international humanitarian law and the challenges … · 28 international humanitarian law and the...
TRANSCRIPT
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND THE CHALLENGES OF CONTEMPORARY ARMED CONFLICTSRECOMMITTING TO PROTECTION IN ARMED CONFLICT ON THE 70TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS
REPO
RT
TABLE OF CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ..........................................................................................................................5
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................9
CHAPTER 2: CONTEMPORARY AND FUTURE CHALLENGES IN THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES ........151. Urbanizationofarmedconflicts ........................................................................................................ 16A) Theprotectionofciviliansagainsttheeffectsofhostilitiesduringurbanwarfare ..................................16B) Theuseofexplosiveweaponsinpopulatedareas ....................................................................................................19C) Theprotectionofthecivilianpopulationduringsieges .......................................................................................22
2. Newtechnologiesofwarfare .............................................................................................................26A) Cyberoperations,theirpotentialhumancost,andtheprotectionaffordedbyIHL .................................26B) Autonomousweaponsystems .........................................................................................................................................29C) Artificialintelligenceandmachinelearning .............................................................................................................31D) HumanitarianconsequencesandconstraintsunderIHL related tothepotentialuseofweaponsinouterspace ......................................................................................... 32E) Challengesposedbycertainnewtechnologiesofwarfaretolegalreviewsofnewweapons ............... 34
CHAPTER 3: NEEDS OF THE CIVILIAN POPULATION IN INCREASINGLY LONG CONFLICTS: SELECTED ISSUES ...............................................................................................................................371. Internallydisplacedpersons .............................................................................................................38
2. Theprotectionofpersonswithdisabilities ....................................................................................... 41
3. Accesstoeducation .......................................................................................................................... 44
CHAPTER 4: IHL AND NON-STATE ARMED GROUPS ...........................................................................491. TheapplicabilityofIHLtoconflictsinvolvingmultiplenon-Statearmedgroups .............................50
2. Thelegalregimeprotectingpersonsliving interritory underthecontrolofnon-Statearmedgroups ...................................................................................52
3. Detentionbynon-Statearmedgroups ...............................................................................................54
CHAPTER 5: TERRORISM, COUNTERTERRORISM MEASURES, AND IHL ............................................571. TheapplicabilityofIHLtoStatesfighting“terrorism” andnon-Statearmedgroupsdesignatedas“terrorists” ...................................................................58
2. Counterterrorismmeasuresand principledhumanitarianaction .....................................................59
3. Statusandprotectionofforeignfightersandtheirfamilies .............................................................. 61
CHAPTER 6: CLIMATE, ARMED CONFLICT, AND THE NATURAL ENVIRONMENT ................................65
CHAPTER 7: ENHANCING RESPECT FOR IHL ......................................................................................711. Investigationsinarmedconflict .......................................................................................................72
2. Rootsofrestraintinwar ...................................................................................................................74
3. “Supportrelationships”inarmedconflict .......................................................................................75
4. IHLinaction:Respectforthelawon the battlefield .........................................................................76
CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION...................................................................................................................79
P. Kr
zysi
ek/IC
RC
CHAPTER 2
CONTEMPORARY AND FUTURE CHALLENGES IN THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES
26 INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND THE CHALLENGES OF CONTEMPORARY ARMED CONFLICTS
2. NEW TECHNOLOGIES OF WARFARE
19 SeeICRC,The Potential Human Cost of Cyber Operations,2019;availableathttps://www.icrc.org/en/download/file/ 96008/the‑potential‑human‑cost‑of‑cyber‑operations.pdf.
Newtechnologiesarechanginghumaninteractionprofoundly–includingintimesofarmedconflict.ManyStatesareinvestingheavilyinthedevelopmentofmeansandmethodsofwarfarethatrelyondigitaltech‑nology.Cybertools,increasinglyautonomousweaponsystems,andartificialintelligencearebeingusedincontemporaryarmedconflicts.TheICRCcloselyfollowsthedevelopmentofnewmeansandmethodsofwarfareandtheirusebymilitaries;italsoengagesallrelevantstakeholdersontheapplicabilityofIHLtotheuseofthesenewmeansandmethodsofwarfare.
Technologicaladvancescanhavepositiveconsequencesfortheprotectionofciviliansinarmedconflict:weaponscanbeusedwithmoreprecision,militarydecisionscanbebetterinformed,andmilitaryaimscanbeachievedwithouttheuseofkineticforceorphysicaldestruction.Atthesametime,newmeansofwarfareandthewaytheyareemployedcanposenewriskstocombatantsandcivilians,andcanchallengetheinter‑pretationandimplementationofIHL.TheICRC’sassessmentoftheforeseeablehumanitarianimpactofnewtechnologiesofwarfare,andthechallengestheymayposetoexistingIHLrules,focusesoninterrelatedlegal,military,technical,ethical,andhumanitarianconsiderations.
IHLisapplicabletothedevelopmentanduseofnewweaponryandnewtechnologicaldevelopmentsinwar‑fare–whethertheyinvolve(a)cybertechnology;(b)autonomousweaponsystems;(c)artificialintelligenceandmachinelearning;or(d)outerspace.StatesthatdeveloporacquiresuchweaponsormeansofwarfareareresponsibleforensuringthattheycanbeusedincompliancewithIHL(e).
A) CYBER OPERATIONS, THEIR POTENTIAL HUMAN COST, AND THE PROTECTION AFFORDED BY IHL
Theuseofcyberoperationsduringarmedconflictsisareality.WhileonlyafewStateshavepubliclyacknow‑ ledgedusingsuchoperations,anincreasingnumberofStatesaredevelopingmilitarycybercapabilities,andtheuseofsuchcapabilitiesislikelytoincrease.
TheICRCunderstands“cyberwarfare”tomeanoperationsagainstacomputer,acomputersystemornet‑work,oranotherconnecteddevice,throughadatastream,whenusedasmeansormethodsofwarfareinthecontextofanarmedconflict.CyberwarfareraisesquestionsaboutpreciselyhowcertainprovisionsofIHLapplytotheseoperations,andwhetherIHLisadequateorwhether,buildingonexistinglaw,itmightrequirefurtherdevelopment.
