introduction on the description of problem how to solve the problem? compensation mechanism
DESCRIPTION
GAME ANALYSIS OF INTEREST GROUPS IN POLICY-PROCESSING OF POWER GRID CONSTRUCTION AND RESEARCH ON COMPENSATION MECHANISMS Liang YAN Huzhou Electric Power Bureau of State Grid – China [email protected]. CONTENT. Introduction On the description of problem How to solve the problem? - PowerPoint PPT PresentationTRANSCRIPT
Frankfurt (Germany), 6-9 June 2011
Liang YANLiang YAN – C – Chinahina – RIF Session – RIF Session 55 – – 00650065
GAME ANALYSIS OF INTEREST GROUPS IN GAME ANALYSIS OF INTEREST GROUPS IN POLICY-PROCESSING OF POWER GRID POLICY-PROCESSING OF POWER GRID CONSTRUCTION AND RESEARCH ON CONSTRUCTION AND RESEARCH ON
COMPENSATION MECHANISMSCOMPENSATION MECHANISMS
Liang YANLiang YAN
Huzhou Electric Power Bureau of State Grid – China Huzhou Electric Power Bureau of State Grid – China [email protected]@163.com
Frankfurt (Germany), 6-9 June 2011
Liang YANLiang YAN – C – Chinahina – RIF Session – RIF Session 55 – – 00650065
Introduction On the description of problem How to solve the problem?
Compensation mechanism
Simulation analysis Research conclusion
CONTENT
Frankfurt (Germany), 6-9 June 2011
Liang YANLiang YAN – C – Chinahina – RIF Session – RIF Session 55 – – 00650065
Recent years have witnessed an increase on the
conflict existing in construction agents and legal
affairs. The policy-processing of grid
construction refers to the attainment of
agreement between the planner of grid
construction and interest groups of external
environment.
1. INTRODUCTION
Frankfurt (Germany), 6-9 June 2011
Liang YANLiang YAN – C – Chinahina – RIF Session – RIF Session 55 – – 00650065
2. ON DESCRIBING THE PROBLEM
Coordinate the economic development of the local life with its social equivalent, improve the related infrastructure and performance of government officials.
Local government
Local residents
Grid company
High standard of compensation for grid-construction land expropriation and environmental pursuit.
Fulfill its social responsibility and lower construction cost.M
AIN
INT
ER
ES
T G
RO
UP
S
Frankfurt (Germany), 6-9 June 2011
Liang YANLiang YAN – C – Chinahina – RIF Session – RIF Session 55 – – 00650065
Negotiation
Coordinated by
government
Litigate
Upgrade
Upgrade
Residents: Compensation, Environmental pursuitGovernment: Economic development, Agency fee
Grid Company: Lower construction cost
CONFLICTING PATH
Conflict2. ON DESCRIBING THE PROBLEM
Frankfurt (Germany), 6-9 June 2011
Liang YANLiang YAN – C – Chinahina – RIF Session – RIF Session 55 – – 00650065
MAIN REASON: Local residents of power inputting areas will get
the benefit from clean energy while local residents of passing-through areas could not get it but environment pollution and land expropriation.
2. ON DESCRIBING THE PROBLEM
Frankfurt (Germany), 6-9 June 2011
Liang YANLiang YAN – C – Chinahina – RIF Session – RIF Session 55 – – 00650065
Compensation mechanism based on the stakeholder theory
Reduce negotiation space of local government and residents in power inputting areas and expand negotiation space of those in areas which transmission line passed through.
3. HOW TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM?
Frankfurt (Germany), 6-9 June 2011
Liang YANLiang YAN – C – Chinahina – RIF Session – RIF Session 55 – – 00650065
Simulation analysis of the compensation mechanism
Check the availability of the compensation mechanism
3. HOW TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM?
Frankfurt (Germany), 6-9 June 2011
Liang YANLiang YAN – C – Chinahina – RIF Session – RIF Session 55 – – 00650065
Simulation analysis of the compensation mechanism
Four interest groups: One grid company Two local governments which grid construction
passed through One local governments which electric power is
input into
3. HOW TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM?
Frankfurt (Germany), 6-9 June 2011
Liang YANLiang YAN – C – Chinahina – RIF Session – RIF Session 55 – – 00650065
The decision-making model of local residents in passing through areas
3. HOW TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM?
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Frankfurt (Germany), 6-9 June 2011
Liang YANLiang YAN – C – Chinahina – RIF Session – RIF Session 55 – – 00650065
The decision-making model of local residents in inputting areas
3. HOW TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM?
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Frankfurt (Germany), 6-9 June 2011
Liang YANLiang YAN – C – Chinahina – RIF Session – RIF Session 55 – – 00650065
Simulation analysis of the compensation mechanism
3. HOW TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM?
Related data of grid company, local government and local residents
k betatoP
betatoV
costa costb costc costd coste costf
Grid company
1000 1 0 2 10 10
Gov. 1 300 0.9 0.9 2 3 2 1.5 4 1.5
Gov. 2 300 0.8 0.8 2 2 2 1.3 3 1.3
Gov. 3 300 0.7 0.7 2 1.5 2 1.2 2 1.2
Resident 2 0.5 1 3 1 0.2
Frankfurt (Germany), 6-9 June 2011
Liang YANLiang YAN – C – Chinahina – RIF Session – RIF Session 55 – – 00650065
Local residents’ profit and cost simulation analysis
3. HOW TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM?
Profit curve of local residents without considering stakeholders
Profit curve of local residents considering stakeholders
Frankfurt (Germany), 6-9 June 2011
Liang YANLiang YAN – C – Chinahina – RIF Session – RIF Session 55 – – 00650065
Local residents’ profit and cost simulation analysis
3. HOW TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM?
Effort cost curve of local residents without considering stakeholders
Effort cost curve of local residents considering stakeholders
Frankfurt (Germany), 6-9 June 2011
Liang YANLiang YAN – C – Chinahina – RIF Session – RIF Session 55 – – 00650065
Firstly, each interest group would like to make an
agreement as soon as possible in the process of
negotiation.
Local residents
Grid companies
Local governments
4. CONCLUSION
Frankfurt (Germany), 6-9 June 2011
Liang YANLiang YAN – C – Chinahina – RIF Session – RIF Session 55 – – 00650065
Secondly, the compensation mechanism based
on the stakeholder theory would be likely to
reduce the compensation degree of inputting
areas and increase that of passing-through
areas to balance their profit.
4. CONCLUSION
Frankfurt (Germany), 6-9 June 2011
Liang YANLiang YAN – C – Chinahina – RIF Session – RIF Session 55 – – 00650065
Thirdly, compensation mechanism based on the
stakeholder theory can effectively reduce the
appearance of deadlock during negotiation.
4. CONCLUSION
Frankfurt (Germany), 6-9 June 2011
Liang YANLiang YAN – C – Chinahina – RIF Session – RIF Session 55 – – 00650065
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