intersubjectivity and the monadic core of the psyche: habermas and castoriadis on the unconscious

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1/21

Intersubjectivity and the Monadic Core of the Psyche: Habermas and Castoriadis on theUnconscious

Author(s): Joel WhitebookSource: Revue europenne des sciences sociales, T. 27, No. 86, Pour une philosophie militantede la dmocratie (1989), pp. 225-244Published by: Librairie DrozStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40369870.

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2/21

JOEL WHITEBOOK

INTERSUBJECTIVITY

ND

THE

MONADIC

CORE

OF

THE

PSYCHE:

HABERMAS

AND

CASTORIADIS ON THE

UNCONSCIOUS

I.

Habermas'

ttacks

n

Nietzsche,

eidegger,

errida

nd Foucault

in The

Philosophical

iscourse

of

Modernity

re

easily

understood.

These

thinkers,

nsofar s

they

aise

specters

f

rrationalism,

ihilism

and

political

egression

or

Habermas,

epresent

he

enemy;

s

such,

they

must

be

defeated,

nd

the

book,

whichconsists

n

a series of

lectures,

ontains

many

brilliant

olemics

o

that end.

The attack

on

Castoriadis, owever,

hich

enters

n

the

ntepretation

f

psycho-

analysis,

s

more

difficulto

comprehend,

oth

with

respect

o

its

vehemence

nd

to its

externality

o Castoriadis'

osition.

If he

had

wantedto criticizeCastoriadis' heory f themonadiccore of the

subject

properly

which,

o

be

sure,

s

not mmune

rom riticism

-

Habermas

should have

at least fulfilled

egel's requirement

f

stepping

nto

he

strength

f

an

opponent's osition.

Instead,

we

are

given superficial

excursus"2

which

hardly

does

justice

to Casto-

riadis'

deep

and

original

ppropriation

f

Freud.

If

it

is

to be crit-

icized,

theory

f

this

depth

deserves more

erious

ritique.

The situation s

all the more

curious

given

he fact

that,

vis-b-vis

post-structuralism,

ost-modernism,

eo-conservatism,

tc.,

Habermas

and Castoriadis

re,

as it

were,

on the

same

side

of

the

theoretical

barricades,

espite

hefact

he atter

makeshis

home

n

Paris.

Indeed,

withrespect o theirmostgeneral ntentions,abermas nd Casto-

riadis

perhaps

have more n

common

with ach

other

han

ither as

with

many

f the

central urrents

n

political

nd

philosophical

hink-

ing

today.

At

a timewhen

various

forms f

contextualist

elativism

dominate he

political-philosophical

andscape,

heir

tubborn

efense

of the

Occident's

ationalist

nd

democratic

raditions

what

Haber-

mas

calls "the

project

of

Enlightenment"

nd

Castoriadis

efers

o

as "the

project

of

autonomy"3

almost

boarders

on

the

eccentric.

I

believe he similarities

o

so far

that,

n the

final

nalysis,

t

could

i See CorneliusCastoriadis,The Imaginary nstitutionor Society,trans.

Kathleen

Barney,

MIT

Press:

Cambridge,

Mass.:

1987),

p,

294-299.

2

See

Jurgen

Habermas,

Excursus

on

CorneliusCastoriadis:

The

Imaginary

Institution/'

he

Philosophical

Discourse

of

Modernity:

welve

Lectures,

rans.

Frederick

Lawerence. MIT

Press:

Cambridge

Mass.:

1987).pp.

327-335.

3

See

Habermas, "Modernity

ersus

Postmodernity,"

ew

German

Critique,

22,

1981,

nd The

Imaginary

nstitution

f

Society,pp.

101

f.

15

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3/21

226

J.

WHITEBOOK

be shown hatHabermas, is claimto haveprovided strictlyormal

argument

otwithstanding,

efends he

"project

of

Enlightenment"

as a

"project

f

autonomy".

Yet,

despite

his

greement

t the

most

general

evel of

programmatic

ntentions,

here

re substantive

if-

ferences n the modes

of

philosophizing

ach

employs

n

pursuing

of those

ntentions.

WhereasHabermas ombines

modified

orm f

transcendental

hilosophy

with results from the

empirical

ocial

sciences to

formulate

theory

f

communicative

ationality,

asto-

riadis

proceeds

hrough

mode

of

thought

e terms ialectical

eluci-

dation."5 And t

is thedifferencen theirmodesof

philosophizing

which,

o

be

sure,

must

ultimately

ave

consequences

or

theirmore

generalprogramaticntentions s well thatsurfaces n the con-

troversy

oncerning

reud.

Castoriadis'

octrine f themonadic ore of the

subject

ouched

theoretical aw nerve in

Habermas because

it not

only

poses

a

profound hallenge

o

the

nterpretation

f

Freud n

Knowledge

nd

Human

nterests,

but to the

very

heart f

Habermas'

general

hilo-

sophical

construction

of

which the

Freud

interpretation

s

in fact

one

paradigmatic

spect).

The

centerpiece

f that

construction,

n-

eluding

the

earlier

reformulation

f Critical

Theory

nd

the more

recent efense f

modernity,

as

been

the

"linguistic

urn,"

that

s,

4

Habermas

claims

to

argue

for

the relative

uperiority

f

modern

Western

rationality

ver

premodern

worldviews n

strictly

ormal rounds,

.e.

in terms f

the

decentration f

the modern

worldview

nd

its

differentiation

nto

cognitive-

instrumental, oral-legal

nd

expressive-aesthetic

ationality.

He

hopes

thereby

to

avoid the

charge

of

Eurocentrism,

ith ts

imperialist

mplications,

hat

was

levelled

gainst

nineteenth

entury hilosophy

f

history

nd

classical

anthropo-

logy.

On

close

inspection, owever,

Habermas does not

praise

that

differentia-

tion

tself n

strictly

ormal

grounds,

ut

because

it,

in

turn,

makes

the achieve-

ment

of

another,

more substantive

ood possible,

.e. an

"open

society"

which,

for the

present

purposes,

we can

take as

more or less

equivalent

with an auto-

nomous

society).

The

institutionalizationf the differentiation

f an

external

world,

social world

nd an

inner

world,

nd the forms

f

cognitive-instrumental,

moral-legal

nd

expressive-aesthetic

ognition

which

correspond

o

them,

s

a

necessaryprecondition or the penetration nd criticism f the sacred realmwhichcharacterizes losed societies. It is the autonomous

ritique

of dogmatic

tradition,

which

is

structurallympossible

n

closed

societies,

not the

formal

conditions hat

make it

possible,

which s

the

finalvalue

.

Furthermore,

would

argue that,

far from

being

a formal

nd

"context-independent

tandard

for

the

rationality

f world

views,"

he notionof an

open society,

nsofar

s it

excludes

all

societies

constructed n a sacred

core,

which

s to

say,

the vast

majority

f

societies that have existed

historically,

arries

with

it

enormous

substantive

content. While

the notionof an

open

or

autonomous

ociety

must be

defended,

the mmense

roblems

nvolved n such a

defense

annotbe avoided

by retreating

into

formalism.

See

Theory

f

Communicative ction:

Reason and

the

Rationali-

zation

of Society,

Vol.

