interview with maj justin hirniak

US Army Sustainment Command

Interview with MAJ Justin Hirniak

UNCLASSIFIED

Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

Abstract In 2003, the Army Field Support Command (AFSC) and the Joint Munitions Command

(JMC), collocated at Rock Island Arsenal, Illinois, began a comprehensive oral history

project aimed at chronicling a full-spectrum slice of the commands’ role in Operation

Iraqi Freedom, Operation Enduring Freedom and the Global War on Terrorism

(GWOT) broadly defined. Because the command was over 90 percent Department of the

Army (DA) civilians and heavily augmented by contractors, the command realized by

2003 that they were managing the largest ever deployment of DA civilians and

contractors into a combat area, and so, over 150 interviews were conducted focusing on

the GWOT-related experiences of DA civilian members of the two commands during

2003 and 2004. Starting at the same time, Mr. George Eaton, currently command

historian at US Army Sustainment Command (ASC), has conducted to date almost 200

more interviews with DA civilians, contractors and uniformed military personnel. This

oral history project aims at delivering an overall picture of the activities and duties of

the various components of AFSC and JMC and their combined efforts to support the

Army’s worldwide operations. The interviews look at growing trends in areas of both

success and concern, while also accounting for how logistics support commands have

completely transformed operational- and strategic-level logistics since 2003. ASC

personnel are forward deployed at every forward operating base in Iraq, Afghanistan,

Kuwait, Qatar and Djibouti, among others. Indeed, what began as a small operation in

2003 has become a robust organization, globally deployed, and is now a key player in

all four of the Army’s materiel imperatives: to sustain, transform, reset and prepare. The

following interview with Major Justin Hirniak, contracting officer with the Logistics

Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP), covers such topics as the LOGCAP 3,

LOGCAP organization, LOGCAP operations, the CONUS Replacement Center (CRC),

LOGCAP site visits, personal weapons on commercial flights and contractors.

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Interview with Major Justin Hirniak 30 June 2203

GE: Today is 30 June, 2003. This is an oral history interview between George Eaton (GE) and Major Justin Hirniak (JH) on his experiences in Southwest Asia (SWA). Could you please state your name and normal duty assignment? JH: Yes, sir. My name is Major Justin Hirniak, and right now I work with the US Army

Field Support Command contracting as the deputy director as well as a contracting officer with the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP). GE: The slot you were in, was it designed and anticipated there would a deployment slot? JH: No, sir. There had been talk over the last six months as the LOGCAP 3 contract had developed and grown about having a returning contracting officer forward in this SWA theater to support the requirements and task orders under LOGCAP. That had been going back and forth, and I think my deployment was triggered or pre-empted, due to the fact that with Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) as well as Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) going on simultaneously and the op tempo increasing, it would be in the best interest of the only field support command to pre-position me over there to act as that principal contracting officer (PCO). GE: Now there is a program manager-logistics civil augmentation program (PM-LOGCAP), is that a contracting officer too? How do we interact with the PM-LOGCAP? Why do we want to go over there to be the PCO? JH: No, sir. The way it's structured is the program manager for LOGCAP falls under the Army Material Command (AMC) and directly falls under the field support command, now the AFFC. With that the program office is geographically located over at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, and Alexander, Virginia, but the contracting support comes from Rock Island Arsenal from the Army Field Support Command. So, as their planners, their Southwest Asia were formed, they called for a PCO down there to act as a contracting officer who would integrate in with the staff again. GE: So when you got called forward, you didn't know exactly what you were going to be doing, even if contracting was going to be this LOGCAP, but you didn't know if you were going to be working American Expeditionary Force (AEF), OEF or OIF? JH: Well what happened sir, is when I originally deployed in Nevada desert, 11 February 2003, the intent to go over was to take care of a series of task orders under the LOGCAP contract under OEF. Those task orders basically were in the Africa area of responsibility (AOR), as well as Central Asia and Afghanistan proper. While I was over there, for approximately four to six weeks, I did get a call forward, because OIF had kicked off as well as the operational stage. There was a bona-fide requirement or need for a PCO forward to come over to OIF and provide direct support for LOGCAP and the task orders that were developing in support of the operation.

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GE: So you said you went over on 3 February? JH: It was 11 February. GE: 11 February 03. How long before you left here were you notified you were going to go? JH: Well this temporary duty (TDY), for me to go over, again like I stated earlier was responsible for the task orders in Central Asia, Africa, as well as Afghanistan. Those task orders were my responsibility. There's basically a base camp that LOGCAP supported out in those areas. And I went over - I was originally scheduled to go over again for four to six weeks and visit all my base camps, I was responsible for four of them. And the intent there was to go over on a quarterly basis to basically go in there, talk to the contractor, talk to the customer, in this case how many base camps were the soldiers on the ground that we were directly supporting, as well as talk to the ACO, which is an administrating contracting officer, basically our eyes and ears downrange that would administer the contract. I had done it in the past and I try to do it on a quarterly basis to ensure that there's continuity as well. Once there's a changeover between the customer as well as the ACOs and the contractor as far as new replacements, I'd go in there and we'd have milestone meetings to see where we're at and where we needed to go. Basically, we worked out issues that are in the field. I had no idea I would end up going for four months, plus, but based off the fact that OEF or OIF was going on I got called over to participate in that. And that's why I stayed for that long. But no, I did not – the TDY to go over to OEF was planned, but the OIF part was not planned. GE: Did you come back or did you shift from Africa or Afghanistan into Kuwait? JH: I shifted. I remember I was at Bagram Airfield, which was one of the task areas we were responsible for. It was probably 72 hours into the start of the tactical phase of OIF. I got a call to basically say, hey look, get over to Kuwait as fast as you can. GE: Okay. And when did you return? JH: I returned on 2 June 2003. GE: Did you go through the continental United States (CONUS) Replacement Center (CRC) and that good stuff on your way or was that bypassed because you were only down there on TDY? JH: I didn't go through CRC on the way. The way I worked it, like I said earlier, I went over there and tried to go over there on a quarterly basis. And what I did, I had cycled through CRC in October 2002, insuring that I was deployable as well as drawing all my necessary equipment though the central issue facility (CIF) as well as my weapon. So I've had that gear at Rock Island with me, because after I was initially deployed my first time in October and November 2002 to OEF, I came back with my equipment. So instead of coming in, I held it because I knew in the future I'd be deploying on it or going TDY on a quarterly basis and then I could use my CRC equipment as well as maintain my deployable status. When I went on this TDY it was part of the quarterly visit to my sites that I was responsible for, so I took that CIF equipment as well as my weapon that I had drawn. I was prepared, ready to go, equipment-wise, uniform-wise, as

