Phenomenology and ExistentialismB Levering, Utrecht University Utrecht, The Netherlands; Fontys Professional University, Tilburg, The Netherlands

ã 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

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Glossary

Civil disobedience – Revolutionary attitude as

opposed to the government to be found in

existentialism.

Embodiment – The phenomenological answer to

the mind–body problem. The human body is as well

object as subject. (Merleau-Ponty).

Essence – The objective of philosophy before

phenomenology.

Existence – The human way of being (Heidegger).

Freedom (absolute) – The core of Sartre’s early

philosophy. Human freedom pushed to the extreme.

Life-world – The human world where all meanings

stem from (Husserl).

Natural attitude – Common but wrong conviction in

philosophy and science that there is something like a

realty behind reality (Husserl).

Pedagogy – Continental view on (philosophy of)

education, not restricted to what happens in the

school, but focused on upbringing in general.

Responsibility – The important consequence of

Sartre’s view on human freedom. In the view of

Levinas, pedagogical responsibility is not intentional

but being held hostage by the helplessness of the

child.

Transcendental idealism – The world as – in the

view of Husserl – constituted by human

consciousness.

Visibility – The property of the world that the

invisible can in principle be made visible (Merleau-

Ponty).

Visuality – The capacity of human beings to see

more of the world than what is caught by the eye

(Merleau-Ponty).

‘‘There is no reality behind the reality.’’ In both philoso-phy and science, we have to do with reality as we encoun-ter it through our ordinary experience. That is theposition of the father of phenomenology, EdmundHusserl (1859–1938). From an epistemological perspec-tive, phenomenology has to be seen as a radical responseto the viewpoint of Kant. Precisely what Husserl had inmind is, curiously, not so easy to grasp. The idea that thereis a genuine reality concealed behind the reality of phe-nomena, the so-called natural attitude, is far more familiarto us in one form or another. It is a view that has been

drummed into us since Plato. Husserl’s creed Zu den

Sachen Selbst should not, therefore, be understood as aform of objectivism; more than anything it means ‘‘backto the original experience.’’ However, the structure of thisordinary, everyday experience is anything but easy toreconstruct.

In Die Krise der Europaische Wissenschaften und die Trans-

cendentale Phanomenologie, Husserl (1954) demonstratesvery clearly that the idea of a reality behind the realityarises from doubts about the veracity of the reality as weencounter it through our ordinary experience. But onwhat grounds could we doubt the truth of everyday expe-rience? The idea of the true reality is a fabrication, theresult of substruction, as Husserl called it. All meaningsoriginate in the life-world, the concrete human world.With this conclusion and taking this as his starting point,Husserl really set off in a different direction.

At first, Husserl had not completely given up the ambi-tion to get through to objective reality. At that stage, he stillregarded phenomenological reduction as putting the ques-tion of the relationship between phenomena and genuinereality on hold for the time being. In his later transcenden-tal idealism, Husserl assumed that the world is constitutedin the consciousness. A more radical rejection of the naturalattitude is not possible. Be that as it may, phenomenologicalanalysis is not concerned with the relationship betweenphenomena and a true reality behind them, but with therelationship between phenomena themselves. One of themost important lessons that phenomenology can teach us,therefore, is that we have to stop searching everywhere forsomething behind things. That is a theme that we willencounter again in various different forms.

The triumphal procession of the natural sciences thatfollowed the scientific revolution of the late Middle Ageswas based on a concentration on epistemological questions.For the first time in history, epistemological questions werebeing asked separately from ontological questions. In theclassical era, it was customary first to determine the natureof reality in order to then look for adequate ways to acquireknowledge. Now, it became the custom to abandon spec-ulations about the nature of the cosmos and to formulaterules which had to be drawn up based on scientific meth-ods, come what may. Such rules, the primacy of formallogic and the method of doubt, led with Rene Descartes, forinstance, to a strict division between subject and object.