One,

trans. Thomas

McCarthy, Beacon

Press: Boston:

1981).pp.

61

ff.

5

See Cornelius

Castoriadis,

Crossroads

n the

Labyrinth,

rans.

Kate

Soper

and

Martin

Ryle, Cambridge

Mass.:

MIT

Press,

1984),

.

xxviii.

For a discussion

of the

concept

of elucidation ee Joel

Whitebook,

Review

of

Crossroads n

the

Labyrinth/' elos, 63, Spring 1985, p. 231ff.

6

Jurgen

abermas,Knowledge

nd Human

Interests,

rans.

Jeremey

.

Sha-

piro, Boston:

Beacon Press:

1972),Chapts.

10,

11

and

12.

7

See

Albrecht

Wellmer.

Communications

nd

Emancipation:

Reflections

on

the

Linguistic

urn n Critical

Theory,"

n

On

Critical

Theory,

d. John

O'Neill,

(New

York:

The

Seabury Press, 1976),pp.

231-262.



4/21

INTERSUBJECTIVITY

AND THE

MONADIC CORE OF

THE PSYCHE 227

themovefromhephilosophyf consciousnessnd"subject-centeredreason" to the

philosophy

f

intersubjectivity

nd communicative

rationality.8Anything

hat would

challenge

thoroughgoing

hilo-

sophy

f

intersubjectivity,

s a monadic

ore of

the

psyche

ertainly

would,

poses

a threat

o

the

heartof Habermas'

heory.

Let me

develop

his

point

by contrasting

he

(modified)

antian

transcendentalismf

Habermas

o

the,

f

not

fully

Hegelian,

t least

anti-Kantian

ealism f

Castoriadis.

Habermas'

inguistic eworking

of

Kantian

philosophy

which

ttempts

o establish he

scope

and

validity

f the

different

pheres

of

rationalityhrough

reflection

on the conditions

f

the

possibility

f

the

types

of

communicative

action predictablyesults n the quintessential antianproblem:

namely,

he

Ding-an-sich,

nly

now

recast n

linguistic

erms. Toward

the

outside,

Habermas'

linguistic

ranscendentalism

revents

him

from

adequately

reaching

the

extra-linguistic

eality

of

external

(especially

iving)

nature.9

Considered

from

the

other

direction,

toward

the

inside,

will

try

to

show it

also

prevents

him

from

adequately eaching

he

pre-linguistic

eality

f inner

nature,

which

is to

say,

he

unconscious.

0

And,

n

general,

he

movefrom

he

philo-

sophy

of

consciousness

o the

philosophy

f

language,

despite

ts

successes n

resolving

ertain

hilosophical

roblems

oncerning

he

relationship

f

subject

o

subject,

oes

not

prove

o be

the

all-encom-

passingphilosophicalanaceathatHabermas nd hisfollowersften

hope

it will

be;

much

of

the

old,

that s

to

say, perennial

aggage

comes

long

n

the

ransition.Just s

the

philosophy

f

consciousness

had

difficulty

ranscending

he

circle

of

subjectivity

nd

reaching

he

other

idedness

of

consciousness,

o

paraphrase

Marx,

so

the

philo-

sophy

f

anguage

as the

parallel

difficulty

n

surmounting

he

arger

circle

of

intersubjectivity

nd

contacting

he other

idedness

of

lan-

guage

n

inner nd

outer

nature. Habermas'

tatement

hat

anguage

"is the

only

hing

whose

naturewe can

know,"

whichhe

made

n

his

Frankfurt

inaugural

Address

n

1965,

olds

for

him

ever

bit as

mucfc

today

s it

did then.

X

And

the

problem

ecomes

particularlyppar-

8

It

is

significant

hat the

excursus

on Castoriadis

immediately

ollows a

chapter

entitled

"An Alternative

Way

out

of the

Philosophy

of

the

Subject:

Communicative

ersus

Subject-Centered

eason."

The

Philosophical

Discourse

of Modernity, dd. 294-326.

9

See

Joel

Whitebook,

The Problem of

Nature

in

Habermas,"

Telos,

40,

Summer

1979,

pp.

41-69,

nd

Habermas

"A

Reply

to

my Critics,"

Habermas:

Critical

Debates,

ed.

John

Thompson

and David

Held,

(Cambridge,

Mass.: MIT

Press:

1982),pp.

238

ff.

10

This

particular argument,

s well

as

much of the

current

paper,

was

anticipated

n

Joel

Whitebook,

Reason and

Happiness:

Some

Psychoanalytic

Themes n

Critical

Theory,"

n

Habermas

and

Modernity,

d.

Richard

Bernstein,

(MIT

Press:

Cambridge,

Mass.:

1986),

p.

151

ff. It

is

also

interesting

o

note

that,

ccording

o

Castoriadis,

he

two

topics

which

"radically uestion

nherited

logic and onthology"nd demandnew,radicalizedformsof thinkingre, "theauto-organizationf living organismsand the unconscious," .e. biology and

psychoanalysis.

These

are

two areas

where the

application

of Habermas'

philo-

sophicalprogram,

would

say,

has not

produced

he

most

conspicuous

uccesses.

The

Imaginary

nstitution

f Society,p.

340.

ii

"Appendix:

Knowledge

nd Human Interests:A

General

Perspective,

now-

ledge

and Human

Interests," .

314.



5/21

228

J.

WHITEBOOK

ent in his treatmentf a pre-linguisticnconscious, nd,a fortiori,

of

a

monadic

core of

the

primal subject.

He

is

compelled

for

systematic

easons

simply

o dismiss the

notionof a

prelinguistic

unconscious x

cathedra. Such a

thicket

f

non-linguisticality

t the

center

f

the

subject

wouldbe an anathema o his entire

hilosophy.

If

Habermas s

content o remain t the Kantian

moment,

hat

s,

to remain n this side of

language,

nd is not

particularly

roubled

by

the

paradoxes

hat

emerge

s

a

result, astoriadis,

n

contrast,

s

preoccupied

with

nd

repeatedly

eturns o the

question

hat neces-

sarily

arose the

instant he

transcendental

ove had

been made:

What are

we to

make

of

this

Ding-an-sich

hich

we atfe orced o

posit, utaboutwhichwe cansaynothing?Acentral hesis f Casto-

riadis1,

hat,

n this

respect,

ets

him

in

opposition

not

only

to

Kantianism ut to

contemporary

ontextualism

s well

which,

n

any

case,

is

basically

the

Kantian

problematic

f

the

categorical

scheme

writ

arge

is

the

following:

t

is

incoherent

o

maintain hat

extra-conceptual

r

extra-linguistic

eality

s

pure

chaos,

"amorphous

clay,"

2

upon

which

we

can

impose

the

order,

ynthesis,

orm

tc.

of

our

conceptual/linguisticrids

t

will.

(After

ll,

the

history

f

sciencedemonstrates

hatnature

rejects"

omeof

our

grids.)