Theuseofcyberoperationsmayofferalternativesthatothermeansormethodsofwarfaredonot,butitalsocarriesrisks.Ontheonehand,cyberoperationsmayenablemilitariestoachievetheirobjectiveswithoutharmingciviliansorcausingpermanentphysicaldamagetocivilianinfrastructure.Ontheotherhand,recentcyberoperations–whichhavebeenprimarilyconductedoutsidethecontextofarmedconflict–showthatsophisticatedactorshavedevelopedthecapabilitytodisrupttheprovisionofessentialservicestothecivilianpopulation.
UnderstandingcyberoperationsandtheirpotentialhumancostTodeveloparealisticassessmentofcybercapabilitiesandtheirpotentialhumancostinlightoftheirtech‑nicalcharacteristics,inNovember2018theICRCinvitedexpertsfromallpartsoftheworldtosharetheirknowledgeaboutthetechnicalpossibilities,expecteduse,andpotentialeffectsofcyberoperations.19
Cyberoperationscanposeaparticularthreatforcertainelementsofcivilianinfrastructure.Oneareaofcon‑cernfortheICRC,givenitsmandate,isthehealth‑caresector.Inthisregard,researchshowsthatthehealth‑caresectorappearstobeparticularlyvulnerabletodirectcyberattacksandincidentalharmfromsuchattacksdirectedelsewhere.Itsvulnerabilityisaconsequenceofincreaseddigitizationandinterconnectivityinhealthcare.Forexample,medicaldevicesinhospitalsareconnectedtothehospitalnetwork,andbiomedicaldevices
Contemporary and future Challenges in the ConduCt of hostilities 27
suchaspacemakersandinsulinpumpsaresometimesremotelyconnectedthroughtheinternet.Thisgrowthofconnectivityincreasesthesector’sdigitaldependenceand“attacksurface”andleavesitexposed,espe‑ciallywhenthesedevelopmentsarenotmatchedbyacorrespondingimprovementincybersecurity.
Criticalcivilianinfrastructure–includingelectrical,water,andsanitationfacilities–isanotherareainwhichcyberattackscancausesignificantharmtothecivilianpopulation.Thisinfrastructureisoftenoperatedbyindustrialcontrolsystems.Acyberattackagainstanindustrialcontrolsystemrequiresspecificexpertiseandsophistication,aswellasspecificallydesignedcybertools.Whileattacksagainstindustrialcontrolsystemshavebeenlessfrequentthanothertypesofcyberoperations,theirfrequencyisreportedlyincreasing,andtheseverityofthethreathasevolvedmorerapidlythananticipatedonlyafewyearsago.
Beyondthevulnerabilityofspecificsectors,thereareatleastthreetechnicalcharacteristicsofcyberoper‑ationsthatarecauseforconcern.
First,cyberoperationscarryariskofoverreactionandescalation,simplyduetothefactthat itmaybeextremelydifficult–ifnotimpossible–forthetargetofacyberattacktodetectwhethertheattacker’saimistospyortocausephysicaldamage.Astheaimofacyberoperationmightbeidentifiedonlyafterthetargetsystemhasbeenharmed,thereisariskthatthetargetwillimaginetheworst‑casescenarioandreactmuchmorestronglythanitwouldhavedoneifithadknownthattheattacker’strueintentwaslimitedtoespionage,forexample.
Second,cybertoolsandmethodscanproliferateinauniquemanner,onethatisdifficulttocontrol.Today,sophisticatedcyberattacksarecarriedoutonlybythemostadvancedandbest‑resourcedactors.Butonceacybertoolhasbeenused,stolenorleaked,orbecomesavailableinsomeotherway,actorsotherthanthosewhodevelopeditmaybeabletofindit,reverse‑engineerit,andrepurposeitfortheirown–possiblymali‑cious–ends.
Third,whileitisnotimpossibletodeterminewhocreatedorlaunchedaparticularcyberattack,attributinganattacktendstobedifficult.IdentifyingactorswhoviolateIHLincyberspaceandholdingthemresponsibleislikelytoremainchallenging.Theperceptionthatitwillbeeasiertodenyresponsibilityforsuchattacksmayalsoweakenthetabooagainsttheiruse–andmaymakeactorslessscrupulousaboutviolatinginternationallawbyusingthem.
Whilecyberoperationshaveexposedthevulnerabilityofessentialservices,theyhavenot,fortunately,causedmajorhumanharmsofar.However,muchisunknownintermsoftechnologicalevolution,thecapabilitiesandthetoolsdevelopedbythemostsophisticatedactors,andtheextenttowhichtheincreaseduseofcyberoperationsduringarmedconflictsmightbedifferentfromthetrendsobservedsofar.
ThelimitsthatIHLsetsforcyberwarfareTheICRCwelcomesthefactthatanincreasingnumberofStatesandinternationalorganizationsareacknow‑ledgingthatIHLappliestocyberoperationsduringarmedconflicts.IturgesallStatestorecognizethepro‑tectionthatIHLoffersagainstthepotentialhumancostofcyberoperations.Forexample,belligerentsmustrespectandprotectmedicalfacilitiesandpersonnelatalltimes,whichmeansthatcyberattacksagainstthehealth‑caresectorduringarmedconflictwould–inmostcases–violateIHL.Likewise,IHLspecificallyprohibitsattacking,destroying,removingorrenderinguselessobjectsindispensabletothesurvivalofthecivilianpopulation.
Moregenerally,IHLprohibitsdirectingcyberattacksagainstcivilianinfrastructure,aswellasindiscriminateanddisproportionatecyberattacks.Forinstance,eveniftheinfrastructureorpartsofitbecomemilitaryobjectives(suchasadiscretepartofapowergrid),IHLrequiresthatonlythosepartsbeattacked,andthattherebenoexcessivedamagetotheremainingcivilianpartsofthegridortoothercivilianinfrastructurerelyingontheelectricityprovidedbythegrid.IHLalsorequirespartiestoconflicttotakeallfeasiblepre‑cautionstoavoidoratleastminimizeincidentalharmtociviliansandcivilianobjectswhencarryingoutacyberattack.