Descartes’ method generated interesting problems. Theepistemological subject–object division was associated witha strict mind–body division. The epistemological question

Phenomenology and Existentialism 81

‘‘How is knowledge possible?’’ manifested itself at that levelas the question ‘‘How can a nonspatial mind have knowl-edge of a spatial body?’’ A consequence of Descartes’methodical rules was in fact that mind and body do notresemble each other in any respect. Everything that themind was, the body was not: immaterial/thinking versusmaterial/nonthinking. How and where would they interactwith each other? As we will see later, phenomenology, forthe first time in history, came up with a solution for themind–body problem that had been formulated as long agoas Aristotle. Phenomenologists prefer not to speak in termsof subject and object, but in terms of I and the world. I andthe world are not separate but are related to each other,since it is simply impossible to separate I and the world.There is no world without I, because the world we wantto talk about exists by the grace of the meaning humansgive to it.

The I–world relationship is about unity in diversity.I and the world do not coincide. The world is not in myhead. Consciousness is always consciousness of some-thing, but I experience the things that I see or hear, nothere but there. Intentionality is called the intelligibilitymoment of phenomenology. That is to say that the idea ofgiving meaning lies at the basis of the ability to know theworld. This is a two-way matter. Besides giving meaning,there is also borrowing meaning. I give things meaning,but the world also forces its meanings upon me.

It is self-evident that language plays a very importantrole in the relationship between I and the world. Lan-guage allows me to name the things in the world, toindicate what the things in the world mean to me, butthe world that I come across does not need me to name itfrom top to bottom. The things already had names beforeI was born. Intersubjectivity seems to precede subjectivity,as we will soon see.

All the same, language is the crowning glory as far asthe meanings in and of the world are concerned, ratherthan the most fundamental connection between I and theworld. It is human corporeality that creates the originalbond between I and the world. Corporeality, particularlyas developed by Merleau-Ponty (1945), has little to dowith the body as in Descartes, from which the relationshipwith the mind remained entirely unclear. The body inMerleau-Ponty is not an object, it is object and subject.I can look at my hand and describe it, then it is an object.But I can also grasp objects with my hand, then it is asubject. Because the human body is both subject andobject, corporeality solves the epistemological subject–object problem.

The body is indeed, to paraphrase Brand (1971), thepre-eminent concrete a priori. Kant was still treating spaceand time as abstract categories of consciousness. Accord-ing to phenomenology, people proportion their world in aconcrete sense starting from their corporeality. Before theday that a metal bar was laid down in Paris as the metal

standard meter, and much later the meter was defined asthe distance traveled by light during an infinitesimal timeinterval, people had used their thumbs, elbows, and feet tomeasure things and 5 km was expressed as the walk for 5 h,the time you needed to move your body over that distance.Even when it comes to psychological traits, from timeimmemorial, these have been expressed in terms whichmade reference to the body. Before abstract scientificterms like extrovert and authoritarian came into everydayuse, we talked, for instance, about people being head-strong and pigheaded when we wanted to describe thepsychological traits of others.

In the philosophy of Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908–61),the relationship between I and the world falls nicely intoplace by describing the phenomenology of observation interms of corporeality. We generally only see the thingsand people around us partially and we never see the frontand back sides at the same time. That does not make usnervous; it would be absurd to doubt that things have areverse side. Our own corporeality completes the things.We really do not need to see it for ourselves, although it isstill possible to check whether things have a reverse side.Merleau-Ponty (1964) speaks of visuality and visibility.We still see the things that are outside our field of view ina certain sense and the things are visible even thoughthere is, in fact, no image on our retina. To put it ineveryday terms: our corporeality allows us to look roundthe corner, as it were.