It fol-

lows

from his

very

act hat

we can

impose

ur

conceptual/linguistic

grids

n the

object,

an

organize

t,

hat he

object

s

at

least

menable

to that rganization,s in somesenseorganizable.Thus, heattempt

to

maintain he claim

that all

synthesis

s

on the

side

of

thought/

language

annot tself e

sustained

nd

already,

o a

certain

xtent,

propels

us

to

the other

ide of

thought/language.

or

example,

he

fact

that

history

f science

proceeds

hrough

succession

f

largely

incommensurate

aradigms

s,

of

course,

ften

dduced as a

prime

piece

of

evidencefor

contextual

elativism.

Castoriadis, owever,

goes

further

nd

inquires

nto

the

conditions f

the

possibility

f this

fact

tself,

hus

raising

he

anti-contextualist

uestion

hat

underlies

it:

namely,

what

must

the

organization

f

nature

be "that allows

[the

succession

f

paradigms]

o

exist

nd makes

them ccur

n the

order hat hey o,andnot nsomeother uitearbitraryrder..."?3

This

is not to

imply

hat

Castoriadis

ttempts

o

speak

about

the

object

in-itself

n

a

direct,

pre-Kantian,

nd

naivelymetaphysical

2

The

Imaginary

nstitution

f Society,p.

333.

13

Modern

Science

and

Philosophical

Interrogation,"

rossroads in

the

Labyrinth, p.

168-9.

Thus,

whereas

Castoriadis' "refutation

f contextualism"

proceeds

through

reference

o the

being-thus

f

the

extra-contextual

bject,

Habermas'

remains

trictly

within

the circle of

transcendental

ntersubjectivity

and

operates

completely

n this

side

of

language.

That

is,

Castoriadis

ttempts

to refute

the

insurpassability

f the

context

by

demonstrating

he

necessary

being-thus

f an

extra-contextual

bject

to which

contextual

frameworks an

refer.

Habermas,

n the

other

hand, ttempts o showthat thefactum f humancommunication s such indicates the existence of universalvalidity claims,

specific

to each

domain of

cognition,

which

transcend

ll

particular

ontextual

schemes.

The refutation f

contextualism

hus

would

be

achieved

exclusively

by

way

of

the consensus chieved

by

the

communication

ommunity

n

referring

to the

object,

that

is,

completely

romthis

side of

language

and

independently

fromthe

object.



6/21

INTERSUBJECTIVITY

AND

THE

MONADIC CORE

OF

THE

PSYCHE

229

manner. The pointrather s this: unlikeHabermas,who abstains

from

peaking

bout

the

object

altogether

or fear

of a

regression

into

metaphysics,

astoriadis

ttempts

o

forge

discourse

which

allows him

to

say

thatwhichwould be

incoherent ot to

say

about

the

object

n-itself,

ut to

say

t in a

non-metaphysical

ashion. This

is

the

modeof discourse

e calls

elucidation. As

we

shall

see,

then,

these

general

hilosophical

ifferences hich

eparate

Habermas

nd

Castoriadis

pply

mutatis

mutandis

o

their

nalyses

of

the

uncon-

scious.

It

represents

test

case,

of

sorts,

or

heir

ifferent

hiloso-

phical

pproaches.

II.

Habermasand

Castoriadis

urned

o

psychoanalysis,

s

Adorno,

Horkeimer,

arcuse nd

othershad

before

hem,

artly

n

response

to the

crisisof

Marxism.

Both

men

sought

o

overcome

he

mpasse

of

Marxian

hought

y

adding

second

dimension

o Marx's

materia-

listic

monism;

he econd

dimension

hich

ach

elaborated,

owever,

reflects

he

differences

n

philosophical

tyles

separating

he

two

thinkers.

Whereas

Habermas

ought

o

locate

that

econd

dimension

in a

communicatively

onceived

notion

of

practical

reason,

Casto-

riadissought o locate t in phantasy,r what he terms heradical

imagination.

Habermas s

primarily

nterestedn

psychoanalysis

or

methodological

easons;

t is

a

"tangible

xample"

6

of

a

successful

emancipatory

cience

which

ombines

ommunicative

ationality

ith

explanatory rocedures,

nd,

as

such,

can be

used

to

clarify

he

foundations

f

critical

theory.

Castoriadis,

n

the

other

hand,

is

primarily

oncerned

ith

Freud's

discovery

f

the

unconscious

which

he

seeks to

develop

nto

theory

f

the radical

magination.

And

he

uses

the doctrine

f

the

radical

magination,

n

turn,

o

counter

he

reductionism

ot

only

of

orthodox

Marxism,

ut

also of

orthodox

Freudianism,

hich,

f

course,

s

not

ntirely

issimilar

rom

t.

Each;

insofar s it attemptso reducethesymbolic o thereal (i.e. econo-

14

n

this

respect,

he

is close to

Adorno,

who, despite

his

modernistic, ost-

metaphysical

onsciousnesswhich bars

access to

the

object,

nevertheless

on-

tinually

trained

o reach

it.

Indeed,

this can be viewed as

the central

tension

animating

his entire

philosophy.

15

Knowledge

nd Human

Interests,

.

214.

This

emphasis

on

the

rationalist

side

of

Freud,

rather

han on

his

discovery

f

the

unconscious,

s

fully

onsistent

with

the

particular

way

Habermas

defends

modernity.

As

has

often

een

pointed

out,

Habermas

does not

primarily

ormulate

is defense n terms of

aesthetic

modernism,

ut in

terms f the three-fold

ifferentiationf

rationality,

f which

aesthetic modernism

i.e.

the

aesthetic-expressive

phere)

is but a

subordinate

moment.

Habermas does not

emphasize

the

restless, explosixe,

experimental

momentof aesthetic modernism nd the avant garde,what McCarthy erms"radical experience" which would correspondto the discoveryof the un^

conscious but

the

greater

differentiationf

Reason.

In this

respect,

Casto-

riadis concentration

n

the

radical

magination

ncorporates

more of the

mpulses

of aesthetic

modernism.

See

Tom

McCarthy,

Introduction,

he

Philosophical

Discourse

of

Modernity,

.

viii,

and

Martin

Jay,

"Habermas

and

Modernism,"

Habermas

and

Modernity, p.

125-139.



7/21

230

J.

WHITEBOOK

micandbiological-corporealeality espectively)xcludes hepossibi-

lity

of

authentically

utonomous

hought

nd action and of

genuine

historical

reation,

which

s

to

say,

the

emergence

f

radically

ovel

meanings

n

history.

To

the

extent

hat he

radical

magination

nter-

venes

between

hereal

and the

ymbolic

s a

potentially

nexhaustible

source

of new

meanings,

hat

reduction s

impossible.

The

radical

imagination

onsists

n a

largely

elf-generated

tream f

unconscious

representations

r

images

whichare

"not

subject

to

determinacy",

i.e.,

not

subject

to time

and

contradiction.

6

These

representations

provide

he

material or

the

daydreams

f the

man-on-the-streets

well

as

for

the

private

hallucinations

f

a

Schreber.

But,

in sub-

limatedform,hey an also be injected ntopublic nstitutionsndbecomethesource of

radically

ovelhistorical

nnovations,

hat

s,

of

"new

figures

f the

thinkable."

7

Castoriadis'

heory

f the

radical

magination

iffers rom

reud's

theory

f

unconscious

hantasy

n

the

degree

f

autonomy

t

assigns

to

the

formation

f

those

phantasies

vis-a-vis

iological-corporeal

reality;

hantasy

ormation

s,

in

other

words,

much

ess

rooted n

the

biological-corporeal,

nd

therefore

much

more

spontaneous,

or

Castoriadis,

han

t is

for

Freud.

