international humanitarian law and the ......like its predecessors, this report addresses only some...

INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND THE CHALLENGES OF CONTEMPORARY ARMED CONFLICTSRECOMMITTING TO PROTECTION IN ARMED CONFLICT ON THE 70TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS

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INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND THE CHALLENGES OF CONTEMPORARY ARMED CONFLICTSRECOMMITTING TO PROTECTION IN ARMED CONFLICT ON THE 70TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ..........................................................................................................................5

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................9

CHAPTER 2: CONTEMPORARY AND FUTURE CHALLENGES IN THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES ........15

1. Urbanizationofarmedconflicts ........................................................................................................ 16A) Theprotectionofciviliansagainsttheeffectsofhostilitiesduringurbanwarfare ..................................16B) Theuseofexplosiveweaponsinpopulatedareas ....................................................................................................19C) Theprotectionofthecivilianpopulationduringsieges .......................................................................................22

2. Newtechnologiesofwarfare .............................................................................................................26A) Cyberoperations,theirpotentialhumancost,andtheprotectionaffordedbyIHL .................................26B) Autonomousweaponsystems .........................................................................................................................................29C) Artificialintelligenceandmachinelearning .............................................................................................................31D) HumanitarianconsequencesandconstraintsunderIHL related tothepotentialuseofweaponsinouterspace ......................................................................................... 32E) Challengesposedbycertainnewtechnologiesofwarfaretolegalreviewsofnewweapons ............... 34

CHAPTER 3: NEEDS OF THE CIVILIAN POPULATION IN INCREASINGLY LONG CONFLICTS: SELECTED ISSUES ...............................................................................................................................37

1. Internallydisplacedpersons .............................................................................................................38

2. Theprotectionofpersonswithdisabilities ....................................................................................... 41

3. Accesstoeducation .......................................................................................................................... 44

CHAPTER 4: IHL AND NON-STATE ARMED GROUPS ...........................................................................49

1. TheapplicabilityofIHLtoconflictsinvolvingmultiplenon-Statearmedgroups .............................50

2. Thelegalregimeprotectingpersonsliving interritory underthecontrolofnon-Statearmedgroups ...................................................................................52

3. Detentionbynon-Statearmedgroups ...............................................................................................54

CHAPTER 5: TERRORISM, COUNTERTERRORISM MEASURES, AND IHL ............................................57

1. TheapplicabilityofIHLtoStatesfighting“terrorism” andnon-Statearmedgroupsdesignatedas“terrorists” ...................................................................58

2. Counterterrorismmeasuresand principledhumanitarianaction .....................................................59

3. Statusandprotectionofforeignfightersandtheirfamilies .............................................................. 61

CHAPTER 6: CLIMATE, ARMED CONFLICT, AND THE NATURAL ENVIRONMENT ................................65

CHAPTER 7: ENHANCING RESPECT FOR IHL ......................................................................................71

1. Investigationsinarmedconflict .......................................................................................................72

2. Rootsofrestraintinwar ...................................................................................................................74

3. “Supportrelationships”inarmedconflict .......................................................................................75

4. IHLinaction:Respectforthelawon the battlefield .........................................................................76

CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION...................................................................................................................79

INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND THE CHALLENGES OF CONTEMPORARY ARMED CONFLICTS 5

EXECUTIVE SUMMARYThisisthefifthreportoninternationalhumanitarianlaw(IHL)andthechallengesofcontemporaryarmedconflictspreparedbytheInternationalCommitteeoftheRed Cross(ICRC)fortheInternationalConferenceoftheRed CrossandRed Crescent(InternationalConference).SimilarreportsweresubmittedtotheInter‑ nationalConferencesheldin2003,2007,2011and2015.TheaimofallthesereportsistoprovideanoverviewofsomeofthechallengesposedbycontemporaryarmedconflictsforIHL;generatebroaderreflectiononthosechallenges;andoutlinecurrentorprospectiveICRCaction,positions,andareasofinterest.

Likeitspredecessors,thisreportaddressesonlysomeofthecontemporarychallengestoIHL.ItoutlinesanumberofissuesthatarethefocusofincreasedinterestamongStatesandotheractors,aswellastheICRC:theurbanizationofarmedconflicts;newtechnologiesofwarfare;theneedsofciviliansinconflictsthatare,increasingly,protracted;non‑Statearmedgroups;terrorismandcounterterrorism;climatechange,theenvironment,andarmedconflict;andenhancingrespectforIHL.Theseissuesincludemattersnotaddressedinpreviousreports,suchassieges,theuseofartificialintelligenceinwarfare,andtheprotectionofpersonswithdisabilities.Thereportalsoprovidesanupdateonsomeoftheissuesthatwereaddressedinpreviousreportsandthatremainhighontheinternationalagenda,suchastheuseofexplosiveweaponsinpopulatedareas,certainnewtechnologiesofwarfare,andforeignfightersandtheirfamilies.

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Theintroductiontothereportprovidesabriefoverviewofcurrentarmedconflictsandtheirhumanitarianconsequences,andoftheoperationalrealitiesinwhichchallengestoIHLarise.

ChapterIIaddressescontemporaryandfuturechallengesintheconductofhostilities,focusingonselectedissuesrelatedtourbanwarfare(section1)andnewtechnologiesofwarfare(section2).

Increasingly,fightingtakesplaceincities,andthiscreatesanumberofspecificchallengesforpartiestotheconflict.Thereportaddressesthreeofthem.ThefirstandfundamentaloneisensuringthatelementaryIHLprinciplesontheconductofhostilities–distinction,proportionality,precautions–areappliedinawaythatprotectsciviliansinurbanbattlefields,whicharecharacterizedbytheinterminglingofciviliansandcombatants,theproximityofcivilianobjectsandmilitaryobjectives,andacomplexwebofinterconnectedurbaninfrastructure.Inparticular,theuseofexplosiveweaponswithwide‑areaimpactindenselypopulatedareascontinuestoraiselegalquestionsandsignificanthumanitarianconcern.ChapterIIalsodiscussestheneedtoensurethatsiegesandencirclementtacticsdonotviolatetherulesontheprotectionofthecivilianpopulation–anissuethathasdrawnsignificantattentioninrecentconflicts.

ThesecondsectionofChapterII isdevotedtonewtechnologiesofwarfare–someofwhichhavebeenemployedinrecentconflicts.Itmayalsobeexpectedthattheirusewillonlyincreaseinfuture–withpossiblepositiveandnegativeconsequencesfortheprotectionofcivilians.Amongotherthings,thischapterdrawsattentiontothepotentialhumancostofcyberwarfare;outlineslegalandethicalissuesconcerningthelossofhumancontrolovertheuseofforceasaresultofautonomyinthe“criticalfunctions”ofweaponsystems;andemphasizeskeyissuesthatStateshavetoconsiderwhenimplementingtheirresponsibilitytoensurethatnewmeansandmethodsofwarfarearecapableofbeingusedincompliancewithIHL.

6 INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND THE CHALLENGES OF CONTEMPORARY ARMED CONFLICTS

Theprotractednatureofmanyoftoday’sarmedconflictshasanimpactontheneedsandvulnerabilitiesofcivilianpopulations.ChapterIIIpresentsaselectionofissuesunderIHLthatrelatetothewiderhumanitar‑iandebateontheprotectionofcivilianpopulations.Inparticular,thechapterdiscusseshowrespectforIHLcancontributetofindingdurablesolutionsfortheplightoftheunprecedentedlyhighnumbersofinternallydisplacedpersons.ItalsorecallshowIHLcanaddressthespecificcapacities,experiencesandperspectivesofpersonswithdisabilitiesduringarmedconflict,therebycomplementingthepertinentprovisionsofinter‑nationalhumanrightslaw.ThechapteralsodescribeshowIHLprotectstheeducationofchildrenwhenitisacontestedstakeinaconflict,whenthecivilianvalueofschoolsisunderestimatedintheconductofhostilities,andwhenmilitariesuseschools.

WhilehumanitarianconcernsandIHLchallengesariseinrelationtooperationsbyallpartiestoarmedcon‑flicts,certain issuespresentthemselvesdifferentlywhenlookingespeciallyatnon‑Statearmedgroups.ChapterIVisthereforedevotedtoIHLandnon‑Statearmedgroups.ItfirstaddressesquestionsregardingtheapplicabilityofIHLtosituationsofviolenceinvolvingmultiplearmedgroups.Subsequently,thechapterdiscussesthelegalregimeprotectingcivilianslivinginterritoryunderthede factocontrolofarmedgroups,andpresentsinitialviewsondetentionbyarmedgroups.

Terrorismandcounterterrorismhavebeenthesubjectsofmanypolicy,humanitarian,andlegaldebatesinrecentyears.ChapterVhighlightsthreeissuesinthisareathatareofparticularhumanitarianconcern.First,itrecallstheapplicabilityofIHLtoStatesfighting“terrorism”andnon‑Statearmedgroupsdesignatedas“terrorists”,counteringthenarrativethatIHLisnotrelevanttothefightagainstterrorism,orthatsomeofitsnormsdonotapply,orapplydifferently,tosuch“exceptional”circumstances.Second,thechapterexpressesconcernsaboutcertaincounterterrorismmeasures,whichimpedeimpartialhumanitarianorgan‑izations’effortstoassistandprotectpersonsaffectedbyarmedconflict,andwhichareincompatiblewiththeletterandspiritofIHL.ThechapteralsohighlightsrecentdevelopmentsthatcancontributetoresolvingthetensionbetweenStates’interestinenactingeffectivecounterterrorismmeasuresandtheirobligationtofacilitateprincipledhumanitarianactivities.Third,thechapteraddressesthestatusandprotectionofforeignfightersandtheirfamiliesunderIHL,focusinginparticularontheneedsofwomenandchildren,aswellasparties’obligationstowardsthem.

ChapterVIfocusesonthedirectandindirecteffectsofarmedconflictonclimateandtheenvironment,recall‑ingthatpeopleaffectedbyarmedconflictareespeciallyvulnerabletoclimatechangeandenvironmentaldegradation.ThechapteralsodrawsattentiontotheICRC’s“GuidelinesforMilitaryManualsandInstruc‑tionsontheProtectionoftheEnvironmentinTimesofArmedConflict”,whicharecurrentlybeingrevised.

Thefinalchapterofthereport,ChapterVII,discusseswaystoenhancerespectforIHL,whichtheICRChaslongconsideredtobethesinglemostimportantchallengetoIHL.ThechapterpresentsworkthattheICRCandpartnershaverecentlyconductedorlaunchedtoenhancetheirdialoguewithallpartiestoarmedconflict.ThisincludestheICRC’sSupport Relationships in Armed Conflictinitiative,whichaimstoleveragethecomplexwebsofsupportandpartneringrelationshipsincontemporaryarmedconflictstostrengthenrespectforIHL;anICRCstudy,Roots of Restraint in War,thatidentifiessourcesthatinfluencenormsofbehaviourinarmedforcesandarmedgroups;andthedevelopmentofGuidelines on Investigating Violations of IHL: Law, Policy, and Good Practice.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION


The2019InternationalConferenceoftheRedCrossandRedCrescent(InternationalConference)coincideswiththe70thanniversaryofthefourGenevaConventionsof1949,thefoundationaltreatiesofthemodernlawofarmedconflict(orinternationalhumanitarianlaw(IHL)).1Sevendecadesaftertheiradoption,theCon‑ventionsenjoyuniversalratification,frequentreaffirmation,andwidespreadintegrationintodomesticlawandmilitarydoctrine.Everyday,armedforcesimplementIHLtoreducewar’scosttohumanity.Formany,respectfortherulesisamatterofprofessionalidentityandcorevalues.

Despitethesesignificantachievements,noncompliancewithIHLremainsanintractableproblem.Eachtrans‑gressionhasgraveconsequencesforthoseaffected,andwhendisregardfortherulesbecomesendemicinaconflict,itisdevastatingnotonlytothelivesofindividualsandfamilies,butalsocommunities,citiesand,increasingly,entireregions.AsmuchasIHLhascometobevaluedininternationalforumsandinmilitarydoctrine,partiestosomeconflictscontinuetofloutitsrulesonascalethatiscauseforseriousglobalconcern. Thelastfouryearshaveseenseveralregionalizedconflictscontinuetheirdownwardspiralofviolence,oftenfuelledbyseriousIHLviolations.Yemen,whichhasbecometheworld’slargesthumanitariancrisis,isfacingepidemics,drugshortages,starvationandadecimatedinfrastructure.ThepainoftheconflictsinSyriacon‑tinuestobefelt,asdisplacedsurvivorsofharrowingviolencesufferappallinglivingconditions,separationfromtheirfamilies,anduncertaintyabouttheirfuture.AcrosstheSahelandLakeChadregions,armedcon‑flictshavecontinuedtobothspurandfeedoffintercommunaltensions.

