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International Nuclear Safeguards

INMM Tutorial

George BaldwinSAND 2006-4071P

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International nuclear safeguards play an essential role to help ensure that nuclear materials are not used to make weapons.

DeliverySystems

Arming, Firing& Fuzing Systems

Testing

NuclearMaterial

HighExplosiveTechnical

Know-How

Note: Here “safeguards” are not the same as nuclear safety.

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The technical objective of International Nuclear Safeguards is:

“…the timely detection of diversion of significant quantitiesof nuclear material

from peaceful nuclear activities

to the manufacture of nuclear weaponsor of other nuclear explosive devicesor for purposes unknown,

and deterrence of such diversion by risk of early detection.”

IAEA Information Circular (INFCIRC)153paragraph 28

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International Nuclear Safeguards have been enormously successful for non-proliferation: How do they work?

Outline of this tutorial: What are “nuclear” and “fissile” materials?What are the technical tools that can be used for nuclear material safeguards?How are the technical measures applied to achieve a Safeguards objective?How are Nuclear Safeguards applied internationally?How have Safeguards evolved to meet challenges to the nuclear nonproliferation regime?

What are nuclear and fissile materials?

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Safeguards are concerned with nuclear—especially fissile—materials and associated technology.

Radioactive MaterialsNuclear Materials:– Uranium (U)– Plutonium (Pu)– Thorium (Th)– Includes metals, alloys, and

chemical compounds– Does not normally include

ore and ore residueFissile Materials– Weapons-usable– Dual use

Radioactive

Nuclear

Fissile

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plutonium nitrate

solution

Nuclear materials exist in a wide variety of physical forms, chemical forms, and containers.

fuel pellets and assemblies for nuclear power reactors

steel cylinders of uranium hexafluoride

oxide powder

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Nuclear material has different isotopic composition.

Nuclear material is present in different nuclear forms called isotopes– same element, but different numbers of neutrons in the

nucleus– for example: important isotopes of uranium include 235U, 238U

Nuclear reactions and radioactive decay can change (“transmute”) isotopes from one type to anotherIsotopes have different nuclear propertiesHowever, isotopes have the same chemical properties

It is very difficult to separate isotopes

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Uranium is dug out of the ground, processed and enriched in the isotope 235U.

primarily 238U 235U is fissile

– Natural uranium, LEU and HEU are all useful in reactors.– Only HEU is useful for making a nuclear explosive.– Depleted uranium (<0.7% 235U) is a byproduct of enrichment.

Natural Uranium0.7% 235U

Low-EnrichedUranium (LEU)

< 20% 235U

High-EnrichedUranium (HEU)

> 20% 235U

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Plutonium does not occur in nature, but is instead produced from 238U in a reactor.

90

92

94

96

98

100

FreshFuel

SpentFuel

Mas

s Pe

r Cen

t

~0.9%

238U

235U236U

Plutonium

Fission Products

Light-water reactor fuel:

!238U

235U

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The use of nuclear materials is described by the “Fuel Cycle”.

This is a simplified diagram of a “once-through”uranium/plutonium fuel cycle.

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Recycle: A fuel cycle with reprocessing recovers unburned 235U and plutonium from spent reactor fuel.

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Plutonium and high-enriched uranium might be used to produce nuclear weapons.

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The nuclear fuel cycle can become very complex.

Nuclear materials have potential dual use, both civilian and military.Paths of nuclear materials within facilities are often complicated, and may be inaccessible for monitoring.The fuel cycle may involve more than one country.

What are the technical tools that can be used for nuclear material

safeguards?

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Nuclear materials emit penetrating neutron and gamma radiation, which can be monitored readily.

The type and intensity of the radiation can reveal precisely what nuclear material (and how much of it) is present. It is a “signature” of the nuclear material.Emission is affected by other elements present.The time distribution of neutrons can also convey information.

neutrons

gammas

heatalphas

container

nuclearmaterial

betas

fission products

A wide variety of technical measures exist to detect, identify and assay nuclear and fissile materials.

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Nuclear materials can be sampled for analysis and weighed.

+

Analysis

WeighingDestructive Analysis (DA)

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Detection of gamma radiation is used in a variety of nuclear material measurements.