Visuality and visibility come to play not only in theconcrete observation of people and things around us. Ourobservation of the state of mind of other people is also likebeing able to look round a corner. After all, we can neverdirectly observe the inner self of another person, we donot know what the inner self is or even whether such athing as an inner self exists. We observe that a person isnot feeling at ease by comparing his or her facial expres-sions and the circumstances, because of the fact that weknow that the person has looked happier on other occa-sions. Our knowledge of another person’s inner self isbased on interpretation at the phenomenal level.

Memory and thinking back to earlier times can also beconceived as looking round a corner. When I think aboutthe past, I can still conjure up certain events vividly in mymind, so vividly in fact that they do not seem any lessintense that they did at the time they were actually hap-pening. But the past is not really present. Anyone watchingme while I am musing on the past will most probably feelthat I am absent minded, and, despite the vividness of myrecollections, I know that they are memories. Just as I haveknowledge of the physical distance to things that I observefrom a greater distance, even looking at them can bring mevery close to them, as if I were there and not here, so I amaware of the distance in time when I remember, but mythoughts can bring me so close to events in the past that it isas if I have actually spanned the years.

82 Philosophy of Education – Philosophical Perspective

That brings phenomenology into the realm of anthro-pology. In addressing the epistemological question, wehave already said a lot about the specifically human wayof knowing, and by doing so about the human condition.The relationship with the world takes us back from anepistemological relationship to a being relationship andthat entails a rehabilitation of ontology. If it had been leftto Martin Heidegger (1889–1976), we would have startedfrom the other side. Existence, according to Heidegger,precedes essence. We can only fathom the world when weapproach it from the human awareness of being there.At the end of his principal work, Sein und Zeit, Heideggerconnects being with the typically human awareness oftime. With the new anthropology comes a new ontology.The new ontology is, however, very different from whatthe Greeks understood by that term.

Time did not exist for the Greeks, time was a nonbe-ing. However, human existence is more than a sequenceof moments in time that are irrelevant in themselves,human existence is not a continuous present. The humanbeing is a unity of the past, present, and future. Thatbecomes unmistakably clear when we try to understandthe meaning of fundamental concrete human experi-ences like fear, guilt, and regret. To exist is to endurethrough time. In the case of regret, it is an unpleasantfeeling that I have now, that relates to an event in thepast, and which forces me to make a resolution for thefuture. Regret is not a self-chosen recollection of the pastor noncommittal contemplation of the future. Regret is afeeling that happens to you at a particular moment, thatyou cannot prevent, and which connects you unavoid-ably to your past and your present. Where Husserl wasstill speaking about consciousness, Heidegger spokeabout existence. In Husserl’s transcendental idealism,the human being constituted reality; in Heidegger’sanalysis, the relationship with the world is affective asmuch as it is cognitive.

From Epistemology to Method andUpbringing

Phenomenology has two general epistemological princi-ples, which not only serve as the starting point for itsmethod, but are also significant for the way the processof education and upbringing takes shape.

The two general epistemological principles of phe-nomenology are subjectivity and intersubjectivity. Thereis personal sense-making, which means that every indi-vidual human being has his or her own outlook on reality.That personal perspective is bound up with preconcep-tions and preferences that we have acquired in our ownpersonal past. In addition to this subjectivity, there isintersubjectivity, the body of communal sense-making.These shared meanings are tied up in social rituals and

customs and the communal meanings that are embodiedin a language and which are specific to their time andculture.

Subjectivity creates a methodical problem. The phe-nomenologist bases his analyses on his own experiencebut the issue is that he is trying to say something about thereality. Phenomenological reduction ought to mean thathe will give up his personal prejudices. Those analyzingupbringing do not report on their own personal experi-ences, even though having been brought up themselvesdoes offer a sure way into the phenomenon. Phenomeno-logical reduction is more of an attitude of wanting toobserve things in an unbiased way, rather than a written-up methodical procedure. On close analysis, phenomeno-logical reduction is also actually an impossible operation.After all, if one were to really renounce the meaningone personally gives to reality, that would make realitydisappear.