Themostprotractedconflictscontinuetoweighdownlifeandhinderrecovery,andsomeofthemshowsignsoffurtherdeterioration.CiviliancasualtieshavespikedinAfghanistandespiteintensifiedpeacetalks.IntheDemocraticRepublicoftheCongoandtheCentralAfricanRepublic,armedgroupscontinuetofragmentandproliferateaspeaceanddemobilizationeffortsareslowtoadvance.Malnutritionhasbecomechronicin SouthSudansincetheoutbreakofconflictthere.InColombia,arecentlyconcludedpeaceagreementhasresultedindisarmamentandpoliticalinclusion;butithasalsoactivatednewsplintergroupsthatdisagreewiththeaccord,aswellasveterangroupsthatseeanopportunitytoconsolidatepower.Theintensityofvio‑lenceinUkrainehasabated,butthesix‑year‑oldconflictshowsfewsignsofresolutionandahighpotentialforre‑escalation.Theeffectsofthesedrawn‑outconflicts–onhealth,education,infrastructure,theecon‑omyandsociety–accumulatewiththepassageoftimeandtheabsenceofspacetomend.Manyofthesecontextshavebeen“forgotten”:theyareunderreportedinthemediaandneglectedbydecision‑makers,leavingmillionstosufferwithouthope.

Inmanyinstances,thefightinghascausedmassivedisplacement,leavingfamilymemberswithnoknow‑ledgeofoneanother’swhereaboutsorwell‑being.Manyofthosewhohavebeendisplacedareundergoingaseeminglyinterminableordeal.Thetidyconflictnarrativeofflightandreturnisinrealityformanyalifeofpersistentstagnation,punctuatedbythetraumaofrepeateddisplacement,thehealth‑effectsofunsuitableaccommodations,thedistressofbeingunabletomovefreely,andtheknowledgethatthoseresponsibleforprotectingthemandensuringtheirsafereturnareinfactreorderingtheirplaceinsociety.

Meanwhile,otherfactorsaredoingmuchtoexacerbateandprolongtheharmcausedbycontemporaryarmedconflicts.Climatechangeincreasesthevulnerabilityofconflict‑shakenpopulationstodroughtandothernaturaldisasters.Socialmediaprovidesawidelyaccessibleplatformfordemonizingandincitingviolenceagainstcommunities.Andfailuretoaccountfordifferencesinhowmen,women,girls,andboysexperienceviolenceleavestheirspecificneedsunrecognizedandunmet.

Thefactorsthattriggerandsustainmanyoftoday’swarsmaybecomplex,buttheviolationsthatneedlesslyintensifytheirhumancostarebasic: indiscriminateanddeliberateattacksagainstcivilians;tortureandotherformsofill‑treatment;rapeandothersexualviolence;attacksonhospitals,medicalpersonnel,and

1 ThisisthefifthreportonIHLandthechallengesofcontemporaryarmedconflictspreparedbytheInternationalCommitteeoftheRed Cross(ICRC)fortheInternationalConference.ThefirstfourreportsweresubmittedtotheInternationalConferencesheldin2003,2007,2011,and2015.Thepurposeofthisreportistoprovideanoverviewofthemainchallengesthattoday’sarmedconflictsposeforIHL,topromptdiscussionofthesechallenges,andtooutlineongoingorprospectiveICRCaction,positionsandareasofinterest.

INTRODUCTION 11

thewoundedthemselves;hostage‑taking;extrajudicialkillingandsummaryexecutions.Tomakethingsworse,aspiritofvengeancehastakenholdinsomecontextswhereviolationsaresystematicallydirectedatadversarieswhoarehors de combatandatanyoneaffiliatedwiththem.

EnsuringthatwarringpartiesrecognizetheapplicabilityofIHLtoallpersonsaffectedbyarmedconflict,regardlessoftheiractions,isvitalforensuringrespectforthelaw;butitisalsoarecurringchallenge.Iftheperiodsincethe2015InternationalConferencehasseensomeactorssolidifytheirreputationforbrutality,ithasalsoseensignsofanalarmingresponsefromothers:thenotionthatsomeindividualsorgroupsaresobadthatthey–andsometimeseventheirfamiliesorcommunities–arebeyondthehumanitarianprotec‑tionofIHL.Thereisanurgentneedtounequivocallyrejectsuchmisconceptionsandtoreassertthat,eventhoughterrorismflagrantlycontravenesthebasicprincipleofhumanity,itmustbefoughtinamannerthatisexemplaryinitsrespectforthelaw.IHLreacheseveryoneaffectedbyarmedconflict,withoutexception.

ForcomponentsoftheInternationalRed CrossandRed CrescentMovement(Movement)andotherhumani‑tarianorganizationsseekingtohelpintoday’sarmedconflicts,defendingthespacetooperatehasneverbeenmoreurgent.Assweepingcounterterrorismlegislationproliferates,outlawingbroadly‑defined‘support’forgroupsandindividualsdesignatedas“terrorists”,theabilityoforganizationstoprovideimpartialhumani‑tarianassistanceandprotectioninconflict‑affectedareasisbecomingincreasinglyjeopardized.ExamplesofgoodpracticebyStatesandrecentpositivedevelopmentsattheUnitedNations(UN)SecurityCouncil,andattheregionallevel,mustbetakenadvantageoftopreservethehumanitarianspacethatStatesuniversallyagreeduponintheGenevaConventions.

Meanwhile,engagingpartiestoconflictindialogueabouttheirresponsibilitiesunderIHLisbecomingmoreandmorecomplicated.Asarmedgroupsfragmentandreconstitutethemselveswithnew,oftenill‑defined,hierarchies,andasgovernmentsretreatfromdirectinvolvementinextraterritorialconflicts–preferringtosupportotheractorsinstead–itisbecomingincreasinglydifficulttoattributeresponsibilityforviolationsandcorrectivemeasures.Inmanyplaces,theinvolvementofmultipleactorswithoverlappinghierarchiesandmotives–political,criminal,religious,ethnic–makesitcomplicatedanddangerousforhumanitarianorganizationstoreachthepeopleaffectedandtoengagebelligerentsindiscussionsoncompliancewithIHL.

AddressingthelessobviouschallengesininterpretingandapplyingIHLisalsovitalforpromotingcom‑pliancewiththelaw.AsStatesdeployforceagainstavarietyofthreats,thefoundationaldeterminationofwhetherthelawofarmedconflictappliesissusceptibletomanipulation.LawissubordinatedtoconveniencewhenStatesinvokeIHLanduselarge‑scaleforceinsituationsthatdonotmeetthelegalcriteriaforarmedconflict;orwhen,conversely,IHLisgivennochancetofulfilitsrolebecauseStates,waryofnegativeper‑ceptionsandexternalconstraints,denytheexistenceofanarmedconflicteventhoughtherequirementshavebeenunmistakablymet.Moreover,asStatesinterpretfundamentalprovisionsofIHLwithincreasingelasticity–usuallytodefendthelegalityofanexpedientcourseofaction–theyriskestablishingregrettablelegalprecedentsandenablingfutureactorstoinflictharmbeyondwhatismilitarilynecessaryortolerabletohumanity.

ContemporarychallengesforIHLgowellbeyondnon‑compliancewiththerules.Transformationsinthemethods,meansandgeographyofwarfarecontinuetotesttheadaptabilityoftreatyandcustomarylaw.Astheworldcontinuestourbanize,sodoitsconflicts,makingwarincitiesanditsconsequencesforcivilianlife,infrastructureandservicesapressingconcern.Manypartiestoconflictshavenotadaptedtheirchoiceofweaponsandtacticstotheuniquevulnerabilitiesofpeopleinurbanenvironments.Inaddition,technologicaladvancesintherealmofwarfarepresentbothpromisesandthreatsforthefutureofthelawofarmedcon‑flict.Therelationshipbetweencyberspaceandthebattlespace,theroleofartificialintelligenceintargetingdecisions,andthepotentialfornon‑peacefuluseofouterspaceareall importantissuesthatwillfigureprominentlyindiscussionsabouttheapplicabilityofIHLtonewtechnologiesofwarfare.Regardlessofwherethesedevelopmentsanddebatesmaylead,soberanalysesandperspectivesareimperative:technologycanprovideunprecedentedprecisionintargeting,andalternativestophysicaldestruction;however,innovationinweaponrymustnotdisplacerigorouslegalanalysisandthehumandecision‑makingdemandedbyIHL.


Despitethesemanychallenges,thepotentialofIHLtomitigatethedevastationofarmedconflictforindi‑viduals,familiesandcommunitiesisunique;andpositiveexamplesabound.Recentyearshaveseenarmedforcesmakemoreofaninvestmentintrackingciviliancasualtiesandunderstandingtheircauses.MilitarylegaladvisersinsomeStateshavebecomemoreinvolvedinupholdingIHLonthebattlefield.Clearanceofanti‑personnellandmines,riskeducationforcommunitiesaffected,andassistancetominevictimscontinueapaceasStatespartiestotheAnti‑PersonnelMineBanConventionimplementtheirobligations.Tensofthousandsofconflict‑relateddetaineeshaveremainedconnectedwiththeirfamilies;prisonersofwarhavebeenreleasedandrepatriated;andmortalremainshavebeenreturnedtorelatives.Non‑Statearmedgroupshavemadecommitmentsagainsttherecruitmentanduseofchildreninhostilitiesandagainstsexualvio‑lence.Anddaily,medicalservicesbelongingtogovernmentsandarmedforcestreatwoundedadversariessolelybasedonmedicalneed.

TheenduranceoftheGenevaConventionsowesasmuchtotheprinciplesandpragmatismtheyembodyastotheworkofStates,Movementcomponents,andotherinternationalactorswhohavedefendedtheirrele‑vanceatcrucialmomentsinhistory.Seventyyearsaftertheirsigning,compliancewiththeConventionsisfarfromperfect.WhenIHLisviolated,theseriousnessoftheconsequences,andtheurgencyoftakingcor‑rectivemeasures,cannotbeoverstated.Internationaljudicialandfact‑findingmechanismsprovideapartialresponse;however,thereisagreatdealofunusedleverageintheworldtodaytostopviolationsastheyoccur.Onthe70thanniversaryoftheGenevaConventions,theundertakingofStatestorespectandensurerespectfortheConventions–statedinArticle1commontothefourGenevaConventions–remainsthebeststartingpointtoreducethesufferingandtheneedsofcommunitiesaffectedbyarmedconflict.

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CHAPTER 2

CONTEMPORARY AND FUTURE CHALLENGES IN THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES


1. URBANIZATION OF ARMED CONFLICTS

2 ICRC,Urban Services during Protracted Armed Conflict: A Call for a Better Approach to Assisting Affected People, 2015;availableathttps://www.icrc.org/sites/default/files/topic/file_plus_list/4249_urban_services_during_protracted_armed_conflict.pdf.

3 Tothatend,theUniversitéLavalandtheICRCorganizedameetingofexpertsontheprincipleofproportionality:see ICRC,The Principle of Proportionality in the Rules Governing the Conduct of Hostilities under International Humanitarian Law, 2018;availableathttps://www.icrc.org/en/download/file/79184/4358_002_expert_meeting_report_web_1.pdf. TheICRChasalsotakenpartinprocessesinvolvingexpertsandorganizedbyotherinstitutions:seeInternationalLawAssociationStudyGroup,The Conduct Of Hostilities and International Humanitarian Law: Challenges of 21st Century Warfare, 2017;availableathttps://ila.vettoreweb.com/Storage/Download.aspx?DbStorageId=3763&StorageFileGuid=11a3fc7e‑d69e‑4e5a‑b9dd‑1761da33c8ab(thisreportalsodiscussesthenotionsof“militaryobjective”and“precautionsinattack”);ChathamHouse,Proportionality in the Conduct of Hostilities: The Incidental Harm Side of the Assessment,researchpaper,2018;availableathttps://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/publications/research/2018‑12‑10‑proportionality‑conduct‑hostilities‑incidental‑harm‑gillard‑final.pdf.