Portable gamma spectroscopy

Measurement of holdup

Non-Destructive Assay (NDA)

Attribute Measurement for Uranium-235

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Passive NDA using coincidence neutron detection is used to assay plutonium.

Most nuclear materials emit neutrons, but as singles (one at a time)Plutonium fissions spontaneously, so it can also release multiple neutrons simultaneouslyCoincidence counting identifies this fission neutron signal to assay plutonium

Combination of neutron counting and gamma spectroscopy

High Level Neutron Coincidence Counter

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Active NDA uses an external source of neutrons to excite nuclear materials; especially useful to assay 235U.

neutrons

container of fissile material

neutrons from fission and (n,2n) reactions

Active neutron coincidence “collar”

Active well coincidence counter

Rod scanner

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Containment & Surveillance methods assure “continuity of knowledge” about nuclear materials.

Cobra seal DCM-14 video camera

How are the technical measures applied to achieve a Safeguards

objective?

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In general, nuclear safeguards exist on different levels, each with different motivations.

Facility operatorneeds to protect valuable assets, ensure safety, and assure higher-level authorities that nuclear materials are being used properly

National authorityneeds to exercise control over facilities, regulate transport, and provide information to the international authority

International authorityneeds to assure other countries that nuclear material is properly protected, controlled, and used appropriately

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Measures for nuclear material safeguards depend upon the form, amount, and strategic value of the material.

Form: Item , or BulkAmount:– “Significant Quantity” (SQ)– as defined by the International Atomic Energy Agency

Strategic Value:– “Direct Use”: plutonium, HEU, and 233U

• unirradiated• irradiated

– “Indirect Use”: uranium except HEU, and thorium

The timeliness of Safeguards measures is dictated by the strategic value of the material.

Plutonium8 kg

HEU25 kg

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Safeguards are based on accountancy, which seeks to verify the “material balance” for a “material balance area”.

Ending Physical Inventory

Time

Increases to inventory

Decreases

Material Balance:(Beginning Inventory) + (In) - (Out) = (Ending Inventory)

But it’s never perfect:the difference is termed “Material Unaccounted For” (MUF)

MUF = (Beginning Inventory) + (In) - (Out) - (Ending Inventory)

Beginning Physical Inventory

Material Balance Area (MBA)

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For international nuclear safeguards, accountancy assures that nuclear materials are present and used as intended.

State declares nuclear materials and facilitiesIndependent inspections periodically verify the declaration:– confirm facility design information– examine operator records & reports– identify & count items– assay nuclear materials

Containment and surveillance measures ensure “Continuity of Knowledge”: i.e., that no changes occur between inspections– tags & seals– video cameras

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International nuclear safeguards resemble the auditing function in banking:

(Nuclear Material)

SecurityGuard Vault

Camera

Bank

(PhysicalProtection)

(Facility)

Accountant

(Material Accountancy)

Auditor

(IAEA Inspector)

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A variety of other forms of control complement international nuclear safeguards.

Domestic material control & accountingPhysical protectionLicensing of facilitiesRegulation of transportImport/export restrictionsEngineering standards & certification

Portal monitoring

How are Nuclear Safeguards applied internationally?

“Traditional” IAEA Safeguards

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International safeguards are called for by treaties and other agreements between parties.

For assurance that nuclear materials are properly protected, controlled, accounted for, and used for peaceful purposes:

A 3rd party (international authority) is delegated the monitoring function

Parties monitor each other bilaterally, or

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The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) both promotes and safeguards atomic energy.

Created in 1957 by StatuteAffiliated with the United NationsObjective:“to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world.”Now comprises 140 Member States, which– participate in formulating Agency

policies– are eligible for technical

assistance in the peaceful use of nuclear energy

– share the costs of its operation

IAEA headquarters, Vienna

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Nuclear Material Safeguards is just one effort within the IAEA.

Policy making bodies

Secretariat

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IAEA INFCIRC 66 describes how Safeguards are applied to individual projects, such as an international reactor sale.

Example of an INFCIRC 66 project agreement:“Agreement of 24 February 1993 Between the International Atomic Energy Agency and the the Government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Supply of a Nuclear Power Station from the People’s Republic of China”

(INFCIRC 418)

300 MWe pressurized light water reactor at Chashma, built by China National Nuclear Corporation

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Safeguards Agreements, required by a variety of agreements, provide the legal context for international nuclear safeguards.

