1 For the text of the appeal, see UNESCO document

87 EX/9, annex.

2 These figures take account of the inclusion in expen¬

diture of provision for subsidies to certain Governments

(see paragraphs 199 and 200 of section F in chapter

I [in the text of the report]).

Group, which were together responsible for an increase in estimated income of $4.6 million, against which had to be offset an estimated increase in expenditure of $1.5 million. This increase in income included an allocation of food-stuffs from the World Food Programme’s emergency resources made in response to an agreed application by one of the Governments of the host countries after consultation between the Chairman of the Working Group, the Director-General of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and the United Nations/FAO Intergovernmental Committee of the World Food Programme.

9. Other helpful developments were two resolutions, one Economic and Social Council resolution 1565 (L), adopted on 3 May 1971, “requesting the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the executive heads of spe¬ cialized agencies, the Executive Director of the United Nations Children’s Fund and the Administrator of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) as well as the non-governmental organizations con¬ cerned to continue to consider appropriate ways and means of rendering all possible assistance to the Palestine refugees” and further requesting them “to include in their annual reports information on their possible present and future assistance to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Pales¬ tine Refugees in the Near East and on their activities that benefit the Palestine refugees;” the other, resolution WHA24.32, adopted on 18 May 1971 by the World Health As¬ sembly, requesting “the Director-General of WHO to intensify and expand its programme of health assistance to the refugees and displaced persons in the Middle East to the amount of at least one million dollars” from funds to be provided outside WHO’s regular budget by means of special voluntary con¬ tributions, and deciding that “meanwhile emergency assistance to the maximum extent possible be given to the refugees and the displaced persons in the Middle East.”4

4 For the texts of the resolutions, [published as annex II

to the report, see Documents 432 and 437 below].


10. In view of the progress made towards reducing the Agency’s deficit for 1971, and after consultation with the Chairman of the Working Group at Agency headquarters in Beirut in March, the Commissioner-Gen¬ eral deferred new reductions in services in order to allow time for the efforts of the Working Group and others to fructify. Bearing in mind that subsidies to Governments were already being withheld and that the orderly transfer of sanitation services to Governments would be dependent on their consent, the amount that could have been saved (at the expense of the refugees’ welfare) by new reductions at that stage without touching either basic health services or education services would have been less than $0.5 million in 1971. (In reference to reductions in administrative expenses attention is invited to paragraph 32 of the introduction to the report of the Commissioner-General for 1968— 1969.)1 The Commissioner-General believes that, especially in the circumstances des¬ cribed in the preceding paragraph, such reductions would have been regarded as an unjustified prejudgement of the success that might attend the Working Group’s efforts and would have aroused controversy and turmoil detrimental to those efforts. It must be recognized, however, that the price of continued deferment may be further inroads into the Agency’s slender working reserve.

11. In reporting to the Working Group on the financial situation at the end of May, the Commissioner-General invited the Group’s attention to the ominous outlook for 1972. The budget estimates in chapter II below show that, on the basis of the pro¬ grammes in the 1971 budget, expenditure will be of the order of $ 51.1 million because of the increase in school population and higher costs, including an expected increase in the price of flour that will add over $1 million. Assuming income at the level now estimated for 1971 (but deducting the one¬ time World Food Programme allocation of food-stuffs), there will be on that basis a deficit in excess of $6 million.2 It is clear,

1 Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fourth

Session, Supplement No. 14 (A/7614), para. 32.

2 See footnote to paragraph 8.

therefore, that unless there is the assurance of a substantial increase in the Agency’s income, most of the reductions referred to in the statement made by the Commissioner- General to the Special Political Committee on 1 December 19703 will be inevitable and that, as he then emphasized, education services will necessarily be included.

General operations 12. In Lebanon, the occupation of Agency

property, to which reference was made in paragraph 16 of the introduction to the report for 1969-19704 continues. The Agency has made repeated representations to the Govern¬ ment on this matter, so far without effect, and has also drawn attention to the risks to which the withdrawal of Government autho¬ rity from camp areas has exposed the Agency and its staff and to their longer-term implica¬ tions for the efficiency of operations.

13. On the positive side, there has been an improvement in the situation at the Siblin Training Centre in Lebanon, where, as mentioned in last year’s report,5 strikes by students and staff and a virtual breakdown in discipline were a cause of concern. For the academic year 1970-1971, the Centre was placed on a non-residential basis and there was no new intake. The Centre has operated satisfactorily during the year and a new intake of students can be accepted in 1971- 1972.

14. In the Syrian Arab Republic, con¬ struction of concrete block shelters for the refugees in the Syrian emergency camps6 was begun in February this year at the Sbneih Camp (outside Damascus), and the programme will be extended to other camps as well to replace worn-out tents. The project will cost approximately $400,000 and will be financed partly from the special contribution for 1971 made by the Government of the

3 For the text of the statement, see A/SPG/SR.738.

4 Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fifth


5 Ibid., para. 17.

6 Ibid., para. 14.

UNITED NATIONS 609

Federal Republic of Germany1 and partly from private donations.

15. The confrontation between the Jordan¬ ian Government and the Palestinian or¬ ganizations referred to in last year’s report2 reached a climax in September 1970, when there was sustained fighting between the Army and the fedayeen on a scale that involved the use of artillery and tanks. The Agency’s operations in east Jordan were completely suspended for a period of 10 days, from 17 to 27 September 1970.

16. The Amman area was particularly affected by the conflict. There were heavy casualties, many of them among refugees, and large parts of the New Amman (Wahdat) Camp and its periphery were very severely damaged. There were casualties and damage also in the Jebel Hussein Camp in Amman and in Zerka and Irbed Camps, though not to the same extent as in the New Amman Camp. Public services, such as the telephone service and the electricity, power and water supplies ceased, and movement on the streets was prevented by fighting and, later, curfews. Agency staff in Jordan were unable to communicate with each other, or indeed anyone else, during those 10 days. In all, 13 Agency employees were killed between September and November.

17. From past experience with emergency situations, the Agency knew that the most valuable contribution it could make would be to restore its essential services. As quickly as possible, therefore, the Jordan Field Office set about restoring the food, medical and health services on which a large part of east Jordan’s population—and almost half, and the needier half of the population of Amman— are, to a greater or lesser degree, dependent. Agency flour was also made available to needy non-refugees against eventual replace¬ ment by the Government, so as to tide the general population over the crisis. At the beginning of the emergency, there was a

1 For further details, see chapter I, “Camps and shelter”

[of the text of the report],



pressing need for prepared meals, as many people had neither fuel, water nor the time to bake bread from their flour rations and the main bakeries were out of action. In these circumstances, UNRWA’s emergency convoys from the West Bank, under the protection of the International Committee of the Red Cross, met a vital need. The first convoys, which brought sandwiches or hot meals and fresh food, also included gifts and voluntary contributions by many groups and individual Palestinians in the West Bank, including Agency staff members. The UNRWA/UNESCO Wadi Seer Vocational Training Centre, just outside Amman, was made available as a temporary convalescent hospital. Schools were reopened as quickly as possible in tents, pending the urgent repair of school buildings, some of which had suffered severe damage. (For the extent of damage and losses incurred by the Agency, see paragraph 59.) The Irbed area was directly supplied with flour from the Agency’s stocks in Damascus, owing to difficulties of movement between Amman and Irbed. The Agency was also able to help in other ways, such as by advising and co-operating with other agencies in emergency work, by lending supplies and vehicles and by making available its facilities for distribution.

18. It is an indication of the seriousness of the situation at the time in Jordan that the Agency was completely immobilized for a longer period than ever before (even at the time of the hostilities in June 1967 the suspen¬ sion of Agency operations in the affected areas was of very limited duration and communications were hardly interrupted). The emergency in Jordan clearly showed the importance to the whole community of the Agency’s logistical services.

19. During the year under report, members of the Agency’s staff in Jordan were detained for varying periods, all but three after the September fighting. In some instances, the authorities entered the Agency’s premises to make the arrests. There have been other instances of entry into and even occupation of Agency premises by both sides during the fighting in September. Parts of some premises were under occupation by the


Jordanian authorities on 30 June 1971. Pro¬ tests have been made to the Government.

20. A significant development for the Agency has been the return of Palestine refugees to the irrigated part of the Jordan valley, which had been abandoned by them in 1968 because of military activities there. The Agency was asked by the Jordanian Government to retore services to refugees in the area, but was obliged to reply that, while it would transfer services where possible, it could not in its present financial situation afford to establish new services. Elsewhere in Jordan, which has the highest number of refugees, the events of September and their consequences adversely affected prospects for employment.

21. The Agency’s operations in Gaza were affected in January 1971 by the impact of security measures of unusual severity taken by the Israeli authorities after a deterioration in the security situation caused by persisting violence in which both Arabs and Israelis lost their lives. Stringent curfews were im¬ posed, and part of the Beach Gamp was cordoned off from 4 to 30 January 1971 while interrogations and searches, involving some demolition of shelters, took place. A number of refugees left the camp, but were allowed to return later. The Israeli authorities also issued an order declaring all camps to be closed areas, entry into and exit out of which would be regulated, but it has not so far been enforced strictly except when security opera¬ tions have been in progress. Agency services in Beach Camp were interrupted between

4 and 7 January, but it was possible thereafter to distribute monthly rations at the normal level, and to increase supplementary feeding during the period of greatest difficulty.

22. The problems, referred to in last year’s report,1 relating to the arrest and detention of staff members in occupied territories con¬ tinued to concern the Agency, but there were fewer cases. There were again several instances of violation of the Agency’s privileges and immunities in these territories, particular¬ ly in Gaza. The Israeli authorities, on some

1 Ibid., para. 13. For the number of cases of arrests

and detention of staff members in the year under report,

see paragraph 161 [of the text of the report].

occasions, used Agency school compounds for screening refugees and, on other occasions, entered into other Agency installations without authority.

23. In the West Bank, which has now a smaller labour force than before 1967, the rate of economic activity continued its revival and unemployment diminished. To some extent this diminution was due to the increas¬ ing employment of workers from the West Bank in Israel. Against higher wage rates must be set a substantially higher cost of living, which rose again sharply as a result of fiscal measures in August 1970 and bore heavily on those unable to work. A feature of the Gaza economy also was increased employment in Israel, and citrus production was higher. There was no significant move¬ ment of refugees from Gaza to the West Bank.

❖ ❖

24. In addition to the information given in chapter I below, it may be appropriate to refer briefly in this introduction to health, education and the Agency’s relations with other organizations.

Health 25. The Agency’s health programme, com¬

prising preventive, curative and environ¬ mental sanitation services, has been main¬ tained, as in past years, at a level comparable with the provision made by the Governments of the Arab host countries for their own populations. These services are buttressed by the programme of supplementary feeding and milk distribution designed to protect the nutritional state of such vulnerable groups as children and nursing mothers, with special attention to the emergency camps. (It should be noted that because of ration ceilings, many children do not receive the basic ration.) The value of the health programme was well demonstrated by the relatively low incidence of cholera among the refugees during the outbreak in the Middle East in the latter half of 1970. The network of Agency clinics, the school health service, and the environ¬ mental sanitation services enabled greater vigilance to be exercised in community and personal hygiene and mass vaccination to be

UNITED NATIONS 611

rapidly carried out. These preventive mea¬ sures have continued in 1971. The Com¬ missioner-General would like to record his appreciation of the co-operation received by the Agency in this matter from the Ministries of Health of the Governments of the host countries and the Israeli health authorities in the occupied territories. Given the crowded conditions of refugee camps, the risk to the health both of the refugee population and the population at large in the host countries would be serious if the Agency’s health services had to be reduced.

Education

26. Somewhat surprisingly, in view of the difficulties experienced in the previous school year, the UNRWA/UNESCO education and training services had on the whole a good record of work and achievement in 1970-1971 despite the disturbances in east Jordan, which reached a climax in September, and a continuing tense security situation in Gaza throughout the year. A compensating factor in the Agency’s schools in the Strip was the delivery of large quantities of school texts from the United Arab Republic, which undoubtedly boosted the morale of both teachers and students. The West Bank schools also benefited from text book deliveries and, in total, UNRWA/UNESCO schools in the occupied territories received approximately half a million copies of the texts they had lacked since 1967. These deliveries, made with the agreement of the Government of Israel, and representing what the Director- General of UNESCO described as an “85 per cent success” so far, were the result of his persistent efforts to break the deadlock, described in previous reports, in the dispute over textbooks banned by the Government of Israel.

27. Throughout the Agency’s area of operations, the steady growth pattern of the education and training services, to which reference was made in last year’s report, continued in 1970-1971; total enrolments in all sectors of the Agency’s own programme is approaching the quarter million mark, the number of class teachers, teacher-training and vocational-training instructors has passed

the 7,000 mark and the number of schools and centres exceeds 500. Details of the Agency’s school and training centre building programmes, which are given in paragraph 105 below, underline perhaps better than anything else the paradoxical situation in which the Agency now finds itself: on the one hand, in doubt whether sufficient funds can be found to meet the recurrent cost of maintaining in its entirety the education system necessary for the admission to its schools of all eligible children seeking entry; on the other, committed by need and the availability of funds from special contribu¬ tions to a large programme of capital works.

28. Details are given in paragraphs 133 to 135 below of the Agency’s in-service teacher training programme operated by the UNRWA/UNESCO Institute of Education from its headquarters in Beirut. The Institute had a very successful year’s work; it has now involved about three-quarters of the Agency’s teaching force and is progressively extending its training to the higher cadres. It is beginning, also, to exercise a professional influence beyond the limits of the Agency’s own operations. Reference is made in para¬ graph 141 below to the assistance rendered this year to the Jordanian Ministry of Educa¬ tion, which sent a team of its officials to Beirut in May 1971 to study the Institute’s methods and techniques with a view to applying a similar pattern of in-service teacher training in Jordan in 1971 1972 and sub¬ sequent years.

Relations with other organs of

the United Nations system

29. As in the past, UNESCO and WHO have collaborated with UNRWA in the conduct of the education and health pro¬ grammes, and their participation has assured the professional competence of UNRWA’s policy and activities in these two fields. For the second year in succession UNRWA and UNESCO co-operated closely in the supervision under UNESCO responsibility of the Gaza secondary school examination. Details of the 1970 examination are given in paragraph 111 below and plans are far advanced to hold the third of this series of


examinations in July 1971. The assistance by the Institute of Education to the Ministry of Education of the Government of Jordan mentioned in the preceding paragraph was given in co-operation with UNICEF.

30. As has been described in paragraphs 7 to 9 above, UNESCO and FAO (through the World Food Programme) contributed to the reduction in the Agency’s deficit for 1971. In the light of a World Health Assembly resolution, WHO is considering how the Agency could be further helped, and discussions are taking place with UNDP on the possibility of financial assistance for appropriate UNRWA projects from the Special Fund.

31. The Agency’s accounts for 19701 have been audited by the United Nations Board of Auditors and their report will be reviewed by the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions and the Fifth Committee of the General Assembly.

Assistance from voluntary agencies and other non-governmental organizations

32. In his report of last year, the Com¬ missioner-General recorded his gratitude to the many voluntary agencies, organizations and individuals who, in response to appeals for assistance, made it possible for the Agency to carry out programmes which might other¬ wise have been allowed to lapse. The names of the donors are noted in the appropriate sections throughout this report and include the Near East Emergency Donations, Inc. (NEED), an American organization; the Australian Care for Refugees (AUSTCARE); the Unitarian Service Committee of Canada; the French Red Cross; the Council of Or¬ ganizations for Relief Services Overseas, Inc. (CORSO), New Zealand; the Norwegian Refugee Council; The Swedish Save the Children Federation (Radda Barnen); the Arabian American Oil Company (ARAMCO); OXFAM, the United King¬ dom; the American Near East Refugee Aid, Inc. (ANERA); the Lutheran World Federa¬ tion; the World Council of Churches; the

1 Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-sixth

Session, Supplement No. 7C (A/8407/Add.3).

Near East Council of Churches; and the Pontifical Mission for Palestine. Contribu¬ tions made direct to UNRWA from all non¬ governmental sources are shown in table 21 of annex I.

33. The Commissioner-General wishes to pay tribute to the prompt and effective help rendered by the voluntary agencies operating in the region (see table 18 of annex I) and those based elsewhere. Their continued, generous assistance is deeply appreciated.

Summary and conclusion 34. While the pressures referred to in para¬ graph 30 of the previous year’s report2 eased, operational difficulties again beset the Agency during the 12 months ending on 30 June 1971. These difficulties were on occasion acute and the Agency once more demonstrated its ability to serve the Palestine refugees well in time of emergency. The need for the Agency’s regular programmes continued to be felt by the refugees and to be acknowledged by the authorities in all areas of operation. In the absence of tangible progress towards a peaceful settlement, it seems inconceivable that these programmes could be dispensed with, and that, for instance, children could be turned away from the schools or protective feeding and other health care denied to them. Nevertheless, the threat to the maintenance of Agency programmes has not receded, expenditure on them cannot be held steady while numbers and costs continue to rise, and special appeals are likely to show diminishing returns if repeated year after year.

35. The current mandate of the Agency will expire on 30 June 1972. It will therefore fall to the General Assembly at its twenty- sixth session to decide whether the mandate should be renewed and, if so, for how long. The Assembly will also have before it the report of the Working Group on the Agency’s finances. The one item can hardly be con¬ sidered in isolation from the other. An assurance of adequate finance over the period of the mandate is required if the Assembly’s

2 Ibid., Twenty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 13 (A/8013), para. 30.

UNITED NATIONS 613

view is that the Agency should continue on its present lines and with its present pro¬ grammes because it is necessary so long as the future of the Palestine refugees is not

resolved, and its disappearance would cause unacceptable hardship and remove an es¬ sential element of stability. To meet deficits from the working balance is no longer possible.

Special Documents Submitted to the General Assembly

409

Report of the United Nations Special Committee To Investigate Israeli Practices

Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories1

September, 1971

CONTENTS Paragraphs

Letter of transmittal

REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE ISRAELI PRACTICES AFFECTING THE HUMAN RIGHT'S OF THE POPULATION OF THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

INTRODUCTION . 1-5

I. ORGANIZATION OF THE WORK OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE . 6-32

II. MANDATE OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE. 33-34 III. ANALYSIS OF EVIDENCE. 35-71

A. Allegations of annexation and settlement. 44—48 B. Allegations of deportation . 49-51 C. Demolition of houses and eradication of villages. 52-58 D. Allegations of ill-treatment while under detention . 59-67 E. Administrative detention. 68 F. Other allegations. 69—71

IV. FINDINGS .. 72-83 V. RECOMMENDATIONS. 84-91

VI. ADOPTION OF THE REPORT. 92

ANNEXES

I. LIST OF SECURITY COUNCIL AND GENERAL ASSEMBLY [not published DOCUMENTS CIRCULATING LETTERS FROM here] THE GOVERNMENTS OF ISRAEL, JORDAN, SYRIA AND THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC CONCERNING THE SITUATION IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

II. LIST OF WITNESSES APPEARING BEFORE THE SPECIAL [not published COMMITTEE IN OPEN MEETING here]

1 Text (excluding the annexes which are not reproduced here ) of the 1971 report of the Special Committee as transmitted

by Chairman H.S. Amerasinghe on September 17 to Secretary-General U Thant and in turn by him to the General

Assembly, and published on October 5, 1971; U.N. doc. A/8389.

614

UNITED NATIONS 615

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

17 September 1971

His Excellency U Thant Secretary-General of the United Nations New York, New York

Sir, The Special Committee to Investigate

Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories has the honour to present the attached report to you as requested by the General Assembly in resolution 2727 (XXV). The report has been formulated in accordance with the terms of General Assembly resolutions 2443 (XXIII), 2546 (XXIV) and 2727 (XXV).

In operative paragraph 4 of resolution 2727 (XXV) the General Assembly urged the Government of Israel to receive the Special Committee, co-operate with it and facilitate its work. The Special Committee has to report with regret that the Government of Israel continues to ignore this appeal for its co-operation, as well as a similar appeal contained in General Assembly resolution 2443 (XXIII).

Although the Government of Israel’s refusal to co-operate with the Special Committee and allow it access to the occupied territories has constituted a major obstacle in the discharge of its mandate, other means of ascertaining facts regarding the situation in the occupied territories, and of executing the mandate entrusted to it by the General Assembly, have been available. The Special Committee has not allowed itself, therefore, to be deterred from discharging what it considers to be an essentially humanitarian duty. It has consciously sought to separate the humanitarian aspects of the problem, which are its primary concern, from the political issues involved.

The Special Committee has kept abreast of developments in the occupied territories throughout the period since its first visit to the Middle East in 1970. Persistent and serious allegations by the Jordanian Govern¬ ment regarding the continued violation of the human rights of the population of the

occupied territories, and the express desire of the Jordanian Government that the Special Committee should visit Jordan in order to hear further evidence of persons who had been deported and of persons who complained of ill-treatment at the hands of the occupying authorities, led the Special Committee to decide on a visit to Amman and Beirut in order to record such evidence.

The evidence presented to the Special Committee during its investigation in 1971 has confirmed its impression that policies and practices violating the human rights of the population of the occupied territories, which it discovered in 1970, have continued and have become even more manifest. This applies especially to the policies of settlement and of annexation of certain territories at present under the Israeli occupation; ex¬ amples of the policy of settlement are the Golan Heights and certain parts of the West Bank, while Eastern Jerusalem provides a clear instance of the policy of annexation. The very fact of the existence of such policies, openly admitted and proclaimed by members of the Government of Israel and by Israeli leaders, is, in the Special Committee’s opinion, a grave violation of the human rights of the population of the occupied territories.

The Special Committee is convinced that the most pressing need at the moment is an effective arrangement to safeguard the human rights of the population of the occupied territories. If such an arrangement is to fulfil its real purpose it must provide for the representation of the interests of all parties concerned, including those persons who are not nationals of any State party to the con¬ flict and whose rights are subject to violation by the occupation authorities.

In paragraph 3 of resolution 2727 (XXV) the General Assembly requested the Special Committee to consult, as appropriate, with the International Committee of the Red Cross in order to ensure the safeguarding of the human rights of the population of the occupied territories. In accordance with this request the Special Committee addressed the ICRG, requesting certain information as well as the ICRC’s views on “the possibility of a con¬ certed effort . . . being made in order to secure


an arrangement that would contribute towards a more effective implementation of human rights without, of course, unduly hampering the Occupying Power in the execution of its obligations”. The correspon¬ dence which was exchanged between the Special Committee and the ICRC is repro¬ duced in the report. Despite the Special Committee’s efforts, it was not possible to hold formal meetings with the ICRC. The informal exchange of views suggested by the ICRC is not, in the Special Committee’s view, an appropriate way of dealing with a subject of this importance.

The plight of the refugees—persons who have been deprived of their homes and denied the right to return to them and who are, therefore, victims of the violation of the most fundamental of human rights—and the tone of bitterness and despair which marked every reference of theirs to the United Nations’ failure to protect their human rights, have created a profound and disturbing impression on the Special Committee.

The Special Committee has continued to receive from you and from the members of the staff of the United Nations who have been associated with it in its work a degree of co-operation and a measure of assistance in the best traditions of the international civil service, and acknowledges with sincere thanks this valuable contribution to the fulfilment of its mandate.

Accept, Sir, on my behalf and on behalf of my two colleagues on the Special Com¬ mittee, the assurances of our highest con¬ sideration.

(Signed) H.S. Amerasinghe

Chairman Special Committee to Investigate

Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories

INTRODUCTION

1. The Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories was established by the General Assembly in resolution 2443 (XXIII), adopted at its 1748th plenary meeting on 19 December 1968. The following Member States were appointed on 12 September 1969 to serve on the Special Committee: Ceylon, Somalia and Yugoslavia.

2. The Government of Ceylon appointed Mr. H.S. Amerasinghe, Permanent Repre¬ sentative of Ceylon to the United Nations, to represent Ceylon on the Special Com¬ mittee. The Government of the Somali Democratic Republic appointed Mr. Abdulrahim Abby Farah, Permanent Repre¬ sentative of Somalia to the United Nations, to represent Somalia on the Special Com¬ mittee. The Government of Yugoslavia appointed Dr. Borut Bohte, Associate Pro¬ fessor of the Faculty of Law of Ljubljana University and member of the Federal As¬ sembly of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, as the representative of Yugoslavia on the Special Committee. On 24 June 1971, the Government of the Somali Democratic Republic informed the Secretary- General that Mr. Hussein Nur-Elmi, Am¬ bassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, had been appointed to act instead of Mr. A.A. Farah on the Special Committee.

3. The General Assembly in resolution 2546 (XXIV), adopted at its 1829th plenary meeting on 11 December 1969, reaffirmed its resolutions relating to the violations of human rights in the territories occupied by Israel; expressed its grave concern at the continuing reports of violation of human rights in those territories; and condemned such policies and practices as collective and area punishment, the destruction of homes and the deportation of the inhabitants of the territories occupied by Israel. The General Assembly urgently called upon the Govern¬ ment of Israel:

“to desist forthwith from its reported repressive practices and policies towards the civilian population in the occupied territories and to comply with its obligations

UNITED NATIONS 617

under the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the relevant resolutions adopted by the various international organizations”.

The Assembly requested the Special Com¬ mittee to take cognizance of the provisions of resolution 2546 (XXIV).

4. In pursuance of its mandate, the Special Committee in 1970 conducted an investiga¬ tion of the allegations of violations of human rights of the population of the occupied territories. Hearings were held by the Special Committee in London, Beirut, Damascus, Amman, Cairo, Geneva and New York, and the evidence of persons who claimed to have first-hand experience of breaches of human rights was recorded. The Special Committee also examined statements made by members of the Government of Israel and other Israeli political leaders, relevant to the allegations with which the Special Committee was concerned.

5. On 5 October 1970, the Special Com¬ mittee presented its first report to the Sec¬ retary-General in conformity with General Assembly resolution 2443 (XXIII). The Secretary-General made the report available to the General Assembly1 and, in accordance with the decision of the Assembly’s General Committee, the report was referred to the Special Political Committee. It was dis¬ cussed in that Committee at its 744th to 751st meetings from 7 to 11 December 1970 (A/SPC/SR.744-751). The report which the Special Political Committee presented to the General Assembly2 on 11 December 1970 included a draft resolution which the Committee recommended for adoption. On 15 December 1970, at its 1931st plenary meeting, the General Assembly adopted res¬ olution 2727 (XXV), inter alia renewing the mandate of the Special Committee. Resolu¬ tion 2727 (XXV) reads as follows:


Session, agenda item 101, document A/8089.

2 Ibid., Annexes, agenda item 101, document A/8237.

“ The General Assembly, “Guided by the purposes and principles

of the Charter of the United Nations, “Bearing in mind the provisions of the

Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the provisions of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949,3

“Recalling Security Council resolutions 237 (1967) of 14 June 1967 and 259 (1968) of 27 September 1968,

“Recalling also its resolutions 2252 (ES-V) of 4 July 1967, 2443 (XXIII) and 2452 A (XXIII) of 19 December 1968, 2535 B (XXIV) of 10 December 1969 and 2672 D (XXV) of 8 December 1970,

“Further recalling Commission on Human Rights resolutions 6 (XXIV) of 27 February 1968,4 6 (XXV) of 4 March 19695 and 10 (XXVI) of 23 March 1970,6 the telegram of 8 March 1968 dispatched by the Com¬ mission to the Israeli authorities,7 the relevant resolutions of the International Conference on Human Rights held at Teheran in 1968,8 Economic and Social Council resolution 1515 (XLVIII), adopted on 28 May 1970 on the recommendation of the Commission on the Status of Women,9 and the other relevant resolutions of the Economic and Social Coun¬ cil, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization and the World Health Organization,

“Having considered the report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices

3 United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 75 (1950), No. 973.

4 See Official Records of the Economic and Social Council,

Forty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 4 (E/4475), chapter

XVIII.

5 Ibid., Forty-sixth Session, document E/4621, chapter

XVIII.

6 Ibid., Forty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 5 (El4816),

chapter XXIII.

7 Ibid., Forty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 4 (E/4475),

para. 400

8 Final Act of the International Conference on Human Rights

(United Nations publication, Sales No.: E. 68.XIV.

2), chapter III.


Forty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 6 (E\4831), chapter

XIII, draft resolution VII.


Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories,1

“Noting with regret that the provisions of the above-mentioned resolutions have not been implemented by the Israeli authorities,

“Gravely concerned for the safety, welfare and security of the inhabitants of the Arab territories under military occupation by Israel,

“1. Expresses its sincere appreciation to the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Prac¬ tices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories and to its members for their efforts in performing the task assigned to them;

“2. Calls upon the Government of Israel im¬ mediately to implement the recommendations of the Special Committee embodied in its report and to comply with its obligations under the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the relevant resolutions adopted by the various inter¬ national organizations;

“3. Requests the Special Committee, pend¬ ing the early termination of the Israeli occupation of Arab territories, to continue its work and to consult, as appropriate, with the International Committee of the Red Cross in order to ensure the safeguarding of the human rights of the population of the occupied territories;

“4. Urges the Government of Israel to receive the Special Committee, co-operate with it and facilitate its work;

“5. Requests the Special Committee to report to the Secretary-General as soon as possible and whenever the need arises there¬ after ;

“6. Requests the Secretary-General to pro¬ vide the Special Committee with all the necessary facilities for the continued per¬ formance of its tasks;

“7. Decides to inscribe on the provisional agenda of its twenty-sixth session an item entitled ‘Report (or reports) of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories’.’5



I. ORGANIZATION OF THE WORK OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE

6. The Special Committee held a series of informal meetings at United Nations Headquarters in New York in January 1971, at which it was decided to request the parties concerned to furnish such further information concerning the policies and practices of the Government of Israel affecting the human rights of the population of the occupied territories as had become available since April 1970, when the Special Committee had visited the Middle East. The Special Com¬ mittee also decided to reconvene in May to examine the information made available and to decide whether it was necessary to under¬ take another field mission for the purpose of hearing further evidence.

7. The Special Committee continued its work under the rules of procedure reproduced in annex III of its first report to the Secretary- General (A/8089).

8. On 19 February 1971, the Special Committee addressed letters to the Permanent Representatives of Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and the United Arab Republic.

9. In its letter to the Permanent Repre¬ sentative of Israel, the Special Committee stated:

“The Special Committee has taken note that, according to statements made by delegates of Israel in the Third Committee and the Special Political Committee during the twenty-fifth session of the General As¬ sembly, the Government of Israel was in possession of information in rebuttal of certain allegations made before the Special Com¬ mittee. Particular reference was made to the case of Mr. Mohammed Derbas (A/C.3/SR. 1782, page 16). The Special Committee invites the Government of Israel to make available to it all evidence in its possession concerning Mr. Derbas as well as those cases referred to in its report to the General As¬ sembly (A/8089), and those contained in the records of testimony received by the Special Committee (A/AC. 145/RT. 1-41).

“The Special Committee feels that it is imperative, particularly in view of the nature of the evidence before it, to obtain all evidence

UNITED NATIONS 619

possible that might help to establish, in a convincing manner, the reality that exists in the occupied territories. In view of the above considerations, the Special Committee reiterates its request to the Government of Israel for its co-operation in the execution of the mandate to enter Israel and Israeli-held territories in order to carry out the appropriate investigations.”

10. The Special Committee wrote to the Permanent Representative of Jordan as follows:

“The Special Committee is in the course of organizing its work for 1971 and, in this connexion, it would appreciate receiving from your Government any information which has become available since the Special Com¬ mittee’s visit to Amman in April 1970, relevant to its mandate as contained in General Assembly resolutions 2443 (XXIII), 2546 (XXIV) and 2727 (XXV), with par¬ ticular reference to incidents occurring during the period since April 1970.

“The Special Committee has taken note of the various letters addressed by your Government to the President of the Security Council and to the Secretary-General, which have been circulated as documents of the General Assembly and the Security Council, in particular those communications in which names of individuals who had allegedly been deported after being ill-treated were men¬ tioned (S/9868, S/9885, S/9919, S/10073 and S/10074). The Special Committee would appreciate receiving any statements recorded from the individuals mentioned in these documents indicating, where possible, sources where such statements could be corroborated. The Special Committee would also be grateful to have any indication of the whereabouts of Mr. Taysir Kuba’a who, according to a report appearing in the Jerusalem Post on 18 January 1971, was deported after serving a three-year jail term.”

11. The Special Committee wrote to the Permanent Representative of Lebanon as follows:

“The Special Committee is in the course of organizing its work for 1971 and, in this connexion, would appreciate receiving from

your Government any information which has become available since the Special Com¬ mittee’s visit to Beirut in April 1970, relevant to its mandate as contained in General Assembly resolutions 2443 (XXIII), 2546 (XXIV) and 2727 (XXV), with particular reference to incidents occurring during the period since April 1970.”

12. The Special Committee wrote to the Permanent Representative of Syria as follows:

“The Special Committee is in the course of organizing its work for 1971 and it would appreciate receiving from your Government information concerning any developments that have taken place since the Special Committee’s visit to Damascus in April 1970, which have a bearing on the mandate of the Special Committee as embodied in General Assembly resolutions 2443 (XXIII), 2546 (XXIV) and 2727 (XXV), with particular reference to incidents occurring during the period since April 1970.

“In particular, the Special Committee would appreciate receiving in summary form, the nature and substance of such evidence and, if possible, indications of any corrobora¬ tive evidence that may exist.”

13. The Special Committee wrote to the Permanent Representative of the United Arab Republic as follows:

“The Special Committee is in the course of organizing its work for 1971 and, in this connexion, it would appreciate receiving from your Government any information which has become available since the Special Com¬ mittee’s visit to Cairo in April 1970, relevant to its mandate as contained in General Assembly resolutions 2443 (XXIII), 2546 (XXIV) and 2727 (XXV), with particular reference to incidents occurring during the period since April 1970.

“The Special Committee has taken note of the communications of the Government of the United Arab Republic, which have been circulated as documents of the General As¬ sembly and the Security Council and con¬ cerning matters which are within the terms of reference of the Special Committee. In particular, the Special Committee would appreciate receiving any information con-


cerning the recent incidents reported in the Gaza Strip and mentioned in documents S/10105 and S/10107. The Special Committee also requests your Government to make available to it those medical reports concern¬ ing the allegations brought before it during the course of the hearings held in Cairo last year, which are available, as, for instance, the case of Miss Hejazi (A/AC.145/RT. 26) and Miss L. Zirbawi (A/AC./145/RT.27), and the whereabouts of Professor Muhammed Safwat who, as your Government may be aware, had been mentioned as the person responsible for a medical report dated 28 July 1966 concerning Mr. Derbas (A/AC. 145/RT. 26).

14. In a note verbale addressed to the Secretary-General on 7 April 1971, the Per¬ manent Representative of Israel communicat¬ ed the following:

“On 22 February 1971, a communica¬ tion was addressed to the Permanent Repre¬ sentative of Israel by Ambassador H.S. Amerasinghe of Ceylon, in his capacity of Chairman of the ‘Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories5. On 10 February 1971, a communication was addressed to the Per¬ manent Representative of Israel by Ambassa¬ dor Ibrahima Boye, of Senegal, in his capacity of Chairman of the ‘Special Working Group of Experts established under resolution 6 (XXV) of the Commission on Human Rights5. Those two letters gave some information regarding projected activities of the two bodies in question in the course of the year 1971.

“The views of the Israel Government regarding the illegal constitution, biased terms of reference and incompetence of organs in question to carry out the tasks sought to be imposed upon them by resolutions adopted by a minority of the General Assembly on the one hand, as well as on the superrerogatory duplicity of effort are a matter of record.

“Aside from its statements and votes in the twenty-third, twenty-fourth and twenty-fifth sessions of the General Assembly, the views of the Government of Israel on the uncon¬ stitutionality of the Committee presided over

by Ambassador Boye appear in the note of the Permanent Representative of Israel of 25 June 1969 (E/CN.4/1016, paragraph 9).

“Furthermore, experience which had been gained of the ‘accomplishments5 of both these bodies, and of the extensive travel in which they have been engaged, endorses Israel’s views regarding their unconstitutional¬ ity and biased character.

“The Government of Israel has no further comment to make at this stage on the activities of these two organs except to reiterate its views as indicated above.

“It would therefore be appreciated if the Secretary-General would transmit copies of this note verbale to Ambassador Amerasinghe and Ambassador Boye.55

15. On 26 April 1971, the Permanent Representative of the United Arab Republic furnished the Special Committee with a list of some of the houses allegedly destroyed by the Israeli authorities in the Gaza Strip and another list giving the names of some Arab prisoners and detainees in the Gaza Strip, together with some details concerning their identity, duration of their sentence and place of confinement.

16. On 27 April 1971, the Permanent Representative of Jordan informed the Special Committee as follows:

“Some relevant information to the mandate and task of the Committee has already been addressed to the President of the Security Council and/or to the Secretary-General and has been circulated as documents of the Security Council and General Assembly. As you have already stated, the Committee has taken note of information therein.

“Pertaining to Mr. Taysir Kuba’a, who was deported by the Israeli authorities after serving a three-year jail sentence, the ap¬ propriate authorities in Jordan were unable to indicate his whereabouts.

“As to statements by individuals expelled by the Israeli occupying authorities, my Government believes that such and other information concerning Israel’s violations of human rights in the occupied territories may be best obtained and reviewed on the spot by a visit of the Special Committee to Amman, Jordan. I would like to express our

UNITED NATIONS 621

earnest hope that Israel will, this time, comply with operative paragraph 4 of General As¬ sembly resolution 2727 (XXV) which:

“‘Urges the Government of Israel to receive the Special Committee, co-operate with it and facilitate its work5.

“On our part we take the opportunity to welcome the Special Committee and to extend to it every co-operation possible in an attempt to facilitate its task. In the meantime we will furnish Your Excellency with any new information in that regard.”

17. On 27 May 1971, the Special Com¬ mittee addressed the Permanent Represen¬ tative of Jordan as follows:

“I have the honour to refer to your letter of 27 April concerning the work of the Special Committee for 1971, and to thank your Government for the kind expression of its readiness to co-operate with the Special Committee.

“The letter refers to the statements, re¬ quested by the Special Committee in its letter of 19 February, recorded from indivi¬ duals mentioned in the letters of the Jordanian Government which have been reproduced as documents of the General Assembly and the Security Council. Your Government suggests that such statements ‘may best be obtained and reviewed by a visit of the Special Committee to Amman’. The Special Com¬ mittee notes that the communications of the Jordanian Government list a considerable number of persons which the Special Com¬ mittee does not have the resources to process individually. The Special Committee also feels that the recording of the evidence of every person who has made allegations of infringement of human rights is not neces¬ sitated by its mandate, namely to investigate Israeli practices affecting the human rights of the population of the occupied territories. The Special Committee therefore requests the co-operation of the Jordanian Govern¬ ment and it would appreciate receiving a list showing the types of allegations that are being made, their frequency and, if possible, the date when the alleged infringement took place, together with names of individuals affected. This would help the Special Com¬ mittee to decide whether it would be necessary

to visit Jordan and, in that event, to fix the period and the duration of such a visit. In view of the lack of time at the disposal of the members of the Special Committee it would be greatly appreciated if the information requested could be forwarded at your earliest convenience.”

18. In June 1971, the Permanent Represen¬ tative of Syria wrote as follows:

“In response to your request for ‘infor¬ mation concerning any developments that have taken place since the Special Committee’s visit to Damascus in April 1970. . as well as ‘corroborative evidence’, I should like to draw Your Excellency’s attention to a number of letters that were addressed after April 1970 to the President of the Security Council or the Secretary-General and cir¬ culated as official documents, a list of which is annexed to this letter, relating to Israeli practices in occupied territories in violation of Humanitarian International Law and relevant United Nations resolutions. The latest of these letters are contained in docu¬ ments S/10213 dated 28 May 1971 and S/10215 dated 1 June 1971.

“Moreover, the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic shall continue to bring to the attention of the Special Committee any additional information and evidence regarding Israeli violation of human rights in occupied territories.”

19. As there were indications that further evidence of a material nature was available, the Special Committee decided to visit Amman and Beirut to collect and examine such evidence, particularly from persons having direct knowledge of the developments since the Special Committee’s earlier visit to the area.

20. The Special Committee was in Amman from 7 to 12 July 1971 and in Beirut from 13 to 16 July 1971. During this period it held a series of meetings for the purpose of hearing witnesses. It heard a total of 49 witnesses, two of them in closed session, and received a number of written communications. The Special Committee also met at Geneva from 16 to 23 July and in New York from 7 to 17 September 1971 to discuss and adopt its draft report.


21. The Special Committee had before it written communications from the Govern¬ ments of Israel, Jordan, Syria and the United Arab Republic concerning allegations of violations of human rights. These had been reproduced as documents of the Security Council and the General Assembly, and are listed in annex I.

22. In addition to the oral testimony and the information communicated by Govern¬ ments, the Special Committee examined information communicated to it by the Inter¬ national Committee of the Red Cross existing in publications of the ICRC, and information contained in Israeli newspapers, in reports of the Institute for Palestine Studies and the Palestine Research Centre, as well as infor¬ mation contained in memoranda presented to the Special Committee in the course of its visit to Amman and Beirut.

23. As the Special Committee was unable to obtain the permission of the Government of Israel to visit the occupied territories, it was obliged once again to pay particular attention to official pronouncements by mem¬ bers of the Israeli Government and other Israeli leaders concerning Israeli practices in the occupied territories. The authenticity of this evidence is beyond question and the evidence itself, therefore, irrefutable.

24. In paragraph 3 of resolution 2727 (XXV) the General Assembly requested the Special Committee,

“pending the early termination of the Israeli occupation of Arab territories, to continue its work and to consult, as appro¬ priate, with the International Committee of the Red Cross in order to ensure the safe¬ guarding of the human rights of the population of the occupied territories”.

25. On 19 February 1971, in a confidential communication addressed to the International Committee of the Red Cross, the Special Committee made reference to its mandate as contained in resolution 2727 (XXV) and requested the ICRC to inform it:

“as to whether it [the ICRC] had any knowledge of certain trials, especially in view of what is stated at page 499 of the September 1970 issue of the International

Review of the Red Cross, under the title ‘Noti¬ fications of Prosecution’ The Special Committee drew the attention of the ICRC to a list of 20 trials which had taken place between 25 November 1970 and 5 February 1971 and about which it desired further information. In the same letter the Special Committee also requested information “as to the number of persons that have been allowed to return to the occupied areas under the various repatriation schemes since 30 April 1970”. In addition, the Special Com¬ mittee requested information concerning “cer¬ tain incidents that have taken place recently in Gaza subsequent to the calling in of Border Police to help the security forces in the area”.

26. On 18 March 1971, the International Committee of the Red Cross replied as follows:

“In reply to the questions contained in your letter, I have the honour to state as follows:

(a) Trials The International Committee of the Red

Cross is continuing its work for the benefit of persons resident in the occupied territories and against whom penal proceedings are being taken. That activity is carried on under the conditions described in the September 1970 issue of the International Review of the Red Cross to which you refer. However, so far efforts to ensure that penal proceedings for activities connected with the occupation are systematically notified to the ICRC delegation in Israel have not been successful. For that reason I am unable to reply to the questions relating to the various trials mentioned in your letter.

(b) Repatriation to the occupied territories You will find herewith a number of issues

in English and French of our news bulletin entitled ‘The ICRC in Action’. The various repatriation operations carried out since 30 April 1970 under the auspices of and with the participation of the ICRC delegation, are related therein. As you may see, the number of persons repatriated to the occupied territories of the Golan Heights is 81, from the United Arab Republic to the occupied territory of Gaza 265, and from the east bank of the Suez Canal to the west bank 750.

UNITED NATIONS 623

(c) Incidents in Gaza As a result of certain incidents which

occurred in 1971 in Gaza, the ICRC and its delegates have had to intervene for the benefit of the victims of those events and our delegate in Cairo has had occasion to inform the United Arab Republic authorities con¬ cerned about the demarches undertaken by the ICRC in that connexion.”

27. The Special Committee addressed an¬ other letter to the ICRC on 2 June 1971, in which it made reference to the ad hoc arrangements proposed by it in its report (A/8089, paras. 150, 151 and 155). It also referred to the fact that the allegations made to the Special Committee had not ceased and stated:

“It appears to the Special Committee, in the light of these considerations, and especially in view of the serious nature of the allegations that have continued to be pre¬ sented to the Special Committee, that it is imperative to come to some arrangement, such as that envisaged in the protecting power formula, which would enable com¬ plaints to be verified and remedial measures taken.

“Accordingly, I have been empowered by the Special Committee to inquire of you the views of the International Committee of the Red Cross on the possibility of a con¬ certed effort being made in order to secure an arrangement that would contribute towards a more effective implementation of human rights in the occupied territories without, of course, unduly hampering the occupying power in the execution of its obligations.”

28. The ICRC replied by letter dated 18 June 1971 in which it stated:

“We are aware of the recommendation made by the Special Committee last year in its report to the Secretary-General (docu¬ ment A/8089) and of the debate which took place in the Special Political Committee during the twenty-fifth session of the General Assembly.

“As you no doubt know, the International Committee of the Red Cross recently convened a Conference of Government Experts on the Reaffirmation and Development of Inter¬ national Humanitarian Law Applicable in

Armed Conflicts. While it was not the purpose of this conference to consider specific situations, one of its committees dealt with problems of implementation of existing hu¬ manitarian law. The discussion was of a general character and dealt with the prin¬ ciples involved, including the designation of Protecting Powers or substitutes to Protect¬ ing Powers. The report of the Conference of Government Experts will in due course be made available to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who will in turn report to the twenty-sixth session of the General Assembly, under the item ‘Human Rights in Armed Conflicts’.” In the same letter the Interna¬ tional Committee also expressed its readiness to meet informally with the Chairman of the Special Committee for “a personal exchange of views on these matters.”

29. At the conclusion of its visit to the Middle East and in the course of considering the evidence that it had heard, the Special Committee decided to address the Inter¬ national Committee of the Red Cross in a further effort to secure certain information that would help assess the credibility of witnesses who appeared before it. The letter, dated 23 July, states:

“During the hearings held by the Special Committee in Amman from 7 to 12 July 1971 and in Beirut from 13 to 16 July 1971, as well as during the hearings held last year, several references were made by witnesses to delegates of the ICRC visiting various prisons and places of detention in the occupied territories. It would help the Committee considerably in verifying the accuracy of evidence if the ICRC could furnish it with a list of its delegates who were assigned to the occupied territories since the occupation in June 1967 showing the areas to which these delegates were assigned and the periods of their duty.

“The Committee would also be glad if the ICRC could furnish the Special Committee with statistics regarding deportation, demoli¬ tion of houses, as well as other practices which may be termed violations of human rights in the occupied territories.

“The Special Committee assures the ICRC that it will avoid using any materials so


furnished in any manner that the IGRG may deem prejudicial to the humanitarian tasks that it is accomplishing at the moment in the occupied territories. The Committee wishes to stress, however, that the ICRC is the only body of recognized and acknowledged im¬ partiality to which the Special Committee can turn for information.

“The Special Committee would like to draw your attention to its letter to the Inter¬ national Committee of the Red Cross of 2 June 1971, in which it sought the views of the ICRC on the possibility of a concerted effort being made to secure an arrangement to contribute towards a more effective im¬ plementation of human rights in the occupied territories without, of course, unduly ham¬ pering the occupying power in the execution of its obligations.

“The Special Committee would have wished to discuss the subject matter of this letter with your organization at a meeting. However, circumstances did not seem to permit this at the present moment. The Committee will be meeting in New York during the period 7 to 17 September 1971 and it would welcome the opportunity to discuss these matters with your organization at that time; alternatively, the ICRC may wish to furnish the information indicated in this letter prior to that date. This informa¬ tion would help the Special Committee in its assessment of the evidence before it.”

30. The International Committee of the Red Cross replied on 2 August 1971 as follows:

“In reply to the request of the Special Committee for a list of ICRC delegates assigned to the occupied territories since 1967 and statistics on practices which may determine violations of human rights, we wish to recall that in conformity with ICRC established practice, reports on the situation in the occupied territories are submitted to the occupying power as well as to govern¬ ments of the countries of origin of those people whose rights appear to have been violated. The ICRC does not feel it can detract from this practice by making such reports more widely available. On the other hand, the ICRC has been pleased to make available to your Committee its information

bulletin (up to issue number 164 of 14 July 1971), copies of the International Review of the Red Cross (up to issue 630 of June 1971) and occasional press releases. Moreover, the an¬ nual report on the activities of the ICRC in 1970, which will shortly come off the press, will likewise be made available to the Special Committee.

“In response to the question raised in the Special Committee’s letter of 2 June 1971 regarding efforts to secure an arrangement towards a more effective implementation of human rights in the occupied territories, M. Pilloud has already had the honour to inform you in a letter of 18 June, that he, together with some of his colleagues, would be glad to have an informal exchange of views with you on these matters. We hope that a mutually convenient time can be found during your current stay in Geneva. In the meantime, we have been pleased to place at the disposal of the Special Committee the documentation prepared for the ICRC Con¬ ference of Government Experts on the Reaffir¬ mation and the Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflict. Volume II of that documentation deals particularly with implementation of existing international instruments.

“We note that the Special Committee will be meeting in New York during the period 7 to 14 September 1971. We do not believe that the ICRC would be in a position to furnish at that time more information than is already contained in the documents referred to in this letter.

“We note the assurance in your letter that the Special Committee appreciates the con¬ ditions under which the ICRC seeks to accomplish its humanitarian task. We trust that the Special Committee understands also the limitations within which it is advisable for the ICRC to meet requests for informa¬ tion.”

31. On 6 August 1971, the Chairman of the Special Committee referred to the letter of 2 August 1971 of the ICRC and stated as follows:

“In my letter of 23 July 1971, I addressed a request for the co-operation of the Inter¬ national Red Cross in accordance with opera-

UNITED NATIONS 625

tive paragraph 3 of General Assembly resolu¬ tion 2727 (XXV).

“It would appear that there is some misunderstanding with regard to the request for certain information contained in my letter of 23 July 1971. The Special Com¬ mittee requested two types of information:

(a) A list of IGRG delegates assigned to the occupied territories since the oc¬ cupation in June of 1967, showing the areas to which the delegates were assigned and the periods of their duty;

(b) Statistics regarding deportation, demo¬ lition of houses, as well as other practices which may be termed violations of human rights in the occupied terri¬ tories.

“The first was required in order to verify several statements made by former prisoners and detainees, to the effect that they were visited at a certain time in a certain prison by an ICRC delegate. In nearly all cases, the person concerned did not know the name of the person whom he recognized as the ICRC delegate. The Special Committee, in requesting this information from the ICRC, was merely attempting to check such state¬ ments of witnesses as one measure of credibility in the Special Committee’s task of assessing evidence before it. The Special Committee was not aware that the disclosure of IGRG delegates’ assignments came within the same category as ‘reports’ referred to in Mr. Micheli’s letter, that ‘are submitted to the occupying power as well as to the country of origin of the person whose rights appear to have been violated,’ and fails to under¬ stand in what manner they can be so con¬ sidered.

“The second type of information requested was statistics regarding deportation, demoli¬ tion of houses, as well as other practices which may be termed violations of human rights. In the course of carrying out its investigation, the Special Committee found that certain statistics, such as those referred to above, did not quite tally. The Special Committee felt that the ICRC would presumably have statistics which would help it to form a more precise idea of the extent of certain practices, such as demolition of houses and deportation.

“Again, in this regard, the Special Com¬ mittee was not aware that the disclosure of this kind of information ran counter to ICRC policy, particularly in view of the fact that it is not the first time that the ICRC has disclosed information of this nature, as for example that contained in the International Review of the Red Cross, August 1970, page 455.

“In resolution 2727 (XXV), the General Assembly requested the Special Committee to consult, as appropriate, with the Inter¬ national Committee of the Red Cross. The Special Committee interprets this mandate as imposing upon it the duty to carry out formal consultation, the outcome of which could be used in a formal manner in the report of the Special Committee to the Secretary-General, unless the ICRC felt other¬ wise. The informal exchange of views sug¬ gested in the letters of the ICRC is not, in the view of the Special Committee, a satis¬ factory way of dealing with a subject of this importance. In this context, the Special Committee would like to stress that it remains available for formal consultation, should the ICRC feel so disposed.”

On 16 August 1971, the ICRC replied as follows:

“To reply to your request, we would briefly explain ICRC’s line of conduct con¬ cerning the delegates’ findings. When the ICRC carries out its humanitarian mission in a country rent by armed conflict, it fully informs that country’s authorities. The same information is sent also to the government of nationals who benefit from that mission (for example prisoners of war, internees, persons under assigned residence, displaced persons, etc.). In occupied countries, such information is given to the government whose nationals are assisted by ICRC delegates.

“It is a rule that the information conveyed to the ICRC by its delegates is not communi¬ cated to anyone but the governments con¬ cerned. The ICRC does, however, regularly publish a news bulletin, as well as press releases and an annual report, in which its delegates’ work is described in general terms.

“The rule mentioned above has for a very long time been constantly applied by the ICRC. As long ago as 1936, for instance,


it explained its special position to a League of Nations Commission concerned with the Italo-Abyssinian War. That position is ap¬ propriate to the nature of the ICRC which is first and last humanitarian and apolitic. The International Committee must above all else endeavour to alleviate the suffering of war’s victims. To do so, it must abide strictly by a policy which enables it to conserve the confidence of parties in conflict. It must, inter alia, abstain from any action which might be construed as an enquiry and hence jeopardize its primary activity of providing protection and assistance.

“It is for that reason that we have stated our willingness to make available to the Special Investigating Committee over which you preside all information published by our institution as well as the general details which you require. We have therefore sent you a full set of such documents and have endeav¬ oured to reply to your queries of a general nature.

“In view of the foregoing, we trust that you will understand that the ICRC must set certain limits to its co-operation with commissions of enquiry.”

II. MANDATE OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE

33. The first report of the Special Com¬ mittee to the Secretary-General (A/8089, chapter II) contains its interpretation of its mandate as laid down in the relevant General Assembly resolutions and in other inter¬ national instruments. The Special Committee reiterates the interpretation it gave to its mandate in that report, and has conducted its second mission in strict accordance with that interpretation.

34. The Special Committee finds further confirmation of the validity of this inter¬ pretation in the spirit and the text of the Declaration on the Occasion of the Twenty- fifth Anniversary of the United Nations (adopted by the General Assembly on 24 October 1970 at its 1883rd plenary meeting —resolution 2627 (XXV)) and would draw special attention to the following passage from paragraph 8 of this Declaration, which states:

“The United Nations has endeavoured in its first twenty-five years to further the Charter objectives of promoting respect for, and observance of, human rights and funda¬ mental freedoms for all. The international conventions and declarations concluded under its auspices give expression to the moral conscience of mankind and represent hu¬ manitarian standards for all members of the international community. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Inter¬ national Covenants on Human Rights,. . . constitute a landmark in international co¬ operation and in the recognition and protec¬ tion of the rights of every individual without any distinction.”

III. ANALYSIS OF EVIDENCE 35. During 1970, the Special Committee

received oral and written testimony which served as a basis for its report to the Secretary- General (A/8089). In order to determine the measures necessary for the effective discharge of its renewed mandate in General Assembly resolution 2727 (XXV), the Special Committee addressed letters to the Govern¬ ments of Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and the United Arab Republic requesting further information as well as information on certain cases that had been brought to the attention of the Special Committee during 1970 (see paras. 8 to 13 above). The Govern¬ ment of Israel had indicated through its representative on the Third Committee, in the course of the debate on the item “Respect for human rights in armed conflicts” at the twenty-fifth session of the General Assembly, that it had in its possession information in rebuttal of the allegations which had been brought before the Special Committee, in particular those relating to ill-treatment of prisoners (A/G.3/SR.1782, pp. 15-17). The representative of Israel in the Third Com¬ mittee had made specific reference to the case of Mr. Mohammad Derbas, who had stated in evidence before the Special Commit¬ tee in Cairo in April 1970 that he had been castrated by surgery by an Israeli surgeon while in Israeli custody in Atlit Prison on or about 15 July 1967. In its letter to the Government of Israel on 20 February 1971,

UNITED NATIONS 627

the Special Committee referred to the state¬ ment that had been made by the Israeli representative in the Third Committee at its 1782nd meeting that his Government had in its possession a medical report of 28 July 1966 by Professor Mohammed Safwat to the effect that the same operation had already been performed by that date. The Special Committee invited the Government of Israel to make available to the Special Committee all evidence in its possession con¬ cerning Mr. Derbas, as well as those cases referred to in the report of the Special Com¬ mittee (see para. 9 above). The Special Committee also addressed a request to the United Arab Republic for information re¬ garding the whereabouts of Professor Moham¬ mad Safwat. The Government of Israel has not so far furnished to the Special Com¬ mittee the information in rebuttal that it claimed to possess, nor has the Special Com¬ mittee been able to trace the whereabouts of Professor Mohammad Safwat (see also para. 65 below).

36. The Special Committee sought to hear persons who had been mentioned by witnesses who had appeared before it during 1970, as such evidence would have been of value as corroboration and would have contributed to a conclusive assessment of the allegations that had been made before it, especially those concerning ill-treatment while under detention. For this purpose, so far as allega¬ tions of ill-treatment of individuals were concerned, the Special Committee set itself the task of hearing evidence of a qualitative and corroborative nature rather than ac¬ cumulating more allegations in addition to those that it had heard during 1970. The Special Committee stressed the need for documentary evidence, especially in the form of medical reports, concerning previous tes¬ timony.

37. In the oral evidence given before the Special Committee this year, several allega¬ tions were made of forcible expulsion or deportation, ill-treatment while under deten¬ tion, and demolition of houses. Other evi¬ dence collected by the Special Committee also concerned these allegations as well as allegations regarding the policy of annexation

and settlement of the occupied territories through expropriation, establishment of Israeli settlements, coupled with deportation and denial of the right to return of those inhabitants of the occupied territories who had left these territories. This evidence is analysed in this chapter (paras. 44 to 71 below).

38. The Special Committee took note of the allegations made in letters addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the President of the Security Council by the Permanent Representatives of Jordan, Syria and the United Arab Republic, which were published as documents of the Security Council and the General Assembly. Many of these allegations were brought to the atten¬ tion of the Special Committee on the specific request of the Government concerned. The Special Committee at the same time took note of the Government of Israel’s replies to these allegations which also appeared as Security Council and General Assembly docu¬ ments.

39. The allegations made in these letters concern, mainly, deportation of individuals, establishment of Israeli settlements in the occupied territories, brutality by the Border Police in Gaza during the beginning of 1971, Israeli measures taken in Jerusalem and confiscation of land, as well as drastic changes in the physical character and demographic composition of the occupied territories. The documents in which the letters are reproduced are listed in annex I to this report.

40. In addition to the above, the Special Committee has taken note of the discussions in the Special Political Committee during the twenty-fifth session of the General As¬ sembly (A/SPC/SR. 744-751), reports of the debates in the Commission on Human Rights at its twenty-seventh session on the question of violation of human rights in the occupied territories in the Middle East (E/CN.4/SR. 1115-1120) and Commission on Human Rights resolution 9 (XXVII), where reference is made to the report of the Special Com¬ mittee.

41. The Special Committee had before it a number of written communications from organizations and individuals in which viola-


tions of human rights were alleged. Among these are reports in Israeli and Arab news¬ papers concerning various aspects of violations of human rights in the occupied territories, and submissions by religious authorities on other aspects of the occupation.