Astheworldurbanizes,sotoodoesconflict.Increasingly,fightingtakesplaceinurbanareas,andciviliansbearthebruntofit.TheICRCknowsfromdirectobservationthattheuseinpopulatedareasofexplosiveweaponsthathavewideareaeffectscontinuestobeamajorcauseofinjuryanddeathamongciviliansandofdamagetocivilianobjects.Evenwhenservicesthatareindispensableforsustaininglifeinurbanareasarenotdirectlytargeted,theyaredisruptedasanindirectresultofattacks,orbecomemoreandmoredegradeduntiltheyareatthepointofbreakdown.2Insomecases,servicesaredeliberatelydeniedtospecificareas,inordertoexertpressureoncivilianslivingthere.Inhabitantsareleftwithoutsufficientfoodorwater,sanitationandelectricity,anddeprivedofhealthcare;suchprivationisaggravatedwhencitiesarebesieged.Inaddition,fightinginurbancentresresultsinwidespreaddisplacement.Oncefightingstops,unexplodedordnanceand/orotherformsofweaponcontamination,andthelackofessentialservices,preventmanyofthedisplacedfromreturning.Manyoftheseconsequencesarenotuniquetocities,buttheyoccuronasignificantlylargerscaleinurbanwarfareandmayrequireadifferenthumanitarianresponse.

IHLimposeslimitsonthechoiceofmeansandmethodsofwarfare,protectingciviliansandcivilianinfra‑structureagainstunacceptableharmanddestruction.Evenso,thedevastatinghumanitarianconsequencesofurbanwarfareraiseseriousquestionsregardinghowpartiestosuchconflictsinterpretandapplyrelevantIHLrules.Inthissection,theICRCpresentsitsviewsandsharesthefindingsofnewmultidisciplinaryresearchon(a)theprotectionofciviliansagainsttheeffectsofhostilitiesduringurbanwarfare;(b)theuseofexplosiveweaponsinpopulatedareas;and(c)theprotectionofthecivilianpopulationduringsieges.

A) THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS AGAINST THE EFFECTS OF HOSTILITIES DURING URBAN WARFARE

Militaryandcivilianpeopleandobjectsareoftenintermingledincities.Forpartiesinvolvedinurbanhostil‑ities,thisinterminglingpresentsimportantchallenges,bothmilitarilyandintermsofavoidingcivilianharm.Becauseurbanwarfareendangersciviliansinwaysparticulartoit,theprotectionaffordedbytheprinciplesandprovisionsofIHLiscritical.Policiescanalsobeaneffectivetooltoprotectciviliansandlimittheeffectsofurbanwarfare,buttheymustnotbeusedtoofferprotectiontociviliansthatwouldbeweakerorlessthanthataffordedbyIHL.

IHLprohibitsattacksdirectedatciviliansandcivilianobjects,aswellasindiscriminateattacks–thatis,attacksthatstrikemilitaryobjectivesandciviliansorcivilianobjectswithoutdistinction.IHLalsoprohibitsattacksthatmaybeexpectedtocauseincidentalcivilianharmthatwouldbeexcessiveinrelationtotheconcreteanddirectmilitaryadvantageanticipated.Whiletheexistenceoftheprincipleofproportionalityisuncontestedandisapplieddailybymilitarycommanders,thekeyconceptsonwhichitrelies(“incidentalcivilianharm”,“militaryadvantage”,and“excessiveness”)wouldbenefitfromfurtherclarification,whichtheICRChassoughttosupport.3

https://www.icrc.org/sites/default/files/topic/file_plus_list/4249_urban_services_during_protracted_armed_conflict.pdfhttps://www.icrc.org/sites/default/files/topic/file_plus_list/4249_urban_services_during_protracted_armed_conflict.pdfhttps://www.icrc.org/en/download/file/79184/4358_002_expert_meeting_report_web_1.pdfhttps://ila.vettoreweb.com/Storage/Download.aspx?DbStorageId=3763&StorageFileGuid=11a3fc7e-d69e-4e5a-b9dd-1761da33c8abhttps://ila.vettoreweb.com/Storage/Download.aspx?DbStorageId=3763&StorageFileGuid=11a3fc7e-d69e-4e5a-b9dd-1761da33c8abhttps://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/publications/research/2018-12-10-proportionality-conduct-hostilities-incidental-harm-gillard-final.pdfhttps://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/publications/research/2018-12-10-proportionality-conduct-hostilities-incidental-harm-gillard-final.pdf

Contemporary and future Challenges in the ConduCt of hostilities 17

Inaddition,IHLrequirespartiestoconflicttotakearangeofprecautionsinattackandagainsttheeffectsofattackstoprotectciviliansandcivilianobjects.Withregardtoprecautionsinattack,allfeasibleprecautionsmustbetakentoavoidoratleastminimizeincidentalcivilianharm.Feasibleprecautionsarethosethatarepossibleinpractice,takingintoaccountallofthecircumstancesrulingatthetime,includinghumanitar‑ianandmilitaryconsiderations.Theunderstandingofwhatprecautionsarefeasiblemayevolveovertime,dependingonanumberoffactors,includingtechnologicaldevelopments,orwiththeidentificationofnewtechniques,tacticsorproceduresthatmakeitpossibletominimizeincidentalcivilianharm.Inthisregard,lessons‑learnedprocesses/exercisesmaybringnewfeasibleprecautionstolight.

Unlesscircumstancesdonotpermit,effectiveadvancewarningmustbegivenofattacksthatmayaffectthecivilianpopulation.Mostattacksinurbanareasmaywelldoso.4Theeffectivenessofawarningshouldbeassessedfromtheperspectiveofthecivilianpopulationthatmaybeaffected.Itshouldreachandbeunderstoodbyasmanyciviliansaspossibleamongthosewhomaybeaffectedbytheattack,anditshouldgivethemtimetoleave,findshelter,ortakeothermeasurestoprotectthemselves.Advancewarningsdonotrelievethepartycarryingouttheattackfromtheobligationtotakeotherprecautionarymeasures,andcivilianswhoremainintheareathatwillbeaffectedbytheattack–whethervoluntarilyornot–remainprotected.

Theprinciplesofdistinction,proportionalityandprecautionsarecomplementary,andallthreemustberespectedforanattacktobelawful.

Debatehasarisenwithrespecttotherelevanceofexpectedincidentalharmtociviliansintheformofdis‑easeandmentaltraumawhenimplementingtheprinciplesofproportionalityandprecautions.IntheICRC’sview,itisimportanttoconsiderincidentalharmthatisforeseeable,suchascontaminationwhentargetingamilitaryobjectiveinacitythatcontainstoxicindustrialchemicals,orthespreadofdiseaseduetoincidentaldamagetomunicipalsewagesystems.Thisisparticularlyrelevantwhenanattackerexpectstocauseinci‑dentaldamagetowaterorsewagesystemsinacitywherecholeraorothersimilarlycontagiousdiseasesarealreadypresent,ashasbeenthecaseinsomerecentconflicts.

Asformentalhealth,whileIHLprohibitsactswhoseprimarypurposeistoterrorizethecivilianpopulation,psychologicaltraumahaslongbeenseenasaninevitableconsequenceofconflicts.Thepsychologicaleffectsofhostilitiesmightalsobelesseasilyanticipatedthanphysicalinjuriesordeath.Yet,itisbroadlyacceptedtodaythathumanhealthencompassesphysicalandmentalhealth.Inthisregard,thereissomeindicationofawarenessinsomerecentmilitarymanualsthatthepsychologicaleffectsofhostilitiesshouldbetakenintoaccount.Thismaybeanareainwhichthepracticeofbelligerentsinthefuturemightbeinfluencedbyevolvingresearchandunderstanding.Intheiroperations,theICRCanditsMovementpartnersseesignificantmentalhealthandpsychosocialneeds,whichrequirebroaderacknowledgementandbetterwaystoaddresstheharmcaused.5

SeveraloftherulesmentionedaboveapplyspecificallytoattackswithinthemeaningofIHL:thatis,tomili‑taryoperationsmostlikelytocauseharmtocivilians.Nonetheless,partiestoconflictmusttakeconstantcaretosparethecivilianpopulationinall militaryoperations.Theseincludetroopmovementsandmanoeuvrespreparatorytocombat,suchasduringgroundoperationsinurbanareas.Thespecificprotectionaffordedtoparticularobjectsmayalsogobeyondattacks.Forinstance,objectsindispensabletothesurvivalofthecivil‑ianpopulationmustneitherbeattackednorotherwisedestroyed,removedorrendereduseless.Thisincludesacity’sdrinking‑watersupplynetworkandinstallations.

4 Forhospitalsandmedicalfacilities,includingthoselocatedinurbanareas,thathavelosttheirprotectionbecausetheyareusedforactsharmfultotheenemy,there is a specific rule on warnings prior to attack.

5 Seebackgrounddocument,“Addressingmentalhealthandpsychosocialneedsofpeopleaffectedbyarmedconflicts,naturaldisastersandotheremergencies”,33IC/19/12.2,2019.


CompliancewithIHLduringtheconductofhostilitiesinurbanareas,asanywhereelse,dependsonwhatthecommanderknew,orshouldhaveknown,atthetimeoftheattack,basedoninformationreasonablyavailablefromallsourcesinthecircumstances.Giventheinterminglingofciviliansandmilitaryobjectivesinurbanareas,itiscriticalthatinformationcollectedwhenplanninganoperationinurbanareasdoesnotfocussolelyonverifyingthattargetsaremilitaryobjectives–akeyrequirement,ofcourse–butalsoonassessingtheincidentalcivilianharm,includingtheindirector“reverberating”effects,thatmaybeexpected.Practicessuchasassumingthepresenceofciviliansinallcivilianbuildingsandassessingpatternsofcivilianlife,amongothers,mayhelpovercomedifficulties–createdbythephysicalenvironmentofacity–inaccuratelyassessing civilian presence.

ChallengesraisedbyattacksinurbanareasServicesessentialtothecivilianpopulationinurbanareasrelyonacomplexwebofinterconnectedinfra‑structuresystems.6Themostcriticalinfrastructurenodeswithinasystemenabletheprovisionofservicestoalargepartofthepopulationanddamagetothemwouldbemostconcerningwhenitcausesthewholesystemtofail.Suchnodesarealsodescribedasa“singlepointoffailure”.Servicesdependontheoperationofpeople,hardwareandconsumables,eachofwhichcanbedisrupteddirectlyorindirectly.Forinstance,adamagedelectricaltransformercanimmediatelyshutdownthesupplyofwatertoanentireneighbourhoodorhospital,drasticallyincreasingtherisksposedtopublichealthandwell‑being.Inaddition,overtime,directandindirecteffectscanhaveacumulativeimpactonaparticularservice–leavinglargepartsofthesystemindisarray–whichbecomesmuchmoredifficulttoaddress.Thiscumulativeeffectwillinfluencetheincidental‑harmassessmentandanalysisduringprotractedhostilities:intheproportionalityassessment,thecivilianharmexpectedfromdamagingthelastelectricpowerdistributionlineofacitywillbesignifi‑cantlygreaterthanthatexpectedfromdamagingoneofmanyfunctioningdistributionlines,asthatlosscanbemadeupbyredundancyinthepowerdistributiongrid.

Giventhiscomplexityandinterconnectednessofessentialservicesystems,itisparticularlyimportanttoconsidernotonlyincidentalcivilianharmdirectlycausedbyanattackbutalsoreverberatingeffects,providedtheyareforeseeable.7Asforanytypeofincidentalharm,whatisreasonablyforeseeable–orshouldhavebeenforeseen–willvary,dependingonthecircumstancesoftheattackandthetarget;however,patternsofincidentalcivilianharmcanbeforeseenbasedonpastexperienceoftheeffectsofurbanwarfare.Whatisforeseeablewillbeinformedandevolve,inparticular,through:analysisoftheeffectsofpastattacks;studiesontheeffectsofconflicts;bettermodellingofweapons’effects;betterunderstandingoftheinfrastruc‑turalset‑upandinterdependencybetweenservices;andnewtechnologiestobetterassesstheconditionorstatusofinfrastructureandservicedeliveryduringtheconflict.Inthisrespect,itisimportantthatarmedforcesrigorouslyapplyshortfeedbackloopsandotherlessonslearnedaspartofthetargetingcycleorother decision‑makingprocesses,topreventtherepetitionofmistakesandinformfutureassessmentsofeffectsthathadnotbeenadequatelyanticipatedormitigatedinthepast.Inparticular,recentconflictshaveshownthedevastatingeffectsthaturbanwarfarehasoncriticalcivilianinfrastructureandthedeliveryofessentialservicestothepopulation,especiallywhenexplosiveweaponswithawideimpactareaareused.

