international journal of cross cultural management -...

http://ccm.sagepub.com

Cultural Management International Journal of Cross

DOI: 10.1177/1470595804038867 2004; 4; 39 International Journal of Cross Cultural Management

Rajesh Kumar Negotiating Behavior

Brahmanical Idealism, Anarchical Individualism, and the Dynamics of Indian

http://ccm.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/4/1/39 The online version of this article can be found at:

Published by:

http://www.sagepublications.com

can be found at:International Journal of Cross Cultural Management Additional services and information for

http://ccm.sagepub.com/cgi/alerts Email Alerts:

http://ccm.sagepub.com/subscriptions Subscriptions:

http://www.sagepub.com/journalsReprints.navReprints:

http://www.sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.navPermissions:

http://ccm.sagepub.com/cgi/content/refs/4/1/39SAGE Journals Online and HighWire Press platforms):

(this article cites 32 articles hosted on the Citations

© 2004 SAGE Publications. All rights reserved. Not for commercial use or unauthorized distribution. at Handelshoejskolen i Aarhus on June 11, 2008 http://ccm.sagepub.comDownloaded from

http://ccm.sagepub.com/cgi/alerts

http://ccm.sagepub.com/subscriptions

http://www.sagepub.com/journalsReprints.nav

http://www.sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav

http://ccm.sagepub.com/cgi/content/refs/4/1/39


India is now emerging as a major player inthe world economy. The growth rate of theIndian economy has increased from a dismal3%–3.5% in the 1970s to 6%–7% in the

1990s. With a middle class in the range of250–300 million people and the economicreform process well under way, India hasbegun to attract increasing interest from

Brahmanical Idealism, AnarchicalIndividualism, and the Dynamicsof Indian Negotiating Behavior

Rajesh KumarThe Aarhus School of Business, Denmark

The article analyzes the implications of the Indian mindset on the dynamics ofIndian negotiating behavior. I argue that the constructs of Brahmanical idealism andanarchical individualism capture the nature of the Indian mindset. Brahmanical idealismreflects the tendency of the decision makers to seek the most perfect solution. Anydiscrepancies between the realities of the external world and the logic of the inner world asmanifested through a search for the ideal solution are not problematical for it is only theinner world that defines the true reality. If Brahmanical idealism focuses on the purity of themental world, anarchical individualism lays emphasis on the primacy of attaining the idealsolution through absolutist forms of interpersonal behavior. That is to say, since eachindividual is engaged in searching for the ideal solution, and furthermore, as eachindividual’s ideal solution is either no better or no worse than that of their counterpart, theattainment of this ideal is problematic because under these conditions cooperative behavioris a rarity. In this sense, anarchic individualism fragments rather than enhances total effort,thereby draining energy away from the system. I analyze the impact of this mindset on theIndian negotiating dynamics and outline the implications of the framework developed herefor the theory and practice of cross cultural management. Implications for negotiating withIndian businesspeople are also discussed.

• bridging differences with Indians • cultural influences • India • mindset • negotiating behavior

Copyright © 2004 SAGE Publicationswww.sagepublications.com

DOI: 10.1177/1470595804038867

CCM International Journal of

Cross CulturalManagement2004 Vol 4(1): 39–58

02_CCM 4_1 2/27/04 12:57 PM Page 39


www.sagepublications.com


foreign investors. International firms arebeing lured to India by the prospect of sellingin a market with a vast untapped potential.Whatever the specific mode of foreign entry(licensing, joint venture, wholly owned sub-sidiary, etc.) international investors face thenecessity of negotiating contractual agree-ments with their Indian counterparts –whether they are Indian businesspeople, representatives of the bureaucracy or a com-bination of both.

Negotiation has been typically con-ceptualized as a process by which actors seekto reconcile their conflicting goals (e.g.Carnevale and Pruitt, 1992; Neale andNorthcraft, 1991). International businessnegotiations bring together actors who havebeen socialized in different cultural traditionsand with different levels of internationalexposure. These negotiations also involveinteraction between actors at multipleorganizational levels and unfold in an envi-ronment that is often changing. The com-plexity of these negotiations is well capturedin Weiss’s (1993) RBC framework in whichhe explicates the intricate interdependencythat exists between relationships, behaviorsand conditions. The relationships, behaviorsand conditions encapsulate a wide range ofmacro- and micro-level variables, such as the nature of the political systems, industrystructure, corporate and national cultures,personality predispositions of the key nego-tiators, and the extent of time pressure, ifany. This is by no means an exhaustive list ofthe potential variables that may be in playhere but it highlights the complex intricaciesin explaining the processes and outcomes ofinternational negotiations.

The task that I attempt in this article is amore limited one. First, I seek to assess theimpact of only one variable – namely,national culture – on negotiation processesand outcomes. I am looking at only one pieceof the larger puzzle but it is an importantpiece given that it is now widely recognizedthat the process of negotiation is culturally

variable, with different negotiation scriptsbeing dominant in different cultures (e.g.Brett, 2000; Cohen, 1997; Kumar, 1999a;Leung and Tjosvold, 1998; Weldon andJehn, 1996). The negotiation scripts preva-lent in a given culture reflect the underlyingvalues/beliefs that are intrinsic to that cul-ture.

A wide variety of studies have shown thatdifferences in negotiation scripts either affectthe efficiency of the intercultural negotiationprocess and/or the integrativeness of thefinal agreement (e.g. Adair et al., 2001; Adleret al., 1987; Brett and Okumura, 1998).Second, while there have been a number ofstudies that have explored the behavior ofnegotiators from different cultures, only verylimited attention has been paid to the under-lying reasoning processes extant in that cul-ture (Gelfand and Dyer, 2000). Theoristshave often relied on the classificatory schemesdeveloped by Hofstede (1980) and/orSchwartz (1994) in exploring how cultureinfluences negotiation processes and out-comes (Kopelman and Olekalns, 1999).While the research undertaken within thisstream of work has undoubtedly furtheredour understanding of intercultural negotia-tion there is clearly a need to better understand the mental frames and/or thereasoning processes shaping behavior. Thusa major objective of this article is to analyzethe mental frames that are shaping thebehavior of Indian negotiators and to exploretheir implications for the development of thenegotiation processes.

Relatedly, it is also worth noting thatwhile there is a considerable amount of con-ceptual as well as empirical work document-ing the way that the Japanese, the Chineseand/or the Koreans negotiate, there are few,if any, conceptual or empirical studies high-lighting the negotiating behavior of Indians(for an exception see Cohen, 1997). This isan area that has traditionally been under-researched by management/organizationalscholars and for this reason it is deserving of

International Journal of Cross Cultural Management 4(1)40

02_CCM 4_1 2/27/04 12:57 PM Page 40



attention. My objective in the article is there-fore to analyze the nature of the Indian worldview and to explore its implications for theevolution of the negotiation process in theIndian socio-cultural context.

It is worth noting that India is a vastcountry with many regional and sub-regional variations. Given these differences isany generalization about the Indian worldview possible? Although I acknowledge theexistence of these differences, I also note thatthere is an essential unity in India stemmingfrom a shared world view, namely that ofHinduism. More than 80% of the populationin India are Hindus. Scholars note that the cultural legacy of Hinduism is deeplyingrained throughout the country (e.g.Almeida, 1996; Smith, 1991). My analysis ofthe Indian world view, therefore, stems primarily from the structure of Hinduism.The analysis is most broadly applicable to theIndian elite who hold managerial positions inbusiness and industry. Although the elitehave, in varying degrees, been influenced byexposure to western influences, such an influ-ence represents secondary socialization, andwhile it is certainly likely to shape someaspects of Indian managerial behavior, it isvery unlikely to have completely negated theinfluence of primary socialization (e.g. Saha,1992; Sinha and Kanungo, 1997).

It is important to note that while this article focuses on Indian negotiating behav-ior, it also makes a contribution to cross cul-tural theory as well as to the practice of crosscultural management. The essential argu-ment being advanced here is that culture isthe lens through which members of a cultureperceive the external world. Although thisinsight is by no means novel, there has beeninsufficient emphasis given to the role playedby mental frames in shaping how individualsfrom different cultures perceive and respondto the external reality. The tendency hasbeen to view culture as behavior, as opposedto viewing culture as a meaning system.Redding (1993), for example, raises the issue

as to whether Hofstede’s dimensions ade-quately capture the interpretative aspects ofculture, and it is this gap that I seek to redresshere in the context of negotiations. It isimportant to note that while the focus in this article is on India, the approach beingadvocated may be used to study other cul-tures.

