INTESTATE CASES

1. [G.R. No. 116775. January 22, 1998]URIARTE vs. COURT OF APPEALS

This is a petition for review oncertiorariof the decision[1]of the Court of Appeals, reversing the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 27, of Tandag, Surigao del Sur, as well as the appellate courts resolution denying petitioners motion for reconsideration. At issue is the right of the parties to a 2.7 hectare piece of land in Sungkit, Madrid, Surigao del Sur, which Justa Arnaldo-Sering left upon her death on March 31, 1989.

The parties and their relationship to Justa Arnaldo-Sering are as follows:

Private respondent Benedicto Estrada is the son of Agatonica Arreza, whose parents were Pedro Arreza and Ursula Tubil.Upon the death of Pedro Arreza, Ursula married Juan Arnaldo by whom she had another daughter, the decedent Justa.[2]Private respondent Benedicto Estrada is thus the nephew of Justa by her half sister Agatonica.

Petitioners, referred to in this case as the heirs of Pascasio Uriarte, are the widow and daughters of Pascasio Uriarte. Pascasio was one of the sons of Primitiva Arnaldo and Conrado Uriarte. His mother,Primitiva Uriarte, wasthe daughter of Domingo Arnaldo and Catalina Azarcon.Domingo Arnaldo and Justas father, Juan Arnaldo, were brothers.[3]Petitioners are thus grandchildren, the relatives within the fifth degree of consanguinity, of Justa by her cousin Primitiva Arnaldo Uriarte.

The other petitioners are the children of Primitiva and those of her brother Gregorio.[4]The children of Primitiva by Conrado Uriarte, aside from Pascasio, areJosefina, Gaudencio, Simplicio, Domingo and Virgilio, all surnamed Uriarte.The children of Gregorio Arnaldo, Primitivas brother, by Julieta Ilogon, are Jorencio, Enecia, Nicolas, Lupecino and Felisa.These other petitioners are thus grandchildren and relatives within the fifth degree of consanguinity of Justa by her cousins Gregorio Arnaldo and Primitiva Arnaldo.

Private respondent Benedicto Estrada brought this case in the Regional Trial Court for the partition of the land left by Justa Arnaldo-Sering. The land, consisting of 2.7 hectares, had been acquired by Justa as follows: 0.5 hectare by inheritance from her parents Juan Arnaldo and Ursula Tubil, and 2.2 hectaresby purchase.[5]Private respondent claimed to be the sole surviving heir of Justa, on the ground that the latter died without issue. He complained that Pascasio Uriarte who, he claimed, worked the land as Justas tenant,refused to give him (private respondent) his share of the harvest.[6]He contendedthat Pascasio had no right to the entire land of Justa but could claim only one-half of the 0.5 hectare land which Justa had inherited from her parents Juan Arnaldo and Ursula Tubil.[7]Pascasio died during the pendency of the case and was substituted by his heirs.[8]In their answer, the heirs denied they were mere tenants of Justa[9]but the latters heirs entitled to her entire land.

They claimed that the entire land, subject of the case, was originally owned by Ambrocio Arnaldo,[10]their great granduncle.It was allegedly bequeathed to Domingo and Juan Arnaldo, Ambrocios nephews, in a holographic will executed by Ambrocio in 1908.[11]Domingo was to receive two-thirds of the land and Juan, one-third.[12]The heirs claimed that the land had always been in their possession and that in her lifetime Justa never asserted exclusive right over the property but only received her share of the harvest from it.[13]They alleged that private respondent did not have any right to the property because he was not an heir of Ambrocio Arnaldo,[14]the original owner of the property.

The trial court sustained petitioners contention.In its decision rendered on November 8, 1991 it ruled:

As earlier stated, the land of Ambrosio Arnaldo which he left to his two nephews, Domingo and Juan Arnaldo, was only .5481 hectares, divided as follows: two-thirds or 3,654 square meters to Domingo, and one-third or 1,827 square meters to Juan. The area increased to 2.7588 hectares from .5481 hectares because the adjacent lot of about two hectares was acquired by Justa Arnaldo Sering, daughter of Juan Arnaldo, after the latters death.The entire 2.7588hectares was covered by tax declaration in the name of Justa Arnaldo Sering.The latter however died intestate and without issue.Her nearest surviving relatives are the children of her uncle Domingo Arnaldo, to whom her entire estate passed on after her death by operation of law, to the exclusion of all other relatives.Thus, the rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent (Art. 277, Civil Code).[15]Accordingly, the court ordered:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the defendants and the intervenors [herein petitioners] and against the plaintiff [private respondent], declaring the defendants and the intervenors, together with the other heirs of the late Domingo Arnaldo, as entitled to the entire parcel of land described in Tax Declaration No. 124 and subsequent revising tax declarations in the name of Justa Arnaldo Sering.No cost.

SO ORDERED.[16]On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed.Contrary to the trial courts finding, the appellate court found that the 0.5 hectares had been acquired by Justas parents, Juan Arnaldo and Ursula Tubil, during their marriage. As the nephew of Justa by her half-sister Agatonica, private respondent was held to be entitled to share in the estate of Justa. In the dispositive portion of its decision the appellate court ordered:

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby REVERSED and another is hereby entered -

Ordering the partition of the property described in the second amended complaint in the following manner:

(1).2500 hectare as the share of defendants-intervenors, and

(2)2.58 hectare as the share of the plaintiff.

For this purpose, the courta quois hereby directed to proceed with the partition in accordance with the procedure laid down in Rule 69 of the Rules of Court.

SO ORDERED.[17]Hence, this petition by the heirs of Pascasio Uriarte, the heirs of Primitiva Uriarte, and the heirs of Gregorio Arnaldo.Petitioners allege:

ITHE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION TANTAMOUNT TO LACK AND/OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN HOLDING THAT THE PLAINTIFF IS THE SON OF AGATONA ARREZA, THE HALF SISTER OF JUSTA ARNALDO SERING;

II THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS PREFERRED TECHNICALITY OVER SUBSTANTIALITY WHEN IT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN HOLDING THAT THE HOLOGRAPHIC WILL LEFT BY THE DECEASED AMBROCIO ARNALDO CANNOT PASS REAL OR PERSONAL PROPERTY;

IIITHE PRAYERS FOR RESTRAINING ORDER AND/OR WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND DAMAGES IS MERITORIOUS;

IVAND THE INSTANT PETITION IS IMPRESSED WITH MERIT AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED.[18]After due consideration of the petition, we find it to be without merit. As already stated, Justa left a piece of land consisting 2.7 hectares.Half of this land (0.5 hectares), as the Court of Appeals found, formerly was conjugal property of her parents, Juan Arnaldo and Ursula Tubil.The rest, consisting of 2.2 hectares, was acquired by Justa after the death of her parents.Accordingly, the division of Justas property should be as follows as private respondent contends:

A - The first 1/2 hectare should be divided into two parts, the share of Juan Arnaldo which will accrue topetitioners and the second half which pertains to Ursula Tubil, which will accrue to private respondent.

B - As to the second portion of the area of the land in question which as already stated wasconsolidated with the 1/2 hectare originally belonging to the conjugal partnership of Juan Arnaldo and Ursula Tubil, the same shall accrue to private respondent, who is the son of Agatonica Arreza, andwho is only three degrees from Justa Arnaldo, whereas petitioners who are the children of Primitiva Arnaldo and Gregorio Arnaldo, are five degrees removed from Justa Arnaldo.[19]The issue in this case is who among the petitioners and the private respondent is entitled to Justas estate as her nearest relatives within the meaning of Art. 962 of the Civil Code.

As a preliminary matter, petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in holding that private respondent is the son of Agatonica Arreza, who was the half-sister of Justa Arnaldo. Petitioners are raising this issue only now.It is well-settled, however, that questions not taken up during the trial of a case cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. With more reason, therefore,should such a question be disallowed when raised for the first time on appeal tothis Court.[20]It is noteworthy that, in their brief before the Court of Appeals,[21]petitioners admitted that private respondent is Justas nephew, his mother, Agatonica, being Justas half-sister.Apparently they are now questioning private respondents filiationbecause,as explained by the Court of Appeals, private respondent is the nearest relative of Justa and, therefore, the only one entitled to her estate.

Indeed, given the fact that 0.5 hectares of the land in question belonged to the conjugal partnership of Justas parents, Justa was entitled to 0.125 hectares of the half hectare land as her fathers (Juan Arnaldos) share in the conjugal property, while petitioners are entitled to the other 0.125 hectares.In addition, Justa inherited her mothers (Ursula Tubils) share consisting of 0.25 hectares.Plus the 2.2 hectares which belonged to her in her own right, Justa owned a total of 2.575 or 2.58 hectares of the 2.7-hectare land.This 2.58-hectare land was inherited by private respondent Benedicto Estrada as Justas nearest surviving relative.As the Court of Appeals held:

According to Article 962 of the Civil Code, In every inheritance, the relative nearest in degree excludes the more distant ones, saving the right of representation when it properly takes place.

Relatives in the same degree shall inherit in equal shares, subject to the provisions of Article 1006 with respect to relatives of the full and half blood, and of Article 987, paragraph 2, concerning division between paternal and maternal lines.

The manner of determining the proximity of relationship are provided by Articles 963 - 966 of the Civil Code.They provide:

ART. 963.Proximity of relationship is determined by the number of generations.Each generation forms a degree.

ART. 964.A series of degrees forms a line, which may be either direct or collateral.