Displacementwithincities,ortootherareas,isoneofthemanyharmfuleffectsonciviliansofurbanwar‑fare.8Inadditiontothethreattocivilianlives,andthedisruptionofessentialurbanservices,oneofthekeydriversoflong‑termdisplacementisthedamageordestructionofcivilianhomestypicallycausedbytheuseofheavyexplosiveweapons.Whiledisplacementisnotexpresslymentionedintheprinciplesofproportion‑alityandprecautionsasarelevanttypeofcivilianharm,dependingonthecircumstancesitmayincrease

6 ICRC,Urban Services during Protracted Armed Conflict: A Call for a Better Approach to Assisting Affected People,2015; availableathttps://www.icrc.org/sites/default/files/topic/file_plus_list/4249_urban_services_during_protracted_armed_conflict.pdf.

7 SeeInternational Humanitarian Law and the Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflicts,2015,32IC/15/11,pp.52–53;availableathttps://www.icrc.org/en/download/file/15061/32ic‑report‑on‑ihl‑and‑challenges‑of‑armed‑conflicts.pdf. (SubsequentreferencestothisreportwillciteitastheIHL Challenges Report 2015.)

8 SeeICRC,Displaced in Cities: Experiencing and Responding to Urban Internal Displacement Outside Camps,ICRC,2018,pp.18ff.;availableathttps://shop.icrc.org/displaced‑in‑cities‑experiencing‑and‑responding‑to‑urban‑internal‑displacement‑outside‑camps‑2926.html.SeealsochapterIII.1)oninternallydisplacedpersons.

https://www.icrc.org/sites/default/files/topic/file_plus_list/4249_urban_services_during_protracted_armed_conflict.pdfhttps://www.icrc.org/sites/default/files/topic/file_plus_list/4249_urban_services_during_protracted_armed_conflict.pdfhttps://www.icrc.org/en/download/file/15061/32ic-report-on-ihl-and-challenges-of-armed-conflicts.pdfhttps://shop.icrc.org/displaced-in-cities-experiencing-and-responding-to-urban-internal-displacement-outside-camps-2926.htmlhttps://shop.icrc.org/displaced-in-cities-experiencing-and-responding-to-urban-internal-displacement-outside-camps-2926.html


theriskofdeath,injuryordisease.Moregenerally,thedisplacementofciviliansexpectedwhenincidentallydamagingtheirhomeswillaffecttheweighttobegiventothatdamageundertheseprinciples.

Anotherchallengeofurbanwarfareisthatmanyobjectsareusedsimultaneouslyformilitaryandcivilianpurposes.Forexample,afiringpositionmightbesituatedontherooftopofacivilianhouseoranapartmentinamultistoreybuildingusedasacommandpost.Similarly,apowerstationmayprovideelectricitytobothamilitarybarracksandtherestofthecity.Ifitsuseformilitarypurposesrendersacivilianobject–ortheseparablepartthereof–amilitaryobjective,itwillbecomealawfultarget.However,theprevailingview,9 sharedbytheICRC,isthattheprinciplesofproportionalityandprecautionsremainrelevant,notonlywithregardtoincidentaldamagetoothercivilianobjects,butalsointermsoftheconsequencesforciviliansofimpairingthecivilianuseofthatobject.Underthisview,forinstance,theattackmustbedirectedattherooftopofthecivilianhouseoratthespecificapartmentinthemulti‑storeybuilding,provideditisfeasibleinthecircumstances,toavertthepossibilityofcivilianslosingtheirhomesandlivelihoods.

Finally,duringgroundoperationsinurbanareas,troopsarelikelytobecomeinvolvedinfirefightsandcallforfiresupport.Thedangerandurgencyofsuchsituationssignificantlyincreasesthelikelihoodandextentofincidentalciviliancasualtiesanddamage–astheICRChasobservedrepeatedly.Asfurtherdiscussedbelow,firebytroopsincontactwiththeenemy,aswellasfiresupport,mustrespectalltherulesgoverningtheconductofhostilities.

ProtectingtheurbanpopulationagainsttheeffectsofattacksCivilianscanbeprotectedmosteffectivelywhentheyarenotinthemidstofcombat.Becauseurbanwarfareoccursamongcivilians,itiscriticalthatpartiesimplementtheirobligationtotakeallfeasibleprecautionstoprotectciviliansandcivilianobjectsundertheircontrolfromtheeffectsofattacks.Forexample,avoidingtolocatemilitaryobjectiveswithinorneardenselypopulatedareas,ormoregenerally,employingstrategiesandtacticsthattakecombatoutsidepopulatedareas,aremeanstotrytoreduceurbanfightingaltogether.

Whenurbanfightingcannotbeavoided,allpartieshaveanobligationtotakeprecautionstospareciviliansfromtheeffectsofattacks.Theobligationofthepartycarryingoutanattacktogiveeffectiveadvancewarn‑ingismirroredbythatofthepartyincontroloftheareatoremoveciviliansandcivilianobjectsfromthevicinityofmilitaryobjectivestothemaximumextentfeasible.

Unfortunately,fartoooftenincontemporaryconflicts,partiesdotheexactoppositeanddeliberatelyendan‑gerthecivilianpopulationandciviliansundertheircontrolbyusingthemashumanshields,whichisabso‑lutelyprohibited.Civiliansusedashumanshields remainprotected,and–while itdoesraisepracticalchallenges–theotherpartymusttakeallfeasibleprecautionstoavoidharmingtheseciviliansandmusttakethemintoaccountinproportionalityassessments.

B) THE USE OF EXPLOSIVE WEAPONS IN POPULATED AREAS Oneofthedefiningfeaturesofurbanwarfareistheuseofexplosiveweaponswithawideimpactarea(alsoreferredtoas“heavy”explosiveweapons),i.e.ofweaponsthattypicallydeliversignificantexplosiveforcefromafarandoverawidearea.10Whilegenerallynotacauseforconcernwhenusedinopenbattlefields,theseweaponshavedevastatingeffectsforthecivilianpopulationwhenemployedagainstmilitaryobjectives

9 Foranaccountofthisdebatewithregardtoproportionality,whichwouldapplymutatis mutandiswithregardtoprecautions,seeICRC,The Principle of Proportionality in the Rules Governing the Conduct of Hostilities under International Humanitarian Law,pp.37–40;InternationalLawAssociationStudyGroup,The Conduct Of Hostilities And International Humanitarian Law: Challenges of 21st Century Warfare, pp.11–12.

10 Theseare:i)weaponsthathaveawideimpactareabecauseofthelargedestructiveradiusoftheindividualmunitionused,i.e.itslargeblastandfragmentationrangeoreffect(suchaslargebombsormissiles);ii)weaponsthathaveawideimpactareabecauseofthelackofaccuracyofthedeliverysystem(suchasunguidedindirect‑fireweapons,includingartilleryandmortars);andiii)weaponsthathaveawideimpactareabecausetheweaponsystemisdesignedtodelivermultiplemunitionssimultaneouslyoverawidearea(suchasmulti‑barrelrocketlaunchers).SeeICRC,IHL Challenges Report 2015,p.49.


locatedinpopulatedareas,11suchastownsandcities.TheirfootprintsarealloverrecentandongoingarmedconflictssuchasthoseinAfghanistan,Gaza,Iraq,Libya,Somalia,Syria,Ukraine,andYemen:death,severeinjuries(oftenleadingtolifelongdisabilities),mentalandpsychologicaltrauma,andlarge‑scaledestructionofhouses,hospitals,schools,andinfrastructureindispensableforthefunctioningofessentialservices–everythingthatmakesacitywork,andonwhichitsinhabitantsdependfortheirsurvival.

Beyondthedirectimpactonthelives,healthandpropertyofcivilians,thereisawidearrayofindirectorreverberatingeffectsthatspreadacrossthenetworksofinterconnectedurbanservicesandaffectamuchlargerpartofthecivilianpopulationthanthosepresentintheimmediateimpactareaoftheattack.Theseincreasinglyknownandforeseeableconsequencesareexacerbatedinprotractedarmedconflicts,wherethelong‑termandattimesirreversibledegradationofessentialservicesincreasesthesufferingofcivilians.Thegenderedimpactofheavyexplosiveweapons’useinpopulatedareasisalsooftenoverlooked:thedifferentsocialrolesofmenandwomenwillinfluencethechancesofwhowillbeinjuredorkilled–men,women,boys,orgirls–,andimpactthenatureofthestigmafacedbysurvivors.Moreover,heavybombingandshell‑ingisamajorcauseofdisplacement;displacedpopulationsareexposedtofurtherrisks,includingsexualviolence,particularlyagainstwomen.

IHLquestionsraisedbytheuseofexplosiveweaponsinpopulatedareasInits2015report,International Humanitarian Law and the Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflicts,12theICRCoutlinedkeyIHLquestionsraisedbytheuseofexplosiveweaponswithawideimpactareainpopulatedareas.Thosequestionsaresummarizedhere,followedbyadditionalissues.

Theuseofexplosiveweaponswithawideimpactareaagainstmilitaryobjectiveslocatedinpopulatedareasisnotprohibitedper seunderIHL,butitisregulatedbytherulesontheconductofhostilities–notablythepro‑hibitionagainstindiscriminateattacks,theprohibitionagainstdisproportionateattacks,andtheobligationtotakeallfeasibleprecautionsinattack.Becauseofthecloseproximityofmilitaryobjectivestociviliansandcivilianobjects,theparticularvulnerabilityofciviliansinurbanenvironmentsasaresultoftheirdependencyoninterlinkedessentialservices,andthewide‑areaeffectsoftheexplosiveweaponsofconcern,theuseofsuchweaponsinpopulatedareastypicallyresultsinsignificantcivilianharm,raisingseriousquestionsabouttheinterpretationandapplicationoftherelevantIHLrules.

Inits2015report,theICRCnotedthattheinherentinaccuracyofcertaintypesofexplosiveweaponsystems –suchasmanyoftheartillery,mortarandmultiple‑rocketlaunchersystemsinusetoday,inparticularwhenusingunguidedmunitions,aswellasunguidedair‑deliveredbombsandrockets–raisesseriousconcernsundertheprohibitionagainstindiscriminateattacks.Theirlowaccuracymakesitverydifficulttodirecttheseweaponsagainstaspecificmilitaryobjectiveasrequiredbythisrule:thereisahighriskthereforethattheywillstrikemilitaryobjectivesandciviliansandcivilianobjectswithoutdistinction.Whileincreasingtheaccur‑ acyofdeliverysystemswouldhelpreducetheweapons’wide‑areaeffectsinpopulatedareas,theiraccuracycouldbeobviatedbytheuseoflarge‑calibremunitions–i.e.munitionsthathavealargedestructiveradiusrelativetothesizeofthemilitaryobjective–whichmightstillbecontrarytoIHL.

Inthe2015report,theICRCalsonotedthat,inadditiontothedirecteffectsofanattackusingheavyexplosiveweapons,indirectorreverberatingeffectsmustalsobetakenintoaccountwhenassessingtheexpectedinci‑dentalcivilianharmasrequiredbytherulesonproportionalityandonprecautionsinattack,insofarastheyarereasonablyforeseeableinthecircumstances.13Forexample,asnotedabove,incidentaldamagecaused byheavyexplosiveweaponstocriticalcivilianinfrastructure–suchasvitalwaterandelectricityfacilities andsupplynetworks–canseverelydisruptservicesessentialtociviliansurvival,notablyhealthcare,the

11 Theterms‘populatedareas’and‘denselypopulatedareas’areusedinterchangeablyhere,torefertoaconcentrationofciviliansorofciviliansandcivilianobjects,beitinacity,townorvillage,orinanon‑built‑uparea,andbeitpermanentortemporary.See,notably,Art.1(2)ofProtocolIIItothe1980ConventiononCertainConventionalWeapons.