At the same time, the article also seeks toexplicate the linkages between the dominantworld view extant in a given culture (India)and the negotiating style that appears to becharacteristic of that culture. In doing so, Iam attempting to provide a culture-basedexplanation, rooted in the Indian world view,as to why Indian negotiators behave in the manner that they do. The focus is notmerely on description, but, above all, is onexplanation that links the cultural world viewof the Indians with the key strategic chal-lenges confronting all negotiators. In theprocess, I am integrating culturally specificinsights as manifested in the schemas domi-nant in a given culture (in this case India)with existing negotiation theory to develop aportrait of negotiating behavior in India. Thearticle thus has the potential of not only con-tributing to the field of cross cultural man-agement but also to negotiation theory, inthat it demonstrates that cultural context hasa powerful impact in delineating the bound-aries of negotiation theory.

In an increasingly interdependent world,the ability to negotiate well is an importantmanagerial skill. Managers negotiating acrosscultural boundaries face the challenge of navigating through a culture that may bealien to them. It is argued here that anunderstanding of the mindset of the indi-viduals one is negotiating with is a prerequi-site for successful negotiations. With this inmind, I have attempted to outline the essen-tials of the Indian world view. A betterunderstanding of the Indian mindset willenable foreign investors seeking to do busi-ness in this country to adjust their negotiatingstrategies accordingly. They may also be less

Kumar: The Dynamics of Indian Negotiating Behavior 41

02_CCM 4_1 2/27/04 12:57 PM 1



surprised by Indian behavior that mayappear alien to them, and for this reason maybe able to handle the complexities of thenegotiating situation more adeptly.

This is a conceptual article in which I setout the main features and the implications ofthe Indian world view for the negotiationprocess. I begin the article by sketching outthe relevance of managerial cognitions inshaping negotiating behavior, then outlinethe nature of the Indian way of thinking andtease out its implications for the negotiatingprocess. The article next highlights the influ-ence of contextual variables that eitheramplify or dampen the impact of the worldview on negotiating processes and outcomes.I conclude by outlining directions for futureresearch and highlighting managerial impli-cations.

Managerial Thinking andNegotiating Behavior

There is by now a considerable amount ofevidence suggesting that managerial thinkingplays an important role in shaping the nego-tiating dynamics (e.g. Bazerman and Carroll,1987; Bazerman and Neale, 1992; Brodt andTinsley, 1998; Thompson, 1998). Implicit inthis line of research is the recognition that theway individuals define a situation is animportant determinant of how they react tothem. A number of scholars have demon-strated the impact of managerial thinking onnegotiation processes and outcomes. Nego-tiators often engage in non-rational escala-tion of commitment (Staw, 1981); assumethat negotiations are zero sum in character(Bazerman et al., 1985); ignore their oppo-nents’ cognitions (Carroll et al., 1988); aresusceptible to salient information (Neale,1984), and are subject to framing biases innegotiations (Bazerman et al., 1985).

The way in which individuals constructdefinitions of situations is influenced both bycognitive content as well as by the underlyingcognitive processes. A widely held assump-

tion in cross cultural psychology has beenthat while cognitive processes are similaracross cultures, cognitive content demon-strably varies, but this sharp differentiationbetween the two may no longer be tenable(Nisbett et al., 2001). These authors point outthat cognitive content and cognitive pro-cesses are mutually reinforcing with the resultthat ‘a given stimulus situation triggers quitedifferent processes in one culture than inanother’ (Nisbett et al., 2001: 306). The onecrucial implication of this distinction is thatto understand how members of different cultures perceive reality one must attend tocognitive content and cognitive processessimultaneously. What I intend to do is there-fore to outline the nature of the Indian worldview and show how this has shaped theIndian negotiating style.

The Nature of the IndianWorld View

The Concept of BrahmanicalIdealism

In recent years a number of scholars havesought to explore the nature of the Indianworld view (e.g. Dumont, 1970; Gopalan andRivera, 1997; Kakar, 1981; Lannoy, 1971;Moddie, 1968; Nakamura, 1964; Nandy,1980; Roland, 1988; Saha, 1992, 1993;Sinha, 2002; Sinha and Kanungo, 1997).Sinha and Kanungo (1997) suggest, forexample, that Indian managers exhibit a pri-mary mode of behavior that is traditional incharacter and a secondary mode of behaviorthat has been acquired from the importationof western management practices. Thus,while the primary mode of behavior reflectsthe prevalence of traditional Hindu valuessuch as collectivism and high power distance,the secondary mode reflects the inculcationof values such as individualism and pragma-tism. Whether the Indians choose to exhibit aprimary or a secondary form of behaviordepends on the context of the situation. The


02_CCM 4_1 2/27/04 12:57 PM Page 42



author/s conceptualize context in terms ofdesh (place), kal (time) and patra (person). Thisframework, as the author/s point out, mayhelp to explain the inconsistency in Indianmanagerial behavior.

Roland (1988) explores the Indian worldview from the standpoint of self. He draws adistinction between the familial, the indi-vidual, and the spiritual self. The familial selfhighlights the interdependence between indi-viduals; the individual self focuses on the factthat each individual is unique and autono-mous from others; the spiritual self focuses onthe individual’s attempt at uncovering thedeeper reality. Roland (1988) maintains thatthe Indian self is primarily a combination ofthe familial self with the spiritual self.

Kakar (1981) notes that Indian culturalideals discourage individuals from display-ing initiative and/or undertaking voluntaryaction. According to Kakar (1981) Indianslook to elders to provide guidance for action.Like Roland, Kakar emphasizes the impor-tance of the familial self in the Indian socio-cultural context and delineates some of theimplications of this self-conception. He notes(1981: 38) ‘The Hindu view of action is necessarily a conservative one; it harks backto a “golden age”, and harbours the scepticalconviction that social change is superfluous,an importunate deviation from traditionalways.’

The work of Sinha and Kanungo (1997)and Sinha (2002) focuses on the content ofthe Indian managerial mindset and its impli-cations for behavior, while Kakar (1981) andRoland (1988) seek to explicate the essence ofthe Indian self. Although these frameworkshave made an important contribution andhave deepened our understanding of Indianpsychological orientation, they have not ex-plicitly focused on the thinking processesunderlying the way that Indians perceive theworld.

The work of Lannoy (1971), in contrast,focuses on the processes of Indian thinking.According to Lannoy (1971) Indians follow a

non-sequential logic in which actions arejudged primarily for their own sake ratherthan for the effect that they produce. As henotes (1971: 289): ‘All work contains its ownsatisfaction. The present should not beregarded as a means to future satisfaction.’The human ideal is to escape from the con-straints of time. In essence, the highest pur-pose in life is to discover the nature of theultimate reality by overcoming the con-straints of the here and now. In a psycho-analytical study of Indian society, Kakar(1981) notes that the Hindu culture stressesthe importance of merging with the ‘other’ asopposed to remaining separate from the‘other’ in arriving at the ultimate reality. Ashe (1981: 36) notes ‘Hindu culture is gov-erned in these matters not by a belief in thegolden mean but by a staunch belief in thegolden extreme.’

The ultimate reality is incapable of beingunderstood through rational means. Thisreality, as Jain and Kussman (1994: 96) note,has ‘no form and no name’. Even though thisultimate reality is incapable of being dis-covered through rational/analytical means,the normative implication is that individualsmust seek to uncover it for, as Jain andKussman (1994: 96) note, ‘The deeper thelevel of reality the more fully one participatesin the truth of being.’ This mode of thinkingencourages individuals to strive for the un-attainable ideal while simultaneously recog-nizing that this attainment may be all butimpossible. To quote Lannoy (1971: 293):‘There is no room in this scheme for themodern idea that man is the subject andagent of history; there is no admissibility ofthe possibility of ameliorating the humancondition, nor confidence in the ability tomaster a hostile environment.’

