ip & r&d in developing countries sean flynn washington college of law wipip 2007
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IP & R&D in Developing CountriesSean Flynn
Washington College of LawWIPIP 2007
Monopoly Economics
Monopoly Econ (Simple)
Norway ARV Demand
Profit Maximizing Norway
Figure 5.2 Revenue per Quantity Sold
0
500,000
1,000,000
1,500,000
2,000,000
2,500,000
3,000,000
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Quantity (units of 210 people)
South Africa
Figure 3.1 Income by Decile
0
5,000
10,000
15,000
20,000
25,000
30,000
35,000
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Income Decile
Ann
ual I
ncom
e, U
SD
SA ARV Demand
Figure 4.1 ARV Demand if Price = 5% Income
0
200
400
600
800
1,000
1,200
1,400
1,600
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Quantity (100,000s people)
Pric
e P
er Y
ear,
US
D
Profit Maximizing SA
Figure 4.2 Revenue per Quantity Sold (USD)
0
20,000,000
40,000,000
60,000,000
80,000,000
100,000,000
120,000,000
140,000,000
160,000,000
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Quantity (100,000s of people)
Monopoly vs. Competition: AIDS drugs
$0
$2,000
$4,000
$6,000
$8,000
$10,000
$12,000
2000 2001 2002 2003
Other Problems
Inefficient R&D investments 2/13 approvals are “significantly better”
Neglected meds Poor consumers Antibiotics
Unpooled buyers Marketing costs
Corruption of evidence (phrma detailing) Costly IP system
Administration, litigation Anticompetitive uses
IGWG
Fifty-ninth World Health Assembly 2006 calls for study of “needs-driven, essential health research and development” proposals
31 Developing countries call for R&D Treaty
Big Idea
Global patent pools Essential medical inventions, tamiflu
Prize funds for improving health care outcomes [developing countries] Only inventions licensed to the pool are eligible
Global agreement to support funding Base on country income Release from TRIPS/IP pressure
S 2210 v. TRIPS
Elimination of exclusive right in return for prize based on health outcomes
Applies to drugs & biological products
Payments for 10 years Remuneration from prize
fund “in lieu of” remuneration from exclusivity
27. patents in all fields of technology w/out “discrimination”
30: limited exceptions not unreasonably conflict
w/ normal exploitation 31: CL- Individual merits,
negotiation
Extra Credit
Can you argue that S 2210 complies with TRIPS? Limited Normal exploitation As a CL