Hernandez 1

Diego Hernandez

Lopez

Philosophy 102A

August 6, 2015

Interpreting Free Will: God, Self, and the Awareness of Illusion

In the following paper I will attempt to consider free will, or lack thereof, and the numer-

ous implications that arise. When considering such a topic it is nigh impossible to refrain from

delving into the more unforgiving depths of rationality, so in my infantile experience, I will do

my best to touch upon them all. First we must define free will for present consideration. For such

a philosophical quandary that has plagued humanity indefinitely, the term itself seems awfully

dependent on semantics under the scenario in which it is being considered. In a religious context,

for example, it is the ability to make decisions independent from a divine creator, from whom all

plans on the consequences of the universe are supposedly wrought, to be independent from a pre-

conceived plan. A scientific view of free will shall invariably turn out an entirely different defini-

tion: none whatsoever. While a scientific perspective (that is to say a reasonable one) should not

be the extent of all consideration, it is important to take into mind that, empirically speaking, the

psychological effects of perception on meaning are not unanimously felt, and are therefore not

definitive. In an empirical sense, free will does not enter into the equation for why the universe

behaves the way it does, and thusly so, is not necessary for its inhabitants (at least monistically)

who do nothing more but abide to the laws of reality. While this may be troubling for some unfa-

miliar with rational thought, there is naught to despair, for lack of absolute freedom does not ne-

cessitate a lack of liberty in action, as is so often confused in this ontological debate. It is possi-

Hernandez 2

ble to hold such a view without being sucked into a vacuum of existential apathy, so it is impor-

tant, going forward, to set parameters. This paper will rationally analyze the lack of free will in

terms of the metaphysical consequences that arise, as well as the existential security that is sure

to be challenged.

Of the many aspects of free will to be discussed, perhaps the effect on being is of primary

interest. If one is to consider the "freedom of will" one must first consider to whom exactly does

this will belong to? Is there a personal identity separate from material reality that can conceive

ownership of such an intrinsic property? Or rather, is will a physical property that only higher

beings have access to, much akin to sensory abilities that lesser animals are incapable of? If so,

where on the evolutionary chain did this divergence of "will" and "lack of will" occur? Let us

consider the technicalities against the existence of free will.

The very nature of free will suggests a dualistic approach to reality, and in order to con-

sider such, an evolutionary standpoint must be made. The universe started off as material, and as

is reasonable enough to say, there existed something before us, before "consciousness," as it

were. If we are to make distinctions between ourselves and lesser animals in terms of freedom,

we must consider the implications of such distinctions. Unless life predicates free will, then it is

safe to assume that the ancestral single celled organisms that we evolved from were not acting on

any single volition, and as such can be concluded, are solely material in substance. Further along

the progression of evolution, perhaps early on in the neanderthal stage, there can only be three

scenarios in which free will is allowed to exist: 1) Free will is a physical property that conceived

itself for some evolutionary purpose, and by the logic that ensues, is also a monistic property; 2)

An immaterial substance of "the mind" somehow came into existence independent of physical re-

ality that led to its inception; 3) God decided, at that point, to give our simpleminded forefathers

Hernandez 3

the ability to think and reason and cognate, arbitrarily creating the "consciousness" as it were.

Let us consider the first scenario. All consequences of evolution are inherently physical and are

isolated in physical realms of existence. Being the most logical option of the three, free will

would have to be a physical property, isolated to a monism. Here is where the fallacy arises,

however. The inherent nature of free will requires a dualistic being to practice it, with a "mind"

with which freedom is utilized. Already the contradiction is apparent. A dualism cannot sponta-

neously arise from a monism, and invariably what really is, a monism is what can be certain to

have existed before supposedly conscious thought, since there was no distinction of "mind" to

even consider a dualism. Whatever may be the case, a monism was first, and by the ever so con-

stricting nature of the laws of physics to which a monism abides to, a second immaterial sub-

stance, by these same laws, cannot possibly come spontaneously into existence. This automati-

cally and unequivocally invalidates the second option. The validity of the third option will be

discussed in a later paragraph.

It is important to keep in mind that the above reasoning can also be applied to the concept

of the "self" and whether or not there is an individual person experiencing reality in his own way.

Additionally, the concept of "self" goes hand in hand with free will, as it suggests an absolute

ownership of some property that allows one to create his own reality. Perception then plays a

huge role in the concept of free will, namely in the case against it. Since any perception we have

is inherently human, we have no other way to perceive reality, we must analyze the psychologi-

cal requirements for such accordingly. In an psychological journal by Aaron Allen Schiller, per-

ception is dependent on context. "...objects perceived are those involved in the fact...there cannot

be context-free perception inasmuch as perception, qua action, is always permeated with the in-

terest of the subject," (Schiller 575). This concept is important in two ways. First off, it shows

Hernandez 4

the causal relationship between external stimuli and psychological interpretation, emphasizing

the challenge cause-and-effect poses to free will. On a physical level, cause and effect has an ob-

vious impact on our actions. Barring a mental disposition to do otherwise, we are instinctual

creatures, and act accordingly. We get hungry, so we eat. We get cold, so we seek shelter. We

get startled, and so the adrenaline begins to rush, and so on. On these animalistic levels of exis-

tence, it is undeniable that free will plays no role, much like as it is with lesser creatures. On a

mental level, as the concept of free will grasps so dearly to, this principle remains just as valid.