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well as making all the necessary adjustments that I needed to be deployable; dental, shots, etc., etc. GE: Where were you storing your weapon in between trips? JH: Okay, the storage of the military weapon actually worked out really well, because the arsenal police station has an arms room, which is in compliance with the arms room that the military runs. When I'd go on TDY, my TDY orders stated that the said person is in the United States military. I'd show the proper ID card, and the regulations state that you can carry on a commercial aircraft, so I did that. When I had to travel between point and point, I'd have the necessary orders to permit me to carry a weapon with me as I went back and forth. When I came to the arsenal I would sign it in and sign it out, just like we usually do in the military arms room, the same type of procedures. GE: Did you have a special carrying box for it? JH: Yes I did, and that's part of the regulations and requirements it would be - I had a 9 millimeter standard service pistol that the Army carried. When traveling it goes into a plastic case with two locks, it's banded, sealed, verified with the commercial airlines every time you come on and off so I mean it was in or within the compliance of traveling commercially with a military weapon. GE: Exactly, because I remember when we came back from Haiti we sent a lot of people up into Philadelphia with their weapons. It took us about a week to get somebody up there to box the weapons up or something into military airplanes, because they were trying to get to their homes and they weren’t paying attention to the rules, so we caused quite a complication in Philadelphia in ‘94 or ‘95. JH: And you know, this is an issue, because there are a lot of individuals who deploy back and forth within AMC who have had military weapons or service weapons. So, a little bit of prior planning, checking the regulations and checking how you went about doing it as well as contacting the commercials airliners ahead of time, made it a lot easier. That's a big lesson on that. GE: The first time you went through CRC, were there any problems with that, were there any glitches, did we understand what was going on? JH: Not for me, personally, because I’d been through CRC several times in past deployments, so I understood as well as have been through CRC before and I knew what to expect and how to get through it. I've talked to some of my peers at the field support command, or now the Army Field Support Command Contracting Office. These civilians who also have to go through CRC, because that’s a requirement when they deploy, and the first time is always the hardest, and for them not having exposure to an environment, which is strictly run and controlled by the military, there were issues with them, but for me it was very, very painless. GE: Can you sort of just give me an outline of when you deployed over there in February, where you went first and which were the different areas?

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JH: Sure, it was quite an expanse and quite a travel. Along with me going over as I stated earlier to check my sites, I also coordinated with the program manager over at the LOGCAP office in Alexander, Virginia, to go over with him. He wanted to do a site visit to all the sites, it was his first time being over there. Mr. Donald Troutner, who is the PM, coordinated with me and we thought it would be a good idea for me to accompany him as a contracting officer in case there were any type of contractual issues that might come up during his site visit, as well as also, go over there with the intent of doing the work that I had to do. So, we basically killed two birds with one stone. We went ahead, like I said, and deployed on 11 February 2003 and our first stop was Djibouti, Africa where we have a site there under LOGCAP. We spent approximately three or four days there, and then went ahead up into Kuwait over at Camp Arifjan because there’s a LOGCAP site there, as well as in Jordan too. So, we basically hit the Persian Gulf in the Middle East first, and after we got done after three weeks, we flew over to Afghanistan and spent some time over in Bagram and then up into Uzbekistan and back to Bagram. At that time, and this was the first week of March, I believe, Mr. Troutner had other business and other sites to visit in the European theater. That was not my responsibility. I was responsible, as I stated earlier, for Central Asia, Afghanistan, and Africa. I remained in Afghanistan, as Mr. Troutner moved to the European theater, and continued to work the efforts and the responsibilities in the taskings to the issues that I had in Afghanistan. Moving to Kandahar, which is in I believe the south - southwestern corner of Afghanistan and then back up to Bagram until I got called forward. GE: Were you the PCO when these contracts were initially let to build these base camps, or did you ever go as their ground, or have you been involved in them since they have been building? JH: I came aboard LOGCAP in October 2002. As a matter of fact, it was the first of October. Prior to that, I had exposure to LOGCAP, because during the solicitation, in other words, the source selection of the contractor to run the LOGCAP 3, I was on the source selection team as the deputy chief of the technical evaluations. So I was familiar with the contract, very much so, from its inception. I had a little break, subsequently deployed to Kosovo - as a contingency contractor - contracting officer, came back to the office, and then assumed the duties as deputy director of the US Army Field Support Command (AFSC) contracting. Because of the operational tempo in late September 2002, and the increased requirements that the LOGCAP office had, the fact that I was a warranted contracting officer and the fact that we didn’t have other warranted contracting officers familiar with this type of contract, the director had requested that I move over and help out, because I was familiar with the LOGCAP 3 contract. So I didn't see these sites from the inception or the startup, but in October 2002, based off where the specific site was located at, there are different levels of completion. And I have a pretty good idea as far as where we were and where we had to go because of past deployments, and also as well as having the experience of building base camps from scratch that were somewhat similar to what we were doing with LOGCAP 3. GE: Was Djibouti the newest one, or I'm just trying to think about the tempo of what we were doing at the time? JH: The sites that I was responsible for? Yes, Djibouti was the most recent site, as far as immaturity and as far as enhancement. There were other sites in southwest Asia that obviously were newer, and as we speak right now, there are still requirements for logistical sites, or sites that are similar to the ones that I'm working on that are still springing up.