A direct line is that constituted by the series of degrees among ascendants and descendants.

A collateral line is that constituted by the series of degrees among persons who are not ascendants and descendants, but who come from a common ancestor.

ART. 965.The direct line is either descending or ascending.

The former unites the head of the family with those who descend from him.

The latter binds a person with those from whom he descends.

ART. 966. In the line, as many degrees are counted as there are generations or persons, excluding the progenitor.

In the direct line, ascent is made to the common ancestor. Thus the child is one degree removed from the parent, two from the grandfather, and three from the great-grandparent.

In the collateral line, ascent is made to the common ancestor and then descent is made to the person with whom the computation is to be made.Thus, a person is two degrees removed from his brother, three from his uncle, who is the brother of his father, four from his first cousin, and so forth.

In this case, plaintiff is the son of Agatonica, the half-sister of Justa. He is thus a third degree relative of Justa.

On the other hand, defendants and intervenors are the sons and daughters of Justas cousin.They are thus fifth degree relatives of Justa.

Applying the principle that the nearest excludes the farthest, then plaintiff is the lawful heir of Justa.The fact that his mother is only a half-sister of Justa is of no moment.[22]Nevertheless, petitioners make much of the fact that private respondent is not an Arnaldo, his mother being Ursulas daughter not by Juan Arnaldo but by Pedro Arreza.They claim that this being the case, private respondent is not an heir of Justa and thus not qualified to share in her estate.

Petitioners misappreciate the relationship between Justa and private respondent.As already stated, private respondent is the son of Justas half-sister Agatonica.He is therefore Justas nephew.A nephew is considered a collateral relative who may inherit if no descendant, ascendant, or spouse survive the decedent.[23]That private respondent is only a half-blood relative is immaterial.This alone does not disqualify him from being his aunts heir.As the Court of Appeals correctly pointed out, The determination of whether the relationship is of the full or half blood is important only to determine the extent of the share of the survivors.[24]Because of the conclusion we have thus reached, the third and fourth grounds of the petition for review must fail.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.The temporary restraining order issued by this Court is LIFTED, and the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.2. G.R. No. 118449 February 11, 1998VIZCONDE vs. COURT OF APPEALS

Petitioner Lauro G. Vizconde and his wife Estrellita Nicolas-Vizconde had two children,viz.,CarmelaandJennifer. Petitioner's wife, Estrellita, is one of the five siblings of spousesRafaelNicolas andSaludGonzales-Nicolas. The other children of Rafael and Salud areAntonioNicolas;RamonNicolas;TeresitaNicolas de Leon, andRicardoNicolas, an incompetent. Antonio predeceased his parents and is now survived by his widow,Zenaida, and their four children.

On May 22, 1979, Estrellita purchased from Rafael a parcel of land with an area of 10,110 sq. m. located at Valenzuela, Bulacan (hereafter Valenzuela property) covered by TCT No. (T-36734) 13206 for One Hundred Thirty Five Thousand Pesos (P135,000.00), evidenced by a "Lubusang Bilihan ng Bahagi ng Lupa na Nasasakupan ng Titulo TCT No.T-36734".1In view thereof, TCT No. V-554 covering the Valenzuela property was issued to Estrellita.2On March 30, 1990, Estrellita sold the Valenzuela property to Amelia Lim and Maria Natividad Balictar Chiu for Three Million, Four Hundred Five Thousand, Six Hundred Twelve Pesos (P3,405,612.00).3In June of the same year, Estrellita bought from Premier Homes, Inc., a parcel of land with improvements situated at Vinzon St., BF Homes, Paraaque (hereafter Paraaque property) using a portion of the proceeds of sale of the Valenzuela property. The remaining amount of the proceeds was used in buying a car while the balance was deposited in a bank.

The following year an unfortunate event in petitioner's life occurred. Estrellita and her two daughters, Carmela and Jennifer, were killed on June 30, 1991, an incident popularly known as the "Vizconde Massacre". The findings of the investigation conducted by the NBI reveal that Estrellita died ahead of her daughters.4Accordingly, Carmela, Jennifer and herein petitioner succeeded Estrellita and, with the subsequent death of Carmela and Jennifer, petitioner was left as the sole heir of his daughters. Nevertheless, petitioner entered into an "Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate of Deceased Estrellita Nicolas-Vizconde With Waiver of Shares",5with Rafael and Salud, Estrellita's parents. The extra-judicial settlement provided for the division of the properties of Estrellita and her two daughters between petitioner and spouses Rafael and Salud. The properties include bank deposits, a car and the Paraaque property. The total value of the deposits deducting the funeral and other related expenses in the burial of Estrellita, Carmela and Jennifer, amounts to Three Million Pesos (P3,000,000.00).6The settlement gave fifty percent (50%) of the total amount of the bank deposits of Estrellita and her daughters to Rafael, except Savings Account No. 104-111211-0 under the name of Jennifer which involves a token amount. The other fifty percent (50%) was allotted to petitioner. The Paraaque property and the car and were also given to petitioner with Rafael and Salud waiving all their "claims, rights, ownership and participation as heirs"7in the said properties.

On November 18, 1992, Rafael died. To settle Rafael's estate, Teresita instituted an intestate estate proceeding8docketed as Sp. Proc. No. C-1679, with Branch 120 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City listing as heirs Salud, Ramon, Ricardo, and the wife (Zenaida) and children of Antonio. Teresita prayed to be appointed Special Administratrix of Rafael's estate. Additionally, she sought to be appointed as guardianad litemof Salud, now senile, and Ricardo, her incompetent brother Herein private respondent Ramon filed an opposition9dated March 24, 1993, praying to be appointed instead as Salud and Ricardo's guardian. Barely three weeks passed, Ramon filed another opposition10alleging, among others, that Estrellita was given the Valenzuela property by Rafael which she sold for not less than Six Million Pesos (P6,000,000.00) before her gruesome murder. Ramon pleaded for the court's intervention "to determine the legality and validity of the intervivos distribution made by deceased Rafael to his children,"11Estrellita included. On May 12, 1993, Ramon filed his own petition, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. C-1699, entitled "In The Matter Of The Guardianship Of Salud G. Nicolas and Ricardo G. Nicolas" and averred that their legitime should come from the collation of all the properties distributed to his children by Rafael during his lifetime.12Ramon stated that herein petitioner is one of Rafael's children "by right of representation as the widower of deceased legitimate daughter of Estrellita."13In a consolidated Order, dated November 9, 1993, the RTC appointed Ramon as the guardian of Salud and Ricardo while Teresita, in turn, was appointed as the Special Administratrix of Rafael's estate. The court's Order did not include petitioner in the slate of Rafael's heirs.14Neither was the Paraaque property listed in its list of properties to be included in the estate.15Subsequently, the RTC in an Order dated January 5, 1994, removed Ramon as Salud and Ricardo's guardian for Selling his ward's property without the court's knowledge and permission.16Sometime on January 13, 1994, the RTC released an Order giving petitioner "ten (10) days . . . within which to file any appropriate petition or motion related to the pending petition insofar as the case is concerned and to file any opposition to any pending motion that has been filed by both the counsels for Ramon Nicolas and Teresita de Leon." In response, petitioner filed a Manifestation, dated January 19, 1994, stressing that he was neither a compulsory heir nor an intestate heir of Rafael and he has no interest to participate in the proceedings. The RTC noted said Manifestation in its Order dated February 2, 1994.17Despite the Manifestation, Ramon, through a motion dated February 14, 1994, moved to include petitioner in the intestate estate proceeding and asked that the Paraaque property, as well as the car and the balance of the proceeds of the sale of the Valenzuela property, be collated.18Acting on Ramon's motion, the trial court on March 10, 1994 granted the same in an Order which pertinently reads as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

On the Motion To Include Lauro G. Vizconde In Intestate proceedings in instant case and considering the comment on his Manifestation, the same is hereby granted.19xxx xxx xxx

Petitioner filed its motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid Order which Ramon opposed.20On August 12, 1994, the RTC rendered an Order denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration. It provides:

xxx xxx xxx

The centerpoint of oppositor-applicant's argument is that spouses Vizconde were then financially incapable of having purchased or acquired for a valuable consideration the property at Valenzuela from the deceased Rafael Nicolas.Admittedly, the spouses Vizconde were then living with the deceased Rafael Nicolas in the latter's ancestral home.In fact, as the argument further goes, said spouses were dependent for support on the deceased Rafael Nicolas.And, Lauro Vizconde left for the United States in, de-facto separation, from the family for sometime and returned to the Philippines only after the occurrence of violent deaths of Estrellita and her two daughters.

To dispute the contention that the spouses Vizconde were financially incapable to buy the property from the late Rafael Nicolas, Lauro Vizconde claims that they have been engaged in business venture such as taxi business, canteen concessions and garment manufacturing.However, no competent evidence has been submitted to indubitably support the business undertakings adverted to.

In fine, there is no sufficient evidence to show that the acquisition of the property from Rafael Nicolas was for a valuable consideration.

Accordingly, the transfer of the property at Valenzuela in favor of Estrellita by her father was gratuitous and the subject property in Paraaque which was purchased out of the proceeds of the said transfer of the property by the deceased Rafael Nicolas in favor of Estrellita, is subject to collation.

WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED.21(Emphasis added)

Petitioner filed a petition forcertiorariand prohibition with respondent Court of Appeals. In its decision of December 14, 1994, respondent Court of Appeals22denied the petition stressing that the RTC correctly adjudicated the question on the title of the Valenzuela property as "the jurisdiction of the probate court extends to matters incidental and collateral to the exercise of its recognized powers in handling the settlement of the estate of the deceased (Cf.: Sec. 1, Rule 90, Revised Rules of Court)."23Dissatisfied, petitioner filed the instant petition for review oncertiorari. Findingprima faciemerit, the Court on December 4, 1995, gave due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective memoranda.

The core issue hinges on the validity of the probate court's Order, which respondent Court of Appeals sustained, nullifying the transfer of the Valenzuela property from Rafael to Estrellita and declaring the Paraaque property as subject to collation.

The appeal is well taken.

Basic principles of collation need to be emphasized at the outset. Article 1061 of the Civil Code speaks of collation. It states:

Art. 1061. Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs, must bring into the mass of the estate any property or right which he may have received from the decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any other gratuitous title, in order that it may be computed in the determination of the legitime of each heir, and in the account of the partition.

Collation is the act by virtue of which descendants or other forced heirs who intervene in the division of the inheritance of an ascendant bring into the common mass, the property which they received from him, so that the division may be made according to law and the will of the testator.24Collation is only required of compulsory heirs succeeding with other compulsory heirs and involves property or rights received by donation or gratuitous title during the lifetime of the decedent.25The purpose is to attain equality among the compulsory heirs in so far as possible for it is presumed that the intention of the testator or predecessor in interest making a donation or gratuitous transfer to a forced heir is to give him something in advance on account of his share in the estate, and that the predecessor's will is to treat all his heirs equally, in the absence of any expression to the contrary.26Collation does not impose any lien on the property or the subject matter of collationable donation. What is brought to collation is not the property donated itself, but rather the value of such property at the time it was donated,27the rationale being that the donation is a real alienation which conveys ownership upon its acceptance, hence any increase in value or any deterioration or loss thereof is for the account of the heir or donee.28The attendant facts herein do not make a case of collation. We find that the probate court, as well as respondent Court of Appeals, committed reversible errors.

First: The probate court erred in ordering the inclusion of petitioner in the intestate estate proceeding. Petitioner, a son-in-law of Rafael, is not one of Rafael's compulsory heirs. Article 887 of the Civil Code is clear on this point:

Art. 887. The following are compulsory heirs:

(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate parents and ascendants;

(2) In default of the following, legitimate parents and ascendants, with respect to their legitimate children and ascendants;

(3) The widow or widower;

(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal fiction;

(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in article 287.

Compulsory heirs mentioned in Nos. 3, 4 and 5 are not excluded by those in Nos. 1 and 2; neither do they exclude one another.

In all cases of illegitimate children, their filiation must be duly proved.

The father or mother of illegitimate children of the three classes mentioned, shall inherit from them in the manner and to the extent established by this Code.

With respect to Rafael's estate, therefore, petitioner who was not even shown to be a creditor of Rafael is considered a third person or a stranger.29As such, petitioner may not be dragged into the intestate estate proceeding. Neither may he be permitted or allowed to intervene as he has no personality or interest in the said proceeding,30which petitioner correctly argued in his manifestation.31Second: As a rule, the probate court may pass upon and determine the title or ownership of a property which may or may not be included in the estate proceedings.32Such determination is provisional in character and is subject to final decision in a separate action to resolve title.33In the case at bench, however, we note that the probate court went beyond the scope of its jurisdiction when it proceeded to determine the validity of the sale of the Valenzuela property between Rafael and Estrellita and ruled that the transfer of the subject property between the concerned parties was gratuitous. The interpretation of the deed and the true intent of the contracting parties, as well as the presence or absence of consideration, are matters outside the probate court's jurisdiction. These issues should be ventilated in an appropriate action. We reiterate:

. . . we are of the opinion and so hold, that a court which takes cognizance of testate or intestate proceedings has power and jurisdiction to determine whether or not the properties included therein or excluded therefrom belongprima facieto the deceased, although such a determination is not final or ultimate in nature, and without prejudice to the right of the interested parties, in a proper action, to raise the question bearing on the ownership or existence of the right or credit.34Third: The order of the probate court subjecting the Paraaque property to collation is premature. Records indicate that the intestate estate proceedings is still in its initiatory stage. We find nothing herein to indicate that the legitime of any of Rafael's heirs has been impaired to warrant collation. We thus advert to our ruling inUdarbe v.Jurado, 59 Phil. 11, 13-14, to wit:

We are of the opinion that this contention is untenable. In accordance with the provisions of article 103535of the Civil Code, it was the duty of the plaintiffs to allege and prove that the donations received by the defendants were inofficious in whole or in part and prejudiced the legitime or hereditary portion to which they are entitled. In the absence of evidence to that effect, the collation sought is untenable for lack of ground or basis therefor.

Fourth: Even on the assumption that collation is appropriate in this case the probate court, nonetheless, made a reversible error in ordering collation of the Paraaque property. We note that what was transferred to Estrellita, by way of deed of sale, is the Valenzuela property. The Paraaque property which Estrellita acquired by using the proceeds of the sale of the Valenzuela property does not become collationable simply by reason thereof. Indeed, collation of the Paraaque property has no statutory basis.36The order of the probate court presupposes that the Paraaque property was gratuitously conveyed by Rafael to Estrellita. Records indicate, however, that the Paraaque property was conveyed for and in consideration of P900,000.00,37by Premier Homes, Inc., to Estrellita. Rafael, the decedent, has no participation therein, and petitioner who inherited and is now the present owner of the Paraaque property is not one of Rafael's heirs. Thus, the probate court's order of collation against petitioner is unwarranted for the obligation to collate is lodged with Estrellita, the heir, and not to herein petitioner who does not have any interest in Rafael's estate. As it stands, collation of the Paraaque property is improper for, to repeat, collation covers only properties gratuitously given by the decedent during his lifetime to his compulsory heirs which fact does not obtain anent the transfer of the Paraaque property. Moreover, Rafael, in a public instrument, voluntarily and willfully waived any "claims, rights, ownership and participation as heir"38in the Paraaque property.

Fifth: Finally, it is futile for the probate court to ascertain whether or not the Valenzuela property may be brought to collation. Estrellita, it should be stressed, died ahead of Rafael. In fact, it was Rafael who inherited from Estrellita an amount more than the value of the Valenzuela property.39Hence, even assuming that the Valenzuela property may be collated collation may not be allowed as the value of the Valenzuela property has long been returned to the estate of Rafael. Therefore, any determination by the probate court on the matter serves no valid and binding purpose.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals appealed from is hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.

3. CORAZON DEZOLLER TISON and RENE R. DEZOLLER,petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and TEODORA DOMINGO,respondents.[G.R. No. 121027.July 31, 1997]

Facts:

The petitioners Corazon Tison and Rene Dezoller are niece and nephew ofthe deceasedTedora Dezoller Guerrero, who appears to be the sister of their father Hermogenes Dezoller. Teodora Dezoller Guerrero died on March 5, 1983 without anyascendantor descendant, and was survived only by her husband, Martin Guerrero, and herein petitioners. Petitioners' father, Hermogenes, died on October 3, 1973, hence they seek to inherit from Teodora Dezoller Guerrero by right of representation.

The records reveal that upon the death of Teodora Dezoller Guerrero, her surviving spouse executed anAffidavitof Extrajudicial Settlement adjudicating unto himself, allegedly as sole heir, the land in dispute. Martin sold the lot to herein private respondent Teodora Domingo andthereafter, a TCT was issued in the latters name.

Martin Guerrero died. Subsequently, herein petitioners filed an action for reconveyance claiming that they are entitled to inherit one-half of the property in question by right of representation. Tedoro Domingo however, attacks the legitimacy of Hermogenes.

During the hearing, petitioner Corazon Dezoller Tison was presented as the lone witness, with documentary evidences offered to prove petitioners filiation to their father and their aunt.Petitioners thereafter rested their case and submitted a written offer of the exhibits.

Subsequently, private respondent filed a Demurrer to Plaintiffs Evidence on the ground that petitioners failed to prove their legitimate filiation with the deceased Teodora Guerrero.

The trial court dismissed the complaint for reconveyance. Respondent Court of Appeals upheld the dismissal, declaring that the documentary evidence presented by herein petitioners, such as the baptismal certificates, family picture, and joint affidavits are all inadmissible and insufficient to prove and establish filiation. Hence, this appeal.Issues:

1. Whether or not a third person (private respondent), not the father nor an heir, may attack the legitimacy of the petitioners.

2. Whether or not the petitioners are entitled to inherit one-half of the property in question by right of representation.Ruling:

1. The private respondent is not the proper party to impugn the legitimacy of herein petitioners.

There is no presumption of the law more firmly established and founded on sounder morality and more convincing reason than the presumption that children born in wedlock are legitimate.And well settled is the rule that the issue of legitimacy cannot be attacked collaterally. Only the husband cancontestthe legitimacy of a child born to his wife. He is the one directly confronted with thescandaland ridicule which the infidelity of his wife produces; and he should decide whether to conceal that infidelity or expose it, in view of the moral andeconomic interestinvolved. It is only in exceptional cases that his heirs are allowed tocontestsuch legitimacy. Outside of these cases, none even his heirs can impugn legitimacy; that would amount to an insult to his memory.