The process known as eidetic reduction dovetailswith the epistemological principle of intersubjectivity. Itattempts to circumscribe the meaning of the phenomenonto be described through systematic variation. Eideticreduction can take place by means of concrete compari-son or through imaginary manipulation. This allows oneto clarify which characteristics must be counted asbelonging to a particular phenomenon and which mustnot. Some say that eidetic reduction cannot actually pro-duce any new knowledge, as it rests on the meanings wealready have and is partially embodied in the languagethat we have acquired in a specific cultural circle. How-ever, if we make the pre-reflexive reflexive, put into wordssomething that has never been put into words before, thenwe have to ask ourselves whether we can really sustain theview that we knew it all along.

The way the upbringing process takes shape canindeed be described very well in terms of two generalepistemological principles of phenomenology. Bringingup children and educating them is always about transfer-ring the culture, introducing them to intersubjectivemeanings. This means that the child is treated from theoutset as a person who is also making sense of the worldsubjectively, in that process.

Existentialism: How to Live?

Jean Paul Sartre (1905–80), one of the two existentialistswhose work and life we want to focus on first here,developed his phenomenology in an intensive expositionof the work of Husserl and Heidegger. In discussing thework of the phenomenologists up to now, their lives havenot been addressed. With existentialists such as Sartre andCamus – neither of whom incidentally wanted to be calledexistentialist – that would be inconceivable. Work and lifeare so profoundly interwoven that a wrong impression

Phenomenology and Existentialism 83

could be created if one were to pay no attention at all totheir lives. Furthermore, in the case of both Sartre andCamus, their literary work formed an excellent introduc-tion to their philosophy. That is why it used to be recom-mended that people start with the novels to gain a goodunderstanding of these philosophers. For the contempo-rary reader though, the extreme individualism in thenovels has probably become just as abstract as the philos-ophy, so one may as well start with the epistemology andontology.

Sartre’s philosophical development is marked by histwo principal works L’Etre et le Neant (Sartre, 1943) and theunfinished Critique de la raison dialectique (Sartre, 1960). Hestarted the first book that was given the subtitle Essay

d’ontologie phenomenologie (Essay on Phenomenological Ontology)

in the early 1930s, before he became acquainted withphenomenology. His second book reveals his turn toMarxism, in particular historical materialism. In L’Etre et

le Neant (Being and Nothingness) Sartre substantiates his ideaof absolute freedom that is so characteristic of his earlyphilosophy. That absolute freedom is extreme, not onlybecause it does not allow human beings any relativism orany excuse at all for their actions on the grounds ofrestrictive social conditions. Sartre takes the idea of abso-lute freedom much further. The man being burned at thestake dies, according to Sartre, not because the fire con-sumes his body but because he chooses to die. The impor-tance of Sartre’s concept of absolute freedom is probablyultimately not the concept itself, but the ethical dimen-sion of human existence that is its consequence: absoluteindividual responsibility. Sartre aptly expressed the humancondition with the words: ‘‘man is condemned to free-dom.’’ The power of this statement is obvious in that whenpeople are convicted in court, their freedom is generallywhat they are deprived of, but a human being cannot doanything other than take responsibility.

The title Being and Nothingness is readily open to mis-interpretation. In that title Sartre is not thinking of beinghuman, his ultimate concern, when he uses the term Being ;on the contrary, he is thinking of the being of things. Thebeing of things is inherent in itself, it is en soi.Nothingness,le Neant, is the logical opposite of that being a thing,absolutely nothing. Nothingness is consciousness, is pour

soi: it is geared to being and, for Sartre, that is typicallyhuman. This means that human consciousness is purelynegative. Sartre coined a new term for this negation:neantiser. That is indeed the essence of being human: thefreedom, the fundamental indeterminateness. The fact isthat people are bound by the consequences of their owndecisions: what Sartre called facticite. The term existen-tialism is not found in Being and Nothingness. Sartre becameespecially associated with the term existentialism follow-ing his 1946 lecture entitled L’Existentialisme est un huma-

nisme, in which he attempted to defend his views againstattacks from Catholic and communist quarters. However,

the authenticity that he focused on in that lectureappeared already at the end of his main work.