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GE: This is sort of off-track. At any camp, in general, most employees are going to be local nationals hired on by the contractor, is that correct? JH: That's a great question. There are a lot of factors that go into that, and it's really not a rule of thumb on the ratio between the types of personnel they employ. Let me first start off by describing the three different types of people who are employed under the LOGCAP 3 contract. The contractor is KBR and they're based out of Houston, Texas, at least the LOGCAP 3 office. And what they hire, when they have a requirement, is they provide a service to the US Army, which is, for the most part, combat service support and certain combat support-type functions or services to the soldiers. What this enables the US Army to do, based off the downsizing, is free up logistical units so they can place them and prioritize the needs for their logistical units. And have the contractor come in as a replacement and provide the same logistical-type services in a sustainment-type environment; contingency, transitioning, or phasing into sustainment. When KBR comes in, again, they're giving the US government a service, the US Army in this case. And the three types of personnel or employees or status of employees they hire are as follows: The first category is expatriates (expats). Expats are United States citizens. The majority of them have prior US military experience as well as, expats can be considered United Kingdom citizens and European citizens. The second type of person they employ is what you call third country nationals. Those third country nationals don't necessarily come from the country that the site is located at, but from outlying countries. The Philippines, for example, Filipinos in Southwest Asia are pretty prevalent, and the (inaudible) Pakistanis, etc. etc. and the last category is called HCN, which is host country nationals, and those are the actual employees from that country where the site is located at. So going back forward to finish answering your question, it really depended where the site was located at. For example, there are certain sites in Afghanistan where the security level is so high, because of the threat, that the army on the ground there that's responsible for that particular site, for the force protection of that site, might deem it, because of the situation that, no local nationals or host country nationals or TCN, third country nationals, are permitted on that site. They might be permitted, but they're under armed escort and they're closely monitored and controlled. They might only be permitted in certain areas of that base camp or site. Again depending on where the site is, depends on the demographics, and the amount of host country nationals, and third country nationals. Obviously, if there's a high threat and the site has tight security, because of what we're doing there, you might have 100% expats running it. Obviously when you have expats it's going to make it more expensive, because they're providing a service, and the labor rates go in there. And then, if you have a site where the threat isn't as high or the security, because of what's on that site, isn't as high, then you'll have the majority of them being third country nationals or host country nationals. And again, I think that answers your question, I know it took a long time. GE: I would assume that the more expats you're requiring, due to security, the longer it's going to take to get the contract running, it's going to take you longer to hire them. JH: Absolutely. GE: So we've got to balance off the vetting process with speed of getting this thing going.

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JH: Absolutely. Initially when you go into a site under a LOGCAP task order, the bulk of the effort for that service are expats, because a lot of the expats that KBR hires have had prior experience with this type of contract in the Balkans, Kosovo, Bosnia, so they've been working in these types of environments as well as these types of services before. If you need to start it up fast, and you need to get things going, the expats will come in, kick it off, which takes time, and then after the vetting process, they'll start taking a look, as far as the contractor, on how to reduce costs for the Army by hiring third country nationals and local nationals. GE: That makes sense to me. Now this next group of questions is mainly for the Deparment of the Army civilian (DAC), because they want them for a different situation level, but I'll try to work my way through them, so we get a good deal. Most of the DACs, when they go over, I worry about how they're received in the theater, how are they taking to their unit. But you were already going on a TDY trip, (inaudible) but did you have any problems integrating into the unit once you got there? JH: Not at all, and what's amazing is there's a saying in the Army that I think you can relate to is, “it's a very small family.” And probably every site that I had visited to do my work, and do my staffing at, I knew at least, at the minimum, two or three officers or NCOs who I had served with in the past. It was easy for me to integrate into the staff, it was easy for me to talk to the right people, the decision makers as well as the staff officers, to get things done and accomplished. I found it very, very easy to do this, and I also found that it paid huge dividends because they had that comfort factor. I had worked with them previously, they knew my capabilities, I knew theirs, and we made a lot of ground and it paid high dividends. The exception was the site at Djibouti, because that was a Marine Corps site. Command and control was done through the Marine Corps, and I had never worked extensively with the Marines in a staffing type atmosphere, so it took awhile to start that off, but in the long run, it kind of went in the right direction. As far as the civilians – for the DACs who are contracting officers – I don’t think, in my opinion, that that there's not a lot of hiccups as far as our contracting officers at our DACs deploying over there working, as far as their ability to get things done. It probably took longer, because the unfamiliarity between adjacent unit staff techniques as well as basic staff techniques, but being a contracting officer and working with contracts, it's a lot more simplified. So, although there are problems, the only dilemma I would see is again understanding staff officer roles and responsibilities of the DACs and going into a site and not being officially assigned to that staff. GE: A lot of times, if we're in a habitual relationship with somebody, who can suggest you go over there, and you visit, and get used to the site, but if all your sites were building new every time, that kind of training may or may not work? JH: Absolutely, and I think for OEF, since that's a lot more mature than OIF, we kind of have the continuity, and the staff. And the units that move in after six to eight months really have a good battle handover from the departing staff on what LOGCAP is all about and how the contract should work, and they have that established relationship. And if the DACs can integrate or the contracting officers can integrate with that staff, they've got good continuity. In OIF it's a struggle and it's probably frustrating at times because they don't have that and they don't have the maturity. And that's a downfall, that's something that we probably, if I had to take a lesson learned away from integration, is we need some type of staffing course here, kind of like

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Combat System Training Unit (CSTU), for the DACs, to have them understand an advanced type level or a basic type level of being a staff officer, that's important. GE: That's a good suggestion, that's what I was going to ask you, if that was something that you would suggest. We could certainly send a few people over there now, since things are quieter, just to observe, and get into the cycle a little bit, and then come back and put together a course like that. JH: Absolutely. GE: So, when you were moving around from camp to camp, and even from here over there, was that 100% mil air that you were flying on? JH: It was either military air while I was in theater, or it was by ground transportation, either military vehicle or civilian vehicle with armed escort. But force protection is of the utmost concern in both theaters and OEF and OIF, and there's a lot of coordination that goes into moving from point A to point B, whether it's by ground or air, because of the situation in both theaters or in both operations right now. It's not like Kosovo or the Balkans right now where you can hop into a sport utility vehicle (SUV), not even be armed half the time, and move from point A to point B without coordinating. There's a lot of command control and other types of coordination that goes into it, and a security element has to be there at all times. GE: How do we coordinate that sort of thing, especially for a guy like you, who goes on a lot of TDY, to make sure that you have the right security with you when you move? JH: It paid big dividends for me to work with the ACO. The ACO, like I said earlier, is the eyes and ears for the PCO. And that ACO is integrated in that unit's staff or that site's staff, so they would usually do an adjacent unit coordination with the force protection office over there to provide transportation, coordinate for transportation, as well as ensure that force protection went with it, as well as the necessary communications/electronics (COMMEL) and equipment that you would need. A lot of the sites, since I had been to them previously, I knew a lot of the force protection officers, so it was easy for me, which gave me a lot of flexibility to come and go, especially by ground and air, because I knew the way the mil air worked and how the ground transportation worked, where I could do, the coordination on my own. GE: So, what was your life support like there besides moving around? Were you finding a place to bunk down, wherever you could, or was the ACO taking care of that for you too generally in advance? JH: Absolutely, I relied on all the ACOs very heavily for my life support. And the life support wasn't anything above and beyond where the soldiers of that particular base camp -- their life support levels. It was the same level, and that's the way you've got to do business. As being a prior combat arms officer, and having more time in combat arms than I do as a contracting officer, it's the old adage, in order to find out the weakness and strengths of that particular service that KBR is providing, you’ve got to integrate and live at the same level. Although there were times where I had the opportunity to live on the local economy, staying in a hotel, and living better than the soldiers, it just wouldn't be justice to go ahead and take that route and not