42. The Special Committee was shown a documentary film made inside the occupied territories. The Special Committee had no reasonable grounds for questioning the au¬ thenticity of the film. It supplemented in visual form the evidence received by the Special Committee of the situation in the occupied territories, particularly as regards the establishment of Israeli settlements, the eradication of Arab villages and the state of feeling among both Arabs and Israelis in the occupied territories. The sound track of the film purported to record statements by Arabs and Israelis, both leaders and members of the public, made in the course of interviews by the producers of the film and giving their version of the occupation.

43. The Special Committee’s mandate is to investigate Israeli policies and practices affecting the human rights of the population of the occupied territories. Bearing this in mind, the Special Committee has analysed the evidence before it in the following manner: it has first sought to assess, according to the criterion of reasonable doubt, the value of the individual allegations and, once this was established, it has sought to determine whether they reflect a policy or a practice affecting human rights. In some cases, the evidence as a whole reveals a clear pattern of policy. For example, the scale on which Israeli settlements are being established in the oc¬ cupied territories, taken in conjunction with deportations and the refusal to repatriate any significant or substantial number of the inhabitants of the territories who had left these territories due to the 1967 hostilities, is sufficient to warrant the conclusion that the Government of Israel has adopted a policy of annexation which would deprive the persons concerned of their fundamental right to return or frustrate the exercise of that right.

A. Allegations of annexation and

SETTLEMENT

44. The evidence, including testimony before the Special Committee regarding an¬ nexation and settlement, supports the allega¬ tion that the Government of Israel is following a policy of annexing and settling occupied territories in a manner calculated to exclude all possibility of restitution to lawful owner¬ ship. In the view of the Special Committee evidence of annexation is stronger with respect to some areas, such as Jerusalem, while in others occupied as a result of the hostilities of June 1967 the evidence justifies the con¬ clusion that, irrespective of the ultimate objectives of Israel’s policy, the Government of Israel is engaged in practices constituting a violation of human rights.

45. The distinction between annexation of conquered territory and occupation of territory in wartime is clarified in the following passage in the Commentary published by the International Committee of the Red Cross on the Fourth Geneva Convention:1

“As was emphasized in the commentary on Article 4, the occupation of territory in wartime is essentially a temporary, de facto situation, which deprives the occupied Power of neither its statehood nor its sovereignty; it merely interferes with its power to exercise its rights. That is what distinguishes occupa¬ tion from annexation, whereby the Occupying Power acquires all or part of the occupied territory and incorporates it in its own territory.2

“Consequently occupation as a result of war, while representing actual possession to all appearances, cannot imply any right whatsoever to dispose of territory. As long as hostilities continue the Occupying Power cannot therefore annex the occupied territory, even if it occupies the whole of the territory concerned. A decision on that point can only be reached in the peace treaty. That

1 The Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, Commentary

on the Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of

Civilian Persons in Time of War (International Committee

of the Red Cross, Geneva, 1958), pages 275 and 276.

2 The annexing State “succeeds” to all the sovereign

rights of the dismembered State in the territory annexed.

UNITED NATIONS 629

is a universally recognized rule which is endorsed by jurists and confirmed by numer¬ ous rulings of international and national courts.

a

“A fundamental principle emerges from the foregoing considerations; an Occupying Power continues to be bound to apply the Convention as a whole even when, in dis¬ regard of the rules of international law, it claims during a conflict to have annexed all or part of an occupied territory. ...”

46. The Special Committee reaffirms the validity of this proposition. It would further¬ more reiterate that every attempt on the part of the Government of Israel at carrying out a policy of annexation and settlement amounts to a denial of the fundamental human rights of the local inhabitants, in particular the right of self-determination and the right to retain their homeland, and a repudiation by the Government of Israel of accepted norms of international law.

47. The following facts tend to support the conclusion that it is the Government of Israel’s policy to annex and settle the occupied territories:

(a) The existence, in the Government of Israel, of a “Ministerial Committee for Settle¬ ment of the Territories”;

(b) Express pronouncements to this effect by Israeli Ministers and leaders;

(c) A memorandum presented on 8 July 1971 to the Special Committee by Mr. Rouhi El-Khatib, Mayor of Jerusalem at the time of the June 1967 hostilities, the facts of which are confirmed by other evidence;

(d) Uncontradicted reports, appearing in the information media, of the planned estab¬ lishment of Israeli settlements in the occupied territories;

(e) Allegations, as yet unrefuted but con¬ sistent with other facts, and contained in several letters addressed by the Governments of Jordan and Syria, concerning measures by the Government of Israel in violation of the human rights of the persons living in occupied territories;

(f) The absence of any serious attempt at repatriation of the refugees to their homes in the occupied territories;

(g) The mass expulsion and continued deportation of individuals from the occupied territories;

(h) The continued transfer of the popula¬ tion of the occupied territories to other areas within the occupied territories.

48. The Special Committee will now deal with the evidence cited in the preceding paragraph.

(a) The existence, in the Government of Israel, of a Ministerial Committee for Settlement of the Territories”

The Chairman of this committee is Mr. Israeli Galili, Minister without Portfolio, referred to in the Jerusalem Post on 3 January 1971. In the view of the Special Com¬ mittee, the very existence of such a committee headed by a person of ministerial rank shows, beyond doubt, that it is a policy of the Govern¬ ment to settle the territories occupied as a result of the hostilities of June 1967.

(b) Express pronouncements by Israeli Ministers and leaders

Some of these statements, even when made by Israeli Ministers and leaders, purport to be personal opinions while others have been made by private individuals who have no official standing in the Government of Israel. On the other hand, their general tenor, the frequency with which they have been repeated and the various measures adopted by the Government of Israel, such as establishment of settlements, justify in the Special Committee’s opinion the conclusion that these statements are a faithful reflection of official Israeli policy.

The following are statements of special significance:

(i) A statement by Housing Minister Ze’ev Sharef on 18 February 1971, broadcast on television and reported in the Jerusalem Post on 19 February 1971, that the Government of Israel would not bow to international pressures to halt the building of housing developments across the cease-fire line in Jerusalem. In the same report the Minister is reported as saying that these housing developments are taking place on expro¬ priated lands.

(ii) A statement by a spokesman for the


Jewish National Fund, reported in the Jerusa¬ lem Post on 5 April 1971, according to whom the Fund had been purchasing land in the occupied territories for the past two years. The areas mentioned include Nebi Samwil, Jerusalem and the Etzion Bloc.

(iii) A report in the Jerusalem Post of 21 March 1971 summarizing a statement by former Minister of Transport and present Chairman of the Herut Executive, Ezra Weizman, in a television interview, that “according to Mr. Weizman, the Jordan River would make the best eastern border for Israel; Judaea and Samaria (the West Bank) must remain under Israeli control; Sharm e-Sheikh is vital for the aerial protec¬ tion of Israel; and whoever controls northern Sinai. . .controls the security of Israel”.

(iv) A statement by Deputy Prime Minister Yigal Allon, as reported in the Jerusalem Post on 8 March 1971, in which expressing his own personal opinion, he “called for urban, rather than agricultural settlements within the administered areas [since]. . . urban settlements would bring more people to the areas than would farming communities”.

(v) A statement by Defence Minister Moshe Dayan in a report, appearing in the Jerusalem Post on 7 January 1971, of an address to students of Haifa University and the Technion to the effect that:

“We are able to turn [the 200,000 refugees in Gaza] into full-fledged citizens. We must establish Jewish settlements in the Strip, turn the sand dunes into fertile farming land, integrate them into our economy,

give them jobs, health services and education, and give Israeli citizenship to all who want it.”

(vi) A statement made by Defence Minister Moshe Dayan on 19 August 1971 (subsequent¬ ly described as an expression of Mr. Dayan’s personal views), reported in the Jerusalem Post on 20 August 1971, in which Mr. Dayan calls for “emphasis [to] be put on [Israel’s] taking unilateral and immediate measures” in the occupied territories. Mr. Dayan is reported as having stated, “We should regard our role also in the administered territories as that of the established government—to plan and implement whatever can be done without leaving ‘options open’ for the day

of peace—which may be distant”. On 27 August 1971 the Jerusalem Post reported a broadcast interview with Mr. Moshe Dayan in which he sought to clarify the remarks made in the statement referred to above. In this interview Mr. Dayan is reported as stating that “after an arrangement we will also remain in most of the areas: the Golan Heights, and the West Bank”. Mr. Dayan called for Israelis to “devote [their] best efforts to these areas.” Referring to the refugee problem in the Gaza Strip, Mr. Dayan stated:

“What we can do, should do, and are doing in the Gaza Strip is solving the problem of the human status of the refugees.... When they are working and earning a decent wage, their standard of living will rise. The style of their housing has to be changed, so that they will live in quarters fit for human beings. . . .

“At this time, we can’t change the formal status of the refugees. . . . But we can do, and are doing, something about changing their human situation, about removing the stigma of‘refugeeism’ from them—the stigma of living on charity and in miserable con¬ ditions. . . . This we can change—humanly speaking to remove them from refugee status and transform them into working people.

“I do not propose annexation, and I do not suggest that we alter the citizenship status of the inhabitants of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. These are formal matters. What I am speaking of is the content of their lives, and not their formal status. What I suggest is that we do our best—and I am very glad that that is what they wish, too.

“They are ready to come out of the camps and go to work, to live as human beings. Let’s do this much, and not worry about their documents, their passports, their Refugee Cards.

c c

“I don’t see any reason that we should expel the Arab residents of Hebron, just as I cannot imagine that it should be pro¬ hibited for Jews to settle permanently—within the framework of the status to be ultimately

UNITED NATIONS 631

agreed upon—anywhere at all in the West Bank.

“But until there is a peace settlement, I think that there has to be ‘unilateral action5.

cc

“And we should long since have been establishing settlements.

C (

“I don’t think that can be a basis for dialogue. I don’t think that we ought to leave in their hands the decision about the future of the areas between the Jordan River, the mountains and Little Israel.

“But beyond that, in the sphere of day-today life, I am in favour of trying as hard as possible to achieve dialogue with them, and to give them as much autonomy as possible, on the communal-life level, in matters of education . . . and in our common life with them.”

(vii) A statement by the President of Israel, Dr. Shazar, speaking at the opening ceremony of the twentieth anniversary cele¬ brations of the Jewish National Fund on 12 January 1971 (reported in the Jerusalem Post on 13 January 1971) that “the Jewish National Fund’s work in preparing land in the Golan Heights for settlement strengthens our firm determination that the Golan remain in Israeli territory”.

(viii) A statement by Deputy Prime Min¬ ister Yigal Allon in the Knesset on 2 December 1970 (reported in the Jerusalem Post on 3 December 1970) in the course of a debate on a motion on “the establishment of Jewish suburbs in cities” in the occupied territories, that he was in opposition to the establishment of such suburbs because of political and other reasons. Mr. Allon is reported as stating that the Government of Israel pursued a “realistic policy based on Middle East and International political possibilities”. He is also reported as stating that the Government had already decided on the establishment of a further four Nahal settlements and of a semi-urban settlement; on the sequestration of 11,400 dunams of land of East Jerusalem and southwards for the setting up of residential areas for both Jews and Arabs; as well as development of a Jewish Quarter at Hebron.

In the course of the debate reference was also made to what are referred to as “Basic Prin¬ ciples”, as endorsed by the Labour Party, National Religious Party and Gahal. Accord¬ ing to Mr. M. Begin, who was presenting the motion which was the subject of this discussion, these “Basic Principles” called for the “ac¬ celeration of permanent settlement, rural and urban, on the soil of the Homeland”. The same report cites the Deputy Prime Minister, Mr. Allon, as stating with reference to Mr. Begin’s remarks on the historical rights to the Land of Israel, that this was the moral basis for the renaissance of the Jewish State, but “historiographical or theological absolutes cannot replace policy. The future map of Israel, in the framework of a peace treaty, was to be founded on historical rights as the moral basis, defensible borders as a security basis, a Jewish and Democratic State as national and social basis”.

The report makes further reference to the statement of Mr. Begin during this debate. The report states:

“Mr. Begin, presenting his motion, said experience had proved there was no reason why Jew and Arab could not live, work, trade and send their children to schools together. It would be good for peace, security and understanding between the people, he said. No people in history had suffered as much as Israel on behalf of its land. He said a recent ‘non-sensical5 decision of the United Nations General Assembly made out as though Israel were depriving someone (Pales¬ tine Arabs) of self-determination. Israel’s rights were solely over this Land, while the Arabs had fourteen sovereign States. ‘We liberated the city of the Land of Israel, and there is no reason why Jews should not live in Jericho, Hebron, Bethlehem, Shechem, Tulkarm and Ramallah.5”

At the heart of the Middle East problem is the “Homeland doctrine” enunciated by the Government of Israel and supported by the Opposition. According to this doctrine even the United Nations resolution on the partition of Palestine and the creation of the State of Israel did not restore to the Jewish people what they were convinced was their territory. The State of Israel as created by the


United Nations has expanded territorially from time to time; according to the Govern¬ ment of Israel, this expansion has been justified by considerations of security. The Special Committee finds it difficult to reconcile this claim with pronouncements by Israeli leaders, proclaiming a faith and belief in what are asserted to be the ancient boundaries of the Land of Israel. Against such a strongly held belief international law or even the norms of international conduct can prove of no avail. In any event the Special Com¬ mittee is unable to accept any argument whereby considerations of security may be invoked to depopulate occupied territories, to deprive hundreds of thousands of persons of their ancestral home, and somehow sought to be justified on the ground that there exist 14 Arab States that are in their opinion required to receive them.

In light of the declared policy of the Govern¬ ment of Israel as expressed categorically by Israeli leaders, the Special Committee has no doubt that the policy of annexation and settlement is dictated by considerations alien to those of national security. No such considerations, however, would in any event offer the least justification for measures that are contrary to the provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention.

Defence Minister Moshe Dayan’s avowed purpose, as quoted in item (v) above, of transforming sand dunes into fertile farming land and providing jobs, health services and education would be an admirable and imagi¬ native policy if it were consistent with the provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention. Even the best of policies are not warranted if they are founded on injustice and if they follow on forcible acquisition of territory and confiscation of property by an occupying Power which has no title other than the unrecognized and inadmissible title of con¬ quest. The same observation applies to Mr. Dayan’s statements referred to in (vi) above.

(c) A memorandum presented to the Special Committee by Mr. Rouhi El-Khatib, Mayor of Jerusalem at the time of the June 1967 hostilities

Mr. El-Khatib maintains that he is still

the d.e jure holder of the office of Mayor. This memorandum contains further state¬ ments regarding alleged violations of human rights in Jerusalem committed in the period between 16 April 1970 and 30 June 1971. The memorandum classifies these alleged violations as follows:

(i) “Evacuation of Arabs from (occupied) Jerusalem”

The memorandum quotes a statement by Mayor T. Kollek, announced on Israeli radio and reported in the Jerusalem Post on 17 May 1971, according to which over 4,000 Arabs have been evacuated from their homes in Jerusalem since 1967. The memo¬ randum states that Arab sources in Jerusalem reveal that around 70 per cent of these persons were evicted from their homes last year, including more than 200 from the village of Nebi Samwil, a northern Arab suburb of Jerusalem. The memorandum adds that the Minister of Defence ordered the bulldozing of 52 houses on 22 March 1971, in Nebi Samwil. The demolition of 46 of these houses was reported in Ha’aretz on 21 June 1971.

(ii) “Expropriation of more Arab lands in (occupied) Jerusalem”

The memorandum quotes the Israeli Official Gazette No. 1656 of 30 August 1970 according to which the Israeli Minister of Finance, Mr. Pinhas Sapir, ordered the expropriation of Arab lands in and around Jerusalem. According to the memorandum the total area of the new land expropriated under this order is 11,680 dunams, the equivalent of 2,920 acres. The memorandum also states that these lands belong to over 10,000 Arabs in seven villages around Jerusa¬ lem who are mainly dependent for their livelihood on the income derived either through their work in plants in these areas or in cultivating some of this land. It states that the people concerned are liable to suffer evacuation in the same way as the inhabitants of the village of Nebi Samwil, which was bulldozed on 22 March 1971.

(iii) “More threats to the Arab population from continuation of illegal Israeli archaeological excavations around the walls of Al-Acjsa Mosque”

The memorandum states that the “Osmani

UNITED NATIONS 633

School Mosque”, near the Western Wall in Jerusalem, has cracked because of excava¬ tions being carried out under it by an ar¬ chaeological team from the Israeli Ministry of Religions. These excavations have so far extended through the basement of over 20 large Arab religious, cultural or residential buildings inhabited by no less than 300 persons, connected to another 80 buildings accommodating an additional 700 persons. The memorandum states that these buildings too are in danger of demolition and their inhabitants in danger of dispersion, in the same manner as the 4,000 evacuees referred to by Mayor Kollek on 17 May 1971. The memorandum alleges that these acts are in defiance of a UNESCO resolution adopted on 10 October 1969 [E.B.4.3.1].

(iv) “Arab human rights threatened by the new master plan for Jerusalem”

The memorandum refers to the new master plan for Jerusalem, announced by Mayor Kollek in December 1970, and states that the master plan calls for the expansion of the area of Jerusalem to eight times its present size to include three Arab cities and 23 Arab villages, which house altogether more than 100,000 Arab inhabitants.

(v) “Israeli housing and industrial projects on the confiscated Arab lands lead to mass exodus of Arab population from Jerusalem”

The memorandum makes reference to a statement made by Mr. Z. Sharef, Israeli Minister of Housing, on 15 February 1971, in which the Minister announced the new Israeli settlements which will be constructed on the hillside confiscated from Arabs in and around Jerusalem. The memorandum also makes reference to a report in Ha’aretz on 9 March 1971 to the effect that the Hebrew University in Jerusalem was planning two large building projects on the Mount of Olives, to be completed by the end of 1980. The same newspaper, according to the memo¬ randum, reported on 6 July 1970 that 13 Israeli hotels, with 4,200 rooms, were planned for Jerusalem before the end of 1975. Ac¬ cording to the memorandum seven of these hotels will be built on confiscated Arab land. The memorandum also makes reference to a report appearing in Ha’aretz on 19 February

1971, according to which 30 new Israeli industrial projects are to be set up on Arab confiscated land near Jerusalem Airport, and the zones planned will absorb 100 new Jewish industrial projects. The memorandum maintains that these measures are being taken in accordance with the policy enunciated by Mr. Sharef on 15 February 1971, which is “to settle new immigrants as quickly as possible in order to keep Jerusalem [a Jewish city]”. The memorandum claims that this policy is tantamount to plundering the land from their original proprietors by force and under different illegal measures and on “false pretences”. It states further that the aim of this policy is to clear these persons from their land and to group all in an Arab ghetto, as has already been done in Jaffa, Acre, Haifa, Nazareth and other Palestinian Arab cities taken in 1948. The memorandum states that the primary aim is to force the remaining Arabs into a “third mass Exodus”, as has already been done during and after the two wars of 1948 and 1967. Under these circumstances, the memorandum states, “the Israeli military occupation is not observing the human rights of the Arab population of the occupied territories”.

(vi) ‘ ‘ The new challenge of compensation” The memorandum makes reference to a

“recent statement” made on 29 June 1971 by Mr. Shapiro, Israeli Minister of Justice, according to which the Israeli Government announced its policy to compensate Jerusalem Arabs for properties confiscated after 1948. It may be noted that the fact of confiscation is admitted. The memorandum makes refer¬ ence to the “Law and Administration Ordinance, 1968”. Under article 5 of that Law, immovable property owned by Jews, which the Jordanian Government admi¬ nistered between 1948 and 1967, shall be released to the original owners or their heirs. The memorandum points out that the same law does not release Jerusalem Arab property confiscated under the Israeli Absentees Law of 1950, and maintains that it constitutes a form of racial discrimination. It refers to General Assembly resolution 194 (III) of 11 December 1948, which defines the occupying authorities’ obligations with respect


to evacuation, repatriation of Palestine ref¬ ugees, restitution of their property and pay¬ ment of compensation in lieu of return and restitution. The memorandum states that the policy of compensation denies the human right of Jerusalem Arabs to return to their homes. It points to a “most absurd contra¬ diction”, since, on the one hand, the Govern¬ ment of Israel claims a right to return “to the land of their alleged ancestors of 2,000 years ago, while on the other hand, they are denying to Jerusalem Arab refugees—who are part of the Palestine Arab refugees—their natural right to return to their own homes”. The memorandum states that “the compensation offered will be limited to nearly one third of the main population, namely those who are still living in Jerusalem”, but that “it does not apply to those who were driven out of their homes, or who were for one reason or another absent from Jerusalem at the time of occupation of the major part of Jerusalem in 1948”. The memorandum states that as the law does not apply to those who were forced to leave during the 1967 hostilities, or who were absent on temporary visits outside Jerusalem, such persons are classified as absentees. According to the memorandum they number over 100,000 persons who, under the proposed Israeli Compensation Law, are not covered by it. The memorandum also refers to a statement by Mr. Shapiro on 29 June 1971, to the effect that compensation will be based on the evaluation of these properties as of 1948 together with an ad¬ ditional 25 per cent, to be paid to the Arab proprietors only, on a yearly instalment basis within 20 years from the date of the enactment of the law. The memorandum draws the attention of the Special Committee to the following possible consequences of this law:

“1. It will place the remaining Arabs of Jerusalem under constant duress to sell their confiscated properties after 1948 to Israel through a so-called ‘legal transaction’.

“2. It will give rise later, for the inter¬ pretation before international circles and world opinion, that the Arabs of Jerusalem have willingly sold their properties to Israel or Israeli citizens.

“3. These former stages may be widely

publicized by the occupying authorities to support their claim to the annexation of Jerusalem and to their subsequent allegation that Jerusalem is the capital of Israel.

“4. It will wipe out the rights of return and restitution of property to the Arabs of Jerusalem.

“5. It will be considered as a precedent to apply the same rules to the rest of the occupied territories.

“6. It will finalize [sic] Jerusalem Arab population, and later the rest of the Palestin¬ ian Arab population in the occupied territories in Arab ghettos.

“7. Finally it will liquidate Jerusalem Arab people, the Palestine people and the Palestine case.”

(d) Uncontradicted reports, appearing in the information media, of the planned establish¬ ment of Israeli settlements in the occupied territories

Examples of such reports are: (i) The master plan for construction of

housing units in occupied Jerusalem, which was made public earlier this year. This plan involves not only the construction of approxi¬ mately 21,000 units inside occupied territory but also construction of these units on ex¬ propriated land of which 74 to 80 per cent belonged to Arabs. The information on the housing units was given by Housing Minister Ze’ev Sharef during a press conference which was reported in the Jerusalem Post on 5 March 1971. The information concerning the expropriated lands was contained in a report of a press conference given by Mayor Teddy Kollek reported on 29 January 1971. In this connexion, the Special Committee also had occasion to view a film which is purported to have been taken recently in the area where the construction is in progress (see para. 42 above).

(ii) Announcements, such as that reported in the Jerusalein Post on 1 March 1971, that two more settlements were planned for the Golan Heights during 1972 and one more settlement was planned in Rafah.

(iii) The reports carried on 5 January 1971 in the Jerusalem Post, according to which the first umoshav shitufi” (settlement) in Sinai

UNITED NATIONS 635

was established on 4 January 1971. The settlement was established near Rafail.

(iv) The report carried on 30 December 1970 in the Jerusalem Post, according to which industrial buildings in Hebron were to be constructed in the new Jewish Quarter that was being built. The area of the con¬ struction of these industrial buildings extended to 1,500 square metres, according to the reported statement of Finance Minister Pinhas Sapir. The Minister was further reported as stating that this was only the first phase, and that when part of these buildings had been occupied, construction of additional structures would begin, totalling 4,000 square metres.

(v) Reports, such as the one appearing in the Jerusalem Post on 30 December 1970, in which the establishment of two civilian settlements in the Jordan Valley and on the Golan Heights during 1971 was announced.

(vi) The announcement carried on 3 De¬ cember 1970 according to which a settlement, Kfar Darom, was re-established in the Gaza Strip. According to this report this settlement had existed prior to 1948 and it had been over¬ run by the Egyptian Army during the 1948 war.

(vii) The report carried on 30 December 1970 according to which a settlement which had been founded by the Jewish Agencies Settlement Department near Latrun was becoming permanent.

(viii) Reports, such as that appearing in the Jerusalem Post on 15 June 1971, according to which the first permanent Jewish civilian settlement in Hebron was inaugurated. The report also states that the first 50 families will be moving into the estate in Hebron at the beginning of September 1971. At the present moment, according to the report, they are housed in temporary quarters in the grounds of military government buildings. The Special Committee was shown a film purporting to be evidence of this statement (see para. 42 above).

(ix) The report appearing in the Jerusalem Post on 17 December 1970 according to which Acting Prime Minister Yigal Allon disclosed that the Government of Israel had decided

on the establishment of five more Jewish settlements in the occupied territories.

(e) Several letters addressed by the Governments of Jordan and Syria concerning measures by the Government of Israel in violation of the human rights of the persons living in occupied Jerusalem

These appear in documents S/9969, S/10123, S/10130, S/10139, S/10149 and S/10169. The Government of Israel has answered some of the allegations in letters circulated as documents S/10138, S/10142 and S/10146, and has sought to rebut them. Since the Government of Israel’s rebuttal of the allegations made by the Government of Jordan is based on the claim that occupied Jerusalem has been annexed to Israel, and as the United Nations Security Council and General Assembly have rejected this claim, the Special Committee feels that the rebuttal is devoid offeree or substance.

A number of letters also concern the ques¬ tion of settlements in the Golan Heights. These are contained in documents S/9823, S/10213 and S/10300. The letter circulated as document S/10213 in turn gave rise to further communications addressed to the Secretary-General by Israel and Syria. The Syrian letters are circulated in documents S/10224, S/10232 and S/10238. The Israeli letters are contained in documents S/10220, S/10228 and S/10234. The Special Com¬ mittee has considerable evidence to show that the eviction of the civilian population on a substantial scale occurred in the period immediately following the hostilities of June 1967, although the process had commenced even during the hostilities. The Special Committee made reference to this aspect of the violation of the human rights of the civilian population in the Golan Heights in its first report to the Secretary-General (A/8089). The Special Committee is aware of the statements made by Israeli leaders to the effect that the Golan Heights will be annexed by Israel. It also has evidence to show that settlements have been established in the Golan Heights area (see para. 48 (a), (b) and (d) above), on or near the sites of villages that had been forcibly evacuated during or


after the hostilities. The Special Committee considers this to be a violation of the right of return of those persons who had fled before, during and after the June 1967 hostilities. Irrespective of any political settlement that is in contemplation or that is ultimately reached, the people whose home is in the Golan Heights have an immediate and in¬ contestable right to return to their homes.

(f) The absence of any serious attempt at repatriation of the refugees to their homes in the occupied territories

On the basis of the testimony of several of the persons forcibly evicted, heard by the Special Committee in Damascus in 1970 (A/8089, para. 75), the report of the Inter¬ national Committee of the Red Cross on its activities in the Middle East (June 1967 to June 1970) reproduced in The International Review of the Red Cross, August and September 1970, Nos. 113 and 114, as well as reports in the Israeli press, the Special Committee has concluded that there has been no serious attempt by the Israeli authorities at repatria¬ tion of civilians whose homes are in the Golan Heights and certainly no policy to that end. Subsequent press releases by the International Committee of the Red Cross indicate that, apart from sporadic efforts through schemes of repatriation designed to reunite families and schemes involving but a few score of persons, there has since June 1967 been no repatriation on any significant scale to warrant the conclusion that the Government of Israel is acting in recognition of the human right of the refugees to return to their homes.

(g) The mass expulsion and continued deporta¬ tion of individuals from the occupied terri¬ tories

The Special Committee confirms the finding reached in its first report (A/8089, paras. 75-77) that in several cases, particularly in the Golan Heights and in the Latrun area (West Bank), whole village populations were forcibly expelled by Israeli forces and have not so far been allowed to return. The Special Committee notes that the allegations made by the Government of Jordan in its letters circulated as documents of the Security

Council and the General Assembly have not been refuted by the Government of Israel (see paras. 49-51 below).

(h) The continued transfer of the population of the occupied territories to other areas within the occupied territories

Such transfers of population have occurred in the case of several villages that were systematically destroyed in 1967 : the popula¬ tion of these villages was either expelled or forced to live elsewhere in the occupied territories. The same practice has been followed in occupied Jerusalem. According to a report in the Jerusalem Post of 17 May 1971, Mr. Teddy Kollek, Israeli Mayor of

Jerusalem, stated that 4,000 Arabs had been evacuated from Jerusalem. Likewise, in the case of Gaza, according to reports appearing in several newspapers and in letters addressed by Governments, several thousands of persons were displaced from the three major refugee camps in Gaza. Official Israeli sources have stated that these transfers of population were necessitated by new security measures, such as the construction of wider roads inside the camps in order to facilitate patrolling and the maintenance of law and order in the camps. Most of the persons whose refugee accommodation was destroyed to permit of the construction of these roads were forced to leave for the West Bank and El Arish, while a few were said to have sought refuge with other families inside Gaza.

The Special Committee considers that the transfers were unwarranted and that even if the construction of new roads was considered indispensable for the maintenance of law and order, the arbitrary transfer of population was unnecessary, unjustified and in breach of the Fourth Geneva Convention.

B. Allegations of deportation

49. Allegations of deportation of individu¬ als from the occupied territories were made by the Jordanian Government in letters circulated in the following documents: S/9868, S/9885, S/9904, S/9919, S/10073, S/10074, S/10165 and S/10203. According to these letters, forcible expulsion took place after

UNITED NATIONS 637

arbitrary detention and ill-treatment. The Government of Israel’s only reply to these allegations was made in a letter circulated as document S/9879. It refers to the allegation of forcible deportation made by the Jordanian Government in document S/9868, but, in the Special Committee’s view, does not refute the allegation. The Government of Israel merely states that “letters such as those addressed. . . by the Permanent Representative of Jordan... are obviously designed to serve as a smoke¬ screen to conceal Jordan’s heavy responsibility for the continued bloodshed and suffering on both sides”. The Special Gommittee has seen for itself some of the persons mentioned in the Security Council documents, who alleged that they had been deported. It had before it letters from the ICRC to the President of the Jordan Red Crescent Society in which it is stated that “the ICRC deeply deplores the fact” (i.e., expulsion of civilians from the West Bank) and that “ICRC delegates in the West Bank made many interventions during the last three years” (i.e., three years ending November 1970) “protesting against the fact of the expulsion and pleading in favour of individual cases”. The letter goes on to state as follows: “I can assure you that they will continue strenuously to interfere in favour of these expelled persons”. The Special Committee has no doubt that a large number of persons have been forcibly deported regularly from the occupied terri¬ tories by the Israeli authorities. The fact of deportation is established beyond all rea¬ sonable doubt in the view of the Special Committee, and the frequency with which it has taken place since the June 1967 hos¬ tilities leads the Special Committee to believe that this is part of the Government of Israel’s policy. The Government of Israel has not commented on allegations of deportation contained in the letters of the Jordanian Government and referred to earlier in this paragraph.

50. Unlike the policy of annexation, which is openly admitted and declared by members of the Government of Israel and by Israeli leaders, there is no similar admission or declaration of policy in regard to deportation. The oral evidence of witnesses appearing

before the Special Committee, together with the established fact that a substantial number of individuals have been deported, clearly demonstrates the existence of a policy of deportation on the part of the Government of Israel. Although, in effecting these de¬ portations, the Government of Israel invokes the Defence (Emergency) Regulations, 1945, which have been extended to the occupied territories, such deportations constitute a breach of the provisions of article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention. The Special Committee has already pronounced itself on these Regulations in its first report (A/8089, paras. 57—60) and it maintains the same opinion it held then, namely, that the Regula¬ tions are ultra vires the Fourth Geneva Con¬ vention.

51. On the question of deportation, the Special Committee also notes the decision of the Supreme Court of Israel, sitting as High Court of Justice in the case of Azmi Ibrahim Marar versus Minister of Defence et al, (H.C. 17/71). Marar had petitioned the High Court of Justice for an order nisi calling upon the Minister of Defence to show cause why he should not rescind his decision to deport the petitioner from the country. The petitioner had been detained for a considerable time under Regulation III (1) of the Defence (Emergency) Regulations, 1945, which provides that: “A Military Commander may by order direct that any person shall be detained in such place of detention as may be specified by the Military Commander in the order’ ’. Eater the Minister of Defence, by virtue of the powers vested in him by Regulation 112 of the Emergency Regulations, issued an order for his deporta¬ tion. Regulation 112 provides that: “(1) the Minister of Defence shall have power to make an order, under his hand, for the deportation of any person from Israel. A person in respect of whom a deportation order has been made shall remain out of Israel so long as the order remains in force”. The Regulation also provides for an advisory committee, appointed under the Regulations, which is empowered to consider and make recommendations to the Government in re¬ spect of any deportation order, if requested


to do so by any person whose deportation has been ordered under the Regulations. In this case, the petitioner had asked the advisory committee to consider the deporta¬ tion order. The Advisory Committee, having considered the order, recommended that it remain in force. The Court dismissed the petition, basing itself inter alia on the argument that it was not within the competence of the High Court to consider the argument brought by the petitioner since this is entrusted exclusively to the Advisory Committee in virtue of Regulation 112, “whether this be desirable or not”. The decision was given on 20 January 1971.

C. Demolition of houses and eradication

of villages

52. In addition to the evidence heard by the Special Committee in the course of its investigation in 1970 concerning demoli¬ tion of houses, further evidence was presented on the same subject in 1971. In particular, the Special Committee takes note of regular reports appearing in the Israeli press regarding demolition of houses.

53. Some witnesses appearing before the Special Committee also alleged demolition of houses:

(a) Shafik Ahmad Hassan Shteiwi, 20 years of age, who was arrested on 24 April 1970. According to Shteiwi, his brother was a member of the resistance movement and the Israelis had threatened to subject his mother and two sisters, who had been arrested, to harsher treatment if he did not give informa¬ tion about his brother. Shteiwi testified that their house had been demolished, his mother and one sister killed and the other sister detained in prison. He also testified that his house had been one of seven demolished by the Israeli Army.

(b) Saber Mohammed Abdul Latij\ head of the local council of the village of Beit Fajjar, in the Hebron District, testified that after his arrest on 1 November 1969, his village had been besieged for about four months, no water had been allowed in and some 70 houses had been blown up. Abdul Latif had been deported on 28 August 1970.

54. The Special Committee also noted the following reports of demolition appearing in the Israeli press; this is not a complete list of such reports on the subject, but they are quoted by way of illustration:

— 10 May 1970, Ha’aretz—3 houses in Hebron.

— 20 May 1970, Ha’aretz—70 houses— Marj Najeh (North Jordan Valley).

— 27 May 1970, Jerusalem Post—5 houses— Ashkar Refugee Camp near Nablus.

— 21 December 1970, Jerusalem Post—5 houses, Gaza.

— 12 January 1971, Jerusalem Post—7 houses—West Bank, Kafir Tayasir (near Jenin).

— 28 February 1971, Jerusalem Post—6 houses, Burin Village (Nablus area).

— 31 March 1971, Jerusalem Post—3 houses, Sillet e-Dahr, near Janin; Atzira e-Kebliyeh, near Nablus.

— 2 April 1971, Jerusalem Post—10 houses, Gaza.

55. The Special Committee also received from the Government of the United Arab Republic a statement containing a list of 34 houses that were demolished, with details of ownership, the size of the buildings, and the dates of demolition. According to this list, these demolitions took place during December 1970.

56. The Special Committee has not been able to ascertain the exact number of houses that have been demolished, but the fact that demolition of houses takes place is undeniable. On 13 November 1969, the Prime Minister of Israel declared to the press that the destruc¬ tion of buildings at Halhoul and Gaza was in pursuance of her Government’s policy of destroying the houses of persons helping members of A1 Fatah. This same statement, according to a report of the International Committee of the Red Cross, was com¬ municated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the ICRC delegation on 23 December 1969 (International Review of the Red Cross, September 1970, No. 114, pages 488 and 489).

57. In addition to allegations of demolition of houses, the Special Committee received reports that a number of villages have been entirely destroyed by the Israeli authorities

UNITED NATIONS 639

in the occupied territories. This is acknow¬ ledged in the aforementioned report of the International Committee of the Red Cross (pages 485 486) and newspaper reports such as those, for example, appearing in the Sunday Times (London) on 11 October 1970, where reference is made not only to the villages of Jalou, Beit Nuba, and Imwas, also referred to by the Special Committee in its first report, but in addition to villages like Surit, Beit Awwa, Beit Mirsem and El-Shuyoukh in the Hebron area and Jiflik, Agarith and Huseirat, in the Jordan Valley. The Special Com¬ mittee has ascertained that all these villages have been completely destroyed. The Special Committee would also recall the case of Halhul, in regard to which it stated in its first report (A/8089, para. 73):

“. . . It is an established fact that Halhul was the scene of extensive destruction, that the destruction was inflicted as a collective punishment by way of reprisal, and that the Israeli authorities were responsible for the destruction that took place.”

The Special Committee heard allegations of the destruction of over 400 Arab villages, but no evidence in corroboration has been furnished to the Special Committee.

58. In a letter addressed to the Jordan National Red Crescent Society on 23 June 1971, the IGRC delegate in Jordan stated:

“...I would like to inform you that, according to our delegation in the West Bank, the village of Nebi Samwil was in fact destroyed by Israeli armed forces on March 22, 1971.

“The president of the ICRC, Mr. Naville, has recently sent a letter to Mrs. Golda Meir in which he expresses the ICRC’s grave concern about the destruction of buildings in the occupied territories. In this letter, which was transmitted at the end of May, he underlines the negative effect of these destruc¬ tions on families and reaffirms the ICRC’s position—already expressed many times be¬ fore—as to the serious violation of humanita¬ rian principles that they represent.”

D. Allegations of ill-treatment while

UNDER DETENTION

59. In its first report, the Special Com¬ mittee referred to the testimony of some witnesses who had appeared before it and who had made allegations of ill-treatment suffered while under detention (A/8089, paras. 78—111). In the course of the evidence heard during its visit to Amman and Beirut in 1971, the Special Committee heard further allega¬ tions of ill-treatment by individuals appearing before it. The Special Committee received a number of written communications in which allegations of ill-treatment were made.

60. In carrying out its investigation in 1971, the Special Committee sought evidence of a corroborative nature rather than a repetition of the allegations made at the Special Committee’s hearings in 1970. The Special Committee heard as many witnesses as possible in the time available and was informed of many others who were apparently ready to give evidence of their personal experiences in prison and detention camps in the occupied territories. In certain cases these statements were supported by other evidence, in the form of medical reports or visible marks of mutilation, physical injury or impairment of faculties. The Special Committee can neither accept nor reject such allegations in the absence of further corroborative evidence.

61. The Special Committee realizes the practical difficulties involved in obtaining evidence concerning allegations, such as those involving ill-treatment, which, by the very nature of the allegation, takes place in cir¬ cumstances where corroborative evidence is not likely to be available. The serious nature of allegations of this type necessitates a most thorough examination of all relevant evidence before the Special Committee could pro¬ nounce itself further as to whether the in¬ dividual allegations have been proven or whether a prima facie case has been established in regard to them and, secondly, as to whether these incidents do establish a pattern of action tantamount to a regular practice on the part of the Israeli authorities.

62. The ICRC expressed similar diffi¬ culties in its report (International Review of


the Red Cross, September 1970, No. 114), in particular with regard to the approximately 300 prisoners who were being held for inter¬ rogation (as of the end of May 1970) and to whom it had no access. In that report, the IGRC stated that in May 1969 its delegate had been authorized by the Minister of Defence to talk in private with prisoners whose interrogation was finished and that delegates could, in the presence of an Israeli officer, also see prisoners held for interrogation, to check their state of health, while a few detainees held incommunicado could not be visited. The IGRC also stated that this procedure referred only to prisons and that “police stations and military camps remained closed to the delegates”. The IGRC reports that visits were carried out under this pro¬ cedure from April to September 1969. The report states:

“However, in the autumn of 1969, the Israeli authorities informed the IGRC that the number of prisoners had so increased that they were obliged to change visiting arrange¬ ments ; from that time on, the delegates would not be able to see any detainee held incom¬ municado . . . even if his ‘isolation’ was not necessarily solitary confinement but was shared with other prisoners in the same category.

“The IGRC rejoined that such a procedure was unacceptable and it endeavoured to find a solution consistent with the letter and the spirit of the Fourth Geneva Convention. Even though its delegates thought that there had been some improvement in interrogation conditions, the IGRC considered that the visiting procedure laid down by the Israeli authorities no longer permitted it to ensure that interrogation methods at variance with humanitarian law did not occur.

“On 19 April 1970, the Israeli Government authorized the delegates to carry out their visits subject to the following conditions: each prisoner would continue to be visited about once a month; no detainee would remain in a detention centre without being seen by the delegates on their second visit after the arrest of the prisoner, unless, in exceptional circumstances and for imperious security reasons, he was denied such a visit, in which

case his name would be communicated to the delegation.”

63. The Special Committee notes that the greater part of allegations concerning ill- treatment while under detention, including those made this year, relate to experiences of prisoners or detainees while under inter¬ rogation in police stations or military camps. The prison most seriously and most frequently implicated in these allegations was Sarafand. Among those witnesses who stated that they had been ill-treated in Sarafand Military Camp were the following: Suleiman Moham¬ med Abu Tair, 22 years old, who had been arrested on 2 February 1969 and deported on 15 June 1971; a witness arrested in June 1970 (and later deported) who testified in closed meeting; Mohammed Ali Omar Abu Bakri, 35 years old, who was arrested on 9 February 1970 and deported on 18 March 1971; Hamdi Khalil Mahmoud Kassab, 50 years of age, who was arrested on 6 April 1969 and deported in May 1971.

64. Among the cases mentioned by the Special Committee in its first report, the Committee would like to refer to the case of Moayyad Osman Badawi El-Bahsh, 22 years of age, who was arrested in December 1967 in Nablus and deported on 7 September 1970. El-Bahsh appeared before the Special Committee in Beirut on 14 July 1971. He was at that time undergoing treatment in London. The witness’ left arm showed signs of complete paralysis when he appeared before the Special Committee. He alleged that this was due to the ill-treatment that he had suffered upon his arrest and that the arm had become paralysed on 9 March 1968. El-Bahsh said that he had been subjected to electrical torture, with clips placed on his ears and genitals and a band around the head, and that he had also been stretched with one arm tied to a post and another to a door which had been constantly opened and closed. The Special Committee observed scars, which could have been caused by cigarette burns, on the witness’ legs, knees, thighs, ankles and penis. The witness stated that he had been suspended by the wrists from a window and a soldier had jumped up and down on the shackles holding his legs together, causing

UNITED NATIONS 641

paralysis of the left arm. The witness also stated that he had been visited in 1968 by a representative of Amnesty International. Giv¬ ing evidence before the Special Committee on 16 April 1970 (A/AC. 145/RT.19, page 67), Najib El-Ahmed stated that he had met El-Bahsh in the infirmary in Nablus Prison in 1968, that they had spent more than 30 days together in the infirmary, that El-Bahsh had developed “partial paralysis of the left side right up to the shoulder”, which El-Ahmed attributed to torture to which El-Bahsh had been subjected at Sarafand. Amnesty International is said to have sent a report on this case to the Government of Israel. Although this report itself has not been pro¬ duced, the Special Committee has received from Amnesty International a copy of the Government of Israel’s comments on the case. In the opinion of the Israeli doctors, “medical tests had proved that from an objective point of view there were no signs of paralysis or injury caused to the left arm as claimed” and El-Bahsh’s condition appeared to be one of hysterical paralysis, 4 ‘where the mental state of the patient seemingly causes paralysis, without there being any objective evidence of damage to the nerves”. The report states:

“From the X-ray taken of Moayid [El-Bahsh] on 18 February 1968 and sub¬ sequent medical tests, it is apparent that there is no basis to the complaint that his left arm had been broken ‘in camp5 between 24 and 29 January 1968.

“It was similarly proved by the medical evidence that during the period between 24 January and 8 March 1968, Moayid had not suffered from a break or fracture in his left shoulder or arm.”

At the time of writing the Special Com¬ mittee still awaits the reports of the doctors by whom El-Bahsh was being treated when he appeared before the Special Committee.

65. The Special Committee has already cited in its first report certain cases of alleged ill-treatment of prisoners and detainees (A/ 8089, paras. 78—111). The Government of Israel’s delegate stated in the Third Commit¬ tee during the twenty-fifth session of the General Assembly (A/C.3/SR. 1782) that

they had information in rebuttal of the allegations. The delegate of Israel referred to the case of Mr. Mohammed Derbas, who had told the Special Committee that he had been castrated by surgery by an Israeli doctor (A/8089, para. 104); the Israeli dele¬ gate stated that he had information to prove that Mr. Derbas had been operated on earlier by an Egyptian doctor. The Special Committee accordingly requested the Govern¬ ment of Israel to furnish this information (see para. 9 above). The Government of Israel has not so far furnished this evidence.

66. There are other cases which were cited last year where the evidence is com¬ pelling, namely those of Mr. Sadaddin Kamal (A/AC.145/RT.11, A/8089, paras. 78 and 79), Mr. Youssef Salahat (A/AC.145/RT.21, A/8089, paras. 78, 96, TOO), Mr. Abu Ras (A/AC.145/RT.20, A/8089, paras. 93-95), Mr. Najeb Mohammed Issa El-Khattab (A/AC.145/RT.23, A/8089, paras. 96, 100), Mr. Suleiman M. Sheikh-Eid (A/AC. 145/ RT. 24, A/8089, paras. 98 and 99), Mr. Munir Abdullah Ghannam (A/AC.145/RT.23, A/ 8089, para. 102), Mr. Abu Rumeile (A/8089, paras. 80 and 86), Mr. Ismael Abu Mayaleh and his wife, Mrs. Abla Tahha (A/AC.145/RT.22, A/8089, paras. 78, 85, 101). These cases provided strong evidence which, in the Special Committee’s judgement as expressed in its first report (A/8089, para. 108), justified the conclusion that there is in several prisons, especially in Sarafand Mili¬ tary Camp, a regular practice of ill-treating inmates, mainly during interrogation.

67. Since the first report of the Special Committee was issued, Mr. Abu Rumeile was sentenced on 25 December 1970 to ten years’ imprisonment. This, according to the President of the Court, as reported in the Jerusalem Post, was a light sentence “in view of the fact that Rumeile had admitted to the charges and had fallen ill during his deten¬ tion”. The evidence before the Special Committee shows that Mr. Abu Rumeile, who had been arrested on 8 March 1969, had been so ill-treated that his mental faculties were affected (see A/8089, para. 86, and appendix to annex VII). In a letter dated 27 January 1970, in annex VII to the Special


Committee’s report, the lawyer for Mr. Rumeile, Mrs. Felicia Langer, wrote to the Minister of Security:

“My client was arrested on 8.3.69 and charged at Lydda by the Chief Military Prosecutor (Asgan Aluf Cadmi—file; Lydda 24, A6921) with various offences under the Defence Regulations (Emergency) 1945. According to evidence given by members of his family and the lawyer who acted on his behalf before me, my client was in full posses¬ sion of his faculties until the 20th June 1969. He claimed that during the period between his arrest and this date he was severely tortured while being investigated for a month in Jerusalem, and that he suffered both physical and mental injuries. He described how he had been beaten, tortured with an electrical apparatus, and burned with lighted cigarettes. The marks of the latter are still fairly visible on his left arm. According to evidence my client suffered severe mental damage, and lost possession of his faculties after the 20th June 1969—a state which persists to this day. A medical examination was made by Dr. J. Streich, deputy district psychiatrist, and Director of the Mental Health Institution at Peta Tiqva, which revealed that my client is no longer able to control his bowel move¬ ments, is unable to identify people around him, and cannot speak coherently. In con¬ sequence, Dr. Streich declared him unfit to appear in court. On 14 October 1969, the military court in Lydda declared that ‘there appears to be no possibility of bringing the accused to trial on account of his mental state’. My client had been in good physical and mental health both before and for a period after his arrest. There are witnesses who knew him before his arrest—both Jews and Arabs—as a successful business man. There are also witnesses who can testify about the state in which he was brought back to his prison cell after interrogation. My client’s health has not improved. He has not even been put into a suitable hospital, but is still in Ramele Prison. On 16 January I saw him and he appeared as a man who was quite insane, ‘who had become a piece of broken pottery’. According to claims made by my client while he was still mentally fit, claims which are

upheld by members of his family as well as the witnesses already mentioned, my client’s state was caused by illegal methods of investi¬ gation, including blows and torture. In view of the seriousness of this case, in which the police and/or the security service are suspected of transforming a healthy man into a physical and mental wreck, I urgently appeal to you to appoint a commission of inquiry so that those responsible may be punished. I can provide names of witnesses, together with their addresses, any time you wish.”

E. Administrative detention

68. The Special Committee notes that the practice of administrative detention of in¬ dividuals continues. Under this practice a considerable number of persons are still deprived of their liberty without charges being brought against them. According to a report appearing in the Jerusalem Post on 15 June 1971, Defence Minister Moshe Dayan informed the Knesset that in May 1970 the number of administrative detainees was 1,131 and that in June 1971 the number had decreased to 560. Of these, 229 came from the West Bank, 303 from the Gaza Strip, 14 from Jerusalem and 14 from Israel. The then Commander of the Israeli forces in Gaza, Menahem Aviram, addressing the press on 1 February 1971, on the day after the month-long, 22-hours a day curfew in Shati Refugee Camp was lifted and journalists allowed to tour the area, stated that local lock¬ ups in Gaza were filled to their 700-bed capacity and that 160 Gaza Palestinians, mostly administrative detainees, were kept in a prison camp in the Sinai. In addition, according to the same report (Jerusalem Post, 2 February 1971) and the same source, there were 24 families of wanted persons living in specially constructed quarters in the Sinai. They were exiled to prevent them from aiding and abetting their relatives who were wanted, and they would be returned as soon as the wanted persons were captured. The report states that Commander Shlomo Gazit, Military Commander of the occupied territories, “flatly rejected journalist requests to visit the Sinai detention camp”. The report

UNITED NATIONS 643

quotes him as saying “it would not be good for Israeli public relations.”

F. Other allegations

69. Several other allegations have been made before the Special Committee, such as intimidation of the local population by the imposition of harsh curfews for prolonged periods, mass arrests and changes in school curricula of Arab children. The Special Committee commented on these allegations in its first report (A/8089, paras. 71-77, 112-122). The Special Committee would refer particularly to the curfew imposed in the Shati Refugee Camp in Gaza in January 1971 following the death of two Israeli children as a result of the throwing of a hand grenade in a public street. The curfew lasted for a period of four weeks for 22 hours a day. A complementary measure was the calling into the area by the Israeli authorities of the so-called Border Police, whose treatment of the civilian population was alleged to have been inordinately harsh and even brutal. These allegations regarding the behaviour of the Border Police find corroboration in a statement made by the Commander of the Israeli forces in Gaza, as reported in the Jerusalem Post on 2 February 1971, soon after the curfew in Shati Refugee Camp was lifted and visiting journalists were allowed to tour the area. The report states: “Speaking to journalists, Commander Aviram also admit¬ ted that there had been several cases of Israeli troops beating up and robbing Arab suspects, and said the men responsible were disciplined in every case after the charges

were substantiated.” 70. The Special Committee notes that

periodic mass arrests of young men, in groups ranging between 21 and 50, continue. These round-ups are usually justified on the ground of some act of violence attributed to the resis¬ tance. Examples of such mass arrests are: the arrest of 25 young men in Jenin, reported in the Jerusalem Post on 21 March 1971; of 28 men in Gaza, reported on 25 February 1971; and of 45 in Hebron on 10 February 1971. Oral evidence given before the Special Committee indicates that such arrests are effected in a random manner.

71. The Special Committee’s attention has been drawn to what are alleged to be instances of radical changes in the educational curricula of Arab children apparently designed to weaken their national consciousness or to obscure the identity of the Palestinian people.

IV. FINDINGS

72. The evidence that the Special Com¬ mittee has received reflects a policy on the part of the Government of Israel designed to effect radical changes in the physical character and demographic composition of several areas of the territory under occupation by the progressive and systematic elimination of every vestige of Palestinian presence in these areas. It would have the effect of obliterating Arab culture and the Arab way of life in the area, and, contrary to international law, of transforming it into a Jewish State. Measures taken under this policy include the establishment of settlements for Israeli Jews in, for example, occupied Jerusalem, Hebron, certain parts of the Jordan Valley, the Golan Heights, Gaza, Northern Sinai and Sharm El-Sheikh. Such a policy will render more difficult any eventual restoration of the Palestinian people’s property and other rights. Besides denying the right of Palestinians who have fled the occupied territories to return to those terri¬ tories, it also threatens the right of Palestinians who have remained in the occupied terri¬ tories to continue to live there. In the Special Committee’s view the right of the inhabitants of the occupied territories to remain in their homeland is unqualified and inalienable.

73. The special Committee is of the opinion that the practice of deportation of persons from occupied territories, as carried out by Israel, is not only contrary to article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention but is also part of a total policy of depriving the people of the occupied territory of their right to remain in their homeland. The Special Committee has made the same finding with regard to the practice whereby Israeli na¬ tionals are transferred to the occupied terri¬ tories, as is the case in East Jerusalem, Hebron, the Golan Heights, certain parts of the Jordan


Valley, Gaza, Northern Sinai and Sharm El-Sheikh.

74. In the debate on the Special Com¬ mittee’s report in the Special Political Com¬ mittee during the twenty-fifth session of the General Assembly, the delegate of Israel, referring to his Government’s policy in the occupied territories, stated that several thous¬ ands of Arab visitors had been allowed into the territories during the summer of 1970 (A/SPG/SR. 744-751; A/C.3/SR. 1782). Ac¬ cording to reports in the Israeli press, several more thousand visitors have been permitted this year. Although this may be considered as a positive aspect of Israeli policy towards the territories it occupies, it is no remedy in the circumstances. The summer visitors’ programme is no substitute for recognition of the right of the refugees to return to their home—a right that is continued to be denied to them by the Government of Israel—nor does it have any bearing whatsoever on the declared policy of the Government of Israel to settle occupied territories and on the fact that several hundred persons had been deported from their home in the occupied territories on official deportation orders pur¬ porting to be issued by the Israeli authorities under the Defence (Emergency) Regulations, 1945. No statistics are available of the number of persons who have been forcibly expelled without any such formality. These facts remain true, irrespective of what the Israeli authorities claim to be, a liberal policy of granting visiting permits or of lifting travel restrictions. The same observation would apply to the statement frequently made that Israeli policy in the occupied territories is to keep the Israeli presence as unobtrusive as possible, not interfering with the conduct of local affairs and keeping intervention by the occupation government to a minimum. It is difficult to reconcile the latter statement with the recurring curfews imposed for periods ranging from dawn-to-dusk over a stretch of 22 hours and the habitual intervention of Israeli troops to deal with acts of resistance to the occupation. The fact remains that (a) the Government of Israel still refuses the population of the occupied territories the right to return to their home; (b) the declared

policy of the Government of Israel is to settle occupied territories with Israeli citizens; (c) the Government of Israel regularly deports civilians from the occupied territories.

75. The Special Committee has shown in paragraphs 52 and 58 above that the Govern¬ ment of Israel’s declared policy is to destroy the houses of persons suspected of helping members of the resistance. This policy is in violation of articles 33 and 53 of the Fourth Geneva Convention. It also violates the fundamental right of the protected persons to a home. The evidence before the Special Committee shows, moreover, that the destruc¬ tion of houses takes place arbitrarily and that it has not ceased. The Special Committee notes the efforts of the ICRC to aid victims, whose houses have been demolished, by providing relief supplies and temporary shelter. The Special Committee notes that many persons whose houses have been de¬ molished have left the occupied territories. The Special Committee is of the view that the policy of demolition of houses in this manner and a demonstrated policy of deporta¬ tion, as parts of a general policy of annexation and settlement, can have but one result: the elimination of any possibility of the fulfilment of the Palestinian people’s right of self-determination within the confines of their own homeland.

76. It is clear that the right of the Pales¬ tinian people to their own homeland was sanctioned by the United Nations in all resolutions adopted by the General Assembly and Security Council, including resolution 181 (II) by virtue of which the General Assembly of the United Nations recom¬ mended the Plan of Partition with Economic Union as spelled out in the resolution. The Plan of Partition, in the same manner as other United Nations resolutions and decla¬ rations on the question, has acknowledged the right of the Palestinian people to self- determination. The concern of the inter¬ national community for this basic right was further manifested when the General As¬ sembly adopted the International Covenants on Human Rights, article 1 of each of which proclaims the right to self-determination. The Israeli policy would have the effect

UNITED NATIONS 645

of extinguishing the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination. The Special Committee considers any act in furtherance of that policy to be a violation of a fundamen¬ tal human right to which all peoples are equally entitled.

77. Numerous allegations of ill-treatment while under detention have been made before the Special Committee. In the absence of sufficient corroborative evidence, the Special Committee is unable to reach a conclusive finding in regard to these cases. The Special Committee is convinced however that, apart from general prison conditions which, despite reported efforts at improvement, are stated to be bad, mainly due to overcrowding, interrogation procedures very frequently involve physical violence (see International Review of the Red Cross, September 1970, No. 114, pages 504- 505; and The Red Cross in Action, news bulletin No. 164, 14 July 1971).

78. The evidence shows that the practice of imposing harsh curfews continues. In regard to the four weeks5 long curfew imposed on the Shati Refugee Camp following the grenade incident in January 1971, the con¬ ditions of curfew make it appear to have been more of a form of reprisal than a necessary means of either preventing similar incidences or bringing the offenders to book.

79. In regard to allegations of mass arrests, the Special Committee has reached the conclusion that whatever their avowed pur¬ pose, the arrests were clearly calculated in part to be a means of destroying the morale of the people of the occupied territories.

80. For lack of evidence, the Special Com¬ mittee is unable to arrive at a finding on the allegation that radical changes have been made in the education curricula of Arab children of the occupied territories. The Special Committee understands that UNESCO has interested itself in securing for the children of the occupied territories the quality and type of education to which they are entitled.

81. On the basis of the testimony placed before it or obtained by it in the course of its investigations, the Special Committee had been led to conclude that the Government of Israel is deliberately carrying out policies

aimed at preventing the population of the occupied territories from returning to their homes and forcing those who are in their homes in the occupied territories to leave, either by direct means such as deportation or indirectly by attempts at undermining their morale or through the offer of special inducements, all with the ultimate object of annexing and settling the occupied territories. The Special Committee considers the acts of the Government of Israel in furtherance of these policies to be the most serious violation of human rights that has come to its attention. The evidence shows that this situation has deteriorated since the last mission of the Special Committee in 1970.

82. The Special Committee must em¬ phasize once again the importance of having an arrangement for implementing the pro¬ visions of the Geneva Conventions which would be acceptable to all parties and which would thereby better ensure the safeguarding of the human rights of the population of the occupied territories. The Special Committee regards its task as essentially a humanitarian and not a political one, despite the fact that there are certain political and juridical pro¬ blems that necessarily arise from the nature of the Middle East question as a whole. It is, however, clear to the Committee that the arrangement it recommended in its report to the Secretary-General (A/8089, para. 155) should be implemented if any progress is to be achieved in safeguarding the human rights of the population of the occupied territories. The Special Committee would like to draw particular attention to the recommendation which provides for the repre¬ sentation under this arrangement of the large population within the occupied territories which has not yet been given the opportunity of exercising the right of self-determination. The Special Committee in no way intends to enter into the question of the status of any of the States vis-a-vis one another nor is the arrangement it proposed in any way meant to prejudice whatever political attitudes these States have taken in relation to one another until now. The arrangement envisaged by the Special Committee is designed to ensure that the persons in the occupied territory


are guaranteed the protection of their rights, namely, the primary right to remain in or return to their home and other rights con¬ sistent with their status as the civilian popula¬ tion of an occupied territory.