Facility AttachmentsState

SafeguardsAgreement

SafeguardsAgreement

SafeguardsAgreement

Subsidiary Arrangements

NPA1992

Quadripartite1991

United Nations Statute1957

Euratom1957

ABACC1991Tlatelolco

1969NPT

1970Rarotonga1986

Pelindaba1996

Bangkok1997 (other)

IAEA1957

Political entities Agreements

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The Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) led to Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements (CSAs).

Under a CSA, Safeguards are applied to all nuclear activities within a stateAll non-nuclear weapons state (NNWS) parties to the NPT are expected to conclude a CSA with the IAEAIAEA Safeguards for a CSA are documented in Information Circular (INFCIRC) 153, as corrected:

“The Structure and Content of Agreements Between the Agency and

States Required in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of

Nuclear Weapons”

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Five Nuclear Weapon State parties to the NPT have concluded “Voluntary Offer Agreements.”

NPT does not require Safeguards in the nuclear weapon states (NWS)– Major industrialized non-nuclear weapon

states objected (unfair competitive advantage)

– NWS offered to accept Safeguards on all nuclear activities, except national security

– Compromise solution to limit cost:• NWS submit lists of “eligible facilities”• IAEA selects which facilities to inspect

Framework for NPT Article VI– 1993 U.S. placed materials “excess to

defense needs” under IAEA Safeguards

United Kingdom– Aug. 1978– INFCIRC 263

United States– Dec. 1980– INFCIRC 288

France– Sep. 1981– INFCIRC 290

Russia– Jun. 1985– INFCIRC 327

China– Sep. 1989– INFCIRC 369

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The Safeguards Department of the IAEA is divided into Operations and Support Divisions.

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An IAEA Inspector is expected to perform a wide range of tasks.

audit bookkeeping records of a facilitydetermine stratification & samplingverify inventory of materialsperform nondestructive assay measurementsservice containment & surveillance equipmentcount controlled itemstake samples for destructive analysisperform design information verification

carry out complementary accesswrite reports & documentationtravelother– negotiate facility attachments– develop new measurements– train other inspectors

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IAEA Safeguards serve to audit a state’s declaration of its nuclear materials and facilities.

Declaration: A party to a Safeguards Agreement establishes and maintains a State System of Accounting and Control (SSAC) for its nuclear materials.The party declares its nuclear materials and facilities to the IAEA.

Verification:The IAEA inspects the nuclear materials and facilities periodically to verify accuracy of the declaration.The IAEA reports its conclusions.

Many states having little or no nuclear activity qualify for a reduced inspection and reporting regime:

Small Quantities Protocol (SQP)

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The IAEA announces a Safeguards conclusion annually, but does not share Safeguards data.

For states with a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) only, the affirmative conclusion states:“All declared nuclear material in these… States has remained in

peaceful nuclear activities or has been otherwise adequately accounted for.”

For states with both a CSA and an Additional Protocol in force, the positive conclusion goes on to say:“In addition… the Agency completed sufficient activities and

evaluation and found no indication of undeclared nuclear material or activities for the State as a whole. On this basis, the Agency concluded that all nuclear material in these States remained in peaceful nuclear activities or was otherwise adequately accounted for.”

– From the IAEA 2004 Annual Report

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EURATOM:European Atomic Energy Community

Nuclear energy in Europe was poised for rapid development in the mid- to late- 1950’s1957: Euratom established by treaty– six Member States originally, 25 parties in 2006– operates its own professional Safeguards inspectorate– Summary report by European Commission to the European

Assembly (annual)

IAEA-Euratom Cooperation– 1973 agreement concerning Safeguards for NPT

(INFCIRC/193)– 1990’s: New Partnership Approach (NPA)– Efforts are ongoing to coordinate overlapping responsibilities

to ensure effectiveness and efficiency

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Chronology1979: Start of gradual bilateral confidence building stepsJuly 1991: ABACC created by bilateral treatyDecember 1991: Quadripartite Agreement included IAEAArgentina, Brazil later joined Tlatelolco (1994) and the NPT (1995, 98)

Structure of ABACCCommission: monitors implementation, reports to both StatesSecretariat: small professional staff, carries out inspections (each State

inspects the other), 30 inspectors from each country

Significanceregional solution that addressed

regional issuessuccess due to both executive

leadership and institutionalizedcooperation

ABACC:Argentine-Brazilian Agency for Accounting and Control

How have Safeguards evolved to meet challenges to nuclear

nonproliferation regime?