This

allows

Castoriadis

o

appro-

priate

Freud

to

radicalize

ocial

theory

y

offering

theory

f

histor-

ical

creation,

while,

t the

same

time,

voiding

he

conservativeen-

denciesof orthodox sychoanalysishichtends to viewphantasies

(and

the

social

nstitutions

eriving

rom

hem)

s

the

eternal

epeti-

tion

of

an

"old

medley"

8

based

on

a few

drive-related

otifs.

To

pull

this

off,

owever,

astoriadis

must

face

another,

omplementary

difficulty:

amely,

ow to

maintain

he

degree

of

independence

or

the

radical

magination

equired

y

his

theory f

historical

reation

without

oosing

ts

moorings

n the

real

altogether.

He

remains

oo

much

of

a

Marxist

nd a

Freudian

and

rightfully

o

-

to disas-

sociate

the

radical

magination

orm

he

real

completely.

As we

shall

see,

he

enlists

Freud's

doctrine f

"leaning-on"

German:

Anlehnung

or

Greek:

naclisis)

n an

attempt

o solve

this

difficulty.

For the moment, owever,et us note thatCastoriadis entral

criticism

f

Freud

s

thathe

devoted

a

largepart

of

his

work"

rying

to

mitigate

he

radicalness

f

his

breakthrough,

hich

consisted

n

the

"discovery

f

the

maginary

lement n

the

psyche,"

y

seeking

"'real'

factors

hat

would

accountfor

the

history

f the

psyche,

ts

organization,

nd

finally,

ven

ts

being,"

9

e.g.

n

the

biological,

nfan-

tile

seduction,

he

primal

cene,

historical

vents

tc.

Against

his

**

The

Imaginary

nstitution

f Society,p.

274.

Crossroads

n

the

Labyrinth,

.

xx.

Castoriadis' otion f

the radical

imaginationan be comparedoHannahArendt's otion fnatality,hich he

too

uses to

combat

historical

eterminismnd

account or

the

possibility

f

radically

ew

beginnings

n

history.

ee The

Human

Condition,

Chicago:

Uni-

versity

f

Chicago

ress:

1973).

*

8

The

Imaginary

nstitution

f Society,o. 311.

i

The

Imaginary

nstitution

f

Society,

p.

281.



8/21

INTERSUBJECTIVITY

AND THE MONADIC CORE

OF

THE

PSYCHE

231

tendency,astoriadiswants o assert"therelativendependencend

autonomy

f

phantasizing"

0

vis-a-vishe real.

Everything

urns,

f

course,

n how that

relative

utonomy

s understood.

The dilemmas

astoriadis ncountersn

trying

o determine hat

relative

utonomy

are

by

no means

proper

o

Freud

lone,"

but,

on

the

contrary,

have a venerable raditionn

philosophy."21

On

the

one

hand,

f

too

much

ndependence

s

assigned

to the

productive

imagination,

ne

runs

the risk

of

a

psychoanalytic

ersionof sub-

jective

dealism:

If

this

psyche

roduces verything

ut of

itself,

f it

is

sheer

nd

total

roduction

f ts

own

representations

ith

espect

o

their

orm

(organization)nd to their ontent,e can wonder owandwhy t

should vermeet

nything

ther

han

tself nd its

own

products.22

While

Castoriadis

s

certainly

ware

of

this

danger,

s the

foregoing

passages

ndicates,

shall

try

o show

hat

ltimately

e is not

entirely

successful

n

avoiding

t.

If,

on theother

and,

he

psyche

borrows"

the

material

nd

organization

or ts

representations

rom he

real,

the

question

rises

as to how the

real can

make

an

impression

n

or

register

n

the

psyche

which s

heterogeneous

o

it. Castoriadis

argues

that the answerto the

paradox

of

representation

annot

be

found

outside

epresentation

tself" nd that

an

"original

epresen-

tation"mustbe positedwhich, s a "schemata ffiguration",ould

"contain

within

tself he

possibility

f

organizing

ll

representations,"

and,

as

such,

would

be the condition

f the

possibility

f all

further

representations

n the

psyche.

Freud,

s

we

know,

maintains

hatthe

real first

nnounces

tself

in the

psyche

hrough

he

unpleasurable

ffect

ssociated

with

hunger.

The

child,

drawing

n

previous

xperience

f

satisfaction,

hich

s

to

say,drawing

n traces

f the

real,

forms

hallucinatory

epresen-

tation

f the breast

n an

attempt

o restore

he state

of

psychical

tranquility'

hat

existed

prior

to

the intrusion

f

the

real

through

the

unpleasurable

ffect. This

hallucinated

breast

becomes,

for

Freud, heoriginal hantasmicepresentationndhallucinatoryish-

fulfillment

ecomes

the

prototype

or all

further

hantasy-

nd

dream-formation.

astoriadis

rgues,

however,

hatthe

hallucinated

breast s

already secondary

r "constituted"

hantasy

which

tself

presupposes

prior

"'constituting1hantasy-phantasmatization."

4

He

maintains

hat

we cannot

est ontent

with

hallucinatory

ish-ful-

fillment

s an

ultimate

atum,

but

must

nquire

nto that

state of

psychic

ranquility

hat

obtained

prior

to

the

intrusion

f

the

un-

pleasurable

ffect nd

which

he child

seeks

to restore

hrough

he

hallucination.

Castoriadis

posits

the

existence

f an

original

/r-

20

The

Imaginary

nstitution

f

Society,

p.

282.

2i

The

Imaginary

nstitution

f Society,

p.

282.

22

The

Imaginary

nstitution

f Society,p.

282.

23

The

Imaginary

nstitution

f Society, .

283.

24

The

Imaginary

nstitution

f

Society, .

285.



9/21

232

J. WHITEBOOK

Vorstellung,roto-representationrphantasmatization,hich annot

be traced

to the

real,

and which

cannotbe a

representation

n

the

ordinary

ense

for t s

notthe

representationf

anything;

ather,

t

s

a

"phantasmatic

cene",

r a

"unitaryubjective

ircuit,"

which oes

not

admit

any

externality,

nd

where

the

difference

etween

nside

and

outside,

ubject

and

object,

nfant nd breast etc. has

yet

to

emerge.

After

ll,

"The

discovery'

f the

breast

s absent ..

s made

only

n

relation o and

on the

basis of the

requirement

hat

nothing

is to

be

absent,

nothing

s to

be

lacking."

How,

then,

does

this "monadic

core

of the

primal

subject"

or

state

of

"initial

utism,"27

s he

calls

it,

"containwithin

tself he

possibility f organizing ll representations"? astoriadis rgues

that

the

requirement

or

complete

unification

posited by

[this]

original epresentation",

8

ontinues o

operate

fter he

break-up

f

the

initial tate and

we

shall

have to

inquire

nto the natureof

that

break-up

when

t is

transferred

o the

"monadic

pole"

of the

psyche.