83. The Special Committee has already stated in its first report (A/8089, para. 146) that it considers that in this case the fundamen¬ tal violation of human rights lies in the very fact of occupation. The most effective way of safeguarding the human rights of the population of the occupied territories, there¬ fore, is to end the occupation of these terri¬ tories. Occupation constitutes an infringe¬ ment of the principle of territorial integrity which has been accepted and repeatedly endorsed by the family of nations and has been enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations. The same principle has been further recognized and elaborated by the United Nations in the Declaration of Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Rela¬ tions and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations adopted by the General Assembly at its twenty-fifth session (resolution 2625 (XXV)) on 24 October 1970. The principle that the acquisition of territory by force is inadmissible has been expressly reaffirmed by the General Assembly in paragraph 1 of resolution 2628 (XXV) relating to the situation in the Middle East. The evidence received by the Special Committee since its mission to the Middle East in 1970 strengthens its conviction that, failing an end to the occupation itself and if the provisions of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 are to be en¬ forced, the States concerned will have to agree to an arrangement that would remove any suspicion regarding violations of human rights of the population of the occupied territories.

V. RECOMMENDATIONS

84. The Special Committee, having ex¬ amined the evidence before it, reiterates the recommendations that it made in its first report (A/8089, paras. 145-156) with the modifications indicated below.

85. The Special Committee notes that the declared Israeli policy of annexing Jerusalem

has become even more manifest in the construction of large housing projects on the occupied eastern limits of the city undertaken as an apparent instrument of that policy. The Special Committee recommends that the General Assembly call upon the Govern¬ ment of Israel to desist from all measures for the annexation of the occupied part of Jerusalem.

86. The Special Committee also notes that since the presentation of its first report certain policies and practices which the Special Committee found to exist in the occupied territories have been continued, in some instances on an even wider scale. This is especially so in regard to the policy of encouraging the movement of Israeli settlers into such settlements. The Special Committee recommends that the Govern¬ ment of Israel be called upon to discontinue

this policy. 87. The Special Committee must also draw

attention to the fact that the practice of deportation of civilians from the occupied territories has continued unabated, and must record its grave concern that this practice, together with the policy of establishing settle¬ ments in the occupied territories, seems calculated to eliminate an identifiable Pales¬ tinian community altogether from the oc¬ cupied territories. The Special Committee, therefore, recommends that the General As¬ sembly at the same time call upon the Govern¬ ment of Israel to permit, unconditionally, all persons who have fled the occupied terri¬ tories, or who have been deported or expelled therefrom, to return to their homes.

88. The Special Committee still maintains that the existing arrangements for the en¬ forcement of the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions are, in the circumstances, in¬ adequate as they neither enable complete and exhaustive investigation of allegations of violations of these Conventions nor do they in a positive sense ensure their scrupulous observance. Such an investigation can be effective only if the parties concerned extend their willing co-operation.

89. The evidence before the Special Com¬ mittee shows that the practices and policies found to exist in the occupied territories

UNITED NATIONS 647

in 1970 have not ceased, and for this reason the Special Committee would reiterate the recommendation contained in paragraph 155 of its first report (A/8089) regarding the establishment of a mechanism to ensure the safeguarding of the human rights of the population of the occupied territories. In renewing this recommendation the Special Committee must emphasize that it attaches the highest importance to the proper represen¬ tation of the interests of the Palestinian population, which has not yet been given the right of self-determination. The Special Com¬ mittee wishes to emphasize the need for effective implementation of the Geneva Con¬ ventions; and that humanitarian considera¬ tions should transcend all political differences and difficulties. Humanitarian considerations and the importance of protecting rights accorded under international law can and should be kept separate and distinct from the political issues. The Special Committee is satisfied that the arrangement it proposes does not and cannot prejudice any final settlement of the political problem involved in accordance with the terms of Security Council resolution 242 (1967).

90. The Special Committee, therefore, commends to the States parties to the conflict in the Middle East the adoption of the arrangement proposed by it in its first report. The merit of that proposal is that it conforms to the spirit of the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions while avoiding certain political problems inherent in the present situation. For such an arrangement to be effective, three elements are essential:

(a) There must be supervision of the conditions of occupation;

(b) This supervision must be exercised by an independent and impartial body;

(c) The investigating body must enjoy freedom of operation in the spirit of the Geneva Conventions.

91. The arrangement proposed by the Special Committee in its first report (A/8089) and recommended by it again is as follows: The General Assembly might recommend:

(a) That the States whose territory is occupied by Israel appoint immediately either a neutral State or States, or an international

organization which offers all guarantees of impartiality and effectiveness, to safeguard the human rights of the occupied territories;

(b) That suitable arrangements be made for the proper representation of the interests of the large population in the occupied territories which has not been given the opportunity of exercising the right of self- determination; and

(c) That a neutral State or international organization, as described in (a) above, be nominated by Israel and be associated in this arrangement. The Special Committee recommends that the State or States or international organization duly nominated under this arrangement might be authorized to undertake the following activities:

(a) To secure the scrupulous implementa¬ tion of the provisions relating to human rights contained in the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions and in particular to investigate and determine the facts in the case of allega¬ tions of the violation of the human rights provisions of these Conventions or of other applicable international instruments;

(b) To ensure that the population of the occupied territories is treated in accordance with the applicable law;

(c) To report to the States concerned, and to the General Assembly of the United Nations on its work.

VI. ADOPTION OF THE REPORT

92. Approved and signed by the Special Committee in accordance with rule 20 of its rules of procedure as follows:

[Signed] H.S. Amerasinghe (Ceylon) [Signed] Hussein Nur-Elmi (Somalia) [Signed] B. Bohte (Yugoslavia)


410 Special Report of the United Nations

Relief and Works Agency Commissioner

General on the Effect on Palestine Ref¬

ugees of Recent Operations Carried

Out by the Israeli Military Authorities

in the Gaza Strip1

September, 1971

1. The Commissioner-General submits the following special report on the effect on Pales¬ tine refugees of recent operations carried out by the Israeli military authorities in the Gaza Strip, in which shelters in refugee camps were demolished and about 15,000 persons displaced, some of them to places outside the Gaza Strip. This report is submitted in accordance with paragraph 21 of General Assembly resolution 302 (IV).

2. On 8 July 1971, while the Minister of Defence of the Government of Israel was in Gaza, he asked to see the Agency’s Field Director for the Gaza Strip and told him that in view of the ineffectiveness of other measures in dealing with violence in Jabalia refugee camp, the Israeli authorities intended in the near future to move numbers of the inhabitants from the camp so that roads could be built or widened for security purposes. The Minister said it was not intended that the refugees should be left without shelter, but, because of the urgency of the measure, new housing outside Jabalia could not be provided in advance of demolition. Displaced persons would have to be accommodated in other camps or in Gaza town or in El Arish outside the Gaza Strip. The Minister also expressed the hope that the Agency would continue to provide services in these new locations to refugees who were moved.

3. United Nations Headquarters were in¬ formed by the Agency of this and other developments. There was no question of the Agency’s being asked to agree to this measure, which was taken on the sole initiative and

1 Text of the special report on Gaza submitted by UNRWA Commissioner-General Sir John Rennie, transmitted to the members of the General Assembly by Secretary-General U Thant and issued on September 17; U.N. doc. A/8383.

responsibility of the Occupying Power. Without further reference to the Agency, the demolition of shelters began on 20 July in Jabalia camp.

4. At a meeting in Gaza, on 28 July, at which the Commissioner-General expressed his concern and sought more information, the Military Governor of the Gaza Strip said that the operations were limited to Jabalia camp, that the numbers involved would not be out of proportion to the numbers involved in earlier road-widening in other camps (where housing had been provided in advance in the same camp); that there were plans for new housing in the Strip, but action was urgent in view of the killing of 80 persons in a period of five months; that El Arish was being used only because alter¬ native housing was not available in the Gaza Strip; and, further, that refugees who have moved to El Arish would be able to return when the new housing was available. On the basis of this information, it appeared that about 600 to 800 families, and in Jabalia only, would be affected by the operations. Without notification to the Agency, however, the operations were extended to Shati (Beach) camp on 2 August and to Rafah camp on or about 15 August.

5. On 6 August, the Commissioner-General drew the attention of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the extreme hardship being inflicted on the refugees by the sudden demolition of their homes and their forcible removal at short notice.

6. In a note verbale of 8 August, the Agency formally protested at the action being taken by the Israeli authorities, which appeared to be contrary to General Assembly resolution 2675 (XXV), which affirmed a number of basic principles for the protection of civilian populations in armed conflicts, and also to the provisions of articles 49 and 53 of the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949 relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War.

7. On 14 August, the Commissioner-Gen¬ eral pointed out to the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs that demolition appeared to be much in excess of the alternative ac¬ commodation available. He asked that a

UNITED NATIONS 649

halt be called to the operations and action urgently taken to provide adequate shelter within the Gaza Strip for those who had lost their homes.

8. On 19 August, at a meeting in the Israeli Ministry of Defence, the Commissioner-Gen¬ eral was informed that the operations had been completed in Jabalia and would be completed that day in Shati (Beach) camp, but that they were still in progress in Rafah and would continue as long as alternative accommoda¬ tion in the Gaza Strip or in El Arish or, also, in the West Bank of Jordan was available. The Commissioner-General was informed that at that stage the homes of 1,515 families, comprising over 10,000 persons, had been demolished. He again called for a halt to the operations, but was told that they must go on. He was also informed that a second phase would take place after up to 800 new houses had been built in four separate areas in the Strip: Khan Younis, Rafah, Deir-el-Balah and the area between Deir-el-Balah and Gaza town.

9. The operations continued in Rafah camp until 26 August. According to the best information at present available to the Agency, about 2,900 families, comprising some 15,000 persons, have been displaced from the three camps in these operations, of whom about 350 families have gone to El Arish, about 30 families to the West Bank, and the rest remain elsewhere in the Gaza Strip. For precise information checks must be made at all Agency distribution centres and this will take some time.

10. Despite assurances given by the Israeli military authorities in the course of the operations, by 14 August about 70 Agency staff members had had their shelters demolish¬ ed, and some had been obliged to move to El Arish owing to the absence of readily available alternative accommodation in the vicinity.

11. The Agency was asked by the Israeli military authorities to continue to provide services to refugees who were moved. Ref¬ ugees who are still resident in the Strip are eligible for the medical and educational services provided there and can ask to have their rations transferred to a nearer distri¬

bution centre in accordance with normal practice. This applies also to those who have had to move to the West Bank of Jordan. As regards El Arish, which is outside the area in which the Agency operates programmes, the Agency has been unable to agree to the request by the Israeli authorities that it should provide services there. A refugee family at El Arish may, however, still pick up its monthly rations at its former distribution centre or, if it so requests the Agency, have them temporarily transferred to a more convenient centre within the Strip. The Agency will also give whatever assistance it can to enable displaced refugees to re¬ establish themselves within the Gaza Strip.

12. According to reports received by the Agency from the refugees and from its staff, the Israeli military authorities carried out these security operations, in general, in the following way. Israeli soldiers arrived in the camp (on some occasions, at least, at night), marked shelters for demolition and gave the inhabitants notice ranging from two to forty-eight hours to leave with all their belongings. The identity cards of the heads of the families affected were taken away by the soldiers in exchange for receipts. The refugees were told that there was good accom¬ modation for them in El Arish, but that, if they preferred, they could go to the West Bank of Jordan, or remain in Gaza if they could find unoccupied accommodation there outside their camp and produce the owner’s written agreement for its use. They were also told that free transport would be provided for those agreeing to go to El Arish or the West Bank of Jordan, that accommodation there would be rent-free for a period and employ¬ ment was available, and that compensation would paid for demolished additions they had made to Agency shelters and for privately-built shelters. The Agency understands that com¬ pensation was also paid for other private property belonging to refugees and affected by demolition, that food for several days was given to those who moved to El Arish, and that medical attention is available there.

13. The Agency has not yet had full information on the effects of the operations described above. It believes that about


4,360 rooms built by the Agency, or with its assistance, have been demolished, and the Government of Israel has been notified of a claim for compensation in respect of them. In addition, it is estimated that over 2,000 privately-built rooms have been de¬ molished. There has been some dislocation of services, but the extent cannot yet be assessed. From such information as is avail¬ able on the whereabouts of refugees displaced by the demolition of their shelters, about 2,500 families must have remained in the Strip, occupying such other empty housing or other permanent shelter as they could find, doubling-up with friends or relatives, or improvising make-shift shelter on vacant land. It is evident that for many their present living conditions must be worse than before and that the health hazard must be greater.

411 Supplement to the Special Report of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency Commissioner-General on the Effect on Palestine Refugees of Operations Car¬ ried Out in July and August 1971 by the Israeli Military Authorities in the Gaza Strip1

November, 1971

1. On the basis of the information now available to him the Commissioner-General confirms that the figures given in the special report for the number of persons affected and the number of rooms constructed by the Agency or with its assistance are approximate¬ ly correct: the figures he now has are 14,704 persons (against “about 15,000”) and 4,428 rooms (against 4,360). He confirms that, in addition, between 2,000 and 3,000 privately built rooms were demolished. The number of families involved is lower: 2,410 against the figure of “about 2,900” given in the special report. The number of staff members involved is higher: 165 against the figure

1 Text of UNRWA Commissioner-General Rennie’s

supplementary special report as transmitted by Secre¬

tary-General U Thant to the General Assembly and

issued on November 23, 1971; U.N. doc. A/8383/Add. 1.

of “about 70” in the special report. 2. The breakdown by camp is as follows:

Agency-built or Persons Families assisted rooms

Jabalia 6,349 1,050 2,179 Beach (Shati) 4,680 789 1,205 Rafah 3,675 571 1,044

3. The present whereabouts of the dis¬ placed refugees is believed to be as follows: about 270 families are in El Arish, about 130 having returned from there to the Gaza Strip; about 30 are in the West Bank of Jordan; about 830 are in the same camps; and the remainder, about 1,280, are elsewhere in the Gaza Strip. Those at El Arish have been provided with accommodation by the Israeli authorities and those in the West Bank who had no other accommodation have been admitted to vacant UNRWA shelters. Some families remaining in the same camp have found vacant shelters but the majority have been taken in by relations and friends. Families who left their camp but did not go to El Arish or to the West Bank have found accommodation by renting vacant buildings or constructing temporary shelters or lodging with relations or friends, many of them having received compensation from the Israeli autho¬ rities for their property which was destroyed. The Commissioner-General has no informa¬ tion from official sources about the plans of the Israeli authorities for further payment of compensation to refugees whose property was destroyed or for assistance with the construction of housing for them.

4. The Agency has submitted a claim for compensation to the Israeli authorities amounting to about $400,000 in respect of Agency-built or Agency-assisted shelters and about $ 36,500 in respect of public and private latrines, garbage platforms and bins, and water points and drains demolished in the course of the security operations with which the special report dealt.

5. Refugees whose dwellings were demolish¬ ed and who have remained in the Gaza Strip continue to receive all Agency services, as do those who moved to the West Bank of Jordan. Those who remain at El Arish are collecting their rations monthly at distribution centres in the Strip.

412

Supplementary Report of the United Nations Special Committee To Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories1

December, 1971

CONTENTS

Paragraphs

Letter of transmittal

INTRODUCTION . 1-10

I. ANALYSIS OF ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE AND FINDINGS THEREON. 11-33

A. Allegations of annexation and settlement. 11 — 16 B. Allegations of transfer of population and of the .

denial of the right to return. 17 -22 C. Allegations of ill-treatment while under detention . 23-30 D. Other allegations. 31-33

II. ADDITION TO RECOMMENDATION MADE IN CHAPTER V OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE’S SECOND REPORT . 34-38

III. ADOPTION OF THE SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT. 39

ANNEXES

I. ABRIDGED VERSION OF REPORT SENT TO THE GOVERNMENT [not published OF ISRAEL ON 29 APRIL 1969 BY AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL here]

II. MR. MOYAD EL-BAHSH-REPORT OF ISRAELI AUTHORITIES [not published SUBMITTED TO AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL here]

III. MEDICAL REPORT ON MR. MOAYAD BAHSH, AGED 22 YEARS, [not published DRAWN UP BY DR. T.H.H. WADE here]

1 Text (excluding the annexes which are not reproduced here) of the supplementary report submitted by the Special

Committee, transmitted to the General Assembly by Secretary-General U Thant and issued on December 9, 1971; U.N.

doc. A/8389/Add. 1.

651

652 INTERNATIONAL^ DOCUMENTS ON PALESTINE, 1971

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

10 December 1971

His Excellency U Thant Secretary-General of the United Nations New York, New York

Sir, The Special Committee to Investigate

Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories has the honour to transmit to you herewith, in accordance with General Assembly res¬ olution 2727 (XXV), a report supplementing the second report, which it adopted and presented to you on 17 September 1971 (A/8389 and Corr.l). The supplementary report has been prepared in order to bring to your attention, and the attention of the General Assembly, certain information which was not available at the time the second report was prepared.

In the view of the Special Committee, the most important development that has taken place since the Special Committee adopted its second report was the announcement by the International Committee of the Red Cross that it had reconsidered its position as a potential Protecting Power in terms of the Geneva Conventions. The International Committee has now announced that it is prepared to take upon itself all the tasks envisaged for the Protecting Power in these Conventions. As the Government of Israel has refused to receive the Special Committee or to co-operate with it, but has allowed the International Committee to function within the occupied territories, the Special Com¬ mittee considers it most desirable and neces¬ sary that appropriate arrangements be made to enable the International Committee to begin forthwith the exercise of the functions of a Protecting Power in the occupied terri¬ tories in the Middle East.

Once the International Committee begins in fact to function as a Protecting Power, the General Assembly might wish to consider whether or not there is a need for the con¬ tinuation of the Special Committee’s activities.

Accept Sir, on my behalf and on behalf of my two colleagues on the Special Com¬ mittee, the assurances of our highest con¬ sideration.

(Signed) H.S. Amerasinghe

Chairman

Special Committee To Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the

Population of the Occupied Territories

INTRODUCTION

1. In resolution 2727 (XXV) of 15 Decem¬ ber 1970, the Special Committee was re¬ quested by the General Assembly to report to the Secretary-General as soon as possible and whenever the need arises thereafter”.

2. On 17 September 1971, the Special Committee presented its second report to the Secretary-General (A/8389 and Corr.l) based on information available to the Com¬ mittee up to that date. Since that date, a number of developments relevant to its man¬ date have come to the attention of the Special Committee. The Special Committee has therefore drawn up the present supplement to its second report.

3. The information in the present report supplements that appearing in chapter III of the second report (A/8389 and Corr.l). In addition, the Special Committee has added some remarks concerning chapter V of that report, containing the recom¬ mendations of the Special Committee.

4. The Special Committee has taken note of the statement released by the Permanent Mission of Israel on 15 October 1971 (A/8472) in connexion with the publication of the second report of the Special Committee. In this statement, the Government of Israel reiterated its reasons for refusing to co¬ operate with the Special Committee. In addition, the Government of Israel charged that witnesses “appeared before the Com¬ mittee with heart-rending stories to the effect that their disabilities, such as for example blindness, were due to ‘Israeli tor¬ tures’, and the Committee appears to have

UNITED NATIONS 653

willingly accepted such nonsense”. The state¬ ment calls “utter falsehood” the “tales of mass deportation of Arabs” from the oc¬ cupied territories and charges that the Special Committee “has given currency to [these] tales”.

5. The statement asserts that the Arab population in the occupied territories “enjoys tranquillity, prosperity and respect for their human rights, to a degree unknown there before 1967”. The statement also refers to the summer visitors scheme as “another fact which by itself should be sufficient to illustrate the falsehood of the testimony on which the Committee so readily relies in its report”. Under this programme, Arab visitors are allowed to visit their relatives and friends in the occupied territories and to tour Israel itself. The statement of the Permanent Mission of Israel puts the number of these visitors for 1971 as “over 100,000”, compared with 17,000 in 1968, 23,000 in 1969 and 55,000 in 1970.

6. The Special Gommittee has also taken note of the statement issued by the Jordan Mission to the United Nations, on 21 October 1971, in connexion with the report of the Special Committee (A/8478). The statement characterizes the report as “factual and objective”.

7. Without indulging in acrimonious ex¬ changes, the Special Committe deems it necessary, in the interest of objectivity, to point out that the accusations contained in the statement of the Israeli Mission are too vague for detailed rebuttal. The Israeli Mission does not refer to any specific cases mentioned in the Special Committee’s report, nor has it furnished any information that could help establish the facts. As the Special Committee has stated repeatedly, it would welcome such information. As regards the Israeli Mission’s contention that the summer visitors pro¬ gramme “should be sufficient to illustrate the falsehood of the testimony” before the Committee, the Special Committee would refer to its comments made in this connexion in its second report (A/8389 and Corr. 1, para. 74) and to paragraphs 21 and 22 of the present report.

8. As stated in both its first and second

reports (A/80891 and A/8389 and Corr. 1), the Special Committee’s mandate requires it to receive evidence that relates to the existence or otherwise of policies and practices affecting the human rights of the population of the territories occupied by Israel as a result of the hostilities of 1967. The Special Committee has interpreted its mandate in the first report2 and reiterated that inter¬ pretation in its second report (A/8389 and Corr. 1, chap. II). The same interpretation applies to the present supplementary report. Briefly stated, the Special Committee con¬ siders that it has been requested by the General Assembly to investigate the practices and policies of the Government of Israel affecting the human rights—namely, those which the Security Council referred to as “essential and inalienable” in its resolution 237 (1967) and those embodied in certain instruments of international law, such as the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions,3— of the population of those territories that Israel occupied as a result of the hostilities of June 1967.

9. In this context, the Special Committee has carried out its investigation of allegations of violations of human rights in the occupied territories. In carrying out its mandate this year, the Special Committee gave priority to evidence in corroboration of evidence previously given before it and to evidence which itself could be corroborated.

10. In drawing up the present report, the Special Committee has continued to take note of newspaper reports of incidents in the Israeli and foreign press, as well as reports by members of the Government of Israel and other Israeli leaders. The Special Com¬ mittee has also taken into account the informa¬ tion appearing in recent United Nations documents, such as the special reports of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Ref¬ ugees in the Near East (UNRWA) on the operations in the Gaza refugee camps (A/8383



2 Ibid., chap. II.

3 See ibid., paras. 36-38; see also United Nations,

Treaty Series, vol. 75 (1950), Nos. 972 and 973.


and Add. 1) and related statements such as those issued by the Government of Israel (A/8432) and the Palestine Liberation Or¬ ganization (A/8395 S/10328). In addition, the Special Committee has received certain additional information on cases referred to in its second report.

I. ANALYSIS OF ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE AND FINDINGS THEREON

A. Allegations of annexation and

SETTLEMENT

11. In its second report, the Special Com¬ mittee expressed the conviction that it was the policy of the Government of Israel to annex and settle the occupied territories. It cited a number of facts that tended to support this conclusion (A/8389 and Corr. 1, para. 47), among which were express pronouncements by Israeli Ministers and leaders in which this policy, in the view of the Special Committee, was made manifest. Since the adoption of its report, the Special Committee has become aware of additional statements to the same effect, such as that made by the Prime Minister of Israel, Mrs. Golda Meir, which was reported in the Jerusalem Post on 10 October 1971. According to this report, the Prime Minister stated:

“Our borders are fixed by the people who live along them. If we retreat, the borders will retreat with us. The danger is then that somebody else will fix the boundaries for us.55

12. The Special Committee has received new reports of the establishment of settlements by Israelis in the occupied territories. The Special Committee, had cited similar in¬ formation in its second report (A/8389 and Corr. 1, para. 48 (d)). The Special Com¬ mittee feels that the following additional reports should be mentioned by way of further evidence of the existence of the policy to annex and settle the occupied territories:

(a) The report appearing in the Israeli newspaper Ma’ariv, on 13 September 1971, which quotes the Director of the Settlement Division of the World Zionist Organization as stating that, since the hostilities of June 1967, 32 settlements had been set up in the

occupied territories, seven of which were set up in the past year. The same report states that six new settlements were being planned for the next year, three in the Golan Heights, two in the Jordan Valley and one in the Gaza Strip.

(b) The report appearing in the Jerusalem Post on 14 September 1971, concerning the establishment of settlements in Kfar Etzion.

(c) The report appearing in the Jerusalem Post, on 20 October 1971, to the effect that the Israeli authorities had completed the fencing off of 4,000 dunams of land near Deir lel-Balah, in the Gaza Strip, “as part of a larger project to establish six Jewish settlements in the Strip”. The report states that the total area of the settlements will be 34,000 dunams.

(d) The report appearing in the Jerusalem Post, on 10 November 1971, that the thirteenth settlement in the Golan Heights had been established; and

(e) The report appearing in the Jerusalem Post, on 28 September 1971, of the continued expansion of the settlements in Hebron, known as Kiryat Arba. According to this report, the Housing Ministry of the Govern¬ ment of Israel has a master plan providing accommodation for 900 families. The same report refers to the founder and spokesman of the original group which moved into the Park Hotel in Hebron for Passover in 1968 “and stayed on”. In this connexion, the Special Committee took note of the letter, dated 3 June 1968, from the Representative of Jordan to the Secretary-General (A/7103),1 which states:

In April 1968, about eighty Orthodox Jews moved into the Park Hotel on the northern outskirts of the city (Hebron), ostensibly to celebrate the Passover holiday, but then announced that they had come to stay. They soon tried to rent houses and shops. The citizens did not comply with these wishes. The Mayor of A1 Khalil (Hebron) cabled the Israel Prime Minister and asked for the removal of this group of Jews. Gon-

1 Issued in printed form in Official Records of the Security

Council, Twenty-third Tear, Supplement for April, May

and June 1968, document S/8609.

UNITED NATIONS 655

sequently, they abused the Mayor and asked him to withdraw his cable. Upon refusing their demand, they demonstrated in the streets and claimed that they were there to stay and their task was part of the ‘redemption of the Land of Israel’. Their acts of provo¬ cation continued and the Israel Government was inactive on this matter.”

13. The letter states that a delegation appointed by the inhabitants of Hebron met the Military Governor on 9 May 1968 and protested against the settlement of Jews in the city, “emphasizing that their presence was potentially dangerous for public security and that their stay would have grave con¬ sequences”. The letter of the Representative of Jordan makes reference to a visit by the then Labour Minister, Yigal Allon, to the religious group when, according to the letter, the Minister “voiced his full support for them”.

14. The Special Committee also noted the reply of the Government of Israel to the allegations contained in the letter of the Government of Jordan. The letter states (A/7105):1

“This letter magnifies and distorts the matter in question.

“A small group of pious Jews and their families have on their own spontaneous initiative taken up residence in Hebron, a town with venerable Jewish historical and religious associations.

“There is no good reason why their neigh¬ bours should not live on peaceful and amicable terms with them and so help to heal the tragic memories of the massacre of Hebron Jews in 1929.”

15. In addition to the above reports, the Jerusalem Post, on 6 October 1971, reported a protest by the Mayor of Hebron, Sheikh Mohammed Ali Ja’abari, against the re¬ quisitioning of 1,000 dunams of land “for the expansion of the Jewish settlement of Kiryat Arba in the area”. The same report, however, quotes an Israel radio report of a statement by a Military Government official

1 Ibid., document S/8626.

to the effect that only 230 dunams were taken over “for security reasons” and that, in fact, only six dunams were actually seized, for which the owners had been adequately compensated.

16. In the view of the Special Committee, these letters, the reports quoted above, as well as those reports concerning the settlements in Hebron referred to in the Special Com¬ mittee’s second report (A/8389 and Gorr. 1, para. 48 (d), (iv) and (viii)), confirm the existence of a policy of annexation and settlement.

B. Allegations of transfer of population

AND OF THE DENIAL OF THE RIGHT TO RETURN

17. In its second report, the Special Com¬ mittee took note of a number of newspaper reports according to which several thousands of persons were displaced from the three major camps in Gaza. The Special Com¬ mittee noted that official Israeli sources had stated that these transfers of population were necessitated by new security measures, such as the construction of wider roads inside the camps in order to facilitate patrolling and the maintenance of law and order in these camps. The Special Committee noted the fact that most of the persons whose refugee accom¬ modation had been destroyed to permit the construction of these roads, were forced to leave for the West Bank and El Arish, while a few were said to have sought refuge with other families inside Gaza (A/8389 and Corr. 1, para. 48 (h)).

18. Since the adoption of its second report, on 17 September 1971, the Special Committee has taken note of reports appearing sub¬ sequently in several newspapers, in letters addressed by Governments, as well as in two special reports prepared by the Commissioner- General of UNRWA on the effect on Palestine refugees of these operations (A/8383 and Add. 1). These reports show that thousands of dwellings have been demolished in the three major refugee camps in Gaza and that their inhabitants dispersed to various areas and, in many instances [were] deprived of the humanitarian assistance they were receiving from UNRWA. This was later confirmed in the statement made by the delegate of


Israel in the Special Political Committee at its 788th meeting, on 26 November 1971.

19. Subsequent to the above reports, another report, which appeared in the Jerusa¬ lem Post on 21 October 1971, stated that the Israeli authorities had decided to move, “on a voluntary basis”, in 1972, another 3,000 families from the refugee camps in Gaza to permanent housing. According to this report, 2,000 families were to be resettled in the suburbs of Gaza Strip towns and about another 1,000 families would be moved to the West Bank. The report states that this move was to be completed by the spring of 1972 with a view to relieving congestion in the camps. The same report quotes the authorities as stating that they would be forced to resume “thinning out” operations in the refugee camps if this resettlement plan were opposed. According to the report, the new homes would cost LI 3,000 each and would be financed by the Military Govern¬ ment, UNRWA and the refugees themselves. In a report appearing in the Jerusalem Post on 22 October 1971, a spokesman for the Defence Ministry was quoted as denying the manner in which the alternative housing was being provided and the source of the financing of these new homes. The Special Committee notes that this official spokesman does not, however, deny the avowed intention of the Government of Israel to move 3,000 families from the refugee camps by next spring.

20. In this context, the Special Committee considers that these proposed transfers, as well as those that have taken place so far during the “thinning out” operations, are unwarranted. The Special Committee would wish to reiterate the view expressed in its second report that security reasons offer no justification for the arbitrary transfer of population to enable the Occupying Power to construct new roads in the area so evacuated. The Special Committee considers the arbi¬ trary transfer of population as unnecessary, unjustified and in breach of the Fourth Geneva Convention.

21. In its second report, the Special Com¬ mittee made reference to the so-called summer visitors programme, which permits Palestin¬

ians living outside the occupied territories to visit relatives and friends during the three- month summer period. The Special Com¬ mittee noted that the delegate of Israel, in the debate on the Special Committee’s report during the twenty-fifth session of the General Assembly, had referred to this programme as an indication of his Government’s policy in the occupied territories. In its second report, the Special Committee stated that, although the summer visitors programme may be considered as a positive aspect of Israeli policy towards the territories it oc¬ cupies, it is no substitute for recognition of the right of the refugees to return to their home, nor does it have any bearing whatsoever on the declared policy of the Government of Israel to settle occupied territories and on the fact that several hundred persons had been deported from their homes in the occupied territories on official deportation orders pur¬ porting to be issued by the Israeli authorities under the Defence (Emergency) Regulations, 1945 (A/8389 and Corr. 1, para. 74).

22. In this connexion, the Special Com¬ mittee notes the statement made by the delegate of Israel in the Special Political Committee at its 788th meeting, as well as reports according to which the summer visitors programme for 1971 had been be¬ tween 80,000 and 106,000 visitors. The Special Committee notes that the programme ended in mid-September 1971 and that all visitors had left the occupied territories. On 3 October 1971, the Jerusalem Post reported that several thousand Arab summer visitors before leaving, had asked to remain in the occupied territories. The report quotes the Military Governor of the West Bank as stating that such requests would be given consideration under the family reunion ar¬ rangements.

C. Allegations of ill-treatment while

UNDER DETENTION

23. In its second report to the Secretary- General, (A/8389 and Corr. 1, para. 64) the Special Committee referred, inter alia, to the case of Moayyad Osman Badawi El-Bahsh, 22 years of age, who was arrested in December 1967 in Nablus and deported on 7 September

UNITED NATIONS 657

1970. The Special Committee stated that El-Bahsh had appeared before it at Beirut, on 14 July 1971. At the time, he was still undergoing treatment in London. The witness’ left arm showed signs of complete paralysis and he alleged that this was due to the ill-treatment that he had suffered upon his arrest. El-Bahsh had informed the Com¬ mittee that he had been subjected to electric torture, with clips placed on his ears and genitals and a band around the head, and that he had also been stretched with one arm tied to a post and another to a door which had been constantly opened and closed. He stated that he had been suspended by the wrists from a window and that a soldier had jumped up and down on the shackles holding his legs together, causing paralysis of the left arm. In this connexion, the Special Committee made reference to the evidence of Najib El-Ahmed, who appeared before it on 16 April 1970 and who had stated that he had met El-Bahsh in the infirmary in Nablus Prison in 1968, where they had spent more than 30 days together and that El-Bahsh had developed 4‘partial paralysis of the left side right up to the shoulder”. El-Bahsh informed the Special Committee that, in 1968, he had been visited in prison by a representative of Amnesty International.

24. In its second report, the Special Com¬ mittee also stated that Amnesty International had sent a report on the case of El-Bahsh to the Government of Israel and, although this report had not been produced at that time, the Special Committee had received from Amnesty International a copy of the Government of Israel’s comments on the case. The Special Committee quoted the opinion of the Israeli doctors as contained in the Government of Israel’s reply to Amnesty International according to which, “medical tests had proved that from an objective point of view there were no signs of paralysis or injury caused to the left arm as claimed” and El-Bahsh’s condition appeared to be one of hysterical paralysis, “where the mental state of the patient seemingly causes paralysis, without there being any objective evidence of damage to the nerves”. Furthermore, the Special Committee quoted the report of the

Israeli doctors which stated, “From the X-ray taken of Moayid

[El-Bahsh] on 18 February 1968 and sub¬ sequent medical tests, it is apparent that there is no basis to the complaint that his left arm had been broken cin camp’ between 24 and 29 January 1968.

“It was similarly proved by the medical evidence that during the period between 24 January and 8 March 1968, Moayid had not suffered from a break or fracture in his left shoulder or arm.”

25. As of 17 September 1971, the Special Committee was still awaiting the report of the doctors by whom El-Bahsh was being treated when he appeared before the Special Committee. Since the date of the adoption of its second report (17 September 1971), the Special Committee has received a copy of the original report that Amnesty Inter¬ national sent to the Government of Israel, as well as the report of Dr. T.H.EI. Wade, dated 8 July 1971, both of which were on El-Bahsh. In his report, Dr. Wade diagnosed the condition as one of hysterical paralysis as far as the left arm was concerned; Dr. Wade further stated that, regarding the left arm, a second doctor, Mr. Donal Brooks, had independently made the diagnosis of hysterical or feigned paralysis. The report of Dr. Wade also contained a description of his observations as a result of a complete examination of El-Bahsh.

26. In the light of the evidence available, the Special Committee does not feel that it is in a position to determine whether or not, in fact, El-Bahsh had been subjected to the extreme forms of ill-treatment that he alleged before the Special Committee. The Special Committee cannot, however, rule out the possibility that paralysis was due to a mental state that was itself the result of some form of physical ill-treatment or psychological strain while under detention. The report of Amnesty International to the Government of Israel, the report communicat¬ ed by the Government of Israel to Amnesty International, and the report by Dr. T.H.H. Wade, appear as annexes I, II and III below.


27. In the interim period since 17 Septem¬ ber 1971, the Special Committee has received reports that a riot occurred in Ashkelon Prison on 30 September. According to these reports, the riot lasted for three hours and it was staged by the 480 prisoners who are held at Ashkelon. A report on this riot appearing in the Jerusalem Post, on 3 October 1971, attributes it to the lack of suitable facilities for the prisoners who serve long sentences of 15 years and over. The report attributes to Mr. Arye Nir, Prison Com¬ missioner, a statement to the effect that the only workshop facility for the prison was outside the prison walls and that this could only accommodate about half the prison population, which was approximately 500 men. The Commissioner is reported as stating that this meant that between 250 and 300 inmates spend 23 hours a day in their cells. The same report states that most of the prisoners at Ashkelon are serving life sentences.

28. The Special Committee notes that, in an interview reported on 12 October 1971, the Minister of Police, Mr. Shlomo Hillel, was reported as stating that the Prison Commissioner, Mr. A. Nir, had appointed a special committee to investigate the riot and that the report of this investigation would be “internal and technical” and that it would not be released to the public. The report quotes the Minister as stating that the immediate causes of the riot were overcrowding, a shortage of staff, and the fact that the prisoners at Ashkelon consisted of “senior terrorist leaders and other dangerous types”.

29. The Special Committee has no evidence that confirms or refutes the allegations made by persons who subsequently visited the prison at Ashkelon that the inmates had been ill-treated by way of reprisal for the riot. No disclosure has been made of the results of the investigation conducted at the behest of the Prison Commissioner. The Special Committee notes that a request by mayors from West Bank towns to visit the prison was turned down, as well as a request by a public delegation of citizens from Nablus, headed by the Mayor of Nablus, Mr. Haj Ma’azoud Al-Masri, which urged that the Knesset Committee of “neutral” parliamen¬

tarians be formed to investigate the conditions at the Ashkelon Prison. According to a report appearing in the Jerusalem Post on 15 October 1971, the Minister of Defence, Moshe Dayan, rejected this request and he is reported to have stated that he was opposed to the appointment of a public investigation committee. The same report states that, following two sit-down strikes by relatives of inmates, and as a reprisal for these demonstra¬ tions, the Defence Minister decided that no citizens of Nablus would be allowed to visit relatives being held in Israeli prisons on the next scheduled visit, which was due in two weeks’ time.

30. In its second report, the Special Com¬ mittee expressed its conviction that general prison conditions, despite reported efforts at improvement, were stated to be bad and that this was mainly due to overcrowding (A/8389 and Corr.l, para. 77). The informa¬ tion quoted above confirms this finding.

D. Other allegations

31. In its second report, the Special Com¬ mittee noted that periodic mass arrests of young men were continuing and quoted instances where such arrests had taken place (A/8389 and Corr. 1, para. 70).

32. The Special Committee notes further reports appearing in the press, according to which this practice has not ceased. On 27 September 1971, the Jerusalem Post reported that 90 persons had been arrested during the month of September in the area north of Hebron. These arrests, according to the report, were made in groups of 19, 36 and 35. According to the Israeli news agency Itim, in the four months ending September 1971, approximately 400 residents of the West Bank had been detained on suspicion of various illegal acts.

33. In this connexion, the Special Com¬ mittee would reiterate the conclusion reached in its second report that, whatever their avowed purpose, these mass arrests were clearly calculated in part to be a means of destroying the morale of the people of the occupied territories (A/8389 and Corr. 1, para. 79).

UNITED NATIONS 659

II. ADDITION TO RECOMMENDA¬ TION MADE IN CHAPTER V OF THE

SPECIAL COMMITTEE’S SECOND REPORT

34. In its report, presented to the Sec¬ retary-General on 17 September 1971, the Special Committee recommended an ar¬ rangement (A/8389 and Corr.l, para. 91)

whereby: (a) The States whose territory is occupied

by Israel appoint immediately either a neutral State or States, or an international organi¬ zation which offers all guarantees of impar¬ tiality and effectiveness, to safeguard the human rights of the population of the oc¬ cupied territories;

(b) Suitable arrangements be made for the proper representation of the interests of the large population in the occupied ter¬ ritories which has not been given the op¬ portunity of exercising the right of self-deter¬ mination; and

(c) A neutral State or international orga¬ nization, as described in (a) above, be nom¬ inated by Israel and be associated in this

arrangement. 35. The Special Committee further recom¬

mended that, under this arrangement, the State or States or international organiza¬ tion so nominated might be authorized to undertake the following activities:

(a) To secure the scrupulous implementa¬ tion of the provisions relating to human rights contained in the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions and in particular to investigate and determine the facts in the case of al¬ legations of the violation of the human rights provisions of these Conventions or of any other applicable international instruments;

(c) To report to the States concerned and to the General Assembly of the United Nations on its work.

36. The Special Committee made this recommendation in the hope that the inves¬ tigation of allegations of violations of human rights could be conducted on the spot, inside the occupied territories, something which could not be accomplished by the Special Committee itself owing to the Government of Israel’s refusal to receive the Committee or

to co-operate with it. Since making this recom¬ mendation, the Special Committee notes that the International Committee of the Red Cross, after giving careful consideration to the question of the reinforcement of the im¬ plementation of the existing (Geneva) Con¬ ventions, has arrived at the conclusion that all tasks falling to a Protecting Power under the Conventions could be considered humani¬ tarian functions and also notes that ICRC expressed itself ready to assume all the func¬ tions envisaged for Protecting Powers in the Conventions.1 The Special Committee, while acknowledging the conclusion reached by the International Committee regarding its new role as Protecting Power, considers that the humanitarian duties at present being carried out by ICRC in the occupied territories, even [with] the limitations imposed upon it, should continue. As understood by the Special Committee, the role of a Protecting Power under the Conventions goes beyond the scope of the humanitarian duties per¬ formed by ICRC in its traditional role. The effective discharge of the Protecting Power’s duties and responsibilities as contemplated by the Geneva Conventions would require ICRC, in its role as a Protecting Power, to free itself from the restraints which it has found necessary to observe in order to preserve its privileged position under its traditional role. The various resolutions adopted by the organs of the United Nations since 1967 indicate the interest, concern and sense of responsibility of the United Nations in rela¬ tion to the question of alleged violations of human rights in the occupied territories in the Middle East. The Special Committee is of the view, therefore, that it would be necessary and proper for ICRC to keep the United Nations fully informed, through the Secretary-General, of its activities as a Pro¬ tecting Power in addition to reporting to the States whose nationals it has been ap¬ pointed to protect.

37. The Special Committee welcomes IC¬ RC’s expression of its willingness to assume

1 See the Report on the Work of the Conference of Government

Experts on the Reaffirmation and Development., of Interna¬

tional Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts

(Geneva, 24 May-12 June 1971), para. 553.


the role of a Protecting Power as a develop¬ ment that facilitates the implementation of the recommendation contained in its first1 and second (A/8389 and Gorr. 1) reports and it would hope that the appropriate arrangements would be made to enable ICRG to begin forthwith the exercise of the functions of a Protecting Power in the interests of safeguarding the human rights of the population of the occupied territories in the Middle East.

38. For these reasons, the Special Com¬ mittee feels that the General Assembly might:

(a) Request the Secretary-General to in¬ form the parties concerned of ICRC’s read¬ iness to take upon itself all the functions envisaged for Protecting Powers in the Geneva Conventions, and to invite them to avail themselves of the services of ICRG in dealing with the application of the provisions of the Geneva Conventions in the occupied terri¬ tories in the Middle East;



(b) Request ICRG to consider the need for keeping the United Nations fully informed, through the Secretary-General, of its activities as a Protecting Power, in addition to reporting to the parties concerned;

(c) Reconsider the mandate of the Special Committee as to whether or not there is need for the continuation of its activities, once ICRC begins, in fact, to function as a Protecting Power.

III. ADOPTION OF THE REPORT

39. This supplementary report was adopted unanimously by the Special Committee on 11 December 1971 after it had met from 7 to 11 December 1971 to consider supplementary information reaching the Special Committee after 17 September 1971, when it adopted its second report (A/8389 and Corr. 1).

(Signed) H.S. Amerasinghe (Ceylon) Chairman

(Signed) A.A. Farah (Somalia) (Signed) B. Bohte (Yugoslavia)

Documents Submitted to the Security Council

413

Report of the United Nations Secretary-General on the Activities of the Special Repre¬

sentative to the Middle East1

November, 1971

CONTENTS Paragraphs

INTRODUCTION . 1-4

I. THE HOLDING OF DISCUSSIONS UNDER THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE’S AUSPICES (JANUARY-MARCH 1971). 5-21

II. FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS (MARCH-NOVEMBER 1971) . 22-29

ANNEXES

I. Aide-memoire presented to Israel and the United Arab Republic by Ambassador Jarring on 8 February 1971

II. Aide-memoire presented to Ambassador Jarring by the United Arab Republic on 15 February 1971.[not published

here] III. Communication presented to Ambassador Jarring by Israel on

26 February 1971.[not published here]

1 Text excluding Annex II (which appears above as Document 277) and Annex III (which appears above as Document

42), of Secretary-General U Thant’s report on the 1971 activities of Special Representative Jarring (incorporating the substance of his reports of February 1 and March 5), issued on November 30, 1971; U.N. doc. A/8541 -S/10403. (For the Secretary-General’s report on the progress of the Jarring mission up to January 1971, see U.N. doc. S/10070

published as Document 329 in International Documents on Palestine 1970.)

661


INTRODUCTION

1. By its resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967, the Security Council af¬ firmed the principles and provisions which should be applied in establishing a just and lasting peace in the Middle East and requested me to designate a special representative to establish and maintain contacts with the States concerned in order to promote agree¬ ment and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with these provisions and principles. I designated Ambassador Gunnar V. Jarring of Sweden as my Special Representative and submitted progress reports from time to time to the Security Council on his efforts (S/8309 and Add. 1-5 and S/9902).

2. By its resolution 2628 (XXV) of 4 November 1970, the General Assembly, after expressing its views on the principles which should govern the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East, called upon the parties directly concerned to resume contact with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General with a view to giving effect to Security Council resolution 242 (1967) and requested me to report to the Security Council within a period of two months, and to the General Assembly as appropriate, on the efforts of the Special Representative and on the implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967).

3. In accordance with my responsibilities under Security Council resolution 242 (1967) and with the request contained in General Assembly resolution 2628 (XXV), I submitted to the Security Council on 4 January 1971 a comprehensive report (S/10070) on the activi¬ ties of the Special Representative up to that date. Subsequently, on 1 February and 5 March, I submitted further progress reports (S/10070/Add.l and Add.2) on his activities.

4. In view of the fact that the General Assembly is about to debate again the situation in the Middle East and of the request con¬ tained in General Assembly resolution 2628 (XXV) that I should report to it as appro¬ priate on the efforts of the Special Represen¬ tative and on the implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967), I am arranging

to have my report of 4 January 1971 (S/10070) available to the Members of the General Assembly; I am also submitting the present report on the implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) to both the Security Council and the General Assembly in order to give a more comprehensive account of the activities of the Special Repre¬ sentative at the beginning of 1971 than that given in documents S/10070/Add. 1 and Add.2 and to bring that account up to date.

I. THE HOLDING OF DISCUSSIONS UNDER THE SPECIAL REPRESENTA¬ TIVE’S AUSPICES (JANUARY-MARCH 1971)

5. It will be recalled that at the close of 1970 it was possible to arrange for the resump¬ tion of the discussions under the auspices of Ambassador Jarring with Israel, Jordan and the United Arab Republic1 for the purpose of reaching agreement on a just and lasting peace between them.

6. Ambassador Jarring resumed his dis¬ cussions with the parties at Headquarters on 5 January 1971 and pursued them actively. He held a series of meetings with the repre¬ sentatives of Israel (including meetings with the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister during a brief visit to Israel made from 8 to 10 January 1971 at the request of that Govern¬ ment), of Jordan, and of the United Arab Republic. In addition, he held meetings with the Permanent Representative of Lebanon, which is also one of the States directly con¬ cerned with the Middle East settlement.

7. At an early stage in these meetings Israel presented to Ambassador Jarring, for trans¬ mission to the Governments concerned, papers containing its views on the “Essentials of Peace”. Subsequently, the United Arab Republic and Jordan having received the respective Israeli views, presented papers containing their own views concerning the implementation of the provisions of Security Council resolution 242 (1967).

1 The name of the United Arab Republic was changed

to the Arab Republic of Egypt on 2 September 1971.

[This footnote is part of the report].

UNITED NATIONS 663

8. During the remainder of January, Am¬ bassador Jarring held further meetings with the representatives of Israel, Jordan and the United Arab Republic, in the course of which he received further memoranda elaborating the positions of the parties. Unfortunately, these indicated that the parties held differing views on the order in which items should be discussed. More importantly, each side was insisting that the other should be ready to make certain commitments before being ready to proceed to the stage of formulating the provisions of a peace settlement.

9. On the Israeli side there was insistence that the United Arab Republic should give specific, direct and reciprocal commitments towards Israel that it would be ready to enter into a peace agreement with Israel and to make towards Israel the various undertakings referred to in paragraph 1 (ii) of Security Council resolution 242 (1967). When agree¬ ment was reached on those points, it would be possible to discuss others, including the refugee problem; such items ensuring security should be discussed in due course.

10. The United Arab Republic continued to regard the Security Council resolution as containing provisions to be implemented by the parties and to express its readiness to carry out its obligations under the resolution in full, provided that Israel did likewise. However it held that Israel persisted in its refusal to implement the Security Council resolution, since it would not commit itself to withdraw from all Arab territories occupied in June 1967. Furthermore in the view of the United Arab Republic Israel had not committed itself to the implementation of the United Nations resolutions relevant to a just settlement to the refugee problem.

11. The papers received by Ambassador Jarring from Israel and Jordan relating to peace between these two countries showed a similar divergence of views. Israel stressed the importance of Jordan’s giving an undertaking to enter into a peace agreement with it which would specify the direct and reciprocal obliga¬ tions undertaken by each of them. Jordan emphasized the inadmissibility of the acquisi¬ tion of territory by war and expressed the view that the essential first step towards peace

lay in an Israeli commitment to evacuate all Arab territories.

12. Ambassador Jarring felt that at this stage of the talks he should make clear his views on what he believed to be the necessary steps to be taken in order to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles of Security Council resolution 242 (1967), which the parties had agreed to carry out in all its parts. He reached the conclusion, which I shared, that the only possibility of breaking the imminent deadlock arising from the differing views of Israel and the United Arab Republic as to the priority to be given to commitments and undertakings—which seemed to him to be the real cause for the existing immobility in the talks—was for him to seek from each side the parallel and simultaneous commit¬ ments which seemed to be inevitable pre¬ requisites of an eventual peace settlement between them. It should thereafter be possible to proceed at once to formulate the provisions and terms of a peace agreement not only for those topics covered by the commitments, but with equal priority for other topics, and in particular the refugee question.

13. In identical aide memoires handed to the representatives of the United Arab Republic and Israel on 8 February 1971 Ambassador Jarring requested those Govern¬ ments to make to him certain prior com¬ mitments. Ambassador Jarring’s initiative was on the basis that the commitments should be made simultaneously and reciprocally and subject to the eventual satisfactory deter¬ mination of all other aspects of a peace settle¬ ment, including in particular a just settlement of the refugee problem. Israel would give a commitment to withdraw its forces from occupied United Arab Republic territory to the former international boundary between Egypt and the British Mandate of Palestine. The United Arab Republic would give a commitment to enter into a peace agree¬ ment with Israel and to make explicitly therein to Israel, on a reciprocal basis, various undertakings and acknowledgements arising directly or indirectly from paragraph 1 (ii) of Security Council resolution 242 (1967). (For the full text of the aide-memoires, see annex I.)


14. On 15 February, Ambassador Jarring received from the representative of the United Arab Republic an aide-memoire in which it was indicated that the United Arab Republic would accept the specific com¬ mitments requested of it, as well as other commitments arising directly or indirectly from Security Council resolution 242 (1967). If Israel would give, likewise, commitments covering its own obligations under the Security Council resolution, including commitments for the withdrawal of its armed forces from Sinai and the Gaza Strip and for the achieve¬ ment of a just settlement for the refugee problem in accordance with United Nations resolutions, the United Arab Republic would be ready to enter into a peace agreement with Israel. Finally the United Arab Republic expressed the view that a just and lasting peace could not be realized without the full and scrupulous implementation of Security Coun¬ cil resolution 242 (1967) and the withdrawal of the Israeli armed forces from all the terri¬ tories occupied since 5 June 1967. (For the full text of the United Arab Republic reply, see annex II.)1

15. On 17 February, Ambassador Jarring informed the Israeli representative of the contents of the United Arab Republic reply to his aide-memoire.

16. On 26 February, Ambassador Jarring received a communication from the represen¬ tative of Israel, in which, without specific reference to the commitment which he had sought from that Government, Israel stated that it viewed favourably 4‘the expression by the United Arab Republic of its readiness to enter into a peace agreement with Israel” and reiterated that it was prepared for meaningful negotiations on all subjects rele¬ vant to a peace agreement between the two countries. Israel gave details of the under¬ takings which in its opinion should be given by the two countries in such a peace agree¬ ment, which should be expressed in a binding treaty in accordance with normal interna¬ tional law and precedent. Israel considered that both parties, having presented their basic positions, should now pursue the nego-

1 See Document 277 above.

tiations in a detailed and concrete manner without prior conditions.

17. On the crucial question of withdrawal on which Ambassador Jarring had sought a commitment from Israel, the Israeli position was that it would give an undertaking covering withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from “the Israeli-United Arab Republic cease¬ fire line” to the secure, recognized and agreed boundaries to be established in the peace agreement; Israel would not withdraw to the pre-5 June 1967 lines. (For the full text of the Israeli paper, see annex III.)2

18. On 28 February, Ambassador Jarring informed the United Arab Republic repre¬ sentative of the contents of the Israeli com¬ munication. The latter held that it was improper for the Israeli authorities to have responded to his Government’s reply, which had been addressed to Ambassador Jarring and would have full effect only if the Israeli authorities would give the commitment re¬ quested of them by Ambassador Jarring.

19. In accepting the United States proposal for renewed discussions under Ambassador Jarring’s auspices (see S/10070, paras. 33 and 34), the parties had agreed that they would observe strictly, for a period of 90 days from 7 August 1970, the cease-fire resolutions of the Security Council. In response to the recommendation of the General Assembly in resolution 2628 (XXV), the cease-fire had been extended for a further period of three months. In my report of 1 February submitted as that period was expiring, I appealed to the parties at that stage of the discussions, to withhold fire, to exercise military restraint and to maintain the quiet which had prevailed in the area since August 1970.

20. In response to that appeal, the Foreign Ministry of Israel, in a communique released in Jerusalem on 2 February, announced that Israel would observe the cease-fire on a mutual basis; in a speech to the National Assembly on 4 February, the President of the United Arab Republic declared the deci¬ sion of the United Arab Republic to refrain from opening fire for a period of 30 days ending on 7 March.

2 See Document 42 above.

UNITED NATIONS 665

21. In submitting my report of 5 March 1971, I commented as follows:

“Ambassador Jarring has been very active over the past month and some further progress has been made towards a peaceful solution of the Middle East question. The problems to be settled have been more clearly identified and on some there is general agreement. I wish moreover to note with satisfaction the positive reply given by the United Arab Republic to Ambassador Jarring’s initiative. However, the Government of Israel has so far not responded to the request of Ambassador Jarring that it should give a commitment on withdrawal to the international boundary of the United Arab Republic.

“While I still consider that the situation has considerable elements of promise, it is a matter for increasing concern that Ambassa¬ dor Jarring’s attempt to break the deadlock has not so far been successful. I appeal, therefore, to the Government of Israel to give further consideration to this question and to respond favourably to Ambassador Jarring’s initiative.

“To give time for further consideration and in the hope that the way forward may be reopened, I once appeal to the parties to withhold fire, to exercise military restraint and to maintain the quiet which has prevailed in the area since August 1970.5,1

II. FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS (MARCH-NOVEMBER 1971)

22. In response to my appeal, the Israeli Government once again made clear its willing¬ ness to continue to observe the cease-fire on a basis of reciprocity. The President of the United Arab Republic, in a statement to the nation on 7 March 1971, declared that his country no longer considered itself further committed to a cease-fire or to withholding fire. This did not, however, mean that political action would cease.

23. On 11 March, the Israeli representa¬ tive informed Ambassador Jarring that his Government was awaiting the reaction of

1 S/10070/Add.2, paras. 14-16. [This and the sub¬

sequent footnotes are part of the report.]

the United Arab Republic Government to the Israeli invitation in its reply of 26 February to enter into detailed and concrete discussions (see paragraph 16 above). When that state¬ ment of the Israeli representative was brought to the attention of the United Arab Republic representative, he maintained that his Govern¬ ment was still awaiting an Israeli reply to Ambassador Jarring’s aide-memoire.

24. Subsequently, the talks under Ambas¬ sador Jarring’s auspices lapsed. He therefore left Headquarters to resume his post as Ambassador of Sweden in Moscow on 25 March.

25. Although he returned to Headquarters from 5 to 12 May and from 21 September to 27 October and has held certain consulta¬ tions elsewhere, he has found himself faced with the same deadlock and with no possi¬ bility of actively pursuing his mission.

26. Indeed, during much of this time the promotion of agreement between the parties was the object of two separate initiatives, first, an effort by the United States of America to promote an interim agreement providing for the reopening of the Suez Canal, which has not, so far, achieved any positive results, and, secondly, a mission of inquiry conducted by certain African Heads of States on behalf of the Organization of African Unity, which is still in progress as this report is being prepared. Both initiatives were described to Ambassador Jarring and myself by the sponsors as designed to facilitate the resump¬ tion of Ambassador Jarring’s mission. Never¬ theless, while they were being pursued, they obviously constituted an additional reason for him not to take personal initiatives.

27. In the introduction to my report on the work of the Organization (A/8401 /Add. 1 and Add.l/Corr.l), I expressed certain views on the situation in the Middle East. After recalling the responses of the United Arab Republic and Israel to Ambassador Jarring’s initiative of 8 February, I said that I con¬ tinued to hope—as I still do—that Israel would find it possible before too long to make a response that would enable the search for a peaceful settlement under Ambassador Jarring’s auspices to continue.

28. After noting the relative quiet which


has continued to exist in the area, I went on to say:

“It is not possible to predict how long this quiet will last, but there can be little doubt that, if the present impasse in the search for a peaceful settlement persists, new fighting will break out sooner or later. Since the parties have taken advantage of the present lull to strengthen considerably their military capabilities, it is only too likely that the new round of fighting will be more violent and dangerous than the previous ones, and there is always the danger that it may not be possible to limit it to the present antagonists and to the confines of the Middle Piast.

“I see no other way to forestall such a disastrous eventuality than by intensifying the search for a peaceful and agreed settle¬ ment. I believe there is still a chance of achieving such a settlement. I do not over¬ look the formidable difficulty of the problems to be tackled, but there exist several important assets on the side of peace efforts as well. The Security Council’s cease-fire resolutions of June 1967 and its resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967, if implemented simul¬ taneously and fully, should provide the frame¬ work for achieving a peaceful and agreed settlement of the present conflict. To promote agreement for such a settlement, we are fortunate to have the services of Ambassador Jarring, who is uniquely qualified for this almost impossible task.