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really get a good sensing on how the soldiers were living and the services that KBR was providing. GE: I would think that KBR would make sure that the contracting officer would have a good place to sleep. (Laughter) JH: I'll tell you what, you joke about it, but that's an interesting point, because, as a procuring contracting officer, like you said, KBR is going to go out of their way to make sure that your life is comfortable, because you're responsible for that contract or anything that happens or fails to happen on that contract. So, they're going to go out of their way to treat you like a VIP. You're only a major, a captain, a GS11 or 12, but they're going to give you the red carpet treatment. And I found that happening all the time when they found out that I was traveling to the site. They'd try to roll out the red carpet and do a dog and pony. Not intentionally, but they wanted to make my life comfortable, and have me have a good experience while I was at that site. Everything was going good and everything was smelling like roses. I went out of my way to make a point that wherever you're going to put me up was coordinated through the ACO and the living conditions would be the same as what the soldiers were provided as part of that service. GE: Did you have all the equipment you needed to do your job? JH: That's a good question. Yes. While I was over there the three most crucial pieces of equipment were access to a computer that had e-mail capability, a cell phone or communications with the capability to call, especially from overseas to the United States, and the third piece of equipment, basically, was force protection, a weapon. I had access to three, at all times. Army Field Support Command contracting had fly-away kits. Those fly-away kits are designed to provide that package as far as communications and computer electronics. I think they need to be upgraded and updated. Although we have them and although they're operational, they're probably outdated, because of bulk max size, and they're not keeping up with the technology. My recommendation is to continue with these fly-away kits or fly-away packages, communications platforms, but to upgrade them. GE: Did you have your own laptop you carried? JH: I had access to my own laptop, but because I had been to these sites previously and I knew the ACOs, there was always a computer or a phone available to me. GE: So, when you were hitting these different sites, who else were you responsible for? I mean who were you talking to at the sites, were you talking to a senior commander at the site as well? Who was wanting to, you know, buttonhole you and make sure that you were given the best service possible? JH: It was usually from the Chief of Staff or a derivative thereof. So you're looking at a colonel (O6) level, every time. A colonel, full bird colonel, and the Chief of Staff is probably the best person responsible for working out issues of service and life support at those base camps, depending on, if the base camp was a headquarters, obviously you might work at a lower level. For example, Bagram is a headquarters element, and since Bagram has a huge population of

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American service members, they actually designed and developed an installation commander function, which when I was working in Bagram, I would deal directly with the installation commander, who was a colonel, full bird colonel. That worked well, because, if you take that and you template it over to a CONUS-type structure of a US military installation, I'd be doing the same thing. At the smaller sites you were dealing with the Chief of Staff, again usually at the lieutenant colonel (O5) or O6 level. The smaller sites you'd have access to the base commander, and they were all very receptive, this was in OEF. OIF, do you want me to talk a little on that? GE: Sure. JH: was kind of different, in the respect that when I was in Iraqi Freedom, they were still fighting the war, they were still moving, they were in the tactical phase, and it was not over, and getting access to these types of individuals, the Chief of Staff, the deputy commander, wasn't realistic. They had to focus on the tactical side of the house, so in OIF it was different in the respect that you were dealing with the supply officers (S4s) and the general staff supply officers (G4s) as opposed to the Chief of Staff. And I'll tell you what, in OIF, it was tough, because the S4s didn't even want to deal with you in the respect that they had the tactical role that they had to think about, so in OIF you were basically dealing with the contractor and trying to get as much guidance as you could from the customer, from the G4 or the S4, and making the best decisions between the contractor as well as yourself to provide them service. GE: In those cases, did you have the contractor and KBR rep with you as you were trying to figure out what the requirements were going to be on the contract? JH: The government is responsible for the requirements, and the customer is, so the soldier or the staff at that particular base camp or that particular task order, had to identify the requirements, give it to the program management office, which had a representative on the ground with the unit, they would develop the requirements, pass them to me, I'd go through them, refine the requirements, and then provide it to the contractor. Once it went to the contractor, they'd in turn provide a rough order of magnitude, which would basically - and a task execution plan - tell the government, or the customer in this case, this is how we're going to do it, through the tax execution plan, as well as these are the services and this is how much it's going to cost. Once the customer accepted that, the integration with the contractor, who was usually a program manager or the operations officer, was a given, it had to be done, so you're taking the contractor to answer a question and working with them as an integral part of the team. That had to be done, if there was lack of communication or lack of staffing between the contractor, KBR, providing the service, and the government, in my case the PCO, the ACO, and the customer, from the LOGCAP planner, then you're setting yourself up for failure, so you had to bring them in and make them part of the team in order for you to operate that successfully. GE: It probably helped to execute immediately upon signing the contract or the mod or whatever. JH: And you know what, by you saying, execute immediately, that became a very frustrating, contentious point. LOGCAP is designed for quick response, but quick response for LOGCAP, in the base contract, as the base contract is written for LOGCAP, is basically gauged or measured in weeks, not hours. I believe it's 72 hours upon notice of receipt or upon execution they're