Sartre does not, however, have his philosophical workto thank for his immense popularity. That was simply toodifficult for the ordinary reader and the student. Thegeneral public in the 1950s could, however, acquaintthemselves with his ideas through his plays and novels,in which the meaning of absolute freedom is insinuatedinto the consciousness of the reader. In Huis clos (No Exit)

(Sartre, 1938), a play that was later filmed under hisdirection, three people are condemned to be togetherfor eternity: an army deserter who had cheated on hiswife, a woman who had committed infanticide and alesbian. They conceal their original identities from eachother but have all chosen to be what they are. They cannotavoid accepting that what they are is the result of theirown choices. In his novel La nausee (Nausea) (1938) andstories such as La chambre (The Room) and Le mur (The Wall),

(in Le mur, Sartre, 1939), Sartre clarifies philosophicalthemes such as consciousness, absolute freedom, andresponsibility for the ordinary reader.

Sartre is also an outstanding example of the intellec-tual who for 40 years made no secret of his anti-bourgeoisopinions. Throughout all those years he expressed hisviews on collaboration, the Cold War, colonialism andthe exploitation of the Third World, the Vietnam war,Russian prison camps in Siberia, female emancipation,and so on. When he tries to understand people in theirsocial and historical context, the key concepts of his earlyphilosophy, absolute freedom and responsibility, turn outto have shortcomings. He was reluctant to admit to wrongchoices that he made and the truth behind political ideol-ogies generally only dawned upon him slowly. Whenstudying phenomenology in Berlin in the early 1930s, hewas blind to the emerging fascism. In 1950 he was stillreluctant to acknowledge the reality of the Soviet gulags.However, President de Gaulle expressed a judgment ofhim in no uncertain terms when he said ‘‘You don’t arrestVoltaire’’ when Sartre the activist was about to be arrested.

The second existentialist to be discussed here is less aphilosopher than the first. Albert Camus (1913–60) onlywrote two books that can be broadly termed philosophicalbooks, Le mythe de Sisyphe, 1942, and L’homme revolte (The

Rebel), 1951. Both, Camus in 1957 and Sartre in 1964, wereawarded the Nobel prize for literature. Sartre turned itdown. In the late 1930s, Camus wrote with admiration,but also with detachment, about La nausee and Le mur.They met in 1944, the beginning of what Sartre called adifficult friendship. Camus never considered Sartre to behis friend. Whatever the relationship was, it ended in 1952when the periodical Les Temps modernes, which Sartreedited, published a scathing criticism of L’homme revolte

penned by Francis Jeanson.Camus himself admits that three mythological themes

operate in his literary work, those of Sisyphus, Prometheus,

84 Philosophy of Education – Philosophical Perspective

and Nemesis. Sisyphus is for Camus the symbol of thehuman condition. By the human condition it is not somuch about the conditions themselves, but about howpeople deal with those conditions. In the classical themeof Sisyphean labor – it is the lot of the first king of Ephyrato be punished in the underworld for his wiliness and greedby being made to push a block of marble up a steep hill overand over again for all eternity – the human condition getsits special meaning of absurdity. Absurdity does not existfor the cricket or the ant, only for humanity. However,acknowledging that life is absurd is only the beginning.Camus formulated a number of rules for human behavior.Whatever you do you should not lie and take refuge fromthe absurdity in religion; that is philosophical suicide. Lifeis worth the effort because there is a logic of the heart thatis stronger than that of the intellect. No lies, no violence, noidealism either, because that costs human lives, but nor canyou look on as a disinterested observer. There is a need forhonnetete, which means decency rather than honesty, andtenderness.