28 INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND THE CHALLENGES OF CONTEMPORARY ARMED CONFLICTS
Notwithstandingtheinterconnectivitythatcharacterizescyberspace,theprinciplesofdistinction,propor‑tionalityandprecautionscanandmustberespected.Acarefulexaminationofthewaycybertoolsoperateshowsthattheyarenotnecessarilyindiscriminate.Whilesomeofthecybertoolsthatweknowofweredesignedtoself‑propagateandindiscriminatelyaffectwidelyusedcomputersystems,theydidnotdothesethingsbychance:theabilitytoself‑propagateusuallyneedstobespecificallyincludedinthedesignofsuchtools.Furthermore,attackingspecifictargetsmayrequirecustom‑madecybertools,whichmightmakeitdifficulttocarryoutsuchattacksonalargescaleorindiscriminately.
Infact,manyofthecyberattacksthathavebeenobservedappeartohavebeenratherdiscriminatefromatechnicalperspective.Thisdoesnotmeantheywerelawfulorwouldhavebeenlawfulifcarriedoutinaconflict;onthecontrary,intheICRC’sview,anumberofthecyberattacksthathavebeenreportedinpublicsourceswouldbeprohibitedduringarmedconflict.However,theirtechnicalcharacteristicsshowthatcyberoperationscanbeverypreciselydesignedtohaveaneffectonlyonspecifictargets,whichmakesthemcap‑ableofbeingusedincompliancewithIHLprinciplesandrules.
IHLrulesprotectingcivilianobjectscan,however,providethefullscopeoflegalprotectiononlyifStatesrecognizethatcyberoperationsthatimpairthefunctionalityofcivilianinfrastructurearesubjecttotherulesgoverningattacksunderIHL.20Moreover,datahavebecomeanessentialcomponentofthedigitaldomainandacornerstoneoflifeinmanysocieties.However,differentviewsexistonwhetherciviliandatashouldbecon‑sideredascivilianobjectsandthereforebeprotectedunderIHLprinciplesandrulesgoverningtheconductofhostilities.IntheICRC’sview,theconclusionthatdeletingortamperingwithessentialciviliandatawouldnotbeprohibitedbyIHLintoday’severmoredata‑reliantworldseemsdifficulttoreconcilewiththeobjectandpurposeofthisbodyoflaw.21Putsimply,thereplacementofpaperfilesanddocumentswithdigitalfilesintheformofdatashouldnotdecreasetheprotectionthatIHLaffordstothem.
Finally,partiestoarmedconflictsmusttakeallfeasibleprecautionstoprotectciviliansandcivilianobjectsunder theircontrolagainst theeffectsofattacks.This isoneof the fewIHLobligationsthatStatesarerequiredtoimplementinpeacetime.
AffirmingthatIHLappliestocyberwarfareshouldnotbemisunderstoodasencouragementtomilitarizecyberspaceoraslegitimizingcyberwarfare.AnyuseofforcebyStates,whethercyberorkineticinnature,willalwaysbegovernedbytheUNCharterandrelevantrulesofcustomaryinternationallaw.IHLaffordsthecivilianpopulationanadditionallayerofprotectionagainsttheeffectsofhostilities.
Inthecomingyears,theICRCwillcontinuetofollowtheevolutionofcyberoperationsandtheirpotentialhumancost,inparticularduringarmedconflicts.ItwillexploreavenuestoreducethatcostandworktowardsbuildingconsensusontheinterpretationofexistingIHLrulesand,ifnecessary,onthedevelopmentofcom‑plementaryrulesthataffordeffectiveprotectiontocivilians.
Theuseofdigitaltechnologyduringarmedconflictsforpurposes otherthanasmeansand methodsofwarfareInrecentconflicts,certainusesofdigitaltechnologyotherthanasmeansandmethodsofwarfarehaveledtoanincreaseinactivitiesthatadverselyaffectcivilianpopulations.Forexample,misinformationanddisinformationcampaigns,andonlinepropaganda,havefusedonsocialmedia,leadinginsomecontextstoincreasedtensionsandviolenceagainstandbetweencommunities.Unprecedentedlevelsofsurveillanceofthecivilianpopulationhavecausedanxietyandincreasingnumbersofarrests,insomeinstancespossiblybasedondisinformation.Disinformationandsurveillancearenotuniqueornewtoarmedconflicts;however,thegreaterscopeandforce‑multiplyingeffectprovidedbydigitaltechnologycanexacerbate–andaddto–theexistingvulnerabilitiesofpersonsaffectedbyarmedconflicts.22Developmentsinartificialintelligence
20 SeeICRC,IHL Challenges Report 2015,p.41.21 SeeICRC,IHL Challenges Report 2015,p.43.22 SeeICRC,Digital Risks in Situations of Armed Conflict,2019;availableathttps://www.icrc.org/sites/default/files/event/file_list/icrc_symposium_on_digital_risks_‑_event_report.pdf.
Contemporary and future Challenges in the ConduCt of hostilities 29
andmachinelearningarealsorelevantinthisregard.23IHLdoesnotnecessarilyprohibitsuchactivities,butitdoesprohibitactsorthreatsofviolencetheprimarypurposeofwhichistospreadterroramongthecivilianpopulation.Moreover,partiestoarmedconflictmustnotencourageviolationsofIHL.Otherbodiesoflaw,includinginternationalhumanrightslaw,mightalsoberelevantwhenassessingsurveillanceanddisinformation.
Theglobaldigitaltransformationischangingnotonlywarfarebutalsothenatureofhumanitarianaction.Digitaltechnologiescanbeleveragedtosupporthumanitarianprogrammes,forinstancebycapturingandusingdatatoinformandadjustresponsesorbyfacilitatingtwo‑waycommunicationbetweenhumanitarianstaffandpopulationsaffectedbyconflicts.24Forexample,theICRCanalyses“bigdata”toanticipate,under‑stand,andrespondtohumanitariancrises,andusesinternet‑basedtoolstointeractwithbeneficiariesaswellaswithpartiestoarmedconflicts.TheICRCalsousesdigitaltoolstorestorefamilylinksand,ifpos‑sible,tofacilitatecommunicationbetweendetaineesandtheirlovedones;theICRCdoesallthisalsotohelppartiestoimplementtheirIHLobligations.Thesenewpossibilitiesentailnewresponsibilities:humanitarianorganizationsneedtostrengthentheirdigitalliteracyanddata‑protectionmeasures,inaccordancewiththe“donoharm”principle.25TheICRCencouragesfurtherresearch,discussion,andconcretestepsbyallreventactorstoenablehumanitarianactorstosafelyadapttheiroperationstodigitalchanges.