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basically supposed to bring in their ADVON team, and then from there, measured by weeks, developing building up and then providing the service. There's a misnomer that the customer did not understand and still does not understand, because I think the perception that LOGCAP 3, the LOGCAP 3 contract has, at least for the customer or the green suiter is, hey, have KBR do it, we don't have the resources to do it, and as soon as we give them the notice, to proceed with the execution, miraculously, we're going to drive out here and there's going to be a mirage, but it's not really a mirage, it's a base camp, and we'll just come in here and take our hot showers and eat and sleep and have AC. That's not the case, so there's a lot of frustration, because I don't think that the customer, didn't want or didn't have the time to really understand what we were trying to tell them. And we'd always try to tell the customer, look, if you want this service we'll give it to you, and KBR will provide it as a contingency as a sustainment, but you're going to have to work with us, and give the contractors some time to provide it. GE: So, were you right behind the tactical units, going up into Iraq, to set up the base camp as you went along, or the LOG bases? JH: My job description in Iraq was twofold, I wore two hats. One was to be the liaison officer for the procuring contracting office and officers under LOGCAP for Operation Iraqi Freedom, so I was the go-between. I also integrated myself into the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), which was originally lead by, I believe it was Lieutenant General Garner (Retired), and that was the main effort. ORHA would come in right when the tactical phase was complete and would set up the infrastructure for post-war Iraq. When ORHA went into Iraq, although the sites they went into were secured quote, unquote, there was still fighting going on. So in other words, we crossed the Kuwaiti berm before the war was declared over. And at times there were tactical units, you know, several kilometers or several miles in front of us that were still engaged in combat, but to answer your question, it's kind of a yes or no. GE: Were there any incidents where you got shot at? JH: Yes, that was kind of funny. I don't know if I should say funny, but I thought it was kind of humorous. When ORHA set up, they had their main headquarters at one of the old palaces in Iraq. I think it was the original palace that was right on the Tigris River. They came in there to set up their office and to start things going, and they had convoys that would run on a daily basis between Baghdad and Kuwait. Airframes and air was limited, the priority on that was to support the tactical units in and around Iraq so we had to do things by ground convoy. There were two established main supply routes (MSRs) that went up to Baghdad. One was a primary, one was an alternate and it was approximately a 10- to 15-hour drive depending on the vehicular traffic and the situation. While I was in Baghdad, I had to make a trip down to Kuwait on some business. As we were going down, we were, I believe south of a town called As Samawah, which is in the southeastern portion of Iraq. The sun had already gone down, it was approximately 2100 hours, and we were moving along at about 60 kilometers an hour. A convoy of about 15 vehicles, heavy vehicles a well as SUVs, with armed escort. And as we were going and heading south and southeast, you could see the tracers coming from three kilometers off, heading right towards the convoy. The driver who was driving our vehicle didn't notice it, and as the tracers bounced up against the berm and shot straight up in the air, I knew we were under fire. I reminded the driver, or the let the driver know that we were under fire and the first

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thing he wanted to do was step on his breaks. I said no, just keep on going, just drive through. That time we had communication amongst all the vehicles, and I thought at that time it would be best not to inform the convoy commander for fear of having other drivers listening in over the net and having them panic, the best thing was to drive through it. I did tell the convoy commander to increase speed. The next checkpoint, the US checkpoint was LFA Cedar, and once we arrived there I explained what happened, and that was that. So it was pretty uneventful, the rounds did come close. They were probably within 15 feet of my vehicle and the vehicle in front of me, but it was a humorous experience because I think if I would have reported coming under contact the way we were trained to do as a military unit should respond to coming under contact, it probably would have been a lot more dangerous. GE: But you told me that earlier that you took some rounds in your SUV? JH: Oh, absolutely, yes, after the incident was over with, we went ahead and stopped and found out, or looked at the front corner panel, and there were three rounds through the front corner panel, so it's probably a good thing that we drove through it and that we didn't stop. GE: Was there any damage to the (inaudible) on your SUV? JH: No, no (inaudible) it's just a joking point, because when I went to turn it in, they were joking about it, but they accepted the vehicle and there was no problem there. GE: Good. If you were there developing a LOGCAP contract, say, on your way up towards Baghdad or one of those places, how were you interacting back with Army Materiel Command-Southwest Asia (AMC-SWA)? JH: AMC-SWA... GE: What was the interaction? JH: My job up there was to provide SIT-REPS, as needed at the minimal on a weekly basis for the ORHA contract, because that became the main effort after the fighting phased out. And I would do that mainly by computer. And computer, as far as e-mail, was pretty solid. At times it was slow but for the most part that was the main means of communications and it worked well. The Defense Secure Network (DSN) was capable, sketchy at best, two main lines and not enough wire to get it to go through, but for the most part it was COMMEL. I spent the majority of my efforts, though, in Kuwait, because under ORHA there were several multiple sites, and each site had an ACO, again, the eyes and ears for the PCO office. They were responsible for the administration of those sites, with the exception of the rear, so I felt it best to maintain my presence in the rear and continue to do site surveys on these sites to ensure that these sites were set and were within the parameters of the requirements of the scope of work. A lot of going back and forth and I spent a considerable amount of time on the road in and around Kuwait as well as going in and around Iraq visiting these sites. GE: ORHA, is that a big department function?

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JH: ORHA, I believe, and I don't know if my facts are straight on this, was an effort that probably stemmed from the Executive Branch and was pushed down to the Department of Defense (DoD), because I know the Secretary of Defense, Mr. Donald Rumsfeld, went ahead and drove that and got it going, but I know there was integration with the State Department on it, and there were a lot of personnel and technical experts from the State Department that integrated. You know, the Army is getting better at working the joint arena. You know we've had our licks working joint in previous engagements and operations, but I think we took that to a new plane, because not only were we working joint, which ORHA was, through DoD, we had Army, Air Force, Navy, Marines, and DAC. Then we also integrated with the State Department and other agencies, so we took it a step further. So it got kind of frustrating and there was a steep learning curve when it came to working an integrated staff. Subsequently, as we all know, General Garner rotated out and Mr. Paul Bremer came in and by that move I think the shift went from the Department of Defense to the Department of State. But again, I preface this all by saying that it was an Executive Branch initiative, because of that shift, and it probably fits the glove better, making the State Department a lead-tight administration, because of post-war Iraq and trying to get the civil infrastructure into place. GE: Any conflict of interest there between your AFSC, AMC, LOGCAP base, and the site of the post you were trying to provide services to? Was DoD doing something different? JH: Not really, because under the terms and conditions of the base contract, it's to provide service and support. And yes, you know we're a Department of the Army agency or major Army command (MACOM), but as I recall there's nothing in the base contract that says we can't support other branches of service, which we do, over in Djibouti. For example, it's Marine Corps run, or other agencies within the federal government. GE: Besides those different folks, did you set up any base camps for special ops sites? JH: Yes. GE: Can you talk about that? JH: I can't talk about that, but probably in a classified type... GE: Okay let’s skip that– we’ll talk about that later on. All the contractors you were working with were KBR contractors, or were there other contractors who were also involved? JH: Again, the contract responsible for the LOGCAP 3 contract is KBR, and they provide a service, a performance-based contract and service to the United States Army or to the customer. We don't tell them how to suck eggs. We want the service, so if we want one base camp with power generation, a dining facility, showers, sleeping arrangements, then we don't tell them how to suck eggs. They've got to figure it out and they've got to give it back to us as far as that service that's valued. If they opt to sub-contract it out, because they think that's the best value for the government, then they can sub-contract it out. KBR does have sub-contracts, depending on the site and depending on the service.

