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The end of the Cold Warconcluded one of the mostdangerous periods in U.S.history. But now, only a coupleof decades later, international

relations theorists and policymakers worrythat China’s rise could lead to an equallydangerous, or possibly more dangerous,competition between superpowers.

In the second half of the 20th century,much of the world’s power was concen-trated in the United States and SovietUnion, fueling their decades-long globaland regional rivalry. The collapse of theSoviet Union in 1991 effectively left theworld with one reigning superpower. Butthe rapid economic ascent of China—theworld’s most populous country, with some1.3 billion people—is promising that bythe middle of this century the UnitedStates again will be sharing global domi-nance. World power will once more be

distributed upon the shoulders of twogiants. Will the transition be a smooth one,or will it create the military, economic, andideological competition that has tradition-ally characterized great-power politics?

There are of course tools for predictingthis, theories that help us understand pastcompetition between nations and theprospects for peace in the future.

Among theories of international rela-tions, realism—which sees power playinga central role in shaping the interactionsof leading states—remains most influen-tial. The standard realist arguments donot bode well for peace. According to thisstandard view, China will pursue its inter-ests more assertively, which will lead theUnited States and its allies, most impor-tantly Japan, to balance harder againstit. This cycle of action and reaction willgenerate a relationship that—at best—parallels the Cold War standoff. And,

As The rise of ChinA porTends A shifT in globAl power, An influenTiAl

Thinker ouTlines A new wAy To meAsure relATions beTween nATions And

prediCT The prospeCTs for peACe.

interpretingthe Actions of

following this line of logic, we will needto worry about the possibility that Chinaand the United States will end up fightinga hegemonic war for control of East Asia.

In my view, however, this perspectivefails to capture some key features of theway states interact, such as how coopera-tion can reduce fear, and how geographyand technology can influence a state’s mili-tary capabilities. Consequently, we end upwith a distorted picture of the future.

In response to these shortcomings,I’ve constructed a new theory that ispresented in my recent book, RationalTheory of International Politics, which attemptsto enhance our ability to explain the pastand to prescribe policies for managingthe future.

Through the lens of my theory,the outlook on U.S.-China relations ismore balanced and, fortunately,more optimistic.

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The theory begins with acouple basic assumptionsthat are widely shared byso-called “grand theories ofinternational politics,” which

examine how states are influenced by theinternational system.

We assume, first, that the internationalsystem is anarchic—which is not to say it ischaotic, only that it lacks an internationalauthority that can enforce agreements andprevent the use of force.

The theory also assumes that states arerational, unitary actors. This clearly is notaccurate, but is well matched to the theory’spurposes. It allows us to imagine a state asa single operating unit with a well-definednational interest. The rationality assump-tion enables us to focus on the impact of theinternational system by envisioning states asconsistently considering the implications oftheir actions. These simplifications enablethe theory to analyze efficiently whichstrategy a state should choose, given theconstraints and opportunities presented bythe international system.

The new theory accounts for this withan offense-defense variable that reflectsthe relative ease of attacking or defending.When the offense-defense balance favorsdefense—as it does when states are sepa-rated by great distances or possess capablenuclear forces—a less powerful state caneffectively defend itself against a morepowerful state.

3. The sTATe’s informATion AbouT The

moTives of iTs AdversAry: For simplicity,the theory distinguishes between two typesof opposing states—those that are interestedonly in security and want to protect the statusquo, and those that are greedy and want torevise the status quo.

A state will usually be uncertain aboutthe opposing state’s type, but this does notmean it knows nothing or that it views allstates similarly. For instance, the prospect ofa nuclear Iran is much more of a worry forthe United States than the well-establishednuclear arsenal of Great Britain. The UnitedStates is confident that Britain is a security-seeking state, but is worried that Iran mightbe a revisionist state.

Disagreements about this third vari-able explain some of the deepest dividesin U.S. foreign policy debates. During theCold War, for example, so-called “hawks”believed the Soviet Union was a highly revi-sionist state, so they favored competitiveU.S. military policies designed to increasethe U.S. ability to deter attacks. “Doves,” onthe other hand, believed the Soviet Unionwas driven largely by insecurity and that itspolicies were best understood as reactionsto threatening U.S. policies. As a result, theyfavored cooperative policies intended toreduce Soviet fears.

An emerging debate overChina is beginning to acquirea similar pattern, withobservers who believe Chinawants to fully dominate its

region calling for more competitive U.S.policies, and others who believe that Chinais largely content with the status quo advo-cating for more restrained military anddiplomatic policies.

The theory then identifies three typesof variables that a state should consider inchoosing its international strategy:

1. The sTATe’s own moTives: Does thestate want simply to be secure, protectingthe territory it currently controls? Or does itwant to expand and revise the status quo?