The

monadic

ole

exerts

"tendency

owards nification"ver

the

restof

psychic

ife

whichhas

the most

diverse nd even contra-

dictory

effects,

anging

from

the

complete

irrationality

f

the

unconscious

o

the

higest

chievementsf

Reason. On the

level of

unconscious

mentation,

herethe

demand

for

complete

nification

continueso "reignnthefullest,awest,most avage nd intractable

manner,"

it

accounts

for the

utter

ndeterminacy

f

the

primary

processes:

n

this

evel,

he

monadic

ole

attempts

o "short ircuit"

all

difference

in

order

to

carry

t back

to an

impossible

monadic

'state'

nd,

failing

o

do

so,

to it

substitutes,

allucinatory

atisfaction

and

phantasizing."

0

In

the

more

conscious,

ocialized strata of

the

psyche,

he

unifying

ntention

f

the monadic

pole

is

enlisted o

synthesize

he

manifold

f

contents

manating

rom

he outside nto

the

relative

nity

f

experience.

t

is

in this sense

that t

provides

the

schematafor

assimilating

ll

representations

oming

nto

the

psyche;

t

is

not

simply

he

synthetic

unction f the

ego

but

of

the

psyche n general. In a manner imilar o thetranscendentalnity

of

apperception,

t is

the

source

of

the

"I

think"

which

ccompanies

all

representations

nd

makes

them

my

representations.

nd,

ike

the

transcendental

nity

f

apperception,

s it is the

precondition

for

all other

representations,

t

cannot itselfbe

represented;

we

only

nfer

t

through

ts

effects. At

an even

higher

evel

yet,

this

intention

oward

unification,

ransformed

nto the demand

for

"uni-

versal

cognitive

onnection" nd

"universal

ignificance",

ecomes

a

sourceof

the

highest

chievementsf

mental

ife:

25The Imaginarynstitution f Society, . 298.

26

The

Imaginary

nstitution

f Society, .

291.

2?

The

Imaginary

nstitution

f Society,p. 294.

28

The

Imaginary

nstitution

f Society, .

283.

29

The

Imaginary

nstitution

f Society,p. 297.

30

The

Imaginary

nstitution

f

Society,p.

302.



10/21

INTERSUBJECTIVITY AND

THE MONADIC

CORE OF THE

PSYCHE

233

The spermof reason is also contained n the completemadnessofthe initial autism. An essential dimensionof

religion

this

goes

without

aying

but

also an essential

dimension

f

philosophy

nd

of science

derivefrom

his.

One does not

put

reason where

t

should

be, and,

what is even

more

serious one

cannot

reach a reasonable

attitudewith

respect

o

reason

..

f

one

refuses o see

in

it

something

other

than,

f

course,

but

also,

an avatar of the

madness of unifica-

tion.

Whether

t is the

philosopher

r

the

scientist,

he

final and

dominant

ntention

to

find,

cross difference

nd

otherness,

mani-

festations

f the same

.. s based on the same

schema of a

final,

hat

is

to

say,

primal

unity....81

Finally,as

it is

the opposite

of

Habermas'

position,

mention should

be made of the fact

that,

for

Castoriadis,

the monadic

pole

of the

psyche

is a source of individuation. As

a

kind

of Aristotelian

prime

matter which cannot

be

exhaustively

nformed

by

the

socialization

process

and

therefore esists

complete

absorption

into the

common

world

kosmoskoinos)

t

"assures

he ndividual

singular

dentity."

2

Thus far we

have examined astoriadis1

ttempt

o

conceptualize

the

autonomous

spect

of

the

psyche's unctioning

is-a-vishe

real.

We mustnow examine

he

problem

rom he

other

direction,

amely,

with

respect

to its

non-autonomous

elationship

o

extra-psychic

reality.

To

conceptualize

he

relationship

etween

he

radical

magi-

nation nd thereal, r,more pecifically,etween hantasy-formation

and

biological-corporeal

eality,

astoriadis,

s I have

already

ndi-

cated,

employs

Freud's

notion

of

"leaning-on,"

hich

he

expands

into

an almost

quasi-ontological

ategory.

To

be

sure,

s

Laplanche

and

Pontalis have

pointed

out,

the central

and

pervasive

role of

notion

f

Anlehnung

n

Freud's

thinking

s often

missed

by

the

non-

German

eader,

who

generally

ssociates

t

only

with

type

f

object

choice.33

But Castoriadis

wants to

go

further.

He

insists

hat the

concept

f

"leaning-on",

long

with

the notion

of

the

radical

magi-

nation,

s

both

"as

original

nd irreducible"

concept

s

cause

or

symbol,

nd

absolutely

necessary

for

"[thinking]

therwise":

he

simultaneouselatednessutnon-reducibilityhich haracterizeshe

"gaps"

separating

hevarious

regions

f

being,34

.g.

betweenvital

and

inanimate

henomena,

ociety

nd

nature,

nd

psyche

nd

soma,

cannot

be

conceptualized

within

the

"inherited

ogic-ontology,"

but

require

he

concept

f

eaning-on.

n each

case,

the

first

member

of the

pair

eans-on he

second.

With

espect

o our

topic,

hen,

whatdoes

it mean

for

he

psyche

to

lean-on

biological-corporealeality?

In the

first

nstance,

he

psyche's

utonomy

is-a-vis he


s not

absolute

si

The Imaginarynstitution f Society, . 299.82The Imaginarynstitutionf Society, . 302.

33

The

Language

of Psychoanalysis,

rans.

Donald

Nicholson-bmith.

New

YorJc:

W.W.

Norton

&

Co.:

1973).

pp.

29-32.

34

"Modern Science

and

Philosophical Interrogation,

Crossroads

in

the

Labyrinth,

p.

217 ff.

35

The

Imaginary

nstitution

f

Society,p.

290.



11/21

234

J.

WHITEBOOK

because "therecan be no oral instinctwithout mouthand thebreast,

no anal

instinct

without an

anus."

By

this

statement,

Castoriadis

does not

simply

mean that the

bodily organs

are

mere

external

conditions without

which the drive and its related

phantasies

cannot

exist:

[T]he

existence f the

mouth and

breast,

or of the

anus,

is not

a

mere

external

ondition',

withoutwhich therewould be

no oral or

anal

instinct,

r more

generally,

o

psychical

unctioning

s we know

it

in

the same

way

as it is clear

that

without

oxygen

n

the

atmosphere

or

circulatory ystem

there would

be

no

psyche,

no

phantasies

r

sublimation.

Oxygen

ontributes

othing

o

phantasies,

it 'allows them

to

exist'....

He

means, rather,

that the

morphology

nd mode

of

functioning

f

the

pertinent

rgans

contribute o

the

drive-related

hantasies

in that

they

delineate the

range

of

possible

forms those

phantasies

can

assume:

...The

mouth-breast,

r the

anus,

have

to be

'taken

nto

account1

y

the

psyche

nd,

what is

more,

hey

upport

nd

induce... The

privi-

leged

somatic

data will

always

be

taken

up

again

by

the

psyche,

psychical

working

ut

will

have

to 'take

them nto

account/

hey

will

leave

theirmark

on

it....3^

Formtheotherside,however,while these


actors

necessarily

"support

and induce"

the

phantasy,

they

do

not cause or

determine t.