B) AUTONOMOUS WEAPON SYSTEMS TheICRCunderstandsautonomousweaponsystemsas:Any weapon system with autonomy in its critical func-
tions. That is, a weapon system that can select and attack targets without human intervention.Autonomyincriticalfunctions–alreadyfoundinsomeexistingweaponstoalimitedextent,suchasairdefencesystems,activeprotectionsystems,andsomeloiteringweapons–isafeaturethatcouldbeincorporatedinanyweaponsystem.
Themostimportantaspectofautonomyinweaponsystems–fromahumanitarian,legalandethicalper‑spective–isthattheweaponsystemself‑initiates,ortriggers,anattackinresponsetoitsenvironment,basedonageneralizedtargetprofile.Tovaryingdegrees,theuseroftheweaponwillknowneitherthespe‑cifictargetnortheexacttimingandlocationoftheattackthatwillresult.Autonomousweaponsystemsare,therefore,clearlydistinguishablefromotherweaponsystems,wherethespecifictiming,locationandtargetarechosenbytheuseratthepointoflaunchoractivation.
TheICRC’sprimaryconcernislossofhumancontrolovertheuseofforceasaresultofautonomyinthecriticalfunctionsofweaponsystems.Dependingontheconstraintsunderwhichasystemoperates,theuser’suncertaintyabouttheexacttiming,locationandcircumstancesoftheattack(s)mayputciviliansatriskfromtheunpredictableconsequencesoftheattack(s).Italsoraiseslegalquestions,sincecombatantsmustmakecontextspecificjudgementstocomplywithIHL.Anditraisesethicalconcernsaswell,becausehumanagencyindecisionstouseforceisnecessaryinordertoupholdmoralresponsibilityandhumandignity.
23 SeechapterII.2)c.onartificialintelligenceandmachinelearning.24 SeeICRC Strategy 2019-2022,“Strategicorientation5:Embracingthedigitaltransformation”,pp.22–23;availableathttps://shop.icrc.org/icrc/pdf/view/id/2844.
25 SeeICRCandPrivacyInternational,The Humanitarian Metadata Problem: “Doing No Harm” in the Digital Era,2018;availableathttps://www.icrc.org/en/download/file/85089/the_humanitarian_metadata_problem_‑_icrc_and_privacy_international.pdf.
30 INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND THE CHALLENGES OF CONTEMPORARY ARMED CONFLICTS
Fullerunderstandingofthelegal,26military,27ethical,28andtechnical29aspectsofautonomousweaponsys‑temshasenabledtheICRCtorefineitsviews.30Itcontinuestoespouseahuman‑centredapproach,basedonitsreadingofthelawandethicalconsiderationsforhumansinarmedconflict.31
HumancontrolunderIHLTheICRCholdsthatlegalobligationsunderIHLrulesontheconductofhostilitiesmustbefulfilledbythosepersonswhoplan,decideon,andcarryoutmilitaryoperations.Itishumans,notmachines,thatcomplywithandimplementtheserules,anditishumanswhocanbeheldaccountableforviolations.Whateverthemachine,computerprogram,orweaponsystemused,individualsandpartiestoconflictsremainresponsiblefortheireffects.
Certainlimitsonautonomyinweaponsystemscanbededucedfromexistingrulesontheconductofhostil‑ities–notablytherulesofdistinction,proportionalityandprecautionsinattack–whichrequirecomplexassessmentsbasedonthecircumstancesprevailingatthetimeofthedecisiontoattack,butalsoduringanattack.Combatantsmustmaketheseassessmentsreasonablyproximateintimetotheattack.Wheretheseassessmentsformpartofplanningassumptions,theymusthavecontinuingvalidityuntiltheexecutionoftheattack.Hence,commandersoroperatorsmustretainalevelofhumancontroloverweaponsystemssufficienttoallowthemtomakecontext‑specificjudgmentstoapplythelawincarryingoutattacks.
Humancontrolcantakevariousformsduringthedevelopmentandtestingofaweaponsystem(“devel‑opmentstage”); thetakingof thedecisiontoactivate theweaponsystem(“activationstage”);andtheoperationoftheweaponsystemasitselectsandattackstargets(“operationstage”).Humancontrolattheactivationandoperationstagesisthemostimportantfactorforensuringcompliancewiththerulesontheconductofhostilities.Humancontrolduringthedevelopmentstageprovidesameanstosetandtestcontrolmeasuresthatwillensurehumancontrolinuse.However,controlmeasuresatthedevelopmentstagealone–meaningcontrolindesign–willnotbesufficient.
Importantly,however,existingIHLrulesdonotprovidealltheanswers.AlthoughStatesagreeontheimport‑anceofhumancontrol–or“humanresponsibility”32–forlegalcompliance,opinionvariesonwhatthismeansinpractice.Further,purelylegalinterpretationsdonotaccommodatetheethicalconcernsraisedbythelossofhumancontrolovertheuseofforceinarmedconflict.
TowardslimitsonautonomyinweaponsystemsIntheICRC’sview,theuniquecharacteristicsofautonomousweaponsystems,andtheassociatedrisksoflossofcontrolovertheuseofforceinarmedconflict,meanthatinternationallyagreedlimitsareneededtoensurecompliancewithIHLandtoprotecthumanity.
Insofarasthesufficiencyofexistinglaw–particularlyIHL–isconcerned,itisclear,asshownabove,thatexistingIHLrules–inparticulardistinction,proportionality,andprecautionsinattack–alreadyprovide
26 NeilDavison,“Alegalperspective:Autonomousweaponsystemsunderinternationalhumanitarianlaw”,inUNODA
Occasional Papers,No.30,November2017;availableathttps://www.icrc.org/en/document/autonomous‑weapon‑ systems‑under‑international‑humanitarian‑law;ICRC,Autonomous Weapon Systems: Technical, Military, Legal and
Humanitarian Aspects,2014:availableathttps://www.icrc.org/en/document/report‑icrc‑meeting‑autonomous‑ weapon‑systems‑26‑28‑march‑2014.