“Ambassador Jarring has clearly defined the minimum conditions that are required to move the peace talks ahead and, until those conditions are met, it is hard to see what else he can do to further his efforts. Steps to ensure that those conditions are met must be taken by the parties concerned and, failing this, by the Security Council itself or by States Members of the United Nations and, particularly, the permanent members of the Security Council, both because of their special responsibility within the United Nations and of their influence on the parties concerned.”3

29. Recent developments have added to the urgency of my remarks. It therefore seems to me that the appropriate organs of

A/8401/Add. 1, paras. 221-223.

the United Nations must review the situation once again and find ways and means to enable the Jarring mission to move forward.

ANNEX I AIDE-MEMOIRE PRESENTED TO ISRAEL AND THE UNITED ARAB

REPUBLIC BY AMBASSADOR JARRING ON 8 FEBRUARY 19711

I have been following with a mixture of restrained optimism and growing concern the resumed discussion under my auspices for the purpose of arriving at a peaceful settlement of the Middle East question.

My restrained optimism arises from the fact that in my view the parties are seriously defining their positions and wish to move forward to a permanent peace.

My growing concern is that each side unyieldingly insists that the other make certain commitments before being ready to proceed to the stage of formulating the pro¬ visions to be included in a final peace agree¬ ment. There is, as I see it, a serious risk that we shall find ourselves in the same deadlock as existed during the first three years of my mission.

I therefore feel that I should at this stage make clear my views on what I believe to be the necessary steps to be taken in order to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and prin¬ ciples of Security Council Resolution 242 (1967), which the parties have agreed to carry out in all its parts.

I have come to the conclusion that the only posssibility to break the imminent dead¬ lock arising from the differing views of Israel and the United Arab Republic as to the priority to be given to commitments and undertakings- which seems to me to be the real cause for the present immobility—is for me to seek from each side the parallel and simultaneous commitments which seem to

1 In presenting the aide-memoire, Ambassador Jarring

added the following interpretation: “I interpret prac¬

tical security measures in the Sharm el-Sheikh area for

guaranteeing freedom of navigation through the Straits

of Tiran to mean arrangements for stationing a United

Nations force in the area for this purpose.”

UNITED NATIONS 667

be inevitable prerequisites of an eventual peace settlement between them.

It should thereafter be possible to proceed at once to formulate the provisions and terms of a peace agreement not only for those topics covered by the commitments, but with equal priority for other topics and in particular the refugee question.

Specifically, I wish to request the Govern¬ ments of Israel and the U.A.R. to make to me at this stage the following prior com¬ mitments simultaneously and on condition that the other party makes its commitment and subject to the eventual satisfactory deter¬ mination of all other aspects of a peace settle¬ ment, including in particular a just settle¬ ment of the refugee problem:

ISRAEL would give a commitment to withdraw its forces from occupied U.A.R. territory to the former international boundary between Egypt and the British Mandate of Palestine on the understanding that satis¬ factory arrangements are made for:

(a) Establishing demilitarized zones; (b) Practical security arrangements in the

Sharm el-Sheikh area for guaranteeing freedom of navigation through the Straits of Tiran; and

(c) Freedom of navigation through the Suez Canal.

The U.A.R. would give a commitment to enter into a peace agreement with Israel and to make explicitly therein to Israel, on a reciprocal basis, undertakings and acknow¬ ledgments covering the following subjects:

(a) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency;

(b) Respect for and acknowledgment of each other’s sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence;

(c) Respect for and acknowledgment of each other’s right to live in peace within secure and recognized bound¬ aries ;

(d) Responsibility to do all in their power to ensure that acts of belligerency or hostility do not originate from or are not committed from within their res¬ pective territories against the popula¬ tion, citizens or property of the other party; and

(e) Non-interference in each other’s domes¬ tic affairs.

In making the above-mentioned suggestion I am conscious that I am requesting both sides to make serious commitments but I am convinced that the present situation requires me to take this step.

414 Report by the United Nations Secretary- General on Attempts To Implement Security Council Resolution 298 De¬ ploring the Failure of Israel To Respect U.N. Resolutions Prohibiting Measures To Alter the Status of Jerusalem1

November, 1971

1. This report is submitted in pursuance of Security Council resolution 298 (1971) of 25 September 1971 concerning Jerusalem, which requested the Secretary-General “in consultation with the President of the Security Council, and using such instrumentalities as he may choose, including a representative

1 Text of Secretary-General U Thant’s report submitted

under the terms of Security Council Resolution 298

(which appears as Document 431 below) and issued

November 19, 1971; U.N. doc. S/10392.

Other reports on Jerusalem submitted under the terms

of Security Council resolutions 252 (1968), 267 (1969)

and General Assembly resolution 2254 (ES-V) (1967)

which call upon Israel to desist from or rescind measures

altering the status of Jerusalem and request the Secre¬

tary-General to report on implementation were.issued

on February 18, April 20 and August 20, 1971. These

reports review correspondence between the Secretary-

General and the Permanent Representative of Israel,

dealing mainly with the Secretary-General’s request

for clarifications on the Israeli “Master Plan” for

Jerusalem and the status of U.N. property in the

city. The original report (U.N. doc. S/10124) and

the April 20 addendum (S/10124/Add. 1) are summariz¬

ed in paras. 76 80 and 94 of the 1970-71 Report of

the Security Council (U.N. doc. A/8402) which appears

as Document 407 above. The addendum of August

20 (U.N. doc. S/10124/Add. 2) is summarized in

para. 179 of the 1971- 72 Report of the Security Council

(U.N. doc. A/8702) to be included in International

Documents on Palestine 1972.


or a mission, to report to the Security Council as appropriate and in any event within sixty days on the implementation of this resolution”. I communicated this resolution to the Government of Israel by cable on the day of its adoption.

2. On 27 September, I met the President of the Security Council Mr. Torn Nakagawa of Japan, and discussed with him the imple¬ mentation of Security Council resolution 298 (1971).

3. On 28 September, I addressed a letter to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Israel, informing him that, in accordance with the request addressed to me by the Security Council, it was my intention to nominate, in consultation with the President of the Security Council and at an early date, a mission consisting of three members of the Security Council with a view to enabling me to report to the Security Council on the implementation of resolution 298 (1971) within the time-limit provided in that resolu¬ tion.

4. On 1 October, at a meeting with the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Israel, I indicated to him that I had in mind as members of the mission the representatives of Argentina, Italy and Sierra Leone.

5. During the first half of October, after consultation with the President of the Security Council, Mr. Guillermo Sevilla Sacasa of Nicaragua, I approached the permanent representatives of Argentina, Italy and Sierra Leone and inquired about the willingness of their respective Governments to serve on the mission. All three Governments signified to me their willingness to serve on the mission in the event that circumstances arose in which it would be desirable to establish it.

6. On 18 October, I addressed another letter to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Israel in which, after referring to my letter of 28 September and to our meeting on 1 October, I indicated that the representa¬ tives of Argentina, Italy and Sierra Leone had signified to me the willingness of their Governments to serve on such a mission in the event that circumstances arose in which it would be desirable to establish it. This letter was handed by me to the representative of

Israel on the same day. On this occasion, the representative indicated that Israel would be forwarding its comments on the Security Council resolution in due course and I reminded him that, under this resolution, 1 had a sixty-day time-limit for reporting and was bound to report within that period.

7. On 19 October, and again on 27 October, I met with the President of the Security Council and the representatives of Argentina, Italy and Sierra Leone to discuss my reporting responsibility under Security Council resolution 298 (1971).

8. Following the meeting of 27 October, the President of the Security Council saw the representative of Israel and discussed this matter with him.

9. On 28 October, having received no reply from the Government of Israel, I addressed a letter to the representative of Israel, drawing his attention to the fact that a month had passed since the adoption of Security Council resolution 298 (1971) which, among other things, requested me to report to the Security Council “as appropriate and in any event within sixty days on the implementation of this resolution.” I added that in view of that stipulation by the Security Council, I would be grateful to receive the comments of the Government of Israel as soon as possible. I also stated that I had, as a matter of course, been in consultation both with the representatives of Argentina, Italy and Sierra Leone who had signified their willingness to serve on the mission and, as required by the resolution, with the Pres¬ ident of the Security Council regarding this matter.

10. Subsequently, I received a note dated 2 November 1971 from the representative of Israel stating that the comments of the Government of Israel were under preparation and would be conveyed to me as soon as possible.

11. On 11 November, the Under-Secre- taries-General for Political and Security Coun¬ cil Affairs and for Special Political Affairs, on my behalf, met with the President of the Security Council and the representatives of Argentina, Italy and Sierra Leone to discuss again the implementation of the

UNITED NATIONS 669

Security Council resolution. In an oral message conveyed to the representative of Israel on 11 November, the President of the Security Council, Mr. Eugeniusz Kulaga of Poland, and myself expressed our concern over the absence of a reply from the Govern¬ ment of Israel regarding the implementation of paragraph 5 of Security Council resolution 298 (1971).

12. On 15 November, the representative of Israel transmitted to me a letter of the same date from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Israel. In his letter, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Israel referred to my cable of 25 September 1971, transmitting the text of resolution 298 (1971) adopted by the Security Council, and gave his Government’s views concerning paragraph 4 of the resolution which calls upon Israel “to rescind all previous measures and actions and take no further steps in the occupied section of Jerusalem which may purport to change the status of the City, or which would prejudice the rights of the inhabitants and the interests of the international community, or a just and lasting peace”. However, the letter did not touch upon the question of the Government of Israel’s response to my proposal for a mission to Jerusalem in order to enable me to discharge my mandate under paragraph 5 of resolution 298 (1971).

13. On 16 November, in a letter addressed to the representative of Israel, I acknowledged receipt of the letter of 15 November from the Government of Israel and noted that the reply of the Israel Government did not refer to para¬ graph 5 of the Security Council resolution in which the possibility of a mission was men¬ tioned ; nor did it refer to my letter of 28 Sep¬ tember and subsequent letters to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Israel, regarding the mission proposed by me, in consultation with the President of the Council. I stated that in the absence of a response by the Government of Israel on this matter, and in view of the fact that the time-limit for my report was to expire on 24 November 1971, I had no alternative but to submit my report to the Security Council without taking any further action to activate the mission of the three members of the Council mentioned in my

earlier letters. 14. It will be recalled that since the termi¬

nation of the mission of my Personal Repre¬ sentative in Jerusalem, Mr. Ernesto A. Thalmann, in September 1967, I have had no means of obtaining first-hand informa¬ tion which is required to fulfil the reporting responsibilities conferred upon me by Security Council resolution 298 (1971). After careful consideration of this resolution, the President of the Security Council and myself concluded that the best way of fulfilling my reporting responsibilities under the resolution was through a mission of three members of the Security Council. It is obvious that the co¬ operation of the Israel Government is required for such a mission to function usefully.

15. As will be seen from the above account of the exchange of correspondence with the Government of Israel, the texts of which are annexed to this report, there has been no indication on the part of the Government of Israel of its willingness to comply with Security Council resolution 298 (1971).

16. In the light of the failure of the Govern¬ ment of Israel to abide by the decision of the Security Council, I have not been able to fulfil my mandate under Security Council resolution 298 (1971).

ANNEX Exchange of letters between the Secre¬

tary-General and the Government of Israel

1. Letter dated 28 September 1971 from the Secretary-General to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Israel

As you will recall, paragraph 5 of Security Council resolution 298 (1971) adopted by the Security Council at its 1582nd meeting on 25 September 1971 “requests the Secretary- General, in consultation with the President of the Security Council and using such instrumentalities as he may choose, including a representative or a mission, to report to the Security Council as appropriate and in any event within sixty days on the implementation of this resolution”.

I wish to inform you that, in accordance with the request addressed to me by the


Security Council, it is my intention to nomi¬ nate in consultation with the President of the Security Council and at an early date a mission consisting of three members of the Security Council with a view to enabling me to report to the Security Council on the implementation of resolution 298 (1971) within the time-limit provided in that res¬ olution.

2. Letter dated 18 October 1971 from the Secretary-General to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Israel

I have the honour to refer to my letter of 28 September 1971 concerning Security Council resolution 298 (1971). In that letter I informed you that it was my intention to nominate, in consultation with the President of the Security Council, a mission consisting of three members of the Council with a view to enabling me to report to the Council on the implementation of the above-mentioned res¬ olution .

In our meeting on 1 October I indicated to you that I had in mind as members of this mission the representatives of Argentina, Italy and Sierra Leone. These members have now signified to me their willingness to serve on such a mission in the event that circumstances arise in which it would be desirable to establish it.

3. Letter dated 28 October 1971 from the Secretary-General to the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations

I have the honour to refer to my cable of 25 September and to my letters of 28 Septem¬ ber and 18 October 1971 to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Israel, Mr. Abba Eban, concerning Security Council resolution 298 (1971).

You will recall that, in our meeting on 1 October, the Minister for Foreign Affairs undertook to transmit to me his detailed comments on this matter. More than one month has now passed since the adoption by the Security Council of the above-men¬ tioned resolution, which, among other things, requests me to report to the Security Council “as appropriate and in any event within sixty

days on the implementation of this resolution.” In view of this stipulation by the Security Council, I would be grateful to receive the comments of the Government of Israel as soon as possible.

You will also recall that in my letter of 18 October I informed the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Israel of the willingness of the representatives of Argentina, Italy and Sierra Leone to serve on a mission to assist me in my reporting duties under the Security Council resolution. I have, as a matter of course, been in consultation both with the three representatives concerned and, as required by the resolution, with the President of the Security Council. The present letter is sent with their full knowledge and agreement.

4. Letter dated 2 November 1971 from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter of 28 October 1971, the contents of which I have transmitted to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

I am instructed to inform you that the comments of the Government of Israel are under preparation and will be conveyed to you as soon as possible.

5. Letter dated 15 November 1971 from

the Minister For Foreign Affairs of Israel

to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to reply to your telegram of 26 September 1971, transmitting the text of resolution 298 (1971) adopted by the Security Council at its 1582nd meeting on the previous day. The central operative paragraph of the resolution calls upon Israel “to rescind all previous measures and actions and to take no further steps in the occupied section of Jerusalem which may purport to change the status of the city, or which would prejudice the rights of the inhabitants and the interests of the international community, or a just and lasting peace”. I propose to analyse the main provisions of this paragraph in order to place the situation in Jerusalem in its true light.

UNITED NATIONS 671

(a) The status of the city

If the “status of the city” referred to in the resolution means the situation existing before 5 June 1967, the renewal of that “status” would involve the restoration of a military

demarcation line and other barriers cutting through the centre of the city, the cancellation of free access to their Holy Places for Jews and Israeli Moslems, which has prevailed only since June 1967, and the re-imposition of a ban on residence or visit by anyone of Jewish faith in the Old City. Moreover, in order to restore the previous status Israel would have to demolish the synagogues and other sites destroyed by the Jordan authorities and restored since then, and to close the cultural, humanitarian and educational insti¬ tutions on Mount Scopus which have been reopened since June 1967. Thus the restora¬ tion of the previous status would involve rescinding the unity, peace and sanctity of Jerusalem today in order to restore the divisions, conflict and sacrilege which made the period 1948-1967 one of the darkest ages in Jerusalem’s long history.

It is inconceivable that the majority of Security Council members could wish to restore that situation. Some of them have indicated that they do not.

The position of Jordan in a part of Jerusa¬ lem for 19 years resulted from an aggressive invasion carried out against the injunctions of the Security Council in the first half of 1948. That position was never recognized by the world community. Thus it is not the case that an internationally accepted or valid status for Jerusalem has been set aside by anything done in the city since 1967.

If one dismisses as inherently untenable the proposition that the Security Council wishes to tear Jerusalem apart again, one is left with the assumption that the concern expressed by the Council is for the effective status of the ethnic and religious communities. It has been asserted in some quarters that Israel is undertaking or planning action with the aim of annulling the present heterogeneous character of the population. I can give assurance that this is not the case. Since 1967 the flight of Christian Arabs from Jerusa¬

lem under Jordanian occupation has been stemmed. The figures in 1967 were 10,800. Today they are 11,500. At the same time the Moslem population has grown from 54,963 in 1967 to 61,600 at the end of 1970, while the Jews, who numbered 195,700 in 1967 are now 215,500. There is nothing to indicate that these relative proportions are likely to be substantially changed in the coming years, and in absolute terms the Christian and Moslem populations are likely to increase and not to dwindle. Israel’s view is that development by the city’s services and amenities should be undertaken for all its communities, and not for one community alone.

(b) The rights of the inhabitants Jerusalem has a population of 300,000,

about three quarters of which are Jews; 61,600 are Moslems and 11,500 are Christians. For the past 200 years the Jews have formed the largest community. The “rights of the inhabitants”, whether Jews, Arabs or Moslems, include the right to administer their own city, to develop it, and to repair the havoc of war. Jerusalem has the right to normal existence. As a living city its life and institutions must be allowed to grow in the interests of all its inhabitants, and it cannot be artificially frozen at the point which it had reached over four years ago.

Since 1967, all Jerusalem’s citizens have had their due voice in the administration of the city. In the last municipal election under the Jordan occupation in 1963 there were only 5,000 eligible voters in a total Arab population of some 60,000. Only males over 21, property owners and rate-payers could vote. No political parties were per¬ mitted. Irrespective of the results of the voting the Mayor was appointed by the Jordanian Government in Amman. On the other hand, in the 1969 election for the munici¬ pal council, universal suffrage for those over 18 years ago was introduced in the sector formerly under Jordanian occupation. The number of Arab citizens who actually cast their vote for the administration of the united city in that election was greater than the total of those eligible to vote in 1963 during the Jordanian occupation.


All the citizens of Jerusalem, both in the western and eastern parts of the city, have the right to normal municipal services. All the city’s inhabitants now receive such services, which were non-existent or inadequate during the 19 years of illegal Jordanian military

occupation. Since 1967 compulsory education laws

have been strictly applied. A system of kindergartens, which did not exist under the Jordanian conquest, has been extended to the eastern part of the city. Vocational training has been expanded, including the opening of a night school for working boys. The network of free medical services for school children, new mothers and babies has spread to this section of Jerusalem. In a special programme carried out in 1967, all children in east Jerusalem were given thor¬ ough medical check-ups, including skin, tuber¬ culosis and eye tests, as well as vaccinations against diphtheria and tetanus and second shots against smallpox. Trachoma and mal¬ nutrition have now all but been eliminated. A new 300-bed hospital on Mount Scopus, to serve the northern and eastern parts of the city, will soon be opened.

The eastern section has been connected to the Jerusalem water-mains, providing round-the-clock water supply for the first time in history. A central sewage system has been introduced. The municipality of Jerusalem has provided play-grounds, parks, libraries and youth clubs where there were none before. An Arabic language theatre has begun performances. A developed social welfare system has been applied for the first time to this part of the city. The citizens living in eastern Jerusalem have the services of a Government Labour Exchange; 40 per cent of the section’s workers have joined and are protected by the Israel Labour Federation. There is no unemployment in Jerusalem. Low-cost public housing and generous mort¬ gage opportunities are being provided by the municipality to Arab residents.

Nothing, therefore, could be more inaccu¬ rate than to assert that the rights of the inhabi¬ tants of Jerusalem have been adversely affected by anything done or planned by Israel. Their rights to peaceful life and development

and to a voice in Jerusalem’s affairs, have been fully respected and indeed advanced only since June 1967.

(c) The interests of the international community

For 22 years Jerusalem has been Israel’s capital and seat of Government. It is the unique spiritual centre of Judaism, as of no other faith. At the same time the Govern¬ ment has always been conscious of the fact that the city is of deep concern to other faiths. Its religious and historical sites are precious to Christians and Moslems, as well as to Jews. This concern was expressed by the Prime Minister of Israel on 27 June 1967 :

“All the Holy Places in Jerusalem are now open to all who wish to pray in them and to the faithful of all religions without discrimination. It is our intention to place the internal administration and arrange¬ ments for the Holy Places in the hands of the religious leaders of the communities to which these places belong.” The protection of the Holy Places is ensured

by law. The Protection of Holy Places Law, 5727-1967, states in its first paragraph:

“The Holy Places shall be protected from desecration and any other violation and from anything likely to violate the freedom of access of the members of the different religions to the place sacred to them or their feelings with regard to those places.” No such law protected the Holy Places

during the Jordanian occupation. The inten¬ tions expressed by the Prime Minister, as well as the dispositions of the law, are now part of the new reality in Jerusalem. The dese¬ cration of historic synagogues in the Old City and of the ancient cemetery on the Mount of Olives was carried out by the Jordanian authorities, and the denial of free access stopped. The churches, mosques, synagogues and other shrines are administered by each religious community. In Jerusalem today everyone is free to visit and pray at the Holy Places of the three great faiths. Pilgrims and visitors to the city. Government leaders, church dignitaries, parliamentarians, jour¬ nalists, men of letters, tourists in their thou¬ sands have testified that Jerusalem and the

UNITED NATIONS 673

Holy Places are secure and open to all. In developing the living city of Jerusalem we are and shall be constantly mindful of its historical treasures and spiritual heritage and care is and will be taken to preserve them for the inhabitants and for the world.

The policy of Israel concerning universal spiritual interests in Jerusalem is as follows: the measures taken to secure the protection of the Holy Places are only a part of Israel’s effort to ensure respect for universal interests in Jerusalem. It is evident from United Nations discussions and documents that the international interest in Jerusalem has always been understood to derive from the presence of the Holy Places. Israel does not doubt her own will and capacity to secure the respect of universal spiritual interests. 11 has forthwith ensured that the Holy Places of Judaism, Christianity and Islam be administered under the responsibility of the religions which hold them sacred.

In addition, in a spirit of concern for historic and spiritual traditions my Govern¬ ment has taken steps with a view to reaching arrangements to assure the universal character of the Holy Places. In pursuance of this objective the Government of Israel has now embarked on a constructive and detailed dialogue with universal religious interests. If these explorations are as fruitful as we hope, the universal character of the Holy Places will for the first time in recent decades find comprehensive expression.

As I informed you on 10 July 1967 [see S/8052], Israel does not wish to exercise unilateral jurisdiction or exclusive respon¬ sibility in the Holy Places of Christianity and Islam, and is willing in consultation with the religious interests traditionally con¬ cerned to give due expression to that principle.

The changes which have affected Jerusa¬ lem’s life and destiny as a result of the measures recently adopted may, therefore, be sum¬ marized as follows: where there was a hostile separation there is now intermingling and constructive civic union; where there was a constant threat of violence there is now peace; where there was once an assertion of exclusive and unilateral control over the Holy Places exercised in sacrilegious dis¬

crimination there is a willingness to work out arrangements with the world’s religious bodies, Christian, Moslem and Jewish, which will ensure the universal religious character of the Holy Places.

This is the first time that a Government in Jerusalem offers special expression for universal interests in Jerusalem instead of asserting its exclusive jurisdiction over all of them. The apprehension expressed in the resolution that the interests of the international community, or the principles of peaceful coexistence may have been adversely affected is thus without any foundation whatever.

(d) A just and lasting peace

The previous division of the city did not bring the Middle East closer to peace. On the contrary that division was an open wound

constantly exacerbated by outbursts of hostili¬ ty and by recurrent Jordanian violation of the fragile armistice which caused the murder of Jerusalem citizens and made life in the city a frequent terror for many residents on both sides of the barbed wire.

Today, for the first time since 1948, Jerusa¬ lem is a city in which Jews and Arabs live together in peace and mingle in their thou¬ sands in the daily pursuits of their lives. Jerusalem has become an example of com¬ munal civic and regional existence and is thus an augury of just and lasting peace to which enlightened men aspire.

Jerusalem is for Israel the focal point of Jewish history, the symbol of ancient glory, of longing, of prayer, of modern renewal. It is also a source of universal inspiration.

Israel’s policy is to promote the rights of Jerusalem’s inhabitants to advance the in¬ terests of the international community and thus to contribute to the promotion of a just and lasting peace. The sharp discrepancy between the Jerusalem reality and the resolu¬ tion presented by Jordan and adopted by the Security Council has profoundly shocked the people of Jerusalem. This sentiment was expressed in the Prime Minister’s statement of 26 October 1971 which remains valid.

At the same time I can give assurance that nothing has been done or will be done to violate the rights of the inhabitants, the in-


terests of international community or the principles of peaceful coexistence. There are many difficulties in Jerusalem as else¬ where arising from regional tensions and hostilities as well as from economic and social factors. But in general men of peace and goodwill will have reason to be gratified by the peace, serenity, union and spiritual harmony which have been strengthened in Jerusalem since the barbed wire fence went down and the Jews and Arabs of Jerusalem came together in a common devotion to their city.

6. Letter dated 16 November 1971 from

the Secretary-General to the Permanent

Representative of Israel to the United

Nations

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter of 15 November 1971 in which you transmit to me the reply of the Govern¬ ment of Israel to my telegram of 26 Septem¬ ber 1971 concerning Security Council resolu¬ tion 298 (1971) on Jerusalem. The reply of the Government of Israel will be included

in the report on this matter which I am re¬ quired by the above-mentioned resolution to make to the Security Council.

I note that the reply of the Israel Govern¬ ment does not refer to paragraph 5 of the Security Council resolution in which the possibility of a mission is mentioned; nor does it refer to my letter of 28 September 1971 and subsequent letters to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Israel which include, among other things, the announcement of my intention to nominate, in consultation with the Pres¬ ident of the Security Council, a mission consisting of three members of the Security Council with a view to enabling me to report under the terms of resolution 298 (1971).

In the absence of a response by the Govern¬ ment of Israel on this matter, and in view of the fact that the time-limit for my report will expire on 24 November 1971, I have no alternative but to submit my report to the Security Council without taking any further action to activate the mission of three members of the Security Council mentioned in my letters referred to above.

PART II: STATEMENTS BY DELEGATES

415 Statements Accusing Israel of Hindering Middle East Peace Efforts and Express¬ ing Soviet Support for the Arab Cause, Made by U.S.S.R. Foreign Minister Gromyko in an Address Before the United Nations General Assembly1

New York, September 28, 1971

The events in the Middle East centre around the same problem: will the legitimate rights of the Arab States which were subjected to aggression be respected, will territories seized by force be returned, or will the policy of aggression be allowed to triumph? Israel and those who protect it are clearly counting on the second alternative. That is why they have paralysed the mission of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations who was charged with the task of facilitating a political settlement in accordance with the well-known decision of the Security Council. That is why the consultations between the representatives of the four Powers, permanent members of the Security Council, have gone into a neutral gear, since to be effective they require the co-operation of all the participants.

But Israel is miscalculating. The policy¬ makers of that country have gone too far in laying bare their plans of conquest for them to obtain support in the international arena. Nobody can now any longer believe Israel’s allegation that it is defending its “existence.” The false arguments with which Israeli ruling circles have been seeking to cover up the real meaning of their policy have fallen through, one after another.

Israel refused to liberate the occupied territories until the Arab countries would

agree to end the state of war. But the Arabs are ready to do so. Israel insisted on a peace agreement being concluded, but the Arab States do not object to this either, provided, of course, that all the occupied territories are returned to them. Israel displayed concern over its security. It is now clear that within the framework of a political settlement in the Middle East the appropriate guarantees, including guarantees by the Security Council, can be provided. These are the strongest guarantees conceivable in the modern world.

Now there can be no more uncertainty in anybody’s mind. Israel does not want peace, and even if it does, it is an annexationist peace. But this runs counter to the Charter of the United Nations and to the most elemen¬ tary principles of international law and it must be ruled out. The Israeli rulers seem to think that if they have managed to hold on to the seized territories for four years this situation can continue indefinitely. But they cannot be unaware of the alternative to a political settlement in the Middle East.

Is the United Nations in a position to make a contribution to the settlement of the problem of the Middle East? Yes, it is, provided it does not limit itself to adopting yet another resolution expressing pious wishes without reinforcing them with effective measures, and provided it utilizes the full scope of its capacities in accordance with the United Nations Charter.

The Soviet Union wants to see peace in the Middle East. It will continue to support the Arab States, victims of aggression, as well as their efforts aimed at liberating their territories. The just cause of the Arab peoples, including the people of Palestine, must win.

1 Excerpted from the official U.N. English text (inter¬

preted from Russian) of Gromyko’s speech in the

General Assembly General Debate; U.N. doc. A/PV.

1942/48-50.

675


416 Statements Calling for Israeli Com¬ pliance with U.N. Resolutions on the Middle East, Made by Foreign Minister Abu Hamad of Lebanon in an Address Before the United Nations General As¬

sembly1


In our region, the Middle East, we are at the very heart of a most poignant tragedy —which has continued since the very creation of the United Nations. It is the tragedy of

the people of Palestine, robbed of their country and evicted from their homes by the use of violence. This tragedy, which was born of a flagrant injustice more than twenty years ago, continues to affect our region and to inflict upon our population destruction and suffering. Since June 1967, territories belonging to three States Members of the United Nations have been occupied by Israeli forces, and since that date Israel has continued to sabotage all attempts at a political settle¬ ment, continuing its military occupation, multiplying its aggressions and subjecting the inhabitants of the occupied territories to a regime of coercion, violence and terror, defying law, equity and the most elementary humanitarian principles.

The situation in Jerusalem is for us a subject of deep concern. The horizon of that city, so peaceful and holy, familiar to millions of human beings, is today disfigured, a systematic plan aimed at depriving Chris¬ tendom and Islam of their inalienable rights to the Holy City is applied with obstinacy. Pressures of all kinds are exerted on the Christian and Moslem population to force them to expatriate themselves. By expro¬ priation and confiscation, the occupier seizes property which does not belong to him and whose historic and spiritual value is beyond estimation. It carries out massive destruction, construction of new habitations, in order

1 Excerpted from the official U.N. English text (inter¬

preted from French) of Abu Hamad’s speech in the

General Assembly General Debate; U.N. doc. A/PV.

1944/47-51.

to present the international community once again with an accomplished fact. But the same community has categorically condemned the acts which have been undertaken by Israel and has declared that they are illegal and invalid. Several resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council have been adopted in that regard.

The most recent resolution, resolution 298 (1971), of the Security Council, adopted on 25 September 1971, is eloquent in that

respect. That resolution expresses the firm will of the international community to oppose categorically the acquisition of territory by force and any modification of the sacred and universal character of the Holy City.

Everywhere, in Gaza, in Sinai, in Golan, and on the banks of the Jordan, we find the same affecting spectacle of tortures, demoli¬ tion, destruction of homes and of whole villages, deportations and expulsions of in¬ habitants, expropriations and confiscations— all of them contrary to the international conventions and to resolutions of the United Nations.

It is true that Lebanon and Israel are still bound by the Armistice Convention of 1949; yet Lebanon considers that it is directly concerned in the establishment of a just, equitable and lasting peace in the Middle East.

For the establishment of such a peace, Lebanon is convinced that it would be vain to seek an equitable and lasting solution without the total evacuation of Israeli forces from the territories occupied since June 1967, and without due respect for the legitimate and inalienable rights of the Palestinian people. Lebanon also considers that until that solution has been achieved, the services, which are already insufficient, provided by UNRWA to the Palestinian refugees, cannot be further reduced without grave consequences, and therefore appeals to all Governments to make up the deficit of the Agency by voluntary contributions. It is necessary to reaffirm once more the responsibility of the international community as a whole in the creation and perpetuation of this human drama, as well as the obligation to alleviate the situation and, in fact, to put an end to it.

At a moment when I am speaking of the

UNITED NATIONS 677

conflict in the Middle East, how can I fail to recall and to stress that my country has suffered and continues to suffer from Israeli aggressions under the most fallacious pretexts which entail loss of human life, the lives of innocent civilians, destruction of property and migration of populations? The Security Council has been repeatedly seized of these complaints by Lebanon.

Since June 1967 efforts aimed at bringing about a political settlement have been exerted by the United Nations, by the four great Powers and by other countries. These efforts have been sabotaged by Israel.

By its delays, its evasions, its refusals, Israel has in fact brought the mission of Ambassador Jarring to a dead end. Has it not already created in the Middle East a state of tension which threatens international peace and security, a situation which is being aggravated day by day?

It is not enough to speak of Israel’s defiance of the United Nations and the international community. It is essential to put an end to it. The United Nations has on several occasions been seized of complaints aimed at putting an end to actions of Israel that violate inter¬ national law and relevant resolutions adopted by the Security Council, the General Assembly and the Commission on Human Rights. Invariably the international community has condemned Israel. It has been condemned for its aggression against Lebanon and for its behaviour in Jerusalem and in the other occupied territories. Its policies and actions have always received condemnation, and severe warnings have been addressed to Israel. On some occasions even very specific threats have been formulated to invoke and apply more effective procedures. Unfortunately, all those resolutions have remained dead letters. Israel has never complied with them. It continues to act as though the United Nations did not exist, or as though its resolu¬ tions had never been adopted. Our Organiza¬ tion is therefore confronted with a situation involving the risk of its losing all the credit it still retains—not only in the eyes of States but also in the eyes of world public opinion.

417 Statements Reiterating Israeli Insistence on Secure and Recognized Borders and Suggesting Various Techniques for Ne¬ gotiations with the Arab States, Made by Foreign Minister Eban of Israel in an Address Before the United Nations Gen¬ eral Assembly1


Our position, then, is this: We have taken note of the Egyptian proposal on withdrawal. Israel would withdraw its armed forces from the Israel-United Arab Republic cease-fire line to the secure, recognized and agreed boundaries to be established in the peace agreement. Now that both parties have presented their basic positions they should pursue their negotiations in a detailed and concrete manner without prior condition to cover all the points I listed in their respective documents with a view to concluding a peace agreement. I continue to adhere to the view which I expressed in the General Assembly in October 1968 that

“It is possible to work out a boundary settlement compatible with the security of Israel and the honour of Arab States. . . . The majority of the United Nations have recognized that the only durable and reasonable solutions are agreed solutions serving the common interests of our peoples. The new peace structure in the Middle East, including the secure and recognized boun¬ daries, must be built by Arab and Israeli hands.” (1686th meeting, p. 46)

Thus if Egypt will present its position for negotiation without the unprecedented re¬ quest for Israel’s acceptance of it in advance, we shall be ready for detailed and concrete negotiation on all the matters mentioned in the Egyptian memorandum of 15 February and the Israeli document of 26 February.

Effective and versatile conciliation must include a capacity to move from one direction to another in a tireless pursuit of peace. In March 1968, Ambassador Jarring suggested

1 Excerpted from the official English text of Eban’s

speech in the General Assembly General Debate;

U.N. doc. A, PY. 1946/42-47.


a formula for the convening of meetings between the parties in Nicosia on the basis of an agreed term of reference. Egypt rejected that proposal. Those concerned with the conciliation effort did not say that the mission had to be held in suspense until Egypt gave a positive reply to something which its policy did not then allow it to endorse. It would

be wrong now to affirm that such a vital objective as the establishment of a negotiated peace between Israel and Egypt will never be possible except on the basis of a working paper which did not happen to secure the agreement of the parties. Egyptian-Israeli peace is too great a cause to be tied and tethered for all time to a single optional memorandum. If Egypt will agree to pursue negotiations in a detailed and concrete manner without prior conditions on all the points listed in the Israeli and Egyptian memoranda of February 1971, this road to meaningful negotiation will lie open.

There are other roads to peace. The Suez Canal agreement and the discussion of an over-all settlement are not the only options available for negotiation. The problem of refugees requires a broad acceptance of regional and international responsibility. We have therefore proposed the convening of a conference of Middle Eastern States, together with Governments which have contributed to refugee relief and the specialized agencies of the United Nations, in order to chart a five-year plan for the solution of the refugee problem and the integration of refugees into productive life.

This problem would now be considered against the background of some alleviating developments in recent months. There is a growing disillusion with the irridentist preten¬ sions of the terrorist groups and the air pirates. The dividing wall which once prevented all human contact between Israelis and Palestine Arabs is falling. It is true that this is due so far to Israeli initiative. Last year not a single Israeli set foot in any Arab land, but 110,000 Arabs from countries at “war” with Israel came into contact with Israel across the open Jordan bridges. An open frontier between Israel and its eastern neighbour similar to the community frontiers in Europe would do

much to give human reality to a peace settle¬ ment, and indeed might help the settlement to be achieved.

There is a fourth possibility. The problems of boundaries and security are usually con¬ sidered to be the crux of the negotiation. But there are other unresolved matters in the memoranda presented by Egypt and Israel in February. At first sight there seems to be some proximity between the peace, non-aggression, recognition and navigation clauses suggested by the two Governments. On closer inspection the disparities are substantial, and could become crucial. We suggested in January and later in March that it might be profitable to attempt to draft some of the clauses of the Egyptian-Israel treaty relating to the prin¬ ciples of peace. It is an accepted negotiating technique to begin with problems in which divergences are less broad and thus to create a favourable atmosphere in which to confront the more acute problems.

There is a fifth road towards negotiating procedure and activity; it concerns the ne¬ gotiating procedure, but its weight is intensi¬ vely substantive and not at all procedural. I have said that in the early months of 1968 Ambassador Jarring suggested meetings be¬ tween the parties, under his auspices, in Nicosia, in accordance with a text setting out the terms of reference for the conferences. On 10 March 1968, Ambassador Jarring informed me that Egypt had rejected that proposal. As the Secretary-General’s report in document S/10070 of 4 January 1971 reveals, Dr. Jarring “was informed of Israel’s official acceptance, without conditions, of the text.”

Now that was the negative turning-point in the history of the Jarring Mission. Since then it has been limited through Egyptian insistence to a bizarre procedure under which Israeli documents are presented to Ambas¬ sador Jarring, and by him to the Egyptian representative. If the Israel document con¬ tains the words “for communication to the Government of Egypt,” the Egyptian repre¬ sentative refuses to take it into his hands; or if he has inadvertently accepted its delivery, he comes back to relinquish it with panic- stricken haste as if it were a hot coal. The Israel document is then divulged by the

UNITED NATIONS 679

Egyptian representative to the Press, ac¬ companied by a burst of invective. Egyptian replies are published without any hint of an intention to communicate them to Israel. The Egyptian position is that Israel may not talk to Egypt directly, may not talk to Egypt indirectly, may not communicate anything to Egypt in writing.

If no other method is available my Govern¬ ment will communicate its views to Egypt by whatever channel or technique is possible. But we cannot conceal our conviction that there is an element of farce in the idea that the word “negotiation” can honestly be applied to the extraordinary procedure followed so far. How can a Government which alleges that it wants a peace agreement with Israel refuse to negotiate the terms of that agreement by a rational method of contact? To say that one is prepared to enter into a peace agreement but not to meet or negotiate even under interna¬ tional chairmanship is to make a mockery of the international community. One thing is clear: no international agreement has been reached on any subject between any States at any time by the methods to which the Jarring mission has so far been confined through

Egypt’s insistence. I am convinced that the strongest chance

of breaking out of the deadlock lies in a transition to a rational negotiating procedure. The hour is ripe. The gap between the parties is wide, but may not be impossible to bridge. Negotiation is the agent which would trans¬ form the potentiality into action.

One of the most important things said about the Middle East in recent days is Sir Alec Douglas-Home’s statement yesterday that “distrust... of this depth . . . cannot [easily] be removed by long-distance correspondence” (1944th meeting, p. 37) and that “those who are in confrontation must actively help [to provide] dialogue.” (ibid.) If all those who hold that view would express it with equal candour an international movement in favour of abandoning the illusion of long-range correspondence would come to effective ex¬ pression.

There is no weight or value in the argument that the Arab Governments would be nego¬ tiating from weakness if they accepted direct

contact under international chairmanship. Their point of reference would be not the military situation, but the political forum in which the Arab side would speak from a position of numerical and geographical pre¬ dominance.

I therefore propose to Foreign Minister Riad that we take our guidance from the spirit which inspires the international life of our age. Let us meet here this month under the auspices of the United States to discuss the details and principles of a Suez Canal settlement; or under the chairmanship of Ambassador Jarring to discuss the establish¬ ment of peace in accordance with Security Council resolution 242 (1967) on the basis of our respective memoranda of February 1971. Let us break out of devious procedures and sterile polemics into a new vision and a new hope.

418 Six-Point Proposal for an Interim Suez Canal Agreement As a Step Towards a Final Settlement in the Middle East, Made by U.S. Secretary of State Rogers in an Address Before the United Nations General Assembly1

New York, October 4, 1971

The other place where progress is urgently required is the Middle East. Over several years the United Nations has made deter¬ mined and persistent efforts to achieve a lasting peace in that critical area. None the less, the opportunities for success and the risks of failure remain in precarious balance. Security Council resolution 242 (1967), estab¬ lishing the principles for a durable peace, was the first major step towards reason after eighteen years of belligerency and a fragile,

1 Excerpted from the official English text of Rogers’


U.N. doc. A/PV. 1950/17-25.


often violated, armistice. The cease-fire along the Suez Canal, now nearing its fifteenth month, was the second major step away from war. It is time for a third major step towards peace.

For four years Ambassador Jarring has worked diligently to secure the agreement called for in Security Council resolution 242 (1967). We support his efforts. We believe his Mission remains the best path to an over¬ all settlement and to lasting peace. Our views on such a final peace settlement remain those expressed in President Nixon’s foreign policy report earlier this year and in my statement of 9 December 1969. Both sides to the conflict are committed to the fundamental and recip¬ rocal principles to which the Jarring Mission is dedicated: living in peace with each other and withdrawal from territories occupied in the 1967 conflict as set forth in Security Council resolution 242 (1967). Despite those commitments a deep gulf of suspicion and distrust remains. Each side is convinced of the justice of its cause. Each is concerned about its future security. A political settlement based on mutual accommodation could assure both. An attempt to achieve these ends by force will destroy all possibilities for either. That is why we believe a third major step towards peace is essential — [a] step that can be taken now; a step that is practical; a step that could help create the confidence and trust which are now lacking; a step towards full and complete implementation of resolution 242 (1967).

That step is an interim Suez Canal agree¬ ment. That is why the United States has welcomed the interest of both Egypt and Israel in such an agreement. That is why, at the request of the parties, the United States has undertaken to play a constructive role in the process of arriving at an agreement.

In order to explore the possibilities of each side, we have discussed concrete and specific ideas designed to meet the legitimate needs and concerns of both sides. Those ideas, given willingness and good intentions on both sides, could become the basis for a break- through. They require further quiet discus- dons with the parties, an undertaking we now hope can be expedited along the following lines.

A first point is the relationship between an interim agreement and an over-all settle¬ ment. A fair approach should be founded on two basic principles: first, that a Suez Canal agreement is merely a step towards complete and full implementation of resolu¬ tion 242 (1967) within a reasonable period of time, and not an end in itself—that has to be clearly established in any agreement; also, that neither side can realistically expect to achieve, as part of an interim settlement, complete agreement on the terms and con¬ ditions of an over-all settlement—if it could, there would be no necessity for an interim settlement. Those final terms and conditions will have to be worked out through nego¬ tiations under Ambassador Jarring’s auspices. And we would hope that if an interim agree¬ ment was reached, active negotiations under Ambassador Jarring’s auspices could be renewed.

A second point is the matter of a cease-fire. Its maintenance is in the interest of all of us, of everyone concerned, of everyone in this room, in fact in the interest of the whole world. The ultimate objective, of course, is a permanent end to belligerency, as part of a final, binding peace agreement. But such a commitment is not realizable in the context of an interim agreement. Neither would a cease-fire of short duration be realistic. With goodwill on both sides, it should be possible to find common understanding between the parties on this issue.

Third is the zone of withdrawal. There are, of course, very important strategic considera¬ tions involved in this key point. However, based on our discussions, we believe it should be possible to meet the principal concerns of both sides. Without going into the details, I would merely say that I believe that in the long run the most significant aspect of an interim agreement might prove to be that it established the principle of withdrawal looking to an over-all settlement as a fact rather than as a theory.

Fourth is the nature of the supervisory arrangements. Both sides must have confi¬ dence that the agreement will not be violated and that adequate machinery will be provided for prompt detection of any infractions. We are confident that ways reassuring to both

UNITED NATIONS 681

Israel and Egypt can be found for altering and strengthening the supervisory mechanisms that have existed in the area for the past two decades.

Fifth is the question of an Egyptian presence east of the Suez Canal. The reopening and operation of the Suez Canal would require Egyptian personnel east of the Canal. It is understandable, too, that normal activities should be pursued in as much of the zone evacuated as possible. The question of an Egyptian military presence east of the Canal is one on which the parties hold opposite views. But here too, based on our discussion, we believe that there are possibilities for compromise on this issue.

Sixth is the use of the Suez Canal. The United States has long held that the Canal should be open to passage for all nations, without discrimination. This principle is clear in the Security Council resolution of November 1967. What is at present at issue in considering an interim agreement is prin¬ cipally the timing at which this right could be exercised. We believe an accommodation on this point is quite possible.

With those six points in mind, let me say this: because the parties have asked us, we intend to continue our determined effort to assist them in arriving at an interim settlement. This effort, we believe, is impera¬ tive because—and I think it is important to keep this in mind—there is no more realistic and hopeful alternative to pursue. There are risks to peace but the greater risk is inaction, unwillingness to face up to the hard decisions. A practical step now—an interim agree¬ ment—would make the next step toward peace less difficult for all the parties to take. It would restore the use of the Suez Canal as a waterway for international shipping. It would re-establish Egypt’s authority over a major national asset. It would separate the combatants. It would produce the first Israeli withdrawal. It would extend the cease-fire. It would diminish the risk of major-Power involvement. It would be an important step toward the complete imple¬ mentation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967).

I submit that the logic for such an agree¬

ment is overwhelming. If the leaders of the area would grasp this opportunity, they would give new hope to their peoples for tranquillity, for progress and for peace.

419 Statements Reiterating Jordanian Ac¬ ceptance of U.N. Resolution 242 and Challenging Israel To Declare Willing¬ ness To Implement Its Provisions, Made by Foreign Minister Salah of Jordan in an Address Before the United Nations Gen¬ eral Assembly1


For, as members all know, shortly after the war the Security Council adopted resolu¬ tion 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967. That resolution was intended to define a just and lasting solution to the problem. Its points were clear, its intent specific. It reaffirmed the established principle that the acquisition of territory by military force is inadmissible and called for the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the Arab territory they had oc¬ cupied. It called for an end to belligerency in the area, it guaranteed the right of all States in the area to live in peace and security within recognized boundaries and it gua¬ ranteed freedom of passage for all ships through international waterways. It also called for a just solution to the problem of the Palestinian refugees. It struck a balance between the obligations of both sides. It met the natural Arab demand that Israeli occupa¬ tion of our territory be decisively ended. It provided the guarantees for future peace and security in the area, which the Israelis alleged were the only aim of their policies, and conditions for ending a temporary military occupation.

1 Excerpted from the official English text of Salah’s


U.N. doc. A/PV. 1951/58-62, 67-68, 72.


Two principal Arab parties, Jordan and Egypt, accepted the resolution and the obliga¬ tions devolving upon them therefrom. My Government was repeatedly assured by major Powers in the Council, and especially the United States, that were the resolution ac¬ cepted its implementation by Israel would be ensured and their full weight would be thrown behind it to assure Israel’s compliance. The Arab Republic of Egypt was given similar assurances pertaining to implementation. And that was done even before the resolution was adopted by the Security Council in an attempt to guarantee Arab acceptance of its

terms. It hardly occurred to our Governments that

the process of implementation was to be subverted and even sabotaged by a game in semantics and procrastination which con¬ tinues up to this day. The game went so Ur as to overtax the patience and hope of even the United Nations representative, Am¬ bassador Jarring, an indomitable and patient diplomat by the most stringent standards.

My Government co-operated fully with Ambassador Jarring, whose terms of reference were defined in the Security Council resolu¬ tion. Like Egypt and Lebanon, it received him repeatedly and responded positively and sincerely to all his questions and efforts. Without hesitation we announced our ac¬ ceptance of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) and expressed readiness to implement our part of it. Israel continued to equivocate about the resolution, sometimes referring only to its “spirit,” sometimes only to one element in it, sometimes fully ignoring it. Two whole years were spent in this tragic game.

In the second round of Dr. Jarring’s efforts, which climaxed in his series of ques¬ tions addressed to the parties in the spring of 1969, my Government displayed an equally positive attitude. Reaffirming its commit¬ ment to an ultimate just peace, it replied in writing: “Jordan accepts the right of every State in the area to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries, free from threats or acts of force.” Furthermore, “Jordan agrees to pledge termination of all claims or states of belligerency.” To another ques¬ tion my Government replied that Jordan

would not oppose the establishment of demili¬ tarized zones. And in reply to yet another question by Ambassador Jarring, we stated that in case demilitarized zones are established, Jordan accepts that such zones be supervised and maintained by the United Nations. The Arab Republic of Egypt gave equally clear commitments to peace. In addition, it gave assurances on freedom of navigation in inter¬ national waterways in the area.

This explicit Arab commitment to the obligations defined in the Security Council resolution was certainly not matched by Israel. Ambassador Jarring could not get any commitment from Israel on an ultimate total withdrawal from the occupied Arab territories, even in the context of complete implementation of the Security Council res¬ olution and the achievement of peace.

To forestall a breakdown in the peace efforts, the four big Powers initiated, in the spring of that year, consultations aimed at breaking the deadlock by getting the Security Council to exercise its responsibilities in the matter. Again we welcomed this move in the Council. We regarded it as natural and necessary. Israel vehemently opposed this initiative and opened a violent propaganda campaign against it. It realized that the intervention of the Council was bound to lead to an agreed position that, while peace in the area was the ultimate objective, Israeli evac¬ uation of the occupied territories was a natural prerequisite.

The following year witnessed a deterioration in the situation in the area and frequent resumption of hostilities. It also witnessed a crystallization of a public posture by Israel confirming what we had always warned against: that, peace or no peace, Israel intended to keep the territory it occupied.

It was this position that led to Israel’s clumsy and nervous reaction to the American initiative in June 1970 to revive the efforts of Ambassador Jarring on the basis of the Security Council resolution. Israel hesitated, resisted, made angry noises about the prospects of revival of United Nations peace efforts, and finally managed to sabotage the initia¬ tive and the renewed Jarring mission. Not

UNITED NATIONS 683

before it stated explicitly, however, that total withdrawal was out of the question.

Foreign occupation of the territories of other States is abhorrent in itself by every internationally recognized standard. But when such an occupation is accompanied by the dispersal and expulsion of the victims from their ancestral homeland, the plundering of their lands and means of livelihood, and the undisguised and openly declared intent to take over that territory irrevocably, sooner or later, then the time has clearly come for the international order and those who wish to be its guardian to take stock of themselves and of the system which they purport to uphold. Has the world reverted again to the jungle status from which it has sought and fought to extricate itself? Does not the world community realize that peace and justice are indivisible, that if Israel is permitted to reap the bitter harvest of its aggression, then which country in the world apart from the super Powers could feel safe about its future and its security? Those are questions —very real questions—which must seriously be pondered by all peoples who have a stake in world peace with justice.

There are three aspects of Israeli occupation which deserve to be highlighted in this context. They are not by any means the only obnoxious ones, but they are the most flagrant.

First, may I draw the attention of this Assembly to the plight and agony of the half a million of our brethren in the Gaza Strip. Twice or possibly more in a lifetime, they have been victims of a life of refuge and squalor, herded in refugee camps. For 20 years they had survived their suffering in the hope that they would eventually be repatriated, to their homes in their homeland.

And now the Israeli forces of occupation are expelling the people of Gaza from their homes, blowing up their houses and forcing them to find shelter in the wilderness of Sinai. This is part of a planned depopulation pro¬ gramme that will eventually lead to Gaza’s being incorporated into the Israeli State. What happens to the people is no concern of the Israelis. It is the land they covet.

There is nothing more certain in our minds than that. But if it is the land they want, they will have to struggle for ever to maintain it. As we have said many times, they may choose land or peace. They can never have both.

The second aspect of the occupation has been the ruthless and inhuman treatment meted out to our brethren in all the occupied territories, in flagrant violation of the Declara¬ tion of Human Rights, the various Geneva Conventions governing the basic rights of civilians under occupation and, above all, the inherent and natural rights of the indigenous inhabitants in their own homeland. Thou¬ sands of homes in towns and villages have been obliterated on the flimsiest pretext that they had been harbouring resistance. Many thousands of youths, young boys and girls, have been languishing in prisons, in numerous instances subjected to torture, off and on for years. Even United Nations investigation of the plight of civilians under occupation was arrogantly denied by the forces of occupation.

But the peak of the tragedy in the Middle East and its greatest manifestation is the tragedy of Jerusalem.

I must pause here to say, in as quiet and unemotional a way as I can, that there will be no peace in the Middle East so long as the Holy City of Jerusalem remains under the domination of Israel. I do not say this emptily; I say it because it is an accepted truth in the mind and heart of every Arab —Moslem and Christian. The liberation of Jerusalem is the corner-stone of peace in the Middle East; it is the essential prerequisite for any move towards the final solution of the problem.

In conclusion, Jordan would like to put itself on record once again as to where it stands. Believing that Security Council resolution 242 (1967) is the right basis for an immediate and just peace in the Middle East, Jordan once again pledges itself to its full acceptance. It subscribes to every one of its principles and it agrees to implement its specific provisions. We accept the call for a just and lasting peace contained in that resolution. We are ready


to fulfil our peace obligations as defined in it. Let Israel declare its acceptance of the

obligations required of it and contained in the resolution—that it end its occupation and withdraw its forces from the Arab terri¬ tories it occupied in June 1967. Let the Israeli Foreign Minister come up to this rostrum and declare in unequivocal terms that, in the context of a peace solution, Israel will withdraw from the West Bank of Jordan, from Arab Jerusalem, from the Gaza Strip, from Sinai, from Sharm el-Sheikh, and from the occupied Syrian heights. Let the Israeli spokesman and his Government declare that Israel wants to live in peace with its neighbours

and not to live at our expense, by annexing our Jerusalem, occupying our land and enslaving our people. Let Israel declare all that, and the road to peace in the Middle East will be opened.

420 Statements Reviewing Israeli Defiance of U.N. Resolutions and Setting Out Recognition of the Palestinian Right to Land and Self-Determination, and Total Israeli Withdrawal from Oc¬ cupied Arab Territories As Prerequisites for a Middle East Peace, Made by Foreign Minister Khaddam of Syria in an Ad¬ dress Before the United Nations General Assembly1


The General Assembly debates yearly the explosive Middle East crisis which threatens not only the security of the area but also world peace. At the heart of this crisis is the cause of the Arab people of Palestine who have been deprived of all rights confirmed by interna-

1 Excerpted from the English text (furnished by the

Syrian Arab Republic delegation) of Khaddam’s

speech delivered in Arabic in the General Assembly

General Debate; U.N. doc. A/PV. 1952/31, 32-33,

34, 35-36, 36-37, 37.

tional legislation, conventions and the United Nations resolutions. It is the case of the Zionist imperialist aggression against the people of Palestine as well as the whole Arab people, an aggression that has continued unabated for over half a century now.

This hall and this forum have witnessed repeated condemnations of Israel for acts of collective killing and genocide. The majority of Members of the United Nations have endorsed these condemnations, as can be ascertained through reference to numerous resolutions adopted by the General Assembly, the Security Council and other organs and Committees of the United Nations. No Member State has a darker United Nations record and one that is [more] tainted with crimes and violations than Israel.

To set the record clear, the number of resolutions on the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Palestine question adopted by the General Assembly, the principal organs of the United Nations, and specialized agencies, UNESCO and WHO, from the first cease-fire decision of 6 June 1967 until now, totals 54 resolutions and decisions. Those resolutions and decisions have, on the one hand, affirmed every Arab right and confirmed, on the other, Israel’s utter disregard of these rights and its deliber¬ ate ignoring of every principle of the Charter, a record which makes Israel a candidate to be expelled from the world Organization in accordance with Article 6 of the Charter. Specifically, of the 54 resolutions referred to, 14 “Condemn” or “Strongly condemn” or “Specifically condemn Israel” for “flagrant violations” of the Charter, including attacks on the Arab countries, its refusal to apply the Fourth Geneva Convention and its viola¬ tions of human rights. Nineteen of those 54 resolutions either “Deplore” or “Deeply de¬ plore” or “Strongly deplore” or “Note with dismay the refusal of Israel” to co-operate in implementing specific resolutions or “urgently call upon the Government of Israel” to imple¬ ment the Charter.

Furthermore, Zionist-Israeli propaganda, in utter disregard of world will and the maintenance of international peace and secu-

UNITED NATIONS 685

rity, has been attempting continuously to picture Israeli aggression on Arab States as being a conflict between the United States and the USSR in the Middle East. Such an attempt aims at tying the United States and its interest totally to Israeli ag¬ gression and to the desire of the expansionist Israeli State to further expand in Arab lands. It is an explosive situation because it aims at pushing ultimately the whole world to the brink of a third world war in order to protect Israeli expansionism and aggression.

We therefore confirm once more that any settlement based on giving a reward to the aggressor is but a call for a further renewal of aggression. It is a dangerous game which threatens the security of the world community. Artificial creations based on racialism and aggression cannot subsist, regardless of the arsenal of offensive destructive arms which they have at their disposal.

The alliance between the United States and Israel, between imperialism and Zionism, which is directed against the uprooted and dispossessed people of Palestine, as well as against the whole of the Arab people who aspire to peace, constitutes a threat to all freedom-loving and peace-loving peoples of the world and is harmful to American in¬ terests, which are sacrificed to serve the aggressive aims of Zionism.

The United States so-called policy of “quiet diplomacy for a Middle East settle¬ ment” is in effect nothing but a manifestation of the American desire to give the aggressor party the opportunity and the needed “quiet” to enjoy the fruits of aggression and to con¬ solidate its control of the occupied territories through establishing new colonies and the expulsion of the inhabitants of these territories.

The large-scale expulsion from their homes and lands of the Arab inhabitants of the Golan Heights, the West Bank of Jordan, Gaza, Sinai and Jerusalem is a terrible crime that should move the conscience of humanity to intervene to save the threatened peace and security of the world.

The Israeli authorities have gone so far in their defiance of the international community

as to declare openly their colonialist intentions regarding the occupied Arab territories, which the Israeli Minister of Defence has recently demanded should be annexed to Israel, and that Israel should therefore regard itself as the “permanent government” of these terri¬ tories.

Zionist acts of aggression and expulsion have reduced the Arab people of Palestine to the status of refugees. The failure of the world community to give justice to these refugees and the indifference with which it has regarded their tragic plight has kindled the spirit of resistance in their torn tents and has converted the homeless and dispos¬ sessed people of Palestine into freedom fighters struggling to defend the rights which the United Nations Charter has recognized as belonging to all peoples.

The struggle of Palestinian resistance is a struggle for the right of self-determination. International law recognizes this right and consecrates the struggle to achieve it. For it is, indeed, the right for the achievement of which all the peoples of the world represent¬ ed in this Organization, not excluding the United States of America, have fought to achieve. It is the right recognized by interna¬ tional law and charters, including the United States Declaration of Independence, and is, therefore, the inalienable right of the Palestinian people which the United Nations General Assembly has repeatedly recognized and affirmed in resolutions adopted by various sessions of the Assembly, most notably by the anniversary twenty-fifth session.

There are two prerequisites for the esta¬ blishment of peace in the Middle East: first, recognition of the right of the Palestinian people to their lands and homeland and to the free exercise of self-determination; second¬ ly, the complete, immediate and uncondi¬ tional withdrawal of Israeli forces from the occupied Arab territories.

The continued occupation of these terri¬ tories constitutes a grave danger to peace, a danger for which the Zionist aggressors and the forces of imperialism that support the aggression must be held responsible.

Freedom-loving forces of the world and


all peoples fighting for liberation bear the responsibility to check the aggressor. These forces, acting collectively, can deter aggres¬ sion, protect the cause of freedom and the sovereignty of peoples, and can ensure a world peace based on justice and equity.