It

is

therefore

mpossible,

within the

"identitary

rame

of

reference f

determinacy."

o

state

with

"which mark

and in what

manner"

these

"privileged

omatic

data"

will

affect

the

phantasy.

A

gap

of

undetermination

separates

the


sub-

stratum

from

the

drive-related

hantasy,

and it is

precisely

in this

gap

that

the

"creativity

f

the

psyche"

functions;

his

gap

also

makes

the

reduction

of

the

drives

to

the


mpossible.

Thus,

while

we

know

that

every

ndividual

and

society

will

necessarily

take

up

these

privileged

somatic

factors and

rework

them in its

formation,we can predictnothing bount the determinateform

they

will

assume

in

a

given

individual

or

society.

The

attempt

to com-

prehend

the

relationship

f

the

drive

to its

biological

substratum

from

within

the

identitary

ogic

thus

leads

to the

paradoxical

violation of

one of

the

central

canons

of

scientific

thinking:

"In the

name of

the

scientific

nd

rigorous

mind,

one

ends

up

once

again

with this

scientific

monstrosity

s a

consequence:

constant

factors

produce

variable

effects."37

Finally,

we

must

address

the

question

of

the

break-up

of

the

psychic

monad.

Castoriadis's

thesis

stated in

its

sharpest

or

most

rhetorical)

form

and

this

s

where

Habermas

lodges his main objection

-

is asfollows: the "social institutionof the

individual,"

which is simul-

8*

The

Imaginary nstitution f Society, . 290.

5T

The

Imaginary

nstitution

f

Society,p.

316.



12/21

INTERSUBJECTIVITY

NDTHE

MONADIC ORE

OF

THE

PSYCHE 235

taneously processof psychogenesisidiogenesis) nd sociogenesis

(koinogenesis)

consists n the

"imposition

n the

psyche" y society

"of an

organization

hich s

essentially eterogeneous

ith t."

38

As

the

psyche

s

"in no

way

predestinated'

sic)

by

nature"for sociali-

zation,

his

mposition

amounts o a

violent

break,

forced

on

it]

by

ts

relation' o others...."

0.

Stated

n this

form,

owever,

he hesis

is incoherent:

f

the

heterogeneity

etween

syche

nd

society

were

as

complete

astoriadis'

uggests

n

these,

his most

extreme

ormu-

lations,

the

socialization

process

would not

simply

be

violent,

t

would be

impossible.

In this

respect,

there exists a

tension

between he

heterogeneity

hesis

nd

Castoriadis' se

of the

doctrine

of anaclisis. At the same timeas he asserts the essentialhetero-

geneity

etween

syche

nd

society

he

also

asserts as

he must

that he

social

order tlleans-on'

he

being

of the

psyche."

0

But this

would

mean that

here

s

already

omething

mmanentn the

monad

upon

which

ocialization

an

lean,

.e.

it

is

not

the

absolute

other

f

society.

And,

indeed,

this

follows

from

Castoriadis'

nti-Kantian

use

of

anaclisis

as a central

doctrine f

his

entire

philosophy:

n

order

for

any region

of

being

to

lean-on

nother,

we

must

posit

something

ithin

he second

region

which,

while

"not

thoroughly

or

ultimately

ongruent"

ith

the

first

everthelesslends

tself

o*1

that anaclisis.

1

Concerning

ur

topic,

Castoriadis

never,

however,

adequatelyheorizeshat lementwithinhepsyche hat lends tselfto" socialization.

Empirically,

s it

were,

he

break-up

f

the

monad

commences

t

the

point

where

hunger

irst

nnounces

tself

nto the

monad. How-

ever,

hunger,

n and

of

tself,

explain[s]

nothing,"

or

he

canonical'

response

o need is

hallucination nd

phantasmatic

atisfaction."42

To illustrate

he relative

trength

nd

independence

f

the

maginary

factor

n

this

context,

astoriadis

dduces the

example

f

anorexia:

To be

sure,

he

magination

oes

not

provide

alories nd

f

nothing

else were

o take

place

the

nfant ould

die

as

indeed e

does die

as

a

result f his

magination

nd

despite

he

foodhe is

offered,

f

he s anorexic.3

Somewhat

ronically,

he

example

f

anorexia

oints

o the

very

iffi-

culties n Castoriadis'

osition

have been

attempting

o

bring

ut.

For

if he

has not ocated

something

ithin

he monadwhich

makes

it

capable

of

opening p

to and

registering

xternal

eality,

e

cannot

explain

how

hallucinatory

ish

fulfillment

s

ever

renounced.

4

To

38

The Imaginary nstitution f Society, d. 298 and 301.

39

The

Imaginary

nstitution

f Society, p.

300-301.

40

The

Imaginary

nstitution

f Society,p.

298.

4*

The Imaginarynstitution f Society, . 273.42The Imaginarynstitution f Society,p. 302.

43

The

Imaginary

nstitution

f Society,p.

302.

4*

Beginning

with the

posit

of

primary utism,

he

is shackled

with

all the

insoluble

dilemmas

which

confronted reud's notion

of

primary

arcissism,

nd

which

are,

as

Laplanche

has

argued, imply

he insurmountable

poria

of Carte-

sian

solipsism

recast

in

psychoanalytic

erms. On

the

assumption

f a

totally



13/21

236 J.

WHITEBOOK

be fair, his s not a Castoriadis' roblem lone,but one he shares

with

no

less a

figure

hanFreudwho

begins

with n

equally

monadic

starting oint.

Freud could never

xplain

how

a

"psychical

ppara-

tus"

operating

ccording

to

the

pleasure

principle

alone,

could

renounce

allucinatory

ish

fulfillment

nd "decide to

form

con-

ception

f the

real

circumstances

n

the external

world nd

endeavor

to

make

a

real

alterationn them." A

psyche

perating

ccording

o

the

pleasure

principle

lone

cannotdecide

anything.

5

There

s,

however,

less extreme

ormulationn

Castoriadis

where

he

does

not

ssert

hat

syche

nd

society

re

radically

eterogeneous,

but

only

that the

psyche

"can never

generate"

ociability

out

of

itself,"which s a differenttoryndeed. Themoreextreme ormu-

lation s

the

result

f

a

faculty

nference rom

heweaker

ne:

Casto-

riadis

wants

to conclude

from

he

fact "that

he

psyche's

ntry

nto

society

ould

never

occur

gratuitously,"

6

that the

psyche

s "in

no

way 'predestinated'

y

nature"

for socialization.

All

that

follows,

however,

rom

he

factthat

psyche

an never

utochthonouslyene-

rate a

socialized

ndividual ut

of

itself

s

only

that

a

"facilitating

environment"

7

s

necessary

or

ocialization

o

unfold.

Indeed,

here

are

passages

n

Castoriadis

imself

which

deny

the

inherent

socia

bility

f

the

psyche:

This s thehistoryf thepsychenthecourse fwhich hepsyche

alters

tself

nd

opens

tself

o the ocial-historical

orld,

epending

too,

n

its

own

work

nd ts own

reativity.

8

This

statement

resupposes

he

existence f a

potentiality

mmanent

in

the

psyche

dare

we

say

an

Anlage?

which s

not

only

"lends

itself

o"

socialization

ut which an

"support

nd

induce t"

as well.