27 SeeICRC,Autonomous Weapon Systems: Implications of Increasing Autonomy in the Critical Functions of Weapons,2016;availableathttps://www.icrc.org/en/publication/4283‑autonomous‑weapons‑systems.
28 SeeICRC,Ethics and Autonomous Weapon Systems: An Ethical Basis for Human Control?,2018;availableathttps://www.icrc.org/en/document/ethics‑and‑autonomous‑weapon‑systems‑ethical‑basis‑human‑control.
29 SeeICRC,Autonomy, Artificial Intelligence and Robotics:Technical Aspects of Human Control,2019;availableathttps://www.icrc.org/en/document/autonomy‑artificial‑intelligence‑and‑robotics‑technical‑aspects‑human‑control.
30 SeeICRC,IHL Challenges Report 2011,pp.39–40.Ondefinitionsinparticular,seeICRC,IHL Challenges Report 2015,p.45.31 SeeICRC,Statements to the Group of Governmental Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems, March2019;available
at https://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/(httpPages)/5535B644C2AE8F28C1258433002BBF14?OpenDocument.32 UnitedNations,Report of the 2018 Session of the Group of Governmental Experts on Emerging Technologies in the Area of
Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems,CCW/GGE.1/2018/3,23October2018.
Contemporary and future Challenges in the ConduCt of hostilities 31
limitstoautonomyinweaponsystems.Aweaponwithautonomyinitscriticalfunctionsthatisunsuper‑vised,unpredictableandunconstrainedintimeandspacewouldbeunlawful,becausehumansmustmakethecontext‑specificjudgmentsthattakeintoaccountcomplexandnoteasilyquantifiablerulesandprinciples.
However,itisalsoclearthatexistingIHLrulesdonotprovidealltheanswers.Whatlevelofhumansuper‑vision,interventionandabilitytodeactivateisneeded?Whatistheminimumlevelofpredictabilityandreliabilityoftheweaponsysteminitsenvironmentofuse?Whatconstraintsareneededfortasks,targets,operationalenvironments,timeofoperation,andgeographicalscopeofoperation?
Moreover,thelimitsdictatedbyethicalconcernsmaygobeyondthosefoundinexistinglaw.Anxietiesaboutthelossofhumanagencyindecisionstouseforce,diffusionofmoralresponsibility,andlossofhumandig‑nityaremostacutewithautonomousweaponsystemsthatpresentrisksforhumanlife,andespeciallywiththenotionofanti‑personnelsystemsdesignedtotargethumansdirectly.Theprinciplesofhumanitymaydemandlimitsonorprohibitionsagainstparticulartypesofautonomousweaponand/ortheiruseincertainenvironments.
Ataminimum,thereremainsanurgentneedforagreementonthetypeanddegreeofhumancontrolneces‑saryinpracticetoensurebothcompliancewithIHLandethicalacceptability.
C) ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND MACHINE LEARNINGArtificialintelligence(AI)systemsarecomputerprogramsthatcarryouttasks–oftenassociatedwithhumanintelligence–thatrequirecognition,planning,reasoningorlearning.MachinelearningsystemsareAIsys‑temsthatare“trained”onand“learn”fromdata,whichultimatelydefinethewaytheyfunction.Botharecomplexsoftwaretools,oralgorithms,thatcanbeappliedtomanydifferenttasks.However,AIandmachinelearningsystemsaredistinctfromthe“simple”algorithmsusedfortasksthatdonotrequirethesecap‑acities.Thepotentialimplicationsforarmedconflict–andfortheICRC’shumanitarianwork–arebroad.33 Thereareatleastthreeoverlappingareasthatarerelevantfromahumanitarianperspective.
ThefirstareaistheuseofAIandmachinelearningtoolstocontrolmilitaryhardware,inparticularthegrowingdiversityofunmannedroboticsystems–intheair,onland,andatsea.AImayenablegreaterautonomyinroboticplatforms,whetherarmedorunarmed.FortheICRC,autonomousweaponsystemsaretheimmediateconcern(seeabove).AIandmachinelearningsoftware–particularlyfor“automatictargetrecognition”–couldbecomeabasisforfutureautonomousweaponsystems,amplifyingcoreconcernsaboutlossofhumancontrolandunpredictability.However,notallautonomousweaponsincorporateAI.34
ThesecondareaistheapplicationofAIandmachinelearningtocyberwarfare:AI‑enabledcybercapabilitiescouldautomaticallysearchforvulnerabilitiestoexploit,orsimultaneouslydefendagainstcyberattackswhilelaunchingcounter‑attacks,andcouldthereforeincreasethespeed,numberandtypesofattacksandtheirconsequences.Thesedevelopmentswillberelevanttodiscussionsaboutthepotentialhumancostofcyberwarfare.AIandmachinelearningarealsorelevanttoinformationoperations,inparticularthecreationandspreadoffalseinformation(whetherintendedtodeceiveornot).AI‑enabledsystemscangenerate“fake”information–whethertext,audio,photosorvideo–thatisincreasinglydifficulttodistinguishfrom“real”informationandmightbeusedbypartiestoaconflicttomanipulateopinionandinfluencedecisions.Thesedigitalriskscanposerealdangersforcivilians(seeabove).35
Thethirdarea,andtheonewithperhapsthemostfar‑reachingimplications,istheuseofAIandmachinelearningsystemsfordecision‑making.AImayenablewidespreadcollectionandanalysisofmultipledatasourcestoidentifypeopleorobjects,assess“patternsof life”orbehaviour,makerecommendationsfor
33 SeeICRC,Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning in Armed Conflict: A Human-Centred Approach,2019;availableathttps://www.icrc.org/en/document/autonomy‑artificial‑intelligence‑and‑robotics‑technical‑aspects‑human‑control.
34 ICRC,Autonomy, Artificial Intelligence and Robotics: Technical Aspects of Human Control,2019;availableathttps://www.icrc.org/en/document/autonomy‑artificial‑intelligence‑and‑robotics‑technical‑aspects‑human‑control.