421 Statements Pointing Out Contradictions

in United States Policy and Practice

in the Middle East, Calling for Israeli

Renunciation of Continued Occupation

and Stressing Egyptian Efforts Towards

Peace Made by Foreign Minister Riad

of Egypt in an Address Before the United

Nations General Assembly1


In pursuance of our efforts for the imple¬ mentation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) and to secure the withdrawal of Israeli forces from all the territories oc¬ cupied after 5 June 1967, President Anwar El-Sadat proposed last February an initiative which provides for the implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) and the withdrawal of Israeli forces in two stages. President El-Sadat declared that upon Israel’s withdrawal to the lines of the first stage, Egypt would be willing to accept a cease-fire for a period of six months, during which Ambassador Jarring would prepare a time¬ table for the implementation of all the pro¬ visions of the Security Council resolution. During this stage Egypt would start clearing the Suez Canal with a view to opening it for international navigation. Egyptian forces would cross the Suez Canal to assume their national responsibilities on the Eastern Bank of the Canal and to protect the Canal and the Egyptian cities on the Canal.

The second stage would then follow. Israeli armed forces would be withdrawn from all

1 Excerpted from the official English text of Riad’s speech in the General Assembly General Debate; U.N. doc. A/PV. 1954/22 23, 24 32.

the Arab territories occupied after 5 June 1967, and the remaining provisions of the Security Council resolution would be fully carried out in conformity with the time-table prepared by Ambassador Jarring.

Israel rejected this initiative, as it had previously rejected the Jarring initiative. This rejection was expressed once again by the Foreign Minister of Israel on 30 September when he declared that Israel would not withdraw from all the occupied Egyptian territories. Moreover, the Israeli Defence Minister stated on 19 September:

“Israel should keep Sharm El-Sheikh, the Golan Heights of Syria, and the Gaza Strip among the territories captured in 1967, at the same time keeping troops on the Jordan River”—that is, the West Bank of Jordan under Israel’s military control— “and retaining new settlements in the oc¬ cupied areas.”

Since the official announcement of its expansionist policy of annexing occupied Egyptian territory, the Israeli leaders have launched an active campaign aimed at resur¬ recting the principle of military conquest as a means for the acquisition of territory of other States. This principle was at the root of the whole colonial system and led to almost all the wars until the emergence of the United Nations.

Israel’s policy of military expansion, its attempts to revive the colonial principle of military conquest, its refusal to agree to permanent peace, and its consistent defiance of the United Nations resolutions are all policies for which Israel finds no support whatever in the international community.

The United States, which provides Israel with military and economic assistance, has repeatedly rejected the principle of military conquest as a means of the acquisition of territory of other States. The United States has, moreover, declared its support of Ambas¬ sador Jarring’s memorandum of 8 February which calls for Israeli withdrawal to Egypt’s international borders and the conclusion of a peace agreement.

In the course of his speech to the General Assembly on Monday, Mr. William Rogers

UNITED NATIONS 687

reaffirmed the position of the United States stated by him on 9 December 1969, in which he said:

“In the context of peace and agreement on specific security safeguards, withdrawal of Israeli forces from Egyptian territory would be required.

“Such an approach directly addresses the principal national concerns of both Israel and the United Arab Republic. It would require the United Arab Republic to agree to a binding and specific commitment to peace. It would require withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from United Arab Republic territory to the international border between Israel and Egypt which has been in existence for over a half century.”

We note that this position corresponds to the Jarring initiative of 8 February 1971, which was accepted by Egypt on 15 February. We also note that in his speech Mr. Rogers called for a step for complete and full imple¬ mentation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967). We consider any attempt to divert such a step into a separate agreement as one of the often used obstacles of Israel to frustrate the realization of peace in the Middle East.

The United States, however, has continued to provide Israel with military and economic aid. At a time when Israel is actively labour¬ ing to annex the occupied Arab territories, the American support does not represent a mere retraction of previous American commitments and commitments under the Charter. Moreover, it enables Israel to pursue its policy of frustrating the imple¬ mentation of the Security Council resolution and to continue its aggression against the Arab countries and its defiance of the United Nations.

There is a basic contradiction between the repeated assertion of the United States of support for the Security Council resolution and its actual policy of providing military and economic aid to Israel, in spite of the latter’s rejection of the Jarring memorandum and its insistence on territorial expansion.

As a great Power and a permanent member of the Security Council, the United States bears a heavy responsibility and assumes

definite commitments with regard to the maintenance of international peace and secur¬ ity. Hence, the United States and the other big Powers should strive for the realiza¬ tion of the steps leading to the achievement of permanent peace in the Middle East.

Wide and important sectors of the interna¬ tional community have defined their position and announced their full support for the Security Council resolution of 22 November 1967, and have called upon Israel to co¬ operate with Ambassador Jarring and to respond positively to his memorandum. I should like to refer, in particular, to the fair resolution adopted by the Council of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity on 22 June 1971 at Addis Ababa. In that resolution the African leaders:

Firstly, called for the immediate withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from all Arab territories to the lines of 5 June 1967.

Secondly, expressed their “full support of the efforts of the Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General to implement Security Council resolution 242 of 22 November 1967 and his initiative for peace of 8 February 1971.”

Thirdly, reaffirmed their solidarity with the United Arab Republic and appreciated its reply of 15 February to Ambassador Jarring’s memorandum as a practical step for establishing a just and lasting peace.

Fourthly, deplored “Israel’s defiance of that initiative” and called upon Israel to respond to this initiative.

The African leaders did not confine them¬ selves to the adoption of that important resolution. They requested the President of Mauritania, Moktar Ould Daddah, in his capacity as President of the current session of the Council of the Organization of African Unity, to consult with the other Heads of State to exert their joint influence to secure the full implementation of their resolution. As a result of these consultations, a Committee was established under the chairmanship of President Moktar Ould Daddah and the Heads of State of Ethiopia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Senegal, Mauritania, Nigeria, Cameroon, Kenya, Tanzania, Ivory Coast and Liberia.


Egypt declared its acceptance of the im¬ plementation of the resolution adopted by the Council of the Organization of African Unity. We shall co-operate with the Com¬ mittee of four African Heads of State led by President Senghor for the success of its mission and in carrying out the collective will of Africa’s Heads of State. In deference to this effort Egypt will not request the discussion of the Middle East item in accordance with its established priority on the agenda of the General Assembly, and will await the results of this mission.

The support for Security Council resolu¬ tion 242 (1967) and the Jarring initiative of 8 February is indeed universal. Besides Africa’s support, Asian States, non-aligned countries, the socialist countries and Western European countries have strongly supported, on many occasions, Ambassador Jarring’s efforts. We are also confident that the Latin American countries, which contributed to laying the foundation of the principle of the non-acquisition of territory by force, will no doubt reject Israel’s attempts aiming at the acquisition of lands through military conquest and will actively support the Secu¬ rity Council resolution and the efforts of Ambassador Jarring to achieve permanent peace in the Middle East.

The Security Council resolution of 22 November 1967 is firmly based on two inseparable foundations, permanent peace and full withdrawal. Ambassador Jarring’s Mission is an integral part of that resolution. There are two roads before us which lead to the full implementation of the Security Council resolution and to the establishment of permanent peace in the Middle East: first, the implementation of President El- Sadat’s initiative, to which I referred earlier in my speech; and, second, that Israel should agree to enter into a peace agreement in accordance with the memorandum of Ambas¬ sador Jarring of 8 February 1971. Egypt has responded positively to this memorandum. It remains for Israel to take the same step, thus enabling Ambassador Jarring to resume his contacts. I would be ready to meet with Ambassador Jarring to discuss with him the implementation of the contents of his

memorandum. I am ready to do this today. Moreover, we agree that the Security

Council should lay down security arrange¬ ments to guarantee peace and security and to ensure non-renewal of aggression in the Middle East. These arrangements include the establishment of demilitarized zones on both sides for equal distances and the establish¬ ment of an international force to supervise peace in the area.

Israel’s refusal to withdraw from the ter¬ ritories it occupied as a result of its aggression of 5 June 1967 is a constant threat to peace. Firm international action is now imperative to force Israel to comply with the basic norms of the Charter. The Security Council, particularly its permanent members, bear at present a great responsibility for peace in the Middle East.

The achievement of permanent peace is the most genuine guarantee for security in the Middle East. Territorial expansion does not guarantee the security of any State. Expansion is not the path to security, but it surely is the road to war. There is a fun¬ damental fact which stands out as clearly as the sun, through all the efforts made, through all the projects submitted and through all the accumulated United Nations records on the Middle East. That fact is summed up in the following words: peace in the Middle East depends on Israel’s renunciation of its policy of expansion. If Israel announces today that it will withdraw its forces to the 5 June 1967 lines, peace would be achieved forthwith in the Middle East.

The leaders of Israel would be indulging in self-deception if they convinced themselves that they could force the people of Egypt to surrender an inch of Egypt’s territory, in any form or under any name. In the Valley of the Nile the people of Egypt offered to the human heritage a civilization of peace. In peace and in tolerance they built their progress. More than once in their long history they stood up to invaders. The invaders were repelled and Egypt remained throughout the length of history.

Today the people in the Valley of the Nile, while looking forward to peace so as to proceed with the tasks of construction and

UNITED NATIONS 689

to meet the challenges of progress, are also committed vis-a-vis the past, the present and the future to stand up to the invaders, to protect the land of Egypt and to insist that peace must rest on justice.

422 Statements Urging the U.N. To Shoulder Its Responsibility for Assuring the Rights of the People of Palestine and Establishing Peace in the Middle East, Made by Permanent Representative el- Shibib of Iraq in an Address Before the United Nations General Assembly1


From the time of its adoption on 22 No¬ vember 1967 we did not have much faith in Security Council resolution 242 (1967). We suspected its objectives and we doubted the possibility of its implementation. We opposed the resolution’s departure from the principle of peace with justice and we resented the fact that it was to all intents and purposes rewarding the aggressor.

The four years which have elapsed since the adoption of that resolution have been enough to justify the worst of our misgivings. We realized that the resolution would never satisfy the legitimate aspirations of the people of Palestine and ensure their inalienable rights to return to their homes and determine their own future in their own country— rights which were reaffirmed by General Assembly resolution 2672 C (XXV) of 8 December 1970. We felt that any attempt to settle the crisis in the Middle East without restoring and respecting the legitimate rights of the Palestinians was unjust and contrary to the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations, particularly the inalien¬ able rights of peoples to self-determination.

1 Excerpted from the official English text of el-Shibilfs

speech in the General Assembly General Debate,

U.N. doc. A/PV. 1956/19 22.

We were also certain that the resolution was impracticable as we were confident that it had not the slightest chance, unjust as it was, of being implemented in the face of the now too obvious Israeli designs of expansion and acquisition of more territory by the use of force. We are not happy to see that it took four years of futile attempts to implement the resolution to prove us right. We are not gloating over the failure, but are rather saddened that the international com¬ munity has not yet resorted to effective measures to vindicate the purposes of the Charter. Only such measures, as provided for in Chapter VII of the Charter, can establish a just and durable peace in the Middle East. That anything short of these measures will not realize any substantial change in Israel’s policy has been amply demonstrated by Israel’s immediate and defiant rejection of Security Council resolution 298 (1971), the third resolution the Council has taken against Israel’s illegal annexation of the city ofjerusalem.

What distresses us most is that we have witnessed since the twenty-fifth session of the General Assembly a certain drift on the part of the United Nations into apathy and a willingness to abdicate its responsibilities towards re-establishing peace in the Middle East by allowing one of its Members to assume its functions. The entire authority of the United Nations and even its mandate under resolution 242 (1967) itself have been usurped by one of the major Powers, a permanent member of the Security Council and, at that, the major patron and benefactor of Israel. What makes the situation all the worse is the fact that the United States, in pursuing its alleged objectives of establish¬ ing peace in our part of the world, has never ceased appeasing the aggressor and granting Israel one concession after another as an excuse for obtaining a dubious Israeli com¬ mitment which Israel has no intention to honour in the first place. There were even reports that the Government of the United States has promised Israel further deliveries of supersonic planes and war materials in return for the promise of a partial withdrawal from the occupied territories of one Arab


country. If this pattern of appeasement is to continue Israel will acquire all that it desires at present of weapons and instruments of destruction without yielding an inch of the occupied territories. What makes this all the more alarming is that Israel is now being promised weapons capable of delivering nuclear warheads when Israel has obstinately refused to ratify the Treaty on the Non-Prolif¬ eration of Nuclear Weapons. To modernize and re-equip the war machine of an aggressor in order to make him disgorge his loot seems to me a most curious enterprise. The Nazis would have been reigning supreme in the world today had their aggression been treated in a similar fashion.

We believe that it is high time for the United Nations to shoulder its responsibilities towards the people of Palestine and towards peace in our area. It should reclaim the initiative in the search for solutions and endeavour to put an end to aggression by adopting the very same measures provided for in the Charter. At the same time, I should like to reaffirm from this rostrum the resolute will of my Government to remain behind the

people of Palestine in their just struggle to regain their inalienable rights to their country and homeland. We shall remain faithful to the Palestinian resistance and will assure it of our full solidarity against the attempts aimed towards' its liquidation. I should also like to assert our firm conviction that no envisaged solution of the problem of the Middle East, whether total or partial, has the flimsiest chance of success without ensuring justice to the Palestinians and restor¬ ing to them their elementary human rights to existence and self-determination.

423 Statements Emphasizing the Necessity for Recognition of the Rights of the People of Palestine, Made by Foreign Minister Bouteflika of Algeria in an Address Before the United Nations Gene¬ ral Assembly1


Almost all speakers have justly stressed from this rostrum that they are deeply concerned by the situation in the Middle East, by the fact that no progress towards a satisfactory settlement has occurred. Yet, attempts to reach an agreement have been numerous, whether at the level of the super-Powers, at the level of the four big Powers, or within the framework of the mission of Ambassador Jarring, Special Re¬ presentative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations. Africa, in turn, is trying to make its contribution to the search for a solution by appointing a mission of four eminent African Heads of State, who would inform themselves on the spot about the state of affairs and the intentions of the main antagonists, and seek ways and means which would lead to proposals acceptable to all parties. Algeria as an African country, is happy to welcome this initiative which is consonant with the idea of the solidarity of our continent with an African country victim of aggression, a part of whose national territory, like a part of that of some Arab countries, is still illegally occupied by Israeli troops.

We have never had the slightest illusion about the aggressive and expansionist charac¬ ter of Israel. Its creation was marred by flagrant injustice, since it was brought about in conditions that are well known, to the prejudice of the Palestinian people expelled from its territory. Its existence is based on the permanent maintenance of this original sin which dooms it to showing continuous hostility towards its neighbours. Finally,

1 Excerpted from the official English text (interpreted

from French) of Bouteflika’s speech in the General

Assembly General Debate; U.N. doc. A/PV. 1965/

78-81.

UNITED NATIONS 691

its policy dooms it to constantly seeking to expand its territory, thus making its own the notorious theory of Lebensraum. The arrogance which has always characterized the attitude of Israel is probably encouraged by the impunity which it has so far enjoyed. We are entitled to wonder, as a Member of this Organization, how far and until when such contempt for our international institution and the principles of our Charter will be condoned. What credence will still attach to our decisions if they can be ignored and trampled on in such a deliberate and constant manner?

But if attempts to reach a solution have failed until now, it is also because an essential element has been forgotten or neglected, an element which is fundamental to any settlement of the situation in the Middle East. I have in mind the Palestinian people, whose inalienable rights have been recognized and reaffirmed by the General Assembly. This people, despoiled of its national territory, is now waging a struggle within the framework of the wide liberation movement evident in the whole word. The echoing solidarity aroused in world public opinion by its struggle confirms the legitimate and just nature of its claims. Indeed, these are founded on sacred notions such as freedom and dignity. They are those for which a people is ready to accept any sacrifice and for which it will always find sufficient resources to attain its objective. It would therefore be dangerous to neglect this fundamental element in the search for a solution but nothing will prevent it from being strengthened and from developing as it is in line with the normal course of the history of all peoples accidentally deprived of their freedom and their national rights.

To see in the problem of the peoples of Palestine merely a problem of refugees who must be assisted and for whom one implores international charity is a grievous error whose consequences can be tragic. One can easily understand that Israel prefers for reasons of its own to conceal under purely social humanitarian aspects a problem whose political dimensions are just as important and incontrovertible. But—and we shall

never tire of repeating it—a just and lasting peace cannot be established in the Middle East except on the basis of the integral recognition of the rights of the people of Palestine to national independence and so¬ vereign existence.

424 Address Made Before the United Nations General Assembly by Permanent Re¬ presentative Chiao of China Calling for Condemnation of Israeli Aggression and Its U.S. Backing and Reiterating Chinese Support for the Restoration of Territory and National Rights to All Arab Peoples Including the Palestinians1

New York, December 8, 1971

Over a long period, particularly since June 1967, the Chinese Government and people have followed with concern the struggle of the Palestinian and other Arab peoples against the aggression committed by Israeli Zionism with the support of United States imperialism and have watched carefully the development of the situation in the Middle East.

The essence of the Middle East question is the aggression against the Palestinian and other Arab peoples by the Israeli Zionists with the support of United States ruling circles. Since the Second World War the Israeli Zionists, fostered and groomed by United States imperialism, with the support of world reactionary aggressive forces, have repeatedly launched wars of aggression against Arab countries. Each time they launched a war they occupied large tracts of Arab territory, driving out of their homeland over one million Palestinian people who had lived there for generations and who have become homeless and destitute. The history of the Middle East over the post-war period of two decades or more has been a history

1 Official English text (interpreted from Chinese) of

Chiao’s speech in the General Assembly Middle East

Debate;- U.N. doc. A/PV. 2006/41-48.


of the continuous expansion and aggression by the Israeli Zionists and a history of the struggle of the Palestinian and other Arab peoples against expansion and aggression.

Under the control and manipulation of the super-Powers, the United Nations, ig¬ noring the just demands of the Palestinian and other Arab peoples and the righteous voice of the people of various countries, has failed to strongly condemn and firmly stop the expansion and aggression by Israeli Zionism and failed to give due support to the Palestinian and other Arab peoples; on the contrary, without distinguishing be¬ tween right and wrong, between aggression and the victims of aggression, it has adopted a number of resolutions which in effect en¬ couraged aggression and shielded Israeli Zi¬ onism in the name of “maintaining peace.” These resolutions are unjust to the Arab people and in contravention of the United Nations Charter.

A number of countries which favoured certain resolutions passed by the United Nations on the Middle East question were solely motivated by their good will for peace. However, even these resolutions have up to now remained empty papers. This is clear to everyone if he just takes a look at the sketch map distributed by the delegation of the Arab republic of Egypt which indicates the Arab territory occupied by Israel since 1947. With the support and encouragement of a super- Power and with the connivance and acqui¬ escence of another super-Power, the Israeli Zionists launched in 1967 their biggest war of aggression. Since then, the Israeli Zionists have become all the more arrogant and truculent and have assumed the posture of undisguised fascist aggressors. As for the United States Government, even those United Nations resolutions which it favoured are only being utilized to deceive others when these resolutions suit its needs but they are cast away when they no longer suit its needs.

While talking much about peace, the United States is doing its utmost to arm Israel. Of late the United States Senate has passed a resolution granting Israel a loan of $>500 million, half of which will be used for the purchase of Phantom jet fighters by

Israel. This is a naked support to aggression and a new provocation to the Palestinian and other Arab peoples. It is because of the above-mentioned behaviour of the United States and Israel that the Palestinian people and Egypt, Syria and other Arab countries have up to now failed to achieve any result in all their efforts to recover the lost territory.

The Israeli Zionists have advanced a theory of so-called “secure boundaries” in order to perpetuate the occupation of the territory they have seized. This is a typical excuse for expansionism, a gangster’s logic. What are “secure boundaries”? According to the logic of the Israeli Zionists, no boundary of well over 100 countries in the world would be secure because the conventional weapons of any country can reach areas within the boundary of a neighbouring country, let alone rockets and nuclear weapons. Does it follow then that the boundaries of all neighbouring countries should be changed? Obviously that is absurd. To put it bluntly, by “secure boundaries” the Israeli Zionists mean that whatever place they invade and occupy, that becomes their boundary. They may consider such boundaries as secure today, but tomor¬ row they will say that these boundaries are insecure and therefore it will be necessary to embark on further expansion.

The Chinese people had their own bitter experience in this respect. Before the Second World War Japanese militarism first invaded and occupied the north-east of China and set up a “Manchukuo,” but later they claim¬ ed they were insecure because of “communist threat” and on that pretext they invaded and occupied North China and launched an all-out war of aggression against the whole country. And in the end they even went so far as to unleash the Pacific war. The theory of demanding “secure boundaries” is a theory of the aggressors. To accept that theory is tantamount to recognizing as legal all the aggression and expansion by Israeli Zionism.

At present, one or two super-Powers are trying to frighten people by spreading the idea that the Palestinian and other Arab peoples must not wage armed struggle to resist Israeli aggression. They say that any resistance would immediately lead to a world war and

UNITED NATIONS 693

that whoever supports such armed struggle is provoking confrontation between the two super-Powers. Have we not all heard of such arguments from this rostrum not long ago? Of course this is sheer nonsense. Why did they not worry about the danger of a world war when Israel launched its war of aggression, if resistance to aggression by the Palestinian and other Arab peoples would become a danger that would lead to a world war? According to their logic, the Chinese people should not have waged their war of liberation, the Korean people should not have resisted United States aggression, and the people of the three countries of Indo-China should not wage their war against the United States aggression and for national salvation. According to their logic, no victim of aggres¬ sion should carry out armed struggle to resist the aggressors. How can such logic stand? It is absolutely just and entirely proper for the Palestinian and other Arab peoples, who are victims of aggression, to be compelled to take up arms to resist aggression, recover their lost territories and restore their right to national existence. Countless facts in the post-war period of the last two decades or more have proved that it is precisely because the people of various countries have contin¬ uously waged revolutionary wars against imperialist aggression that the imperialists have not dared lightly to unleash a world war. The United States and another super-Power, echoing each other, are doing their utmost to spread the ideas mentioned above in an at¬ tempt to frighten people with the danger of a world war. In so doing, their aim is to bind the hands of the Palestinian and other Arab peoples and to prevent them from waging just struggles, so that the two super-Powers can manipulate the situation and achieve their ulterior purposes.

One can see ever more clearly from the development of the Middle East situation that the two super-Powers are contending and colluding with each other there. They are taking advantage of the temporary dif¬ ficulties facing the Palestinian and other Arab peoples to make dirty political deals in their contention for important strategic points and oil resources and the division of

spheres of influence in the Middle East at the expense of the national rights and ter¬ ritorial integrity and sovereignty of the Pales¬ tinian and other Arab peoples. Herein lies the crux of the matter and that is why the Middle East question has remained unsolved over such a long period. It is well known that the Israeli Zionists, who are obsessed with ambitious designs, cannot exist without the support of United States imperialism. We are not opposed to the Jewish people or the people of Israel, but we are firmly opposed to the Zionist policies of expansion and ag¬ gression. We have never recognized Israel, nor have we had any contact with it since the founding of the People’s Republic of China. We hold that all the countries and peoples that love peace and uphold justice have the obligation to support the Palestinian and other Arab peoples in their struggle to restore their right to national existence and recover their occupied land, and that no one has the right to make political deals behind their backs at the expense of their right to national existence and their territorial integrity and sovereignty. The Chinese Government and people always stand on the side of the Pales¬ tinian and other Arab peoples who are sub¬ jected to aggression, firmly support their just struggles and give them assistance within the limits of our capability. The principled stand of our [people] is firm and unshakable.

The imperialists are paper tigers; the super-Powers are also paper tigers. In ap¬ pearance they are fierce and powerful, but in reality they are not so frightening. So long as the people who are subjected to ag¬ gression fear no pressure and blackmail, refuse to be deceived and are determined to take up arms, persevere in struggle and uphold unity, they are fully capable of de¬ feating all imperialist aggressors. Is not the post-war history of the last twro decades or more full of such instances?

We call upon the Governments and peoples of all countries to strongly condemn the ag¬ gression by the Israeli Zionists, strongly condemn United States imperialism which supports their aggression, and strongly con¬ demn the reactionary forces in Jordan for


their sanguinary repression of the Palestinian people.

We maintain that the Israeli Zionist ag¬ gressors must withdraw from the Egyptian, Syrian and all other Arab territories they have occupied. The legitimate rights of the Pales¬ tinian people to national existence and to return to their homeland must be restored. We firmly support the Palestinian, Egyptian, Syrian and other Arab peoples in their just struggle to restore their national rights and recover their lost territories.

The destiny of the Palestinian and other

Arab peoples must be decided by themselves, their affairs must be handled by themselves. We oppose all conspiratorial activities of aggression, subversion, control and inter¬ ference carried out by any super-Power against the Arab countries and people.

The aggression by United States imperi¬

alism and Israeli Zionism has educated the broad masses of the Arab people by negative example, heightened their political conscious¬ ness and enabled them gradually to see who are their enemies and who are their friends, who are their true friends and who are their false friends. At present, from the Persian Gulf in the east to the Atlantic coast in the west, the 100 million and more Arab people are in the midst of an upsurge of the anti-impe¬ rialist struggle. The Afro-Asian people and the peoples of the world stand on the side of the Palestinian and other Arab peoples. We are deeply convinced that carrying on a protracted struggle and upholding unity against imperialism, the heroic Arab people who have an ancient civilization and the spirit of resistance will surely overcome nu¬ merous difficulties on their road of advance and win continuous new victories.

PART HI: RESOLUTIONS

General Assembly

425 United Nations General Assembly Res¬ olution 2759 D (XXVI) Accepting the Accounts of UNRWA for the Year 19701

November 8, 1971

The General Assembly, 1. Accepts the accounts of the United

Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East for the year ended 31 December 1970 and the certificates of the Board of Auditors,2

2. Takes note of the observations of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions as set forth in its report.3

426 United Nations General Assembly Res¬ olution 2787 (XXVI) Confirming the Legitimacy of Struggle for Self-Determi¬ nation by Peoples Under Colonial and Foreign Domination, Including the People of Palestine4

December 6, 1971

The General Assembly, Reaffirming its resolutions 1514 (XV) of

14 December' 1960, 1803 (XVII) of 14 December 1962, 1904 (XVIII) of 20 Novem-

1 U.N. doc. A/Res/2759 (XXVI). Adopted without

objection at the 1979th plenary meeting.

2 Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-Sixth

Session, Supplement No. 7 C (A/8407/Add.3). [This

and the subsequent note are part of the resolution.]

3 A/8350, paras. 14-16.

4 U.N. doc A/Res/2787 (XXVI). Adopted at the 2001st

plenary meeting:

In favor: 76. Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Bahrain,

Botswana, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian

ber 1963, 2200 (XXI) of 16 December 1966, 2535 B (XXIV) of 10 December 1969, 2625 (XXV) of 24 October 1970, 2649 (XXV) of 30 November 1970 and 2672 G (XXV) of 8 December 1970 and resolution VIII adopted by the International Conference on Human Rights held at Teheran in 1968,5

Solemnly reaffirming that the subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and colonial exploitation is a violation of the principle of self-determination as well as a denial of basic human rights and is contrary to the Charter of the United Nations,

Concerned at the fact that many peoples continue to be denied the right to self- determination and are living under conditions of colonial and foreign domination,

Expressing concern at the fact that some countries, notably Portugal, with the support

S.S.R., Cameroon, Central African Republic, Ceylon,

Chad, Chile, China, Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Czecho¬

slovakia, Ecuador, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia,

Gabon, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana,

Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq,

Ivory Coast, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya,

Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia,

Morocco, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan,

People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen, Peru, Poland,

Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal,

Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Togo,

Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian S.S.R., U.S.S.R.,

United Republic of Tanzania, Yemen, Yugoslavia,

Zambia.

Against: 10. Australia, Belgium, France, Israel, Luxem¬

burg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Portugal, United

Kingdom, U.S.A.

Abstained: 33. Argentina, Austria, Barbados, Brazil,

Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dahomey, Denmark,

Dominican Republic, Finland, Gambia, Iceland,

Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Laos, Lesotho, Liberia,

Madagascar, Malawi, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama,

Paraguay, Philippines, Spain, Swaziland, Sweden,

Thailand, Uruguay, Venezuela.

5 Final Act of the International Conference on Human Rights

(United Nations publication, Sales No.: E.68.XIV.2),

p. 9. [This note is part of the resolution. ]

695


of its North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies, are waging war against the national liberation movement of the colonies and against certain independent States of Africa and Asia and the developing countries,

Confirming that colonialism in all its forms and manifestations, including the methods of neo-colonialism, constitutes a gross en¬ croachment on the rights of peoples and the basic human rights and freedoms,

Convinced that effective application of the principle of self-determination of peoples is of paramount importance for the promotion of friendly relations between countries and peoples, the guarantee of human rights and the maintenance of peace in the world,

Affirming that the future of Zimbabwe cannot be negotiated with an illegal regime and that any settlement must be on the basis of “no independence before majority rule55,

Reaffirming the inalienable rights of all peoples, and in particular those of Zimbabwe, Namibia, Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau) and the Palestinian people, to freedom, equality and self-determination, and the legitimacy of their struggles to restore those rights,

Reaffirming the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Rela¬ tions and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, which elaborated the principle of self-determination of peoples,

Considering that the establishment of a sovereign and independent State freely deter¬ mined by the whole people belonging to the territory constitutes a mode of implementing the right of self-determination,

Further considering that any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and territorial integrity of a State established in accordance with the right of self-determination of its peoples is in¬ compatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter,

Mindful that interference in the internal affairs of States is a violation of the Charter and can pose a serious threat to the main¬ tenance of peace,

1. Confirms the legality of the peoples’ struggle for self-determination and liberation

from colonial and foreign domination and alien subjugation, notably in southern Africa and in particular that of the peoples of Zimbabwe, Namibia, Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau), as well as the Palestinian people, by all available means consistent with the Charter of the United Nations;

2. Affirms man’s basic human right to fight for the self-determination of his people under colonial and foreign domination;

3. Calls upon all States dedicated to the ideals of freedom and peace to give all their political, moral and material assistance to peoples struggling for liberation, self-deter¬ mination and independence against colonial and alien domination;

4. Believes that the main objectives and principles of international protection of human rights cannot be effectively imple¬ mented while some States, particularly Por¬ tugal and South Africa, pursue the imperialist policy of colonialism, use force against inde¬ pendent African States and developing coun¬ tries and peoples fighting for self-determina¬ tion and support regimes that are applying the criminal policy of racism and apartheid;

5. Condemns the colonial and usurping Powers that are suppressing the right of peoples to self-determination and hampering the liquidation of the last hotbeds of colonial¬ ism and racism in the African and Asian continents and in other parts of the world;

6. Condemns the policy of certain States members of the North Atlantic Treaty Or¬ ganization that contribute to the creation in southern Africa of a military-industrial complex whose aim is to suppress the move¬ ment of peoples struggling for their self- determination and to interfere in the affairs

of independent African States; 7. Recalls that it is the duty of every State to

contribute through joint and independent action to the implementation of the principle of self-determination, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter, and to assist the United Nations to discharge the respon¬ sibilities vested in it by the Charter for the implementation of this principle;

8. Urges the Security Council as well as States Members of the United Nations or members of specialized agencies to take

UNITED NATIONS 697

effective steps to ensure the implementation of the relevant United Nations resolutions on the elimination of colonialism and racism, and to report to the General Assembly at its twenty-seventh session;

9. Resolves to devote constant attention to the question of flagrant large-scale viola¬ tions of human rights and fundamental freedoms resulting from the denial to peoples under colonial and foreign domination of their right to self-determination;

10. Calls upon all States to observe the principles of the sovereign equality of States, non-interference in the internal affairs of other States and-respect for their sovereign rights and territorial integrity.

427 United Nations General Assembly Res¬ olution 2791 (XXVI) Approving the Re¬ port of the Working Group on the Fi¬ nancing of UNRWA and Requesting It To Continue Its Work1

December 6, 1971

The General Assembly, Recalling its resolutions 2656 (XXV) of 7

December 1970 and 2728 (XXV) of 15 December 1970,

Having considered the report of the Working Group on the Financing of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East,2

Taking into account the annual report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, covering the period from 1 July 1970 to 30 June 1971,3

1 U.N. doc. A/Res/2791 (XXVI). Adopted at the 2001st

plenary meeting:

In favor: 114

Against:

Abstained: 2

2 A/8476. [This and subsequent notes are part of the

resolution.]


Session, Supplement No. 13 (A/8413).

Taking note of the joint appeal made by the President of the General Assembly and the Secretary-General on 17 November 1971,4

Recognizing with grave concern that the fi¬ nancial situation of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East continues to be acute, thereby imminently endangering the already minimum services being provided to Palestine refugees,

Emphasizing the urgent need for extraordi¬ nary efforts and exceptional measures in order to maintain, at least at their present level, the activities of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East,

1. Commends the Working Group on the Financing of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East for its work and approves its report, drawing special attention to the conclusions and recommendations contained in chapter

V of that report; 2. Requests the Working Group to continue

its work for one year in accordance with the provisions of its previous mandate and, as appropriate, to pursue urgently with Govern¬ ments, both bilaterally and on a regional basis, with specialized agencies and other organiza¬ tions within the United Nations system, and with other organizations and individuals concerned, the implementation of the recom¬ mendations approved by the General Assem¬ bly in the present resolution, as well as the implementation of other resolutions relating to the mandate of the Working Group;

3. Endorses Economic and Social Council resolution 1565 (L) of 3 May 1971, and in particular urges serious consideration and early implementation of paragraph 5 of that resolution;

4. Supports the joint appeal made by the President of the General Assembly and the Secretary-General to Governments to join in the collective effort to solve the financial crisis of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East;

4 A/8526.


5. Requests the Working Group, after con¬ sultation with all concerned, in particular the Secretary-General and the Commissioner- General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, and taking into account the views expressed in the course of the debate during the twenty-fifth and twenty-sixth sessions of the General Assembly relevant to the mandate of the Working Group, to prepare and submit a comprehensive report on all aspects of the financing of the Agency to the General Assembly at its twenty-seventh session;

6. Requests the Secretary-General to provide the necessary services and assistance to the Working Group for the conduct of its work.

428 United Nations General Assembly Res¬ olution 2792 (XXVI) Extending the Man¬ date of UNRWA, Deploring Israeli De¬ struction of Shelters and Displacement

of Refugees in Gaza and Calling on Israel To Take Immediate Steps for Their Return, and Expressing Grave Concern at the Denial of Self-Determination to the People of Palestine1

December 6, 1971

A The General Assembly, Recalling its resolution 2672 A (XXV) of

8 December 1970 and all previous resolutions mentioned therein, including resolution 194 (III) of 11 December 1948,

1 U.N. doc. A/Res/2792 (XXVI). Adopted at the

2001st plenary meeting:

Resolution A: 112 to 0, with 3 abstentions;

Resolution B: 113 to 0, with 1 abstention;

Resolution C:

In favor: 79. Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Australia,

Austria, Bahrain, Belgium, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi,

Byelorussian S.S.R., Cameroon, Ceylon, China, Cuba,

Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Egypt, Equatorial

Guinea, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Greece, Guinea,

Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq,

Taking note of the annual report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Ref-

Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait,

Lebanon, Libya, Luxemburg, Madagascar, Malaysia,

Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Moroc¬

co, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria,

Norway, Oman, Pakistan, People’s Democratic Repu¬

blic of Yemen, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Saudi Arabia,

Senegal, Somalia, Spain, Sudan, Sweden, Syria,

Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia,

Turkey, Ukrainian S.S.R.,U.S.S.R., United Kingdom,

United Republic of Tanzania, Yemen, Yugoslavia,

Zambia.

Against: 4. Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Israel.

Abstained: 35. Argentina, Barbados, Botswana, Brazil,

Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile,

Dahomey, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Gabon,

Ghana, Guyana, Honduras, Ivory Coast, Jamaica,

Laos, Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi, Nicaragua, Panama,

Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Singapore,

Swaziland, Uganda, U.S.A., Upper Volta, Uruguay,

Venezuela, Zaire. Resolution D:

In favor: 53. Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Bahrain,

Bulgaria, Byelorussian S.S.R., Cameroon, Ceylon,

Chile, China, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Egypt,

Equatorial Guinea, Greece, Guinea, Hungary, India,

Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Japan, Jordan, Kuwait, Leba¬

non, Libya, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Mongolia,

Morocco, Niger, Oman, Pakistan, People’s Democratic

Republic of Yemen, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Saudi

Arabia, Senegal, Somalia, Spain, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia,

Turkey, Ukrainian S.S.R., U.S.S.R., United Repu¬

blic of Tanzania, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia.

Against: 23. Barbados, Belgium, Canada, Colombia,

Costa Rica, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador,

El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Israel, Italy,

Liberia, Luxemburg, Madagascar, Malawi, Nether¬

lands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Swaziland, U.S.A.,

Uruguay.

Abstained: 43. Argentina, Australia, Austria, Botswana,

Brazil, Burma, Burundi, Central African Republic,

Chad, Dahomey, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Gabon,

Ghana, Guyana, Iceland, Ireland, Ivory Coast, Ja¬

maica, Kenya, Laos, Lesotho, Malta, Mexico, Nepal,

Nigeria, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philip¬

pines, Portugal, Singapore, Sweden, Thailand, Togo,

Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda, United Kingdom,

Upper Volta, Venezuela, Zaire.

Resolution E:

In favor: 88. Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Australia,

Austria, Bahrain, Belgium, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi,

Byelorussian S.S.R., Cameroon, Canada, Ceylon,

Chad, Chile, China, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia,

UNITED NATIONS 699

ugees in the Near East, covering the period from 1 July 1970 to 30 June 1971,1

Taking note also of the joint appeal made by the President of the General Assembly and the Secretary-General on 17 November 1971,2

1. Notes with deep regret that repatriation or compensation of the refugees as provided for in paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 194 (III) has not been effected, that no substantial progress has been made in the programme endorsed by the Assembly in paragraph 2 of resolution 513 (VI) for the reintegration of refugees either by repatriation or resettlement and that, therefore, the situa¬ tion of the refugees continues to be a matter of serious concern;

2. Expresses its sincere appreciation to Mr. Laurence Michelmore, on the occasion of his resignation as Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, for his efficient administration of the Agency during the past seven years and for his dedicat¬ ed service to the welfare of the refugees;

3. Expresses its thanks to the Commissioner- General and to the staff of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East for their continued

Denmark, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fin¬

land, France, Greece, Guinea, Guyana, Hungary,

India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Japan,

Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Luxemburg,

Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mauritania,

Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands,

New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Paki¬

stan, People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen, Peru,

Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Saudi Arabia,

Senegal, Singapore, Somalia, Spain, Sudan, Sweden,

Syria, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia,

Turkey, Ukrainian S.S.R., U.S.S.R., United King¬

dom, United Republic of Tanzania, U.S.A., Upper

Volta, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia.

Against: 3. Costa Rica, Guatemala, Israel.

Abstained: 28. Argentina, Barbados, Botswana, Brazil,

Central African Republic, Colombia, Dahomey, Domi¬

nican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Gabon, Ghana,

Honduras, Iceland, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Kenya,

Laos, Lesotho, Malawi, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay,

Portugal, Swaziland, Uganda, Uruguay, Zaire.


Session, Supplement No. 13 (A/8413). [This and subse¬

quent notes are part of the resolution.]

2 A/8526.

faithful efforts to provide essential services for the Palestine refugees, and to the spe¬ cialized agencies and private organizations for their valuable work in assisting the refugees;

4. Notes with regret that the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine was unable to find a means of achieving progress in the implementation of paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 194 (III), and requests the Commission to exert continued efforts towards the implementation thereof and to report thereon as appropriate, but not later than 1 October 1972;

5. Directs attetition to the continuing critical financial position of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, as outlined in the Com- missioner-GeneraFs report;

6. Notes with concern that, despite the com¬ mendable and successful efforts of the Com¬ missioner-General to collect additional con¬ tributions to help relieve the serious budget deficit of the past year, contributions to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East continue to fall short of the funds needed to cover essential budget requirements;

7. Calls upon all Governments as a matter of urgency to make the most generous efforts possible to meet the anticipated needs of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, particularly in the light of the budgetary deficit projected in the Commissioner-Gen¬ eral’s report, and therefore urges noncontri¬ buting Governments to contribute and con¬ tributing Governments to consider increasing their contributions;

8. Decides to extend until 30 June 1975, without prejudice to the provisions of para¬ graph 11 of General Assembly resolution 194 (III), the mandate of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Ref¬ ugees in the Near East.

B Recalling its resolutions 2252 (ES-V) of 4

July 1967, 2341 B (XXII) of 19 December 1967, 2452 C (XXIII) of 19 December 1968, 2535 C (XXIV) of 10 December 1969 and 2672 B (XXV) of 8 December 1970,


Taking note of the annual report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Ref¬ ugees in the Near East, covering the period from 1 July 1970 to 30 June 1971,1

Taking note also of the joint appeal made by the President of the General Assembly and the Secretary-General,2

Concerned about the continued human suf¬ fering resulting from the June 1967 hostilities in the Middle East,

1. Reaffirms its resolutions 2252 (ES-V), 2341 B (XXII), 2452 C (XXIII), 2535 C (XXIV) and 2672 B (XXV);

2. Endorses, bearing in mind the objectives of those resolutions, the efforts of the Com¬ missioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Ref¬ ugees in the Near East to continue to provide humanitarian assistance, as far as practicable, on an emergency basis and as a temporary measure, to other persons in the area who are at present displaced and in serious need of continued assistance as a result of the June 1967 hostilities;

3. Strongly appeals to all Governments and to organizations and individuals to contribute generously for the above purposes to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East and to the other intergovernmental and non¬ governmental organizations concerned.

C The General Assembly, Having considered the special report of the

Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Ref¬ ugees in the Near East on the effect on Palestine refugees of recent operations carried out by the Israeli military authorities in the Gaza Strip,3 and the supplement thereto,4

Noting that both the Secretary-General and the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East have expressed


Session, Supplement Mo. 13 (A/8413).

2 A/8526.

:1 A/8383.

4 A/8383/Add.l.

great concern about the effect on Palestine refugees of these operations, in which shelters in refugee camps were demolished and about 15,000 persons displaced, some of them to places outside the Gaza Strip,

Recalling Commission on Human Rights resolution 10 (XXVI) of 23 March 1970,5 in which the Commission deplored all policies and actions aiming at the deportation of the Palestinian refugees from the occupied Gaza Strip and called upon Israel to desist forthwith from deporting the Palestinian civilians from the Gaza Strip,

1. Declares that the destruction of refugee shelters and the forcible removal of their occupants to other places, including places outside the Gaza Strip, contravene articles 49 and 53 of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 19496 as well as paragraph 7 of General Assembly resolution 2675 (XXV) of 9 December 1970 entitled “Basic principles for the protection of civilian populations in armed conflicts”;

2. Deplores these actions by Israel; 3. Calls upon Israel to desist from further

destruction of refugee shelters and from further removal of refugees from their present places of residence;

4. Calls upon Israel to take immediate and effective steps for the return of the refugees concerned to the camps from which they were removed and to provide adequate shelters for their accommodation;

5. Requests the Secretary-General, after con¬ sulting with the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, to report as soon as possible and whenever appropriate thereafter, but in any case not later than the opening date of the twenty- seventh session of the General Assembly, on Israel’s compliance with the provisions of paragraph 3 and on the implementation of the provisions of paragraph 4 of the present resolution.


Forty-eighth Session, Supplement Mo. 5 (E/4816), chap-

XXIII.

« United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 75 (1950), No. 973.

UNITED NATIONS 701

D The General Assembly,

Recognizing that the problem of the Palestin¬ ian Arab refugees has arisen from the denial of their inalienable rights under the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,

Recalling its resolutions 2535 B (XXIV) of 10 December 1969, in which it reaffirmed the inalienable rights of the people of Palestine, 2672 C (XXV) of 8 December 1970, in which it recognized that the people of Palestine are entitled to equal rights and self-determination in accordance with the Charter and 2649 (XXV) of 30 November 1970, in which it recognized that the people of Palestine are entitled to the right of self-determination,

Bearing in mind the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples enshrined in Articles 1 and 55 of the Charter and more recently reaffirmed in the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations1 and in the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Secu¬ rity,2

1. Recognizes that the people of Palestine are entitled to equal rights and self-determi¬ nation, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations;

2. Expresses its grave concern that the people of Palestine have not been permitted to enjoy their inalienable rights and to exercise their right to self-determination;

3. Declares that full respect for the inalien¬ able rights of the people of Palestine is an indispensable element in the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.

E The General Assembly, Recalling Security Council resolution 237

(1967) of 14 June 1967, Recalling also its resolutions 2252 (ES-V)

of 4 July 1967, 2452 A (XXIII) of 19 Decem¬ ber 1968, 2535 B (XXIV) of 10 December 1969 and 2672 D (XXV) of 8 December

1 General Assembly resolution 2625 (XXV).

2 General Assembly resolution 2734 (XXV).

1970, calling upon the Government of Israel to take effective and immediate steps for the return without delay of those inhabitants who had fled the areas since the outbreak of hostilities,

Having considered the report of the Secretary- General3 of 27 August 1971 concerning the implementation of resolution 2672 D (XXV),

Gravely concerned about the plight of the displaced inhabitants,

Convinced that the plight of the displaced persons could be relieved by their speedy return to their homes and to the camps which they formerly occupied,

Emphasizing the imperative of giving effect to its resolutions for relieving the plight of the displaced inhabitants,

1. Considers that the plight of the displaced inhabitants continues since they have not yet returned to their homes and camps;

2. Expresses its grave concern tha t the displaced inhabitants have not been able to return in accordance with the above-mentioned res¬ olutions ;

3. Calls once more upon the Government of Israel to take immediately and without any further delay effective steps for the return of the displaced inhabitants;

4. Requests the Secretary-General to follow the implementation of the present resolution and to report thereon to the General Assembly.

429 United Nations General Assembly Res¬ olution 2799 (XXVI) Noting with Ap¬ preciation the Positive Reply of Egypt to the Initiative of the Secretary-Gen¬ eral’s Special Representative in the Middle East4

December 13, 1971

The General Assembly, Deeply concerned at the continuation of the

grave situation prevailing in the Middle East, particularly since the conflict of June 1967,

2 A/B366.

4 U.N. doc A/Res (XXVI). Adopted at the 2016th

plenary meeting:


which constitutes a serious threat to inter¬ national peace and security.

Convinced that Security Council resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967 should be implemented immediately in all its parts in order to achieve a just and lasting peace in the Middle East in which every State in the area can live in security,

Determined that the territory of a State shall not be the object of occupation or acquisition by another State resulting from the threat or use of force, which is contrary to the Charter of the United Nations and to the principles enshrined in Security Council resolution 242 (1967) as well as in the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security adopt¬ ed by the General Assembly on 16 December

1970,1 Expressing its appreciation of the efforts of

the Committee of African Heads of State undertaken in pursuance of the resolution adopted on 23 June 1971 by the Assembly of

In favor: 79. Afghanistan, Argentina, Austria, Bahrain,

Belgium, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian

S.S.R., Cameroon, Ceylon, Chad, Chile, Colombia,

Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Equa¬

torial Guinea, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Gambia,

Greece, Guinea, Guyana, Hungary, India, Indonesia,

Iran, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya,

Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon, Luxemburg, Malaysia, Mali,

Malta, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Nepal, Nether¬

lands, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Peru,

Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia,

Sierra Leone, Somalia, Spain, Sudan, Thailand, Togo,

Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda,

Ukrainian S.S.R., U.S.S.R., United Arab Emirates,

United Kingdom, United Republic of Tanzania,

Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia.

, Against: 7. Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El

Salvador, Haiti, Israel, Nicaragua, Uruguay.

Abstained: 36. Algeria, Australia, Barbados, Bolivia,

Botswana, Brazil, Canada, Central African Republic,

China, Dahomey, Denmark, Ecuador, Fiji, Gabon,

Ghana, Honduras, Iceland, Ivory Coast, Khmer

Republic, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Ma¬

lawi, Morocco, New Zealand, Panama, Paraguay,

People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen, Senegal,

Singapore, Sweden, Syria, U.S.A., Upper Volta, Zaire.

1 General Assembly resolution 2734 [of 16 December

1970. Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-

fifth Session, Supplement No. 28 (A/8028), pp. 22—24].

[This and the subsequent note are part of the resolution.]

Heads of State and Government of the Or¬ ganization of African Unity,

Gravely concerned at the continuation of Israel’s occupation of the Arab territories since 5 June 1967,

Having considered the item entitled “The situation in the Middle East”,

1. Reaffirms that the acquisition of terri¬ tories by force is inadmissible and that, consequently, territories thus occupied must be restored;

2. Reaffirms that the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East should include the apjdication of both the following principles:

(a) Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict;

(b) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledge¬ ment of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and its right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force;

3. Requests the Secretary-General to take the necessary measures to reactivate the mission of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the Middle East in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to reach a peace agreement as envisaged in the Special Representative’s aide-memoire of 8 February 1971,2

4. Expresses its full support for all the efforts of the Special Representative to implement Security Council resolution 242 (1967);

5. Notes with appreciation the positive reply given by Egypt to the Special Representative’s initiative for establishing a just and lasting peace in the Middle East;

6. Calls upon Israel to respond favourably to the Special Representative’s peace initia¬ tive;

7. Further invites the parties to the Middle East conflict to give their full co-operation to the Special Representative in order to work out practical measures for:

(a) Guaranteeing freedom of navigation

2 A/8541. For the printed text of this document, see

Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-sixth Tear,

Supplement for October, November and December 1971,

document S/10403, annex 1.

UNITED NATIONS 703

through international waterways in the area; (b) Achieving a just settlement of the

refugee problem; (c) Guaranteeing the territorial inviola¬

bility and political independence of every State in the area;

8. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council and to the General Assembly, as appropriate, on the progress made by the Special Representative in the implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) and of the present resolution;

9. Requests the Security Council to consider, if necessary, making arrangements, under the relevant Articles of the Charter of the United Nations, with regard to the imple¬ mentation of its resolution.

430 United Nations General Assembly Res¬ olution 2851 (XXVI) Strongly Calling Upon Israel To Rescind All Measures To Annex and/or Settle the Occupied Territories and Requesting the Special Committee To Investigate Israeli Prac¬ tices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories To Continue Its Work1

December 20, 1971

The General Assembly, Guided by the purposes and principles of the

Charter of the United Nations, Bearing in mind the provisions and principles

of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,

1 U.N. doc. A/Res/2851 (XXVI). Adopted at the 2027th

plenary meeting:

In favor: 53. Afghanistan, Algeria, Bahrain, Bulgaria,

Burundi, Byelorussian S.S.R., Ceylon, Congo, Cuba,

Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea,

Greece, Guinea, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran,

Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia,

Mali, Mauritania, Mongolia, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria,

Oman, Pakistan, People’s Democratic Republic of

Yemen, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Saudi Arabia,

Senegal, Somalia, Spain, Sudan, Syria, Togo, Tunisia,

Turkey, Ukrainian S.S.R., U.S.S.R., United Arab

Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Yemen,

Yugoslavia, Zambia.

as well as the provisions of the Geneva Con¬ vention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949,2

Recalling Security Council resolutions 237 (1967) of 14 June 1967 and 259 (1968) of 27 September 1968, as well as other pertinent resolutions of the United Nations,

Having considered the report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories,3

Gravely concerned about the violations of the human rights of the inhabitants of the oc¬ cupied territories,

Considering that the system of investigation and protection is essential for ensuring effec¬ tive implementation of the international in¬ struments, such as the aforementioned Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949, which provide for respect for human rights in armed conflicts,

Noting with regret that the relevant provisions of that Convention have not been implement¬ ed by the Israeli authorities,

Recalling that, in accordance with article 1 of that Convention, the States parties have undertaken not only to respect but also to ensure respect for the Convention in all circumstances,

Noting with satisfaction that the International Committee of the Red Cross, after giving careful consideration to the question of the reinforcement of the implementation of the

Against: 20. Barbados, Bolivia, Canada, Costa Rica,

Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Gambia, Guatema¬

la, Haiti, Israel, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Ma¬

lawi, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Swaziland, U.S.A.,

Uruguay, Zaire.

Abstained: 4b. Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium,

Botswana, Brazil. Burma, Cameroon, Central African

Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Dahomey, Denmark,

Ecuador, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Ghana, Guyana,

Honduras, Ireland, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan,

Kenya, Luxemburg, Malta, Mexico, Netherlands,

New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Philippines, Portugal,

Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Sweden, Thailand,

Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda, United Kingdom,

Upper Volta, Venezuela.

2 United Nations, Treaty Series, Vol. 75 (1950), No. 973.

[This and subsequent notes are part of the resolution.]

3 A/8389 and Corr. 1 and 2 and Add.l and Add.l/Corr.l

and 2.


Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949,1 has arrived at the conclusion that all tasks falling to a protecting Power under those Conventions could be considered humani¬ tarian functions and that the International Committee of the Red Cross has declared itself ready to assume all the functions en¬ visaged for protecting Powers in the Conven¬ tions,2

1. Commends the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories and its members for their efforts in performing the task assigned to them;

2. Strongly calls upon Israel to rescind forth¬ with all measures and to desist from all policies and practices such as:

(a) The annexation of any part of the occupied Arab territories;

(b) The establishment of Israeli settlements on those territories and the transfer of parts of its civilian population into the occupied territory;

(c) The destruction and demolition of villages, quarters and houses and the con¬ fiscation and expropriation of property;

(d) The evacuation, transfer, deportation and expulsion of the inhabitants of the oc¬ cupied Arab territories;

(e) The denial of the right of the refugees and displaced persons to return to their homes;

(f) The ill-treatment and torture of pris¬ oners and detainees;

(g) Collective punishment; 3. Calls upon the Government of Israel to

permit all persons who have fled the occupied territories or have been deported or expelled therefrom to return to their homes;

4. Reaffirms that all measures taken by Israel to settle the occupied territories, includ¬ ing occupied Jerusalem, are completely null and void;

5. Calls upon the Government of Israel to comply fully with its obligations under the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection

1 United Nations, Treaty Series, Vol. 75 (1950), Nos.

970 973.

2 See A/8389/Add.l and Add.l/Corr.l and 2, para. 36.

of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949;

6. Requests the Special Committee, pending the early termination of Israeli occupation of Arab territories, to continue its work and to consult as appropriate with the Interna¬ tional Committee of the Red Cross in order to ensure the safeguarding of the welfare and human rights of the population of the occupied territories;

7. Urges the Government of Israel to co¬ operate with the Special Committee and to facilitate its entry into the occupied territories in order to enable it to perform the functions entrusted to it by the General Assembly;

8. Requests the Secretary-General to provide the Special Committee with all the necessary facilities for the continued performance of its

tasks; 9. Requests all States parties to the Geneva

Convention of 12 August 1949 to do their utmost to ensure that Israel respects and fulfils its obligations under that Convention;

10. Requests the Special Committee to report to the Secretary-General as soon as possible and whenever the need arises thereafter;

11. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its twenty-seventh session an item entitled “Report (or reports) of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories.”

Security Council

431 United Nations Security Council Res¬ olution 298 Deploring the Failure of Israel To Respect U.N. Resolutions Con¬ cerning Measures To Change the Status of Jerusalem1*

September 25, 1971

The Security Council, Recalling its resolutions 252 (1968) and 267

(1969) and the earlier General Assembly

3 U.N. doc. S/Res/298. Adopted at the 1582nd meeting-:

UNITED NATIONS 705

resolutions 2253 (ES-V) and 2254 (ES-V) of July 1967 concerning measures and actions by Israel designed to change the status of the Israeli-occupied section of Jerusalem,

Having considered the letter of the Permanent Representative of Jordan on the situation in Jerusalem (S/10313) and the reports of the Secretary-General (S/8052, S/8146, S/9149 and Add. 1, S/9537 and S/10124 and Add. 1 and 2), and having heard the statements of the parties concerned on the question,

Reaffirming the principle that acquisition of territory by military conquest is inad¬ missible,

Noting with concern the non-compliance by Israel with the above-mentioned resolu¬

tions, Noting with concern further that since the

adoption of the above-mentioned resolutions Israel has taken further measures designed to change the status and character of the occupied section of Jerusalem,

1. Reaffirms Security Council resolutions 252 (1968) and 267 (1969);

2. Deplores the failure of Israel to respect the previous resolutions adopted by the United Nations concerning measures and actions by Israel purporting to affect the status of the city of Jerusalem;

3. Confirms in the clearest possible terms that all legislative and administrative actions taken by Israel to change the status of the city of Jerusalem including expropriation of land and properties, transfer of populations and legislation aimed at the incorporation of the occupied section are totally invalid and cannot change that status;

4. Urgently calls upon Israel to rescind all previous measures and actions and to take no further steps in the occupied section of Jerusalem which may purport to change the status of the City, or which would prejudice the rights of the inhabitants and the interests of the international community, or a just and lasting peace;

In favor: 14. Argentina, Belgium, Burundi, Republic

of China, France, Italy, Japan, Nicaragua, Poland,

Sierra Leone, Somalia, U.S.S.R., United Kingdom,

U.S.A.

Against: —

Abstained: 1. Syria.

5. Requests the Secretary-General, in con¬ sultation with the President of the Security Council and using such instrumentalities as he may choose, including a representative or a mission, to report to the Security Council as appropriate and in any event within 60 days on the implementation of this resolution.

Economic and Social Council

432 United Nations Economic and Social Council Resolution 1565 (L) Calling for Assistance for the Palestine Refugees Through UNRWA and Other U.N. and Related Bodies1

May 3, 1971

The Economic and Social Council, Recognizing the acute financial situation

of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East which endangers the minimum services provided to Palestine refugees,

Recalling General Assembly resolutions 2656 (XXV) of 7 December 1970 and 2672 B (XXV) of 8 December 1970,

Recallingfurther General Assembly resolution 2728 (XXV) of 15 December 1970 by which the Assembly approved the report2 of the Working Group on the Financing of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East and endorsed the Working Group’s recommenda¬ tions, thereby, inter alia, urging all organiza¬ tions of the United Nations system to study ways by which they might assist the Agency or undertake activities helpful to the refugees

1 U.N. doc. E/5044 (see Official Records of the Economic and

Social Council, Fiftieth Session, Supplement No. 1, pp.

1-2). Adopted unanimously at the 1747th plenary

meeting.


Session, Annexes, agenda item 35, document A/8264.

[This note is part of the resolution.]


which would lessen the financial burden of the Agency, to the maximum extent possible,

Noting with appreciation the efforts made so far by the Working Group with regard to the organizations of the United Nations system in soliciting increased assistance to the Pales¬ tine refugees,

Noting also with appreciation the assistance already offered by some organizations within the United Nations system in response to those efforts, in recognizing that, especially in cases of emergency, concern for human welfare requires an extra interagency solidarity,

Being convinced, however, that further con¬ tributions and assistance for the benefit of the Palestine refugees are urgently needed,

1. Welcomes in particular the decisions already taken under the World Food Pro¬ gramme to provide emergency food aid up to $2 million;

2. Welcomes also the contacts initiated with the International Labour Organization and the World Health Organization with a view to obtaining services to the maximum extent possible:

3. Welcomes further the positive steps taken by the Director-General of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Or¬ ganization in launching an appeal for funds to maintain the educational services for Palestine refugees and the encouraging results obtained so far;

4. Expresses the hope for an early implemen¬ tation of the above-mentioned decisions, parti¬ cularly of paragraph 3 of General Assembly resolution 2672 B (XXV), as well as manifes¬ tations of concrete results of the above-men¬ tioned contacts and steps in accordance with constitutional procedures;

5. Requests the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the executive heads of spe¬ cialized agencies, the Executive Director of the United Nations Children’s Fund and the Administrator of the United Nations Develop¬ ment Programme as well as the non-govern¬ mental organizations concerned to continue to consider appropriate ways and means of rendering all possible assistance to the Palestine refugees;

6. Requests further all organizations of the United Nations system to include in their

annual reports information on their possible present and future assistance to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East and on their activities that benefit the Palestine refugees, and thus lessen the financial burden of the Agency.