The necessity of an independent action directly impugning the legitimacy is more clearly expressed in the Mexican Code (Article 335) which provides: The contest of the legitimacy of a child by the husband or his heirs must be made by proper complaint before the competent court; any contest made in any other way is void.This principle applies under our Family Code.Articles 170 and 171 of the code confirm this view, because they refer to the action to impugn the legitimacy.This action can be brought only by the husband or his heirs and within the periods fixed by law.Upon the expiration of the periods provided in Article 170, the action to impugn the legitimacy of a child can no longer be brought.The status conferred by the presumption, therefore, becomes fixed, and can no longer be questioned.The obvious intention of the law is to prevent the status of a child born in wedlock from being in a state of uncertainty for a long time.It also aims to force early action to settle any doubt as to the paternity of such child, so that the evidence material to the matter, which must necessarily be facts occurring during the period of the conception of the child, may still be easily available.2. The following provisions of the Civil Code provide for the manner by which the estate of the decedent shall be divided in this case, to wit:

Art. 975.When children of one or more brothers or sisters of the deceased survive, they shall inherit from the latter by representation, if they survive with their uncles or aunts.But if they alone survive, they shall inherit in equal portions.

Art. 995.In the absence of legitimate descendants and ascendants, and illegitimate children and their descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate, the surviving spouse shall inherit the entire estate, without prejudice to the rights of brothers and sisters, nephews and nieces, should there be any, under Article 1001.

Art. 1001.Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children to the other half.

Upon the death of Teodora Dezoller Guerrero, one-half of the subject property was automatically reserved to the surviving spouse, Martin Guerrero, as his share in the conjugal partnership.Applying the aforequoted statutory provisions, the remaining half shall be equally divided between the widower and herein petitioners who are entitled to jointly inherit in their own right.Hence, Martin Guerrero could only validly alienate his total undivided three-fourths (3/4) share in the entire property to herein private respondent.Resultantly, petitioners and private respondent are deemed co-owners of the property covered by the Transfer Certificate of Title in the proportion of an undivided one-fourth (1/4) and three-fourths (3/4) share thereof, respectively.

4. G.R. No. L-2599 October 27, 1905PAVIA vs. UGARTERamon Iturralde y Gonzalez having died intestate on the 28th of December, 1900, Maria Juana Ugarte e Iturralde asked that she be judicially declared the legitimate heir of the deceased.

There being no legitimate heirs to the estate either in the direct ascendant or descendant line of succession, the petitioner presented herself as a collateraldescendant that is to say, as the legitimate niece of the deceased. Her mother, Maria Juana Iturralde y Gonzalez, as well as the deceased, Ramon Iturralde y Gonzalez, were children of Manual Iturralde and Josefa Gonzalez.

The petition of Maria Juana Ugarte e Iturralde, then the only claimant to the estate, having been heard in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure in force at the time, intestate proceedings were instituted, and she was declared, in an order made on the 31st of January, 1901, without prejudice to third parties, to be the heir of the deceased, Ramon Iturralde y Gonzalez.

In the month of December, 1904, however, Carmen Linart, through her guardian, Rafaela Pavia, claimed one-half of all of the estate of the deceased, Ramon Iturralde y Gonzalez, and asked at the same time that Maria Juana Ugarte e Iturralde, who had been declared the lawful heir of the deceased a fact which this new relative did notdeny be required to render an account of the property of the estate.

The father of the petitioner was in the same collateral degree of succession as Maria Juana Ugarte e Iturralde. Pablo Linart, the father of Carmen Linart, was the legitimate son of Maria Josefa Iturralde y Gonzalez, another sister of Ramon Iturralde y Gonzalez. They, and Maria Juana Iturralde y Gonzalez are the common trunk from which the three branches issue.

Carmen Linart does not claim that her father, Pablo, who was of the same degree as Maria Juana Ugarte e Iturralde, should have succeeded Ramon, for the reason that the latter died first. This, however, was not alleged, mush less proved. What she claims is that, although she is one degree lower in the line of succession that her aunt, Maria Juana Iturralde y Gonzalez, yet she is entitled to a share of the estate of the deceased through her father, Pablo Linart, by representation that is to say, that even though a grandniece, she is entitled to the same share in the estate as the direct niece, Maria Juana Ugarte e Iturralde.lawphil.netThe court below on the 24th of February, 1905, entered judgment declaring that the petitioner had the same right to participate in the inheritance as had Maria Juana Ugarte e Iturralde, and ordered the latter to render an account of the estate, enjoining her, at the same time, from disposing of any part thereof until such accounting had been made and the estate distributed. Maria Juana Ugarte excepted to the judgment and has brought the case to this court.

After a consideration of the case, this court finds: (1) That the relative nearest in degree excludes those more distant, with the exception of the right of representation in proper cases (art. 921, par. 1 of the Civil Code); and (2) that the right of representation in the collateral line shall take place only in favor of children of brothers or sisters whether they be of whole or half blood (art. 925, par. 2).

In the light of the foregoing, the error which the appellant claims was committed in the court below is very clearly shown. The court below held that the grandniece was entitled to the same share of the estate that the niece was entitled to, when, as a matter of law, the right of representation in the collateral line can only take place in favor of the children of brothers or sisters of the intestate, and the plaintiff in this case is not a daughter of one of the sisters of the deceased, such as is the appellant, but the daughter of a son of a sister of the deceased. It would have been quite different had it been shown that her father, Pablo Linart, had survived the deceased. In that case he would have succeeded to the estate with his cousin, Maria Juana Ugarte, and then, by representation, she, the plaintiff, might have inherited the portion of the estate corresponding to her father's. It is not an error to consider that the word "children" in this connection does not include "grandchildren." There is no precedent in our jurisprudence to warrant such a conclusion.

The decisions of the supreme court of Spain of October 19, 1899, and December 31, 1895, relied upon, are not applicable to this case. Those decisions were rendered in cases relating to testate and not to intestate successions. In both cases, and in many others decided by the supreme court of Spain, prior to the operation of the Civil Code, where a testator had named certain persons as heirs and, they failing, that the property should pass to their children, it was held that "Grandchildren" were necessarily included in the word "children," and that in such a case the grandchild does not, properly speaking, inherit by representation, "for the reason that he must in any event succeed thechildin the natural and regular order," and pointed out in the last decision referred to. And, as is also pointed out in the first decision, "the fact that it was stated with more or less correctness in the prayer of the complaint that the action was based upon the right of representation, is not sufficient to deny to the appellant a right which he had under the terms of the will." The difference is this, that in the case of a testamentary succession, we must take into consideration and give force to the intention of the testator when he substitutes the children for the heirs first named by him. The descendants are ordinarily considered as included in the term "children," unless they are expressly excluded, whereas in intestate successions, reference should only be had to the provisions of the law under which it is evident that the rights of representation in the collateral line do not obtain beyond the sons and daughters of brothers or sisters.

We, therefore, hold that in an intestate succession a grandniece of the deceased can not participate with a niece in the inheritance, because the latter, being a nearer relative, the more distance grandniece is excluded. In the collateral line the right of representation does not obtain beyond sons and daughters of the brothers and sisters, which would have been the case if Pablo Linart, the father of the plaintiff, had survived his deceased uncle.

For the reasons above stated, we hereby reverse the judgment of the court below, and declare that Carmen Linart has no right to succeed the deceased with said Maria Juana Ugarte e Iturralde, who was once declared to be the lawful heir, and who is now in possession of the estate, as to whom we hereby dissolve the injunction issued from the Court of First Instance.

After the expiration of twenty days let judgment be entered in accordance herewith, without special provisions as to the costs of this instance, and let the record be remanded to the court of First Instance from whence it came for execution of the said judgment. So ordered.

5. G.R. No. L-26699 March 16, 1976

SALAO vs. SALAO, This litigation regarding a forty-seven-hectare fishpond located at Sitio Calunuran, Hermosa, Bataan involves the law of trusts and prescription. The facts are as follows:

The spouses Manuel Salao and Valentina Ignacio of Barrio Dampalit, Malabon, Rizal begot four children named Patricio, Alejandra, Juan (Banli) and Ambrosia. Manuel Salao died in 1885. His eldest son, Patricio, died in 1886 survived by his only child. Valentin Salao.

There is no documentary evidence as to what, properties formed part of Manuel Salao's estate, if any. His widow died on May 28, 1914. After her death, her estate was administered by her daughter Ambrosia.

It was partitioned extrajudicially in a deed dated December 29, 1918 but notarized on May 22, 1919 (Exh. 21). The deed was signed by her four legal heirs, namely, her three children, Alejandra, Juan and Ambrosia, and her grandson, Valentin Salao, in representation of his deceased father, Patricio.