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GE: Let me ask you one question I think you can answer on the tape. Special ops guys are different, they think differently and operate differently. Would a civilian contracting officer have a harder time in that environment than you did, I mean compared to the way a DAC would fit in at one of the other base camps that were third dimensional? JH: Yes and no. No, in the respect that in my experience in dealing with special operations, they're more laid back, and they're more loose when it comes to adjacent unit staff coordination, they really don't follow our doctrinal way to do business. So making coordination and their approach of going about things is a lot more laid back. So in that respect a DAC would have an easier time doing coordination and understanding what the requirements are. No, in the respect that those special ops guys are unique, because they need very specialized type services and requirements, more so, than the conventional type forces. And when it comes to that, sometimes a DAC might not understand the reason why they need it, and the tendency could be, although, I haven't seen it happen, but I could see the problem or issue arising, for the DAC responsible for that particular requirement under LOGCAP saying no, because they would basically put on their contracting officer's hat and say nope, this is what LOGCAP 3 can do. We can't leave the parameters of it, this is a gray area and we can't go there. It would take some really innovative ways to structure the task order to still provide these special operations type units the same requirements, but frame it in a different way. GE: Do you think they have a harder time accepting civilian contracting officers as military, from their point of view? Or do you think they’re willing to accept anybody who’ll provide them the service? JH: I think we can speak about this. There's one particular site that's a special operations in the respect that the commander at that site is a special ops guy as well as the entire site is just special ops related, and...can you give me the question again, please? GE: Do you think the special ops guys have a harder time accepting a civilian PCO? JH: Oh, okay, got it. And I came down to take a look at this site, and it just seemed like they had put in a requirement three or four times and it didn't go through because of a DAC. Just by a stroke of luck the operations officer was an old classmate of mine, we also had served in the Gulf War together. When I sat down and met him, we got it fixed real quickly. There's nothing shady about it, we just had to re-wicker the requirements. And I think what it was is when he originally approached the DAC and gave him the requirement, the DAC really didn't understand what he wanted, and the special operations officer didn't really frame it the right way. So by me being there, knowing the person and also knowing that, hey, wait, this is what you really need, we got to re-wicker the requirement and put it on a task order. So sometimes it's just Army lingo, understanding what the requirement is, and understanding, from the contractual perspective, how you can re-work it to meet the needs and still have it within the confines and the parameters of the contract. And a lot of that is just common sense. A lot of it is just lingo and being on the same sheet. I don't see that as a huge problem, for the most part. I know a couple DACs right now in AFSC who have special ops task orders exclusively and for the most part they're doing a great job. I think the problem that comes in and has nothing to do with special ops or conventional units, is the changeover. You know, these units for the most part, rotate in and out on a six- to eight-month basis, and when you have a change of staff and

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new personalities and all, you get a lot of conflict and you get a lot of frustration, but it's like that everywhere. GE: Everywhere. Alright. Do you think the AMC units back in CONUS were aware of what was going on and were able to respond to any deployments you guys had? JH: As far as our staff back here? In the offices? GE: Yes. And PM LOGCAP for that matter too. JH: Yes and no. Yes in the respect that, if you had something hot that had to be done within X amount of hours, and when I say hours, 24 to 72, if you could get a hold of them, absolutely. No in the respect that sometimes, if you had an intricate requirement - and I don't mean to say this in a bad way, but sometimes they were second guessing. You'll never experience or never really get a good understanding of what's going on downrange until you're physically out there, and this contract is all about supporting the soldiers. It should be transparent to the solders, and when I say transparent, their staff shouldn't have to be frustrated or beating their heads over, or trying to figure out why it takes so long to get relatively simple tasks executed or services provided to them. And I feel it's important for every PCO, not necessarily being deployed out there, but if a PCO forward should be out there, good bad or indifferent, I just don't know, if that's the right call, but at the minimum PCOs should be out there at their task orders that they're responsible for, downrange, on a quarterly basis, because things change, units change, and circumstances and the environments change, so, they need to be out there consistently. That is a must-do thing, that's something we can't compromise on, and it'll continue to work better. The other side of the sword is resources, as far as personnel. Our contract right now, we just transitioned from Army Field Support Command contracting to AFSC contracting, bigger units, bigger MACOM, more responsibility, more requirements, and as you know, with the government service, we're going to be hurting here within the next three to five years as far as personnel retiring and transitioning out. We need to keep up, we need to hire quality individuals. I'd also go as far to say that as a procuring contracting officer, you just can't take any PCO with a warrant and shove them into AFSC. That PCO needs to be a certain type of caliber of individual; someone who can handle multiple tasks simultaneously. Have the flexibility to understand a decision-making process and really have an average to good background on the way the Army works at the tactical and operational level. There are great contracting officers on this Arsenal who could spin contracts around me on any day of the year, and regurgitate from the federal activation branch, but that doesn't mean that they're going to be a good fit for the LOGCAP contract. They need deployment or contingency experience, and this is what this is, a contingency-type environment. GE: Did you call back and need any support from the ops center, the ground mobile command (GMC) ops center, and if so, did they support you well? JH: The only requirement I needed from the ops center was to get a replacement procuring contracting officer letter (PCOL) to replace me, because I was PCS, the ops center took the call and basically helped put the call forward. They were responsive, that was generated from SWA forward, they got it, they turned it around in a timely manner, but for the most part, most of my dealings as far as support back in the rear, either came from my office direct, or from the LOGCAP program office in Alexandria.

