Kuroda vs. Jalandoni, 83 Phil. 179 (1949)

Link: http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1949/mar1949/gr_l-2662_1949.html

Digest:

FACTS: Shigenori Kuroda was the highest ranking Japanese officer stationed in the Philippines during the Japanese occupation. He was then charged before the Military Commission, headed by Major General Rafael Jalandoni, due to the atrocities that were done against non combatant civilians and prisoners during the war. His trial was in pursuant to Executive Order No. 68 which established the National War Crimes Office and prescribing rules and regulations governing the trial of accused war criminals. Kuroda is questioning the legality of the said EO arguing that the same is not provided for in the Constitution. He further underscores the fact that the Philippines is not a signatory of the Hague Convention on the Rules and Regulations Covering Land Warfare hence we cannot impose against him any criminal charges because it has no laws to base on, national or international.

ISSUE: Whether or not Kuroda can be charged in Philippine courts?

HELD: Yes. EO No. 68 is constitutional hence the Philippine courts can take cognizance of the case at bar. EO No 68 is in pursuant to the constitutional provision that states “the Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, and adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the nation.” The Hague Convention and other similar conventions whose principles are generally accepted are hence considered as part of the law of the land.

Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh, 75 Phil. 113 (1945)

Link: http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1945/sep1945/gr_l-5_1945.html

Digest:

FACTS: Co Kim Chan had a pending civil case, initiated during the Japanese occupation, with the Court of First Instance of Manila. After the Liberation of the Manila and the American occupation, Judge Arsenio Dizon refused to continue hearings on the case, saying that a proclamation issued by General Douglas MacArthur had invalidated and nullified all judicial proceedings and judgments of the courts of the Philippines and, without an enabling law, lower courts have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of and continue judicial proceedings pending in the courts of the defunct Republic of the Philippines (the Philippine government under the Japanese).

ISSUES:1. Whether or not judicial proceedings and decisions made during the Japanese occupation were valid and remained valid even after the American occupation;2. Whether or not the October 23, 1944 proclamation MacArthur issued in which he declared that “all laws, regulations and processes of any other government in the Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control” invalidated all judgments and judicial acts and proceedings of the courts;3. And whether or not if they were not invalidated by MacArthur’s proclamation, those courts could continue hearing the cases pending before them.

HELD: Political and international law recognizes that all acts and proceedings of a de facto government are good and valid. The Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines under the Japanese occupation may be considered de facto governments, supported by the military force and deriving their authority from the laws of war.Municipal laws and private laws, however, usually remain in force unless suspended or changed by the conqueror. Civil obedience is expected even during war, for “the existence of a state of insurrection and war did not loosen the bonds of society, or do away with civil government or the regular administration of the laws. And if they were not valid, then it would not have been necessary for MacArthur to come out with a proclamation abrogating them.The second question, the court said, hinges on the interpretation of the phrase “processes of any other government” and whether or not he intended it to annul all other judgments and judicial proceedings of courts during the Japanese military occupation.IF, according to international law, non-political judgments and judicial proceedings of de facto governments are valid and remain valid even after the occupied territory has been liberated, then it could not have been MacArthur’s intention to refer to judicial processes, which would be in violation of international law.A well-known rule of statutory construction is: “A statute ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains.”

Another is that “where great inconvenience will result from a particular construction, or great mischief done, such construction is to be avoided, or the court ought to presume that such construction was not intended by the makers of the law, unless required by clear and unequivocal words.”

Annulling judgments of courts made during the Japanese occupation would clog the dockets and violate international law, therefore what MacArthur said should not be construed to mean that judicial proceedings are included in the phrase “processes of any other governments.”

In the case of US vs Reiter, the court said that if such laws and institutions are continued in use by the occupant, they become his and derive their force from him. The laws and courts of the Philippines did not become, by being continued as required by the law of nations, laws and courts of Japan.

It is a legal maxim that, excepting of a political nature, “law once established continues until changed by some competent legislative power. IT IS NOT CHANGED MERELY BY CHANGE OF SOVEREIGNTY.” Until, of course, the new sovereign by legislative act creates a change.

Therefore, even assuming that Japan legally acquired sovereignty over the Philippines, and the laws and courts of the Philippines had become courts of Japan, as the said courts and laws creating and conferring jurisdiction upon them have continued in force until now, it follows that the same courts may continue exercising the same jurisdiction over cases pending therein before the restoration of the Commonwealth Government, until abolished or the laws creating and conferring jurisdiction upon them are repealed by the said government.