I

believe

Castoriadis ould

not

incorporate

he

significance

f

these

Anlagen

which end

themselves

o socialization nto

his

theory,

s

he

should

have,

for

wo

reasons. The

first

s the

general

ostility

n

the

French

sychoanalytic

radition

both

Lacanian

nd

non-Lacanian)

closed,

monadic

tarting

oint,

with

complete

nd utter

rrelation

etween

internal

onsciousness

nd the

external

orld,

here

s

no

way

out:

it is as

impossible

or

Freud o

distinguished

etween

erceptions

nd

hallucinationss

it

was for

Descartes

o

distinguish

etween

eridical

nd adventitiousdeas.

See

Laplanche,

ife

nd Death

n

Psychoanalysis,

rans.

effrey

ehlman,Baltimore:

The

Johns

opkins

niversity

ress:

1976), p.

70

ff.

45

Freud,

Formulations

n the Two

Principles

f

Mental

Functioning,"

Standard

ditions.

ol.

XII,

p.

219.

This

problem,

tated n

psychological

erms,

is

exactly arallel

o the

central

roblem

f

social

contract

heory.

A

group

f

individuals

iving

n

a

state f

naturewouldnever

ave

the

tructures

vailable

to

them

o enter

nto

contract.Just s the

decision"

o

form contractnd

enter

nto an

institution

resupposes

he

existence f

institutions,

o the

"decision" o

renounce

he

pleasure

rinciple

nd

recognize

eality

rinciples

already resupposesherenunciationf thepleasure rinciple.

46

The

Imaginary

nstitution

f Society,p.

311.

47

See

D.W.

Winnicott,

he

Maturational

rocess

and

the

Facilitating

nviron-

ment:

Studies

in

the

Theory

of

Emotional

Development, New

York:

Inter-

national

Universities

ress:

1974), p.

223

and

239.

48

The

Imaginary

nstitution

f

Society,

p.

300.



14/21


15/21

238

J. WHITEBOOK

the go'sflightromtselfs an operationhat s carriedut nandwith anguage.Otherwiset wouldnot be

possible

o reverse he

defensive

rocess

ermeneutically,

ia the

nalysis

f

anguage.

*

Habermas

onceives f

repression

s a

process

of

excommunication.

When,

n

the

course

of

development,

the nfantile

go"

s confronted

with the

social

prohibition

f

forbiddenwishes

personified

n

the

form

f

frightening

arental

igures,

t has no

choice,

because of

its

inherent

weakness,

but to

take

"flight

rom tself nd

objectivate

itself n

the

d."

65

(To

the

detriment

f his

analysis,

abermas

does

not

systematically

istinguish

etween

he

unconscious nd

the

id.)

This

flight

onsists

n the

excommunicationf therepresentationfthosewishesfrompublic,

ntersubjective

ommunication

hrough

their

degrammaticization

nd

privatization:

The

psychically

most

effective

ay

to

render

undesiredneed

dispositions

armless s

to

exclude

from public

communication

he

interpretations

o

which

they

re

attached."

6

As

a

psychic

ealm,

he

unconscious

s

consti-

tuted

as

the

repository

f

all

those

excommunicated

ua

distorted,

degrammaticized,

nd

privatized

epresentations,

nd,

s

such,

ssumes

the

character

f

an

internal

oreign

erritory.

ts

foreignness,

ow-

ever,

s

only

relative

nd

not

absolute,

or,

espite

he

distortions,

t

remains

essentially

linguistic

domain.57

"The

communication

between

he

two

systems,"

s

Freud

called

it,58s,forHabermas,nprinciplet least,nota problem;whateverechnical ifficultiesuch

translation

ay

present,

he

talking

ure

consists

n the

regrammati-

cization

f

those

excommunicated

ut

essentially

inguistic

epresen-

tations

nd

their

eintegration

nto

public

communication.

Habermas'

ommitment

o the

inguistic

osition

s

so

strong

hat

he

is

compelled

o

eliminate

ystematically

he

existence

f

anyputa-

tively

re-linguistic

henomena

y

assimilating

heir

pparent

pre-

linguisticality

o the

inguistic.

This

strategy

s

evident

n the

follow-

ing

passage,

which

s

not

only

o

inaccurate s

to be

almost

bizarre,

but

which

lso

points

o

the

fundamental

ifficulty

ith

Habermas'

approach:

us

every ay

that

translation

f

this

kind

s

possible."

Freud,

The

Unconscious/

Standard

Edition.

Vol.

XIV. p.

166.

54

Knowledge

nd

Human

Interests, .

241. For

the

purposes

of

this

paper*

I

must

leave

aside

the

critical

question

of

whether

Habermas,

or

any

of

the

linguistic

einterpreters

f

Freud

for

that

matter,

an

adequately

account for

the

dynamic,

conomic

nd

affective

lements

nvolved

n

analysis, .g.

working

through,

within

he

theoretical

onfines f

their

inguistic eformulations.

55

Knowledge

nd

Human

Interests, .

258.

56

Knowledge

nd

Human

Interests, p.

223-34.

57

in

its

broad

outlines,

Habermas'

position

nvites

comparison

with

Lacan's.

Not

only

does he

maintain

hat the

unconscious

s

essentially

linguistic

ntity,

but he

also

argues

that

only

a

sophisticated

inguistic heory,

hich

was

unavail-

able to Freud,can overcome heanachronisms n Freud'stheorizing,idpsycho-

analysis

of

biologism

and

place

it on

firm

methodological

oundations. The

linguistic

heories hat

Habermas

enlists,

hermeneuticsnd

universal

pragmatics*

are,

of

course,

differenthan

the

one to

which

Lacan

turned,

.e.

structuralism.

See

Knowledge nd Human Interests,n. 241.

8

"The

Unconscious/'

.

190.



16/21

INTERSUBJECTIVITY

AND THE

MONADIC CORE OF

THE

PSYCHE

239

Only n the mediumof languageis the heritageof man's natural

history

rticulatedn theformof

interpreted

eeds: the

heritage

f

a

plastic

mpulsepotential,

which,

while

pre-oriented

n

libidinal nd

aggressive

irections,

s

otherwise

ndefined,

wing

to its

uncoupling

from inherited

motor

activity.

On the

human

level,

instinctual

demands re

represented

y

interpretations,

hat

s,

by

hallucinatory

wishfulfillmentsemphasis dded).59

In this

passage,

Habermas'

Kantianism

is in

full

view.

Remaining

squarely

on this side of

language,

he

wants to

maintain

that,

as

we

only

encounter

the

drives

qua interpreted,

hat

is,

from

within the

web

of

intersubjectivity,

t is

meaningless

to refer o a

pre-interpreted

inner nature. Freud's entire drive theory,however, consisted pre-

cisely

in the

attempt,

f

not

to

theorize

nner

nature

an

sich,

at

least

to theorize

the

"frontier"

Grenze)

w

between

soma and

psyche

(not

to mention the frontier

etween the

image

and

the

word).

Indeed,

it would

not

be

excessive to

assert,

as

Grossman

has,61

that

Freud

was

essentially

a

theorist

of

frontiers; nd,

as

Hegel

already

argued

against

Kant,

to

attempt

to

determine

he

limit of a

frontier

Grenze)

is

already

to cross

over

it.