Nakamura (1964) points out that theIndian process of thinking is idealistic in theextreme. As he notes (1964: 136): ‘There is atendency among the Indians, divested in general of the concept of a perceptible objec-tive order, not to differentiate too sharply


02_CCM 4_1 2/27/04 12:57 PM Page 43



between the actual and the ideal or betweenfact and imagination or fantasy.’ He furtherpoints out that Indians never take any con-certed actions to curb what he calls an‘extravagant development of fantasy’. Thefantasy in which the Indians engage is ‘free,boundless, and extravagant, and often goesto extremes’ (Nakamura, 1964: 142). Inter-estingly enough, even though Indians areprone to fantasizing in an extreme manner,they are very passive in acting on their fantasies (Nakamura, 1964). One interestingimplication of this mode of thinking is thatwhile Indians may be relatively quick in setting up excessively high imaginary idealsthat they would like to realize, they are nottroubled by their failure to realize them.

Nakamura’s comments are echoed byModdie (1968), who suggests that Indians aretoo prone to strive for absolute perfection.Their approach to problem solving is muchtoo grandiose to result in concrete solutionsto concrete problems. Moddie (1968: 5) notesthat there is

a penchant for the choice of absolute in thoughtand behavior. In the sphere of intellect weexpect easy Upanishidic perfection rather thanrealizing that in real life progress lies betweenimperfection and a little less imperfection.

In a commentary on the Indian planningprocess the noted political theorist LucienPye (1985: 143) points out that ‘Indian politi-cians showed a marked propensity to indulgein enthusiastic planning, utopian speculation,and wishful thinking, while usually failing tocarry out the implementation: virtuous talk,big plans, but little delivery.’

In a similar vein Irvine (1998: 38), whilecommenting on the attitude of India’s elitetowards economic reform, notes

What emerges is a yearning for an economicthird way somewhere between laissez fairecapitalism and the planned economy. Thismanifests itself in opposition to most AngloSaxon notions of sensible economic manage-ment rather than looking for workable alter-natives.

He further observes that the Indian elite,while critical of the errors made by others inthe pursuit of economic liberalization, aremuch less inclined to acknowledge the limita-tions inherent in their own system. It isalmost as if the conception of an imaginaryideal implies that its realization in practice is all but inevitable. The economic reformprocess initiated in 1991 may have initiatedthe foundations for attaining a better balancebetween thinking and action, but while itmay still be too early to form an overall judgment about the emergent change, theearly indications are not overly encourag-ing.

In a study of the development of inde-pendent power production in India Rufin et al. (2003) note that while the policy makersrecognize the need for stemming the powershortage and also accept the need to providethe appropriate incentives to investors, theimplementation process has been much tooslow for the necessary goals to be realized.These author/s point out that while the policy makers’ target was to increase powergenerating capacity by 10 000 MW over theperiod 1991–2000, in point of fact the addi-tional increase was only 2000 MW.

The Indian mindset has been describedas rooted in the fundamental principles of‘Brahmanical idealism’ by Kumar (1999b).The conception of Brahmanical idealism has a number of different aspects. First, itunderscores the importance of uncoveringthe ultimate reality, no matter how difficultthis might be. This is well exemplified byKakar (1981: 34) who notes that the culturalideal

has as its goal the liberated, rather than thesuccessful, or the achieving man; whichemphasizes the possibility of man’s realizationrather than his salvation, which considers theexploration and enrichment of the inner worldof experience a vital life task; and which relieson a practice of a cultivated subjectivity andintrospection to gain knowledge of the self andthe world.


02_CCM 4_1 2/27/04 12:57 PM Page 44



The concept also highlights the impor-tance of cultivated subjectivity in uncoveringthis ultimate reality. The one crucial implica-tion of this is that Brahmanical idealism represents an introverted form of thinking.Actors are engaged in wishful thinking thatmay be divorced from empirical reality to anexcessively high degree. In other words, theinner thought processes are not viewed asvery distinctive from the external world.While all individuals everywhere may needto draw such a distinction, if for nothing elsethan for survival, the degree to which the twoare separated varies across cultures (Lillard,1998). One crucial implication of this is thatexternal reality is rationalized rather thandealt with very directly in a pragmatic,hands-on way. Within the Indian culturalcontext Gopalan and Rivera (1997: 163) citing Husain (1961) note ‘Action is rankedinferior to knowledge and behaviors seekingtruth, harmony, and unity are given priorityover focusing on practicality and reality.’This stems in large part from the actors’recognition that what can be made into areality in the inner self-contained world ofthe individual, is at the same time the truedefinition of reality (Saha, 1992). It is alsoworth noting that the idealistic mindset isalso a self-validating one, in that, if the idealsare not met, it does not bring into questionthe validity of those ideals. Indeed, the failureto attain the ideals may make the individualseven more determined to realize them.

The Concept of AnarchicalIndividualism

If Brahmanical idealism focuses on the purity of the inner world, anarchical indi-vidualism lays primacy on attaining thedesired ideal through rigid adherence toabsolutist forms of interpersonal behavior.Although India has traditionally been char-acterized as a collectivist society (Hofstede,1980) in which the family is central, Indianshave an individualistic streak which is most evident in interaction with out-group

members (e.g. Derné, 2000; Kakar, 1981;Sinha, 2000). Indians have found it difficultto form in-groups beyond the extended family and the caste community, although it needs to be said that even within theextended family and the caste, cooperationmay not always be easily forthcoming(Roland, 1990). Indeed, as Nandy (1980:121) notes: ‘The difficulty the Indian societyhas always faced in managing large scaleorganizations is an offshoot of the Brah-manical world view, and its strong emphasison unconditional anarchic individualism.’

In anarchical individualism, individualsundoubtedly act out their personal views, butfind it difficult to engage in mutually co-ordinated action to achieve shared goals.While cooperation between individuals maybe problematical in individualistic cultureseverywhere, this lack of cooperation is par-ticularly pronounced in the presence of anar-chical individualism. Gupta (2002) points outthat cooperative behavior and teamworkamong Indians are extremely difficult. In asimilar vein, as Das (1998: 11) notes: ‘even inthe most homogenous Marwari companies,brothers, and nephews incessantly fight witheach other’ (see also Roland, 1990, 1988). Hefurther notes that while conflicts are commonand endemic in all global firms, they are con-tained because otherwise the firms’ competi-tiveness would be undermined. In India, onthe other hand, as Das notes, conflicts ‘tendto spill out’. It is the existence of anarchicalindividualism that renders the managementof internal conflicts within Indian organiza-tions most difficult. How is compromise pos-sible when each individual not only thinks inabsolutist terms, but also views their ownparticular definition of the situation as beingthe only ‘right’ definition?

Evidence of anarchical individualism is tobe found in just about every domain of orga-nizational and inter-organizational inter-actions. In 1998, for example, there waswrangling in New Delhi between the bureau-crats and the air traffic controllers concern-


02_CCM 4_1 2/27/04 12:57 PM Page 45



ing the use of new air traffic control equip-ment (Kazmin, 1998). Controllers balked atthe use of new radar and navigational equip-ment, even though it had been installed ninemonths previously. The attempts by theAirports Authority to persuade the con-trollers to accept the new system were cer-tainly not successful during that period oftime. The recognition that the installation ofthe new equipment would improve air safetydid not speed up the internal wranglingbetween the parties, in spite of the fact thatthere was external pressure from the Inter-national Federation of Airline Pilots Associa-tion to install the new equipment given thefact that the system in place until its intro-duction was not considered to be the safest inthe world.

Another fascinating example of the lackof teamwork within Indian organizations isthe way that the Indian government dealtwith the now bankrupt energy giant Enron.Following the initiation of economic reformsin 1991 the Indian government invited foreign power producers to set up new powergeneration plants in the country. Enron wasone of the first foreign firms to respond to thisinvitation and it proposed setting up a powerplant in the State of Maharashtra. After contentious negotiations a memorandum ofagreement was signed in 1993 betweenEnron and the state government ofMaharashtra, which at that time was led bythe Congress party. The project was notwithout its critics who continued to complainvociferously about the lack of transparency inthe negotiation process and the fact that thenegotiated agreement was much too one-sided in favor of Enron. These criticismsnotwithstanding, Enron started the process ofconstructing the power plant. In 1995, a newgovernment led by the Bharatiya JanataParty and the Shiv Sena came to power andone of their first actions was to order a freshreview of the Enron project. In a matter ofmonths the new government cancelled thestate government’s contract with Enron on

the grounds that it was not in the best inter-est of the people of that state. Enron wasundoubtedly not pleased by this turn ofevents and they threatened to take the stategovernment to arbitration, as mandatedunder the terms of the existing contract.