Things we see and interpret are the result of previous events and ideas. There is no single sponta-

neous instance of a thought process that comes through of its own volition. "Interest," as Schiller

suggests, is the result of an prolonged exposure of an event that occurred previously to the per-

ception in question. What we notice and what we may think we pay attention to is actually the

result of an antecedent, not a volition of will. The self is not so, rather, a set of preconceptions

that self perpetuates into further misconceptions of its singularity. This concept proliferates: in

addition to disproving free will, it also outlines the misconception with which we view it. Free

will, no matter which side of the argument one decides to take, is an inherent perception, and as

previously mentioned, perceptions are determined by previous events. In other words: the per-

ception of the concept of free will is determined. Additionally, if free will does exist, then it

would not be perceived, but sensed, or felt in some way. However, by the very nature of the un-

certainty of mental processes, and the immaterially, therefore nonexistence, of dualistic proper-

ties characteristic of free will, it cannot hold a place in the realm of immediate certainty. But

then, if we are to pay an unbiased due towards rationality, we must then question what exactly

does lie in the realm of immediate certainty.

Hernandez 5

There is a concept in philosophy called theoretical skepticism in which all of reality is

called into question. The very same logic used in the previous paragraph could very well be con-

structed to the conclusion that absolutely nothing can be known for certain, either due to the un-

reliability of human perception or just a greater inability to understand absolute truth. I have no

defense against this idea, and any claim from me otherwise would be dogmatic. I can't pretend to

know any absolute truth, and no authority known to man could ever hope to achieve as much.

There may very well be a sort of barrier between us and truth, with everything inside the barrier

is logical fallacy and everything outside real truth. That isn't to say, however, there is nothing to

be done. Nothing can be know in absolute certainty, but within our barrier the fallacy, if any-

thing, is uniform due to the consistency of its appearance, and therein lies security. While per-

ception can be construed as a foundation for doubt, what cannot be denied is the perception we

unanimously share as a species. Fallacy, when isolated from a comparative truth that would ex-

pose its nature, remains just. In that, all logical conclusions we make are allowed to be taken as

valid within the confines of the barrier. We can't know the status of reality outside the barrier:

we don't need to.

As interesting as the validity of knowledge is, I begin to digress. Previously I mentioned

a third scenario in which free will is allowed to exist, that is, given to us by God, wherein before

we were monistic and mindless creatures. Now in this scenario, the less reasonable concept of

god must be considered. Not that of an "initial cause" as many would like to put it, but one capa-

ble of inherently human qualities, one capable of giving and taking. The very possibility of this

god has no logical foundation, for such a god to exist many assumptions must be accepted with-

out question. Primary of which is that logic does not apply. God's omniscience and "divine fore-

knowledge" directly challenges the very same free will he advocates (Fowler). Logic has to be

Hernandez 6

twisted to an illogical stance to support itself, completely isolated from the foundational basis of

rationality to be considered legitimate. However, since this god seems to be the main point of a

rather circular reasoning in the argument for free will, let us consider such a scenario in which a

knowable fate exists. Such a god, then, would have to be inherently of the second substance of

"mind," as I have previously established that an immaterial substance cannot arise from a mate-

rial one, in order to have that quality exist in humanity. Not even getting into such a divine crea-

ture capable of whimsically crossing the realms of already unlikely distinctions of reality, the na-

ture of these two substances, if taken to be true, make it so that such collusions are impossible.

The immaterial substance, in the supposed case of humanity, is dependent on material compo-

nents such as the body to exist, such as the brain for storage, and body for sustenance. Material

can only interact with like: as I take it there is no spiritual connection between atoms and mole-

cules, but a physical one, and as such, there is no way for the physical and the "mental" to inter-

act. As such, we run another structural issue in the god argument of free will: God, being imma-

terial, cannot interact with material substance. This view is also supported by Gregg D. Caruso, a

psychologist/philosopher in his book Free Will and Consciousness: a Deterministic Account of

the Illusion of Free Will. Caruso argues that, even in the event of a dualism, no substance can ac-

count for mental causation (Torres). Material and immaterial substances cannot interact, and the

result of such allows only one substance to be the cause of our actions. Since our actions exist,

they are in the material realm, and cannot be caused my immateriality. The only reasonable con-

clusion that can be made from here is that the immaterial substance, constituting the soul as well

as god, is exactly that: immaterial, nonexistent, and imagined. But then another issue arises. How

can physical progression of the material develop the appearance of immaterial "mental" pro-

cesses to imagine such?