The lands left by Valentina Ignacio, all located at Barrio Dampalit were as follows:

Nature of Lands(1) One-half interest in a fishpond which she had inherited from her parents, Feliciano Ignacio and Damiana Mendoza, and the other half of which was owned by her co-owner, Josefa Sta. Ana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21,700(2) Fishpond inherited from her parents . . . . . . . . . . . . 7,418

(3) Fishpond inherited from her parents . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6,989

(4) Fishpond with a bodega for salt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50,469

(5) Fishpond with an area of one hectare, 12 ares and 5 centares purchased from Bernabe and Honorata Ignacio by Valentina Ignacio on November 9, 1895 with a bodega for salt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11,205

(6) Fishpond . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8,000

(7) One-half interest in a fishpond with a total area of 10,424 square meters, the other half was owned by A. Aguinaldo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5,217

(8) Riceland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50,454

(9) Riceland purchased by Valentina Ignacio from Eduardo Salao on January 27, 1890 with a house and two camarins thereon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8,065

(10) Riceland in the name of Ambrosia Salao, with an area of 11,678 square meters, of which 2,173 square meters were sold to Justa Yongco . . . . . . . . . .9,505

TOTAL . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 179,022 square

meters

To each of the legal heirs of Valentina Ignacio was adjudicated a distributive share valued at P8,135.25. In satisfaction of his distributive share, Valentin Salao (who was then already forty-eight years old) was given the biggest fishpond with an area of 50,469 square meters, a smaller fishpond with an area of 6,989 square meters and the riceland with a net area of 9,905 square meters. Those parcels of land had an aggregate appraised value of P13,501 which exceeded Valentin's distributive share. So in the deed of partition he was directed to pay to his co-heirs the sum of P5,365.75. That arrangement, which was obviously intended to avoid the fragmentation of the lands, was beneficial to Valentin.

In that deed of partition (Exh. 21) it was noted that "desde la muerte de Valentina Ignacio y Mendoza, ha venido administrando sus bienes la referida Ambrosia Salao" "cuya administracion lo ha sido a satisfaccion de todos los herederos y por designacion los mismos". It was expressly stipulated that Ambrosia Salao was not obligated to render any accounting of her administration "en consideracion al resultado satisfactorio de sus gestiones, mejoradas los bienes y pagodas por ella las contribusiones (pages 2 and 11, Exh. 21).

By virtue of the partition the heirs became "dueos absolutos de sus respectivas propiedadas, y podran inmediatamente tomar posesion de sus bienes, en la forma como se han distribuido y llevado a cabo las adjudicaciones" (page 20, Exh. 21).

The documentary evidence proves that in 1911 or prior to the death of Valentina Ignacio her two children, Juan Y. Salao, Sr. and Ambrosia Salao, secured a Torrens title, OCT No. 185 of the Registry of Deeds of Pampanga, in their names for a forty-seven-hectare fishpond located at Sitio Calunuran, Lubao, Pampanga (Exh. 14). It is also known as Lot No. 540 of the Hermosa cadastre because that part of Lubao later became a part of Bataan.

The Calunuran fishpond is the bone of contention in this case.

Plaintiffs' theory is that Juan Y. Salao, Sr. and his sister Ambrosia had engaged in the fishpond business. Where they obtained the capital is not shown in any documentary evidence. Plaintiffs' version is that Valentin Salao and Alejandra Salao were included in that joint venture, that the funds used were the earnings of the properties supposedly inherited from Manuel Salao, and that those earnings were used in the acquisition of the Calunuran fishpond. There is no documentary evidence to support that theory.

On the other hand, the defendants contend that the Calunuran fishpond consisted of lands purchased by Juan Y. Salao, Sr. and Ambrosia Salao in 1905, 1906, 1907 and 1908 as, shown in their Exhibits 8, 9, 10 and 13. But this point is disputed by the plaintiffs.

However, there can be no controversy as to the fact that after Juan Y. Salao, Sr. and Ambrosia Salao secured a Torrens title for the Calunuran fishpond in 1911 they exercised dominical rights over it to the exclusion of their nephew, Valentin Salao.

Thus, on December 1, 1911 Ambrosia Salao sold underpacto de retrofor P800 the Calunuran fishpond to Vicente Villongco. The period of redemption was one year. In the deed of sale (Exh19) Ambrosia confirmed that she and her brother Juan were thedueos proindivisosof the saidpesqueria.On December 7, 1911 Villongco, the vendee a retro, conveyed the same fishpond to Ambrosia by way of lease for ananual canonof P128 (Exh. 19-a).

After the fishpond was redeemed from Villongco or on June 8, 1914 Ambrosia and Juan sold it underpacto de retroto Eligio Naval for the sum of P3,360. The period of redemption was also one year (Exh. 20). The fishpond was later redeemed and Naval reconveyed it to the vendorsa retroin a document dated October 5, 1916 (Exh. 20-a).

The 1930 survey shown in the computation sheets of the Bureau of Lands reveals that the Calunuran fishpond has an area of 479,205 square meters and that it was claimed by Juan Salao and Ambrosia Salao, while the Pinanganacan fishpond (subsequently acquired by Juan and Ambrosia) has an area of 975,952 square meters (Exh. 22).

Likewise, there is no controversy as to the fact that on May 27, 1911 Ambrosia Salao bought for four thousand pesos from the heirs of Engracio Santiago a parcel of swampland planted tobacawanand nipa with an area of 96 hectares, 57 ares and 73 centares located at Sitio Lewa, Barrio Pinanganacan, Lubao, Pampanga (Exh. 17-d).

The record of Civil Case No. 136, General Land Registration Office Record No. 12144, Court of First Instance of Pampanga shows that Ambrosia Salao and Juan Salao filed an application for the registration of that land in their names on January 15, 1916. They alleged in their petition that "han adquirido dicho terreno porpartes igualesy por la compra a los herederos del finado, Don Engracio Santiago" (Exh. 17-a).

At the hearing on October 26, 1916 before Judge Percy M. Moir, Ambrosia testified for the applicants. On that same day Judge Moir rendered a decision, stating,inter alia,that the heirs of Engracio Santiago had sold the land to Ambrosia Salao and Juan Salao. Judge Moir "ordena la adjudicacion y registro del terreno solicitado a nombre de Juan Salao, mayor de edad y de estado casado y de su esposa Diega Santiago y Ambrosia Salao, de estado soltera y mayor de edad,en participaciones iguales"(Exh. 17-e).

On November 28, 1916 Judge Moir ordered the issuance of a decree for the said land. The decree was issued on February 21, 1917. On March 12, 1917 Original Certificate of Title No. 472 of the Registry of Deeds of Pampanga was issued in the names of Juan Salao and Ambrosia Salao.

That Pinanganacan or Lewa fishpond later became Cadastral Lot No. 544 of the Hermosa cadastre (Exh. 23). It adjoins the Calunuran fishpond (See sketch, Exh. 1).

Juan Y. Salao, Sr. died on November 3, 1931 at the age of eighty years (Exh. C). His nephew, Valentin Salao, died on February 9, 1933 at the age of sixty years according to the death certificate (Exh. A. However, if according to Exhibit 21, he was forty-eight years old in 1918, he would be sixty-three years old in 1933).

The intestate estate of Valentin Salao was partitioned extrajudicially on December 28, 1934 between his two daughters, Benita Salao-Marcelo and Victorina Salao-Alcuriza (Exh. 32). His estate consisted of the two fishponds which he had inherited in 1918 from his grandmother, Valentina Ignacio.

If it were true that he had a one-third interest in the Calunuran and Lewa fishponds with a total area of 145 hectares registered in 1911 and 1917 in the names of his aunt and uncle, Ambrosia Salao and Juan Y. Salao, Sr., respectively, it is strange that no mention of such interest was made in the extrajudicial partition of his estate in 1934.

It is relevant to mention that on April 8, 1940 Ambrosia Salao donated to her grandniece, plaintiff Benita Salao, three lots located at Barrio Dampalit with a total area of 5,832 square meters (Exit. L). As donee Benita Salao signed the deed of donation.

On that occasion she could have asked Ambrosia Salao to deliver to her and to the children of her sister, Victorina, the Calunuran fishpond if it were true that it was held in trust by Ambrosia as the share of Benita's father in the alleged joint venture.

But she did not make any such demand. It was only after Ambrosia Salao's death that she thought of filing an action for the reconveyance of the Calunuran fishpond which was allegedly held in trust and which had become the sole property of Juan Salao y Santiago (Juani).

On September 30, 1944 or during the Japanese occupation and about a year before Ambrosia Salao's death on September 14, 1945 due to senility (she was allegedly eighty-five years old when she died), she donated her one-halfproindivisoshare in the two fishponds in question to her nephew, Juan S. Salao, Jr. (Juani) At that time she was living with Juani's family. He was already the owner of the the other half of the said fishponds, having inherited it from his father, Juan Y. Salao, Sr. (Banli) The deed of denotion included other pieces of real property owned by Ambrosia. She reserved for herself the usufruct over the said properties during her lifetime (Exh. 2 or M).

The said deed of donation was registered only on April 5, 1950 (page 39, Defendants' Record on Appeal).

The lawyer of Benita Salao and the Children of Victorina Salao in a letter dated January 26, 1951 informed Juan S. Salao, Jr. that his clients had a one-third share in the two fishponds and that when Juani took possession thereof in 1945, he refused to give Benita and Victorina's children their one-third share of the net fruits which allegedly amounted to P200,000 (Exh. K).

Juan S. Salao, Jr. in his answer dated February 6, 1951 categorically stated that Valentin Salao did not have any interest in the two fishponds and that the sole owners thereof his father Banli and his aunt Ambrosia, as shown in the Torrens titles issued in 1911 and 1917, and that he Juani was the donee of Ambrosia's one-half share (Exh. K-1).

Benita Salao and her nephews and niece filed their original complaint against Juan S. Salao, Jr. on January 9, 1952 in the Court of First Instance of Bataan (Exh. 36). They amended their complaint on January 28, 1955. They asked for the annulment of the donation to Juan S. Salao, Jr. and for the reconveyance to them of the Calunuran fishpond as Valentin Salao's supposed one-third share in the 145 hectares of fishpond registered in the names of Juan Y. Salao, Sr. and Ambrosia Salao.