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GE: I know that you went on a tactical user-oriented intelligence system (TUI) earlier there. Did you notice any difference in the response from back here between the time before OIF kicked off, or was it the same level that people were responsive back here in thinking that was going on downrange? JH: That's a good question. I think I’d mentioned earlier, I don't want to use the term armchair quarterback, but different perspective and urgency. I think that anytime you're running a rear detachment, especially when that rear detachment is across the pond or separated by a continent, you don't have the sense of urgency, or you really can't get your emotions, or feelings into, hey, if this doesn't happen, or if you don't get this group, it's going to impact the soldiers in this way. You know we've got great media now, because you watched all of OIF from your computer screen and from the TV every night, but it's not like when you're watching what the soldiers did from the tactical perspective, that you're taking a minute and thinking, all right, how is that impacting their living conditions? I mean your mind's not on that. And I think that can be applied in any situation, when you're running a rear D, or rear detachment or office. As a contracting officer back at the rear though, I don't think there's anything wrong with it, I don't think it's callous or indifferent, I just think as a contracting officer back here, you're where the rubber meets the road, because you can have ten procuring contracting officers forward doing great things with the soldiers and the customers, right where the action is and right where the service is required. But by having ten contracting officers down there making coordination, making things happen, the things they make happen have to still be inputted electronically, because all the contracts throughout the government, the entire federal government, are run electronically. They've got to be inputted in the database, and that's the unglamorous job, but they have to happen in order for those contracts to be valid, in order for the contractors to get paid and our computer systems here interface with the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) computer systems, as well as all the other units that are responsible to put this contract together. That's the unglamorous part. So you've got to maintain a certain level of indifference, I think, working back here to ensure that when PCOs forward are making the coordination, making things happen, doing things verbally, the requirements still have to be inputted here, and yet to maintain that level keel. So that could be part of it. I'm not really into human psychology, but that's basically a very rudimentary description of why I think there’s a lack of responsiveness. Not because, “Hey I'm going to sit on this, because I'm going to enjoy my weekend.” Not the case. Everyone here worked their weekend and met the mission requirements as necessary, but you've got to maintain that level of this is one little task order out, because there’s a (inaudible) procuring contracting officer downrange trying to make things happen for a particular task order. Well I've got over 60 task orders here. Multiply that, you've got to have the big picture, with strategic type vision here. But to close on that question, I think you have to have the ability here to focus strategically and operationally. But then when you get these calls in the middle of the night, when the PCO’s downrange trying to do a tactical type thing making a quick fix for one task order or one particular requirement, you still have to fit that little piece in the big puzzle. So that's why I go back and do multiple tasks simultaneously. You've got to be able to juggle. GE: (inaudible) You made a good point. No matter who you are or how experienced you are, when you get down there living with the troops you're trying to support, you get very much a sense of urgency, and you often lose your operational strategic perspective when you do that.

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JH: Absolutely. GE: Instead of back here saying wait a minute, come on, hang on a second, let's fit that into the big picture. JH: Absolutely. And you know me going out and being at one particular base camp with one particular requirement, trying to get that requirement going, you know, I've got four other base camps I'm responsible for. But that's the biggest priority is that customer on the ground has at that time, and they want it done. But a lot of times I had to back off and say, hey, we're going to get this thing going, but guess what, I've got to turn around and I've got four other base camps to hit because they've got similar problems. And that's what I always told my ACOs, again, the eyes and ears of the PCO. I'd get calls on the weekend, at 3:30 in the morning. I always picked up the phone, always had a cell phone, because you've got to be responsive, you've got to do your job, but when they've got a problem and they lay it out and they frame it for you, you've got to have that good decision making process to say, okay, got it, but you know what, you've got to wait three or four days on this, or you've got to wait a week on this, because right now, you're one. I'm responsible for four or five, and that's not my priority right now. So they understood that, and you reinforce that when you're downrange visiting all the ACOs. GE: Who are your ACOs? Were they other AFSC employees, or where they people from the local unit who were reporting in? JH: That's a good question. By the time you try to scribe all this and piece it all together, I hope your head doesn't spin. I think we're talking about past organizations, and this one is kind of interesting. The ACOs are warranted contracting officers, just like I am. As a PCO you're responsible for a series of task orders, which fall under LOGCAP. Task orders usually correlate to a specific service or a specific base camp. So you've got a series of them, four or five, maybe up to 10 or 15. There's a DAC right now whose name is Dick Terhune and I believe he's got about 20 task orders he's responsible for, so he's really juggling, great guy. So you're responsible for them, your eyes and ears are ACOs, they come from DCMA. DCMA is a joint agency, for the most part – GE: Defense Contract Management Agency? JH: Correct. And they've got contracts that they administer, so as post-award effort - the award's given and they come in there and make sure that contract is administered, and what they do is they rotate out on a six-month basis, they're pulled out of assignment, out of their job in the United States, and they're deployed over six months, to work as an ACO for a particular LOGCAP task order. And they'll rotate in and they'll administer that contract post-award (inaudible). GE: That makes sense. That's not so hard. (inaudible) They’re fulfilling the plan. Any other personal evaluation or opinion about the operations? The list I have here, (inaudible) topics of equipment, C2, joint forces, allied forces - coalition forces, combo, personnel management, just sort of the grab bag, anything you want to talk about.