12 ICRC,IHL Challenges Report 2015,pp.47–53.13 Onthequestionofwhenreverberatingeffectsarereasonablyforeseeable,seechapter2,section1)a.ontheprotectionofciviliansagainsttheeffectsofhostilitiesduringurbanwarfare.


provisionofelectricity,andwaterandsanitationservices.Astheseservicesareforthemostpartinterdependent, damagetoanyonecomponentofaservicewilloftenhaveadominoeffectonotheressentialservices,trig‑geringhumanitarianconsequencesfarbeyondaweapon’simpactzone.Basedondirectobservationoftheextensivecivilianharmcausedbytheuseofheavyexplosiveweaponsinpopulatedareas,thereissignificantdoubtthatarmedforcessufficientlyfactorinsuchreverberatingeffects,asrequiredbytherulesofpropor‑tionalityandprecautionsinattack.

Whereexplosiveweaponswithawideimpactareaareusedtoprovidecoveringfireforownorfriendlyforcesunderattack,someStatesinvokethenotionof“self‑defence”tosuggestthatIHLrestrictionsontheuseofforce,includingonthechoiceofweapons,couldbelessstringentcomparedtosuchrestrictionsinpre‑plannedattacks,andtojustifytheuseofweaponsthatcarryahighriskofindiscriminateeffectsinthecircumstances.However,eventheuseofforcein“self‑defence”iscircumscribedbytheabsoluteprohibitionsagainstindis‑criminateanddisproportionateattacks,andbyallotherIHLrulesgoverningtheconductofhostilities,whichapplyindefensiveaswellasoffensivesituations.IntheICRC’sview,theprotectionofownorfriendlyforcesisarelevantmilitaryconsiderationimpactingonthefeasibilityofprecautions.Itisalsoarelevantmilitaryadvantagewhenassessingtheproportionalityofanattack,butonlyinsofarasitis“concreteanddirect”,whichisprimarilythecasewhentroopsareunderattack(i.e.in“self‑defence”scenarios).Inallsuchcir‑cumstances,forceprotectionmustbebalancedagainsthumanitarianconsiderations,suchastheextentofincidentalcivilianharmexpectedtoresultfromtheuseofheavyexplosiveweapons.Inthisrespect,thegreatertheriskofincidentalcivilianharmanticipatedfromtheattack,thegreatertherisktoitsownforcestheattackingpartymayhavetobepreparedtoaccept.Atanyrate,forceprotectioncanneverjustifytheuseofindiscriminatefireasameasuretoavoidtheexposureofownorfriendlyforces.

Attimes,explosiveweaponswithawideimpactarea(mostcommonlyartilleryorotherindirect‑fireweaponsystems)areusedtoharasstheenemy,todenythemfreedomofmovement,ortoobstructtheiractivities(“harassing”,“interdiction”or“suppressive”fire).Thistakestheformofacontinuousflowoffire–oftenoflowormoderateintensity–intendedtodelivereffectsoveranareaoronspecificobjectsorpersons,dependingonthecircumstances.However,tobelawful,harassing,interdictionorsuppressivefiremustbedirectedataspecificmilitaryobjective,andmustusemeanscapableofbeingsodirected.Yetinpracticeitisnotalwaysclearthatthisisthecase.

Whenusingindirect‑fireweaponsystemssuchasartillery,manyarmedforcesapplyfireadjustmenttech‑niquessuchas“walkingfire”againstatargetor“bracketing”atarget,inordertobeabletostrikethetar‑getafterseveralroundsoffire.Suchtechniquesconsistinfiringroundsprogressivelyclosertothetarget,recordingtheirimpactandmakingadjustments(corrections)beforefiring“foreffect”atthetarget(fireinsalvos).Suchmethodsofadjustingfirewithinapopulatedareainthemselvesposeasignificantriskofcivilianharm,inthatthe“adjustment”roundsarelikelytolandoff‑targetandstrikeciviliansand/orcivil‑ianobjects.Theuseofsuchtechniquesinpopulatedareasthereforeraisesquestionsundertheprohibitionagainstindiscriminateattacks.

Avoidingtheuseofwide-impactexplosiveweaponsinpopulatedareasInits2015report,theICRCreiteratedapositionithadfirstexpressedlikethisin2011:“duetothesignificantlikelihoodofindiscriminateeffectsanddespitetheabsenceofanexpresslegalprohibitionforspecifictypesofweapons,theICRCconsidersthatexplosiveweaponswithawideimpactareashouldbeavoidedindenselypopulatedareas”.14

14 Ibid.,pp.48–49.TheICRCfirstpublisheditspositiononexplosiveweaponsinpopulatedareasinICRC,International Humanitarian Law and the Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflicts,2011,32IC/15/11,pp.40–42;availableathttps://www.icrc.org/en/doc/assets/files/red‑cross‑crescent‑movement/31st‑international‑conference/31‑int‑conference‑ihl‑challenges‑report‑11‑5‑1‑2‑en.pdf(subsequentreferencestothisreportwillciteitastheIHL Challenges Report 2011).AsimilarcallwasmadebytheMovementin2013.SeeResolution7ofthe2013CouncilofDelegates,“Weaponsandinternationalhumanitarianlaw”,CD/13/R7,para.4;availableathttps://www.icrc.org/en/doc/assets/files/red‑cross‑crescent‑movement/council‑delegates‑2013/cod13‑r7‑weapons‑and‑ihl‑adopted‑eng.pdf.

https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/assets/files/red-cross-crescent-movement/31st-international-conference/31-int-conference-ihl-challenges-report-11-5-1-2-en.pdfhttps://www.icrc.org/en/doc/assets/files/red-cross-crescent-movement/31st-international-conference/31-int-conference-ihl-challenges-report-11-5-1-2-en.pdfhttps://www.icrc.org/en/doc/assets/files/red-cross-crescent-movement/31st-international-conference/31-int-conference-ihl-challenges-report-11-5-1-2-en.pdfhttps://www.icrc.org/en/doc/assets/files/red-cross-crescent-movement/council-delegates-2013/cod13-r7-weapons-and-ihl-adopted-eng.pdfhttps://www.icrc.org/en/doc/assets/files/red-cross-crescent-movement/council-delegates-2013/cod13-r7-weapons-and-ihl-adopted-eng.pdf


TheICRChascalledonallStatesandpartiestoarmedconflictstoadoptapolicyofavoidanceofuseofheavyexplosiveweaponsinpopulatedareas,regardlessofwhetherornotsuchusewouldviolateIHL,basedonthreeobservations:

• thegravepatternofcivilianharmcausedbytheuseoftheseweaponsandthehumanitarianandmoralimperativetoprevent,oratleastreduce,suchlevelsofdestructionandsuffering

• theobjectivedifficultyofemploying–inconformitywiththeprohibitionsagainstindiscriminateanddisproportionateattacks–explosiveweaponswithawideimpactareaagainstmilitaryobjectivessituatedinpopulatedareas

• thepersistentlackofclarityonhowStates,andpartiestoarmedconflictsinparticular,interpretandapplysaidIHLruleswithregardtotheuseofheavyexplosiveweaponsinpopulatedareas.AstheICRChaspreviouslystated,“therearedivergentviewsonwhethertheserulessufficientlyregulatetheuseofsuchweapons,orwhetherthereisaneedtoclarifytheirinterpretationortodevelopnewstandardsorrules.Basedontheeffectsofexplosiveweaponsinpopulatedareasbeingwitnessedtoday,thereareseriousquestionsregardinghowthepartiesusingsuchweaponsareinterpretingandapplyingIHL.”15

Anavoidancepolicysuggestsapresumptionofnon‑useofsuchweaponsowingtothehighriskofincidentalcivilianharm,whichcouldbereversedifsufficientmitigationmeasurescanbetakentoreducesuchrisktoanacceptablelevel.Theseincludemeasuresandproceduresrelatedtotargetingandtothechoiceofweaponsthatsignificantlyreducethesizeoftheexplosiveweapon’sareaofimpact,andothermeasurestominimizethelikelihoodand/orextentofincidentalcivilianharm.Suchpoliciesandpracticesshouldbedevelopedwellinadvanceofmilitaryoperationsandfaithfullyimplementedduringtheconductofhostilities,sharedwithpartnerforcesorsupportedpartiesinthecontextofsuchoperations,andtakenintoconsiderationwhendecidingonthetransferofheavyexplosiveweaponsaswellaswhenprovidingsupporttoapartytoanarmedconflict.

Changingbehaviourthrough“goodpractice”Giventhecomplexchallengesofconductinghostilitiesinurbanenvironments,andtheuniquevulnerabil‑itiesofcivilianslivingthere,itiscriticalthatmilitarypoliciesandpracticespaysufficientattentiontotheprotectionofcivilians,includinginthechoiceofmeansandmethodsofwarfare.Whileinstancesofexpresslimitationsonheavyexplosiveweaponsandassociatedmethodsofwarfareinpopulatedareascanbefound,thesearescatteredormission‑specificandrarelypartofaconsistentapproachtowardsmilitaryoperationsconductedinsuchenvironments.InformationavailabletotheICRCtodateindicatesthatonlyalimitednum‑berofStatesappeartohavespecificguidanceandtrainingonurbanwarfareortheconductofhostilitiesinpopulatedareas–althoughsomepositivemovementcanbeseen.

TosupportpolicydevelopmentinthisregardbyStatesandpartiestoarmedconflicts,theICRCrecommended,inarecentlypublishedreport,anumberofgoodpracticesforimplementinganavoidancepolicyandforfacilitatingcompliancewithIHLrulesontheconductofhostilitiesinpopulatedareas.

Inlightofthelarge‑scaledestructionandciviliansufferingwitnessedintoday’sarmedconflicts,theICRCcontinuestocallonallpartiestoarmedconflicttotakeurgentactionbyreviewingtheirmilitarypoliciesandpracticeandbyensuringthattheirdoctrine,education,trainingandweaponsareadaptedtothespecificitiesofurbanandotherpopulatedenvironmentsandtothevulnerabilityofcivilianstherein.

C) THE PROTECTION OF THE CIVILIAN POPULATION DURING SIEGESThehistoryofwarfareisfullofinstancesofsiegesbeingusedasamethodofwarfare.Someofthemarenotoriousfortheirexceedinglyhighdeathtolls.ContemporaryconflictsintheMiddleEasthaveagaindrawntheattentionoftheinternationalcommunitytosiegesandotherencirclementtactics.

Siegesoftenhavegraveconsequencesforlargenumbersofcivilians.Recentsiegeswereaccompaniedbybombardmentandsometimesintensefightingbetweenbesiegingandbesiegedforces,creatingconstantdan‑gerforthecivilianstrappedinthebesiegedarea.Littleornoelectricityanddegradedpublicservicesarealso

15 SeeICRC,IHL Challenges Report 2015,p.51.


characteristicfeaturesofsieges.Familiesareforcedtomakeimpossiblechoiceswiththelittlefoodandwateravailable.Factorssuchasage,gender‑specificroles,ordisabilities,mayexacerbatedifficultiesinaccessingscarceresources.Theconsequencesarehunger,malnutrition,dehydration,illness,injuryanddeath.

Thenotionof“siege”Thereisnodefinitionof“siege”or“encirclement”underIHL.Asiegecanbedescribedasatactictoencircleanenemy’sarmedforces,inordertopreventtheirmovementorcutthemofffromsupportandsupplychan‑nels.Theultimateaimofasiegeisusuallytoforcetheenemytosurrender,historicallythroughstarvationandthirst,thoughincontemporaryconflictsbesiegingforcesusuallyattempttocapturethebesiegedareathroughhostilities.Siegesorotherformsofencirclementmayalsobepartofalargeroperationalplan:forinstance,theycanbeusedtoisolatepocketsofenemyforcesleftbehindduringaninvasion.

Asiegethatdoesnotinvolveattemptstocaptureanareathroughassaultmaybeaimedatobtainingamili‑taryadvantageinrelativesafetyforthearmedforcesofthebesiegingparty.Itavoidsthehazardsofurbanfightingforthebesiegingpartyandmayalsobeameanstolimittheheavyciviliancasualtiesoftenassociatedwithurbanfighting.

Conversely,siegesthatdoinvolveattemptstocaptureanareathroughassaultmayincreasetheintensityofthefightingandtheassociatedrisksofincidentalharmforcivilians.Thisisparticularlythecaseifthebesiegedforcesareleftwithnooptionotherthantofightorsurrender.

UnderIHL,itisnotprohibitedtobesiegeanareawherethereareonlyenemyforcesortoblocktheirre‑ inforcementorresupply,includingtoachievetheirsurrenderthroughstarvation.Itisalsonotprohibitedtoattackmilitaryobjectiveswithinabesiegedarea,providedsuchattackscanbecarriedoutinconformitywiththeprinciplesofdistinction,proportionalityandprecautions.