Juan S. Salao, Jr. in his answer pleaded as a defense the indefeasibility of the Torrens title secured by his father and aunt. He also invoked the Statute of Frauds, prescription and laches. As counter-claims, he asked for moral damages amounting to P200,000, attorney's fees and litigation expenses of not less than P22,000 and reimbursement of the premiums which he has been paying on his bond for the lifting of the receivership Juan S. Salao, Jr. died in 1958 at the age of seventy-one. He was substituted by his widow, Mercedes Pascual and his six children and by the administrator of his estate.

In the intestate proceedings for the settlement of his estate the two fishponds in question were adjudicated to his seven legal heirs in equal shares with the condition that the properties would remain under administration during the pendency of this case (page 181, Defendants' Record on Appeal).

After trial the trial court in its decision consisting of one hundred ten printed pages dismissed the amended complaint and the counter-claim. In sixty-seven printed pages it made a laborious recital of the testimonies of plaintiffs' fourteen witnesses, Gregorio Marcelo, Norberto Crisostomo, Leonardo Mangali Fidel de la Cruz, Dionisio Manalili, Ambrosio Manalili, Policarpio Sapno, Elias Manies Basilio Atienza, Benita Salao, Emilio Cagui Damaso de la Pea, Arturo Alcuriza and Francisco Buensuceso, and the testimonies of defendants' six witnesses, Marcos Galicia, Juan Galicia, Tiburcio Lingad, Doctor Wenceslao Pascual, Ciriaco Ramirez and Pablo P. Salao. (Plaintiffs presented Regino Nicodemus as a fifteenth witness, a rebuttal witness).

The trial court found that there was no community of property among Juan Y. Salao, Sr., Ambrosia Salao and Valentin Salao when the Calunuran and Pinanganacan (Lewa) lands were acquired; that a co-ownership over the real properties of Valentina Ignacio existed among her heirr after her death in 1914; that the co-ownership was administered by Ambrosia Salao and that it subsisted up to 1918 when her estate was partitioned among her three children and her grandson, Valentin Salao.

The trial court surmised that the co-ownership which existed from 1914 to 1918 misled the plaintiffs and their witnesses and caused them to believe erroneously that there was a co-ownership in 1905 or thereabouts. The trial court speculated that if valentin had a hand in the conversion into fishponds of the Calunuran and Lewa lands, he must have done so on a salary or profit- sharing basis. It conjectured that Valentin's children and grandchildren were given by Ambrosia Salao a portion of the earnings of the fishponds as a reward for his services or because of Ambrosia's affection for her grandnieces.

The trial court rationalized that Valentin's omission during his lifetime to assail the Torrens titles of Juan and Ambrosia signified that "he was not a co-owner" of the fishponds. It did not give credence to the testimonies of plaintiffs' witnesses because their memories could not be trusted and because no strong documentary evidence supported the declarations. Moreover, the parties involved in the alleged trust were already dead.

It also held that the donation was validly executed and that even if it were void Juan S. Salao, Jr., the donee, would nevertheless be the sole legal heir of the donor, Ambrosia Salao, and would inherit the properties donated to him.

Both parties appealed. The plaintiffs appealed because their action for reconveyance was dismissed. The defendants appealed because their counterclaim for damages was dismissed.

The appeals, which deal with factual and legal issues, were made to the Court of Appeals. However, as the amounts involved exceed two hundred thousand pesos, the Court of Appeals elevated the case to this Court in its resolution of Octoter 3, 1966 (CA-G.R. No. 30014-R).

Plaintiffs' appeal. An appellant's brief should contain "a subject index index of the matter in the brief witha digest of the argument and page references"to the contents of the brief (Sec. 16 [a], Rule 46, 1964 Rules of Court; Sec. 17, Rule 48, 1940 Rules of Court).

The plaintiffs in their appellants' brief consisting of 302 pages did not comply with that requirement. Their statements of the case and the facts do not contain "page references to the record" as required in section 16[c] and [d] of Rule 46, formerly section 17, Rule 48 of the 1940 Rules of Court.

Lawyers for appellants, when they prepare their briefs, would do well to read and re-read section 16 of Rule 46. If they comply strictly with the formal requirements prescribed in section 16, they might make a competent and luminous presentation of their clients' case and lighten the burden of the Court.

What Justice Fisher said in 1918 is still true now: "The pressure of work upon this Court is so great that we cannot, in justice to other litigants, undertake to make an examination of the voluminous transcript of the testimony (1,553 pages in this case, twenty-one witnesses having testified), unless the attorneys who desire us to make such examination have themselves taken the trouble to read the record and brief it in accordance with our rules" (Palara vs. Baguisi 38 Phil. 177, 181). As noted in an old case, this Court decides hundreds of cases every year and in addition resolves in minute orders an exceptionally considerable number of petitions, motions and interlocutory matters (Alzua and Arnalot vs. Johnson, 21 Phil. 308, 395; SeeIn re Almacen,L-27654, February 18, 1970, 31 SCRA 562, 573).

Plaintiffs' first assignment of error raised a procedural issue. In paragraphs 1 to 14 of their first cause of action they made certain averments to establish their theory that Valentin Salao had a one-third interest in the two fishponds which were registrered in the names of Juan Y. Salao, Sr. (Banli) and Ambrosia Salao.

Juan S. Salao, Jr. (Juani) in his answer "specifically" denied each and all the allegations" in paragraphs I to 10 and 12 of the first cause of action with the qualification that Original certificates of Title Nos. 185 and 472 were issued "more than 37 years ago" in the names of Juan (Banli) and Ambrosia under the circumstances set forth in Juan S. Salao, Jr.'s "positive defenses" and "not under the circumstances stated in the in the amended complaint".

The plaintiffs contend that the answer of Juan S. Salao, Jr. was in effect tin admission of the allegations in their first cause of action that there was a co-ownership among Ambrosia, Juan, AIejandra and Valentin, all surnamed Salao, regarding the Dampalit property as early as 1904 or 1905; that the common funds were invested the acquisition of the two fishponds; that the 47-hectare Calunuran fishpond was verbally adjudicated to Valentin Salao in the l919 partition and that there was a verbal stipulation to to register "said lands in the name only of Juan Y. Salao".

That contention is unfounded. Under section 6, Rule 9 of the 1940 of Rules of Court the answer should "contain either a specific dinial a statement of matters in accordance of the cause or causes of action asserted in the complaint". Section 7 of the same rule requires the defendant to "deal specificaly with each material allegation of fact the truth of wihich he does not admit and, whenever practicable shall set forth the substance of the matters which he will rely upon to support his denial". "Material averments in the complaint, other than those as to the amount damage, shall be deemed admitted when specifically denied" (Sec. 8). "The defendant may set forth set forth by answer as many affirmative defenses as he may have. All grounds of defenses as would raise issues of fact not arising upon the preceding pleading must be specifically pleaded" (Sec. 9).

What defendant Juan S. Salao, Jr. did in his answer was to set forth in his "positive defenses" the matters in avoidance of plaintiffs' first cause of action which which supported his denials of paragraphs 4 to 10 and 12 of the first cause of action. Obviously, he did so because he found it impracticable to state pierceneal his own version as to the acquisition of the two fishponds or to make a tedious and repetitious recital of the ultimate facts contradicting allegations of the first cause of action.

We hold that in doing so he substantially complied with Rule 9 of the 1940 Rules of Court. It may be noted that under the present Rules of Court a "negative defense is the specific denial of t the material fact or facts alleged in the complaint essential to plaintiff's cause of causes of action". On the other hand, "an affirmative defense is an allegation of new matter which, while admitting the material allegations of the complaint, expressly or impliedly, would nevertheless prevent or bar recovery by the plaintiff." Affirmative defenses include all matters set up "by of confession and avoidance". (Sec. 5, Rule 6, Rules of Court).

The case ofEl Hogar Filipino vs. Santos Investments,74 Phil. 79 and similar cases are distinguishable from the instant case. In theEl Hogarcase the defendant filed a laconic answer containing the statement that it denied "generally ans specifically each and every allegation contained in each and every paragraph of the complaint". It did not set forth in its answer any matters by way of confession and avoidance. It did not interpose any matters by way of confession and avoidance. It did not interpose any affirmative defenses.

Under those circumstances, it was held that defendant's specific denial was really a general denial which was tantamount to an admission of the allegations of the complaint and which justified judgment on the pleadings. That is not the situation in this case.

The other nine assignments of error of the plaintiffs may be reduced to the decisive issue of whether the Calunuran fishpond was held in trust for Valentin Salao by Juan Y. Salao, Sr. and Ambrosia Salao. That issue is tied up with the question of whether plaintiffs' action for reconveyance had already prescribed.

The plaintiffs contend that their action is "to enforce a trust which defendant" Juan S. Salao, Jr. allegedly violated. The existence of a trust was not definitely alleged in plaintiffs' complaint. They mentioned trust for the first time on page 2 of their appelants' brief.

To determine if the plaintiffs have a cause of action for the enforcement of a trust, it is necessary to maek some exegesis on the nature of trusts(fideicomosis).Trusts in Anglo-American jurisprudence were derived from thefideicommissaof the Roman law (Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Abadilla,46 Phil. 642, 646).

"In its technical legal sense, a trust is defined as the right, enforceable solely in equity, to the beneficial enjoyment of property, the legal title to which is vested in another, but the word 'trust' is frequently employed to indicate duties, relations, and responsibilities which are not strictly technical trusts" (89 C.J.S. 712).