In early 1996, the parties decided to signa new, renegotiated, agreement. In May1999 phase I of the Dabhol power projectstarted producing power. Was this the end ofthe story? Evidently not. By December 2000there was yet another change of governmentin the State of Maharashtra. On this occa-sion the Congress Party-led coalition (theparty which had signed the original agree-ment with Enron in 1993) instituted a freshreview of the project on the grounds that theprice of Enron’s power was too high! Thistime around, the negotiations with Enronwere to prove fruitless and by July 2001Enron had decided to sell its stake in theIndian power project.

The point I wish to make is that whateverthe merits or the demerits of the differentagreements negotiated with Enron (and byall accounts there were many problems in theagreement that was negotiated), the differentgovernments that came into power con-sistently critiqued the agreement that hadbeen negotiated by the previous party. It isalmost as if the different state governmentswere more interested in scoring points overtheir predecessors than in trying to strive foran agreement with Enron that may have had some durability. Most importantly thedecision makers failed to consider the strate-gic impact of a continuing policy of incon-sistency on other foreign power producerswho were exploring the possibility of enteringthe Indian market. (For an in-depth exami-nation of this case see ‘Enron (A), (B) and(C)’, Harvard Business School, 1997. The casehas also received extensive coverage in thepress.)


02_CCM 4_1 2/27/04 12:57 PM Page 46



The Indian World View andNegotiating Dynamics

The Impact of BrahmanicalIdealism

Theorists note that in negotiation there arefour possible outcomes, namely (1) no agree-ment; (2) a victory for one of the parties; (3) acompromise; or (4) a win–win solution, i.e. asolution in which the joint benefits to the parties are greater than those obtained with acompromise (Rubin et al., 1994 ). Which ofthese outcomes emerges as a product of thenegotiation process is often dependent on theaspiration levels of the parties, the rigiditieswith which the aspirations are held, the psy-chological biases that get intensified duringthe interaction, and/or the emergence ofaffect during the negotiation process (e.g.Barry and Oliver, 1996; Brett et al., 1999;Pruitt, 1981).

The aspiration level refers to the standardthat the negotiator hopes to attain or exceedduring the negotiating encounter. This stan-dard defines the benchmark against whichthe negotiator assesses the success or failureof the negotiation. Psychological biases maybe intensified during the negotiation processas a result of an idealistic mode of thinking.The negotiators may also experience nega-tive emotions if the negotiation fails to pro-duce the desired outcome and/or the processof getting to the agreement is an excruciat-ingly slow one. In this section I will attemptto outline the impact of Brahmanical ideal-ism on (a) the aspiration levels of Indiannegotiators; (b) the rigidity of the aspirationlevels; (c) the intensification of the psycho-logical biases; and (d) the emergence of emo-tions during the negotiation process.

Aspiration levels of Indian negotiatorsA major implication of Brahmanical idealismis that aspiration levels (expectations) ofIndian negotiators are likely to be very high.In searching for the ideal solution Indiannegotiators are trying to realize their goals to

the maximum degree that is imaginable. Thisis both advantageous as well as disadvanta-geous for the Indian negotiator. On the posi-tive side, high aspiration levels are essentialfor attaining integrative solutions (Filley,1975). Without high aspiration levels theactors may settle for a compromise and indoing so leave gains on the table. High aspiration levels also prevent negotiatorsfrom being taken advantage of by their coun-terparts. On the negative side, high aspira-tion levels slow down the process of reachingan agreement (e.g. Bazerman et al., 1985;Pruitt and Lewis, 1975). In the extreme casethey may persuade the other actor to with-draw from the negotiation process.

High aspiration levels may manifest them-selves in two distinct ways (Higgins, 1998):they could represent either the maximizationof positive outcomes (promotion focus) or theminimization of negative outcomes (pre-vention focus). While a ‘promotion focus is concerned with accomplishments, hopes,and aspirations, prevention focus is con-cerned with safety, responsibilities, and obli-gations’ (Higgins, 1998: 16). In a negotiationcontext, a promotion focus could mean maximizing benefits from a negotiated transaction, while a prevention focus couldmean minimizing the possibility of enteringinto unprofitable transactions. Although theimpact of high aspiration levels using eitherthe promotion or the prevention motiva-tional orientation on negotiation processeshas not been systematically tested either in alaboratory setting or in a field setting, there issome anecdotal evidence suggesting that highaspiration levels have brought both benefitsas well as losses for Indian negotiators.

On a positive note, a Danish managercommenting on his interactions with anIndian agent noted that discussions with theIndian agent went on and on. The negotiatedagreement took much longer to obtain com-pared with what is typical for Denmark. TheDanish manager noted that the Indian agentwas very clever and he was able to obtain the


02_CCM 4_1 2/27/04 12:57 PM Page 47



best contract relative to other contracts thefirm had negotiated in South Asia. On a lesspositive note, a shipping manager based inthe United States noted about the Indians(Robinson, cited in Knee 1998: 3–4)

They have a tendency to badger one to thepoint of exasperation, when the averageAmerican, or European businessman will givein just to get rid of them or to move thingsalong. Alternatively, they will stall when thingsare not going their way, until the silencebecomes unbearable and you give in.

Rigidity of aspiration levels A relatedimplication of this world view is that the aspiration levels are going to be relativelyrigid, i.e. they may not change as readily asone might expect them to. The underlyinglogic is that flexibility in aspiration levels maycompromise one’s ability to attain the mostdesirable solution. Although theorists havemaintained that goal rigidity is important inattaining integrative agreements, they havealso made the additional argument that goalrigidity should be combined with flexibility ofmeans if the negotiation process is to succeed(Pruitt, 1981). In other words, one must drawa distinction between ultimate and inter-mediate goals. A related argument has morerecently been made by Brett et al. (1999),who have argued that negotiation is as mucha process of goal discovery as it is one of getting what one wants.

Following this line of reasoning theauthor/s have drawn a distinction betweenhigher and lower level standards. Higherlevel standards focus on interests, whereaslower level standards focus on positions. Afocus on higher level standards offers nego-tiators a much better possibility of attainingtheir goals because they offer multiple path-ways for goal attainment, whereas a focus onlower level standards constricts that flexi-bility. Implicit in this theorizing is the recog-nition that when negotiators find they areunable to attain their initially held goals anda discrepancy emerges, they may deal with

that discrepancy either internally (i.e. reform-ulating their goals) or externally (i.e. byinducing the other negotiator to readjusthis/her expectations to move the negotiationprocess further along).

Given the rigidity of the aspiration levels,one would surmise that the Indian negotia-tors would deal with the discrepancy by trying to readjust the expectations of theother negotiator instead of trying to readjusttheir aspiration levels. This may be doneeither by asking questions, giving informa-tion, and/or being silent (Brett et al., 1999).There is some evidence to suggest thatIndians maintain rigidity in their aspirationlevels by taking the moral high ground(Cohen, 1997). There is suggestive evidencethat the rigidity to which Cohen (1997)alludes encompasses both interests and posi-tions, although this needs further empiricalexamination. England et al. (1974), in a studyof Indian managerial values, noted thatIndian managers have a strong moralorientation, a finding that has been rein-forced by the work of Sinha and Kanungo(1997). After all, if one is taking a principledposition, where is the room for readjustingone’s expectations or aspiration levels? Theimplication of all this is that the rigidity inaspiration levels of Indian negotiators mayeither slow down the process of negotiationsand/or may induce them to try to reshapethe expectations of their counterparts ratherthan changing their own standards. Oneconsequence is then that in some instances itmay enable the Indians to get a better agree-ment than might have been the case other-wise, but in other instances it may be a caseof missed opportunities.

Intensification of psychological biasesAn idealistic mode of thinking may exag-gerate the psychological biases that are often present in the negotiation process.Negotiation scholars note that over-optimisticconfidence, reactive devaluation, divergentconstrual, attributional distortion, and non-


02_CCM 4_1 2/27/04 12:57 PM Page 48



rational escalation of commitment to a courseof action are psychological biases that oftenrender negotiation problematical (e.g. Rossand Ward, 1995; Rubin et al., 1994).