Commission on Human Rights

433 United Nations Commission on Human Rights Resolution 9 (XXVII) Condemn¬ ing Continued Violations by Israel of Human Rights in Occupied Arab Terri¬ tories1

March 15, 1971

The Commission on Human Rights, Guided by the purpose and principles of

the Charter of the United Nations, Bearing in mind the Universal Declaration

on Human Rights, Reaffirming that the Human Rights and

fundamental freedoms as provided for in the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of August 12, 1949,2 and in other relevant international instruments, fully apply to all the territories occupied by Israel as a result of the hostilities in the Middle East, including occupied Jerusalem,

1 U.N. doc. E/4949 (see Official Records of the Economic

and Social Council, Fiftieth Session, Supplement No. 4, pp.

79- 82). Adopted at the 1120th meeting:

In favor: 14. India, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Mauritania,

Morocco, Pakistan, Poland, Turkey, Ukrainian S.S.R.,

U.S.S.R., United Arab Republic, United Republic of

Tanzania, Yugoslavia.

Against: 2. Guatemala, U.S.A.

Abstained: 14. Austria, Chile, Congo (Democratic Repu¬

blic of), Finland, France, Ghana, Mexico, Netherlands,

New Zealand, Peru, Philippines, United Kingdom,

Uruguay, Venezuela.

2 United Nations, Treaty Series, Vol. 75 (1950), No. 973.

[This and the subsequent note are part of the resolution.]

UNITED NATIONS 707

Recalling Security Council resolutions 237 (1967) of 14 June 1967 and 259 (1968) of 27 September 1968 and General Assembly resolution 2252 (ES-V) of 4 July 1967, in which the Council and the General Assembly called upon Israel to ensure the safety, welfare and security of the inhabitants of the areas where military operations have taken place and to facilitate the return of those inhabitants who have fled these areas since the outbreak of hostilities;

Recalling General Assembly resolutions 2443 (XXIII) of 19 December 1968, 2546 (XXIV) of 11 December 1969, 2674 (XXV) of 9 December 1970, and 2675 (XXV) of 9 December 1970,

Further recalling General Assembly resolution 2727 (XXV) of 15 December 1970 in which the Assembly requested the Special Com¬ mittee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affect¬ ing the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories, pending an early termination of Israeli occupation, to continue its work in order to ensure the safeguarding of the human rights of the population in the occupied territories,

Also recalling its resolution 6 (XXV) by which it decided to establish a special Working Group of Experts to investigate allegations concerning Israel’s violations of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of August 12, 1949, and resolution 10 (XXVI) in which it condemned Israel’s grave violations of human rights as well as its violations of the Geneva Convention in the occupied territories,

Having studied the report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories,1

Gravely concerned by the fact that Israel’s violations of human rights in the occupied territories continue unabated, in total dis¬ regard of the appeals and resolutions adopted by the United Nations, the specialized agen¬ cies, the International Conference on Human Rights held at Teheran in 1968 and the XXIst International Conference of the Red Cross held in Istanbul in September 1969,

. \!firmed by the fact that Israel continues the

1 A/8089.

establishment of settlements in the occupied territories including occupied Jerusalem, while it refuses to permit the return of the refugees and displaced persons to their homes, a right the denial of which by Israel constitutes an affront to humanity and a grave violation of international law,

1. Condemns Israel’s continued violations of human rights in the occupied territories, including policies aimed at changing the status of these territories;

2. Condemns specifically the following policies and practices of Israel: •

(a) Denial of the right of the refugees and displaced persons to return to their homes;

(b) Resort to collective punishment; (c) The deportation and expulsion of the

citizens of the occupied territories; (d) Arbitrary arrest and detention of the

citizens of the occupied territories; (e) Ill treatment and torture of prisoners; (f) Destruction and demolition of villages,

town quarters, houses and confiscation and expropriation of property;

(g) Evacuation and transfer of sections of the population of the occupied territories;

(h) Transfer of parts of its own civilian population into the occupied territories;

3. Strongly deplores Israel’s policies in the occupied territories aimed at placing the population in a general state of repression, fear and deprivation, and particularly de¬ plores :

(a) Requisition of hospitals and their trans¬ formation into police stations;

(b) Abrogation of the national laws and interference with the judicial system;

(c) Refusal to allow the text books ap¬ proved by the Director-General of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization for schools in the occupied territories, and the insistence on forcing upon school children an alien system of education;

4. Calls upon Israel once again to comply fully with its obligations under the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of August 12,1949;

5. Again calls upon Israel to enable forthwith the refugees and displaced persons to return to their homes;


6. Once again calls upon Israel to heed and to implement the many resolutions adopted by the United Nations organs and the specialized agencies for the safeguarding of human rights in the occupied territories;

7. Reaffirms that all measures taken by Israel to colonize the occupied territories including occupied Jerusalem are completely null and void;

8. Declares that Israel’s continued and increasing violations of the human rights of the population of the occupied territories, and its deliberate and persistent refusal to abide by its legal obligations under the United Nations Charter, international law, and the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of August 12, 1949, indicate the necessity of collective action on the part of the international com¬ munity to ensure respect lor the human rights of the population of the occupied territories;

9. Urges the International Committee of the Red Cross to co-operate with the United Nations organs, and particularly with the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Prac¬ tices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories in the fulfilment of its task to ensure the safe¬ guarding of the human rights of the population of the occupied territories, and to inform the Commission on Human Rights at its twenty- eighth session of the steps it has taken in this regard;

10. Requests the Secretary-General to give wide publicity to United Nations documents dealing with the violations of human rights in the occupied territories, and in particular to the report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population in the Occupied Territories, and to use United Nations media of information in disseminating information on the conditions of the popula¬ tion of the occupied territories, the refugees and displaced persons;

11. Decides to include the question of the violation of human rights in the territories occupied as a result of hostilities in the Middle East as a separate item of high priority on the agenda of the Commission’s twenty-eighth session.

UNESCO

434 United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization Executive Board Decision 87 EX/4.2.4 Calling Again on Israel To Admit UNRWA/UNESCO Textbooks into Occupied Arab Terri¬ tories1

1971

I

The Executive Board,

1. Having examined the Director-General’s report (87 EX/9 and Add. 1 and 2) on co¬ operation with the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) and having heard his oral report on this subject,

2. Recalling its previous decisions on this question and in particular decision 4.1.2 of its 85th session,

3. Commends the Director-General on his dedicated and tireless efforts to implement these decisions;

4. Expresses its satisfaction at the co-opera¬ tion of the Governments of Jordan, Lebanon and the United Arab Republic with the Director-General to implement the Executive Board’s decisions;

5. Takes note of the declaration of the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic according to which it welcomes any collabora¬ tion with the Director-General of UNESCO to secure the education of the children of the refugees and to provide them with the text¬ books they need in the UNRWA/UNESCO schools situated in Syrian Arab territory;

6. Expresses its concern at the failure of the Government of Israel to comply with the above-mentioned resolution by refusing or delaying the granting of import permits to 12 of the textbooks approved by the Director- General ;

7. Urgently calls again upon the Govern¬ ment of Israel to authorize the immediate admittance of all textbooks already approved, or to be approved, by the Director-General

1 U.N. doc. A/8413 (see Official Records of the General

Assembly, Twenty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 13, pp.

102-103). Adopted at the 87th session of UNESCO.

UNITED NATIONS 709

into the occupied territories for distribution and use in the UNRWA/UNESGO schools therein;

8. Invites the Director-General to report to the Executive Board at its 88th session on the implementation of this resolution.

II The Executive Board, 1. Recalling its previous decisions 4.2.1

and 4.1.2 adopted at its 84th and 85th sessions respectively on the launching of an interna¬ tional appeal for voluntary contributions to UNRWA,

2. Affirming its belief that the only real and effective justice for the Palestine refugees is that based on the recognition of their human rights,

3. Aware of the fact that the programmes for the education of the Palestine refugees could be seriously impaired by the precarious¬ ness and insufficiency of the resources available to UNRWA,

4. Commends the Director-General on his dedicated and most appreciated efforts to implement the decisions of the Executive Board on this subject;

5. Expresses its thanks to Ambassador Mansour Khalid for the valuable and fruitful mission he has agreed to undertake on behalf of UNESCO;

6. Expresses the hope that the Member States who do not contribute to UNRWA will find it possible to contribute to UNESCO’s deposit account for the education of the Palestine refugees;

7. Invites the Director-General to continue his efforts to achieve the goal of covering the deficit in UNRWA’s resources for the education of Palestine refugees;

8. Further invites the Director-General to report to the Executive Board at its 88th session of the responses to his appeal.

435 United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization Executive Board Decision 88 EX/4.1.1 Calling Again on Israel To Admit UNRWA/UNESCO Textbooks to Occupied Arab Territories and Commending Arab States for Grant¬ ing University Scholarships to Palestine Refugees1

1971

The Executive Board, 1. Having examined the Director-General’s

Report (88 EX/3 and Add. 1, 2, 3 and 4) on co-operation with the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) and having heard his oral report on this subject,

2. Recalling its previous decisions on this question and in particular decisions 4.1.2 and 4.2.4 adopted respectively at the 85th and 87th sessions,

I 3. Notes with satisfaction the substantial

results so far obtained thanks to the dedicated and continuous efforts of the Director-General and to the co-operation of the States concerned regarding the settlement of the question of textbooks in the UNRWA/Unesco schools;

4. Observes with regret that, in the case of seven of the textbooks approved by the Director-General, the Government of Israel has not yet complied with the above-mention¬ ed resolutions in respect of the granting of the necessary import permits;

5. Urgently calls again upon the Govern¬ ment of Israel to authorize the immediate admittance of all textbooks already approved, or to be approved, by the Director-General into the occupied territories for distribution and use in the UNRWA/Unesco schools therein;

6. Calls on all concerned governments to pursue their efforts towards securing the implementation of the -pertinent Executive Board resolutions;

1 UNESCO doc. 88 EX/Decisions. Adopted at the

88th session of UNESCO.


II 7. Having learned with satisfaction that, as

a result of the voluntary contributions made in response to the appeal by the Secretary-' General of the United Nations and the Director-General of Unesco, no cuts have so far been necessary in the UNRWA/Unesco educational programme,

8. Thanks the Member States which gener¬ ously responded to these appeals;

9. Notes with anxiety, however, that cuts might become inevitable if other resources were not to become available at an early date;

10. Accordingly addresses a pressing appeal to Member States to ensure the continuation of this indispensable operation;

11. Requests the Director-General to con¬ tinue his efforts to this end;

III 12. Having learned with satisfaction that,

thanks to the Director-General, it proved possible to arrange for the holding of the Arab Republic of Egypt’s secondary school leaving examination in the occupied territory of the Gaza strip for seven thousand students in 1971,

13. Expresses its gratification at the success of an initiative, so perfectly in accord with Unesco’s mission to promote education and peace;

14. Further notes with satisfaction the large numbers of grants made by the Governments of the Arab States to enable refugees to continue their studies in the universities of those countries;

IV 15. Invites the Director-General to report

to the Executive Board, as appropriate, on the implementation of this resolution.

436 United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization Executive Board Decision 88 EX/4.3.1 Calling Upon Israel To Preserve Cultural Properties, Especially Christian and Islamic Re¬ ligious Sites in the Old City of Jerusalem1

1971

The Executive Board, 1. Recalling the provisions of The Hague

Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict,

2. Recalling resolutions 3.342 and 3.343 adopted by the General Conference at its fifteenth session and decisions 4.4.2 and 4.3.1 adopted by the Executive Board at its 82nd and 83rd sessions respectively,

3. Recalling the Security Council resolutions 252 (1968) of 21 May 1968, 267 (1969) of 3 July 1969 and 298 (1971) of 25 September 1971 and the United Nations General As¬ sembly resolutions 2253 and 2254 of 4 and 14 July 1967 respectively, concerning measures and actions affecting the status of the City of Jerusalem,

4. Having considered the reports contained in documents 87 EX/31,87 EX/34, 87 EX/35, 88 EX/46 and 88 EX/47,

5. Reaffirms Unesco’s concern regarding the implementation of its previous decisions in this matter;

6. Urgently calls upon Israel to: (a) see that the necessary measures are

taken for the scrupulous preservation of all sites, buildings and other cultural properties, especially in the Old City of Jerusalem;

(b) desist from any archaeological exca¬ vations, the transfer of such properties and any change of their features or their cultural and historical character, particularly with regard to Christian and Islamic religious sites;

(c) adhere scrupulously to the provisions of the above-mentioned Convention and res¬ olutions ;

7. Invites the Director-General to ensure the presence of Unesco in the City of Jerusalem

1 UNESCO doc. 88 EX/Decisions. Adopted at the 88th

session of UNESCO.

UNITED NATIONS 711

with a view to securing an efficient imple¬ mentation of the resolutions of the General Conference and the Executive Board in this respect;

8. Further invites the Director-General to report to the Executive Board at its 89th session on the implementation of this resolu¬ tion.

World Health Organization

437

World Health Organization Resolution

WHA 24.32 Authorizing Expanded Health

Assistance to the Palestine Refugees1

May 18,1971

The Twenty-fourth World Health Assembly, Recalling its resolution WHA23.52 on

health assistance to refugees and displaced persons, operative paragraph 5(b) of which requested its Director-General to take all effective measures to safeguard health con¬ ditions amongst refugees and the displaced persons in the Middle East;

Noting the United Nations General As¬ sembly resolution 2656 (XXV) of 7 December 1970, which inter alia established a Working Group on the Financing of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Ref¬ ugees in the Near East;

Noting further the United Nations General Assembly resolution 2728 (XXV) of 15 December 1970 by which the Assembly approved the first report of the Working Group and endorsed the Working Group’s recommendations, thereby, inter alia, urging all organizations of the United Nations system to study ways by which they might assist or undertake activities helpful to the refugees;

Considering the Economic and Social Council resolution 1565 (L) of 6 May 1971, welcoming, inter alia, the contacts initiated with the World Health Organization with


Assembly, Twenty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 13, p. 98). Adopted at the 16th plenary meeting.

a view to obtaining services to the maximum extent possible, and requesting the executive heads of specialized agencies to continue to consider appropriate ways and means of rendering all possible assistance to the Pales¬ tine refugees;

Noting with appreciation the report of the Director-General contained in document A24/B/19 and the comments he has supplied on the means of financing outside the regular budget which might be used;

Recognizing the acute financial situation of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East which endangers the minimum services provided to the Palestine refugees;

Mindful of the principle that the health of all peoples is fundamental to the attain¬ ment of peace and security; and

Realizing that more material and human aid is urgently needed to alleviate the suf¬ ferings of the refugees in the Middle East, in particular in the field of health,

1. Requests the Director-General of the World Health Organization to intensify and expand its programme of health assistance to the refugees and displaced persons in the Middle East to the amount of at least one million dollars; and

2. Decides that meanwhile emergency as¬ sistance to the maximum extent possible be given to the refugees and the displaced persons in the Middle East.

438

World Health Organization Resolution

WHA 24.33 Drawing Attention to Israel’s

Violations of the Human Rights of the

Palestine Refugees and the Inhabitants

of Occupied Arab Territories1

May 18,1971

The Twenty-fourth World Health Assembly, Bearing in mind that the health of all


Assembly, Twenty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 13, pp. 99-100). Adopted at the 16th plenary meeting.


peoples is fundamental to the attainment of peace and security;

Mindful of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights;

Recalling its resolutions WHA21.38, WHA22.43 and WHA23.52 on health as¬ sistance to refugees and displaced persons in the Middle East;

Having considered the report of the Director-General (A24/B/19) and the annual report of the Director of Health of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Pales¬ tine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA);

Further recalling resolution 9 (XXVII) of the United Nations Commission on Human

Rights; Noting that the Commissioner General of

UNRWA has drawn attention that any further lowering of the already austere pro¬ visions of health services to refugees under his mandate would jeopardize the health of refugees and of the general public with whom they live;

Recalling General Assembly resolution 2672 (XXV) in which attention was drawn to the continuing critical financial position of the UNRWA and the serious effects of this crisis on the health activities of UNRWA;

Noting further that the reports published by competent organizations reveal that the occupying authorities bar the distribution of medicaments by the International Commit¬ tee of the Red Cross to the inhabitants of the Occupied Territories,

1. Reaffirms that the protection of the life and physical and mental health of the refugees and displaced persons require that they immediately be afforded to return to their homes, in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the United Nations;

2. Calls upon Israel to abide by the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949, which provides for essential safeguards

for the protection of physical and mental health of the inhabitants of the Occupied Territories;

3. Draws the attention that Israel’s violations of basic human rights of the refugees, displaced persons and the inhabitants of the Occupied Territories constitute a serious impediment to the health of the population of the Occupied Territories, a matter the continuation of which would necessitate that the Organization should consider the application of Article 7 of its Constitution;

4. Calls upon Israel to refrain from any interference with the activities of the Inter¬ national Committee of the Red Cross in the Occupied Territories;

5. Expresses its appreciation to the Director- General of the World Health Organization, the Director of Health of UNRWA and to the specialized and other organizations that provide assistance to the refugees, displaced persons and the inhabitants of the Occupied Territories in the Middle East; and

6. Requests the Director-General of the World Health Organization:

(a) to take all other effective measures in his power to safeguard health conditions amongst refugees, displaced persons and the inhabitants of the Occupied Territories in the Middle East;

(b) to continue and strengthen his co¬ operation with the International Committee of the Red Cross to provide material and human aid to the population of the Occupied Territories;

(c) to submit a comprehensive report to the Twenty-fifth World Health Assembly on the conditions of physical and mental health of the population of the Occupied Territories;

(d) to bring this resolution to the attention of all governmental and non-governmental organizations concerned.

INDEX

f = following page ff = following 2 pages n = footnote pass, (passim) = intermittent references

A.A.P.S.O.: see Afro-Asian People’s Solidarity Organization

Abbassieh Prison (Egypt): 328 Abd al-Daim, Muhammad Khalil: 358 Abdel Qadir, Zain al-Abidin Muhammad Ahmad:

509 Abdul Latif, Saber Mohammed: 638 Abu Ali: 138 Abu Ammar: see Arafat, Yasser Abu Ayyad: see Khalaf, Salah Abu Bakri, Mohammed ’Ali: 640 Abu Dhabi: 322, 449, 539 Abu Feras: 138 Abu Hamad, Khalil: outlines Lebanon’s stand

on Middle East settlement, 493f. Speech at United Nations, 676f

Abu Imad: 138 Abu Khaled: 138 Abu Lutf: see Qaddumi, Faruq Abu Mayaleh, Ismael: 641 Abu al-Mu’tasem: see Affana, Ahmad Abu Ras, Mr.: 641 Abu Rumeile, Mr.: ill-treatment of in Israeli

custody described, 64If Abu Sabri: 358 Abu-Rudeis District (Sinai): 16 Abu Sitta, Hamid: 358 Abu Tair, Suleiman Mohammed: 640 Abu Yusif: see Najjar, Muhammad Yusif Abu Zenima (Sinai): 329 Acharafie Gamp (Jordan): 508 Acre: 633 Addis Ababa (Ethiopia): 248, 552, 597, 687.

See Organization of African Unity al-Adgham, Bahi: 353n, 354, 426n, 429n, 434n,

452n, 509n, 51 In, 515, 519n, 523. Reports by,

on work of Supreme Arab Follow-Up Com¬ mittee, 345f, 42If, 439-441, and criticizing Jordan, 445-447

Adwan, Kamal: 358 Affana, Ahmad: 358 Afghanistan: 168, 188n, 575. Middle East policy

of, 244. U.N. voting record of, 695n, 698n, 7Q2n, 703n

Aflaq, Michel: 432 African Heads of State mission: see Organization

of African Unity African Trade Unions: see All-African Trade

Union Federation Afro-Asian Peoples’ Solidarity Organization: 117,

498. Resolution of tenth session of, 190-193 Agarith (occupied territories): 639 Agnew, Spiro: 209 Ahidjo, Ahmadou: 238, 285 el-Ahmed, Najib: 641, 657 Ahmad, Qaid: 347 al-Aisami, Shibli: rejects negotiations with Israel,

395f, and calls for armed struggle, 427f Ajlun (Jordan): area involved in Palestinian-

Jordanian clashes, 220, 354, 429f, 467f, 503, 505, 512, 524, 539

Akaba: see Aqaba, Gulf of Albania: voting record at U.N., 695n, 698n Algeria: 16n, 31, 185, 189n, 190n, 198, 218, 225,

231, 282n, 364f, 430n, 435nf, 442. Visits to, by Italian foreign minister (communique), 188; by Cuban foreign minister (communique), 208f; by President of Cameroon (communique) ,238; by Kosygin, 249f, (communique), 252f. National Front Party of, talks with French Socialist Party 116f, and Italian Communist Party, 260f. Revolution in compared to Palestine resistance, 412, 541. Position of, outlined by Boumedienne, 418f, by the Revolutionary Coun¬ cil, 518f, and at the U.N., 578, 690f. Voting record of, at U.N., 695n, 698n, 702n, 703n

Algerian National Liberation Front Party: 116f, 260f

713

714 INDEX

Ali, Iftikhar: 131

All-African Trade Union Federation, 4th Congress,

Cairo, 1971: statements of, 16

Allenby Bridge (Jordan): 330

Allende, Salvador: 58

Allon, Yigal: 305, 351, 534, 655. Statements on

U.S. Middle East policy and on Israeli settle¬

ment plans, 53-55, 630f, 635. Hussein denies

meeting with, 521

“Allon Plan”: 53f, 78, 84

Almeyda-Medina, Clodomiro: expresses Chilean

support for Palestine Resistance, 58

Amer, Abd al-Hakim: 183

Amerasinghe, H.S.: 614n, 616, 620, 647, 652,

660. See also United Nations Special Committee

to Investigate Israeli Practices. . .

American Near East Refugee Aid Inc.: 612

American University of Beirut: 320

Amin Dada, Idi: 81

Amir of Kuwait: see al-Sabah, Shaikh Sabah

al-Salim

Amman: 65, 162f, 220, 235, 237, 345, 358f, 384,

400, 402, 419, 421, 429, 430, 434, 445, 448,

452f, 467, 481, 495, 497, 609, 617, 639, 671.

Clashes between government troops and Pales¬

tinians reported in, 12f, 346f, 349f, 353, 355,416,

420, 441, 444, 507

“Amman Agreement”: 221, 337, 358, 377, 426,

435, 438, 447, 468, 495, 504. Adherence to

called for, by al-Adgham, 345f, by PLO, 360,

523, by Abu Ayyad, 429, by Arab Heads of

State, 436, 442f, 543. Jordan accused of violat¬

ing, 353f, 355, 509, 519. Adherence to, claimed

by Jordan, 430, 51 If, by PLO, 438, 452, 454.

Committee formed to implement, 434. Point of,

discussed by al-Tall, 480f. Jordanian position

on questioned by Sadat, 514f. For provisions

of and signatories to see pp. 426n, 430n, 434n,

442n

Ammash, Saleh Mehdi: 10

Amnesty International: 641, 657

Anderson, Jack: 237

ANERA: 612

Anglo-Israel Association: 298n

Angola: 16n, 31, 190n, 562, 696

Ankara (Turkey): 122, 131, 243

Anwar, Muhammad: 358

Aqaba, Gulf of: 83, 128, 288, 489. Weapons

said to be unloaded in, 12. Regarded as inter¬

national waterway by EEC, 141, by Council

of Europe, 144, by Belgium, 193 and by U.K.,

578

Aqsa Mosque: protection of, demanded by Muslim

World League, 250ff, and by Jordan, 596.

Excavations endangering, 632

Arab-American Chamber of Commerce: 464

Arab Boycott Office: report on effectiveness of,

464f

Arab Ceasefire Observer Mission: 358, 377. Al-

Adgham reports on dissolution of, 440, 445,

and praises commander of, 441

Arab Defense Council: 566

Arab Economic Council, Seventeenth Session,

Cairo, 1971: resolutions made by, 564f

Arab Kings and Heads of State: 425, 427, 429,

519, 550. Role of, in mediating Jordanian-

Palestinian conflict, 345ff, 446f, 453, 509. Ap¬

pealed to, by Jordanian Chamber of Deputies,

383, and by PLO, 415, 438, 512f. Summit

meeting of, called by Jordan, 430f, 435f. Report

of al-Adgham to, 439ff. Letter from King

Hussein to, 51 If. See also “Cairo Agreement”;

“Amman Agreement”; Conference of Rep¬

resentatives of Arab Heads of State

Arab League: see League of Arab States

Arab Liberation Front: 540

Arab Organization for Education, Culture and

the Sciences: 499

Arab Parliamentary Union: 383

Arab Republic of Egypt: see Egypt

Arab Socialist Renaissance Party: see Baath Party

(Iraq)

Arab Socialist Union: 158, 160, 166, 179, 374f,

451, 513n. Representatives of, meet with Soviet

Communist Party, 22If

Arab Summit Conference: Hussein calls for,

430f, 435

Arab Women’s Information Committee: 271

Arabian-American Oil Company (ARAMCO):

612. Oil production of, 198, 491

Arabian Gulf: 340, 437, 488, 491, 530. Said

threatened by Iran, 548. See also Persian Gulf

Arab population in occupied territory: 191, 266.

Pope Paul’s message regarding, 193. Condition

of, described by British M.P.’s, 270-275. Dis¬

placement of by Jewish immigrants, 368f.

Position of, described by N. Shaath, 472.

Communications to Security Council regarding,

589 -592. U.N. Special Committee reports on

treatment of, 614-647, 651-660. U.N. resolu¬

tions regarding, 706ff. See also Gaza; Jordan,

West Bank; Palestinian people; Jerusalem;

INDEX 715

Palestine refugees; U.N. Special Committee. ..

Arafat, Yasser (Abu Ammar): 12, 65, 137, 162,

221, 348, 366, 387, 426n, 429n, 436, 443, 452n,

509n, 51 In, 519n, 523, 540, 543. Accuses U.S.

of being involved in Jordan clashes, 13, 438.

Message from Chou En-lai to, 204. Visit of,

to Soviet Union (communique), 266f and report,

543. Appeals to Arab leaders to halt Jordanian

fighting, 353, 415, 420, 441f. Program of,

submitted to Palestine National Council, 394f.

Accused of lying by King Hussein, 420f, 447f.

Speaks on position of Revolution, and the

fighting in Jordan, 504-508. Role of, described

by S. Khalaf (Abu Ayyad), 540

ARAMCO: 612. Oil production of, 198, 491

Argentina: 668, 670. Submits draft resolution

to U.N. General Assembly, 579. Voting record

at U.N., 695n, 698n, 702nf, 705n

al-Ariani, Abdurrahman: visit to U.S.S.R. (com¬

munique), 309

El cArish (Sinai): possible Israeli withdrawal to,

discussed, 62, 312, 381. Israeli transfer of

Gaza families to, 333f, 636, reported by

UNRWA, 648ff and by U.N. Special Committee,

655

Armistice Agreements, 1949: see Jordan-Israel

Armistice Agreement; Lebanon-Israel Armistice

Agreement

el-Arkoub (Lebanon): 507. Attacked by Israel,

584

Ashkenazim: 507

Ashdod (Israel): 332

Ashkar Refugee Camp: Israelis destroy houses

in, 638

Ashkelon (Israel): 15. Riots in prison at, 658

al-Assad, Hafez: 451, 509, 519n. Visit of, to

U.S.S.R., 19, (communique), 21. Statements

on Palestinians, Arab unity, and negotiations,

408-410, 414. Efforts to resolve Jordanian-

Palestinian clashes, 434, 445, 510. Leadership

of Syria praised, 461. Declares goals of Federa¬

tion with Egypt, and Libya, 525f

al-Assifa, 220

Assiut (U.A.R.): 24

Assouan Usher, Arsene: 285

Aswan High Dam: 9. Soviet participation in,

compared to U.S. aid, 320, 479

al-Ata, Hashim: 510

al-Atasi, Nur al-Din: 475f

“Atlantic Pact”: 116

Atlit Prison (Israel): 626

AUSTCARE: 612

Australia: 196. Voting record at U.N.: 695n,

698n, 702nf

Australian Care for Refugees (AUSTCARE): 612

Austria: 143n, 464. Voting record at U.N.,

695n, 698n, 702nf, 706n

Aviram, Menahem: statements of, on Israeli Army

in Gaza, 642f

Avnery, Uri: advocates Palestine State, 162f

Ayyubi, Mahmud: 509

Al-Azhar: 383

Baath Party (Iraq): 168, 190. Policy of, on nego¬

tiations, 395f and armed struggle, 427f, on

Arab unity, 432, 548

Baath Party (Syria): 21, 65n, 260n, 408, 451,

526. Criticized by Syrian Communist Party,

134n. Statement of, on Jordanian-Palestinian

clashes, 415, and on the Palestine Revolution,

529ff

Bab al-Mandeb: 489

Bahrain: 323, 352, 562. Voting record at U.N.,

695n, 698n, 702n, 703n

al-Bahsh, Moayyad Osman Badawi: treatment of,

in Israeli prison, 640f, 656f

Bakdash, Kh.: 134

al-Bakr, Ahmad Hasan: 297. On Eastern Front,

Arab unity and peaceful negotiations, 432ff.

On Palestine Resistance, 508f, 548f

al-Bakr, Ibrahim: 356f, 387

Baptist Hospital (Gaza): 15

Barbados: 579. Voting record at U.N., 695n,

698n, 702n, 703n

Barbour, Walworth: 177

al-Barghuthi, Ibrahim: 358

Bar Lev, Chaim: on Israeli military power,

ceasefire lines, and renewal of war, 238-241.

On Egyptian power, 460f

Bar Lev Line: 122, 381, 492

Barreh, Siyad: visit to Iraq (communique), 297

Bashir, Muhammad: 358

Bashir, Takhsin: 209

Bayh, Birch: 38

Bedouins: 334. Role of, in Jordanian-Palestinian

clashes, 508, 541

Begin, Menachim: 280. On Israeli policy, 43.

Meir rejects position of, 84. On the rights of

Jews, 631

Beirut (Lebanon): 320, 350, 444, 467, 522, 586,

617, 639, 657

716 INDEX

Beit Awwa (occupied territory): 639

Beit Fajjar (occupied territory): 638

Beit Mirsem (occupied territory): 639

Beit Nuba (occupied territory): 639

Beit Shean Valley: 581

Bel Abbas, Yousef: visit to Spain (communique), 8

Belgium: 143n, 161n, 17In. Policy of outlined,

43f, 85, 193ff. Voting record at U.N., 695n,

698n, 702n, 703n, 705n. See also North Atlantic

Council; European Economic Community

Ben Abbas, Yousef: see Bel Abbas, Yousef

Benelux countries: 218

Benghazi Declaration: 450f, 525f, 529n, 566.

See also Federation of Arab Republics

Ben-Gurion, David: 86, 164. Views on peace,

112,295

Bergus, Donald C.: 185, 209. Controversy over

“memorandum” issued by, 200ff. Mediating

role of, 492f. Sadat’s description of memo¬

randum by, 556

Bethlehem (occupied territory): 334, 631

Birindelli, Gino: 237

Black Sea: 219

Black September: 399, 524. See also Palestine

Resistance

Blix, Hans M.: on guerilla warfare, 170f

Bdgvad, J.E.: 582

Bohte, Borut: 616, 647, 660

Bolivia: 579. Voting record at U.N., 702n, 703n

Bonn (West Germany): 215, 279. Relations

with Arab countries, 185, 248, and with Israelis,

205

Botswana: 198n, 282n. Voting record at U.N.,

695n, 698n, 699n, 702n, 703n

Boumedienne, Houari: 185. Joint communique

with Ahidjo of Cameroon, 238, with Kosygin,

252f. Supports armed struggle, 418f

boundaries/borders, Israeli: 50, 95, 10In, 105, 128,

136, 142, 144, 243, 261, 265, 269, 284, 572,

577, 602f, 664. Position of various countries,

organizations and individuals on: Egypt, 42,

57, 377-381 pass.; Israeli government, 43f,

54f, 61-64 pass., 71, 73ff, 83f, 232f, 269f, 296,

302ff, 654; United States, 50, 69, 72; Sisco,

89; Dayan, 103; Galili, 107f; Israeli Labor

Party, 129f; West Germany, 205ff; Israeli

Communist Party, 213; France, 264, 580; China,

692. See also demilitarized zones; occupied

territory; “guarantees, international”

Bouteflika, Abdel Aziz: 168n. Communique with

Moro of Italy, 188, and with Roa Garcia of Cuba,

208f. Visit of, to China and Vietnam (com¬

muniques), 225f. On Algerian policy, 690f

boycott: see Arab Boycott Office

Boye, Ibrahima: 620

Brandt, Willi: 215, 269. On West German

policies, 22, 104, and relations with Arab

States, 7If

Bratislava: see International Union of Students

Bray, Charles W.: 87. Criticizes Israeli practices

in occupied territory, 183

Brazil: statement by U.N. representative of, 578f.

Voting record at U.N., 695n, 698nf, 702nf

Brezhnev, Leonid: 40, 120, 281, 558. On relations

with Arab countries and U.S., 98-100. Speech

of analyzed by Galili, 107. Meets M. Riad,

203, and Sadat, 406

Britain: see United Kingdom

British Petroleum: 491

Brooks, Donald: 657

Bruce-Gardyne, lock: report of, on investigatory

trip to Gaza, 272f

Budapest: see World Peace Council, Budapest,

1971

Bulgaria: policy of outlined, 65f. Number of

Jews emigrated from, 101. Voting record at

U.N., 695n, 698n, 702nf

al-Buq’a Camp (Jordan): 354f, 426

al-Buraim Island: PFLP announces attack on

oil tanker near, 489

Burin Village: houses demolished in, 638

Burma: voting record at U.N., 695n, 698n, 702nf

Burundi: 16n, 189n, 282n, 575. Voting record

at U.N., 695n, 698n, 702nf, 705n

Byelorussian S.S.R.: voting record at U.N., 695n,

698n, 702nf

Byrnes, James F.: 121

“Cairo Agreement” (Jordan): 357, 360, 377,

468, 495. Alleged to be repudiated by Jordan,

221, 514. Al-Tall views on, 337f, 480f. Appeals

to Jordan and PLO for adherence to, 345f,

436, 442f. Jordan accused of violating, by

Palestinians, 353ff, 452ff, 504, 513; and by

Tripoli Charter States, 509f, 519f; by Sadat,

515. Syrian efforts to ensure implementation

of, 415, 434. Palestinians reiterate adherence

to, 426, 429f, 438, 523. Jordan claims adherence

to, 430, 51 If. Al-Adgham reviews efforts to

implement, 447. Kuwait views on, 543. For

provisions of and signatories to see pp. 426n,

430n, 434n, 442n

INDEX 717

“Cairo Agreement” (Lebanon): 385

Cambodia: 139, 396, 473

Cameroon: 189n, 282n, 285, 575, 687. President

of, visits Algeria (communique), 238. Voting

record at U.N., 695n, 698n, 702nf

Canada: 161n, 17In, 196. Voting record at

U.N., 695n, 698n, 702nf. Middle East policy

of, 104f, and rights of peoples to independence,

149

Canterbury, Archbishop of: see Ramsey, Michael,

Archbishop of Canterbury

Caradon, Lord (Hugh Foot): 73

ceasefire (Egyptian-Israeli): 65f, 74f, 84, 91,

101, 102, 104, 130, 135, 159, 170, 174, 210,

213, 216, 269, 277, 289, 303, 305, 308, 325,

364, 366, 409, 492, 570, 599, 601, 677. “Rogers

Plan” role in resumption of, 17, 44, 60, 286, 600,

and Rogers’ views on, 18, 128, 186, 256, 286,

326, 680. Meir’s views on, 22 29 pass., 64, 178,

182f, 232, 264f. Viewed by Nixon, 50, 69.

Allon on, 55. Eban on Israeli position on, 70f.

Alleged U.S.S.R. activities during, 95, denied,

597. Galili on, 106f, 226, 230. Bar Lev on

Israeli usage of, 238ff. Egyptian-Israeli dif¬

ferences over, 312. Sadat on extension of, and

other views, 340-344 pass., 370, 373f, 380f,

404 406 pass., 469, 486, 516, 533, 535, 545,

551, 554f. Mention of, in U.N. Secretary-

General Annual Reports, 570ff, 664f, and in

U.N debates on extension of, 573-580 pass.

Complaints at U.N. of violations of, 58If

ceasefire (Lebanese-Israeli): complaints at U.N.

of violations of, and debate on, 583-586

ceasefire (Jordanian-Israeli): complaints at U.N.

of violations of, 581, 590

ceasefire (Jordanian-Palestinian conflict): 87, 345,

353n, 439, 509n

ceasefire (Syrian-Israeli): complaints at U.N.

of violations of, 587ff

CENTO: see Central Treaty Organization

Central African Republic: 189n, 282n. Voting

record at U.N., 695n, 698n, 702nf

CentralTreatyOrganization: 122, 172. Statement

by Council of, on Middle East, 131

Ceylon: 518, 575, 616. Accused by Israel of bias,

589. Voting record at U.N., 695n, 698n,

702nf. See also U.N. Special Committee to

Investigate Israeli Practices. . .

Chad: 188nf, 282n, 562. Voting record at U.N.,

695n, 698n, 702nf

Chiang Kai-shek: joint communique with King

Faisal, 152

Chiao Kuan-hua: speech of, at U.N. General

Assembly, 691—694

Chile: communique by Communist Party of,

58f, and by Socialist Party of, 59f. Voting

record at U.N., 695n, 698n, 702nf, 706n

China, People’s Republic of: 137, 190n, 279,

302, 340, 516. Statements in press of, on U.S.

interference in Jordan, 12f, 220f, on formation

of Federation of Arab Republics, 125f, on a

Palestinian state, 132f, on contacts with Israel,

236. Support for Palestine cause expressed

by leaders of, 133, 138f, 204, 246f. Visit to,

by Bouteflika (communique), 225. Admission

of to U.N. viewed by Israeli Minister Galili,

230. Visit of Fateh delegation to, reported,

473f. Policy of outlined by U.N. delegate of,

691-694. U.N. voting record of, 695n, 698n,

702n, 705n

Chi Peng-fei: 138

Chou En-lai: joint statement with P.L.O. delega¬

tion, 137f. Affirms support for Palestine Revolu¬

tion, 138ff, 204

Christian (s): 537. Right to live in secular state

in Palestine, 59, 414, 507. Rights of, to Jeru¬

salem and Holy Places, 93f, 199, 308f, 316f,

422, 463, 465, 676, 683. Israeli attitude to,

108, 672f. Statements of Pope Paul on, 115, 325.

Uri Avnery’s views on, 163. Cooperation with

Muslims welcomed, 188. Companies of, boy¬

cotted, 464. Sites of, damaged, 590. Letter

to U .N. by Syrian community of, 597. UNESCO

resolution on sites of, 710

Colombia: 579. U.N. voting record of, 695n,

698n, 699f, 702n, 703n

Commission of the Churches on International

Affairs: lln

Communist Party of Bulgaria: 65n

Communist Party of Chile: joint statement with

Fateh, 58f

Communist Party of Czechoslovakia: 155

Communist Party of France: statement on Middle

East by, 254

Communist Party of Israel (MAKI): deplores

Israeli Army actions in Gaza, 32f. Demands

peace plan from Israeli government, 135f,

and criticizes government, 213f

Communist Party of Israel (RAKAH): views of,

on Jarring talks, 3. Visit of to U.S.S.R. (com¬

munique), 324

Communist Party of Italy: meeting with Algerian

718 INDEX

N.L.F. (communique), 260f

Communist Party of Syria: visit of to U.S.S.R.

(communique), 134

Communist Party of the Soviet Union (C.P.S.U.):

4, 40, 107, 179, 190, 266, 270. Contacts with

Syrian Baath Party, 19f, 21. Report of, on

Soviet foreign policy, 98ff. Statements issued

on Middle East by, 113f, 115, and commented

on by Fateh leader, 544. Contacts with Syrian

Communist Party, 134 and with Egyptians,

160f, 203f, 22If, 258f. Contacts with Israeli

Communist Party (RAKAH), 324f. See also

U.S.S.R.

Conference of Arab Foreign Ministers: 559

Conference of Arab Writers, Eighth, Damascus:

recommendations of, 562f

Conference of International Union of Students,

Tenth, Bratislava, 1971: 30

Conference of Non-Aligned Countries, Third,

Lusaka, 1970: 42, 212, 238, 247, 574

Conference of the Progressive Parties of the

Mediterranean Basin: 116

Conference on Reaffirmation and Development

of International Humanitarian Law Applicable

in Armed Conflicts, Geneva: proposal on guerilla

warfare, 170f

Conference of Representatives of Arab Heads of

State, Cairo, 1971: Jordan refuses to attend,

430f. Letter from King Hussein to, 435f.

Appeals for end of clashes, 436f. Final com¬

munique of, 442f

Conferences: see also headings beginning with

Congress; International; World

Congo, Democratic People’s Republic of the

(Brazzaville): 16n, 189n, 282n, 579, 687. U.N.

voting record of, 695n, 702n, 703n, 706n

Congo (Kinshasa): see Zaire

Congress of Municipal Councils, Fifth, Algiers:

addressed by Boumedienne, 418f

Congress of the All-African Trade Union Federa¬

tion, 4th: 16

Constantinople Convention (1888): U.A.R. said

to adhere to principles of, 62f, 378, and ques¬

tioned by Israel, 62f. EEC endorses, 141

Coral Sea: attack on viewed by Rogers, 186.

P.F.L.P. claims attack on, 489

CORSO: 612

Costa Rica: 579. U.N. voting record of, 695n,

698n, 699n, 702n, 703n

Council for the Advancement of Arab-British

Understanding: 270n

Council of Europe: resolution on Middle East

taken by, 143f

Council of Organizations for Relief Services

Overseas, Inc. (CORSO): 612

Cuba: Foreign Minister of, visits Algeria (com¬

munique), 208f. Visit of Kosygin to (com¬

munique), 270. U.N. voting record of, 695n,

698n, 702n, 703n

Cyprus: 143n, 237, 327. Makarios of, visits

U.S.S.R. (communique), 174f. U.N. voting

record of, 695n, 698n, 702n, 703n

Czechoslovakia: 78, 169. Voting record at U.N.,

695n, 698n, 702n, 703n

C.P.S.U.: see Communist Party of the Soviet

Union

Daddah, Mokhtar Ould: 285. Visit of, to Saudi

Arabia (communique), 263. Asked to implement

OAU resolution on Middle East, 687

Daghely, Jalal: 215

Dahomey: 16n, 189n, 282n. Voting record at

U.N., 695n, 698n, 702n, 703n

Dair Ala (Jordan): 353

Dakar (Senegal): 131, 278. See also Organization

of African Unity

Damascus (Syria): 65n, 168n, 237, 239, 274,

387, 425, 467, 498, 522, 547, 608, 609, 617,

619, 636

Damascus Declaration: 526

Daud, Muhammad: alleged to have rejected

negotiations with commandos, 348

Davies, Rodger P.: statement supporting aid

to Middle East, 21 Of

Dayan, Moshe: 297, 534. Statements by: on Israeli

practices in Gaza, 13f; on retention of Sharm

el-Sheikh, 63, 83, 409, and policies for other

occupied territory, 117f, 234f, 630, 632; on

Israel’s war objectives, 266; on Palestinians in

Israeli jails, 275, 642; on U.S. policy and a Suez

settlement, 101-104, 118, 287f. Opinions of,

viewed by Avnery, 163 and criticized by a

U.S. spokesman, 236f. Said to have offered

airfields in Sinai to NATO, 209. Reprisals

taken by, against Nablus citizens, 658

Dead Sea: 334

Debbin (Jordan): 467f

Declaration on Principles of International Law

concerning Friendly Relations (U.N.G.A. Res.

No. 2625 (XXV) ): 701

Declaration on the Strengthening of International

INDEX 719

Security (U.N. G.A. Res. No. 2734 (XXV) ):

701, 702

Defense (Emergency) Regulations, 1945: invoked

by Israel to effect deportations, 637, 644, and

arrests, 642

De Gaulle, Charles: 82, 167

Deir el-Balah (Gaza): 649, 654

Demchenko, P.: 307

Demichev, P.N.: 324

demilitarized zones: 72, 303. Idea of, accepted

by U.A.R., 59, 112, 378, 553, 688, and by

Jordan, 601, 682. Israeli policy towards, 64.

Featured in U.K. policy, 109. Proposed by

EEC Report, 142, 193. Provided for, in U.N.

Resolution 242, 194. Proposed by OAU Com¬

mittee of Ten, 284. Discussed by Saudi Arabia,

462f, and by the U.S.S.R., 577

Demirel, Suleyman: supports U.N. Resolution

242, 9

Democratic Popular Front for the Liberation of

Palestine: see Popular Democratic Front for

the Liberation of Palestine

Democratic Republic of Vietnam: see Vietnam

Democratic State of Palestine: 137. Goal of

Fateh, 59, 507. Idea of, rejected by Avnery,

162f. Endorsed by the Palestine National

Council, 398, by Assad of Syria, 414 and N.

Shaath, 471. Idea of, viewed by Saudis, 463

Denmark: 143n, 152, 161n, 171n, 182. Visit of

Kosygin to (communique), 301. Voting record

at U.N., 695n, 698n, 702n, 703n

Derbas, Mohammed: torture of, in Israeli prison

described, 618, and denied by Israelis, 626, 641

Dhofar (Oman): 320, 323

Diaz, Victor: 58

Dinstein, Dr.: 206

Dinitz, Sacha: on U.S.-Israel relations, 200

Diori, Hamani: visit to Libya (communique), 40f

Doha: 352

Dobrynin, Anatole: 124, 280

Dome of the Rock: 251

Dominican Republic: 579. Voting record at

U.N. 695n, 698n, 699n, 702n, 703n

Douglas-Home, Alec: 122, 131, 281, 548. Reviews

Anglo-Arab relations, 66-68. Statements by,

on withdrawal issue and Israeli position, 94-96;

and on a peacekeeping force, 109f, 243; on

relations with Egypt, 241—243; on Mediter¬

ranean balance of power, 244ff; on his visit to

Middle East and U.K. policy, 276f; on relations

with Israel, 298. Quoted by Eban, 679

Dubai: role of, in the Arabian Gulf, 322

Dulles, John Foster: 78, 86, 342, 479

Dulzin, A.L.: report by, of Jewish Agency budget,

195-198

East Germany: see German Democratic Republic

East Ghor project (Jordan): 316

Eastern Front/Command: 355, 455, 460. Neglect

of, deplored by Iraqi leaders, 412, 432f, and by

Sadat, 460, 495. Al-Tall on Jordan’s role in,

444f. Jordan accused of destroying, 506, and

urged to reactivate, 514. Conditions stated

for Iraq’s participation in, 549

Eban, Abba: 68, 79, 86, 89, 111, 167, 255, 298,

303, 307, 326, 369, 379, 409, 534, 670. State¬

ments of, on Suez settlement, 28; on continua¬

tion of Suez ceasefire, borders and negotiations,

69ff, 289ff, 677ff; and on U.S.-Israel relations,

267-270; on Israeli policy towards Africa and

the O.A.U., 277ff

Ecuador: 579. U.N. voting record of, 695n, 698n,

699n, 702n, 703n

Egypt: 6n, 13, 16, 20, 85, 98, 101, 105, 122, 141,

144, 163, 17If, 188n, 190n, 201f, 207, 209,

213f, 218, 222, 225, 235, 237, 244, 249, 300,

309, 330, 339, 353n, 362, 365, 368, 369n, 409,

413, 426n, 429n, . 435n, 436n, 441n, 442,

444f, 447n, 509, 51 In, 519n, 521, 529n, 537n,

562, 564n, 565, 570, 576, 578, 611, 614, 618,

622f, 677, 682, 692, 708, 710. Seen as willing

to recognize Israel, 3, and to implement U.N.

Resolution 242, 4. Role of Soviets in, assessed,

5, 48, 50, 52, 87, 89, 210, 286f, 292. Statements

by Soviet leaders and press on position of, and

support for, 8f, 56f, 90f, 99, 119f, 155f, 158,

160f, 173, and by Soviet Communist Party,

221f. Treaty of Friendship with U.S.S.R.,

156-158, commented on by Podgorny, 158f, by

Nixon, 167f, by Israel, 168-170, in Soviet

press, 173, by Rogers, 185, 255, and by Sadat,

477-480. U.S. statements on policy of: by

leaders, Sisco, 33, 36-38, 150; Rogers, 88f,

123f, 126ff, 148f, 254-257 pass., 286f, 326,

680f; Nixon, 167; Sen. Fulbright, 112; and

in U.S. Congressional report, 310—314 pass.,

318-321. Policy of: assessed by Tito, 39f,

41f, 262f, 308; praised by France, 44f, 166,

by Iran, 60, by Bulgaria, 65, by World Peace

Council, 145f; seen by British leaders, 66ff,

94ff, 241, 244f, 276f, by West Germans, 184f,

720 INDEX

and by East Germans, 187; criticized by Iraqi

leader, 395f. Israeli views on policy of, by

government: 42f, 52f, 73-77, and leaders: Meir,

2.2-29, 61-65, 83f, 108, 175-183 pass., 232f,

264f, 301-306/raws.; Eban, 70f, 677ff; Peres, 83;

Rabin, 92f; Dayan, 101-103; Galili, 105-107,

226-230; MAKI, 135; Bar Lev, 238-241.

Resolutions in support of, taken by O.A.U.,

189, and by the Afro-Asian Peoples’ Solidarity

Organization, 192. Foreign Minister Riad of,

visits Yugoslavia (communique), 21 Iff. Letter

from O.A.U. Committee addressed to, 282-285,

and reply of, 552. I.C.R.G. report on Israeli

prisoners in, 328f, on repatriation of persons

to, 331, and on aid to persons in Sinai, 332ff.

Appealed to, by P.L.O. for intervention in

Jordan, 420, and Jordanian letters addressed

to, 420, 430f. Establishment of Federation of,

with Libya and Syria, 449-451, hailed by

Sadat, 45If, 527f, with other two leaders,

525, and commend on by al-Tall, 455. Joint

statement of, with Saudi Arabia on Jordanian-

Palestinian conflict, 522f. Attitude of Hussein

to, 53If.

Statements by President Sadat of: on general

policy, ceasefire extensions, Suez proposals,

etc, 340-344, 370-376, 379-382, 392ff, 404-

408, 458-461, 469f, 485ff, 494f, 533-536, 545-

548, 550fF, 554-559; on Jarring proposals,

360f, 377f; on friendship with U.S.S.R, 477-

480; on Jordan’s actions against Resistance,

513-518, and memorandum by, on Israeli

response to initiatives of, 367ff. Policy of,

outlined by National Assembly, 417f. Policy

of, outlined by Foreign Minister Riad of,

492f, 686-689. Statements and letters at U.N.

by representatives of, 574, 590, 593f, 595f, and

by Israel against, 574f. Reports at U.N. of

ceasefire violations along Suez, 58Iff. U.N. report

on activities of Jarring with, 598-603 pass.,

662—667. Communications to and from U.N.

Special Committee, 619f, 626f, 638. U.N.

voting record of, 695n, 698n, 699n, 702n,

703n, 706n. U.N. resolution praising response

of, to Jarring memo, 701-703. See also Suez

Canal; Sharm al-Shaikh; ceasefire; Sadat,

Anwar (for further details of policy statements);

Sinai

Egyptian National Defence Council: 374f

Egyptian National Assembly: 451. Speeches to,

by Sadat, 370, 469, 477, 545-548, and state¬

ments of policy by, 417f

Egypt People’s Assembly: 170. See also Egyptian

National Assembly

Egyptian People’s/Popular Council: 25f, 180.

See also Egyptian National Assembly

Egyptian Red Crescent: 332

Egyptian-Soviet Treaty: see Treaty of Friendship

and Cooperation (U.S.S.R. and U.A.R.)

Eilat/Elath (Israel): 63, 77, 84, 214. Arab oil

said being shipped to, 489ff

Eilat (Israeli warship): 371

Eilat-Ashkelon pipeline: 489f

Eisenhower, Dwight D.: 83, 86, 103

E1AL240

El Salvador: 579. U.N. voting record of, 695n,

698n, 699n, 702n, 703n

Emde, Herr: 215

Emirates: see United Arab Emirates

England: see United Kingdom

Eppler, Herr: 215

Equatorial Guinea: 189n, 282n, 575. Voting

record at U.N., 695n, 698n, 699n, 702n, 703n

Eren, Nuri: 605

Eritrea: 320

Eshkol, Levi: 28

Ethiopia: 189n, 217, 282n, 285, 687. Visit of

foreign minister of, to Saudi Arabia (com¬

munique), 134. Israel said to have base in,

252. U.N. voting record of, 695n, 698n, 699n,

702n, 703n

Etzion Bloc (occupied territory): 630

European Economic Community: 46, 51, 215,

218, 298, 332. Report on Middle East policy,

141 ff, commented on by French leaders, 152f,

165, by German leaders, 153f, 205—208 pass.,

and by Belgian leader, 193ff

Faisal, King, ibn Abdul Aziz al-Saud: 353n,

426n, 429n, 434n, 442n, 447n, 452n, 509n,

51 In, 519n. Visit of, to Taiwan (communique),

152, to Japan (communique), 154f, and to

U.S. (statement), 470f. Communique of, with

Quid Daddah, 263. Attitude of, to Jordanian-

Palestinian conflict, 515

Faisal, Y.: 134

El-Fakhriyya Minaret (Jerusalem): 596

Farah, Abdulrahim Abby: 616, 660. See also

U.N. Special Committee to Investigate Israeli

Practices. . .

al-Fateh (P.N.L.M.): 78, 366, 414, 539, 592,

INDEX 721

638. Communique with Chilean Communist

Party, 58f, and with Chilean Socialist Party,

59. Position of, questioned by Avnery, 163.

Delegation of, visits China, 246. Respected

by Arab Governments, 315. Statements by

leaders of, on clashes in Jordan, 346-352,

429f, on Palestine National Council delibera¬

tions, 394f, on role of, in Resistance, 505f, 540,

on U.S.S.R. position towards Resistance, 544.

Role of, viewed by Hawatma, 402, and by

Sadat, 514. Denies accusations of Jordan gov¬

ernment, 467f. Educational efforts of, 472f

Fawzi, Mahmoud: 29, 469

fedayeen: 48. Activities of, viewed by U.S.

officials, 34, 128, 21 Of, by Avnery, 162f. For

main entry see: Palestine Resistance

Federal National Assembly: 450. See also Federa¬

tion of Arab Republics

Federal Republic of Germany: see Germany,

Federal Republic of

Federation of Palestinian Writers: 563

Federation of Arab Republics: 237, 260, 449,

509. Formation of, hailed by Chinese press,

125. Proclamation of, 449ff. Hopes for and

importance of, announced by Sadat, 45If, 516,

526f, by Assad, 525f, and by Qadhafi, 529,

by Khaddam, 565f. Views on, voiced by al-Tall,

455. See also Tripoli Charter

Feher, Lajos: visit of, to Syria (communique), 327f

Filali, Abdellatif: 245

Finland: 168, 182. Voting record at U.N., 695n,

698n, 699n, 702n, 703n, 706n. See also Socialist

International

Fiji: 702n

four powers: 34, 39, 48, 67, 76, 85, 95, 121, 125,

145, 177, 311, 369, 405f, 419, 424, 535, 545,

551, 558, 577, 601, 677, 687, 689, 690. Nixon

feels that key to peace held by, 5. French attitude

towards consultations and role of, 17, 44, 222f,

264, 281, 300, 576. Egyptians said to desire

intervention by, 24. Israel’s attitude towards,

25f. U.S. leaders on possible guarantees by,

35, 52, 86. Sent letters by Tito, 40. Israeli

views on guarantees by, 63f. Soviet press view

on role of, and U.S. participation in, 90ff. Nego¬

tiations of, seen by British leader, 243, 245.

Sadat on possible role of, and guarantees by,

341f, 373, 376, 380ff, 536, 556, and on attitudes

of, 459f. Sadat says Rogers refused support

for role of, 492. Jordanian view of, 363, 682.

U.N. Report on activities of, 603. Soviet

commentary on, 675

Fox, Major R.S.: 582

France: 5, 6, 68, 131, 143n, 161n, 171n, 185,

205, 218, 231, 269, 311, 320, 379, 464, 493,

555, 585, 600, 603, 605. Leaders of, outline

policy: Schumann, 17, 164-167, 222f, 276,

281, 300f; de Lipkowski on U.A.R. positive

attitude, 44f; Pompidou on interim settlement,

264. Communique by Socialist Party of, 116.

Report on Common Market accord by U.N.

Representative of, 152. Statement by Com¬

munist Party of, 254. U.S. on policy of, 313f,

321. Position of, praised by Kuwait, 438, and

by Sadat, 460, 518. Arms sales by, discussed

by Qadhafi, 457. Statements by U.N. Represen¬

tative of, 576f, and amendment to U.N. G.A.

Resolution 2628 (XXV), 579f. U.N. voting

record of, 695n, 698n, 699n, 702n, 703n, 705n,

706n

Franco, General Francisco: 9

Franjieh, Suleiman: 314, 353n, 426n, 429n, 434n,

442n, 447n, 452n, 509n, 51 In, 519n

French Red Cross: 612

Front for Liberation Action: 506

Fulbright, William: viewpoint of, assessed by

Rogers, 87. Support for U.S. initiative and

negotiated settlement, voiced by, 96ff, and

suggesting sanctions against Israel, 110-113.

Opposes Sen. Jackson’s aid to Israel proposals.

294ff

Gabon: 189n, 282n. U.N. voting record of,

695n, 698n, 699n, 702n

Gaddafi, Muammar: see Qadhafi, Muammar

Gahal Party (Israel): 631. Opposes Israeli response

to Egyptian position, 43. Said to desire reten¬

tion of West Bank, 78, 84

Galilee: 55

Galili, Israel: 629. On possible interim solutions

with Egypt, 105ff, 226-229. On Soviet involve¬

ment, 107f. On U.S. attitude towards Israel

and China, 229f

Gambia: 16n, 189n, 282n. U.N. voting record of,

695n, 702n, 703n

Gaza: 62, 64, 74f, 106f, 112, 214, 231, 235, 240,

243, 315, 327, 337, 351, 382, 426, 437, 438,

448, 484, 490, 510, 620, 638, 664. Israeli

practices in, reported and deplored: by Israeli

League for Human Rights, 13-16; by Com-

722 INDEX

munist Party (MAKI), 32f; by Afro-Asian

Solidarity Organization, 192; by three British

Members of Parliament, 270-275; in Arab

speeches and communications to the U.N.,

589fT, 676, 683-685 pass.; in reports of U.N.