Mejoff vs. Director of Prisons, 90 Phil. 70 (1949)

Link: http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1949/jul1949/gr_l-2855_1949.html

Digest:

FACTS: Boris Mejoff was a Russian citizen who was arrested for being suspected as a Japanese spy after the Philippine liberation. It was found out that he illegally entered the Philippines in 1944. He was without inspection and admission by the immigration officials at a designated port of entry. He was then ordered to be deported to Russia on the first available transportation to said country. But Russian ships refused to take him due to their alleged lack of authority to do so. He was then transferred to the Bilibid Prison and was kept in detention as the Commissioner of Immigration believes it is of best interest to detain the unwanted alien while arrangements for his deportation are being made. Mejoff contends that he was legally brought to the Philippines by the then Japanese forces and he may not now be deported. He also contends that the statutory period to deport him has long lapsed and that we cannot detain him for an unreasonable period of time pursuant to the Universal Declaration on Human rights.

ISSUE: Whether or not Mejoff shall remain in detention?

HELD: Yes. The government has the power and the authority to eject from the Philippines any and all unwanted aliens. He entered the country illegally in 1944 and was arrested in 1948. Pursuant to Section 37 of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 an unwanted alien is subject to deportation within 5 years from arrest. And he may be held for a reasonable period of time (depending on the circumstances) while arrangements are being held for his deportation. There is no allegation however as to the length of time that he has been detained. Hence, the same cannot be construed as “unreasonable”. Further, there is no indication that the statutory period to deport Mejoff had lapsed.

Baer vs. Tizon 57 SCRA 1 (May 1974)

Link: http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1974/may1974/gr_l_24294_1974.html

Digest:

FACTS: Respondent Edgardo Gener, as plaintiff, filed a complaint for injunction with the Court of First Instance of Bataan against petitioner, Donald Baer, Commander of the United States Naval Base in Olongapo. He alleged that he was engaged in the business of logging and that the American Naval Base authorities stopped his logging operations. He prayed for a writ of preliminary injunction restraining petitioner from interfering with his logging operations. A restraining order was issued by respondent Judge Counsel for petitioner, upon instructions of the American Ambassador to the Philippines, entered their appearance for the purpose of contesting the jurisdiction of respondent Judge on the ground that the suit was one against a foreign sovereign without its consent.

ISSUE: Whether the contention of the petitioner that the respondent judge acquires no jurisdiction on the ground that the suit was one against a foreign sovereign without its consent.

HELD: YES. The contention of the petitioner is tenable. The writ of certiorari prayed for is granted, nullifying and setting aside the writ of preliminary injunction. The invocation of the doctrine of immunity from suit of a foreign state withoutits consent is appropriate. In the case of Coleman v.Tennessee, it was explicitly declared:

“It is well settled that a foreignarmy, permitted to marchthrough a friendly country or tobe stationed in it, by permission of its government or sovereign, is exempt fromthe civil and criminaljurisdiction of the place."

In the case of Raquiza v. Bradford, it was held that:

”Accuracy demands the clarification that after the conclusion of the Philippine-American Military Bases Agreement, the treaty provisions should control on such matter, the assumption being that there was a manifestation of the submission to jurisdiction on the part of the foreign power whenever appropriate.This is not only a case of a citizen filing a suit against his own Government without the latter's consent but it is of a citizen filing an action against a foreign government without said government's consent, which renders more obvious the lack of jurisdiction of the courts of his country.

In the case of Parreno v. McGranery, the court ruled that:

"It is a widely accepted principle of international law,which is made a part of the lawof the land (Article II, Section 3of the Constitution), that aforeign state may not bebrought to suit before thecourts of another state or itsown courts without its consent."

The doctrine of state immunity is notlimited to cases which would result in apecuniary charge against the sovereign orwould require the doing of an affirmative actby it. Prevention of a sovereign from doing anaffirmative act pertaining directly andimmediately to the most important publicfunction of any government - the defense of the state - is equally as untenable as requiringit to do an affirmative act."

Yamashita vs. Styer 75 Phil 563

Link: http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1945/dec1945/gr_l-129_1945.html

Digest:

FACTS:1. Yamashita was the Commanding General of the Japanese army in the Philippines during World War 2. He was charged before the American military commission for war crimes.

2. He filed a petition for habeas corpus and prohibition against Gen. Styer to reinstate his status as prisoner of war from being accused as a war criminal. Petitioner also questioned the jurisdiction of the military tribunal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the military tribunal has jurisdiction

HELD: YES.