Over-optimistic confidence refers to thetendency to overestimate one’s chances ofobtaining a negotiated agreement on one’sown terms. In other words, negotiators whoare over-optimistic often resist making con-cessions, or even when they make con-cessions may do so only grudgingly. An idealistic mode of thinking may exaggeratethe likelihood of this happening because itleads to a tendency to pay less attention tothe external environment, and in the processnegotiators may overlook clues suggestingthat their chances of prevailing on their ownterms are not as high as may have been con-strued. A good example of over-optimism isthe crisis that developed between India andChina over disputed territory in 1962.Despite there being credible evidence thatChina might attack India if the latter did notend its aggressive operations in the disputedterritory, the Indian policy makers wereextremely surprised when China invadedIndia (Vertzberger, 1984).

Reactive devaluation is the tendency todevalue a concession simply on account ofthe fact that a concession has been made(Ross and Stillinger, 1991). One would sur-mise that an idealistic mindset may heightenthis tendency, because within this frame ofthinking the very act of making a concessionundercuts the principled logic of the positionthat the other negotiator was advancing.Divergent construals refer to the fact that thesame information may be evaluated very differently by negotiators from the two sides.While this is present in almost all negotia-tions its salience is heightened when one ofthe negotiators has an idealistic mindsetwhile the other’s mindset is much moregrounded in empirical reality. One conse-quence of this is that the different negotiatorsmay find different cues salient in the environ-ment, with the consequence that they may

not even agree either on the nature of theproblem and/or on its origins.

Attributional distortion refers to the ten-dency for the actors to see their counterpart’sbehavior as reflecting their internal disposi-tion, rather than situational contingencies(Ross, 1977). Given the lack of sharp differ-entiation between the internal and the exter-nal world, external cues may not be pickedup and this may reinforce the tendency tomake dispositional rather than situationalattributions. Non-rational escalation of com-mitment refers to the tendency to persist witha course of action even in the face of mount-ing evidence that the action is not yieldingthe desired results (Staw, 1981). An idealisticmindset, motivated by the desire to attain thebest possible solution, will aggravate this tendency, because the Indian negotiators areunlikely to be easily satisfied with an outcomethat does not correspond to their expecta-tions.

Emotional dynamics Negotiation re-searchers have begun to pay attention to therole played by emotions in the negotiationprocess (e.g. Barry and Oliver, 1996; Georgeet al., 1998; Kumar, 1997). Emotions arehigh intensity affective states that arise from the actors’ ability or inability to attaintheir goals (e.g. Lazarus, 1991; Oatley andJohnson-Laird, 1996). Given that negotiationis both a task as well as an interpersonally oriented activity, the emergence of emotionsin the negotiation process is only natural.What implications does an idealistic mode ofthinking have for the emotional experiencesof Indian negotiators? First, given that Indiannegotiators have high aspiration levels thatare rigidly maintained, one would surmisethat goal blockages are likely to be a fairlycommon occurrence. The implication of thisis that Indian negotiators are likely to experi-ence emotions frequently. However, if thegoal blockages persist over time, they maywell become attuned to them and for thatreason either may not experience emotions


02_CCM 4_1 2/27/04 12:57 PM Page 49



so frequently or the intensity of the emotionalreactions may not be so high.

On the other hand it is quite conceivablethat these negative emotional reactions maycertainly induce Indian negotiators to take afresh look at the realism of their aspirationlevels, and that may bring about a change in their internal standards. The conditionsunder which either one or the other psycho-logical processes dominates may well be aninteresting issue to study. Second, it would beinteresting to surmise as to the nature of theemotional reactions that are likely to ariseamong Indian negotiators. It is useful to look at this because different emotions havedifferent behavioral implications (Kumar,2004, forthcoming). Theorists have drawn adistinction between dejection- and agitation-related emotions (Higgins, 1987). Dejection-related emotions represent the absence of apositive outcome and are in the nature offrustration, disappointment, dissatisfaction,etc. whereas agitation-related emotionsrepresent the presence of a negative outcomeand are in the nature of tension, anxiety,fear, etc.

Given the focus of the Indian negotiatorson obtaining the most ideal outcome, I wouldsurmise that failure to obtain the desired outcomes is likely to generate dejection-related emotions. It has been argued thatdejection-related emotions induce individualsto try harder to attain their goals, whereasagitation-related emotions induce them toescape or flee from the situation (Kumar,1997). The one crucial implication of this isthat in the immediate aftermath of an unsuc-cessful negotiation, Indians may intensifytheir efforts to attain their desired goals.

The Impact of AnarchicalIndividualism

There are many different kinds of negotia-tions; namely, negotiation between individu-als, negotiation between groups, or negotia-tion within a group. In the case of negotiationbetween individuals, the choice and the

implementation of the negotiation strategyare dependent on the decisions made by theindividuals themselves. In the case of inter-group negotiations, the negotiators represent-ing the different groups face the challenge of satisfying the interests of their opposingnegotiator as well as those of their con-stituents who they are trying to represent in the negotiations. Labor managementnegotiations, negotiations between a multi-national firm and the host country, or negotiations between a host country and anon-governmental organization are all exam-ples of intergroup negotiations. Intergroupnegotiations in which the negotiators mustseek to deal simultaneously with their counterpart and their constituents create thenegotiator’s dilemma (Lewicki et al., 1994).The dilemma arises because satisfying theinterest of their constituents may impede thenegotiators from concluding an agreementwith their opponent, and likewise if the nego-tiator were to accede to the demands of theopponent, he or she would be likely to incurthe wrath of the constituents.

Although the negotiator’s dilemma isdifficult to manage just about everywhere,the point that I would like to make here isthat anarchical individualism makes themanagement of this dilemma particularly difficult. As outlined earlier, a major tenet ofanarchical individualism is that cooperativebehavior among individuals is a rarity. Thishas a number of different implications. First,it suggests that internal consensus is likely toprove extremely elusive. If so, how is a givenorganization able to articulate, much lessimplement, a coherent negotiating strategywhen dealing with another organization?The difficulty that India has had in attractingforeign investment in the independent powerindustry since the onset of economic reformsin 1991 is in part due to its inability to formulate and implement a coherent negoti-ation strategy with outside investors (e.g.Rufin et al., 2003; Saez, 1998). Many inves-tors became disillusioned and left the coun-


02_CCM 4_1 2/27/04 12:57 PM Page 50



try. This is not the only sector in which problems have occurred. In the cellphoneindustry several foreign investors who hadreceived licenses from some agencies of thegovernment left the country because theyfailed to gain additional clearances (Tread-gold, 1998).

The inability to attain and/or sustain aninternal consensus means that it makes it lessworthwhile for the other negotiator to con-tinue to negotiate in this environmentbecause it is unclear to him or her whetherthe negotiation process will bear any fruit atall. A number of foreign investors haveexpended an enormous amount of effort andenergy in trying to get their projects cleared,but apparently to no avail. As the Global

Power Report (2003: 7) notes:

But after a tumultuous decade, the country’sIPP program crumbled in failure. Virtually allof the large foreign firms that participated inthe program – among them CMS generation,PowerGen, Mirant, and AES corporation –have exited the Indian power market.

It is undoubtedly the case that these werecomplex projects which were highly visible,so attaining an internal consensus was probably even more difficult than might havebeen the case otherwise, but the generalpoint remains – namely that anarchical indi-vidualism renders intra-group cooperationhighly problematical. Anarchical individual-ism slows down the negotiation process,either because the Indian negotiating teamtakes a long time to formulate their strategyand/or due to the fact that they are unable to respond to their counterpart’s offer in atimely way.

Second, anarchical individualism mayimpart a high degree of unpredictability inthe negotiation process. While all negotia-tions are characterized by unpredictability,and complex negotiations perhaps even moreso, anarchical individualism adds perhapsanother layer of complexity to the process. Isuspect that the more varied the negotiatingteam and the greater the number of players

in it, the more problematical anarchical indi-vidualism might be. Anarchical individual-ism may also detract from the negotiatingteam’s ability to concentrate on the task athand – much of their time and effort mightgo in either critiquing other team membersor responding to criticisms leveled againstthem. This may distract them from truly trying to concentrate on developing an inte-grative solution to the problem at hand.Finally, internal disunity within the Indiannegotiating team may convey an impressionto the other party that they are not reallyserious about negotiations.