35 SeeICRC,Digital Risks in Situations of Armed Conflict.
32 INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND THE CHALLENGES OF CONTEMPORARY ARMED CONFLICTS
coursesofaction,ormakepredictionsaboutfutureactionsorsituations.Thepossibleusesofthese“decision‑ support”or“automateddecision‑making”systemsareextremelybroad:theyrangefromdecisionsaboutwhom–orwhat–toattackandwhen,andwhomtodetainandforhowlong,todecisionsaboutoverallmilitarystrategy–evenonuseofnuclearweapons‑aswellasspecificoperations,includingattemptstopredict,orpre‑empt,adversaries.
AIandmachinelearning‑basedsystemscanfacilitatefasterandbroadercollectionandanalysisofavailableinformation.ThismayenablebetterdecisionsbyhumansinconductingmilitaryoperationsincompliancewithIHLandminimizingrisksforcivilians.However,thesamealgorithmically‑generatedanalyses,orpre‑dictions,mightalsofacilitatewrongdecisions,violationsofIHLandexacerbatedrisksforcivilians.Thechal‑lengeconsistsinusingallthecapacitiesofAItoimproverespectforIHLinsituationsofarmedconflict,whileatthesametimeremainingawareofthesignificantlimitationsofthetechnology,particularlywithrespecttounpredictability,lackoftransparency,andbias.TheuseofAIinweaponsystemsmustbeapproachedwithgreatcaution.
Ahuman-centredapproachAIandmachinelearningsystemscouldhaveprofoundimplicationsfortheroleofhumansinarmedconflict.TheICRCisconvincedofthenecessityoftakingahuman‑centred,andhumanity‑centred,approachtotheuseofthesetechnologiesinarmedconflict.
ItwillbeessentialtopreservehumancontrolandjudgementinusingAIandmachinelearningfortasks,andindecisions,thatmayhaveseriousconsequencesforpeople’slives,andincircumstanceswherethetasks –ordecisions–aregovernedbyspecificIHLrules.AIandmachinelearningsystemsremaintoolsthatmustbeusedtoservehumanactors,andaugmentandimprovehumandecision‑making,nottoreplacethem.
EnsuringhumancontrolandjudgementinAI‑enabledtasksanddecisionsthatpresentriskstohumanlife,liberty,anddignitywillbeneededforcompliancewithIHLandtopreserveameasureofhumanityinarmedconflict.Inorderforhumanstomeaningfullyplaytheirrole,thesesystemsmayneedtobedesignedandusedtoinformdecision‑makingat“humanspeed”ratherthanacceleratedecisionsto“machinespeed”.
Thenatureofhuman‑AIinteractionrequiredwilllikelydependonthespecificapplication,theassociatedconsequences,andtheparticularIHLrulesandotherpertinentlawthatapplyinthecircumstances–aswellasonethicalconsiderations.
However,ensuringhumancontrolandjudgementintheuseofAIsystemswillnotbesufficientinitself.InordertobuildtrustinthefunctioningofagivenAIsystem,itwillbeimportanttoensure,includingthroughweaponreviews:predictabilityandreliability–orsafety–intheoperationofthesystemandtheconse‑quencesofitsuse;transparency–orexplainability–inhowthesystemfunctionsandwhyitreachesitsoutput;andlackofbiasinthedesignanduseofthesystem.
D) HUMANITARIAN CONSEQUENCES AND CONSTRAINTS UNDER IHL RELATED TO THE POTENTIAL USE OF WEAPONS IN OUTER SPACE
Militaryuseofspaceobjectshasbeenanintegralpartofwarfareforseveraldecades.Itincludestheuseofsatelliteimagerytosupporttheidentificationofenemytargetsandtheuseofsatellitecommunicationsys‑temsforcommand‑and‑control,andmorerecently,forremotelycontrolledmeansofwarfare.Theweapon‑izationofouterspacewouldfurtherincreasethelikelihoodofhostilitiesinouterspace,withpotentiallysignificanthumanitarianconsequencesforciviliansonearth.
Theexactscopeofthepotentialhumanitarianconsequencesoftheuseofweaponsinouterspaceisuncer‑tain.Itisclear,however,thattheuseofweaponsinouterspace–beitthroughkineticornon‑kineticmeans(suchaselectronic,cyberordirectedenergyattacks),usingspace–and/orground‑basedweaponsystems–coulddirectlyorincidentallydisrupt,damage,destroyordisablecivilianordual‑usespaceobjectsonwhichsafety‑criticalcivilianactivitiesandessentialcivilianservicesdepend.Thisincludesthenavigationsatellitesystems(suchasBeiDou,Galileo,GLONASS,andGPS)thatareincreasinglyemployedincivilianvehicles,
Contemporary and future Challenges in the ConduCt of hostilities 33
shipping,andairtrafficcontrols.Satellitesarealsocriticalfortheweatherservicesusedfordisasterpre‑ventionandmitigation,andforthesatellitephoneservicesonwhichthedeliveryofhumanitarianassistanceandemergencyreliefisreliant.
Theuseofweaponsinouterspacewouldnotoccurinalegalvacuum.It isconstrainedbyexistinglaw, notablytheOuterSpaceTreaty,36theUNCharter,andIHLrulesgoverningmeansandmethodsofwarfare.
TheapplicabilityofIHLinouterspaceisconfirmedbyArticleIIIoftheOuterSpaceTreaty,whichstatesthatinternationallawappliestotheuseofouterspace;andIHLformspartofinternationallaw.Furthermore,theInternationalCourtofJusticehasrecalledthattheestablishedprinciplesandrulesofIHLapplicableinarmedconflictapply“toallformsofwarfareandtoallkindsofweapons,thoseofthepast,thoseofthepresentandthoseofthefuture”.37Intermsoftreatylaw,thefour1949GenevaConventionsandProtocolI of8June1977additionaltotheGenevaConventions(AdditionalProtocolI)apply“toallcasesofdeclaredwaroranyotherarmedconflictwhichmayarisebetweentwoormoreoftheHighContractingParties”.38 Article49(3)ofAdditionalProtocolIshowsthattheProtocol’srulesontheconductofhostilitiesaremeanttoapplytoalltypesofwarfarethatmayaffectciviliansonland.Thiswouldincludehostilitiesinouterspace.