A person who establishes a trust is called the trustor; one in whom confidence is reposed as regards property for the benefit of another person is known as the trustee; and the person for whose benefit the trust has been created is referred to as the beneficiary" (Art. 1440, Civil Code). There is a fiduciary relation between the trustee and thecestui que trustas regards certain property, real, personal, money or choses in action (Pacheco vs. Arro, 85 Phil. 505).

"Trusts are either express or implied. Express trusts are created by the intention of the trustor or of the parties. Implied trusts come into being by operation of law" (Art. 1441, Civil Code). "No express trusts concerning an immovable or any interest therein may be proven by parol evidence. An implied trust may be proven by oral evidence" (Ibid,Arts. 1443 and 1457).

"No particular words are required for the creation of an express trust, it being sufficient that a trust is clearly intended" (Ibid,Art. 1444; Tuason de Perez vs. Caluag, 96 Phil. 981; Julio vs. Dalandan, L-19012, October 30, 1967, 21 SCRA 543, 546). "Express trusts are those which are created by the direct and positive acts of the parties, by some writing or deed, or will, or by words either expressly or impliedly evincing an intention to create a trust" (89 C.J.S. 72).

"Implied trusts are those which, without being expressed, are deducible from the nature of the transaction asmatters of intent,or which are superinduced on the transaction byoperation of law as matter of equity,independently of the particular intention of the parties" (89 C.J.S. 724). They are ordinarily subdivided into resulting and constructive trusts (89 C.J.S. 722).

"A resulting trust. is broadly defined as a trust which is raised or created by the act or construction of law, but in its more restricted sense it is a trust raised byimplication of law and presumed to have been contemplated by the parties,the intention as to which is to be found in the nature of their transaction, but not expressed in the deed or instrument of conveyance (89 C.J.S. 725). Examples of resulting trusts are found in articles 1448 to 1455 of the Civil Code. (See Padilla vs. Court of Appeals, L-31569, September 28, 1973, 53 SCRA 168, 179; Martinez vs. Grao 42 Phil. 35).

On the other hand, a constructive trust is -a trust "raised by construction of law, or arising by operation of law". In a more restricted sense and as contra-distinguished from a resulting trust, a constructive trust is "a trust not created by any words, either expressly or impliedly evincing a direct intension to create a trust, but bythe construction of equity in order to satisfy the demands of justice."It does not arise "by agreement or intention, but by operation of law." (89 C.J.S. 726-727).

Thus, "if property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property comes" (Art. 1456, Civil Code).

Or "if a person obtains legal title to property by fraud or concealment, courts of equity will impress upon the title a so-called constructive trust in favor of the defrauded party". Such a constructive trust is not a trust in the technical sense. (Gayondato vs. Treasurer of the P. I., 49 Phil. 244).

Not a scintilla of documentary evidence was presented by the plaintiffs to prove that there was an express trust over the Calunuran fishpond in favor of Valentin Salao. Purely parol evidence was offered by them to prove the alleged trust. Their claim that in the oral partition in 1919 of the two fishponds the Calunuran fishpond was assigned to Valentin Salao is legally untenable.

It is legally indefensible because the terms of article 1443 of the Civil Code (already in force when the action herein was instituted) are peremptory and unmistakable: parol evidence cannot be used to prove an express trust concerning realty.

Is plaintiffs' massive oral evidence sufficient to prove an implied trust, resulting or constructive, regarding the two fishponds?

Plaintiffs' pleadings and evidence cannot be relied upon to prove an implied trust. The trial court's firm conclusion that there was no community of property during the lifetime of Valentina; Ignacio or before 1914 is substantiated by defendants' documentary evidence. The existence of the alleged co-ownership over the lands supposedly inherited from Manuel Salao in 1885 is the basis of plaintiffs' contention that the Calunuran fishpond was held in trust for Valentin Salao.

But that co-ownership was not proven by any competent evidence. It is quite improbable because the alleged estate of Manuel Salao was likewise not satisfactorily proven. The plaintiffs alleged in their original complaint that there was a co-ownership overtwohectares of land left by Manuel Salao. In their amended complaint, they alleged that the co-ownership was oversevenhectares of fishponds located in Barrio Dampalit, Malabon, Rizal. In their brief they alleged that the fishponds, ricelands and saltbeds owned in common in Barrio Dampalit had an area oftwenty-eighthectares, of which sixteen hectares pertained to Valentina Ignacio and eleven hectares represented Manuel Salao's estate.

They theorized that the eleven hectares "were, and necessarily, the nucleus, nay the very root, of the property now in litigation (page 6, plaintiffs-appellants' brief). But the eleven hectares were not proven by any trustworthy evidence. Benita Salao's testimony that in 1918 or 1919 Juan, Ambrosia, Alejandra and Valentin partitioned twenty-eight hectares of lands located in Barrio Dampalit is not credible. As noted by the defendants,Manuel Salao was not even mentioned in plaintiffs' complaints.The 1919 partition of Valentina Ignacio's estate covered aboutseventeenhectares of fishponds and ricelands (Exh. 21). If at the time that partition was made there were eleven hectares of land in Barrio Dampalit belonging to Manuel Salao, who died in 1885, those eleven hectares would have been partitioned in writing as in the case of the seventeen hectares belonging to Valentina Ignacio's estate.

It is incredible that the forty-seven-hectare Calunuran fishpond would be adjudicated to Valentin Salao mere by by word of mouth. Incredible because for the partition of theseventeenhectares of land left by Valentina Ignacio an elaborate "Escritura de Particion" consisting of twenty-two pages had to be executed by the four Salao heirs. Surely, for the partition of one hundred forty-five hectares of fishponds among three of the same Salao heirs an oral adjudication would not have sufficed.

The improbability of the alleged oral partition becomes more evident when it is borne in mind that the two fishponds were registered land and "the act of registration" is "the operative act" that conveys and affects the land (Sec. 50, Act No. 496). That means that any transaction affecting the registered land should be evidenced by a registerable deed. The fact that Valentin Salao and his successors-in-interest, the plaintiffs, never bothered for a period of nearly forty years to procure any documentary evidence to establish his supposed interest ox participation in the two fishponds is very suggestive of the absence of such interest.

The matter may be viewed from another angle. As already stated, the deed of partition for Valentina Ignacio's estate wag notarized in 1919 (Exh. 21). The plaintiffs assert that the two fishponds were verbally partitioned also in 1919 and that the Calunuran fishpond was assigned to Valentin Salao as his share.

Now in the partition of Valentina Ignacio's estate, Valentin was obligated to pay P3,355.25 to Ambrosia Salao. If, according to the plaintiffs, Ambrosia administered the two fishponds and was the custodian of its earnings, then it could have been easily stipulated in the deed partitioning Valentina Ignacio's estate that the amount due from Valentin would just be deducted by Ambrosia from his share of the earnings of the two fishponds. There was no such stipulation. Not a shred of documentary evidence shows Valentin's participation in the two fishponds.

The plaintiffs utterly failed to measure up to the yardstick that a trust must be proven by clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence. It cannot rest on vague and uncertain evidence or on loose, equivocal or indefinite declarations (De Leon vs. Molo-Peckson, 116 Phil. 1267, 1273).

Trust and trustee; establishment of trust by parol evidence; certainty of proof. Where a trust is to be established by oral proof, the testimony supporting it must be sufficiently strong to prove the right of the alleged beneficiary with as much certainty as if a document proving the trust were shown.A trust cannot be established, contrary to the recitals of a Torrens title, upon vague and inconclusive proof.(Syllabus, Suarez vs. Tirambulo, 59 Phil. 303).

Trusts; evidence needed to establish trust on parol testimony. In order to establish a trust in real property by parol evidence, the proof should be as fully convincing as if the act giving rise to the trust obligation were proven by an authentic document. Such a trust cannot be established upon testimony consisting in large part of insecure surmises based on ancient hearsay. (Syllabus, Santa Juana vs. Del Rosario 50 Phil. 110).

The foregoing rulings are good under article 1457 of the Civil Code which, as already noted, allows an implied trust to be proven by oral evidence. Trustworthy oral evidence is required to prove an implied trust because, oral evidence can be easily fabricated.

On the other hand, a Torrens title is generally a conclusive of the ownership of the land referred to therein (Sec. 47, Act 496). A strong presumption exists. that Torrens titles were regularly issued and that they are valid. In order to maintain an action for reconveyance, proof as to the fiduciary relation of the parties must be clear and convincing (Yumul vs. Rivera and Dizon, 64 Phil. 13, 17-18).

The real purpose of the Torrens system is, to quiet title to land. "Once a title is registered, the owner may rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in the portals of the court, or sitting in themirador de su casa,to avoid the possibility of losing his land" (Legarda and Prieto vs. Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590, 593).

There was no resulting trust in this case because there never was any intention on the part of Juan Y. Salao, Sr., Ambrosia Salao and Valentin Salao to create any trust. There was no constructive trust because the registration of the two fishponds in the names of Juan and Ambrosia was not vitiated by fraud or mistake. This is not a case where to satisfy the demands of justice it is necessary to consider the Calunuran fishpond " being held in trust by the heirs of Juan Y. Salao, Sr. for the heirs of Valentin Salao.