Hernandez 7

Free will is a perception of a much more mechanic reality. Neurons make up the brain

where sensory information is collected to make cohesive accounts of physical existence. Any

thoughts or emotions that arise are the result of an evolutionary attempt to adapt to environmen-

tal situations where such a perception of reality would benefit in a chance for prolonged exis-

tence. There is a fine line, however, between determinism and fate. Fate suggests an fixed path

that will happen invariably. Determinism, on the other hand, follows likely occurrences in the

present moment of existence, which in turn leads to infinite combinations of new likely occur-

rences, and so forth, causing a sort of causal indeterminacy, however really more of an instanta-

neous determinism. While the substance that makes up "you" and the substance that makes up

everything is is all the same, they are arranged in different systems: biological systems, while de-

void of any actual intention, functions on the purpose of perpetuating itself, while reality "out

there" just exists. The biological function of the body subset of materiality exists to serve itself,

and while there is no objective sense of free will due to the nature of these biological systems,

there is an appearance of such which allows human conventions to bleed through: on a behav-

ioral level necessary for social interaction, an illusion of free will is the resultant of tailored pre-

conceptions and adaptions that make the "individual." There is no free will, but that, however,

should be cause for existential angst.

Before I discuss meaning, let us first consider other arguments for free will. As of far, I

have employed rather scientific modes of reasoning, with the intention of unequivocally writing

off the possibility of free will. However, there are other more elite minds in the scientific com-

munity who use the same reasoning to imply otherwise. Recent discoveries in quantum science

have pushed some to suggest that, due to the neurological impulses that can now be detected,

conscious decision does, indeed exist: while the impulses come before the action, quantum state

Hernandez 8

reductions in neutrons and the backwards time effect in quantum physics suggest otherwise

(Hameroff). While I have no knowledge on quantum physics as it pertains to biology, the very

implication of this study disproves the suggestion that Hameroff attempts to make. Rather than

taking free will as a whole it is deconstructed into individual parts, and analyzed in such a way

that the particles being considered, themselves, are subject to the laws of physics. This in no way

explains the conditions for which must be in order for free will to occur, that is the existence of

conscious thought. By analyzing the parts, it comes down to a set of probabilities in which indi-

vidual neurons and quantum particles can behave, and that of itself loses all quality for the possi-

bility of free will.

Lastly I will discuss the meaning that ensues regardless of its dissociation with freedom

of will. It is easy to think that, in light of such a reality, existence is meaningless, due to the ap-

parent lack of choice and the instantaneous determinism that dictates the way you act. This is

not, however, to be confused with predetermination. As far as the human perception of time

goes, there is no such thing as the future, only an infinite set of likelihoods that change, as ironi-

cally as it may seem, indeterminately. The future lies in the mind, the mind is immaterial there-

fore not in existence, and as such the future does not exist as well. Atoms that make us up have

no conceptions as to the future, so any on our part is just the result of a evolutionary develop-

ment for the apprehension of a possible danger, and as such we do our best to focus our existence

in the only aspect of reality that actually does exist: momentary experiences. Additionally, the

lack of free will does not take away any existential liberty, nor awareness. There is no other exis-

tence to be considered, this is the extent of all reality that can be proved rationally. Ideas of any

other sort are mental and there is no empirical evidence of such. You are here right now, and any

conceptions on the lack of free will does not take you out of your element of existence, and one

Hernandez 9

should behave accordingly, even if such behavior is only an appearance of choice. As often is the

case with philosophical considerations, one can get lost in the endless implications that are sure

to ensue, but one should be careful not to detract the purpose of philosophical inquiry, which I

believe is to be secured in existence. The self does not exist, for as I have previously elaborated,

that would suggest a dualistic reality. In here, within the lack of freedom, lies rather a more ulti-

mate Liberty: the freedom from burden. Not to be confused with apathy, there can be a more

complete acceptance of all possibilities of reality. While yes, we remain human and the biologi-

cal and evolutionary impulses that drive us otherwise, the fact remains that we are a causal ex-

tension of the reality we experience, and as such can achieve an ultimate sense of security. We

exist, regardless of illusions on will. Perhaps then, the only true meaning we have is to be aware.

Works Cited

Schiller, Aaron Allen. "The Primacy Of Fact Perception." Philosophical Psychology 25.4 (2012):

575-593. Academic Search Premier. Web. 6 Aug. 2015.

Torres, Erika, and David Fajardo-Chica. "Gregg D. Caruso: Free Will And Consciousness: A

Determinist Account Of The Illusion Of Free Will." Minds & Machines 23.4 (2013): 519-522.

Academic Search Premier. Web. 6 Aug. 2015.

Hernandez 10

Fowler III, Charles D. "Omniscience And Human Free Will: Implications For Christian Educa-

tion In The Local Church." Journal Of Religious Thought 60-63.(2008): 213-232. Academic

Search Premier. Web. 6 Aug. 2015.

Hameroff, Stuart. “How Quantum Brain Biology Can Rescue Free Willl.” Frontiers in Integratice

Neuroscience: n. pag. Print.