It is thanks to French existentialists like Camus andSartre that civil disobedience came to be part of the think-ing about citizenship in the late 1960s. That was somethingon which they agreed. Where they disagreed was on thelimits of protest and especially on the admissibility ofviolence. Camus set the different positions on violenceagainst each other in his play Les justes. Camus was nounconditional pacifist, but he said he would rather beright by not killing anyone than be right standing on therim of a mass grave. He also said that one can only kill oncondition that one is also killed. Because Camus ultimatelybased resistance to terror on respect for life, he wasreproached for having a Red Cross morality. Sartre, whohad the last word in the Les temps modernes debate, accusedCamus of lack of philosophical depth. When it came to theadmissibility of violence, Sartre was indeed far more radicalas the years passed, but he had his limits. He scathinglydescribed Andreas Baader, a member of the German ter-rorist Baader-Meinhof group, after visiting him at Baader’srequest in 1974 in prison, as incredibly stupid.

Freedom and Responsibility in Upbringingand Education

In the continental European pedagogic tradition, in whichphenomenology and existentialism play an important role,the term education (German: Erziehung, Dutch: opvoeding) isemphatically not confined, as it tends to be in the English-speaking world, to what takes place in school. The termpedagogy has been used in Western Europe (and SouthAfrica) from time immemorial to refer to the branch oflearning that is concerned with what happens to childrenon their long journey to adulthood, so this also includeswhat happens in the family. Not only the relationship

between parents and children, but also the relationshipbetween teacher and pupil are primarily seen as pedagogicrelationships. The modern formulation of the purpose ofupbringing and education stems from the concept of auton-omy, as developed in the work of the philosopher ImmanuelKant. The idea of autonomy, that we encounter again in aradicalised form in the absolute freedom concept of earlySartre, had become untenable by the end of the 1970s, ascriticism from postmodernist circles made clear. Absolutefreedom is not only restricted by outside forces – socialconditions – it is also restricted internally due to internalflaws and inadequacies. For human beings, autonomyis unachievable in the real world. However, autonomyremains essential as a positive fiction for the process ofbringing up children. Child-rearing and education continueto aim for autonomy, because human society in general,and especially human society in a democracy, assumesindividual autonomy.

On the question of the responsibility that parents andteachers take in the pedagogic relationship, Sartre’s inter-pretation of the concept also falls short. In general one canindeed assume, as Sartre does, that responsibility pre-sumes freedom. In the case of the pedagogic relationship,however, responsibility is not based on freedom but on thelack of freedom, more specifically: the child’s lack offreedom. The parent does not have the option whetheror not to accept the parenting role. In the terms of theFrench phenomenologist, Emanuel Levinas (1906–95),the parent is held hostage by the helplessness of thechild. Parents cannot do anything other than take thisresponsibility upon themselves.

Bibliography

Brand, G. (1971). Die Lebenswelt. Eine Philosophie des konkretenApriori. Berlin: de Gruyter.

Camus, A. (1942a). L’Etranger. (Ward, M. (trans.) (1989). The stranger.New York: Random House.). Paris: Gallimard.

Camus, A. (1942b). Le mythe de Sisyphe. (O’Brien, J. (trans.) (1955).The myth of Sisyphus. London: Penguin Books.) Paris: Gallimard.

Camus, A. (1951). L’Homme revolte. (Bower, A. (trans.) (1991). Therebel: An essay on man on revolt. New York: Vintage.) Paris:Gallimard.

Husserl, E. (1954). Die Krisis der europaischen Wissenschaften und dietranszentale Phanomenologie: Eine Einleitung in diephanomenologische Philosophie: Eine Einleitung in diephanomenologische Philosophie. (Carr, D. (trans.) (1970). The crisisof European sciences and transcendental phenomenology: Anintroduction to phenomenological philosophy. Evanston: NorthWestern University Press.). (Biemel, W. hrsg) Husserliana VI.Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff. (urspr. 1936).