Unfortunately,civiliansareoftentrappedwithinwhenentiretownsorotherpopulatedareasarebesieged,causingunspeakablesuffering.IHLoffersvitalprotectiontotheseciviliansbyimposinglimitstowhatthepartiescandoduringsuchsieges.

Thescopeoftheparties’obligationtoallowcivilianstoleaveabesiegedareaThroughouthistory,besiegingandbesiegedforceshavepreventedciviliansfromleavingbesiegedareas.Forthebesiegingforces,themainpurposewasoftentohastenthesurrenderofthebesiegedforces,becausecivilianshavetorelyonthesamesuppliesastheenemyforces.AttheNurembergtrials,thepracticeofusingartillerytopreventciviliansfromleavingabesiegedareawasdeemedanextreme,butnotunlawful,measure.

Thelawhasevolvedconsiderablysincethen.Ithasdevelopedevenbeyondtheessential,butlimited,provi‑sionsoftheGenevaConventionsontheevacuationofspecificcategoriesofvulnerablepeople.

Today,siegesarelawfulonlywhendirectedexclusivelyagainstanenemy’sarmedforces.

First,shootingatorotherwiseattackingciviliansfleeingabesiegedareawouldamounttoadirectattackonciviliansandisabsolutelyprohibited.

Second,IHLrulesapplytotheconductofhostilitiesduringsieges.Asshowninthefollowingparagraphs,theimplementationofseveralrulesstemmingfromtheprincipleofprecautionsrequiresbothpartiestoallowcivilianstoleavethebesiegedareawheneverfeasible.Inparticular,constantcaremustbetakentosparethecivilianpopulationinallmilitaryoperations,andallfeasibleprecautionsmustbetaken,notablyinthechoiceofmeansandmethodsofwarfare,toavoidorminimizeincidentallossofcivilianlife,injurytociviliansanddamagetocivilianobjects.Inabesiegedareawherehostilitiesaretakingplace,andinviewoftheriskthatposestothem,oneobviousprecautionarymeasureistoevacuatecivilians,oratleastallowthemtoleave.Partiesmustalsogiveeffectiveadvancewarningsofattacksthatmayaffectthecivilianpopulation,thepur‑poseofwhichispreciselytoenablecivilianstotakemeasurestoprotectthemselves.


Thebesiegedpartyhasobligations,too.Itmusttakeallfeasibleprecautionstoprotectthecivilianpopulationunderitscontrolfromtheeffectsofattacks.Thiscanentailallowingcivilianstoleaveorotherwiseremovingthemfromthevicinityofmilitaryobjectives,forexamplebyevacuatingthemfromabesiegedareawherehostilitiesareongoingorexpectedtotakeplace.

Thebesiegedpartymightbe tempted toprevent thecivilianpopulation from leavingbecausehavingabesiegedareaclearedofcivilianswouldmakeiteasierforthebesiegingforcestostarveoutthebesiegedforces,orgivetheformermoreleewaywhenattackingmilitaryobjectivesinthebesiegedarea.However,IHLcategoricallyprohibitsusingthepresenceofcivilianstorendercertainareasimmunefrommilitaryoper‑ations,forinstanceinattemptstoimpedethemilitaryoperationsofthebesiegingforces.Thiswouldamounttousingthecivilianpopulationashumanshields.

Finally,treatyandcustomaryIHLprohibitthestarvation ofthecivilianpopulationasamethodofwarfare.Theimplicationisthattheplightofciviliansdeprivedofsuppliesessentialtotheirsurvivalinabesiegedareacannolongerbeusedbyabesiegingpartyasalegitimatemeanstosubdueitsenemy.ItisthereforetheICRC’sviewthatabelligerentaimingtousestarvationasamethodofwarfareagainstenemyforces,besiegedinanareainwhichciviliansarealsotrapped,mustallowthecivilianstoleavethebesiegedarea,becauseexperienceshowsthatinpracticethesecivilianswillsharetheprivationcausedbyasiegeandmaybeexpectedtobeleftwiththeirbasicneedsunmet.

Theprotectionofciviliansleaving,orbeingevacuatedfrom,abesiegedareaCiviliansmayfleeabesiegedorotherwiseencircledareaorbevoluntarilyevacuated;theymayalsobeevacu‑atedagainsttheirwillbyapartytotheconflict.

Theissueofforcibleevacuationofabesiegedareahasraisedquestionswithrespecttoforceddisplacement.UnderIHL,forceddisplacementisprohibited,unlessthesecurityoftheciviliansinvolvedorimperativemili‑taryreasonssodemand.ProhibitedactsofforceddisplacementcanincludethoseresultingfromunlawfulactsunderIHLbythepartiesinordertocoercecivilianstoleave,includingintheconductofhostilities.16 As hostilitiesduringsiegesentailahighriskofincidentalciviliancasualties,thesecurityoftheciviliansinvolvedmayrequiretheirevacuationfromthebesiegedarea,buttheevacuationmustnotbecarriedoutinawaythatwouldamounttoforceddisplacementasaresultofunlawfulacts.

Toensurethatdisplacementisnotforcedorunlawful,itmustlastnolongerthanrequiredbythecircum‑stances.Displacedpersonshavearighttoreturnvoluntarilyandinsafetytotheirhomesorplacesofhabitualresidenceassoonasthereasonsfortheirdisplacementceasetoexist.17Althoughtemporaryevacuationsmaybenecessary,andevenlegallyrequired,siegesmustnotbeusedtocompelcivilianstopermanentlyleaveaparticulararea.

Fromapracticalperspective,safeevacuationsarebestorganizedwhenthepartiestotheconflictagreeonthenecessaryprocedures.Intheabsenceofsuchanagreement,bothpartiesremainobligedtotakeallfeasibleprecautionstoavoidcausingincidentalharmtociviliansfleeingduringhostilities.

Incaseofdisplacement,regardlessofwhetherciviliansfleeorareevacuatedfromabesiegedarea,allpos‑siblemeasuresmustbetakentoensurethattheciviliansinquestionarereceivedundersatisfactorycondi‑tionsofshelter,hygiene,health,safety(includingfromsexualandgender‑basedviolence)andnutritionandthatmembersofthesamefamilyarenotseparated.

16 ICTY,Prosecutor v. Milomir Stakic,Judgment(AppealsChamber),IT‑97‑24‑A,22March2006,paras281,284–287;ICTY,Prosecutor v. Blagojevic and Jokic,Judgment(TrialJudgment),IT‑02‑60‑T,17January2005,paras596 and600–601.

17 SeechapterIII.1)oninternallydisplacedpersons.


Thebesiegingpartymaydecidetoscreendisplacedpersonsforsecurityreasons,suchasfindingoutwhethermembersofthebesiegedforcesintermingledwiththeciviliansleavingthebesiegedarea.ScreeningandothersecuritymeasuresundertakenbythebesiegingpartymustbeconductedwithfullrespectforIHLandhumanrightslaw,particularlywithregardtohumanetreatment,livingconditionsandrelevantproceduralsafeguardsincasesofdetention,andtheprohibitionagainstcollectivepunishment.

Theprotectionofciviliansandthewoundedandsickwhoremain inabesiegedorencircledareaCivilianswhoremaininabesiegedareacontinuetobeprotectedascivilians,unlessandforsuchtimeastheytakeadirectpartinhostilities.Themerefactofremaininginabesiegedarea–whethervoluntarily,for‑ cibly,orashumanshields–doesnotamounttotakingadirectpartinhostilities.Inaddition,thepresenceofbesiegedfightersamongthecivilianpopulationdoesnotmeanthatthecivilianslosetheirprotectionfromdirectattack.Thebesiegedandbesiegingforcesthereforeremainboundbyalltherulesprotectingciviliansagainsttheeffectsofhostilities.18

Furthermore,theIHLrulesonstarvationandonreliefoperationsaredesignedtoensure–incombination–thatciviliansarenotdeprivedofsuppliesessentialtotheirsurvival.

First,inadditiontotheprohibitionagainstusingstarvationofthecivilianpopulationasamethodofwarfare,IHLprohibitsattacking,destroying,removingorrenderinguselessobjectsindispensabletothesurvivalofthecivilianpopulation.Evenwhensuchobjectsarealsousedbytheenemyarmedforces,operationsagainstthemareprohibitediftheycanbeexpectedtoleavethecivilianpopulationwithsuchinsufficientquantitiesoffoodorwaterastocauseitsstarvation.

Second,duringasiege,thepartiescontinuetobeboundbyIHLobligationsrelatingtoreliefoperationsandhumanitarianaccess.IHLprovidesthatimpartialhumanitarianorganizationshavearighttooffertheirser‑vicesinordertocarryouthumanitarianactivities,inparticularwhentheneedsofthepopulationaffectedbythearmedconflictarenotbeingmet.Onceimpartialhumanitarianreliefoperationshavebeenagreedto,thepartiestothearmedconflict–whichretaintherighttocontrolthehumanitariannatureofreliefconsign‑ments–mustallowandfacilitaterapidandunimpededpassageofthesereliefoperations.

Thecommanderofabesiegedforcewhoisnotinapositiontoprovidethesuppliesessentialtothesurvivalofthecivilianpopulationunder itscontrolmustconsenttohumanitarianreliefoperationsforcivilians.Similarly,thecommanderofabesiegingforcemustallowhumanitarianaccesstoandreliefoperationsforciviliansremaininginthebesiegedarea.Thisissubjecttotheparties’rightofcontrolandabilitytoimposetemporaryandgeographicallylimitedrestrictionsrequiredbymilitarynecessityatthetimeandplaceofon‑goinghostilities.

Finally,IHLcontainsextensiverulesrelatingtorespectandprotectionforthewoundedandsick,aswellasthepersonsandobjectsassignedtocareforthem.TheGenevaConventionscontainafewexplicitprovisionsontheevacuationofthewoundedandsickfrombesiegedareasandthepassageofmedicalpersonnelandmedicalequipmentintosuchareas.Moregenerally,partiesmusttakeallpossiblemeasurestosearchfor,collectandevacuatethesickandwounded,andmustprovide–tothefullestextentpracticableandwiththeleastpossibledelay–themedicalcareandattentionrequiredbytheircondition.Alltheserulesapplynotonlytocivilians;theyalsobenefitwoundedandsickmembersofanenemy’sarmedforces.Theapplicabilityoftheserulestosiegesisuncontested.

18 SeechapterII.1)a.ontheprotectionofciviliansagainsttheeffectsofhostilitiesduringurbanwarfare.


2. NEW TECHNOLOGIES OF WARFARE

19 SeeICRC,The Potential Human Cost of Cyber Operations,2019;availableathttps://www.icrc.org/en/download/file/ 96008/the‑potential‑human‑cost‑of‑cyber‑operations.pdf.

Newtechnologiesarechanginghumaninteractionprofoundly–includingintimesofarmedconflict.ManyStatesareinvestingheavilyinthedevelopmentofmeansandmethodsofwarfarethatrelyondigitaltech‑nology.Cybertools,increasinglyautonomousweaponsystems,andartificialintelligencearebeingusedincontemporaryarmedconflicts.TheICRCcloselyfollowsthedevelopmentofnewmeansandmethodsofwarfareandtheirusebymilitaries;italsoengagesallrelevantstakeholdersontheapplicabilityofIHLtotheuseofthesenewmeansandmethodsofwarfare.

Technologicaladvancescanhavepositiveconsequencesfortheprotectionofciviliansinarmedconflict:weaponscanbeusedwithmoreprecision,militarydecisionscanbebetterinformed,andmilitaryaimscanbeachievedwithouttheuseofkineticforceorphysicaldestruction.Atthesametime,newmeansofwarfareandthewaytheyareemployedcanposenewriskstocombatantsandcivilians,andcanchallengetheinter‑pretationandimplementationofIHL.TheICRC’sassessmentoftheforeseeablehumanitarianimpactofnewtechnologiesofwarfare,andthechallengestheymayposetoexistingIHLrules,focusesoninterrelatedlegal,military,technical,ethical,andhumanitarianconsiderations.