Special Committee, 622f, 627, 635f, 642ff,

654f, and in Special Reports by UNRWA,

648-650. I.C.R.C. report on: deportations

and transfers from, 329, 333, repatriations to

or from, 331, and aid given in, 332. P.L.O.

reports people of, mistreated in Jordan, 356.

Appeal from Palestine Red Crescent against

Israeli actions in, 367. Israeli withdrawal

from, demanded by Egypt, 371, 378, 459, 470,

602. U Thant asked to help stop repression in,

536. Problems in, faced by UNRWA, 572f.

UNRWA report on activities in, 605f, 610,

648-650. U.N. G.A. resolution on Israeli

practices in, 698—701

Gaza Camp (Jordan): 426, 503

Gazit, Shlomo: 642. Statements by, on attitudes

of Arabs in occupied territory, 173f. Admits

crimes committed in Gaza, 367

Gazzi, B.: 134

General Federation of Arab Writers: 563

General Islamic Conference of Jerusalem: 38n

General Union of Palestine Students: 31, 39

Geneva Convention, 3rd: 328

Geneva Convention, 4th (1949) on the protection

of inhabitants in occupied territories: 561,

640, 653, 683f, 712. Cited as being violated

by Israel: by U.S. State Department spokesman,

183, by U.K. Labour M.P.’s, 271; by UNRWA

Commissioner-General, 572f, 648; by Arab

states at the U.N., 589-592; by U.N. Special

Committee, 632, 636f, 643-647; in U.N. resolu¬

tions, 689, 700. Israel does not admit appli¬

cability of, 329, and urged to apply by U.N.

General Assembly, 617f. Passage on annexa¬

tion and occupation quoted, 628f. Red Cross

ready to assume Protecting Power status under

terms of, 652, 659f. Said applying to Israel,

706f

German Democratic Republic: 279. Socialist

Party of, declarations on Middle East, 186f.

Visit to, of Syrian minister (communique),

214f. Government statement calling for Israeli

withdrawal, 306f. P.L.O. leader reports on

visit to, 543

German Red Cross: 332

Germany, Federal Republic of: 143n, 161n, 17In,

186, 218, 321, 332, 437, 464, 609. Statements

by leaders of, on Middle East policy of, 22,

7If, 104, 153, 184f, 205-208, 246, 248. Support

of Israel by, condemned, 31, 19If. Visit of

Libyan prime minister to (communique), 215

Germany, Federal Republic of, Social Democratic

Party: 184

Ghaleb, Murad: 557

Ghalib, Abd al-Hamid: 475f

Ghana: 189n, 190n, 282n, 580, 605. U.N. voting

record of, 695n, 698n, 699n, 702n, 703n, 706n

Ghannam, Munir Abdullah: 641

Gibraltar: 237

Golan/Syrian Heights: 62, 106, 117, 174, 194,

235, 280, 332, 380 409, 636, 645, 676, 685.

Featured in “Allon Plan”, 55. Israeli position

on, reiterated by Meir, 64, 77, 84, 108, 112;

by Peres, 82; by Dayan, 118,630, 686; supported

by a British M.P., 96. Israeli settlements in,

criticized by U.S., 183; mentioned in U Thant’s

report, 615; reported in Israeli press, 634f, 654.

Repatriation of families to, 331, 622. Sadat’s

position on, 341f, 371, 470, and that of al-Tall,

444. Syria protests Israeli actions in, 59If.

See also occupied territories

Goldmann, Nahum: 165. Expresses optimism of

settlement possibilities, 279f

Gowon, Yakubu: 282n, 285

Great Britain: see United Kingdom

Grechko, Andrei: 190n

Greece: 143n, 16In, 171n, 210, 493. Voting

record at U.N., 695n, 698n, 699n, 702n, 703n

“Green Berets” (Israeli Border Guards): 14f.

See also Israeli Defence Forces

Gromyko, Andrei: 119, 203, 256. Statement by,

at U.N., 675

“guarantees, international”: 75, 85, 98, 103, 128,

130, 195, 280, 326, 675, 681. Concept of:

rejected by Israel, 25, 318; viewed by Qadhafi,

369; discussed by Allon, 54; by Meir, 63f,

78, 84, 108; by Peres, 83; by Dayan, 288. U.S.

position on, outlined by Sisco, 35; by Nixon,

47, 49, 69; by Rogers, 86. Idea of, supported

by France, 44. Britain’s participation in dis¬

cussed, 95. Soviets prepared to join in, 99.

U.N. peacekeeping force for, suggested, 109f.

Acceptance of, urged by Israeli Communist

Party, 214. Recommended by O.A.U. Com¬

mittee, 284. Sadat prepared to accept, 38If.

See also U.N. peacekeeping force

“guarantees, U.S.”: discussed by Rogers, 148

INDEX 723

Guatemala: 579. U.N. voting record of, 695n,

698n, 699n, 703n, 706n

Gueye, Amadou: 81

Guinea: 16n, 188n, 189n, 190n, 282n, 575. U.N.

voting record of, 695n 698n, 699n, 702n, 703n

Guinea-Bissau: 16n, 562, 696

Gulf Oil: 491

Guyana: 579. U.N. voting record of, 695n, 698n,

699n, 703n

Habbash, George: 65. Hails coup d’etat in

Sudan, 51 Of

Haditha, Mashur: 348

Hafez, Munir: 376n

Haganah: 78

Hague Convention for Protection of Cultural

Property . ..: 596, 710

Haifa (Israel): 78, 84, 541, 633

Haifa Hospital (Israel): 221

Haikal, Muhammad Hasanain: 457

Haiti: 579, 702n, 703n

Halhoul (occupied territory): 638f

Hallstein Doctrine: 184f

Hamdi, Mahmoud: 138

Haram al-Sharif: endangered by excavations,

537, 596

Harmel, Pierre: outlines Belgian policy, 43f,

85, 193ff

Harriman, W. Averell: discusses Soviet attitude

to the Middle East, 51

al-Hasan, Bilal: reports on visit of P.D.F.L.P.

to China, 473

Hasan, Amir: 354

Hassan II, King: 254

Hassouna, Muhammad Abd-al-Khalik: 248

Hausner, Gideon: 16

Hawatma, Nayef: 541. Criticizes the Palestine

National Council, 399-403

Heath, Edward: 40

Hebrew Municipal Council (Jerusalem): 94

Hebrew University: 633

Hebron (West Bank): 63, 235, 251, 329, 589,

658. Israel said establishing settlements in,

630f, 643, 654. House reported destroyed in,

638f. Inhabitants of, protest settlements, 655.

Helms, Richard: visit of, to Israel discussed, 200,

209, 221

Helou, Charles: reviews events of 1967 War, 474f

Helsinki (Finland): see Socialist International

Conference

Hermon (Lebanon): 585. Bar Lev asserts Israeli

control of area, 240

Herut: see Gahal

Hillel, Shlomo: 658. On commando activities

in occupied territory, 287

Hilmi, Ahmad Abd al-Hamid: 345, 358. Work

of praised, 441

Histadrut: see Israeli Labour Federation

Holland: see Netherlands

Holy Places/Land: 188, 263, 366. Israeli position

on, 108, 672f. Concern lor, voiced by Pope

Paul VI, 115, 193. Right of Muslim access

to, affirmed by Shah of Iran, 198f. Jihad for

protection of, called by Muslim League, 250f.

Attitude of Saudi Arabia to, 465, 471. See

also: Jerusalem; names of specific sites

Honduras: 579. Voting record at U.N., 695n,

698n, 702n, 703n

Houphouet-Boigny, Felix: 285

Hulah Valley (Israel): 77, 82n, 84

Hungary: Middle East policy of, outlined, 297f.

Prime Minister of, visits Syria (communique),

327. Voting record at U.N., 695n, 698n, 699n,

703n

Husak, Gustav: 155

Huseirat (occupied territory): 639

Hussein camp (Jordan): 508

Hussein Takriti, Saddam: 410

Hussein, King: 162, 231, 240f, 280, 353, 395,

410, 421, 426n, 429n, 434, 439, 443, 444, 447,

452n. 509n, 519n, 531, 539, 559, 560. Position of,

viewed by U.S. officials, 34, 128, 211, 314f.

Israeli concessions to, 78, 84. Criticized by

French Socialists, 116f. Accused of accepting

U.S. aid by Chinese press, 13, 220f. Actions

of, reported by P.L.O. leaders, 347, 505. Inten¬

tions against Palestinians denied by, 422-425,

51 If, and Resistance criticized by, 51 If, 52If,

53Iff. Calls made by, for Arab Summit, 430f,

435f. Appeals made to, for end of clashes

with Palestinians, 436. Statements by Sadat

on actions of, 460f, 513—516, 526f. Rejects

idea of West Bank State, 476f, 559fF, but allows

for self-determination, 537f. Announces death

of al-Tall, 553f. See also Jordan

Ibrahimi Mosque (Hebron): 251, 589

Iceland: 143n, 16In, 17In, 182. Voting record

at U.N., 695n, 698n, 699n, 702n

Imwas (Israel): 639

724 INDEX

India: 190n, 218, 263, 308, 320, 518, 575. Vodng

record at U.N, 695n, 698n, 699n, 703n, 706n

Indian Ocean: 99. Soviet presence in, cited,

121, 126, 180, 232. Statement of U.S. interests

in, 218ff, 286, 319f, 324

Indochina: 139, 172, 396, 473, 562

Indonesia: 188n, 190n, 218, 285, 595. Voting

record at U.N., 695n, 698n, 699n, 703n

Institute for Palestine Studies: 622

International Association of Democratic Lawyers:

resolution of, on Palestine question, 140f

International Committee of the Red Cross: see

Red Cross

International Conference for Peace and Justice,

Rome, 1971: declaration, 118f

International Conference on Human Rights,

Teheran, 1968: 695, 707

International Conferences: see also headings begin¬

ning with Conference; World; Congress

“international guarantees”: see “guarantees, inter¬

national”

International Labour Organization: 706

International Meeting of Communist and Workers’

Parties, Moscow, 1969: 325

International Muslim Organizations Meeting,

Mecca, 1971: 38, 595

International Palestine Week, Peking, 1971 and

Algiers, 1971: statements of Chinese at, 133,

137f. Statements issued by, 136f

International Review of the Red Cross: cited in U.N.

Special Committee report, 622-645 pass.

International Symposium on Palestine, Second,

Kuwait, 1971: 39

International Union of Students, Tenth Con¬

ference, Bratislava, 1971: statement, 30f

Iran: 31, 131, 168, 188n, 217, 218, 263, 308.

Visit to Yugoslavia by Foreign Minister of

(communique), 7. Middle East policy of, 60,

598. Policy on oil and Persian Gulf reviewed,

198f. Position of, analyzed in U.S. Congress

report, 322f. Oil from, said reaching Israel,

490f. Voting record at U.N., 695n, 698n, 699n,

702n, 703n, 706n

Iraq: 31, 79, 108, 217, 327n, 362, 540. Visit to

Turkey by Vice-President of (communique), lOf.

Visited by North Koreans (communique), 168,

by Soviet delegation (communique), 190, and

by Somali President (communique), 297. Situa¬

tion in, analyzed in U.S. Congress report,

314, 323. Military position of, viewed by

Qadhafi, 364f. Policy statements by leaders

of, 410-414, 432-434, 508f, 549f, 689f, and in

proposed National Charter, 548. Role of, in

Eastern Front affirmed by al-Tall, 455 and

reviewed by Sadat, 460, 514. Position of Jews

in, 598. Voting record at U.N., 695n, 698n,

699n, 703n, 706n

Iraqi armed forces: 433, 506. See also Eastern

Front

Iraqi Baath Party: see Baath Party (Iraq)

Iraq Revolutionary Command Council: 10, 410

Irbid (Jordan): area involved in Palestinian-

Jordanian clashes, 354, 357, 359, 415f, 420,

425f, 438, 440, 445, 452, 581. Provided with

emergency relief, 609

Ireland: 143n, 152. Voting record at U.N.,

695n, 698n, 699n, 702n, 703n

al-Iryani, Abdul Rahman: 519n

Islam: see Muslims

Islamic Foreign Ministers Conference, 2nd,

Karachi, 1970: 188n

Islamic Secretariat: 39, 251

Islamic Solidarity Conference, Jedda, 1971: com¬

munique, 188

Ismail, Hafez: 557

Ismailia (Egypt): 328, 372

Ismailia Control Centre (Suez): 583

Israel: for statements of/on policy by leaders of,

see: Allon; Avnery; Aviram; Bar Lev; Begin;

Ben Gurion; Communist Parties of Israel*

Dayan; Dinitz; Dulzin; Eban; Eshkol; Galili;

Gazit; Goldmann; Hillel; Kollek; Meir; Peled;

Peres; Rabin; Sapir. For policy see also Israeli

government; Knesset. See also Arab population

in occupied territory; U.N. Special Com¬

mittee. ..; U.N. Resolutions

Israel-Lebanon Armistice Agreement, 1949: 494,

587,676 Israel-Lebanon Mixed Armistice Commission:

584

Israel-Syria Mixed Armistice Commission: 588

Israeli Air Force: 557

Israeli Communist Parties: 3, 32f, 135, 213, 324.

For details see Communist Party of Israel

(MAKI) and Communist Party of Israel

(RAKAH)

Israeli Defence (Emergency) Regulations: 644

Israeli Defence Forces (IDF): 25ff, 118, 638.

Behavior in Gaza described, 14f, 32f. Strength

of, affirmed by Meir, 29, and need for, 181.

Principle of withdrawal from Suez by, advocated

by MAKI, 135, and accepted by Meir’s govern-

INDEX 725

ment, 177, 264. Preparedness of, assessed by

Bar Lev, 238—240. See also Gaza

Israeli Gahal Party: 631. Opposes Israeli response

to Egyptian position, 43. Said to desire reten¬

tion of West Bank, 78, 84

Israeli Government: alleged proposals of, sent to

Jarring, 6. Denounced for policies in Gaza,

13-16. Welcomes U.A.R. initiatives, 42f. State¬

ments of policy issued through U.S. Embassy

of, 73-77, 168-170. Change of policy of,

demanded by MAKI, 135, 213f. Aid to,

requested in U.S. Congress, 21 Of, 26If, 291-294.

Letters and statements at U.N. by represen¬

tative of, on debate in General Assembly Res.

2628 (XXV), 574f; on ceasefire violations,

581-589 pass.; on occupied territories, 589-

592 pass.; on Jerusalem, 592-597 pass., 667-674;

on Jarring mission, 666—669. For report on

administration of occupied territories see U.N.

Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Prac¬

tices Affecting the Human Rights of the Popula¬

tion of the Occupied Territories. See also

Knesset; names of leaders (see entry for Israel);

Jewish Agency; U.N. Resolutions

Israeli Labour Federation (Histadrut): 672

Israeli Labour Party: 63, 101 n, 631. Speech by

Meir at Congress of, 108. Position of, outlined

by Sapir, 129f

Israeli Law and Administration Ordinance (1968):

633

Israeli Law on Absentee Property (1950): 633

Israeli Law on Compensation: 634

Israeli League for Human and Civil Rights:

report of, on Israeli practices in the Gaza Strip,

13-16

Israeli National Religious Party: 84, 631

Israeli Parliament: see Knesset

Israeli prisons: 31, 324

Italy: 68, 122, 143n, 161n, 171n, 231, 237, 281,

320, 490, 668, 670. Policy statements by leaders

of, 79f, 216ff. Visit to Algeria by foreign

minister of (communique), 188. Statement by

Communist Party of, 260f. U.N. voting record

of, 695n, 698n, 699n, 702n, 703n, 705n

Ivory Coast: 189n, 282n, 285, 687. U.N. voting

record of, 695n, 698n, 699n, 702n, 703n

Izvestia: 90, 209

Ja’abari, Shaikh Mohammed 5Ali: 655

Jabalia Refugee Camp (Gaza): 648ff

Jaber, Shaikh al-Ahmad al-Jaber: 357, 377n.

Favors holding Arab Summit Conference, 362

Jackson, Henry: speeches opposing Rogers

Plan, 120ff, and favoring U.S. aid to Israel,

291-294. Amendment of, opposed, 294

Jaffa (Israel): 541, 633

Jalloud, Abdul Salam: 215

Jalou (Israel): 639

Jamaica: 579. U.N. voting record of, 695n,

698n, 699n, 702n, 703n

Japan: 51, 100, 190n, 605, 668. Dependence on

Arab oil cited, 121, 172, 219, 321. King Faisal’s

visit to (communique), 154f. U.N. voting

record of, 695n, 698n, 699n, 702n, 703n, 705n

Jarring, Gunnar V.: 5, 7f, 20, 39, 48, 98, 101, 109,

116, 167, 182, 184, 204, 210, 216, 229, 232,

245, 248, 259, 264, 269, 275, 278, 301, 306,

313, 364, 369n, 376, 380f, 405, 422, 486, 494,

521, 533, 536, 551, 555, 558, 605, 686ff, 690.

Memorandum allegedly given by Meir to, 6.

Israeli acceptance of and conditions for partici¬

pation in mission of, outlined by Meir, 22-27,

176ff, 296, 303f. Text of Egyptian responses

to communications from, 360f, 367ff, 377f, and

response viewed by Tito, 40f, by Israeli leader

Begin, 43, by Belgium, 44, by U.S.S.R., 56f,

90f, 99, 119, by Iran, 60, by Meir, 62f, by

Israeli government, 75f, by Douglas-Home,

95, 243, by Sharp (Canada), 105, by Sen.

Fulbright, 112, by World Peace Council, 146,

by U.S, 150, by O.A.U, 189, 284, in U.S.

Congressional Report, 311. Reply to note

(memorandum) of, by Israeli government, 52f,

70f, 73ff, viewed by U.S.S.R, 57, 120, by

Bulgaria, 65f, by Douglas-Home, 67, by Leba¬

non, 677. Israeli desire to continue talks with,

106. U.S. desire for Israeli positive reply to

note of, 165f. Resumption of mission welcomed

by Jordan, 362f. Mission of and progress by,

discussed in U.N. Reports, 571-580 pass., 586,

592f, 598-603, 662-665. Text of aide-memoire

by, 666f. Jordanian cooperation with, outlined,

682. Commentaries on mission of, by various

organizations and individuals: Amin Dada

(Uganda), 82; Brandt (F.R.G.), 22, 71f, 104;

Eban (Israel), 677-679;. European Economic

Community, 143, 152f, 154, 194; Israeli Com¬

munist Parties (RAKAH), 3, (MAKI), 135;

Kosygin (U.S.S.R.), 4; Moro (Italy), 80;

Organization of African Unity, 283; Peres

(Israel), 83; Rabin (Israel), 92; Rogers (U.S.),

726 INDEX

18f, 85f, 89, 122f, 126f? 148f, 326, 680; Sadat (Egypt), 341, 343, 372-375 pass., 458f, 470, 518, 552; Scheel (F.R.G.), 205f; Schumann (France), 17, 300; Sisco (U.S.), 33f, 37; Social¬ ist International, 159f; Vatican, 93; World Council of Churches, 11. See also U.N. General Assembly Resolution 2799 (XXVI), Doc. 429.

Jebel Hussein Camp (Jordan): 609 Jedda (Saudi Arabia): 440, 540, 547. See Islamic

Solidarity Conference Jedrychowski, Stefan: 216 Jenin (West Bank): 235, 329, 638, 643. See also

Arabs in occupied territory Jerash (Jordan): area involved in Palestinian-

Jordanian clashes, 220, 353, 357, 359, 426, 429f, 503, 505, 512, 524, 539

Jericho (occupied territory): 589, 631

Jerusalem: 23, 70, 82, lOln, 112, 115, 151, 163, 205, 216, 269, 273, 296, 310, 341, 344, 351, 371, 373, 418, 425, 435, 444, 470, 477, 542, 601, 642, 685, 689, 704ff, 710. Resolutions on recovery of, by Muslim organizations, 38f, 188, 250ff. Iran government statement on legal status of, 60. Israeli statements on, 63, 65, 77, 84, 108, 129, 235. Rogers questioned about role of, in settlement, 127. International status of, favored by E.E.C., 142, and by Pope Paul VI, 193, 325. Suggested as joint capital of Israel and Palestine state, 162. Resolution by United Towns Organization on, 288. U.S. Congressional report on status of, 316f. Jor¬ danian government position on, 363, 422, 431, 444. Jordan accused of not fighting for, 419. Resistance operations in, 505. Fall of, described by Hussein, 522. U.N. reports on situation in, 573, 592-597, 627f, 633f, 636, 643, 646, and report on attempts to implement U.N. Resolution 298 on status of, 667-674. State¬ ments by U.N. delegates on situation in, 578, 676f, 683f. Text of U.N. Resolution 298 on, 704f. UNESCO Resolution on religious sites in, 710. Statements by various leaders on, and Israeli measures in, deplored: Afro-Asian Peoples’ Solidarity Organization, 192; Arch¬ bishop of Canterbury, 308f; Demirel (Turkey), 9; Feher (Hungary), 327; International Union of Students, 30; Lopez Bravo (Spain), 81; Mayhew (U.K.), 96; King Mohammed Zahir (Afghanistan), 244; Moro (Italy), 217; Organi¬ zation of Arab Cities, 536f. Saqqaf (Saudi Arabia), 463; Scheel (F.R.G.), 206; Prifice

Sultan (Saudi Arabia), 465. U.S. State Depart¬ ment spokesman, 183; Vatican, 93f; World Peace Council, 146. See also Arab population in occupied territory; Holy Places

Jewish Agency: 635. Financial report of, 195-198 Jewish National Fund: 630f Jewish people: 63, 193, 205, 275, 693. — religion,

137, 414. — communities in Sweden, 182f. — rule in Jerusalem, 317, 633. — companies not boycotted, 464. — history, taught in Pales¬ tinian camps, 472f, focussed on Jerusalem, 673. — citizens in Iraq, 598. — state, 25If, 521, 631. — quarter, in Hebron, 631, 635. — settlements in occupied territory, 631, 635, 654f. — projects in Jerusalem, 633. See also

Jews Jews: 118, 199, 205, 266, 287, 293, 308, 324,

462, 633. Proposed Democratic State in Pales¬ tine and, 59, 410, 463, 47Iff. Israeli leaders on rights of, to settle in West Bank, 63f* 409, 630f, and on status under Jordanian rule, 108, 671. In Arab countries, 68, 598. Jerusalem sacred to, 93, 309, 316f, 67Iff. Israel able to absorb, 101. Emigration of Russian, 128f. Dual loyalty of, 136. Armed stuggle said not against, 137, 398. Democratic state for, with Arabs rejected, 162f. Scandinavian, 182fi Fi¬ nances for immigration of, 195-198. Arabs have always coexisted with, 231. Influence of, in U.S., 280. Status in Israel of Eastern, 507. Actions of, in Hebron, 654f

Jiflik (occupied territory): 639 Jihad: 250f Johnson, Carol: report of, on investigatory trip

to Gaza, 270-272 Johnson, Lyndon: 103, 139, 201, 344 Jordan, 4f, 33, 65, 67, 71, 88f, 98, 122, 126ff, 150,

163, 178, 188n, 214, 235, 306, 341, 366f, 372, 382, 410, 412f, 422, 432f, 449, 459, 462, 465, 502, 526f, 564n, 571, 574, 576, 61 If, 615, 618—622 pass., 626—636 pass., 686. Pledge of non-belligerence by, required oy Israel, 23. Israeli leaders on border with (Meir), 62ff, 77, 84, 108, (Dayan), 118, (Bar Lev), 240f. U.S. aid to, requested, 211 and described by Rogers, 285. Economic situation of, 316. I.C.R.C. report on operations in, 328-332 pass. Welcomes resumption of Jarring mission, 362f. Chamber of deputies of, appeals for aid, 383f. Overthrow of government of, advo¬ cated by P.F.L.P., 387. Criticized by Iraqi

INDEX 727

leader, 395f. Arafat on Palestinian unity with, 398, and calls for Arab condemnation of, 512f. Refuses to attend Cairo meeting of Arab representatives, 430f. Premier of, views Arab Federation’s cuts in aid to, 455f. Algeria suspends relations with, 518f. Charter of National Union of, 527ff. Policy of, outlined by King Hussein, 537f, 559-561. Announce¬ ment of assassination of premier of, 553f. Rejects Israeli plans for West Bank elections, 561. Al-Lauzi government policy statement for, 567f. UNRWA activities in, 572, 605f, 609f. Complaints to U.N. by, 58If, 590f, on Jerusalem, 592- 596 pass. U.N. report on res¬ ponse of, to Jarring talks, 598-602 pass. Com¬ plaints by, on Israeli practices in occupied territory of, 636f, 654f. Foreign minister of addresses U.N., 681-684. U.N. voting record of, 695n, 698n, 699n, 702n, 703n, 705n, 708n.

Clashes with Palestine Resistance in, 174. Blamed on U.S. by Chinese press, 12f, 132, 220f, and by International Lawyers, 141. Viewed by: U.S. leaders, (Nixon), 46, 48, (Davies), 210, and in U.S. Congressional report, 314ff. Official statements on Jordanian view of, 337ff, 416f, 420f, 444f, 447f, 477, 480f. Work by Follow-Up Committee on, 345f, 42If, 439ff, 445f. Resistance statements on events of, agree¬ ments in, 346-352, 353-356, 359f, 390f, 396, 426f, 429f, 438, 452-455, 467f, 482, 497f, 500f, 503ff, 506, 523f, 539fF, and appealing for intervention in, 353, 415, 420, 441. Kuwait suspends aid to Jordan because of, 356f, 43 7f. P.L.O. and government announce end of, 357 and text of accord reached, 357—359. Qadhafi on reasons for, 366. P.F.L.P. calls for continua¬ tion of, 386f, and rejects mediation in, 524. Hussein’s statements on, 423ff, 435, 51 If, 52If, 531 ff, 559f. Joint committee formed with Syria to solve, 434. Statements on, by Arab Represen¬ tatives, 436f, 442f. Saudi Arabia-U.A.R. pro¬ posals for ending, 522f. Deplored and/or con¬ demned by various leaders and organizations: Afro-Asian Solidarity Organization, 191; Amir of Kuwait, 377, 543; Baath Party (Syria), 415; Chinese U.N. Representative, 693f; French Socialists and Algerian N.L.F., 116f; Inter¬ national Students Union, 30f; Muslim World League, 252; Sadat, 460f, 495, 513ff. Soviet press, 7; Tripoli Charter States, 509f, 519f; Vatican press, 223f; World Peace Council,

146. See also Arab Kings and Heads of State; King Hussein; Supreme Arab Follow-Up Com¬ mittee; Amman Agreement; Cairo Agreement; Eastern Front; al-Tall, Wash

Jordan, West Bank: 194, 231, 251, 271, 273, 327, 330, 371, 419, 420, 438, 444, 454, 470, 484, 582, 591, 605f, 684f. Statements by Israeli leaders on administration and future of, 55, 63, 77f, 82f, 112, 117f, 130, 173, 235, 241, 630. Palestinian state in, advocated by Avnery, 162f, considered in U.S. Congressional report, 316, and rejected by P.F.L.P., 337, by Fateh leader, 351, by Jordanian Chamber of Deputies, 383, by P.D.F.L.P. leader, 400f, by Hussein, 425, by Nabil Shaath, 47 If. Gaza refugees transferred to, 333. Character of, being changed by Israelis, 373. Hussein’s statements on Jordan policy towards, 422-425, 537f, 559f, and on Palestinian leadership in, 52If. Jordanian pay¬ ment of salaries to officials in, 481. Unity of, with Jordan stressed, 560, and Israeli elections in rejected, 561. Convoys from, used to aid victims of Jordanian-Palestinian conflict, 609. workers from, employed in Israel, 610. U.N. Special Committee report on Israeli practices in, 626-647 pass., 652-660 pass. UNRWA report on activities in, 649f. See also occupied terri¬ tory; Arabs in occupied territory; U.N. Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices.. .

Jordan Civil War: ^Jordan: Clashes with Pales¬ tine Resistance

Jordan-lsrael Armistice Agreement: 581 Jordan National Red Crescent Society: 330,

332, 637, 639 Jordan River: 78, 83, 84, 223, 398, 506, 521,

527, 686. Considered by Israelis as defensible border, 118

Jordan Valley: 84, 316, 467f, 581, 643. Alleged Jordanian action against commandos in, 353, 360, 426f, 438, 454. Refugees returning to, 610. Israeli settlements in West Bank of, 635, 654, and destruction of villages in, 639

Jordanian Army: 426n, 429n, 434n, 442n, 447n, 452n, 509n, 51 In, 515, 519n, Reports on clashes with Palestine Resistance, 7, 359, 419f, 438, 440f. Not performing its proper role, 461, 468. Soldiers said deserting from, 506. See also Jordan: Clashes with Palestine Resistance

Jordanian National Union: 531. Text of pro¬ posed charter for, 527-529. Hussein explains need for, 532, 560

728 INDEX

Joseph’s Shrine (Nablus): 589

Judaism: 672. See also Jews; Holy Places

Judea: 78, 84, 173, 240, 630. See also occupied

territory; Jordan, West Bank

July 14th Agreement: 347

Kadhafi, Muammar: see Qadhafi, Muammar

Kalkilya (occupied territory): 351, 380

Kamal, Sadaddin: 641

Kantara: 328, 33If

Kantara Control Centre (Suez Area): 582

Karameh (Jordan): 330, 568. Battle of, 436f,

506f, 568

Karami, Rachid: 474f

Karkabi, Zahi: 324

Kassab, Hamdi Khalil Mahmoud: 640

Kefar-Kassem: 14

Kenya: 189n, 282n, 285, 687. U.N. voting record

of, 695n, 698n, 699n, 702n, 703n

Kenyatta, Jomo: 285

Kfarchouba (Lebanon): 584

Kfar Darom (Gaza): 635

Kfar Etzion (occupied territory): 654

Khaddam, Abdel Halim: joint communiques

on visits to East Germany, 214f, to Poland,

216. Outlines Syrian policy, 565-567, at U.N.,

684-686

Khalaf, Salah (Abu Ayyad/Iyad): 468, 481.

On failings in Resistance, clashes with Jordan,

346-350, 539f, on Palestinian state, 35If. Denies

agreements with Jordan, 429f. Describes events

in Jordan, 452-455, and differences within

the Resistance, 540ff

Khalid, Mansour: 607, 709

al-Khalil: see Hebron

Khan Younis (Gaza): 649

Kharj Island (Iran): 489ff

Khartoum Conference: 234f, 239, 356f, 383, 522

al-Khashman, Muhammad: 384

al-Khatib, Samir: 358

el-Khatib, Ruhi: 288n, 629, 632

el-Khattab, Najeb Mohammed Issa: 641

al-Khauli, Hassan Sabri: 522n, 523

Khleifawi, Abdul Rahman: 466

Khmer Republic: 702n

King, John: 13

Kings and Heads of States: see Arab Kings and

Heads of State

Kiryat Arba (occupied territory): 654. See also

Hebron

Kissinger, Henry: 344, 557

Knesset: 16, 43, 82n, 106, 227, 642. Decision to

renew Jarring talks seen by RAKAH, 3. State¬

ments of Israeli policy to, by Meir, 22-29,

83f, 175-183, 264f, 376, by Dayan, 275, by

Eban, 289-291

Kollek, Teddy: 632ff, 636

Koran: 289

Korean Socialist Workers’ Party: 168

Kosciusko-Morizet, Jacques: statement on E.E.C.

Middle East policy, 152f

Kosseimeh District (Sinai): 16

Kosygin, Alexei: 49f, 52, 119, 406. On Soviet

Middle East policy, 4. Pledges Soviet support

for Arabs, 19f, and denies expansionist aims,

249f. Joint communiques on visits to Algeria,

252f, to Morocco, 254, to Cuba, 270, to Denmark,

301, to Norway, 306

Kuba’a, Taysir: 619f

Kufr Awa (Jordan): 581

Kulaga, Eugeniusz: 669

Kuneitra (Golan Heights): 64, 331, 380, 606

Kuo Mo-jo: states Chinese support for Pales¬

tinians, 17f, 133. Meets with P.L.O. delega¬

tion, 137f

Kuwait: 31, 39, 188n, 209, 217, 235, 323, 350,

353n, 365, 426n, 429n, 430n, 434n, 435n,

436n, 442, 447n, 452n, 509n, 51 In, 519n, 547,

564n. Replies to Qadhafi’s ideas on Pan-Arab-

ism, 340. Halts financial aid to Jordan, 356f.

Welcomes idea of Arab Summit Conference,

362. Supports Palestine armed struggle, 377f,

and rejects solutions not accepted by Pales¬

tinians, 437f. Amount of aid to Jordan, 481.

Education of Palestinians in, 499. Favors mili¬

tary solution, 542f. U.N. voting record of,

695n, 698n, 699n, 702n, 703n

Kuwaiti Graduate Society: 39

Ladgham: see al-Adgham, Bahi

Laird, Melvin: 292

Lance missiles: 557

Langer, Felicia: 642

Laos: 139, 396, 473. Voting record at U.N.,

695n, 698n, 699n, 702n

Latrun (West Bank): 380. Israeli settlements

in, 635f

al-Lauzi, Ahmad: states Jordanian policy on

Resistance, 567f

League for Human Rights: see Israeli League

INDEX 729

for Human Rights

League of Arab States: 39, 246, 251, 338, 383,

498, 513, 543, 554, 562f, 565. Meeting of

Secretary of, with Scheel, 248. Attitude of

Salah Khalaf to, 347, 350

Lebanon: 6n, 23, 48, 71, 79, 122, 150, 188n, 214,

353n, 360n, 372, 412, 426n, 429n, 430n, 434n,

435n, 436n, 442, 447n, 452n, 457, 507, 509n,

51 In, 519n, 540, 562, 565, 574, 591, 601, 605,

618, 626, 662, 682, 708. Meir opposes bi¬

national Palestinian state resembling, 78. Pos¬

sible admission to E.E.C. considered, 207.

U.S. aid to, 210f. Dayan’s views on border

with, 235. Number of commandos said killed

on Israeli border of, 275. U.S. Congressional

report on situation in, 314f. I.C.R.C. activities

in, 330f. Helou on role of, in 1967 war, 474ff.

Policy of, outlined, 493f. Incidents on Israeli

border of, 57If, and complaints about them

to U.N., 583-587. UNRWA operations in,

608. Speech by Foreign Minister of, at U.N.,

676f. U.N. voting record of, 695n, 698n, 699n,

702n, 703n, 706n. See also U.N. Security Council

Resolution 285 (1970)

Lebanon-Israel Armistice Agreement, 1949: 494,

587, 676

Lenner, Mark: 13

Lesotho: 16n, 189n, 282n. U.N. voting record

of, 695n, 698n, 699n, 702n, 703n

Liberia: 189n, 282n, 285, 687. U.N. voting

record of, 695n, 698n, 699n, 702n, 703n

Libya: 20, 31, 118, 121, 188n, 189n, 218, 235,

237, 282n, 339, 353n, 426n, 429n, 430n, 434n,

435n, 436n, 441 n, 442, 447n, 452n, 509, 51 In,

519n, 520, 562. Visit of Niger President to

(communique), 40f. Formation of Federation

with Egypt and Syria: viewed by Chinese

press, 125f, by Meir, 181, by Bar Lev, 239f,

by Iraqi President, 432, by Sadat, 45If, 516,

526f, by al-Tall, 455, by Qadhafi, 525, 529.

Visit to West Germany by Deputy Prime

Minister of (communique), 215. Policy of,

outlined by Revolutionary Command Council,

339f, by President Qadhafi, 364ff, 370, 378f,

457f, 487f. Proclamation of Federation with

Egypt, Syria, 449—451. U.N. voting record of,

695n, 698n, 699n, 702n, 703n. See also Tripoli

Charter States; Federation of Arab Republics

Libyan Revolutionary Command Council: policy

statement by, 339f

de Lipkowski, Jean: 44

Lopez Bravo, Gregorio: joint communiques with

foreign ministers of Morocco, 81, and Tunisia,

15If. Reiterates support of Spain for Arabs

and Palestine cause, 29, and outlines Spanish

policy, 68f, 81, and on Mediterranean, 262.

Visit of, to Tunisia (communique), 45

Losonczi, Pal: 297, 327n

Louis, Viktor: 200

Lusaka Conference: 42, 248. See also Conference

of Non-Aligned Countries, Third, Lusaka, 1970

Lutheran World Federation: 612

Luxembourg: 143n, 161n, 171n. U.N. voting

record of, 695n, 698n, 699n, 702n, 703n

Maadi Hospital (Egypt): 328

McCloskey, Robert J.: 236, 326

Madagascar: see Malagasy Republic

Mafraq (Jordan): 415, 426, 438

Magen David Adorn: 332

Maghreb: 218, 245, 455. See also Tunisia, Algeria,

Morocco

Majali, Habis: 348

Mahjub, Muhammad Ahmad: outlines economic

boycott of Israel, 464f

MAKI: see Communist Party of Israel (MAKI)

Makarios III of Cyprus: visits U.S.S.R. (com¬

munique), 174f

Malacca, Straits of: 219

Malagasy Republic: 189n, 282n. U.N. voting

record of, 695n, 698n, 699n. 702n, 703n

Malawi: 189n, 282n. U.N. voting record of,

695n, 698n, 699n, 702n, 703n

Malaysia: 188n, 575. U.N. voting record of,

695n, 698n, 699n, 702n, 703n

Mali: 16n, 188n, 189n, 282n, 575. U.N. voting

record of, 695n, 698n, 699n, 702n, 703n

Malik, Yakov: 56n

Malta: 143n, 237. U.N. voting record of, 695n,

698n, 699n, 702n, 703n

Manescu, Corneliu: 114, 282

Mansfield, Michael: 87f

Mao Tse-tung: 17, 32, 126, 133

Masmoudi, Muhammad: joint communiques,

with foreign ministers of Spain, 45, 15If,

Mauritania, 73, and Senegal, 81. Expresses

confidence in U.S., 363f, and support for

U.A.R. efforts, 382

Marar, Azmi Ibrahim: 637

Marjayoun (Lebanon): 475

Marj Na’yeh (occupied territory): 638

730 INDEX

al-Masri, Haj Ma’azoud: 658

Mauritania: 188n, 189n, 282n, 285, 575, 687.

Visit of Tunisian foreign minister to (com¬

munique), 73. President of, visits Saudi Arabia

(communique), 263. U.N. voting record of,

695n, 698n, 699n, 702n, 703n, 706n

Mauritius: 16n, 189n, 282n. U.S.S.R. seen seeking

port facilities in, 320

Mecca (Saudi Arabia): see International Muslim

Organizations Meeting, Mecca, 1971

Mediterranean: 51, 64, 174f, 200, 253f, 310,

316, 322. Spain calls for cooperation of nations

of, 9, 45, 262. Importance of stressed by Spain,

29, 81, 151, by Italy, 79, 188, 216ff, by E.E.C.

countries, 85, 143f, by Progressive Parties, 116,

427, by Tunisia, 15If, by France, 166f, 276,

by North Atlantic Council, 171, by Algeria,

188. Israel said key to peace in, 54. Soviet

presence in, 111, 120; seen threatening U.S.

interests, 121, and NATO interests, 319, 321,

and viewed by NATO Committee, 161, by

Meir, 180, by Tito, 231, by Sadat, 344, 555,

by Qadhafi, 457. U.S. and NATO presence

in, viewed by Soviets, 172, 237, 577, 597, bv

Douglas-Home, 245, by Qadhafi, 457

Meir, Golda: 3, 33, 37, 91, 123, 127, 164, 167, 200,

307, 342, 369n, 534, 555, 639. Memorandum

to Jarring allegedly sent by, 6. Statements

by, on Jarring talks, possible Suez settlement,

22-25, 26-29, 6Iff, 108, 302ff, on international

guarantees, 25, 108, on borders, 44, 62ff, 74,

77f, 82n, 83f, 108, 232f, 654, on U.S.S.R. and

U.S. Middle East policies, 175-183, 306, on

Israeli need for U.S. aid, 30If, on withdrawal,

304ff. Views of assessed by Fulbnght, 11 If.

Letter from O.A.U. Committee to, 282—285,

and reply by, 296. U.A.R. reaction to state¬

ments by, 376, 379, 409

Mexico: 579. U.N. voting record of, 695n, 698n,

699n, 702n, 703n, 706n

Michelmore, Laurence: 605, 699

Micheli, Dominique: 625

MiG’s: 5, 557

Militia (Jordan): 358, 448

Millas, Orlando: 58f

Mirage aircraft: 300, 379, 457

al-Misaa: 209

missile(s): 50, 64, 77, 88, 381, 557. See also SAM

missiles

Mitla Pass (Sinai): 302, 558

Mobutu, Joseph Desire: 285

Moersch, Karl: 215

Mohammed, Ali Nasser: 253

Mohammed Zahir, King: 244

Moi, Daniel Arap: 285

Mongolia: 163f, 575. U.N. voting record of,

695n, 698n, 699n, 702n, 703n

Monteil, M.: 166, 223

Moro, Aldo: outlines Italian Middle East policy,

importance of Mediterranean, 79f, and concern

for Palestinians, 216ff. Visit of, to Algeria

(communique), 188

Morocco: 16n, 188n, 189n, 218, 282n, 365, 527,

562, 578. Foreign minister of, visits Spain

(communique), 8. Visit to, by Spanish foreign

minister (communique), 81, by British foreign

secretary (press conference), 244f, (commu¬

nique), 245, by Premier Kosygin (communique),


702n, 703n, 7Q6n

Moslem Museum (Jerusalem): 596. See also

Muslims

Mosque of Rachel’s Tomb: 589

Mouknass, Hamdi Ould: 73

Mount of Olives: 633

Mount Scopus: 94, 671

Mozambique: 16n, 31, 562, 696

al-Mutnh, Riyad: 358, 429, 440

Muskie, Edmund: 38, 51

Muslim/Islamic countries: 39, 250, 339, 471, 518

Muslim Organizations, International: declara¬

tions of joint meeting of, 38f

Muslim World League: 38n. Constituent assembly

resolution, 250ff

Muslim(s)/Islamic people: 38, 163, 188, 422,

464, 565, 676, 710. Should live in democratic

state in Palestine, 59, 414, 507. Concern for

rights of in Holy Land, expressed by the Vatican,

93f, by Shah of Iran, 198f, by Archbishop of

Canterbury, 308f, by UNESCO, 710. Israel to

guarantee access to holy places of, 108. Called

to Jihad, by World League, 250ff. Position in

Jerusalem assessed by U.S. Congressional report,

316f, and in the Persian Gulf, 322. Rights of,

to Jerusalem affirmed, 463, 465, 683. In Israel,

671

Naaman, Ahmad Muhammad: 466

Naame, D.: 134

Nablus (West Bank): 235, 589, 638, 641, 656.

Israeli prison in, visited by I.C.R.C., 329f,

INDEX 731

and conditions in, protested by Mayor al-Masri,

658. See also Arabs in occupied territory

Nahal settlements: 631

Nahl (Sinai): 16

Napjar, Muhammad Yusif (Abu Yusif): on results

of Palestine National Council meeting, 394f

Nakagawa, Torn: 668

Namibia: 696

Nasser, Gamal Abdel: 28, 174, 185, 234, 242,

257, 269, 280, 304, 310, 314, 342, 353n, 365,

417, 426n, 429n, 434n, 442n, 447, 457, 472,

495, 509n, 51 In, 513, 515, 519n, 547, 554, 605.

Leadership of Egypt, after death of, 36. Policy

of, continued, 39, 258, 493. Israeli commentary

on, 43, 63, 75, 83, 118, 180f, 183. Sadat on

policy of, 343, 371, 382, 392, 460f, 479. Quoted

on Arab union, 452. Said misled during 1967

war, 474f

Nasser Hospital (Gaza): 14f

NATO: see North Atlantic Treaty Organization

Naville, Marcel A.: 639

Nawaf, Prince Ibn Abd al-Aziz: statement on

King Faisal’s talks in U.S., 471

Nazareth: 633

Near East Council of Churches: 612

Near East Emergency Donations Inc. (NEED):

612

Nebi Samwil (occupied territory): 630, 632, 639

NEED: see Near East Emergency Donations Inc.

Negev: 55

Nepal: U.N. voting record of, 695n, 698n, 699n,

702n

Netherlands (Holland): 143n, 161n, 171n. U.N.

voting record of, 695n, 698n, 699n, 702n, 703n,

7Q6n

New Zealand: 612. U.N. voting record of,

695n, 698n, 699n, 702n, 703n, 706n

Nguyen Ti Binh: 153

Nicaragua: 579, 668. U.N. voting record of,

695n, 698n, 699n, 702n, 703n, 705n

Nicosia (Cyprus): 599, 678

Niger: 188n, 189n, 282n. President of, visits Libya

(communique), 40f. U.N. voting record of,

695n, 698n, by9n, 7U2n, /U3n

Nigeria: 16n, 189n, 282n, 285, 575, 579f, 687.

U.N. voting record of, 695n, 698n, 699n,

702n, 703n

Nile/Valley: 343, 455

Nir, Arye: 658

Nixon, Richard: 12, 34, 40, 85, 91, 123, 127, 139,

165, 182, 185, 210, 229, 255, 270, 286, 301,

312, 344, 462, 470n, 680. Affirms U.S. support

for Israel, 4ff. Reports on Middle East situa¬

tion to Congress, 46-51. Attitude of, assessed

by Allon, 53f, by Wexler, 61, by Rabin, 201,

by Goldmann, 279f, by Meir, 305f. Denies

imposing settlement on Israel, 69. Hailed as

world leader, 148. Views on Soviet-Egyptian

treaty, 167f. Sadat on communications with,

373, 379, 469, 534, 546, 555f, 558. Report on

Faisal’s talks with, 471

Non-Aligned Countries: 42, 263. Statement made

at Representatives Consultative meeting of,

247

Non-Aligned Countries Conference, Third,

Lusaka, 1970: 42, 212, 238, 247, 574

North Atlantic Council: 171

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO):

99, 17In, 200, 207, 245, 285, 310, 696. Indepen¬

dence of Middle East vital to, 49, and U.S.S.R.

Middle East involvement a threat to, seen by

Rogers, 120f, and in communique by Planning

Committee of, 161. Importance of Arab oil

to, 172, 321. Israel said offering air bases to,

209. Power of, assessed in Soviet press, 237.

Israeli entry into, 317, and Soviet threat to,

studied in U.S. Congressional report, 319,

321. See also North Atlantic Council

North Korea: delegation from, visits Iraq (commu¬

nique), 168

North Vietnam: Bouteflika’s visit to, 225f

Northern Ireland: 600, 605

Norway: 143n, 152, 161n, 171n, 182, 605.

Kosygin’s visit to (communique), 306. U.N.

voting record of, 695n, 698n, 699n, 702n, 703n

Norwegian Refugee Council: 612

Nouira, Hedi: 45

Novikov, V.N.: 190

Nujaim, Jean: 474

Numairi, Gaffar Mohamed: 353n, 357, 426n,

429n, 434n, 442n, 447n, 452n, 509n, 51 In,

519n. Visit of, to U.S.S.R. (communique),

117. Hails resolutions of Tripoli Conference.

520

Nur-Elmi, Hussein: 616) 647

Nusaiba, Nuhad: 358

Nyerere, Julius: 285

O.A.U.: see Organization of African Unity

occupied territory: see Arabs in occupied terri¬

tory; U.N. Special Committee to Investigate

Israeli Practices in. . .

732 INDEX

oil: 66f, 383. OPEC policies on, supported by China, 3If. Transport of, affected by opening of Suez Canal, 93. Importance of, to industrial countries and Soviets seen as threat to flow of, 121, 218f, 321. Soviet press analysis of impor¬ tance to U.S. of, 172. Iran’s policy on, 198. Saudi Arabia’s policy on, 465. P.F.L.P. claims Israel receiving Iranian and Arab, 489-592

Oman: 321, 323. U.N. voting record of, 695n, 698n, 699n, 702n, 703n

OPEC: see Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries

Organization of African Unity: 81, 238, 248, 251, 289, 548, 597, 665, 687f, 702. Statements by, on Middle East problems, 144f, by Annual Assembly of, 189. Peace mission of, visits Israel: statement by leader of, 275f, and by Eban, 277ff. Text of peace mission memo¬ randum, 282-285, and replies by Meir, 296, and by Sadat, 552f

Organization of Arab Cities: 288n. Resolution on Jerusalem, 536f

Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC): 533. Supported by Chinese press, 3If. Iran’s views on, 198

Osmani School Mosque: 632f OXFAM: 612

Packard, David: 12 Pakistan: 131, 188n, 218, 308, 518, 575, 595.

Support of Jordan acknowledged, 339. U.N. voting record of, 695n, 698n, 699n, 702n, 703n, 706n

Pak Song-chol: 168 Palestine and Palestine issue/problem: 10, 152,

154f, 168, 181, 251, 366, 379, 383, 399f, 413, 425, 427, 458, 463, 469, 472, 484, 526, 582, 553, 562, 571, 667. Viewed by Brandt, 22, by Meir, 24, 26, 64f, 108, 181, by Dayan, 266. Liberation of, called for and problems inherent in, 38f, 136, 250, 352, 370, 378, 418, 471ff, 524. Jor¬ danian policy on, 337, 430f, 435, 444f, 528, 559f, and viewed by Tunisians, 383. Occupied by Zionists, 409, 508. Solution for, outlined by Syrian leaders, 410, 414, 566f, and Iraqi leaders, 427f, 432f, 548f. Egyptian policy on, 382, 494f, and Kuwaiti policy on, 437. The pivot of Arab struggle, 530. See also Palestine Resistance; Palestinians

Palestine Armed Struggle Command (PASC):

484 Palestine Liberation Army: 389, 391, 402, 444 Palestine Liberation Organization: 357, 440, 541,

654. Delegations from, visit China, 132, 137f, 204, 473f, and U.S.S.R., 266f. Appeals to end fighting in Jordan made to, 345f. Spokesmen for, describe fighting in Jordan, 353-356, 359f. Qadhafi on problems of, 366. Better unity in, proposed, 387ff. Stipulations on leadership in Constitution of, 390ff. Sole representative of Palestinians, 397, 512f. Report on activities of, 496-499. Working paper by, on ending Palestinian-Jordanian clashes, 523f

Palestine Liberation Organization Central Com¬ mittee: 12, 139, 204, 346, 359, 394, 401, 416, 426n, 429n, 434, 436, 438, 442n, 447n, 448, 504, 509n, 51 In, 519n. Appeals by, to Arab leaders for end of Jordanian-Palestinian fighting, 353, 415, 420, 441. Joint communique issued with Jordan government, 357, and text of agreement on end of fighting, 357ff. Reaffirms rejection of U.N. Resolution 242, 36 If. Proposals for P.L.O reorganization submitted to, 387ff. Said taking over role of Executive Committee, 391. Issues statement on Jordan situation, 452-455. See also Arafat, Yasser

Palestine Liberation Organization Executive Com¬ mittee: 139, 266, 403, 543. Statements by representatives of, on fighting in Jordan, 221. Seen being supplanted by Central Committee, 391. Asked to assume certain duties, 395. Report on P.L.O. activities submitted by, 496-499. Memorandum of, to Arab Heads of State, 512f. Message sent by, to U Thant on Israeli actions in Gaza, 536. See also Arafat, Y asser

Palestine Liberation Organization Permanent Council for Educational Planning for Pales¬ tinians: 498

Palestine Liberation Organization Unified Com¬ mand: 116, 434

Palestine National Charter: amendments to, pro¬ posed, 384ff. Adherence to, called for, 387f, 390f, 397, 496

Palestine National Council/Assembly: 132, 181, 221, 505f, 513. Chinese message of support to, 204. Proposals for reconstitution of, 384f, 387ff, 389-392. Sadat’s speech to Eighth Session ot, 392, and to Ninth Session of, 494f. Statements on results of Eighth Session, 394f. Political program adopted by, 396-399. Ineffectiveness

INDEX 733

of, cited by P.D.F.L.P., 399-403, and by P.F.L.P., 403f. P.D.F.L.P. recommendations for, 487. P.L.O. report to, 496-499. Final communique of Ninth Session of, 503f

Palestine National Fund: 389, 392 Palestine National Liberation Movement: see

al-Fateh Palestine Red Crescent: 367 Palestine refugees: 42, 50, 56, 59, 101, 127, 135,

151, 234, 283, 369, 378, 419, 578, 600, 616, 706, 709, 711. Just settlement to problem of, called for by representatives of: Bulgaria, 65; Egypt, 342, 382, 470, 602; Germany (West), 215; Israeli Communist Parties (RAKAH), 3 and (MAKI), 214; Italy, 217; Jordan, 363. Importance of issue stressed by Brandt, 22, 71. Viewed as a humanitarian problem by Meir, 29. Lives of, in camps deplored, 30, 47, 223. Israeli proposals for, 52f, 83 and attitude towards, 75, 678. Seen as a popula¬ tion threat by Sapir, 130. Solution for suggested by E.E.C., 142, and by Council of Europe, 144. Treatment of, in Gaza Strip, 273IF, 591. U.S. Congressional report on Israeli and Egyp¬ tian positions on, 312, and on situation of, 314f. UNRWA report on services to, 603-613, and on Israeli activities in Gaza Strip, 648-650. More aid to, called for, 676. Statements on, by foreign ministers of Syria, 685, and Algeria, 691. U.N. resolutions renewing UNRWA mandate for, 698-701. WHO resolution on rights of, 71 If. See also Arab population in occupied territory; Gaza; Palestinian people

Palestine Research Center (P.L.O.): 499, 622 Palestine Resistance/commandos: 237, 364, 422,

473, 494, 530, 562, 595. Support for, expressed by; Chilean Communist and Socialist Parties, 58f; Chilean foreign minister, 58; Chou En-lai, 137-140; Iraq, 168, 190, 297, 433, 690; North Korea, 168; Saudi Arabia, 463f; Somalia, 297; Soviet spokesmen, 266f; Syria, 410, 466, 565ff, 685; Tunisian Socialist Party, 427; U.S.S.R., 543ff; World Peace Council, 145ff. Statements on, by Israeli leaders, (Gazit) 174, (Bar Lev) 240, (Dayan) 275, and U.N. representative, 585. Position of, in Jordan assessed in U.S. reports, 210f, 314f. I.C.R.C. dealings with, 331. Statements on role and problems of, by various leaders of, 337, 350-352, 399-404, 471ff, 481- 485, 499-503, 504-508, 539-542, and on re¬ organization of, 384-387,387-392,487. Disunity

in, deplored by Qadhafi, 366, by Sadat, 495. Political program for, 396-399. Elements of, criticized by Iraqi leader, 412f. Seen as only way to liberate Palestine, 427f.

Clashes with Jordan army: described, ex¬ plained by commando leaders, 346-349, 353- 356, 359f, 426f, 429f, 438, 441 f, 452-455, 467f, 504f, 512f, 523f, and by Jordanian leaders, 416, 420f, 423fF, 430f, 435f, 444f, 447f, 477, 480f, 51 If, 52If, 53If. Agreement to end, announced, 357, and text of, 357ff. Al-Adgham’s statements on, 42If, 439ff, 445ff. Syria organizes mediation committee on, 434. Representatives of Arab Heads of State call for end of, 436, 442f. Sadat’s views on, 460f, 495, 513ff. Saudi Arabian-U.A.R. efforts to end, 522f. Commen¬ tary on, and condemnation of Jordan regime expressed by: Afro-Asian Peoples’ Solidarity Organization, 190ff; Algeria, 518f; Algerian N.L.F., 116f, 261; Baath Party (Syria), 415; Boumedienne, 419; Chinese press, 12f, and leaders, 18; Federation of Arab Republics, 525; French Socialist Party, 116f; International Association of Democratic Lawyers, 141; Inter¬ national Students Union, 30f; International Symposiums on Palestine, (Kuwait), 39, and (Algeria), 136f; Italian Communist Party, 261; Kuwait, 356f,' 437f; Soviet press, 7; Tripoli Charter States, 509f, 519f. See also

Palestine Liberation Organization; Arafat, Yasser; Palestinian people; names of resistance organizations

Palestine state (in West Bank): 461. Rejected: by Meir, 64f, 78; by P.F.L.P., 337, 384, 386, 400, 501; by Jordan, 338, 424, 476, 560; by Fateh, 351, 355f; by P.F.L.P.-General Com¬ mand, 366f; by P.L.O., 398; by Nabil Shaath, 471. Seen as U.S. plot, 126, 133. Advocated by Uri Avnery, 162f. See also Democratic State of Palestine

Palestinian Arab Organization: 506 Palestinian democratic state: see Democratic State

of Palestine Palestinian people/Palestinians; 26, 187f, 235,

257, 310, 362ff, 383, 385, 407, 416, 426, 442, 492, 524, 545, 562, 585, 609, 643f. Thought to be considering coexistence with Israel, 34. Israeli leaders’ commentary on, (Meir) 64f, _ 181, (Peres) 82, (Galili) 230. Struggle of, seen in. Chinese press, 12f, 125f, 132f, and in Soviet press, 224. Presence in Jordan viewed by

734 INDEX

Rogers, 128. Council of Europe calls for participation in settlement by, 143f. Viewed by Avnery, 162f. Vatican commentary on plight of, in Jordan, 223. Treatment of, in occupied territory, 272f, 274, 590. U.S. Con¬ gressional report on Jordanian clashes with, and conditions of, described, 314f. Resistance statements on role of, problems of, and plans of, 350ff, 355f, 383ff, 390-403 pass., 426f, 438, 452ff, 468, 483f, 496-508 pass., 510, 541, 543f. Qadhafi on problems of, 366. Sadat on right to speak for themselves, 371. Said to be treated worse by Jordanians than by Zionists, 419. Al-Adgham on Jordanian attitude to, 422, 440. Educated against Zionism not Jews, 472f. P.L.O. said legal representative of, 513. - writers said to be part of Resistance, 563. Rights of, considered in U.N. resolutions, 575, 605f, 695f, 698-701, and in debates at U.N., 577-580 pass. Permitted to visit relatives in occupied territory, 656.