1. The military commission was lawfully created in conformity with an act of Congress sanctioning the creation of such tribunals.

2. The laws of war imposes upon a commander the duty to take any appropriate measures within his powers to control the troops under his command to prevent acts which constitute violation of the laws of war. Hence, petitioner could be legitimately charged with personal responsibility arising from his failure to take such measure. In this regard the SC invoked Art. 1 of the Hague Convention No. IV of 1907, as well as Art. 19 of Hague Convention No. X, Art. 26 of 1929 Geneva Convention among others.

3. Habeas corpus is untenable since the petitioner merely sought for restoration to his former status as prisoner of war and not a discharge from confinement. This is a matter of military measure and not within the jurisdiction of the courts.

4. The petition for prohibition against the respondent will also not life since the military commission is not made a party respondent in the case. As such, no order may be issued requiring it to refrain from trying the petitioner.

Kookooritchkin vs. Solicitor General, 81 Phil 435

Link: http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1948/aug1948/gr_l-1812_1948.html

Digest:

FACTS: Appellee filed with the lower court a petition for naturalization, accompanied with supporting affidavits of two citizens. The petition was finally set for hearing but it was held on that date because the province was invaded by Japanese forces and the case remained pending until the records were destroyed during the military operations for liberation. The case was declared reconstituted and the evidence was presented. On the same day resolution was issued granting the petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is a Russian citizen or is stateless.

HELD: The appealed resolution is affirmed. After finding in this country economic security in a remunerative job, establishing a family by marrying a Filipina with whom he has a son, and enjoying for 25 years the freedoms and blessings of our democratic way of life, and after showing his resolution to retain the happiness he found in our political system to the extent of refusing to claim Russian citizenship even to secure his release from the Japanese and of casting his lot with that of our people by joining the fortunes and misfortunes of our guerrillas, it would be beyond comprehension to support that the petitioner could feel any bond of attachment to the Soviet dictatorship.

Agustin vs. Edu, 88 SCRA 195 (1979)

Link: http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1979/feb1979/gr_l_49112_1979.html

Digest:

FACTS: Agustin is the owner of a Volkswagen Beetle Car. He is assailing the validity of Letter of Instruction No 229 which requires all motor vehicles to have early warning devices particularly to equip them with a pair of “reflectorized triangular early warning devices”. Agustin is arguing that this order is unconstitutional, harsh, cruel and unconscionable to the motoring public. Cars are already equipped with blinking lights which is already enough to provide warning to other motorists. And that the mandate to compel motorists to buy a set of reflectorized early warning devices is redundant and would only make manufacturers and dealers instant millionaires.

ISSUE: Whether or not the said is EO is valid.

HELD: Such early warning device requirement is not an expensive redundancy, nor oppressive, for car owners whose cars are already equipped with 1) ‘blinking-lights in the fore and aft of said motor vehicles,’ 2) ‘battery-powered blinking lights inside motor vehicles,’ 3) ‘built-in reflectorized tapes on front and rear bumpers of motor vehicles,’ or 4) ‘well-lighted two (2) petroleum lamps (the Kinke) . . . because: Being universal among the signatory countries to the said 1968 Vienna Conventions, and visible even under adverse conditions at a distance of at least 400 meters, any motorist from this country or from any part of the world, who sees a reflectorized rectangular early warning device installed on the roads, highways or expressways, will conclude, without thinking, that somewhere along the travelled portion of that road, highway, or expressway, there is a motor vehicle which is stationary, stalled or disabled which obstructs or endangers passing traffic. On the other hand, a motorist who sees any of the aforementioned other built-in warning devices or the petroleum lamps will not immediately get adequate advance warning because he will still think what that blinking light is all about. Is it an emergency vehicle? Is it a law enforcement car? Is it an ambulance? Such confusion or uncertainty in the mind of the motorist will thus increase, rather than decrease, the danger of collision.