Habermas,

in

contrast,

ather

than

theorizing

he

frontier

etween

the

prelinguistic

and

the

linguistic,

that

is,

rather

than

theorizing

the

coming-to-be

f

language,

extends the

web of

intersubjectivity

o

far as to incorporate the prelinguistic nto it; hence, the strange

equation

of

hallucinatory

wish

fulfillments ith

interpretations

the

most that could

possibly

be

said is

that

they

are

both

representa-

tions).

Were such an

equation

correct,

a

central

distinction

of

Freud's entire

theoretical

construction,

amely,

between the

progres-

sive

and

regressive

functioning

f

the

psyche,

would

be

obliterated.

When the

psyche

operates

in

a

"progressive"

direction,

excitation

moves toward the

"motor end

of the

apparatus,"

and

the

individual

seeks

gratification

hrough

ction

in

the

external,

ublic,

inguistically

mediated world.

Hallucinatory

wish-fulfillment,

owever,

is the

result of

the

psyche's

tendency

o work

in "a

backward

direction";

62

excitation moves toward the "sensory end" of the apparatus, the

individual

eschews

the external

world

as

a

source of

gratification,

and seeks

pleasure

through private,

asocial,

phantasms.

Habermas

ignores

"the

most

general

and the

most

striking

sychological

charac-

teristic"of a dream

(the

prototype

f

hallucinatory

wish

fulfillment),

namely,

that "a

thought

of

something

hat

is

wished is

represented,"

not as a

statement,but,

pictorially,

as a scene."

63

Insofar

as

they

are

linguistic,

nd

therefore ublic

and

intersubjective,

hen,

nterpre-

69

Knowledge

nd Human

Interests, .

239.

o

See

Freud.

"Instincts

nd

their

Vicissitudes/'

tandard

Edition.

Vol.

XIV,d. 122.

61

William

Grossman,

"Hierarchies,

Boundaries and

Representation

n a

Freudian Model

Organization,"

1st

Sandor

Rado

Lecture,

Columbia

Psycho-

analytic

nstitute.

June

7.

1988

unpublished).

2

The

Interpretation

f

Dreams,

Standard

Edition,

Vol.

V,

p.

534.

63

Freud,

The

Interpretation

f Dreams,

p.

534.



17/21

240

J.

WHITEBOOK

tations re precisely heoppositeof pictorial, rivate, nd autistic

hallucinations.

However,

f

wisheswere

in fact

inguistically

nter-

preted

via

their

hallucinatoryepresentation,

s

Habermas

asserts,

they

would

pso facto

be

linked

with

public, ulturally

efined nter-

pretations

nd the

requirements

f his

philosophical

rogram

would

be met:

drive

epresentations

ouldbe

included

n

the web of inter-

subjectivity

nd

"rooted n the

meaning

tructures f the

ife-world,

no

matter ow

elementary..."

from

he start.

Given

he

foregoing

onsiderations,

abermas'

riticisms

f

Casto-

riadis

should

come

as no

surprise.

He

argues

that,

havingposited

"the

stream

f the

imaginary

imension"

nd

the

"monadic

ore

of

subjectivity,"astoriadis annot solve the problemwhichplagued

"the

philosophy

f

consciousness

romFichte to

Husserl,"

namely,

"the

ntersubjectivity

f

social

praxis

hat

s

compelled

o

begin

from

the

premise

f

isolated

consciousness."

He

proceeds

o

argue

that,

in

Castoriadis'

onception,

socialized

ndividuals

o

not

enter

nto

inter

ubjective

elationships

ith

one

another n

any genuine

ense

of

the

term."

Ultimately,

nd

this

s Habermas'

main

point,

Casto-

riadis

cannot

provide

us

with

the

figure

f

mediation

etween he

individual

nd

society."

In

Castoriadis,

he

socialized

individual

remains

divided

nto

monad

and

member

f

society,"

nd

"psyche

and

society

stand

in a

kind

of

metaphysical

pposition

to

one

another."5 As I havealreadyndicated,hecriticismsre not enti-

rely

nfounded,

nd

I

shall

return

o

them

elow.

For

now,

however,

would

ike

to

point

out

that he

main

charge

Habermas

evels

againstCastoriadis,

amely,

hathe

cannot

provide

the

mediation

etween

ndividual

nd

society,

an

itself

be

turned

against

Habermas

but

from

he

oppositedirection).

Habermashim-

self

does

not

provide

genuine

ccount

f

the

mediation

f

ndividual

and

society,

ecause

he

solves

the

problem,

t

least in

principle,

n

advance

thorough

he

pre-established

armony

etween n

already

linguistic

nconscious

nd

an

intersubjective

ocial

world.

The

pro-

blem

of

mediation

nly

rises

when

here s a

sufficient

ifference

o

be mediated.Habermas,n short, urchases hemediation etween

psyche

nd

society

by

d&radicalizing

reud's

notion

of

the

uncon-

scious.

Habermas

s

correct n

arguing

hat

"language

unctionss

a

kind

of

transformer"

ft

hich

draws

the

ndividual

nto

the nter-

subjective

ocial

world.

But

it

does

not

do

so

without

residuum

of

private

n-itselfness

without

whichwe

would

all

be

pre-coordi-

nated

clones

and

it is

this

residuum

hat

does

not

adequately

appear

in

Habermas'

account.

Adorno,

s we

know,

praised

the

orthodox

sychoanalytic

heory

f

the

drives,

ven

with

ts

biologism,

for

preserving

he

moment f

non-identity

etween

ndividual

nd

society.

And

whereas

e

(as

well

as

Castoriadis),

fter

aving

rama-

w

Knowledge nd Human nterests, . 256.

66

The

Philosophical

Discourse

of Modernity,n>. 333-34.

6

Jurgen

abermas,

A

Postscript

o

Knowledge

nd

Human

Interest,"

hilo-

sophy

of

the

Social

Sciences.

3

(1970),p.

170.



18/21

INTERSUBJECTTVITY

NDTHE MONADIC

ORE

OF

THE

PSYCHE

241

tized the moment of difference, ave difficultyn accountingfor the

moment of

identity

between

psyche

and

society,

Habermas

is

in

danger

of

loosing sight

of the moment of

non-identity

ltogether.

Habermas

believes he has

solved the

problem by rejecting

Castoriadis'

techne

model

of

socialization,

in which social

form is

imposed

on

asocial

matter,

n favor of a model

that

views

socialization

as

simul-

taneously

process of

individuation:

[L]anguage

has to be conceived

f as a medium

hat

both

draws

each

participant

n interaction nto a

community

f

communication,

s

one of its

members,

nd at

the same time

subjects

him

to an

un-

relenting ompulsion

oward ndividuation.That is

to

say,

the

inte-

gration f perspectives f speaker,hearer and observer, s well asthe

intermeshing

f this

structurewith a

system

f world

perspec-

tives that

coordinates he

object

world

with

the social and

the

sub-

jective

worlds,

are

pragmatic

presuppositions

f

a

correct

use

of

gammatical

entences n

speech

acts.**

The

concept

of

individuation

employed

in this

intersubjectivity and the monadic core of the psyche: habermas and castoriadis on the unconscious

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