IHLappliestoanymilitaryoperationsconductedaspartofanarmedconflict,includingthoseoccurringinouterspace,regardlessofwhetherornottheuseofforceislawfulundertheUNCharter(jus ad bellum). IHLdoesnotlegitimizetheuseofforceinouterspace;nordoesitencouragethemilitarizationorweapon‑ izationofouterspace.ThesoleaimofIHListopreserveameasureofhumanityinthemidstofarmedcon‑flict,notablytoprotectcivilians.
TheOuterSpaceTreatyprohibitstheplacementinorbitaroundtheearthofobjectscarryingnuclearweaponsorotherweaponsofmassdestruction,theinstalmentofsuchweaponsoncelestialbodies,andthestationingofsuchweaponsinouterspaceinanymanner.Italsoforbidstheestablishmentofmilitarybases,instal‑lationsandfortifications,thetestingofanytypeofweapon,andtheconductofmilitarymanoeuvresoncelestialbodies;italsorequiresthatcelestialbodiesbeusedexclusivelyforpeacefulpurposes.Foritspart,IHLnotablyprohibitsweaponsthatareindiscriminatebynature,aswellasanumberofotherspecifictypesofweapon.Theseprohibitionsarenotlimitedtotheterrestrialdomains.
Evenwhenresortingtoweaponsthatarenotprohibited,abelligerenthastorespecttheIHLrulesgoverningtheconductofhostilities.Theseincludetheprincipleofdistinction,theprohibitionagainstindiscriminateanddisproportionateattacks,andtheobligationtotakeprecautionsinattackandagainsttheeffectsofattack.Furthermore,attacking,destroying,removingorrenderinguselessobjectsindispensabletothesur‑vivalofthecivilianpopulationisprohibited.Whilespecificprotections,suchasthelatter,applytoabroadrangeofmilitaryoperations,therulesaffordinggeneralprotectiontocivilianobjectsapplymostlyinrela‑tiontoattacks.UnderIHL,akineticoperationagainstaspaceobjectwouldconstituteanattack.However,aspaceobjectcouldalsobedisabled(rendereddysfunctional)withoutbeingphysicallydamaged,forexamplebydirectedenergy/laserweaponsoracyberattack.IntheICRC’sview,suchnon‑kineticoperationswouldconstituteattacksunderIHL.
IHLforbidstargetingcivilianobjects inouterspace.However,civiliansatellitesorsomeoftheirhostedpayloadsmayalsobeusedbythearmedforces,meaningtheyareofadual‑usenature.Theymaybecomemilitaryobjectives,providedthattheiruseformilitarypurposesissuchthattheyfulfilthedefinitionunderArticle52(2)ofAdditionalProtocolI.Ifsuchadual‑usesatelliteoritspayloadisattacked,theexpectedinci‑dentalharmtociviliansandcivilianobjects,directlyorthroughknock‑oneffects,mustbetakenintocon‑siderationwhileassessingthelegalityoftheattackundertheprinciplesofproportionalityandprecautions.Furthermore,theconsequencesforciviliansofputtinganendtoorimpairingthecivilianuseofthetargeted
36 1967TreatyonPrinciplesGoverningtheActivitiesofStatesintheExplorationandUseofOuterSpace,includingtheMoonandotherCelestialBodies.
37 InternationalCourtofJustice,Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons,AdvisoryOpinion,8July1996,para.86.38 Art.1(3),AdditionalProtocolI;Art.2commontothefour1949GenevaConventions.
34 INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND THE CHALLENGES OF CONTEMPORARY ARMED CONFLICTS
satelliteorpayloadmustalsobeconsidered.Asnotedabove,disablingthecivilianfunctionsofsatellitescoulddisruptlargesegmentsofmodern‑daysocieties,especiallyiftheysupportsafety‑criticalcivilianactivitiesandessentialcivilianservicesonearth.
Anotherissueofconcernistheriskposedbyspacedebris.Debriscanbecreatedbyanumberofspaceactiv‑ities.Akineticattackonasatellite,forexample,riskscausingfarmoredebristhanotherspaceactivities.Debrismaycontinuetotravelintheorbitsinwhichitwasproducedfordecadesormore.Giventhespeedatwhichittravels,debrisrisksdamagingothersatellitessupportingcivilianactivitiesandservices.Thiswouldhavetobeconsideredin–andmaylimit–thechoiceofmeansandmethodsofwarfareinouterspace.
TheICRCisconcernedbythepotentiallyhighhumancostoftheuseofweaponsinouterspace.Itrecom‑mendsthatfuturemultilateralprocessesacknowledge:
• thepotentiallysignificanthumanitarianconsequences,forciviliansonearth,oftheuseofweaponsinouterspace
• theprotectionaffordedbytheIHLrulesthatrestrictbelligerents’choiceofmeansandmethodsofwarfare,includinginouterspace.39
Aswiththedevelopmentofanynewmeansormethodsofwarfare,theweaponizationofouterspaceisnotinevitablebutachoice.Statesmaydecidetosetlimitsinthisregardforarangeofreasons,includinghumani‑ tarianones.ThefactthatIHLappliesdoesnotpreventStatesfromagreeingonadditionalrulestoprohibitorlimitspecificmilitaryactivitiesorweaponsinouterspace,astheydidintheOuterSpaceTreaty.Statesmaydecidethatfurtherprohibitionsorlimitationsmaybewarrantedtoreducetherisksofthesignificantcivilianharmthatcouldensuefromtheuseofweaponsinouterspace.