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IRAQ

NPT signatory state with IAEA Safeguards Agreement– before 1991: no diversion of

declared nuclear materials

following the 1991 Gulf War– UNSCOM/ IAEA inspections

under UN Security Council Resolution 687

– revealed a clandestine nuclear weapons development program on a huge scale

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Status– DPRK claims to be reprocessing

fuel to recover plutonium– IAEA verification work was halted in

December 2002– Application of safeguards under the

DPRK’s INFCIRC/66 safeguards agreement has been suspended

– DPRK status under the NPT is not clear

– Six-Party Talks attempting to resolve the current impasse

NORTH KOREA

Prompt detection of undeclared activities

– possibility of undeclared plutonium– late 1992: IAEA alerted UN

Security CouncilIAEA was already using additional tools

– enhanced data analysis– third party information– authority to request additional

information and special inspectionsInitial crisis

– DPRK withdrew from IAEA membership but its Safeguards agreement remained binding

– 1994 deal: Freeze program and accept two power reactors

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The IAEA “Programme 93+2” responded to the new demands on Safeguards.

How can the charter of IAEA Safeguards be expanded to:– Detect clandestine nuclear activities?– Make safeguards more efficient?

Important to verify not only the correctness of a declaration, but also its completeness“Programme 93+2” began in 1993, intended to be completed within two yearsAdditional measures were identified to strengthen Safeguards

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Additional Safeguards measures were split into two categories.

Part I– No additional legal authority

would be required– IAEA Board of Governors

agreed to implement these measures in June 1995

Part II– Additional legal authority

would be required– “Model Additional Protocol”

drafted as the basis for negotiating this authority with parties to existing Safeguards Agreements

– approved by the IAEA Board of Governors in May 1997

INFCIRC 540 (corrected)

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Part I measures had already been available to the IAEA, but had not been fully utilized.

•Early provision of design information on new facilities or changes in existing facilities with safeguarded material

•Voluntary reporting of imports and exports of nuclear material, specified equipment and non-nuclear material

•Environmental sampling at locations where inspectors already have access, under existing safeguards agreements

•Use of unattended and remote monitoring

•Greater use of short notice inspections•Enhanced training

•Closer co-operation between IAEA and State (regional) systems for accounting and control of nuclear material

•Enhanced collection and analysis of information from safeguards declarations and from open sources

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Part II measures extended the scope of IAEA Safeguards.

Provision of information about, and inspector access to, all aspects of a State’s nuclear fuel cycle;Provision of information on, and short notice inspector access to, any place on a nuclear site;Provision of information about and access to nuclear fuel cycle related R&D;Provision of information on the manufacture and export of sensitive nuclear related technologies, and access to manufacturing and import locations;Environmental sampling at locations beyond those provided under safeguards agreements;Improved access: Simplified procedures for designation of inspectors, and issuance of multiple-entry visasRight to use internationally established communications systems.

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The Additional Protocol is gradually being implemented.

Status of Protocols Additional to Safeguards Agreements(as of 17 May, 2006)– Additional Protocol in force in 75 States and Euratom– 107 states have signed an Additional Protocol– 114 states have been approved by the Board of Governors

Implementation– Declarations and verification inspections underway since 1997– Field trials to test verification measures (e.g., two sites in Japan)– Euratom agreement in force since April 2004

Current IAEA Safeguards incorporate two main elements– a much enhanced role of “all source” information collection, review

and analysis– an emphasis on state-level evaluation, supporting the state-level

safeguards conclusions

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Summary

International Nuclear Safeguards have been enormously successful for non-proliferation.Safeguards require international cooperation and a legal framework for implementation.A variety of technical tools enables safeguards to provide accountancy and continuity of knowledge of nuclear materials.Challenges to the international safeguards regime have led to major, but evolutionary improvements.