Statements on plight of and/or support for rights of, made by spokesmen for the following countries or organizations: Afghanistan, 244; African Trade Union Federation, 16; Afro- Asian Solidarity Organization, 191; Algeria, 208f, 225, 253, 418, 518f, 690f; Algerian N.L.F., 116f, 261; Chile, 58; Chilean Communist Party, 59; China, 17f, 132, 138f, 204, 225, 236, 246, 691f; Cuba, 208f, 270; Egypt, 10, 75, 161, 203, 212, 221, 259, 361, 368, 370, 375, 379, 417, 470, 494f, 515, 546; Federation of Arab Republics, 125; France, 44; French Communist Party, 254; French Socialist Party, 116f; Germany (East), 215, 307; Germany (West), 71; Hungary, 327f; Hungarian Com¬ munist Party, 155; International Association of Democratic Lawyers, 140f; International Conference for Peace and Justice, 119;. Inter¬ national Symposiums in Algeria, 137f, in Kuwait, 39; International Union of Students, 30f; Iraq, 10, 168, 190, 297, 433, 548ff, 689f; Israeli Communist Parties, (RAKAH) 3, 324, and (MAKI) 213f; Italy, 216; Italian Communist Party, 261; Japan, 155; Jordan, 337ff, 363, 423f, 430f, 435, 52If, 532, 560, 568; Kuwait, 377, 437f, 543; Febanon, 493f, 676; Fibya, 41; Mauritania, 73; Mongolian Revolutionary Party, 164; Morocco, 9, 245, 254; Muslim World Teague, 250f; Niger, 41; North Korea, 168; North Vietnam, 226; Poland, 216;

Rumania, 115, 282; Saudi Arabia, 125, 152, 155, 462f; Senegal, 81; Somaliland, 297; South Yemen, 253; Spain, 9, 29, 45, 81, 152; Soviet Communist Party, 115, 134, 222, 324; Sudan, 117; Syria, 21, 216, 410, 567, 684f; Syrian Communist Party, 134; Taiwan, 152; Tripoli Charter States, 520; Tunisia, 73, 81, 152, 382; Tunisia Socialist Party, 427; U.N. Report, 647; U.S.S.R., 10, 20f, 117, 119, 155f, 161, 190, 203, 249, 253f, 258, 266f, 270, 309, 675; U.S.A., 49; Warsaw Treaty Countries, 598; World Peace Council, 145ff; Yemen Arab Republic, 309, 466; Yugoslavia, 7, 41, 212, 231, 263. See also all headings beginning with Palestine; Arab population in occupied territory

Panama: 579. U.N. voting record of, 695n, 698n, 699n, 702n, 703n

Paraguay: 579. U.N. voting record of, 695n, 698n, 699n, 702n, 703n

Partition Resolutions/Plan: 422f, 644 P.D.F.L.P.: see Popular Democratic Front for

the Liberation of Palestine “Peaceful solutions”: 432ff. See “Rogers Plan”;

“U.S. initiative” Pedini, Signor: 217 Pehlavi, Mohammad Reza: 60, 491, 548. Outlines

Iran’s policy on oil, the Persian Gulf, and Muslim Holy Places, 198f. Position of, analyzed in U.S. Congressional report, 322. See also

Iran Peking Review: 3In, 125n, 132n. Excerpts from,

12f, 220f, 236. See also People's Daily (China) Peled, Natan: 101 People's Daily (China): excerpts from, 3If, 125f,

132f People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen: see

Yemen, South People’s Struggle Front: 506 Peres, Shimon: on U.S.-Israeli relations, 82f Persian/Arabian Gulf: 32, 217, 219, 274, 694.

U.S. position and interest in assessed, 51, 121, 218f, 32Iff. Soviets desire access to, 52, 320. Iranian influence in, discussed, 198f. Saudi role in, 211. See also Arabian Gulf

Peru: U.N. voting record of, 695n, 698n, 699n, 702n, 703n, 706n

Petitpierre, Mr.: 329 petroleum: see oil P.F.L.P.: see Popular Front for the Liberation

of Palestine Phantoms: 61, 311, 457, 582. Renewed ship-

INDEX 735

merits called for in Congress, 261, 265, 293f. U.S. suspension of shipments to Israel, discussed by Eban, 267f, by Goldmann, 279f, by Meir, 301f, 305. Said to represent U.S. support of Israeli aggression, 344, 417, 469, 516, 546f, 574, 577f, 692

Philippines: U.N. voting record of, 695n, 698n, 699n, 703n, 706n

Pilloud, C.; 624 P.L.O.: see Palestine Liberation Organization P.N.L.M.: see al-Fateh Podgorny, Nicolas V.: 165, 173, 179, 222, 373,

406, 470n. Pledges Soviet support for U.A.R., 8, 9f, 158f, 160f, and criticizes U.S. actions in Middle East, 155f. Outlines Soviet Middle East policy, 257f

Poland: 669. Syrian minister’s visit to (com¬ munique), 216. U.N. voting record of, 695n, 698n, 699n, 702n, 703n

Pompidou, Georges: statements on French Mid¬ dle East policy, Ilf, 264. Thanked by Sadat for French friendly policy, 460, 518

Ponomaryov, Boris N.: 134, 221 Pontifical Mission for Palestine: 612 Pope Paul VI: 199. Expresses concern for people

of occupied territory, 115, 193, and those in Jordan, 325

Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (P.D.F.L.P.): 366, 433. Future of, assessed in U.S. Congressional report, 315. Criticizes Palestine National Council, 399—403. Protests Rogers’ Middle East visit, 457. Leader reports on China visit by, 473f. Recommends changes in Palestine National Council, 487. Arafat commentary on, 540f

Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (P.F.L.P.): 366, 510, 514, 540, 541. Future of, assessed in U.S. Congressional report, 315. Rejects idea of Palestine State, 337, and pro¬ poses reconstitution of Palestine National Coun¬ cil, 384-387. Criticizes Palestine National Council, 403f. Protests Rogers’ Middle East visit, 456. Criticizes and analyzes Resistance organization, 481-485, 499- 503. Announces attack on Israeli oil tanker and alleges Arab oil reaches Israel, 489- 492. Rejects mediation in Jordanian-Palestinian clashes, 524. Arafat commentary on, 540f

Popular Front for the ‘Liberation of Palestine- General Command: rejects all peaceful pro¬ posals, 366f. Protests Rogers’ Middle East

visit, 456 Popular Front for the Liberation of the Occcupied

Arab Gulf: 323 Port Said (Egypt): 372 Porter, Dwight: 476 Portugal: 31, 16In, 17In. U.N. voting record

of, 695n, 696n, 698n, 699n, 703n

Pravda: commentary on Palestinian-Jordanian clashes, 7. Commentary on U.S. Middle East policy, 171-173, including possible U.S. mili¬ tary intervention, 237, and shipments of air¬ craft to Israel, 307

Primakov, Ye.: 17In Puja, Frigyes: 327n von Puttkamer, Jesco: 153

Qaddumi, Faruq (Abu Lutf): report of, on Palestinian delegation’s visit to U.S.S.R., 544f

Qadhafi, Muammar: 40, 353n, 426n, 429n, 434n, 442n, 447n, 451,452n, 509,51 In, 519n, 520, 525. Regarded as fanatic by Dayan, 118. Reply to proposals of, by Kuwait, 340, 362. Stresses need for Arab and Palestinian unity, 364ff, 378f, and for the elimination of Zionist aggres¬ sion, 370. Statements against superpower in¬ volvement in Mediterranean, 457f, and on U.S. policy in the Middle East, 487f. Hails formation of Federation of Arab Republics, 529

Qalqilya (occupied territory): 351, 380 Qantara: 328, 33If Qatar: 323. U.N. voting record of, 695n, 698n,

699n, 702n, 703n Quneitra (Golan Heights): 64, 331, 380, 606

Rabat Arab Summit Conference: 45In Rabin, Yitzhak: 177, 267n. On U.S. policy

towards Israel, 92f, and importance of U.S. support, 20Iff

Rachel’s Tomb: 589 RAKAH: see Communist Party of Israel

(RAKAH) Rafah (Gaza): Israeli settlements in, 634f. Popu¬

lation transfers of camp in, 648ff Ramallah (West Bank): 162, 329, 591, 631 Ramele Prison (Israel): 642 Ramsey, Michael, Archbishop of Canterbury:

, on status of Jerusalem, 308f Ra’s al-Khayma: 322f Rashid, Nadhir: 358

736 INDEX

Ras Nakoura (Lebanon): 328 Ras Tanoura (Saudi Arabia): 491 Red Crescent: 332. See names of local societies,

e.g. Egyptian Red Crescent Red Cross: 590, 609, 707, 712. Report on services

to Arabs and Israelis, 328—334. Asked to aid inhabitants of Gaza Strip, 367. Israel said barring distribution of supplies in occupied territories, 59If. U.N. report on attempts to get information from, 615f, 618, 622-626, and excerpts from reports and letters dealing with problems in Middle East, 624f, 636—640. State¬ ment on Geneva Conventions, 328f. Is prepared to become a Protecting Power, 652, 659f. Is urged to cooperate with U.N. Special Com¬ mittee, 708

The Red Cross in Action: 645 Red Sea: 52, 55, 186, 214, 217ff, 320, 489 refugees: see Palestine refugees Rennie, Sir John: 603n, 605, 648n. See also

UNRWA Reunion: 16n Revolutionary Command Council, Libya: see

Libya “Rhodes-type” talks: 18 Rhodesia: 31, 437

Riad, Mahmoud, 24, 29, 67, 69, 178, 303, 326, 679. Visit of, to U.S.S.R. (communiques), 119f, 203f, and to Yugoslavia, 21 Iff. On U.S. Middle East policy and U. A. R.-U.S.S.R. Treaty, 492f, and on Egyptian efforts towards peace, 686-689

al-Rifa’i, Abd al-Mun’em: 348 Riksdag: 100. See also Sweden Roa Garcia, Raul: 208 Rogers, William: 34f, 37, 44, 48f, 54, 64, 82, 94,

131, 135, 184, 210, 233, 280, 301, 372, 459, 468, 540, 542, 679, 686, 687. Statements by: on Middle East negotiations, 18f; on aspects of U.S. Middle East policy, international guar- arantees, 85-90, 148f, 254, 326f; on a peace¬ keeping force, 122-125; on settlement condi¬ tions, 126-129; on the U.A.R.-U.S.S.R. Treaty, 185f, 255f; on the balance of power, 285ff. Policy of, supported by Fulbright, 96, 11 Off, and questioned by Dayan, 103, 287f. Reasons for and effect of Middle East tour, reviewed by Sisco, 150f, by Schumann, 165, 222, in Soviet press, 172f, by Meir, 175ff, in U.S. Congressional report, 312f, by Resistance leader, 473. Eban on talks with, 267ff. Visit of, de¬

nounced by Resistance groups, 456f. Talks with, discussed by Saudi minister, 462f, by Sadat, 469, 485f, 545f, 554-558, by al-Tall, 481, by Mahmoud Riad, 492, 516, 533ff, by Lebanese minister, 493f

“Rogers Plan/Initiative”: 17, 92, 117, 351, 365, 481, 556, 598. Rejected by Allon, 53ff, by Meir, 64, by Peres, 82, by Algerian N.L.F., 116, by Galili, 228f, by Muslim World League, 251, by Eban, 267f, by Resistance Organiza¬ tions, 337, 361, by Iraqi Baath, 395. Supported by Iran, 60, by Avnery, 163, by West Germany, 207, by Tunisia, 364, by Jordan, 444, 521. Abandonment of, called for by Sen. Jackson, 120f. Criticized in Soviet press, 17If. Accepted by Egypt, 184, 372, 392, 404f, 472, 533. Viewed by Iraqi leaders, 41 If, 433, and by Boumedienne, 419

Rostow, Eugene: 73 Rumania: 490. Supports political settlement in

Middle East, 114, 282. U.N. voting record of, 695n, 698n, 699n, 702n, 703n

al-Rusaifa (Jordan): 355, 426, 439 Rusan, Ahmad: 358 Rwanda: 189n, 282n. U.N. voting record of,

695n, 702n, 703n Ryan, Patrick Arguello: 30n

Sa’ad, Abu Ammar: 137 al-Sabah, Shaikh Jaber al-Ahmad al-Jaber: 357.

Favors an Arab Summit Conference, 362. Outlines Kuwait’s attitude to armed struggle, 542f

al-Sabah, Shaikh Saad al-Abdullah: 362 al-Sabah, Shaikh Sabah al-Salim: 353n, 426n,

429n, 434n, 442n, 447n, 452n, 509n, 51 In, 519n. On armed struggle, 377, 542f

al-Sabban, Muhammad Soroor: 38n Sabri, Ali: 166,517 Sacasa, Guillermo Sevilla: 668 Sadat, Anwar: 17, 22, 77, 80, 83, 103, 112, 123,

125, 127, 158, 173, 175, 185, 199, 212, 234, 287, 289, 300, 409, 417, 433, 493, 506, 509, 519n, 522n, 525f, 550, 664f. Joint communiques with Podgorny, 9f, 160f, with Tito, 4If, 262f. Statements by and policy of, viewed by Israeli leaders, (Meir) 24-29, 61f, 64f, 108, 176-181, 232f, 289ff, 302-305, (Galili) 43, 105ff, 226, 228f, (Eban) 70f, (Israeli Embassy in U.S.) 75f, 170, (Israeli Communist Party—MAKI)

INDEX 737

135, (N. Goldmann) 279f, (Dayan) 288. Posi¬

tion of assessed, by Sisco, 37, by Rogers, 149,

255f, in-Congressional report, 311, 313f, and

praised by Podgorny, 156, 257, by Schumann,

166, by Douglas-Home, 243, by Tito, 308.

Visit of, to U.S.S.R. (communique), 259f.

Letter sent to, by O.A.U. representatives, 282-

285, and reply to, by, 552f. Statements classed

as threats by Sen. Jackson, 29If. Criticized

for being willing to negotiate, 395. Arafat

sends appeal to, 420.

Statements by: on a possible Middle East

settlement, 341, 379, 458; on Suez ceasefire

extension, 341f, 370, 373f, 404f, 517, 545f;

on support of Palestinians, 342f, 371, 375,

393f, 470, 546; on U.S. Middle East policy,

344,479, 516,545ff; on friendship with U.S.S.R.,

372, 406, 460, 477f, 480, 517f, 557f; on an inter¬

national peacekeeping force and guarantees,

380ff; on Israeli passage through Suez, 381;

on Egypt’s relations with U.S., 407, 459, 486,

516ff, 550f, 554-557; on Federation of Arab

Republics, 45 If; on Hussein and Jordan clashes,

461; 513ff; on reopening of Suez Canal, 485,

516f. See also Egypt; Suez Canal

Sadiq, Muhammad Ahmad: 551

Safad Hospital (Israel): 328

Safwat, Muhammad: 620, 627

Sahbani, Tayyib: 354, 439

Saiqa: 540

Salah, Abdullah: 553. Outlines Jordanian policy

at U.N., 681-684

Salahat, Youssef: 641

Salem, Shaikh Jaber Ali: 362

Salizzoni, Signor: 79, 217

al-Salt (Jordan): area involved in Palestinian-

Jordanian clashes, 353ff, 357, 359

SALT: 207, 229

Samaria: 78, 84, 173, 240, 630. See also Jordan,

West Bank; occupied territories

SAM missiles: 5, 87, 89. Sadat explains Russian

presence in crews of, 554f. Israel accuses

Egypt of moving, 575

Sapir, Pinhas: statements on Arab population

in West Bank, 129f. Orders expropriation of

Arab land, 632

Saqqaf, Omar: 522n, 523. Joint communique

with Ethiopian minister, 134. Voices support

for Egypt and for binational state, 462ff

Sarafand (Lebanon): Israeli attacks at, 507.

Said a base of operations against Israel, 587

Sarafand Military Camp (Israel): 328. Said

worst Israeli prison, 640f

Saudi Arabia: 122, 150, 188n, 209, 210f, 217,

235, 353n, 362, 365, 426n, 429n, 434n, 442n,

447n, 452n, 509n, 51 In, 514, 519n, 565, 595.

Visit to, by Ethiopian minister (comminique),

134, and Mauritian president (communique),

263. King Faisal of, visits Taiwan, and Japan

(communiques), 152, 154. Oil reserves in, 198.

Revolutionary potential in, 323. Statements

of policy by leaders of, 462f, 465, 470f, 578.

Continues to give aid to Jordan, 481. Oil

from, said reaching Israel, 490f. Attempts of,

to solve Jordanian-Palestinian clashes, 522f.

U.N. voting record of, 695n, 698n, 699n, 702n,

703n

al-Sawaliha (Jordan): 353

Sbneih Camp (Syria): 608

Scheel, Walter: 215, 281. Outlines E.E.C. policy,

153f, and German policy on Middle East and

Jerusalem, 205-209, on relations with Arab

states, 246, 248. See also Germany, Federal

Republic of

Schumann, Maurice: 122, 124, 152, 194. Outlines

French position on “Rogers Plan,” four power

talks, 17, and on the danger of superpower

intervention, 164-167, on relations with Israel,

222f, on general Middle East policy, 276, 300,

and agreement with British policy, 281

SEATO: 172

Senegal: 188n, 189n, 282n, 285, 552n, 575, 580,

687. Visited by Tunisian minister (commu¬

nique), 81. President of, views Israel, 131, and

heads of O.A.U. delegation, 275. U.N. voting

record of, 695n, 698n, 699n, 702n, 703n. See

also Organization of African Unity

Senghor, Leopold Sedar: 277, 278, 282n, 285,

289, 296, 552n, 688. Statements on Israel,

131, and on role of O.A.U. Committee, 275.

See also Organization of African Unity

Sephardim: 507

Shaath, Nabil: outlines Palestinian views on

democratic state in Palestine, re-education of

Palestinians, 47Iff

Shadmi, Colonel: 14

al-Shafii, Husein: 469, 516

Shah of Iran (Shahanshah Aryamehr): see Pehlavi,

Mohammed Reza

Shaikh Zayid: 449, 539

al-Shaikhly, Abdul Karim: 10, 327n

al-Shami, Ahmad: 353n, 426n, 429n, 434n, 442n,

738 INDEX

447n, 452n, 509n, 51 In, 519n

Shapiro, Ya’acov: 633f

Sharef, Ze’ev: 629, 633f

al-Sharida, Abd al-Majid: 358

Sharif Zaid Bin Shaker: 358

Sharja: 323

Sharm al-Shaikh: 82, 380, 474, 684, 686. Reitera¬

tions of Israeli policy on, 55, 63, 74, 77, 83, 84,

102, 106, 108, 117f, 214, 296, 630, 686. Peace¬

keeping force in, called for by Rogers, 88f.

Israeli policy on, viewed in Soviet press, 91,

by U.K. Parliamentarian, 96, by Sen. Fulbright,

97f, 112, by Syrian leader, 409, by Sadat,

551, by M. Riad, 686. U.S. position on, viewed

by Rabin, 92, and by Dayan, 102f. Problem

of, seen in E.E.C. policy, 194, and by O.A.U.

Committee, 284. Statements of Egyptian policy

on, 378, 38If, 459, 533, 553. Israel said estab¬

lishing settlements in, 643f. Jarring’s position

on, 666n. See also Suez Canal; Egypt

Sharp, Mitchell: states Canadian Middle East

policy, 104f

Shati camp (Gaza): 14. Curfews and population

transfers in, 642f, 645, 648ff

Shazar, Shneor Zalman: 631

Shechem (occupied territory): 631

Sheikh-Eid, Suleiman M.: 641

Shell Oil: 491

al-Shibib, Talib: speech at U.N. on Iraqi position

on Palestine issue, 689f

Shibli, Amin: 347

Shiffa Hospital (Gaza): 15

Shteiwi, Shaftk Ahmad Hassan: 638

al-Shuyoukh (West Bank): 639

Siblin Training Centre (Lebanon): 608

Sierra Leone: 189n, 282n, 579, 668, 670. U.N.

voting record of, 695n, 702n, 703n, 705n

Sinai Peninsula: 55, 72, 74, 75, 87, 97, 102, 121,

178, 194, 201, 216, 228, 235, 290, 292, 371, 373,

444, 459, 486, 550, 552, 590, 676, 683f. Israeli

punitive deportations to, 15f, 30, 192, 642.

Partial Israeli withdrawals in, discussed by

Meir, 62ff, 302f, by Galili, 106f, by Sapir, 130.

Egyptian position on, supported by Bulgaria,

65, and commented on by Douglas-Home,

243, 276. Demilitarization of, demanded by

Israel, 77, 84, and advocated by Rogers, 88.

Landing fields in, said offered to NATO, 209.

Reports on Israeli transfers of populations to,

273, 367. Return of, urged by N. Goldmann,

280. Israeli position on, analyzed, 312f, 318,

and economic development of reviewed in

Congressional report, 316. Source of oil for

Israel, 322. I.C.R.C. services to inhabitants

in, 33If. Egyptian position on, 34If, 378,

380ff, 405, 417, 470, 545, 555, 602, 664. Ezra

Weizman’s views on, 630. Israeli settlements

in, 634f, 643f

Singapore: U.N. voting record of, 695n, 698n,

699n, 702n, 703n

Sisco, Joseph: 175, 178, 200, 209, 256, 278, 341,

457, 469, 492, 551. Statements by, on Jarring

mission, 33f, Soviet involvement in the Middle

East, 35ff, on U.S. policy, 72, and Rogers’

visit to the Middle East, 150f. Mission of,

discussed by Galili, 227f, by Meir, 233, by

Eban, 268f, and assessed in U.S. Congressional

report, 312f. Sadat discusses talks with, and

mission of, 492, 533ff, 555ff

Sixth Fleet: see U.S. Sixth Fleet

Skyhawk(s): 307, 547, 574, 582

Socialist International Conference (Helsinki): 164.

Resolution of, on the Middle East, 159f, and

Meir gives view on, 182

Socialist Constitutional Party of Tunisia: 427

Socialist Party of Chile: 59f

Socony Mobil: 491

Socotra: 320

Somalia (Somali Democratic Republic): 16n,

188n, 189n, 217, 282n, 320, 575, 589, 595.

President of, visits Iraq (communique), 297.

Representative of, serves on U.N. Special Com¬

mittee, 616. U.N. voting record of, 695n, 698n,

699n, 702n, 703n, 705n

South Africa: 16n, 190n, 191, 196, 218, 232,

418, 437, 562, 696

South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO):

122 South Vietnam: see Vietnam

Southern Rhodesia: 191

Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee: 266

Soviet Communist Party: see Communist Party

of the Soviet Union

Soviet-Egyptian Treaty: see Treaty of Friendship

and Cooperation (U.S.S.R.-U.A.R.)

Soviet Union: see Union of Soviet Socialist

Republics

Spain: 231, 493. Visits of Moroccan minister

to (communique), and of Tunisian minister

(communique), 15If. Policy of, on Mediter¬

ranean and relations with Arabs, 29, 68f,

262, on Palestinians and on Jerusalem, 81.

INDEX 739

Foreign minister of, visits Tunisia (commu¬

nique), 45. Statements at U.N. on policy

of, 585, 595f. U.N. voting record of, 695n,

698n, 699n, 702n, 703n

Spanish Center of Higher Studies in National

Defense: 68

Spiers, Ronald I.: statement on U.S. interests

and policy, 218-220

Standard Oil of California: 491

Standard Oil of New Jersey: 491

Sterner, Michael: 209, 556

Strait of Hormuz: 219

Strait of Tiran: 75, 288, 379. Navigation through

required by Israel, 55, 77, 84, 296. Egypt

willing to allow navigation through, 57, 62,

112, 128, 378, 381, 553. Easily blocked, 74.

E.E.C. views as international waterway, 141,

and as requiring free navigation, 193. British

views on, 578. Recommendation on by O.A.U.

Committee, 284. Jarring’s views on, 666n.

See also Sharm al-Shaikh

Streich, Dr. J.: 642

Sudan, Democratic Republic of the: 20, 189n,

282n, 318, 339, 347, 353n, 357, 365, 426n, 429n,

430n, 434n, 435n, 436n, 44In, 442n, 447n, 452n,

509, 51 In, 519n, 525n, 529n, 564n, 607. Presi¬

dent of, visits U.S.S.R. (communique) ,117. Pro¬

posed union with Libya and Syria viewed,

432, 455. Postpones joining F.A.R., 449n,

45In. Statement of policy during temporary

coup in, 510. Message from president of, to

Tripoli Conference, 520. Viewed by Sadat,


702n, 703n. See also Tripoli Charter States

Suez Canal: 48, 66, 89, 101, 148, 150, 166, 201,

204, 205, 214, 216, 223, 245, 310, 372, 414, 491,

517, 522, 550, 551, 571, 576f, 597, 605, 665,

667, 686. Israeli views on interim settlement

in, 22, 24, 27ff, 53, 92ff, 102, 105ff, 108, 118,

130, 135, 175-178, 226IF, 232f, 264f, 287f,

296, 301—305 pass., 678. U.S. policy on pos¬

sible settlement in, 37, 123ff, 126ff, 149, 151,

186, 210, 236, 255, 286, 326, 679-681, reviewed

in Congressional report, 312. Soviet interests

in, seen by U.S. leader, 52, and in Congres¬

sional report, 219, 320f. Egyptian position on,

57, 378, 379ff, 405, 458f, 469f, 485f, 492, 533f,

545f, 553, 686, viewed by Bulgaria, 65, by

U.S.S.R., 99, 225, by Fulbright, 112. U.S.

policy on, criticized by Sen. Jackson, 120ff,

292, by Eban, 268f, and approved by Douglas-

Home, 243, 276. Israel’s military position at, 64,

240. Israel sees no commitment on, from Egypt,

75, 289f. Soviets pulled back from, 89. State¬

ments on, in E.E.C. position paper, 141f,

193, and in Council of Europe announcement,

144. Re-opening of, viewed by West German

leaders, 185, 207f, and by Tito, 231, 308. Israeli

and Egyptian positions assessed in O.A.U.

report, 284. Solution to problem seen under¬

mining Palestinians’ position, 366,481. I.C.R.C.

operations across, 328f, 33If, 622. Situation

on, seen as explosive by Hussein, 424. Saudi

Arabia’s views on, 462. Report on UNTSO

ceasefire operations on, 38Iff. See also Sharm

al-Shaikh

Sultan, Ibn Abdel Aziz, Prince: states Saudi

attitude on Jerusalem and oil, 465

Sumaria: 78, 84, 173, 240, 630. See also Jordan,

West Bank; occupied territories

SUMED pipeline: 242

Sunda:219

Supreme Council of Palestinian Federations: 498

Supreme Council of Islamic Affairs: 38n

Supreme Soviet: 9, 160, 259. See also Union of

Soviet Socialist Republics

Surit (occupied territory): 639

Suslov, M.A.: 134

al-Suwaidi, Ahmad Khalifa: 568

Swaziland: 16n, 189n, 282n. U.N. voting record

of, 695n, 698n, 699n, 703n

Sweden: 143n, 182, 599, 600, 662, 665. Fears

clash between superpowers over Middle East,

lOOf. Delegate from, views International Law

on Armed Conflicts, 170f. U.N. voting record

of, 695n, 698n, 699n, 702n, 703n

Swedish Save the Children Federation (R£dda

Barnen): 612

Switzerland: 143n, 332

Syria; 65n, 67, 79, 107, 125, 135, 159, 168n, 178,

181, 182, 214, 235, 237, 275, 280, 306, 320,

341, 365, 412, 425, 430n, 435n, 436n, 441n,

442, 445, 448, 455, 459, 519n, 540, 551,

562, 564n, 574, 618, 619, 684, 692. President of,

visits U.S.S.R., statements by Soviet leader,

19, (communique), 21. Borders with, said

negotiable by Dayan, 62, 64. Soviet support

for, reiterated, 98f. Viewed by Dayan as

extremist, 118. Regime in, assessed by U.S.

officials, 21 Of, 314, and praised by Sadat,

461. Foreign minister of, visits Poland (com¬

munique), 216. Relations of, with Italy, 217.

740 INDEX

Visit to, by Hungarian minister (communique),

237f. Commando activity in, 315. Federation

with Egypt and Libya, proclaimed, 449ff, and

viewed by Bar Lev, 239, by Iraqi president,

432, by Sadat, 515f, 526f, by Qadhafi, 525, by

Assad, 525f. I.C.R.C. services to prisoners

in and from, 328-332 pass. Policy of, reaf¬

firmed, 408ff, 414, 466f, and views of, stated

at U.N., 684ff. Statements by Baath Party of,

415, 529ff. Attempts by, to mediate Jordanian-

Palestinian clashes, 434, 509f. Helou describes

contacts with, during 1967 War, 475f. Minister

of, advocates joint Arab economic stance, 565.

Ceasefire violations on borders of, reported,

587ff. Letters and statements by U.N. delegate

of, 590ff, 595, 597. UNRWA report on services

in, 605ff. Correspondence with U.N. Special

Investigative Committee, 619, 621f, 626f, 629,


702n, 703n, 705n, 708n. See also Golan Heights

Tabqa Dam (Syria): 320

Taher Dablan: 346

Tahha, Mrs. Abla: 641

Taiwan: 152

Takriti, Saddam Hussein: 410

Talhuni, Bahjat: 347

al-Tall, Wash: 384, 514, 561. Statements on

Arab unity, the Palestinian cause, 337ff, on

clashes with Resistance, 416f, on Jordanian

policy on the West Bank, 444f, and on cuts in

aid to Jordan, 455f, 480f. Consultations with,

described by al-Adgham, 345, 354. Joint state¬

ment with P.L.O. issued by, 357, and agree¬

ment signed by, 357-359. Hussein’s letter

on West Bank state addressed to, 476f, and

reply by, promising maintenance of law and

order, 477. Assassination of, announced by

Hussein, 553f

Tanzania, United Republic of: 189n, 190n, 232,

282n, 285, 575, 687. U.N. voting record of,

695n, 698n, 699rj., 702n, 703n, 706n

Tarazi, Dr. (Gaza): 15

TASS: 236,596

Teheran: 67, 198, 547, 695

Tekoah, Yosef: 24, 369n

Tepavac, Mirko: 41n. Joint communiques with

foreign ministers from: Iran, 7; the Vietnamese

P.R.G., 153; and Egypt, 21 If

Tel Aviv Journalists’ Association: 117

Telli, Diallo: 144

Texaco: 491

Thailand: U.N. voting record of, 695n, 698n,

699n, 702n, 703n

Thalmann, Ernesto A.: 669

Tiberias Control Centre (Syrian sector): 587

Tiran Strait: see Strait of Tiran

Tito, Josip Broz: 65, 212, 548, 558. On Arab

cause, Jarring mission, 39f, on Soviet presence

in Mediterranean, 23If, on Israeli withdrawal,

308. Visits to U.A.R. (communiques), 4If,

262f. See also Yugoslavia

Tlas, Mustapha: 445. Announces Syrian-formed

committee to mediate Jordanian-Palestinian

clashes, 434

Togo: 189n, 282n. U.N. voting record of, 695n,

698n, 699n, 702n, 703n

Tolbert, William: 285

Trade Union Congress (Cairo): 304

Trade Union Congress (Cairo): 304

Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation (U.S.S.R.

and U.A.R.): 175, 222, 249, 255, 258, 311,

492. Text of, 156-158. Hailed by Podgorny,

158f. Impact of, assessed by Nixon, 167f, by

Israeli government, 168ff, in Soviet press, 173,

by West German leader, 184, by U.S. officials,

185f, 210, by East German Socialist Party,

187, by Israeli leaders, 229, in U.S. Congres¬

sional report, 319, and praised by Afro-Asian

Solidarity League, 192. Discussed in Egyptian-

Soviet communiques, 203f, 259f. Discussed by

Sadat, 477-480, 534, 546, and by M. Riad,

493

Tripoli Charter: 441. Origin of, explained, 45In,

509n, 525n, 529n. See also Federation of Arab

Republics

Tripoli Conferences: (1970) 412, 433, 453, 549f,

(1971) 519, 520

Trucial States: see United Arab Emirates

Trudeau, Pierre: statement on peoples’ rights

to independence, 149

Tulkarm (West Bank): 329, 351, 380, 631

Tunisia: 188n, 189n, 218, 282n, 353n, 354, 426n,

429n, 434n, 442n, 447n, 452n, 509n, 51 In,

514, 519n, 562, 595, 695n, 698n, 699n, 702n,

703n. Visited by West German chancellor (inter¬

view statements), 22, and by Spanish foreign

minister (communique), 45. Joint communiques

by foreign minister of, on visits to, Mauritania,

73, Senegal, 81, Spain, 15If. Relations with

Italy, 218. Confidence in U.S. expressed by

INDEX 741

leader of, 363f, and support for Egyptian

settlement efforts, 382f. Statement by Socialist

Party of, 427. Leadership of, attacked by Syrian

Baath, 428. U.N. voting record of, 695n, 698n,

699n, 702n, 703n

Turk, R.: 134

Turkey: 122, 131, 143n, 161n, 168, 171n, 188n,

210, 231, 285, 464, 605. Policy‘of, outlined,

9. Visited by Iraqi vice-president (commu¬

nique), lOf. U.N. voting record of, 695n,

698n, 699n, 702n, 703n, 706n

Uganda: 189n, 282n, 575. Policy on U.N. Resolu¬

tion 242 stated by president of, 8 If. U.N. voting

record of, 695n, 698n, 699n, 702n, 703n

Ukrainian S.S.R.: U.N. voting record of, 695n,

698n, 699n, 702n, 703n, 706n

Ulbricht, Walter: 279

Umbricht, Mr.: 330, 333

UNESCO: 289, 633, 684, 706f. Israeli excava¬

tions seen as violations of resolutions by, 537,

596. Helps improve educational programs

among Palestinians, 606f, 611, 645. Text of

Board decisions, asking Israel to allow UNRWA/

UNESCO textbooks into occupied territories,

708fF, and calling for protection of cultural

property in Jerusalem, 71 Of

Unified Arab Command: 475

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.):

40, 62, 147, 155, 174f, 192, 262, 279, 281, 298,

300, 30If, 326, 409, 522, 535, 551, 557, 599,

600, 603, 685. Commentaries on the Middle

East in press of, 7, 90ff, 171ff, 209f, 224f, 237,

307, and statements of policy by government

of, 56ff. Commentary by U.S. leaders on

influence of: Nixon, 5f, 46-50 pass., 69, 167f;

Sisco, 35ff; Harriman, 5 If; Sen. Fulbright,

11 If; Sen. Jackson, 120f, 292f; Rogers, 123,

126f', 185f, 254ff, 286f; Davies, 210f; Spiers,

219f. Communiques issued during visits to,

by leaders: of Syria, 21; of Sudan, 117; of Egypt,

119f, 203f, 259f; of Canada, 149; of Cyprus,

174f; of P.L.O, 266f; of North Yemen, 309.

Delegations from, visit Iraq (communique),

190, Cuba (communique), 270. Possible par¬

ticipation in four-power peacekeeping force

discussed, 85f, 95, and accepted by Sadat,

555. Statements by Communist Party of, 113f,

115, 22If. Jews in, 128f, 197, 274. Treaty of

Friendship with Egypt, text, 156ff, praised by

Podgorny, 158f, by German Socialist Party,

187, by Sadat, 477-480. Possible resumption

of relations with Israel considered, 199. Presence

in Mediterranean of fleets of, criticized by

Tito, 23, and by Qadhafi, 457. Arms ship¬

ments by, mentioned in U.S. Congressional

resolutions, 261, 265. Sadat describes Egypt’s

friendship with, 372f, 406, 460, 477-480, 488,

517f, 534, 546f, and reasons for policy of, 558.

Arab leaders view and praise policy of: Assad,

414; Saddam Hussein, 411; Khaddam, 565;

Khleifawi, 467; Kuwait National Assembly,

439. Possible confrontation with U.S. seen

by French leader, 166, by Sen. Fulbright,

296, and considered by Sadat, 343f. Role

of, in Middle East assessed in U.S. Congres¬

sional report, 310f, 133, 315, 318-321. M.

Riad on reasons for friendship treaty with,

493. P.L.O. officials report on visits to, 543,

544f. Letters and statements by U.N. represen¬

tatives of, 577, 597. U.N. voting record of,

695n, 698n, 699n, 702n, 703n, 705n, 706n.

Statements by leaders of, on policy of, and

friendship with Arab countries: Brezhnev, 98ff;

Gromyko (at U.N.), 675; Kosygin, 4, 19f,

249f, 252f, 301, 306; Podgorny, 8, 9f, 155f,

158f, 160f, 257f. Policy of: praised by Israeli

Communist Party (RAKAH), 3, 324f, by

Bulgaria, 65f; viewed by Israeli leaders: Bar

Lev, 239; Dinitz, 200; Eban, 291; Galili, 107,

229f; Meir, 26, 28f, 179-182, 233; Rabin,

20Iff, and in official Israeli statements, 75f,

168ff. Criticized in Chinese press, 236. For

detailed entries see names of leaders; Communist

Party of the Soviet Union: Treaty of Friendship

and Cooperation (U.S.S.R. and U.A.R.)

Unitarian Service Committee of Canada: 612

United Arab Emirates: 198, 322f. Declaration

on cooperation with Arab states, 568. U.N.

voting of, 702n, 703n

United Arab Republic: see Egypt

United Jewish Appeal: 196

United Kingdom: 76, 83, 126, 131, 143n, 152,

161n, 17In, 185, 196, 199, 218, 311, 419, 457,

464, 600, 603, 605, 612, 706n. Seen as having

a role in guaranteeing peace in Middle East,

by Nixon, 5f, by Sadat, 555. Criticized as

imperialist, 30f, and for role in the Gulf, 437.

Policy of, and relations with Arabs, described

by foreign minister of, 66f, 94ff, 109f, 24Iff,

244f, 245f, 276f, 298ff. Said dependent on

742 INDEX

Arab oil, 172. U.S.S.R. seen as a threat to,

in Gulf area, 232. Leaders of, report on con¬

ditions in Gaza, 270, 275. Policy of, viewed by

French minister, 281, 300, assessed in U.S.

Congressional report, 313, 321, and changes in

viewed by Sadat, 460, 518, by Riad, 493.

Statements at U.N. by representative of, 577f,


702n, 703n, 705n'

United Kingdom, Parliament: debates in, on

Middle East policy, 94ff. Members of, report

on trip to Israel and Gaza, 270-275

United Nations: 3f, 9, 11, 16, 51, 78, 83, 131,

141, 145, 148, 152, 165, 181, 206, 212, 229,

230, 244, 25If, 255, 258, 261, 262, 276, 283, 306,

368, 372, 376, 378, 405, 407, 461, 465, 535f,

606, 616, 626, 632, 659, 664, 677f, 683, 706.

Urged to take firm position by Tito, 41, and

role of non-aligned countries in, 42, 247.

Most suitable forum for discussion, 80. Role

of, 88, 109f, 317, 327. Fulbright on his expecta¬

tions for, 112f. E.E.C. resolutions seen in context

of, 143. Seen as impotent by Meir, 183, and as

an institution of demagogy, 202. Expulsion

of Israel from, called for, 190, 192. Israel

said violating forty-two resolutions of, 191.

Soviet delegation of, discusses relations with

Israel, 199. Sadat on limited influence of,

229f. Twenty-fifth Session of, praised, 247.

Leaders express disappointment in: Rogers,

326; Qadhafi, 378f; Boumedienne, 418; Shaikh

Sabah, 542; Hussein, 559. Israel’s defiance of,

not possible without U.S. support, 547. Why

Palestine problem should be submitted to,

549f. Presence in Middle East required, 577f,

682. Report on Israeli encroachments on Jeru¬

salem headquarters of, 593, 596f. Asked to

accept its responsibilities, 690, and said con¬

trolled by superpowers, 692.

Charter of: principles and aims of, cited and

supported, 6, 8, 41, 43, 81, 110, 141, 145, 1561,

212, 245, 259, 361, 363, 368, 407, 477f, 561,

594, 646, in addresses at U.N., 675, 684-692

pass., and in resolutions of, 696-708 pass. U.S.

seen flouting principles of, 10. Israeli policy

violation of, 21, 160, 253, 306, 458, 537, 577.

Fulbright describes principle of sanctions found

in, 113. Right of self-determination embodied

in, 146. Implementation of Article Six of,

on expulsion urged, 192. Aims of, on inter¬

national security should be improved, 248.

France affirms Security Council responsibilities

given by, 576. Palestinians have rights under,

578, 605f, and Lebanon claims protection under,

584f. See also U.N. General Assembly and

U.N. Security Council; U.N. Special Com¬

mittee. . .; U.N. peacekeeping force and other

U.N. agencies; U.N. documents are on pages

569-712

United Nations Association: 169n, 110

U.N. Commission on Human Rights: 59If, 627,

677

U.N. Commission on Human Rights Resolution

9 (XXVII): 712. Text and voting record of,

706-708

U.N. Commission on Human Rights Resolution

10 (XXVI): 589, 617, 627, 707

U.N. Conciliation Commission for Palestine: 699

U.N. Declaration on Granting Independence to

All Colonial Countries and Peoples: 157

U.N. Development Programme (UNDP): 607,

612

U.N. Economic and Social Council Resolution

1565 (L): 607, 697, 705, 711. Text of, 705f

U.N. Economic Survey Mission: 603n

U.N. Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organi¬

zation : see UNESCO

U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO):

607

U.N. General Assembly: 4,69,91,98,165.191,213,

242, 246, 259, 270, 271, 284, 286, 291, 299f,

308, 312, 361, 368, 373, 542, 593f, 600, 603,

606, 612, 662. Resolutions of, support U.N.

Security Council, 60. Vatican deplores ignoring

resolutions of, 94. Cable sent to, by East German

government, 306f. Israel distrusts, 317f. Review

of debates in, 573-581. Special documents

submitted to: U.N. Special Committee reports

to, 614—647, 651-660, and UNRWA reports

to, 648ff. Requests extension of ceasefire, 664.

Speeches at meetings of, 675-694. Texts and

voting records of resolutions of, 695—704

U.N. General Assembly Resolution 2628 (XXV):

4, 7, 60, 119, 147, 166, 191, 368, 573n, 600,

646, 662, 664. Debate on draft texts of, 580

U.N. General Assembly Resolution 2727 (XXV):

615ff, 619, 622, 625, 626, 652, 707. & also


Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the

Population of the Occupied Territories

U.N. General Assembly Resolution 2759D

(XXVI): text of, 695

INDEX 743

U.N. General Assembly Resolution 2787

(XXVI): text and voting record of, 695ff


(XXVI): text and voting record of, 697f


(XXVI): text and voting record of, 698—701


(XXVI): text and voting record of, 70Iff


(XXVI): text and voting record of, 703f

U.N. General Assembly Resolutions: cited in

speeches and other resolutions: No. 181 (II),

644; No. 194 (III), 633, 699; No. 1514 (XV),

191; No. 2252 (ES-V), 192, 289, 617, 700f,

707; No. 2253 (ES-V), 705, 710; No. 2254

(ES-V), 192, 289, 593, 604n, 667n, 705, 710;

No. 2443 (XXIII), 615ff, 619, 707; No. 2452

(XXIII), 192, 617, 700f; No. 2535 (XXIV),

617, 701; No. 2546 (XXIV), 615ff, 619, 707;

No. 2625 (XXV), 646; No. 2627 (XXV),

626, 706; No.' 2649 (XXV), 701; No. 2656

(XXV), 604, 705, 711; No. 2672 (XXV),

192, 617, 369, 605, 689, 700f, 705f, 712; No.

2674 (XXV), 707; No. 2728 (XXV), 606,

705, 711; No. 2675 (XXV), 573, 648, 700, 707

U.N. Headquarters: in Jerusalem, 593f, in New

York, 605

U.N. Infants and Children’s Emergency Fund

(UNICEF): 607, 612, 706

U.N. observers: 240. Ineffectiveness of, cited by

Israel, 84. Desired at Suez by Egypt, 312,

342, and Jordan, 363. Suggested in U.N.

resolutions on ceasefire, 579. Reports on activi¬

ties of, 581-594pass. See also U.N. peacekeeping

force

U.N. peacekeeping force: 109, 122, 241, 340,

379. Suggested by Sadat for Suez, 57, 342,

381, and in Egyptian proposals, 378, 600f.

Rejected by Israel, 63. Ineffectiveness of in

1967, seen by Sisco, 72, and by Israelis, 84,

in U.S. Congressional report, 317f. Advocated

by Rogers, 86, 88ff, 112, 124, and in E.E.C.

recommendations, 142. Britain willing to par¬

ticipate in, 94f, 243. Recommended by French

foreign minister, 223. Israeli rejection of, seen

by Sadat, 369. Seen by Jarring as necessary,

666n. See also “guarantees, international”

UNRWA: 273, 676. Property of, destroyed by

Israelis, 27If. U.S. report on, 314. Difficulties

encountered by, 572. Text of annual report

of (excerpts), 603-613. Cooperation with

UNESCO, 606, 611, and with other U.N.

agencies, 61 If. Special reports on operations

by Israelis in Gaza, 648-650, cited by U.N.

Special Committee..., 653, 655f. U.N. General

Assembly resolutions on operations and finances,

695, 697f, and those by Economic and Social

Council, 705f, by UNESCO, 708ff, and WHO,

71 If

UNRWA Commissioner-General: 573, 700.

Reports to U.N. (excerpts), 603-613, 648,

650

UNRWA/UNESCO Education and Training

Centre: 611. See also UNESCO

U.N. Secretary-General: 26f, 38n, 39, 44, 67,

80, 143, 148, 165, 311, 367, 369n, 407, 542, 594,

604n, 605,620,635,645,660,697,698f, 701,703.

E.E.C. report on policy to, 152. U.A.R.

response to ceasefire appeal of, 370-375, 405f.

Asked by Sadat for a report on Israel’s attitude,

536. Report by, on U.N. work, 571-573, and

on U.N. debates, 573-580. Report and letters

by, to Security Council, 582, 584f, 587f, 593f,

596f. U.N. report on activities of the Special

Representative of, 598-603, and 661-667.

(For details of contents see 661) Report of,

on attempts to implement U.N. Security Council

Resolution 298 (1971), 667-674. See also Jarring,

Gunnar V.

U.N. Secretary-General’s Special Representative:

404, 407, 573n, 579f, 597, 661, 675. U.N.

reports on activities of, 598-603, 661-667.

U.N. resolution on efforts of, 70Iff. For main

entry see Jarring, Gunnar V.

U.N. Security Council: 16, 57, 68, 76, 88, 94,

98, 104, 109, 142, 165, 191f, 223, 233, 251f,

259, 275, 283, 317, 361, 368, 405, 437, 492,

536, 542, 551, 558, 573, 575, 576, 579, 620f,

627, 635, 644, 675, 684. Report of, on situa¬

tion in the Middle East, 581-603. Directives

needed from four permanent members of, 17,

and agreement by, said essential, 44, 687f.

Guarantees by, considered, 63f, and requested

by Sadat, 378, 381, 556. Responsibility of,

said discharged by Resolution 242, 43. Mayhew

deplores violations of resolutions on Jerusalem

of, 96. Power of, said usurped by U.S., 689.

Documents submitted to, 661-674. Texts and

voting records of resolutions of, 704f. See also

four powers

U.N. Security Council Resolution 242 (1967):

91, 109, 114, 163, 186f, 198, 212, 217, 248,

744 INDEX

318, 326, 364, 374ff, 405, 419, 431, 433, 444,

457, 459, 465, 493, 556, 597, 647, 702, 703.

Israeli acceptance of, viewed by French minister,

17, by U.S. State Department spokesman,

236, and criticized for not implementing, by

Yugoslavia, 41f, by G.P.S.U., 134, by O.A.U.,

144, by World Peace Council, 146, by East

Germany, 306f, by U.A.R., 376, by Jordan,

423. U.A.R.’s implementation of, praised by

Bulgarian representative, 65f, by U.K. foreign

minister, 94ff, by Iran, 598. Various interpreta¬

tions of, viewed by Sisco, 72, by Israelis, 76,

by Schumann, 281, 300, by Hussein, 532.

Rejection of, by P.L.O. praised, 116. Rejected

in statement of International Palestine Week,

137. E.E.C. interpretation of, 141 f, viewed by

Meir, 165. Rejected by Palestinians, 361,

504, and rejection explained to Soviets, 544.

Acceptance of, not prejudicial to Palestinian

rights, 338. Termed not in Arabs’ interests

by Assad, 414, and outdated by Qadhafi,

458. Sadat sees U.S. as ignoring provisions of,

545. U.N. reports of efforts to implement,

57If, 574-580, 598-603, 662-667. Seen as a

failure by Iraqi U.N. representative, 689.

Official statements on, by organizations and

comments of officials of the following countries:

Belgium, 43; Bulgaria, 66; Canada, 104f;

CENTO, 131; Council of Europe, 143f; Cyprus,

175; Czechoslovakia, 155; E.E.C., 152, 194;

Egypt, 10, 160, 203f, 259, 360, 367ff, 372,

377f, 392f, 404, 470, 518, 552f, 686ff; France,

222, 264, 276; Germany, East. 306; Germany,

West, 22, 72, 104, 207, 215; Hungary, 297;

International Conference for Peace and Justice,

119; Iran 7, 199; Israel, 6, 23, 25, 106, 296, 679;

Israeli Communist Parties, 3, 135, 213; Jordan,

362f, 422, 521, 537, 559, 681ff; Mauritania, 73;

Mongolia, 164; Norway, 306; O.A.U., 189,283f;

Rumania, 115, 282; Senegal, 275; Socialist

International, 159; Spain, 29, 81, 262; Sudan,

117, 595; Sweden, 101; Tunisia, 73; Turkey, 9,

11; Uganda, 81f; U.S.S.R., 4, 8, 10, 20, 56, 112,

117, 119, 160, 175, 203f, 225, 257f, 299, 301,

360, 324; U.S.S.R. Communist Party, 113f;

United Kingdom, 242f, 244f; United States,

33, 36, 48, 52, 72, 122f, 126f, 149f, 679ff; U.S.

Congress, 261, 265, 294, 31 Iff; United Towns

Organization, 289; World Peace Council, 147;

Yugoslavia, 7, 42, 263


summary of debate on, voting record of, 585


676, 689, 710. Report of Secretary-General

on attempts to implement, 667ff, letters between

U.N. and Israel on subject of implementation,

669-674. Text and voting record of, 704f

U.N. Security Council Resolutions: cited in

speeches and other U.N. resolutions: No. 237

(1967), 27, 70f, 192, 589, 604n, 653, 701, 707;

No. 252 (1968), 593, 667n, 704f, 710; No.

256 (1968), 593; No. 259 (1968), 707; No.

267 (1969), 146, 593, 595, 704f, 710; No. 271

(1969), 593; No. 280 (1970), 585


Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the

Population of the Occupied Territories: 589,

59If, 704. Reports of, 614-647, and 651-660.

Asked to continue mission of, 707, and that

publicity be given to report of, 708. For con¬

tents breakdown of reports, see 614 and 651

U.N. Special Working Group of Experts: 589, 620

United Nations Truce Supervision Organization

(UNTSO): report of activities of: in Suez

Canal sector, 58Iff, on Israeli-Lebanese border,

584-586 pass., on Israeli-Syrian border, 587f,

592, on Israeli activities against Jerusalem

headquarters, 592-594 pass. See also U.N.

peacekeeping force

UNTSO: see United Nations Truce Supervision

Organization

United Socialist Party of France: statement by,

on Middle East, 116

United States: 30f, 62, 65, 73, 95, 109, 131, 136,

138, 161n, 164, 186f, 226, 231f, 246, 262, 266,

274, 338, 371, 375, 417, 419, 456f, 464, 518, 532,

534, 565, 579, 603, 605, 685. Policy of: criticized

by Israeli Communist Party (RAKAH), 3; con¬

demned in Chinese press, 12f, 125f, 132f; criti¬

cized in joint communiques by: Syria-U.S.S.R.,

21; U.A.R.-Yugoslavia, 41; U.A.R.-U.S.S.R.,

119, 160, 259; Algeria-Cuba, 208; Yemen-

U.S.S.R., 253; Iraq-Somalia, 297; Syria -

Hungary, 327f; analyzed in Soviet government

statements, 57f, in Israeli government statement,

76f, and in Soviet press, 90ff, 17Iff, 209f, 224,

237, 307; praised by Zionist leader, 61; criticized

by World Peace Council, 145ff, and by Afro-

Asian Peoples’ Solidarity Organization, 19If;

changes in, predicted by N. Goldmann, 279f;

denounced in statements by the Palestine

National Council, 397, by the Kuwait National

INDEX 745

Assembly, 437, and by Baathist National Con¬ gress, 531. Statements by leaders of, on policy

of: Bray, 183; Davies, 21 Of; Harriman, 5If; Sen.

Fulbright, 96-98, 110-113, 294ff; Sen. Jackson,

120ff, 291-294; McCloskey, 236f; Nixon, 4ff, 46-

51, 69, 167f; Rogers, 18f, 85-90, 122-125, 126-

129, 148f, 185f, 254-257, 285ff, 326f; Sisco, 33-

38, 72, 150f; Spiers, 218ff. Commentaries on

Middle East policy of, by world leaders:

Brezhnev (U.S.S.R.), 99f; Chiao (China), 691,

693f; Kuo Mo-jo (China), 17f; Podgorny

(U.S.S.R.), 8, 10, 155f, 257f; Pompidou

(France), 264; Schumann (France), 17,166, 300.

Commentaries on Middle East policy of, by

Arab leaders: Abu Hamad, 494; Assad, 409f,

414; King Faisal, 470f; King Hussein, 522, 531;

Masmoudi, 363f; Qadhafi, 487f, 525; M. Riad,

492f, 686f; Shaikh Sabah, 542; Sadat, 340-344,

372f, 379-382 pass., 407, 458f, 469f, 479, 485f,

515ff, 533ff, 545ff, 551, 554-559; Shibib,

689; and by Israeli leaders: Allon, 53ff; Dayan,

lOlff, 287f; Dinitz, 200; Eban, 267-270:

Galili, 108, 227-230; Meir, 26, 175ff, 180ff;

Peres, 82. Spain acts for, in U.A.R., 29, 68f.

Commentary on U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations in

Swedish government statement, lOOf. Jews in,

seen contributing to Israel, 196. Oil policy of,

viewed by Shah of Iran, 198. Congressional

report on Middle East situation, 310-324.

Response to peace intitiative of, described in

U.N. reports, 571, 574f, 598, 600, 664f. State¬

ments at U.N. by delegate of, 576, 585f, and

by Rogers, 679-681. Statements at U.N. against

policy of, 577f, 597. U.N. voting record of,

695n, 698n, 699n, 702n, 703n, 705n, 706n.

For detailed entries see Rogers, William and

“Rogers Plan”; names of leaders

U.S. Central Intelligence Agency: 504. Views

expressed on visit to Israel by director of, 200,

209, 221

U.S. Congress: 12. Middle East section of Nixon’s

speech to, 46-51

U.S. House of Representatives: proposed resolu¬

tion on military aid to Israel presented to,

265. Foreign Affairs Committee of, hears Sisco’s

report on Rogers’ Middle East trip, 20, 150f;

Spiers’ report on national security and the

Middle East, 218ff, and Subcommittee report

on Middle East situation, 310-324

U.S. peace initiatives: 34, 43, 47f, 75, 230, 255,

269, 286, 312, 313, 338, 372, 571, 574f, 598,

600, 664f. See also “Rogers Plan”; Rogers,

William

U.S. Senate: 90, 96. Foreign Relations Committee

chairman of, views U.S. policy, 110-113. Aid

request, explained to Appropriations Com¬

mittee of, 21 Of. Resolution on military aid to

Israel presented to, 26If, and amended by

Jackson, 291-294

U.S. Sixth Fleet: 120, 262, 479, 577, 597. Qadhafi

demands withdrawal of, 457

U.S. State Department: statement of, on Israeli

actions in occupied territory, 183

United Towns Council: resolution on Jerusalem,

288f

Universal Declaration of Human Rights: 617f,

626, 706, 712

Upper Volta: 16n, 189n, 282n. U.N. voting record

of, 698n, 699n, 702n, 703n

Uruguay: 579. U.N. voting record of, 695n,

698n, 699n, 702n, 703n, 706n

Usher Assouan, Arsene: 285

U Thant: 36, 83, 152, 165, 311, 570n, 573n, 614n,

652, 661n, 667n. For main entry see U.N. Sec¬

retary-General

Vatican: 108. Comment on Jordanian-Pales¬

tinian clashes, 223f. See also Pope Paul VI

Venezuela: 31, 579. U.N. voting record of, 695n,

698n, 699n, 702n, 703n, 706n

Vietnam (North and South): 38, 111, 190n, 191,

229, 279, 381, 419, 437, 473, 559, 562. Chou

En-lai on similarities to Palestine issue, 138.

P.R.G. delegation visits Yugoslavia (commu¬

nique), 153

Vilner, Meir: 324

Wade, Dr. T.H.H.: 657

Wadi Seer Vocational Training Centre: 609

Wahdat Camp: 445, 467, 508, 609

Wang Hsin-ting: 138, 246

Warsaw Pact/Treaty member states: 10, 21,

169, 597f

Weizman, Ezer: 280, 630

West Bank: ^Jordan, West Bank

Wexler, William: 61

Wheelus Airbase: 487

Winzer, Otto: 214

Wischnewski, Herr: 184f

World Council of Churches Central Committee:

746 INDEX

612. Recommendations of, 11

World Food Programme (W.F.P.): 607, 706

World Health Assembly (W.H.A.): 607

World Health Organization (WHO): 592, 607,

611, 684, 706. Resolutions on assistance to

Palestine refugees, 711, and on the distribution

of medications in occupied territory, 71 If

World Jewish Congress: 165, 279

World Muslim Congress: 38n

World Peace Council, Budapest, 1971: 117, 498.

Message to, from O.A.U. Secretary-General,

144f. Resolution of, 145ff, and appeal by, 147

World Week for Solidarity with the Palestinian

People, Algiers: 136

World Zionist Organization: 198, 654

Wu Teh: 138

al-Yahya, Abd al-Razzaq: memorandum of, on

role of P.L.A., 389-392

Yamani, Ahmad: 403n

Yarmuk: 467

Yemen, North (Yemeni Arab Republic): 188n,

217, 218, 353n, 426n, 429n, 430n, 434n, 435n,

436n, 442n, 447n, 452n, 466, 509n, 511n, 519n,

562, 564. President of, visits U.S.S.R. (com¬

munique), 309. U.S. Congressional report on'

situation in, 320, 323. U.N. voting record of,

695n, 698n, 699n, 702n, 703n

Yemen, South (People’s Democratic Republic of

Yemen): 430n, 435n, 436n. Soviet influence

seen in, 218. Prince Muhammad of, visits

U.S.S.R. (communique), 253f. U.S. Congres¬

sional report on activities of, 323. U.N. voting

record of, 695n, 698n, 699n, 702n, 703n

Yemeni Arab Republic: see Yemen, North

Yifru, Ketema: 134

Yousef, M.: 134

Yugoslavia: 153, 464, 518, 575. Communiques

issued during visits to, by leaders of, Iran, 7,

Vietnam, 153, U.A.R., 21 Iff. President Tito

of, visits U.A.R. (communiques), 4If, 262f.

Tito’s statements on policy of, 39f, 23If, 308.

Criticized by Israelis as biased, 589. Represen¬

tative of, serves on U.N. Special Committee,


702n, 703n, 706n

Zahedi, Ardeshir: 131, 199, 217. Visit to Yugo¬

slavia by (communique), 7

Zahir, King Mohammad: supports rights of Pales¬

tinians, 244

Zagladin, V.V.: 324

Zaire: 189n, 282n, 285. U.N. voting record of,

698n, 699n, 702n, 703n

Zaid Bin Shaker, Sharif: 358

Zambia: 16n, 31, 189n, 232, 282n, 575. U.N.

voting record of, 695n, 698n, 699n, 702n, 703n

Zayid, Shaikh bin Sultan al-Nahayan: 449, 539

Zayyat, Mohamed: 367n

Zerka (Jordan): 329, 438, 497, 609

Zimbabwe: 31, 696

Zionism: 30, 31, 39, 58f, 99, 125f, 133, 134n,

136f, 139, 141, 156, 164, 168, 172, 190, 209,

215, 225, 257, 259f, 263, 309, 339, 366, 383,

386f, 390, 394, 396, 398f, 401, 409, 427, 43 Iff,

442, 449, 458, 465 , 471, 473 , 482 , 500, 502,

504ff, 508, 516, 522, 528, 531, 549, 562, 566,

598, 685, 69If, 694. Expansionist, 152, 154.

Criticized by Avnery, 162. Said to have pene¬

trated American administration, 352. Racist,

405. Jews need to be liberated from, 472.

See also World Zionist Organization

Zirbawi, Miss L.: 620