E) CHALLENGES POSED BY CERTAIN NEW TECHNOLOGIES OF WARFARE TO LEGAL REVIEWS OF NEW WEAPONS
Asnotedabove,thedevelopmentanduseofnewtechnologiesofwarfare,suchasautonomousweaponsys‑temsormilitarycybercapabilities,donotoccurinalegalvacuum.Aswithallweaponsystems,theymustbecapableofuseincompliancewithIHL,particularlyitsrulesontheconductofhostilities.TheresponsibilityforensuringthisrestswitheveryStatethatisdeveloping,acquiringandusingthesenewtechnologiesofwarfare.Inthisrespect,legalreviewsareascriticalnowastheywerewhenArticle36ofAdditionalProtocolI wasconceivedduringtheColdWararmsrace.ToassistStatesinimplementingthisobligation,in2006,theICRCpublishedA Guide to the Legal Review of New Weapons, Means and Methods of Warfare: Measures to
Implement Article 36 of Additional Protocol I of 1977.WhatfollowsisdrawnfromthatGuideandaddressesnewquestionsregardingthechallengestolegalreviewsposedbynewtechnologiesofwarfare.
EveryStatepartytoAdditionalProtocolIisobligedtodeterminewhethertheemploymentofanewweapon,meansormethodofwarfarethatitstudies,develops,acquiresoradoptswould,insomeorallcircumstances,beprohibitedbyinternationallaw.40IntheICRC’sview,therequirementtocarryoutlegalreviewofnewweaponsalsoflowsfromtheobligationtoensurerespectforIHLunderArticle1commontotheGenevaConventions.41Besidestheselegalrequirements,allStatesalsohaveaninterestinassessingthelawfulnessofnewweapons.LegalreviewsareacriticalmeasuretohelpensurethataState’sarmedforcescanconduct
39 SeealsoICRC,“Humanitarianconsequencesandconstraintsunderinternationalhumanitarianlaw(IHL)relatedtothepotentialuseofweaponsinouterspace”,workingpapersubmittedtotheGroupofGovernmentExpertsonFurtherPracticalMeasuresforthePreventionofanArmsRaceinOuterSpace,2019;availableathttps://undocs.org/GE‑PAROS/2019/WP.1.
40 SwedenandtheUnitedStates,forexample,firstestablishedmechanismsforlegalreviewin1974,threeyearsbeforetheadoptionofAdditionalProtocolI.
41 ThisisalsotheviewofsomeStates.SeeAustralia,“TheAustralianArticle36reviewprocess”,workingpaper submitted to the Group of Government Experts of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions
on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (CCW),2018,para.3;availableathttps://unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/46CA9DABE945FDF9C12582FE 00380420/$file/2018_GGE+LAWS_August_Working+paper_Australia.pdf;TheNetherlandsandSwitzerland,“Weaponsreviewmechanisms”,workingpapersubmittedtotheCCW,2017,para.17.
Contemporary and future Challenges in the ConduCt of hostilities 35
hostilitiesinaccordancewiththatState’sinternationalobligations.Theyalsohelppreventthecostlyconse‑quencesofapprovingandprocuringaweapontheuseofwhichislikelytoberestrictedorprohibited.
Weaponsystemsofalltypesshouldbesubjectedtolegalreview,includingphysicalsystems(hardware)anddigitalsystems(software).Thisextendstomilitarycybercapabilitiesintendedforuseorexpectedtobeusedintheconductofhostilities.Italsoincludessoftwarecomponentsthatformpartoftheweaponsystem(the“means”ofwarfare)orthewayinwhichthesystemwillbeused(the“method”ofwarfare),suchassoftwarethatcontrolsaphysicalsystemorsupportsdecision‑makingprocessesforuseofthatweaponsystem.Sinceaweaponcannotbeassessedinisolationfromthewayinwhichitwillbeused,thenormalorexpecteduseoftheweaponmustbeconsideredinthelegalreview.
Weaponsthatincludeasoftwarecomponentthatpermitsthecriticalfunctionsofselectionandattackoftargets(thedefiningcharacteristicsofautonomousweaponsystems)tobetriggeredbytheweaponsystem’senvironment,ratherthanbyacommander,makeitchallengingtoassesswhethertheweaponcanbeusedincompliancewithIHLrules.Areviewerwillneedtobesatisfiedthattheproposedweapon’sdesignandmethodofusewillnotpreventacommanderfromexercisingthejudgementrequiredbyIHL.Ifthereviewerisnotsatisfiedofthis,theymustnotallowtheweapontobeused;alternatively,theymayneedtoimposelimitationsontheweapon’susetoensurethecommander’sabilitytocomplywithIHL.
Foreseeingtheeffectsofweaponsystemsthroughtestingmaybecomeincreasinglydifficult,asweaponsystemsbecomemorecomplexoraregivenmorefreedomofactionintheirtasks,andthereforebecomelesspredictable,suchasweaponsystemsthatincorporatemachinelearning.Unpredictabilityinthefunctioningofthesystem,andtheinteractionofthesystemwithadynamicenvironment,cannotbesimulatedinadvanceofuse.Thischallengewillbecompounded,insomecases,bytheinabilityofthecommandertounderstandhowaweaponsystemusingartificialintelligence–particularlymachinelearning–reachesitsoutputfromagiveninput,whichmakesitdifficult(ifnotimpossible)toforeseetheconsequencesofitsuse.
Forlegalreviewstobeeffective,Statesthatdeveloporacquirenewweapontechnologiesneedtonavigatethesecomplexities.Therefore,legalreviewsofweapons,meansandmethodsofwarfare,relyingonthesenewtechnologiesmayneedtobeconductedatanearlierstageofweapondevelopment,andatshorterinter‑vals,thanformoretraditionaltechnologies,andmayneedtoberepeatedduringdevelopment.Theuniquecharacteristicsofnewtechnologiesandtherelatedprocessesoflegalreviewrequirenewstandardsoftestingandvalidation.Statesshouldalsoshareinformationabouttheirlegal‑reviewmechanismsand,totheextentfeasible,aboutthesubstantiveresultsoftheirlegalreviews,especiallywhereaweapon’scompatibilitywithIHLmaybeinquestion–sothatotherStateswillnotencounterthesameproblemsandcanbenefitfromreviewingStates’conclusionsonwhethertheuseoftheweaponinquestionisprohibitedorrestrictedbyIHL.WhenStatesexchangeinformationaboutconductinglegalreviewsofnewtechnologies,itcanhelpbuildexpertiseandidentifygoodpractices,andalsoassistStatesthatwishtoestablishorstrengthentheirownmechanisms.