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JH: (inaudible) Yeah, I think what I'll do is focus on what you just said, but I'll talk specifically about the contractor KBR as it's applicable to them. I'm a firm believer right now that, hands-down, we've got the best equipped and most technologically-advanced Army in the world, ever, and we're getting better. Most of the other countries just can't afford it. Research and development (R&D) is just a very expensive proposition. We're going to get better and we're going to maintain that edge. That's what makes us great. The soldiers downrange at these base camps are equipped just as I described. They've got the best of everything. But what happens is, under LOGCAP 3, KBR, you've got to look at them not as individuals who are doing their job, rolling up their sleeves and providing soldiers these services, but you've got to look at them overall as a service, so you don't look at an individual, you look at the service they're providing. And the Army sees it that way, so when KBR has to go to these base camps to support these soldiers, and some of these are forward operating base camps that KBR is in there right with the soldiers. There's forward operating base camps that get hit by direct and indirect fire on a weekly basis in Afghanistan and Iraq. These contractors get shot at just like the American soldiers did. But as far as equipment the Army tends to forget, under the terms and conditions of the base contract, that the Army is responsible for force protection. Not only force protection to protect these contractors when they go about doing their business, but also force protection to provide them individual equipment in order for them to defend themselves within the parameters of the code given to them by the Geneva Convention as a non-combatant. So in other words they don't carry personal weapons, but we should give them Kevlars, protective vests, protective equipment and NBC protective equipment so those individuals can operate under these conditions. I think the Army, although that's written into the contract and it's expressly put out in that contract, doesn't see that as an urgency, or it's slow to act on it. The problems I've seen with equipment, it always comes after the fact. Thank God we finally got on the same sheet, working with SBC company as well as working with Army central issue facilities (CIFs) as well as asking the contractor to procure their own type of protective equipment. Right before OIF started, especially when NBC, because during the build-up phase, as a matter of fact a week prior, as I recall, in some cases, to the ground war kicking off in Iraq, I know for a fact that some of the KBR employees didn't have protective equipment. Then it came in at the eleventh hour, thank God. Now it's getting better. The Army understands that when we sign up for a service, we accept the service that KBR is going to provide and we also accept the fact that we've got to provide them with force protection. GE: Anything else? JH: Definitely. Force protection, our military is small, we rely heavily on technology and training to get the mission accomplished, and from the force protection perspective, especially in Iraq right now, there are not enough soldiers to go around. We all know that protecting supply routes and protecting convoys is a resource-intensive task. It takes a lot of resources. And we're working on it, we're getting better, but that's something that has to be integrated with the contractor, so the contractor is actually brought into the logistical planning as well as an integral part of that planning, to provide requirements to the Army and the Army in turn can plan appropriately to provide force protection for them. It's getting better, but during the early stages of the war, and you can quote me on this, there were times when KBR crossed that berm of Kuwait into Iraq providing services for the United States Army, and force protection was at a minimum. Thank God we never had an incident, but the threat was definitely there.

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GE: Are there any specific individuals who were critical to the success of your operation? JH: For OEF and OIF? GE: Yes. JH: I'll tell you what, I think instead of crediting one individual, there are some good-news stories and there are some not-so-good-news stories. I think working as a team in having the contractor integrated directly in the operational staff of that particular site or that particular theater will make or break LOGCAP. I think OEF does it a lot better, because of tenure, and because of certain individuals with KBR as well as the Army staff who understand that. It wouldn't be fair to take OIF and say this is the same type of operation, it's not. OIF is larger in scope geographically as well as there's several different sub-tasks or sub-missions integrated or embedded in the operation, as opposed to OEF, which was more clean-cut in my opinion. And we're not doing that as well in OIF, integrating the contractor within the staffs. And anytime you've got something larger, bigger, and more cumbersome, the staff integration always becomes harder and more intricate. That's something that we definitely need to do better at, both the Army as well as the PCO office, because I see the PCO as partially responsible for success or failure by insuring that, hey, here's the contractor, here's your operations guy from the contracting side of the house, here's your project manager, here's your transportation manager, hey Army, you know what, if you want these services, these guys have to come through, and they've got to be riding through staff and dovetail right in, and that's something we're struggling with. GE: They all probably need to be on emergency central commissions too. JH: Oh, absolutely. They've got the proper and appropriate clearances, they can deal at every level, the contractor can. The concept of contractors on the battlefield, I'll tell you what, always be prepared. You know we go back, no more Task Force Smiths, capture lessons learned would be (inaudible) better,. I'm a firm believer of joint operations that made huge strides in the last 10 years, huge strides, but now we've got something a little bit different. It's contractors on the battlefield. That's not going to go away. And we had emerging doctrine that started right after the Gulf War on contractors on the battlefield. There's a field manual (FM) on contractors on the battlefield, several, and everyone understands that they're there and there are three different types. But I think we got caught short. We talked about it, we put the doctrine out, we put the FM out, but that's something that we're struggling to self-adjust and get on the right azimuth. We're all thinking about it now, I know general terms from AMC is taking that on as a lead for Army (inaudible) wide who's a proponent for it. He's a firm believer of it, but we've got to do better and we've got to do it quicker. And we can make some mistakes along the way but we've got to self-correct and get there quickly because the next time around we definitely have to be on par and we've got to be no faults noted. GE: I think that we never quite want to come to grips with the (inaudible) the contractors are going to be in harm's way. And when it's tough on them in rear areas where it was easy, and when they were (inaudible) final jump, the fact that they're going to be right there with the troops in the combat areas.

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JH: A great point, I mean extremely valid point, because (inaudible), linear battlefield, absolutely linear. No tears (inaudible) And... GE: (inaudible) Okay (inaudible) JH: Yes, we took the ground, the contractors were behind. And as we moved up and secured, the contractors had force protection afforded to them. They didn't have to worry about supply routes. Now we take OEF and OIF, let's go back to Vietnam, same template. We all know who the enemy is, they're integrated into the civilian population, they melt in, and you've got base camps and you secure MSRs. So here we are back where we were 30 years go. We've got to figure it out quick, we've got to be able to adapt with the contractors on the battlefield for the situation. And it's going to be challenging. Are we doing okay? Yes. Can we do better? Absolutely. GE: So do you have any other comments, any final comments? JH: I appreciate you sitting down and getting this verbal history, or oral history with me. I hope it helps. Some good experience out there as far as seeing this contract in flight, it's a huge animal, I think the contractors are here to stay as far as supporting our service members out there. They're important and they're going to be there as long as the service members are, but we just need to do a great job of integrating them in and a lot of that has to do with how the PCOs can facilitate that, as well as the LOGCAP planners, how they're going to be facilitating it. PCO forwards, I wanted to mention that in closing. Again, I don't know if that's right, wrong, or indifferent. If it has to be done right, and you'd mentioned something about equipment. They've got the capabilities to have the equipment over there as personal equipment as far as communication and computers. But if you put PCO forward long-term then there are other members of the team who have to go downrange with that PCO, as far as resource management, legal, and the whole team needs to go. Because a PCO forward, although they can influence the tactical level, and to some extent the operational level, will never be able to catch up on the other half of the operational and the strategic level. They need the resources to come along with them as an entire package. So to take that a step forward, and I want to close on that, is PCO forward, yes, it can work, and it could be invaluable to that SWA commander forward, but the rest of the resources have to go along with that PCO. GE: I understand. Thanks Major Hirniak and good luck with your PCOs. JH: Thank you sir.

END OF INTERVIEW

interview with maj justin hirniak

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