2. The sTATe’s mATeriAl vAriAbles:

The most obvious and widely employedmaterial variable is power—the resourcesthat a state can draw upon to build up mili-tary forces. The more powerful a state isrelative to its adversary, the more capableit is of winning an arms race and, if fullyarmed, of winning a war.

But considering only power here is agrave mistake. The relative ease of defendinga state also must be considered. For instance,separation by great distances—especiallyby water—makes a state more difficult toattack; so do nuclear weapons, which canprovide a state with the ability to retaliate,and thereby effectively deter an adversaryeven when the adversary is much wealthierand more powerful.

Charles Glaser, a professor of political science and international affairs, and director of the Institute forSecurity and Conflict Studies at the Elliott School of International Affairs.

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In the best-case scenario then, inwhich both China and the United Statesare seeking only enough security to defendthemselves and preserve the status quo,is there still cause for concern? Couldtwo security-seeking states end up inarmed conflict?

Under my theory the answer is: Yes,potentially. This competition is explainedin international relations theory with aconcept called the security dilemma. Itoccurs when the actions a state takes tobecome more secure reduce the security ofa potential adversary. The security dilemmacan be particularly severe when a state that’spreparing to defend itself appears to act justlike a state that is preparing to attack. Whenattacking would be relatively easy, the effectis compounded.

Information about the motives of anopposing state can factor into the equation.If the opposing state is believed likely tobe interested only in protecting its security,then the security dilemma is less severe.Extending cooperative policies to that state,rather than pursuing competitive ones, is lessrisky because it is more likely to reciprocatecooperation. And in reciprocating coopera-tion, the state that would otherwise havebuilt up its arms for security can communi-cate that it is not driven by greedy motives.

Overall then, Rational Theory of InternationalPolitics finds that the international systemdoes not, as a general rule, fuel competi-tion between major powers. This stands instark contrast to the standard realist view,which holds that states will always competeintensely for security. While it is true thatunder some material and informationalconditions competition and even war willbe a security-seeker’s best strategy, underother conditions states will be able to adoptcooperative strategies and enjoy high levelsof security.

The book goes far beyond these centralarguments, demonstrating the versatility ofthe new theory. For example, it considersa variety of types of states, including statesthat vary in their determination to changethe status quo, and examines how changesin power can create additional pressuresfor competition.

Rational Theory of International Politicsemploys this theory to analyze andexplain important historical cases,including the end of the Cold War andGermany’s decision under Adolf Hitlerto pursue continental hegemony. It alsodelves into whether key arms races actu-ally represented the best options availableto the states involved. Although usuallydangerous and often correlated withwar, an arms race could nevertheless bea state’s best option because the interna-tional environment makes not racing evenmore dangerous.

I conclude, however, that three bigarms races in recent history reflectedflawed policies: Germany’s decision tolaunch a naval race against Britain at thebeginning of the 20th century; Japan’sdecision to engage the United States in anaval competition starting in the 1930s;and the U.S. decision to intensify thenuclear arms race by building multiple-warhead missiles starting in the 1970s. Inthe end, these actions reduced the states’security, and available alternatives wouldhave served them better.

In terms of current policy, the book’sfindings offer new insights into the impli-cations of China’s rise. While the stan-dard realist view foresees an intensifyingU.S.-China military competition, thisneed not be the case if we consider theessential material and information vari-ables highlighted by my theory.

Both China and the United Statesenjoy a large defensive advantage that iscreated by the expanse of the Pacific Oceanbetween them, and by the deterrent capa-bilities offered by nuclear weapons. As aresult, both the United States and Chinawill be able to protect their vital interestsduring and after China’s rise.

These benign material conditions, inturn, will make it easier for the UnitedStates and China to avoid severelystrained political relations. It’s helpful,too, that their current political relation-ship is relatively good.

This is not to say, however, that thereare no dangers in the U.S.-China rela-tionship. The most volatile point between

them is Taiwan. China places top priorityon integrating Taiwan with the mainlandand sees U.S. efforts to protect Taiwan asthreatening its vital interests. It remainsan open question whether the UnitedStates can preserve good political rela-tions with China while sticking with itscurrent policy toward Taiwan. If not,the United States will need to considerrevising its Taiwan policy.

As China rises, it also will be impor-tant for both sides, but especially theUnited States, not to infer too muchfrom the actions of the other. An over-reaction to Chinese growth, particularlyin the scale of its military, could all-too-easily spark a chain reaction that leadsboth sides to exaggerate their insecurity,which would increase the probability ofcrises and war.

In other words, as the global balanceof power continues to shift, the prospectsfor peace between the United Statesand China are quite good. The key is forleaders of both states to keep a close watchand a cool head.

ChArles glAser’s most recent book,Rational Theory of International Politics,was published by princeton university pressin 2010.

GW