On Police Power

The Letter of Instruction in question was issued in the exercise of the police power. That is conceded by petitioner and is the main reliance of respondents. It is the submission of the former, however, that while embraced in such a category, it has offended against the due process and equal protection safeguards of the Constitution, although the latter point was mentioned only in passing. The broad and expansive scope of the police power which was originally identified by Chief Justice Taney of the American Supreme Court in an 1847 decision, as “nothing more or less than the powers of government inherent in every sovereignty” was stressed in the aforementioned case of Edu v. Ericta thus: “Justice Laurel, in the first leading decision after the Constitution came into force, Calalang v. Williams, identified police power with state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare. Persons and property could thus ‘be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the general comfort, health and prosperity of the

state. Shortly after independence in 1948, Primicias v. Fugoso reiterated the doctrine, such a competence being referred to as ‘the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and general welfare of the people.’ The concept was set forth in negative terms by Justice Malcolm in a pre-Commonwealth decision as ‘that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society.’ In that sense it could be hardly distinguishable as noted by this Court in Morfe v. Mutuc with the totality of legislative power. It is in the above sense the greatest and most powerful attribute of government. It is, to quote Justice Malcolm anew, ‘the most essential, insistent, and at least illimitable powers,’ extending as Justice Holmes aptly pointed out ‘to all the great public needs.’ Its scope, ever expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future where it could be done, provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits. In the language of Justice Cardozo: ‘Needs that were narrow or parochial in the past may be interwoven in the present with the well-being of the nation. What is critical or urgent changes with the time.’ The police power is thus a dynamic agency, suitably vague and far from precisely defined, rooted in the conception that men in organizing the state and imposing upon its government limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable an individual citizen or a group of citizens to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such salutary measures calculated to insure communal peace, safety, good order, and welfare.”

It was thus a heavy burden to be shouldered by Agustin, compounded by the fact that the particular police power measure challenged was clearly intended to promote public safety. It would be a rare occurrence indeed for this Court to invalidate a legislative or executive act of that character. None has been called to our attention, an indication of its being non-existent. The latest decision in point, Edu v. Ericta, sustained the validity of the Reflector Law, an enactment conceived with the same end in view. Calalang v. Williams found nothing objectionable in a statute, the purpose of which was: “To promote safe transit upon, and avoid obstruction on roads and streets designated as national roads . . .”As a matter of fact, the first law sought to be nullified after the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, the National Defense Act, with petitioner failing in his quest, was likewise prompted by the imperative demands of public safety.

Abbas vs. COMELEC 179 SCRA 287 (1989)

Link: http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1989/nov1989/gr_89651_1989.html

Digest:

FACTS: On October9,1987, the Abbas et al filed before the SET an election contest docketed against 22 candidates of the LABAN coalition who were proclaimed senators-elect in the May 11, 1987 congressional elections by the COMELEC. The SET was at the time composed of three (3) Justices of the Supreme Court and six (6) Senators. Abbas later on filed for the disqualification of the 6 senator members from partaking in the said election protest on the ground that all of them are interested parties to said case. Abbas argue that considerations of public policy and the norms of fair play and due process imperatively require the mass disqualification sought. To accommodate the proposed disqualification, Abbas suggested the following amendment: Tribunal’s Rules (Section 24) requiring the concurrence of five (5) members for the adoption of resolutions of whatever nature is a proviso that where more than four (4) members are disqualified, the remaining members shall constitute a quorum, if not less than three (3) including one (1) Justice, and may adopt resolutions by majority vote with no abstentions. Obviously tailored to fit the situation created by the petition for disqualification, this would, in the context of that situation, leave the resolution of the contest to the only three members who would remain, all Justices of this Court, whose disqualification is not sought.

ISSUE: Whether or not Abbas’ proposal could be given due weight.

HELD: The most fundamental objection to such proposal lies in the plain terms and intent of the Constitution itself which, in its Article VI, Section 17, creates the Senate Electoral Tribunal, ordains its composition and defines its jurisdiction and powers.

“Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.”

It is quite clear that in providing for a SET to be staffed by both Justices of the SC and Members of the Senate, the Constitution intended that both those “judicial” and “legislative” components commonly share the duty and authority of deciding all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of Senators. The legislative component herein cannot be totally excluded from participation in the resolution of senatorial election contests, without doing violence to the spirit and intent of the Constitution. It is not to be misunderstood in saying that no Senator-Member of the SET may inhibit or disqualify himself from sitting in judgment on any case before said Tribunal. Every Member of the Tribunal may, as his conscience dictates, refrain from participating in the resolution of a case where he

sincerely feels that his personal interests or biases would stand in the way of an objective and impartial judgment. What SC is saying is that in the light of the Constitution, the SET cannot legally function as such; absent its entire membership of Senators and that no amendment of its Rules can confer on the three Justices-Members alone the power of valid adjudication of a senatorial election contest. The charge that the respondent Tribunal gravely abused its discretion in its disposition of the incidents referred to must therefore fail. In the circumstances, it acted well within law and principle in dismissing the petition for disqualification or inhibition filed by herein petitioners. The instant petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Phillip Morris vs. Court of Appeals, 224 SCRA 576 (1993)