Merleau-Ponty, M. (1945). Phenomenologie de la perception. (Smith, C.(trans.) (1962). Phenomenology of perception. New York: HumanitiesPress.) Paris: Gallimard.

Merleau-Ponty, M. (1964). Le visible et l’invisible. (Lingis, A. (trans.)(1968). The visible and the invisible. Evanston: NorthwesternUniversity Press.). Paris: Gallimard.

Sartre, J.-P. (1943). L’Etre et le Neant. Essai d’ontologiephenomenologique. (Barnes E. H. (trans.) (1992). Being andnothingness. NewYork:Washington Square Press.). Paris: Gallimard.

Phenomenology and Existentialism 85

Sartre, J.-P. (1960). Critique de la raison dialectique. Tome I. Paris:Gallimard (Sheridan-Smith, A. (trans.) (2002). Critique of dialecticalreason. And in French in text, vol. I. (new edn.). New York: VersoBooks.).

Sartre, J.-P. (1938). La nausea. Paris: Gallimard (Alexander, L. (trans.)(1969). Nausea. New York: New Directions Publishing Corporation.).

Sartre, J.-P. (1939). Le mur. Paris: Gallimard (Alexander, L. (1991).(trans.) The wall and other stories. New York: Directions PublishingCorporation.).

Further Reading

De Boer, Th. (1966). De ontwikkelingsgang in het denken van Husserl((1978). The Development of Husserl’s Thought. The Hague: Nijhoff.)Assen: van Gorcum.

Gorner, P. (2007). Heidegger’s Being and Time: An Introduction.Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Heidegger, M. (1927). Sein und Zeit. (Stambaugh, J. (transl.) (1996).Being and time. Albany: State University of New York Press.).Tubingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag.

Kwant, R. C. (1963). The Philosophy of Merleau-Ponty. Pittsburgh, PA:Duquesne University Press.

Lee, E. N. and Mandelbaum, M. (eds.) (1967). Phenomenology andExistentialism. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Press.

Levering, B. and Van Manen, M. (2002). Phenomenologicalanthropology in The Netherlands. In Tymieniecka, A.-T. (ed.)Phenomenology World-Wide, pp 274–286. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

Levinas, E. (1961). Totalite et Infini. Essay sur l’exteriorite. Den Haag:Martinus Nijhoff (Lingis, A. (trans.) (1969). Totality and infinity.Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University Press.).

Levy, B.-H. (2003). Sartre: The Philosopher of the Twentieth Century.Cambridge: Polity.

Lottman, H. R. (1997). Albert Camus: A Biography. London: Weidenfeldand Nicolson.

Peperzak, A. Th. (1997). Beyond: The Philosophy of Emanuel Levinas.Evanston: North Western University Press.

Sartre, J. P. (1945). Huis clos: suivi les mouches. Paris: Gallimard(Gilbert, S. (trans.) (1955). No exit, and three other plays. New York:Vintage Books.).

Spiegelberg, H. (1982). The Phenomenological Movement. A HistoricalIntroduction, 3rd rev. The Hague: Nijhoff and enlarged edn.

Zaner, R. M. (1964). The Problem of Embodiment: Some Contributionsto a Phenomenology of the Body. The Hague: Nijhoff.

Relevant Websites

http://www.phenomenologycenter.org – Center for AdvancedResearch in Phenomenology.

http://www.csudh.edu/phenom_studies – Centre for Philosophy andPhenomenological Studies, California State University, DominguezHills.

http://britishphenomenology.com – Journal of the British Society forPhenomenology, The British Society for Phenomenology.

http://www.spep.org – Society for Phenomenology and ExistentialPhilosophy.

http://britishphenomenology.com – The British Society forPhenomenology.

http://www.ipjp.org – The Indo-Pacific Journal of Phenomenology.http://www.phenomenology.org – The World Phenomenology Institute.