IHLisapplicabletothedevelopmentanduseofnewweaponryandnewtechnologicaldevelopmentsinwar‑fare–whethertheyinvolve(a)cybertechnology;(b)autonomousweaponsystems;(c)artificialintelligenceandmachinelearning;or(d)outerspace.StatesthatdeveloporacquiresuchweaponsormeansofwarfareareresponsibleforensuringthattheycanbeusedincompliancewithIHL(e).

A) CYBER OPERATIONS, THEIR POTENTIAL HUMAN COST, AND THE PROTECTION AFFORDED BY IHL

Theuseofcyberoperationsduringarmedconflictsisareality.WhileonlyafewStateshavepubliclyacknow‑ ledgedusingsuchoperations,anincreasingnumberofStatesaredevelopingmilitarycybercapabilities,andtheuseofsuchcapabilitiesislikelytoincrease.

TheICRCunderstands“cyberwarfare”tomeanoperationsagainstacomputer,acomputersystemornet‑work,oranotherconnecteddevice,throughadatastream,whenusedasmeansormethodsofwarfareinthecontextofanarmedconflict.CyberwarfareraisesquestionsaboutpreciselyhowcertainprovisionsofIHLapplytotheseoperations,andwhetherIHLisadequateorwhether,buildingonexistinglaw,itmightrequirefurtherdevelopment.

Theuseofcyberoperationsmayofferalternativesthatothermeansormethodsofwarfaredonot,butitalsocarriesrisks.Ontheonehand,cyberoperationsmayenablemilitariestoachievetheirobjectiveswithoutharmingciviliansorcausingpermanentphysicaldamagetocivilianinfrastructure.Ontheotherhand,recentcyberoperations–whichhavebeenprimarilyconductedoutsidethecontextofarmedconflict–showthatsophisticatedactorshavedevelopedthecapabilitytodisrupttheprovisionofessentialservicestothecivilianpopulation.

UnderstandingcyberoperationsandtheirpotentialhumancostTodeveloparealisticassessmentofcybercapabilitiesandtheirpotentialhumancostinlightoftheirtech‑nicalcharacteristics,inNovember2018theICRCinvitedexpertsfromallpartsoftheworldtosharetheirknowledgeaboutthetechnicalpossibilities,expecteduse,andpotentialeffectsofcyberoperations.19

Cyberoperationscanposeaparticularthreatforcertainelementsofcivilianinfrastructure.Oneareaofcon‑cernfortheICRC,givenitsmandate,isthehealth‑caresector.Inthisregard,researchshowsthatthehealth‑caresectorappearstobeparticularlyvulnerabletodirectcyberattacksandincidentalharmfromsuchattacksdirectedelsewhere.Itsvulnerabilityisaconsequenceofincreaseddigitizationandinterconnectivityinhealthcare.Forexample,medicaldevicesinhospitalsareconnectedtothehospitalnetwork,andbiomedicaldevices

https://www.icrc.org/en/download/file/96008/the-potential-human-cost-of-cyber-operations.pdfhttps://www.icrc.org/en/download/file/96008/the-potential-human-cost-of-cyber-operations.pdf


suchaspacemakersandinsulinpumpsaresometimesremotelyconnectedthroughtheinternet.Thisgrowthofconnectivityincreasesthesector’sdigitaldependenceand“attacksurface”andleavesitexposed,espe‑ciallywhenthesedevelopmentsarenotmatchedbyacorrespondingimprovementincybersecurity.

Criticalcivilianinfrastructure–includingelectrical,water,andsanitationfacilities–isanotherareainwhichcyberattackscancausesignificantharmtothecivilianpopulation.Thisinfrastructureisoftenoperatedbyindustrialcontrolsystems.Acyberattackagainstanindustrialcontrolsystemrequiresspecificexpertiseandsophistication,aswellasspecificallydesignedcybertools.Whileattacksagainstindustrialcontrolsystemshavebeenlessfrequentthanothertypesofcyberoperations,theirfrequencyisreportedlyincreasing,andtheseverityofthethreathasevolvedmorerapidlythananticipatedonlyafewyearsago.

Beyondthevulnerabilityofspecificsectors,thereareatleastthreetechnicalcharacteristicsofcyberoper‑ationsthatarecauseforconcern.

First,cyberoperationscarryariskofoverreactionandescalation,simplyduetothefactthat itmaybeextremelydifficult–ifnotimpossible–forthetargetofacyberattacktodetectwhethertheattacker’saimistospyortocausephysicaldamage.Astheaimofacyberoperationmightbeidentifiedonlyafterthetargetsystemhasbeenharmed,thereisariskthatthetargetwillimaginetheworst‑casescenarioandreactmuchmorestronglythanitwouldhavedoneifithadknownthattheattacker’strueintentwaslimitedtoespionage,forexample.

Second,cybertoolsandmethodscanproliferateinauniquemanner,onethatisdifficulttocontrol.Today,sophisticatedcyberattacksarecarriedoutonlybythemostadvancedandbest‑resourcedactors.Butonceacybertoolhasbeenused,stolenorleaked,orbecomesavailableinsomeotherway,actorsotherthanthosewhodevelopeditmaybeabletofindit,reverse‑engineerit,andrepurposeitfortheirown–possiblymali‑cious–ends.

Third,whileitisnotimpossibletodeterminewhocreatedorlaunchedaparticularcyberattack,attributinganattacktendstobedifficult.IdentifyingactorswhoviolateIHLincyberspaceandholdingthemresponsibleislikelytoremainchallenging.Theperceptionthatitwillbeeasiertodenyresponsibilityforsuchattacksmayalsoweakenthetabooagainsttheiruse–andmaymakeactorslessscrupulousaboutviolatinginternationallawbyusingthem.

Whilecyberoperationshaveexposedthevulnerabilityofessentialservices,theyhavenot,fortunately,causedmajorhumanharmsofar.However,muchisunknownintermsoftechnologicalevolution,thecapabilitiesandthetoolsdevelopedbythemostsophisticatedactors,andtheextenttowhichtheincreaseduseofcyberoperationsduringarmedconflictsmightbedifferentfromthetrendsobservedsofar.

ThelimitsthatIHLsetsforcyberwarfareTheICRCwelcomesthefactthatanincreasingnumberofStatesandinternationalorganizationsareacknow‑ledgingthatIHLappliestocyberoperationsduringarmedconflicts.IturgesallStatestorecognizethepro‑tectionthatIHLoffersagainstthepotentialhumancostofcyberoperations.Forexample,belligerentsmustrespectandprotectmedicalfacilitiesandpersonnelatalltimes,whichmeansthatcyberattacksagainstthehealth‑caresectorduringarmedconflictwould–inmostcases–violateIHL.Likewise,IHLspecificallyprohibitsattacking,destroying,removingorrenderinguselessobjectsindispensabletothesurvivalofthecivilianpopulation.

Moregenerally,IHLprohibitsdirectingcyberattacksagainstcivilianinfrastructure,aswellasindiscriminateanddisproportionatecyberattacks.Forinstance,eveniftheinfrastructureorpartsofitbecomemilitaryobjectives(suchasadiscretepartofapowergrid),IHLrequiresthatonlythosepartsbeattacked,andthattherebenoexcessivedamagetotheremainingcivilianpartsofthegridortoothercivilianinfrastructurerelyingontheelectricityprovidedbythegrid.IHLalsorequirespartiestoconflicttotakeallfeasiblepre‑cautionstoavoidoratleastminimizeincidentalharmtociviliansandcivilianobjectswhencarryingoutacyberattack.


Notwithstandingtheinterconnectivitythatcharacterizescyberspace,theprinciplesofdistinction,propor‑tionalityandprecautionscanandmustberespected.Acarefulexaminationofthewaycybertoolsoperateshowsthattheyarenotnecessarilyindiscriminate.Whilesomeofthecybertoolsthatweknowofweredesignedtoself‑propagateandindiscriminatelyaffectwidelyusedcomputersystems,theydidnotdothesethingsbychance:theabilitytoself‑propagateusuallyneedstobespecificallyincludedinthedesignofsuchtools.Furthermore,attackingspecifictargetsmayrequirecustom‑madecybertools,whichmightmakeitdifficulttocarryoutsuchattacksonalargescaleorindiscriminately.

Infact,manyofthecyberattacksthathavebeenobservedappeartohavebeenratherdiscriminatefromatechnicalperspective.Thisdoesnotmeantheywerelawfulorwouldhavebeenlawfulifcarriedoutinaconflict;onthecontrary,intheICRC’sview,anumberofthecyberattacksthathavebeenreportedinpublicsourceswouldbeprohibitedduringarmedconflict.However,theirtechnicalcharacteristicsshowthatcyberoperationscanbeverypreciselydesignedtohaveaneffectonlyonspecifictargets,whichmakesthemcap‑ableofbeingusedincompliancewithIHLprinciplesandrules.

IHLrulesprotectingcivilianobjectscan,however,providethefullscopeoflegalprotectiononlyifStatesrecognizethatcyberoperationsthatimpairthefunctionalityofcivilianinfrastructurearesubjecttotherulesgoverningattacksunderIHL.20Moreover,datahavebecomeanessentialcomponentofthedigitaldomainandacornerstoneoflifeinmanysocieties.However,differentviewsexistonwhetherciviliandatashouldbecon‑sideredascivilianobjectsandthereforebeprotectedunderIHLprinciplesandrulesgoverningtheconductofhostilities.IntheICRC’sview,theconclusionthatdeletingortamperingwithessentialciviliandatawouldnotbeprohibitedbyIHLintoday’severmoredata‑reliantworldseemsdifficulttoreconcilewiththeobjectandpurposeofthisbodyoflaw.21Putsimply,thereplacementofpaperfilesanddocumentswithdigitalfilesintheformofdatashouldnotdecreasetheprotectionthatIHLaffordstothem.

Finally,partiestoarmedconflictsmusttakeallfeasibleprecautionstoprotectciviliansandcivilianobjectsunder theircontrolagainst theeffectsofattacks.This isoneof the fewIHLobligationsthatStatesarerequiredtoimplementinpeacetime.

AffirmingthatIHLappliestocyberwarfareshouldnotbemisunderstoodasencouragementtomilitarizecyberspaceoraslegitimizingcyberwarfare.AnyuseofforcebyStates,whethercyberorkineticinnature,willalwaysbegovernedbytheUNCharterandrelevantrulesofcustomaryinternationallaw.IHLaffordsthecivilianpopulationanadditionallayerofprotectionagainsttheeffectsofhostilities.

Inthecomingyears,theICRCwillcontinuetofollowtheevolutionofcyberoperationsandtheirpotentialhumancost,inparticularduringarmedconflicts.ItwillexploreavenuestoreducethatcostandworktowardsbuildingconsensusontheinterpretationofexistingIHLrulesand,ifnecessary,onthedevelopmentofcom‑plementaryrulesthataffordeffectiveprotectiontocivilians.

Theuseofdigitaltechnologyduringarmedconflictsforpurposes otherthanasmeansand methodsofwarfareInrecentconflicts,certainusesofdigitaltechnologyotherthanasmeansandmethodsofwarfarehaveledtoanincreaseinactivitiesthatadverselyaffectcivilianpopulations.Forexample,misinformationanddisinformationcampaigns,andonlinepropaganda,havefusedonsocialmedia,leadinginsomecontextstoincreasedtensionsandviolenceagainstandbetweencommunities.Unprecedentedlevelsofsurveillanceofthecivilianpopulationhavecausedanxietyandincreasingnumbersofarrests,insomeinstancespossiblybasedondisinformation.Disinformationandsurveillancearenotuniqueornewtoarmedconflicts;however,thegreaterscopeandforce‑multiplyingeffectprovidedbydigitaltechnologycanexacerbate–andaddto–theexistingvulnerabilitiesofpersonsaffectedbyarmedconflicts.22Developmentsinartificialintelligence

20 SeeICRC,IHL Challenges Report 2015,p.41.21 SeeICRC,IHL Challenges Report 2015,p.43.22 SeeICRC,Digital Risks in Situations of Armed Conflict,2019;availableathttps://www.icrc.org/sites/default/files/event/file_list/icrc_symposium_on_digital_risks_‑_event_report.pdf.

https://www.icrc.org/sites/default/files/event/file_list/icrc_symposium_on_digital_risks_-_event_report.pdfhttps://www.icrc.org/sites/default/files/event/file_list/icrc_symposium_on_digital_risks_-_event_report.pdf


andmachinelearningarealsorelevantinthisregard.23IHLdoesnotnecessarilyprohibitsuchactivities,butitdoesprohibitactsorthreatsofviolencetheprimarypurposeofwhichistospreadterroramongthecivilianpopulation.Moreover,partiestoarmedconflictmustnotencourageviolationsofIHL.Otherbodiesoflaw,includinginternationalhumanrightslaw,mightalsoberelevantwhenassessingsurveillanceanddisinformation.