Link: http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1993/jul1993/gr_91332_1993.html

Digest:

FACTS: Herein petitioner Philip Morris Inc., is a corporation registered under the laws of Virginia, USA and the two other petitioners are the affiliates of said corporation all of which are not doing any business here in the Philippines. They are the registered owners of the labels Mark VII, Mark Ten and Lark, all are cigarette products. On the other hand, respondent Fortune Tobacco Corp., is a corporation organized under the Philippine which manufactures and sells cigarettes using the same brand name “Mark” in one of its products. This controversy arose when petitioners filed a suit against the respondent alleging that the trademark “Mark” may not be used by the respondent because such trademark is exclusively owned by it and that the continuous manufacture and sale of the cigarettes of the same trademark by the respondent would cause an irreparable injury or damage to it. Pending the resolution of the case on its merits, petitioners prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to preclude the respondent from performing any of the acts complained of. On the other hand, for its defense, respondent contends that since petitioners are not doing business in the Philippines coupled with the fact that the Director of Patents has not denied their pending application for registration of its trademark “MARK”, the grant of preliminary injunction is premature. The trial court denied the petitioner’s prayer for injunction. On appeal, the appellate court initially set aside the decision of the lower, but eventually lifted said injunction. Hence, this present petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not Fortune Tobacco could be precluded from manufacturing and selling cigarettes with a trademark “MARK” similar to that of petitioner.

HELD: No. A fundamental principle of Philippine Trademark Law is that actual use in commerce in the Philippines is a prerequisite to the acquisition of ownership over a trademark or a trade name. Adoption alone of a trademark would not give exclusive right thereto. Such right grows out of their actual use. Adoption is not use. One may make advertisements, issue circulars, give out price lists on certain goods; but these alone would not give exclusive right of use. The records show that the petitioner has never conducted any business in the Philippines. It has never promoted its trade name or trademark in the Philippines. It is unknown to Filipino except the very few who may have noticed it while travelling abroad. It has never paid a single centavo of tax to the Philippine Government. Under the law, it has no right to the remedy it seeks. In other words, the petitioner may have the capacity to sue for infringement irrespective of lack of business activity in the Philippines but the question whether they have an exclusive right over their symbol as to justify issuance of the controversial writ will depend on the actual use of their trademarks in the Philippines. A foreign corporation may have the personality to file a suit for infringement but it may not necessarily be entitled to protection due to absence of actual use of the emblem in the local market.

Secretary of Justice vs. Lantion 322 SCRA 160 (2000)

Link: http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/jan2000/gr_139465_2000.html

Digest:

FACTS: On January 18, 2000, petitioner was ordered to furnish private respondent copies of the extradition request and its supporting papers and to grant the latter reasonable period within which to file his comment with supporting evidence.

Private respondent states that he must be afforded the right to notice and hearing as required by our Constitution. He likens an extradition proceeding to a criminal proceeding and the evaluation stage to a preliminary investigation.

Petitioner filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration assailing the mentioned decision.

ISSUE: Whether or not the private respondent is entitled to the due process right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process

HELD: No. Private respondent is bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process.

An extradition proceeding is sui generis. It is not a criminal proceeding which will call into operation all the rights of an accused as guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. The process of extradition does not involve the determination of the guilt or innocence of an accused. His guilt or innocence will be adjudged in the court of the state where he will be extradited. Hence, as a rule, constitutional rights that are only relevant to determine the guilt or innocence of an accused cannot be invoked by an extraditee especially by one whose extradition papers are still undergoing evaluation. As held by the US Supreme Court in United States v. Galanis:

“An extradition proceeding is not a criminal prosecution, and the constitutional safeguards that accompany a criminal trial in this country do not shield an accused from extradition pursuant to a valid treaty.”

As an extradition proceeding is not criminal in character and the evaluation stage in an extradition proceeding is not akin to a preliminary investigation, the due process safeguards in the latter do not necessarily apply to the former.

The procedural due process required by a given set of circumstances “must begin with a determination of the precise nature of the government function involved as well as the private interest that has been affected by governmental action.” The concept of due process is flexible for “not all situations calling for procedural safeguards call for the same kind of procedure.”