Overall Impact ofBrahmanical Idealism andAnarchical Individualism

I have so far outlined the impact of Brah-manical idealism and anarchical individual-ism on the nature of Indian negotiating practices. While Brahmanical idealismshapes the expectations of Indian negotiators,anarchical individualism highlights the factthat consensus is often difficult to attain andmaintain within an Indian negotiating team.The question therefore is: what is the overallimpact of these dimensions on the negotiatingprocess? While high aspiration levels mayhave the potential of generating integrativeagreements, anarchical individualism maydetract from such a possibility, and especiallyso in cases of intergroup negotiations. I wouldalso surmise that rigidity in aspiration levelsmay have a positive or a negative impact onnegotiation processes and outcomes, depend-ing on whether it is interest-based or posi-tional-based rigidity. Positional-based rigiditywill be detrimental to successful negotiations,whereas interest-based rigidity may be morefacilitative of a positive outcome, althoughthe positive outcome may not necessarilyemerge expeditiously.

More broadly, both Brahmanical ideal-ism and anarchical individualism work toslow down the speed of the negotiation


02_CCM 4_1 2/27/04 12:57 PM Page 51



process. The stability of the negotiated outcome may also be compromised by thepresence of anarchical individualism in par-ticular. Individuals and/or groups who aredissatisfied by a particular negotiated out-come may seek to reopen the issue. Given theslowness and the unpredictability at times ofnegotiating with the Indians, the ability tofoster inter-organizational trust may be some-what problematical, although interpersonaltrust, if established, may be durable.

Contextual FactorsInfluencing NegotiatingBehavior

While Brahmanical idealism and anarchicalindividualism have a powerful influence onIndian negotiating behavior a number ofcontextual factors may either amplify ordampen the impact of the Indian mindset.The contextual variables are (a) the nature ofthe organization; (b) nature of the opponent(i.e. a member of the in-group or the out-group); (c) task complexity; and (d) individualdifference variables.

Nature of the Organization

Most Indian businesses have traditionallybeen family owned and this is still the casetoday, although some changes are under wayas a product of the opening up of the Indianeconomy in the early 1990s. Decision makingis centralized, with the head of the familybeing the primary decision maker. With centralization of decision making you maynot see the presence of anarchical individual-ism at the highest levels, although it may still be prevalent at lower levels within theorganization. Bureaucracies are a differentmatter. While bureaucratic agencies almostuniversally never cooperate optimally, thelevel of cooperation between such agencieshas been particularly problematical in India.Saez (1998) points out that bureaucraticinfighting between the central and the stategovernments has slowed down the formula-

tion and/or the implementation of policy.Consider the fact that, even with the initia-tion of economic reform, implementing apower project in India requires the foreigninvestor to obtain 43 clearances at centrallevel and 57 at state level (Business Line, 2001).

Nature of the Opponent

Whether or not an individual is a member of the in-group or the out-group plays animportant role in determining how Indiansrelate to each other (Sinha and Kanungo,1997). Members of the same caste are mem-bers of the in-group, whereas members ofanother caste belong to the out-group.Within a caste group the family constitutesthe basic in-group. One implication of thisdistinction is that anarchical individualism is unlikely to play a major role in shapingdecision outcomes where the interactioninvolves members of the in-group. As Sinhaand Kanungo (1997: 97) note ‘Within aningroup they tend to maintain good relation-ships, cooperate, care for each other, makesacrifices . . . etc.’ In this negotiation settingIndians may also be much more willing tocarefully examine the perspective of theother party instead of relying on their idealsin formulating and implementing their nego-tiating strategy.

Task Complexity

I define task complexity as consisting of (a) apriori integrative potential inherent in thenegotiating situation; (b) the nature of thenegotiation (transactional vs. dispute settle-ment negotiations); and (c) accountabilitypressures confronting negotiators (Kumar,2004, forthcoming). The lower the a prioriintegrative potential of the negotiating situa-tion, the more detrimental will be the impactof an idealistic mode of thinking on negotia-tion processes and outcomes. Transactionalnegotiations involve the fashioning of a newagreement between the parties, whereas dispute resolution negotiations involve theresolution of a pre-existing conflict (Brett,


02_CCM 4_1 2/27/04 12:57 PM Page 52



2000). Dispute resolution negotiations aremore difficult due to the presence of pre-existing emotions. An idealistic mode ofthinking and anarchical individualism arelikely to exacerbate the problems of a swiftresolution in this situation. Negotiators arerewarded or punished by their constituentsand this gives rise to accountability pressures.The more salient these pressures are in agiven situation the more difficult it is going tobe to resolve the problems. The greater thetask complexity of a given negotiating situa-tion the slower will be the process of negotia-tion and the greater the probability that itmay lead to outright failure.

Individual Difference Variables

It is important to bear in mind that not allindividuals in India will tend to think in highly idealistic terms or behave in a rigidway with members of the out-group.Differences in personality, life experiences,generational differences, and so on, may allcontribute to variations in thinking patterns.

Conclusion

I have attempted to sketch out the impact of the Indian world view on the Indianapproach to negotiations. I have argued thatBrahmanical idealism and anarchical indi-vidualism help explain some critical dimen-sions of Indian negotiating behavior. Theportrait of the Indian negotiator that I haveattempted to spell out is a somewhat complexone. On the one hand the Indian negotiatorhas high aspiration levels, which is undoubt-edly essential for attaining good outcomes,but at the same time, this negotiator may findit difficult to interact with an individual froma different agency should such cooperationbe necessary for negotiating with an outsideparty. As has been argued, this combinationoften leads either to a slow pace of negotia-tions or to a failure because a foreign nego-tiator may find it hard to accurately gaugewhether the negotiation process will be a

success or a failure. (The Indian negotiator,in contrast, may not necessarily give up soeasily because he or she may be sensitized tothis pattern of interaction.)

An intriguing question that needs to befully explored is this: given that the Indiannegotiators are often confronted with a dis-crepancy between the desired and the actualoutcome, do they seek to resolve these dis-crepancies, and if so how? Perhaps theIndian tolerance for coping with discrepan-cies is higher than that typically found inwestern societies, and this may explain why arecurrence of this kind of behavior occurs. Atthis point this is pure speculation but surely itwould help us to delve more fully into thepsychology of the Indian negotiator. A related issue is the impact of an idealisticmode of thinking on the intensification of thepsychological biases and the emergence ofemotional dynamics. The linkages that Ihave attempted to draw here may well beworth testing through laboratory experi-ments and field studies.

What implications does this sketch of theIndian negotiation style have for foreigninvestors seeking to negotiate commercialcontracts in India? It is crucially important torecognize that Indians are often looking forthe best possible solution – they are less sensitive to the constraints imposed by timeand outcome orientation (Gopalan andRivera, 1997) and for that reason may be lesswilling to settle for anything other than anideal solution. Negotiating with Indians,therefore, requires an excessive supply ofpatience as they seek to arrive at an optimaloutcome. It is not a process that can neces-sarily be hurried along, and especially sowhen Indian negotiators wish to minimizenegative outcomes. An extensive preoccupa-tion with detail and what many may perceiveto be an overcritical attitude are also reflec-tive of the same idealistic mindset. You cannot directly challenge that mindset;instead, you have to educate them about thevirtues of looking at the problem from an


02_CCM 4_1 2/27/04 12:57 PM Page 53



alternative perspective, and if you are able todo that you are likely to be successful. Butagain this is not something that can neces-sarily happen during the course of a businesstrip.

It is also worth noting that Indians do notwork well as a group at all; indeed, eachIndian thinks that he or she knows best. Asargued earlier, anarchical individualism isone of India’s chief problems. This isundoubtedly a problem for you as well, as itcomplicates your effort in arriving at a nego-tiated settlement. There is not much that youcan do here except to act in ways that lead tothe emergence of an agreement that every-one can live with.

Finally, cross cultural theorists suggestthat relationships are important in negotiat-ing internationally (e.g. Adler, 1997; Cohen,1997; Triandis, 1994). Although relationshipsare undoubtedly important in India, they areless important than in societies like Chinawhere guanxi plays an important role. Thecrucial implication of this is that while initiat-ing and maintaining relationships may be toyour advantage in India, it is by no means suf-ficient. What is crucial is the understanding ofhow Indians think and the implications fornegotiating dynamics. It is such an exercisethat I have attempted in this article. India isnow emerging as a major player in the worldeconomy and to fully capitalize on the oppor-tunities here it is imperative to understand themindset of the Indian negotiator.