And even assuming that there was an implied trust, plaintiffs' action is clearly barred by prescription or laches (Ramos vs. Ramos, L-19872, December 3, 1974, 61 SCRA 284; Quiniano vs. Court of Appeals, L-23024, May 31, 1971, 39 SCRA 221; Varsity Hills, Inc. vs. Navarro, 9, February 29, 1972, 43 SCRA 503; Alzona vs. Capunitan and Reyes, 114 Phil. 377).

Under Act No. 190, whose statute of limitation would apply if there were an implied trust in this case, the longest period of extinctive prescription was only ten year (Sec. 40; Diaz vs. Gorricho and Aguado, 103 Phil. 261, 266).

The Calunuran fishpond was registered in 1911. The written extrajudicial demand for its reconveyance was made by the plaintiffs in 1951. Their action was filed in 1952 or after the lapse of more than forty years from the date of registration. The plaintiffs and their predecessor-in-interest, Valentin Salao, slept on their rights if they had any rights at all.Vigilanti prospiciunt juraor the law protects him who is watchful of his rights (92 C.J.S. 1011, citing Esguerra vs. Tecson, 21 Phil. 518, 521).

"Undue delay in the enforcement of a right is strongly persuasive of a lack of merit in the claim, since it is human nature for a person to assert his rights most strongly when they are threatened or invaded". "Laches or unreasonable delay on the part of a plaintiff in seeking to enforce a right is not only persuasive of a want of merit but may, according to the circumstances, be destructive of the right itself." (Buenaventura vs. David, 37 Phil. 435, 440-441).

Having reached the conclusion that the plaintiffs are not entitled to the reconveyance of the Calunuran fishpond, it is no longer n to Pass upon the validity of the donation made by Ambrosia Salao to Juan S. Salao, Jr. of her one-half share in the two fishponds The plaintiffs have no right and personality to assil that donation.

Even if the donation were declared void, the plaintiffs would not have any successional rights to Ambrosia's share. The sole legal heir of Ambrosia was her nephew, Juan, Jr., her nearest relative within the third degree. Valentin Salao, if living in 1945 when Ambrosia died, would have been also her legal heir, together with his first cousin, Juan, Jr. (Juani). Benita Salao, the daughter of Valentin, could not represent him in the succession to the estate of Ambrosia since in the collateral line, representation takes place only in favor of the children of brothers or sisters whether they be of the full or half blood is (Art 972, Civil Code). The nephew excludes a grandniece like Benita Salao or great-gandnephews like the plaintiffs Alcuriza (Pavia vs. Iturralde 5 Phil. 176).

The trial court did not err in dismissing plaintiffs' complaint.

Defendants' appeal. The defendants dispute the lower court's finding that the plaintiffs filed their action in good faith. The defendants contend that they are entitled to damages because the plaintiffs acted maliciously or in bad faith in suing them. They ask for P25,000 attorneys fees and litigation expenses and, in addition, moral damages.

We hold that defemdamts' appeal is not meritorious. The record shows that the plaintiffs presented fifteen witnesses during the protracted trial of this case which lasted from 1954 to 1959. They fought tenaciously. They obviously incurred considerable expenses in prosecuting their case. Although their causes of action turned out to be unfounded, yet the pertinacity and vigor with which they pressed their claim indicate their sincerity and good faith.

There is the further consideration that the parties were descendants of common ancestors, the spouses Manuel Salao and Valentina Ignacio, and that plaintiffs' action was based on their honest supposition that the funds used in the acquisition of the lands in litigation were earnings of the properties allegedly inherited from Manuel Salao.

Considering those circumstances, it cannot be concluded with certitude that plaintiffs' action was manifestly frivolous or was primarily intended to harass the defendants. An award for damages to the defendants does not appear to be just and proper.

The worries and anxiety of a defendant in a litigation that was not maliciously instituted are not the moral damages contemplated in the law (Solis & Yarisantos vs. Salvador, L-17022, August 14, 1965, 14 SCRA 887; Ramos vs. Ramos,supra). The instant case is not among the cases mentioned in articles 2219 and 2220 of the Civil Code wherein moral damages may be recovered. Nor can it be regarded as analogous to any of the cases mentioned in those articles.

The adverse result of an action does notper semake the act wrongful and subject the actor to the payment of moral damages. The law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate; such right is so precious that moral damages may not be charged on those who may exercise it erroneously. (Barreto vs. Arevalo, 99 Phil. 771. 779).

The defendants invoke article 2208 (4) (11) of the Civil Code which provides that attorney's fees may be recovered "in case of a clearly unfounded civil action or proceeding against the plaintiff" (defendant is a plaintiff in his counterclaim) or "in any other case where the court deems it just and equitable" that attorney's fees should he awarded.

But once it is conceded that the plaintiffs acted in good faith in filing their action there would be no basis for adjudging them liable to the defendants for attorney's fees and litigation expenses (See Rizal Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, L-23729, May 16, 1967, 20 SCRA 61).

It is not sound public policy to set a premium on the right to litigate. An adverse decision does not ipso facto justify the award of attorney's fees to the winning party (Herrera vs. Luy Kim Guan, 110 Phil. 1020, 1028; Heirs of Justiva vs. Gustilo, 61 O. G. 6959).6. Anselma Diaz v. IAC and Felisa Pamuti Jardin

GR No. L-66574(150 SCRA 645) June 17, 1987Nature: Petition for ReviewDoctrine: Right of Representation is admitted only within the legitimate familyFacts:

Felisa is a niece of Simona who together with Felisas mother Juliana were the only legitimate children of spouses Felipe and Petronilla;

Juliana married Simon and out of their union were born Felisa and another child who died during infancy; Simona is the widow of Pascual and mother of Pablo; Pablo was the only legitimate son of his parents Pascual and Simona; Pascual died in 1970; Pablo in 1973 and Simona in 1976; Pablo at the time of his death was survived by his mother Simona and six minor natural children: four minor children with Anselma Diaz and two minor children with Felixberta. 1976 Judge Jose Raval declared Felisa as the sole legitimate heir of Simona Petitioners Anselma and Felixberta as guardians of their minor children file for opposition and motion to exclude Felisa from further taking part or intervening in the settlement of the intestate estate of Simona 1980 Judge Bleza issued an order excluding Felisa from further taking part or intervening and declared her to be not an heir of Simona Felisas motion for recon was denied, and she filed her appeal to the Intermediate Appellate Court declaring her as the sole heir of Simona

Issue: Who are the legal heirs of Simona, her niece Felisa or her grandchildren (the natural children of Pablo)? FelisaRuling: The 6 minor children cannot represent their father Pablo in the succession of the latter to the intestate estate of his legitimate mother Simona because of the barrier provided for under Art. 992 of the Civil CodeArt 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child.

Pablo is a legitimate child. However, his 6 minor children are illegitimate.

Art 992 provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestate between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother of said legitimate child. They may have a natural tie of blood, but this is not recognized by law for the purposes of Art. 992.

JBL Reyes reflections on this which also finds full support from other civilists:

In the Spanish Civil Code of 1989, the right of representation was admitted only within the legitimate family.

An illegitimate child cannot inherit ab intestate from the legitimate children and relatives of his father and mother.

The Civil Code of the Philippines adhered to this principle since it reproduced Art 943 in its own Art 992, but with fine inconsistency in subsequent articles (990, 995, 998) which allows the hereditary portion of the illegitimate child to pass to his own descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate.

7. G.R. No. L-51263 February 28, 1983

LEONARDO vs. COURT OF APPEALSPetition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 43476-R, promulgated on February 21, 1979, reversing the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Rizal in favor of petitioner:(a) Declaring plaintiff Cresenciano Leonardo as the great grandson and heir of deceased FRANCISCA REYES, entitled to one-half share in the estate of said deceased, jointly with defendant Maria Cailles;

(b) Declaring the properties, subject of this complaint, to be the properties of the deceased FRANCISCA REYES and not of defendants Maria Cailles and James Bracewen

(c) Declaring null and void any sale of these properties by defendant Maria Cailles in so far as the share of Cresenciano Leonardo are affected;

(d) Ordering the partition within 30 days from the finality of this decision, of the properties subject of this litigation, between defendant Maria Cailles and plaintiff Cresenciano Leonardo, share and share alike;

(e) Ordering defendants Maria Cailles and James Bracewell, within 30 days from the finality of this decision, to render an accounting of the fruits of the properties, and 30 days thereafter to pay to plaintiff Cresenciano Leonardo his one-half share thereof with interest of 6% per annum;

(f) Ordering defendants Maria Cailles and James to pay jointly and severally plaintiff Cresenciano Leonardo the amount of P2,000.00 as attorney's fees;

(g) Ordering defendants to pay the costs; and

(h) Dismissing defendants' counterclaim.1From the record, it appears that Francisca Reyes who died intestate on July 12, 1942 was survived by two (2) daughters, Maria and Silvestra Cailles and a grandson, Sotero Leonardo, the son of her daughter, Pascuala Cailles who predeceased her. Sotero Leonardo died in 1944, while Silvestra Cailles died in 1949 without any issue.

On October 29, 1964, petitioner Cresenciano Leonardo, claiming to be the son of the late Sotero Leonardo, filed a complaint for ownership of properties, sum of money and accounting in the Court of First Instance of Rizal seeking judgment (1) to be declared one of the lawful heirs of the deceased Francisca Reyes, entitled to one-half share in the estate of said deceased jointly with defendant, private respondent herein, Maria Cailles, (2) to have the properties left by said Francisca Reyes, described in the complaint, partitioned between him and defendant Maria Cailles, and (3) to have an accounting of all the income derived from said properties from the time defendan