In tilting the balance in favor of the interests of the State, the Court stresses that it is not ruling that the private respondent has no right to due process at all throughout the length and breadth of the extrajudicial proceedings. Procedural due process requires a determination of what process is due, when it is due, and the degree of what is due. Stated otherwise, a prior determination should be made as to whether procedural protections are at all due and when they are due, which in turn depends on the extent to which an individual will be “condemned to suffer grievous loss.”

As aforesaid, P.D. No. 1069 which implements the RP-US Extradition Treaty affords an extraditee sufficient opportunity to meet the evidence against him once the petition is filed in court. The time for the extraditee to know the basis of the request for his extradition is merely moved to the filing in court of the formal petition for extradition. The extraditee’s right to know is momentarily withheld during the evaluation stage of the extradition process to accommodate the more compelling interest of the State to prevent escape of potential extraditees which can be precipitated by premature information of the basis of the request for his extradition. No less compelling at that stage of the extradition proceedings is the need to be more deferential to the judgment of a co-equal branch of the government, the Executive, which has been endowed by our Constitution with greater power over matters involving our foreign relations. Needless to state, this balance of interests is not a static but a moving balance which can be adjusted as the extradition process moves from the administrative stage to the judicial stage and to the execution stage depending on factors that will come into play. In sum, we rule that the temporary hold on private respondent’s privilege of notice and hearing is a soft restraint on his right to due process which will not deprive him of fundamental fairness should he decide to resist the request for his extradition to the United States. There is no denial of due process as long as fundamental fairness is assured a party.

Mighty Corporation vs. Gallo Winery, 243 SCRA 473 (2004)

Link: http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2004/jul2004/gr_154342_2004.html

Digest:

FACTS: On March 12, 1993, respondents sued petitioners in the RTC-Makati for trademark and trade name infringement and unfair competition, with a prayer for damages and preliminary injunction.

They claimed that petitioners adopted the Gallo trademark to ride on Gallo Winery’s and Gallo and Ernest & Julio Gallo trademark’s established reputation and popularity, thus causing confusion, deception and mistake on the part of the purchasing public who had always associated Gallo and Ernest and Julio & Gallo trademarks with Gallo Winery’s wines.

In their answer, petitioners alleged, among other affirmative defenses that: petitioners Gallo cigarettes and Gallo Winery’s wine were totally unrelated products. To wit:

1. Gallo Winery’s GALLO trademark registration certificates covered wines only, and not cigarettes;2. GALLO cigarettes and GALLO wines were sold through different channels of trade;3. the target market of Gallo Winery’s wines was the middle or high-income bracket while Gallo cigarette buyers were farmers, fishermen, laborers and other low-income workers;4. the dominant feature of the Gallo cigarette was the rooster device with the manufacturer’s name clearly indicated as MIGHTY CORPORATION, while in the case of Gallo Winery’s wines, it was the full names of the founders-owners ERNEST & JULIO GALLO or just their surname GALLO;

On April 21, 1993, the Makati RTC denied, for lack of merit, respondent’s prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.

On August 19, 1993, respondent’s motion for reconsideration was denied.

On February 20, 1995, the CA likewise dismissed respondent’s petition for review on certiorari.

After the trial on the merits, however, the Makati RTC, on November 26, 1998, held petitioners liable for, permanently enjoined from committing trademark infringement and unfair competition with respect to the GALLO trademark.

On appeal, the CA affirmed the Makati RTC’s decision and subsequently denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE:

Whether GALLO cigarettes and GALLO wines were identical, similar or related goods for the reason alone that they were purportedly forms of vice.

HELD: Wines and cigarettes are not identical, similar, competing or related goods.

In resolving whether goods are related, several factors come into play:

- the business (and its location) to which the goods belong- the class of product to which the good belong- the product’s quality, quantity, or size, including the nature of the package, wrapper or

container- the nature and cost of the articles- the descriptive properties, physical attributes or essential characteristics with reference to their

form, composition, texture or quality- the purpose of the goods- whether the article is bought for immediate consumption, that is, day-to-day household items- the field of manufacture- the conditions under which the article is usually purchased and- the articles of the trade through which the goods flow, how they are distributed, marketed,

displayed and sold.

The test of fraudulent simulation is to the likelihood of the deception of some persons in some measure acquainted with an established design and desirous of purchasing the commodity with which that design has been associated. The simulation, in order to be objectionable, must be as appears likely to mislead the ordinary intelligent buyer who has a need to supply and is familiar with the article that he seeks to purchase.

The petitioners are not liable for trademark infringement, unfair competition or damages.