Although the focus of this article has beenon exploring the linkage between the Indianworld view and Indian negotiating behavior,it also has broader ramifications. It suggests,first of all, that cross cultural researchersmust pay greater attention to capturing thecomplexities of how managers think acrosscultures. While a focus on behavior is useful,it is insufficient for a number of reasons.First, a focus on behavior alone does not tellus the origins of that behavior. Second, thesame behavior may originate from a numberof different factors and, in the absence of a

good understanding of the origins of behav-ior, it may be difficult to fully comprehendthe essence of a given culture. Third, theimpact of thinking and reasoning processes isoften multifaceted, unconscious, and haslong-lasting consequences (see Nisbett et al.,2001 for an extended review).

It would also be useful to capture thecomplexities of managerial thinking in a variety of different strategic contexts. Thestrategic context utilized here involves nego-tiations, but they could as well involve otherphenomena, ranging from more macro-levelissues such as management of joint ventures/acquisitions or business–government rela-tions, to more micro-level issues such as leadership/motivation. Finally, this articlebrings to the fore the importance of under-standing the mindset of the other party when negotiating across cultural boundaries.Negotiation is essential to successful strategyimplementation, and in a cross cultural con-text this requires that managers possess theability to understand the mindset of the otherparty they are dealing with. This is a pre-requisite for developing strategies that will beeffective in the cross cultural arena.

ReferencesAdair, W.L., Okumura, T. and Brett, J.M. (2001)

‘Negotiation Behavior when Cultures Collide:The United States and Japan’, Journal ofApplied Psychology 86(3): 371–85.

Adler, N.J. (1997) International Dimensions ofOrganizational Behavior, 3rd edn. Cincinnati,OH: South-Western College Publishing.

Adler, N.J., Graham, J.L. and Gehrke, T.S.(1987) ‘Business Negotiations in Canada,Mexico, and the US’, Journal of BusinessResearch 15(5): 411–29.

Almeida, R. (1996) ‘Hindu, Christian, andMuslim Families’, in M. McGoldrick, J.Giordano and J.K. Pearce (eds) Ethnicity andFamily Therapy, 2nd edn, pp. 395–423. NewYork: Guilford.

Barry, B. and Oliver, R.L. (1996) ‘Affect inDyadic Negotiation: A Model andPropositions’, Organizational Behavior and HumanDecision Processes 67(2): 127–43.


02_CCM 4_1 2/27/04 12:57 PM Page 54



Bazerman, M.H. and Carroll, J.S. (1987)‘Negotiator cognition’, in B.M. Staw and L.L.Cummings (eds) Research in OrganizationalBehavior, vol. 9, pp. 247–88. Greenwich, CT:JAI Press.

Bazerman, M.H., Magliozzi, T. and Neale, M.A.(1985) ‘Integrative Bargaining in aCompetitive Market’, Organizational Behaviorand Human Decision Processes 35(3): 294–313.

Bazerman, M.H. and Neale, M.A. (1992)Negotiating Rationally. New York: Free Press.

Brett, J.F., Northcraft, G.B. and Pinkley, R.L.(1999) ‘Stairways to Heaven: An InterlockingSelf Regulation Model of Negotiation’,Academy of Management Review 24(3): 435–51.

Brett, J.M. (2000) ‘Culture and Negotiation’,International Journal of Psychology 35(2): 97–104.

Brett, J.M. and Okumura, T. (1998) ‘Inter andIntra Cultural Negotiations: US and JapaneseNegotiators’, Academy of Management Journal41(5): 495–510.

Brodt, S.E. and Tinsley, C.H. (1998) ‘The Roleof Frames, Schemas, and Scripts inUnderstanding Conflict across Cultures’,unpublished manuscript.

Business Line (2001) ‘German Industry WatchingEnron Issue’, 30 March.

Carnevale, P.J. and Pruitt, D.G. (1992)‘Negotiation and Mediation’, Annual Review ofPsychology 43: 531–82.

Carroll, J.S., Bazerman, M.H. and Maury, R.(1988) ‘Negotiator Cognitions: A DescriptiveApproach to Negotiators Understanding oftheir Opponents’, Organizational Behavior andHuman Decision Processes 41(3): 352–70.

Cohen, R. (1997) Negotiating across Cultures:Communication Obstacles in International Diplomacy. Washington, DC: US Institute ofPeace.

Das, G. (1998) ‘Why Indians Make Poor TeamPlayers’, Times of India 21 July: 11.

Derné, S. (2000) ‘Culture, Family Structure, and“Psyche” in Hindu India: The “Fit” and the“Inconsistencies”’, International Journal of GroupTensions 29(3,4): 323–48.

Dumont, L. (1970) Homo Hierarchicus: An Essay onthe Caste System. Chicago: Chicago UniversityPress.

England, G.W., Dhingra, O.P. and Agarwal,N.C. (1974) The Manager and the Man: A CrossCultural Study of Personal Values. Kent, OH:Kent State University Press.

Filley, A.C. (1975) Interpersonal Conflict Resolution.Glenview, IL: Scott Foresman.

Gelfand, M.J. and Dyer, N. (2000) ‘A CulturalPerspective on Negotiation: Progress, Pitfalls,

and Prospects’, Applied Psychology: AnInternational Review 49(1): 62–99.

George, J.M., Jones, G.R. and Gonzales, J.A.(1998) ‘The Role of Affect in Cross CulturalNegotiations’, Journal of International BusinessStudies 29(4): 749–83.

Global Power Report (2003) ‘India, Once Again,Plans Power Sector Reforms to EncourageNew Projects’, 13 March: 7–8.

Gopalan, S. and Rivera, J.B. (1997) ‘Gaining aPerspective on Indian Value Orientations:Implications for Expatriate Managers’,International Journal of Organizational Research5(2): 156–79.

Gupta, R.K. (2002) ‘Prospects of EffectiveTeamwork in India: Some CautionaryConjectures from a Cross CulturalPerspective’, Indian Journal of Industrial Relations38(2): 211–29.

Harvard Business School (1997) ‘Enron (A), (B), and(C)’, Cambridge, MA.

Higgins, E.T. (1987) ‘Self Discrepancy: A TheoryRelating Self and Affect’, Psychological Review94(3): 319–40.

Higgins, E.T. (1998) ‘Promotion and Prevention:Regulatory Focus as a MotivationalPrinciple’, in M.P. Zanna (ed.) Advances inExperimental Social Psychology, vol. 30, pp.1–46.New York: Academic Press.

Hofstede, G. (1980) Culture’s Consequences:International Differences in Work Related Values.Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.

Husain, A.S. (1961) The National Culture of India.Bombay: Asia Publishing.

Irvine, S. (1998) ‘Seen from India’s IvoryTower’, Euromoney 356: 38–46.

Jain, N.C. and Kussman, E.D. (1994) ‘DominantCultural Patterns of Hindus in India’, in L.A.Samovar and R. Porter (eds) InterculturalCommunication: A Reader, pp. 95–104. Belmont,CA: Wadsworth.

Kakar, S. (1981) The Innerworld: A PsychoanalyticStudy of Childhood and Society in India. Delhi:Oxford University Press.

Kazmin, A.L. (1998) ‘Dangerous Skies overDelhi: It’s Air Safety vs. Bureaucracy. GuessWho’s Winning?’, Business Week 3608, 14December: 31.

Knee, R. (1998) ‘Shipping to India’, World Trade11(11): 54–7.

Kopelman, S. and Olekalns, M. (1999) ‘Processin Cross Cultural Negotiations’, NegotiationJournal 15(4): 373–80.

Kumar, R. (1997) ‘The Role of Affect in Negoti-ations: An Integrative Overview’, Journal ofApplied Behavioral Science 33(1): 84–100.


02_CCM 4_1 2/27/04 12:57 PM Page 55



Kumar, R. (1999a) ‘A Script TheoreticalAnalysis of International NegotiatingBehavior’, in R.J. Bies, R.J. Lewicki and B.H.Sheppard (eds) Research on Negotiation inOrganizations, vol. 7, pp. 285–311.Connecticut: JAI Press.

Kumar, R. (1999b) ‘Confucian Pragmatism vsBrahmanical Idealism: Understanding theDivergent Roots of Indian and ChineseEconomic Performance’, Journal of AsianBusiness 16(2): 49–69.

Kumar, R. (2004) ‘Culture and Emotions inIntercultural Negotiations: An Overview’, inM. Gelfand and J. Brett (eds) Culture andNegotiation, Stanford, CA: Stanford UniversityPress, forthcoming.