Theglobaldigitaltransformationischangingnotonlywarfarebutalsothenatureofhumanitarianaction.Digitaltechnologiescanbeleveragedtosupporthumanitarianprogrammes,forinstancebycapturingandusingdatatoinformandadjustresponsesorbyfacilitatingtwo‑waycommunicationbetweenhumanitarianstaffandpopulationsaffectedbyconflicts.24Forexample,theICRCanalyses“bigdata”toanticipate,under‑stand,andrespondtohumanitariancrises,andusesinternet‑basedtoolstointeractwithbeneficiariesaswellaswithpartiestoarmedconflicts.TheICRCalsousesdigitaltoolstorestorefamilylinksand,ifpos‑sible,tofacilitatecommunicationbetweendetaineesandtheirlovedones;theICRCdoesallthisalsotohelppartiestoimplementtheirIHLobligations.Thesenewpossibilitiesentailnewresponsibilities:humanitarianorganizationsneedtostrengthentheirdigitalliteracyanddata‑protectionmeasures,inaccordancewiththe“donoharm”principle.25TheICRCencouragesfurtherresearch,discussion,andconcretestepsbyallreventactorstoenablehumanitarianactorstosafelyadapttheiroperationstodigitalchanges.

B) AUTONOMOUS WEAPON SYSTEMS TheICRCunderstandsautonomousweaponsystemsas:Any weapon system with autonomy in its critical func-tions. That is, a weapon system that can select and attack targets without human intervention.Autonomyincriticalfunctions–alreadyfoundinsomeexistingweaponstoalimitedextent,suchasairdefencesystems,activeprotectionsystems,andsomeloiteringweapons–isafeaturethatcouldbeincorporatedinanyweaponsystem.

Themostimportantaspectofautonomyinweaponsystems–fromahumanitarian,legalandethicalper‑spective–isthattheweaponsystemself‑initiates,ortriggers,anattackinresponsetoitsenvironment,basedonageneralizedtargetprofile.Tovaryingdegrees,theuseroftheweaponwillknowneitherthespe‑cifictargetnortheexacttimingandlocationoftheattackthatwillresult.Autonomousweaponsystemsare,therefore,clearlydistinguishablefromotherweaponsystems,wherethespecifictiming,locationandtargetarechosenbytheuseratthepointoflaunchoractivation.

TheICRC’sprimaryconcernislossofhumancontrolovertheuseofforceasaresultofautonomyinthecriticalfunctionsofweaponsystems.Dependingontheconstraintsunderwhichasystemoperates,theuser’suncertaintyabouttheexacttiming,locationandcircumstancesoftheattack(s)mayputciviliansatriskfromtheunpredictableconsequencesoftheattack(s).Italsoraiseslegalquestions,sincecombatantsmustmakecontextspecificjudgementstocomplywithIHL.Anditraisesethicalconcernsaswell,becausehumanagencyindecisionstouseforceisnecessaryinordertoupholdmoralresponsibilityandhumandignity.

23 SeechapterII.2)c.onartificialintelligenceandmachinelearning.24 SeeICRC Strategy 2019-2022,“Strategicorientation5:Embracingthedigitaltransformation”,pp.22–23;availableathttps://shop.icrc.org/icrc/pdf/view/id/2844.

25 SeeICRCandPrivacyInternational,The Humanitarian Metadata Problem: “Doing No Harm” in the Digital Era,2018;availableathttps://www.icrc.org/en/download/file/85089/the_humanitarian_metadata_problem_‑_icrc_and_privacy_international.pdf.

https://shop.icrc.org/icrc/pdf/view/id/2844https://www.icrc.org/en/download/file/85089/the_humanitarian_metadata_problem_-_icrc_and_privacy_international.pdfhttps://www.icrc.org/en/download/file/85089/the_humanitarian_metadata_problem_-_icrc_and_privacy_international.pdf


Fullerunderstandingofthelegal,26military,27ethical,28andtechnical29aspectsofautonomousweaponsys‑temshasenabledtheICRCtorefineitsviews.30Itcontinuestoespouseahuman‑centredapproach,basedonitsreadingofthelawandethicalconsiderationsforhumansinarmedconflict.31

HumancontrolunderIHLTheICRCholdsthatlegalobligationsunderIHLrulesontheconductofhostilitiesmustbefulfilledbythosepersonswhoplan,decideon,andcarryoutmilitaryoperations.Itishumans,notmachines,thatcomplywithandimplementtheserules,anditishumanswhocanbeheldaccountableforviolations.Whateverthemachine,computerprogram,orweaponsystemused,individualsandpartiestoconflictsremainresponsiblefortheireffects.

Certainlimitsonautonomyinweaponsystemscanbededucedfromexistingrulesontheconductofhostil‑ities–notablytherulesofdistinction,proportionalityandprecautionsinattack–whichrequirecomplexassessmentsbasedonthecircumstancesprevailingatthetimeofthedecisiontoattack,butalsoduringanattack.Combatantsmustmaketheseassessmentsreasonablyproximateintimetotheattack.Wheretheseassessmentsformpartofplanningassumptions,theymusthavecontinuingvalidityuntiltheexecutionoftheattack.Hence,commandersoroperatorsmustretainalevelofhumancontroloverweaponsystemssufficienttoallowthemtomakecontext‑specificjudgmentstoapplythelawincarryingoutattacks.

Humancontrolcantakevariousformsduringthedevelopmentandtestingofaweaponsystem(“devel‑opmentstage”); thetakingof thedecisiontoactivate theweaponsystem(“activationstage”);andtheoperationoftheweaponsystemasitselectsandattackstargets(“operationstage”).Humancontrolattheactivationandoperationstagesisthemostimportantfactorforensuringcompliancewiththerulesontheconductofhostilities.Humancontrolduringthedevelopmentstageprovidesameanstosetandtestcontrolmeasuresthatwillensurehumancontrolinuse.However,controlmeasuresatthedevelopmentstagealone–meaningcontrolindesign–willnotbesufficient.

Importantly,however,existingIHLrulesdonotprovidealltheanswers.AlthoughStatesagreeontheimport‑anceofhumancontrol–or“humanresponsibility”32–forlegalcompliance,opinionvariesonwhatthismeansinpractice.Further,purelylegalinterpretationsdonotaccommodatetheethicalconcernsraisedbythelossofhumancontrolovertheuseofforceinarmedconflict.

TowardslimitsonautonomyinweaponsystemsIntheICRC’sview,theuniquecharacteristicsofautonomousweaponsystems,andtheassociatedrisksoflossofcontrolovertheuseofforceinarmedconflict,meanthatinternationallyagreedlimitsareneededtoensurecompliancewithIHLandtoprotecthumanity.

Insofarasthesufficiencyofexistinglaw–particularlyIHL–isconcerned,itisclear,asshownabove,thatexistingIHLrules–inparticulardistinction,proportionality,andprecautionsinattack–alreadyprovide

26 NeilDavison,“Alegalperspective:Autonomousweaponsystemsunderinternationalhumanitarianlaw”,inUNODA Occasional Papers,No.30,November2017;availableathttps://www.icrc.org/en/document/autonomous‑weapon‑ systems‑under‑international‑humanitarian‑law;ICRC,Autonomous Weapon Systems: Technical, Military, Legal and Humanitarian Aspects,2014:availableathttps://www.icrc.org/en/document/report‑icrc‑meeting‑autonomous‑ weapon‑systems‑26‑28‑march‑2014.

27 SeeICRC,Autonomous Weapon Systems: Implications of Increasing Autonomy in the Critical Functions of Weapons,2016;availableathttps://www.icrc.org/en/publication/4283‑autonomous‑weapons‑systems.

28 SeeICRC,Ethics and Autonomous Weapon Systems: An Ethical Basis for Human Control?,2018;availableathttps://www.icrc.org/en/document/ethics‑and‑autonomous‑weapon‑systems‑ethical‑basis‑human‑control.

29 SeeICRC,Autonomy, Artificial Intelligence and Robotics:Technical Aspects of Human Control,2019;availableathttps://www.icrc.org/en/document/autonomy‑artificial‑intelligence‑and‑robotics‑technical‑aspects‑human‑control.

30 SeeICRC,IHL Challenges Report 2011,pp.39–40.Ondefinitionsinparticular,seeICRC,IHL Challenges Report 2015,p.45.31 SeeICRC,Statements to the Group of Governmental Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems, March2019;available

at https://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/(httpPages)/5535B644C2AE8F28C1258433002BBF14?OpenDocument.32 UnitedNations,Report of the 2018 Session of the Group of Governmental Experts on Emerging Technologies in the Area of

Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems,CCW/GGE.1/2018/3,23October2018.

https://www.icrc.org/en/document/autonomous-weapon-systems-under-international-humanitarian-lawhttps://www.icrc.org/en/document/autonomous-weapon-systems-under-international-humanitarian-lawhttps://www.icrc.org/en/document/report-icrc-meeting-autonomous-weapon-systems-26-28-march-2014https://www.icrc.org/en/document/report-icrc-meeting-autonomous-weapon-systems-26-28-march-2014https://www.icrc.org/en/publication/4283-autonomous-weapons-systemshttps://www.icrc.org/en/document/ethics-and-autonomous-weapon-systems-ethical-basis-human-controlhttps://www.icrc.org/en/document/ethics-and-autonomous-weapon-systems-ethical-basis-human-controlhttps://www.icrc.org/en/document/autonomy-artificial-intelligence-and-robotics-technical-aspects-human-controlhttps://www.icrc.org/en/document/autonomy-artificial-intelligence-and-robotics-technical-aspects-human-controlhttps://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/(httpPages)/5535B644C2AE8F28C1258433002BBF14?OpenDocument


limitstoautonomyinweaponsystems.Aweaponwithautonomyinitscriticalfunctionsthatisunsuper‑vised,unpredictableandunconstrainedintimeandspacewouldbeunlawful,becausehumansmustmakethecontext‑specificjudgmentsthattakeintoaccountcomplexandnoteasilyquantifiablerulesandprinciples.

However,itisalsoclearthatexistingIHLrulesdonotprovidealltheanswers.Whatlevelofhumansuper‑vision,interventionandabilitytodeactivateisneeded?Whatistheminimumlevelofpredictabilityandreliabilityoftheweaponsysteminitsenvironmentofuse?Whatconstraintsareneededfortasks,targets,operationalenvironments,timeofoperation,andgeographicalscopeofoperation?

Moreover,thelimitsdictatedbyethicalconcernsmaygobeyondthosefoundinexistinglaw.Anxietiesaboutthelossofhumanagencyindecisionstouseforce,diffusionofmoralresponsibility,andlossofhumandig‑nityaremostacutewithautonomousweaponsystemsthatpresentrisksforhumanlife,andespeciallywiththenotionofanti‑personnelsystemsdesignedtotargethumansdirectly.Theprinciplesofhumanitymaydemandlimitsonorprohibitionsagainstparticulartypesofautonomousweaponand/ortheiruseincertainenvironments.

Ataminimum,thereremainsanurgentneedforagreementonthetypeanddegreeofhumancontrolneces‑saryinpracticetoensurebothcompliancewithIHLandethicalacceptability.

C) ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND MACHINE LEARNINGArtificialintelligence(AI)systemsarecomputerprogramsthatcarryouttasks–oftenassociatedwithhumanintelligence–thatrequirecognition,planning,reasoningorlearning.MachinelearningsystemsareAIsys‑temsthatare“trained”onand“learn”fromdata,whichultimatelydefinethewaytheyfunction.Botharecomplexsoftwaretools,oralgorithms,thatcanbeappliedtomanydifferenttasks.However,AIandmachinelearningsystemsaredistinctfromthe“simple”algorithmsusedfortasksthatdonotrequirethesecap‑acities.Thepotentialimplicationsforarmedconflict–andfortheICRC’shumanitarianwork–arebroad.33 Thereareatleastthreeoverlappingareasthatarerelevantfromahumanitarianperspective.

ThefirstareaistheuseofAIandmachinelearningtoolstocontrolmilitaryhardware,inparticularthegrowingdiver

international humanitarian law and the ......like its predecessors, this report addresses only some...

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