Lannoy, R. (1971) The Speaking Tree: A Study ofIndian Society and Culture. London: OxfordUniversity Press.

Lazarus, R.S. (1991) Emotion and Adaptation. NewYork: Oxford University Press.

Leung, K. and Tjosvold, D. (1998) ConflictManagement in The Asia Pacific: Assumptions andApproaches in Diverse Cultures. Singapore: JohnWiley.

Lewicki, R.J., Litterer, J.A., Minton, J.W. andSaunders, D.M. (1994) Negotiation. Boston:Irwin.

Lillard, A. (1998) ‘Ethnopsychologies: CulturalVariations in Theories of Mind’, PsychologicalBulletin 123(1): 3–32.

Moddie, A.D. (1968) The Brahmanical Culture andModernity. Bombay: Asia Publishing House.

Nakamura, H. (1964) Ways of Thinking of EasternPeoples: India, China, Tibet, Japan. Honolulu:East West Center Press.

Nandy, A. (1980) At the Edge of Psychology. NewDelhi: Oxford University Press.

Neale, M.A. (1984) ‘The Effect of Negotiationand Arbitration Cost Salience on BargainerBehavior: The Role of Arbitrator andConstituency in Negotiator Judgment’,Organizational Behavior and Human Performance34(1): 97–111.

Neale, M.A. and Northcraft, G.B. (1991)‘Behavioral Negotiation Theory: AFramework for Conceptualizing DyadicBargaining’, Research in Organizational Behavior13: 147–90.

Nisbett, R.E., Choi, I., Peng, K. andNorenzayan, A. (2001) ‘Culture and Systemsof Thought: Holistic vs Analytic Cognition’,Psychological Review 108(2): 291–310.

Oatley, K. and Johnson-Laird, P.N. (1996) ‘TheCommunicative Theory of Emotions’, in L.L.Martin and A. Tesser (eds) Striving and Feeling:

Interactions among Goals, Affect and Self Regulation,pp. 363–93. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence ErlbaumPress.

Pruitt, D.G. (1981) Negotiation Behavior. New York:Academic Press.

Pruitt, D.G. and Lewis, S.A. (1975)‘Development of Integrative Solutions inBilateral Negotiations’, Journal of Personality andSocial Psychology 31(4): 621–33.

Pye, L.W with Pye, M.W. (1985) Asian Power andPolitics: The Cultural Dimensions of Authority.Cambridge: Belknap.

Redding, G. (1993) ‘Comparative ManagementTheory: Jungle, Zoo, or Fossil Bed?’,Organization Studies 15(3): 323–59.

Roland, A. (1988) In Search of Self in India andJapan: Towards a Cross-cultural Psychology.Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Roland, A. (1990) ‘The Psychological and thePsychosocial in Indian OrganizationalRelationships’, unpublished manuscript.

Ross, L. (1977) ‘The Intuitive Psychologist andHis Shortcomings: Distortions in theAttribution Processes’, in L. Berkowitz (ed.)Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, vol. 10,pp. 173–220. New York: Academic Press.

Ross, L. and Stillinger, C. (1991) ‘Barriers toConflict Resolution’, Negotiation Journal 8(4):389–404.

Ross, L. and Ward, A. (1995) ‘PsychologicalBarriers to Dispute Resolution’, in M.P.Zanna (ed.) Advances in Experimental SocialPsychology, vol. 27, pp. 255–304. San Diego,CA: Academic Press.

Rubin, J.Z., Pruitt, D.G. and Kim, S.H. (1994)Social Conflict: Escalation, Stalemate, and Settlement.New York: McGraw-Hill.

Rufin, C., Rangan, U.S. and Kumar, R. (2003)‘The Changing Role of the State in theElectricity Industry in India, China, andBrazil: Differences and Explanations’,American Journal of Economics and Sociology, 62(4):649–75.

Saez, L. (1998) ‘A Comparison of India andChina’s Foreign Investment Strategy towardEnergy Infrastructure’, Journal of DevelopingAreas 32(2): 199–220.

Saha, A. (1992) ‘Basic Human Nature in IndianTradition and its Economic Consequences’,International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy12(1, 2): 1–50.

Saha, A. (1993) ‘The Caste System in India andits Consequences’, International Journal ofSociology and Social Policy 13(3, 4): 1–75.

Schwartz, S.H. (1994) ‘BeyondIndividualism/Collectivism: New Cultural


02_CCM 4_1 2/27/04 12:57 PM Page 56



Dimensions of Values’, in U. Kim, H.C.Triandis, C. Kagitcibasi, S.C. Choi and G.Yoon (eds) Individualism and Collectivism: Theory,Method, and Applications, pp. 85–122. ThousandOaks, CA: Sage.

Sinha, J.B.P. (2000) ‘Towards IntegrativePsychology in India. Invited Address at the3rd Conference of Asian Association of SocialPsychology, Taipei, Taiwan.

Sinha, J.B.P. (2002) ‘A Cultural Frame forUnderstanding Organisational Behavior’,Psychology and Developing Societies 14: 155–66.

Sinha, J.B.P. and Kanungo, R.N. (1997)‘Context Sensitivity and Balancing in IndianOrganizational Behavior’, International Journalof Psychology 32(2): 93–105.

Smith, H. (1991) The World’s Religions: Our GreatWisdom Traditions. New York: HarperCollins.

Staw, B.M. (1981) ‘Escalation of Commitment toa Course of Action’, Academy of ManagementReview 6(4): 577–87.

Thompson, L. (1998) The Mind and Heart of theNegotiator. Upper Saddle River, NJ: PrenticeHall.

Treadgold, T. (1998) ‘India: The Good, the Bad,

and the Ugly’, Corporate Location(November–December): 42–7.

Triandis, H.C. (1994) Culture and Social Behavior.New York: McGraw-Hill.

Vertzberger, Y. (1984) ‘Bureaucratic-organizational Politics and InformationProcessing in a Developing State’, InternationalStudies Quarterly 28(1): 69–95.

Weiss, S.E. (1993) ‘Analysis of ComplexNegotiations in International Business: TheRBC Perspective’, Organization Science 4(2):269–300.

Weldon, E. and Jehn, K.A. (1996) ‘ConflictManagement in US–Chinese Joint Ventures’,in J. Child and Y. Lu (eds) Management Issues inChina, vol. II, pp. 89–105. New York:Routledge.

RAJESH KUMAR is Associate Professor ofInternational Business in the Aarhus School ofBusiness, Fuglesangs Alle 4, DK-8210 Aarhus V,Denmark.[email: [email protected]]


Résumé

L’idéalisme brahmane, l’individualisme anarchique et les dynamiques ducomportement de négociation indien. (Rajesh Kumar)Cet article analyse les implications de l’état d’esprit indien sur la dynamique du comporte-ment de négociation indien. Les concepts d’idéalisme brahmane et d’individualisme anar-chique sont utilisés pour capturer la nature de l’état d’esprit indien. L’idéalisme fait référenceà la tendance des décideurs de chercher à atteindre la solution la plus parfaite. Tout écartentre les réalités du monde extérieur et la logique du monde intérieur tel qu’il se manifestedans la recherche de la solution idéale ne sont pas problématiques puisque seul le mondeintérieur définit la vraie réalité. Si l’idéalisme brahmane se concentre sur la pureté du mondemental, l’anarchisme individualiste met l’accent sur la préférence pour atteindre des solutionsidéales à travers des formes absolutistes de comportement interpersonnel. Autrement dit,puisque chaque individu est impliqué dans la recherche d’une solution idéale, et que de surcroît, chaque solution idéale individuelle n’est ni meilleure, ni moins bonne que celle deleur contrepartie, atteindre cet idéal est problématique puisque dans ces conditions, le com-portement de coopération est rare. En ce sens, l’individualisme anarchique fragmente plutôtqu’il ne favorise l’effort d’ensemble, ce qui provoque une dispersion de l’énergie du système.L’impact de cet état d’esprit sur le comportement de négociation indien est analysé et lesimplications de ce cadre théorique sont soulignées pour le développement des théories et pratiques de management interculturel. Les implications managériales sont identifiées pour lanégociation avec des Indien.

02_CCM 4_1 2/27/04 12:57 PM Page 57




Rajesh Kumar

02_CCM 4_1 2/27/04 12:57 PM Page 58



international journal of cross cultural management -...

Documents