iq, social competence, and evaluation of early childhood

IQ, Social Competence, andEvaluation of Early Childhood

Intervention Programs

EDWARD ZIGLER Yale UniversityPENELOPE K. TRICKETT Yale University

ABSTRACT: The IQ score has been without questionthe most often utilized outcome measure in evaluationsof early childhood intervention programs. Reasonsfor the popularity of the IQ as an assessment tool arediscussed, and problems raised by employing the IQin this manner are noted. The importance of accurateoutcome evaluation of programs with clearly definedgoals is related to both the social science and policy-making arenas. The authors argue that social com-petence, rather than IQ, should be the primary mea-sure of the success of intervention efforts. Difficultiesin defining and assessing social competence are dis-cussed. An index of social competence is suggestedthat includes measures of physical health, IQ, schoolachievement, certain motivational and emotional vari-ables, and such molar social expectancy variables asschool attendance and incidence of juvenile delin-quency.

While there are serious shortfalls in our nation'sdelivery of services to children and their families,our tax dollars are currently being spent to fundsome rather sizable and expensive programs. Theseprograms include Title I of the Elementary andSecondary Education Act at a cost of approxi-mately $1.5 billion annually; the Head Start pro-gram at a cost of over $400 million annually; daycare, which, as limited as it is, still amounts tofederal and state expenditures in excess of $2billion a year.

Both taxpayers and decision makers are legiti-mately concerned with whether these programssucceed or fail—the slang word in governmentalcircles regarding this matter is "accountability."The desire for accountability typically takes aquantitative form and spells itself out in two typesof evaluation. The first type is called processevaluation. An example of this is the monitoringeffort in the Head Start program to guarantee thateach Head Start center delivers the services man-dated by the program. In this kind of evaluation,

simple questions are asked, such as, "Do the chil-dren receive medical evaluation or not?" Thistype of evaluation presents little theoretical ormethodological difficulty, which probably explainsits popularity as well as the reluctance to do eval-uations that go beyond the process type.

A much more demanding and difficult type ofevaluation is outcome evaluation, which does notask whether the services were delivered but at-tempts instead to assess the verifiable impact ofthe services. It is under the rubric of outcomeevaluation that we encounter the government's be-loved concept of "cost-benefit analysis." Thiselegant phrase, a creation originally of the De-partment of Defense, is usually translated as"How much bang do you buy per buck?" Since$10 million in the Department of Defense appearsto be a rounding error, it is important to note thatwhile a single buck may still be important toeach of us, it has little meaning in federal govern-mental circles. The cost-benefit analysis concepthas been adopted with a vengeance by governmentofficials in the social services area, and the legiti-mate question they are asking is, "What is beingaccomplished as a result of the expenditure of hun-dreds of millions of dollars?"

Cost-benefit analysis presents at least two majorproblems. First, we never appear quite sure whatvariables to include and what variables to exclude

This article is based on a paper presented at the ThirdAnnual Vermont Conference on the Primary Preventionof Psychopathology, Burlington, Vermont, June 1977.

Preparation of this manuscript was supported by Re-search Grant HD-03008 from the National Institute ofMental Health.

The authors would like to thank Catherine J. Ross forher assistance with an earlier draft of this manuscript.

Requests for reprints should be sent to Edward Zigler,Department of Psychology, Yale University, Box 11AYale Station, New Haven, Connecticut 06S20.

AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGIST • SEPTEMBER 1978 • 789Copyright 1978 by the American Psychological Association, Inc.

0003-066X/78/3309-0789$00.75

in our cost-benefit equation. For example, shouldthe health and education improvements in a com-munity that are the result of Head Start's beingin that community be included? Or should thecareer development of the Head Start teachers beincluded in our cost-benefit equation? The sec-ond problem with cost-benefit analysis is that evenafter we decide which outcome measures are legiti-mately included in the equation, we often find our-selves at a loss in determining the exact dollaramount to attribute to particular outcomes. Ashas been pointed out before (Zigler, 1973), it isdifficult to determine the dollar value assigned towarding off a case of measles or raising the mea-sured IQ by 10 points.

One principle should emerge from this brief dis-cussion: Our ability to perform outcome evaluationis enhanced to the degree that the goals of a pro-gram are clear and explicit and to the degree thatthese goals are held constant through the life ofthe program. The difficulty in evaluating theHead Start program stems largely from the factthat its goals were originally presented rathervaguely. The same is true of the Women, Infants,and Children (WIC) program in which more than$200 million per year is spent to improve thenutrition of pregnant mothers and very youngchildren. As Solkoff (1977) pointed out, we can-not evaluate this program because no one hasenunciated clearly what its circumscribed and mea-sureable goals might be. Please do not mishear us.We are wholeheartedly in favor of pregnantmothers receiving the nutrition that is so crucialfor the optimal physical development of the childin utero. Our context here is outcome evaluation.America's children and their families have somany unmet needs that we must champion thevalue of outcome evaluation so that decisionmakers can be informed as to whether they shouldperpetuate current programs or reallocate fundsto other programs holding greater promise ofachieving desired and explicit goals.

What then is the relationship of the social sci-entist to the constructor of social policy? Decisionmakers look to social science and outcome evalua-tion to provide some badly needed direction inhow to spread a finite number of public dollarsacross what often appears to be an infinite num-ber of possibilities. As Senator Proxmire (1977)has said, "Taxpayers' funds are not unlimited, andI would not be doing my job if I failed either tocriticize spurious spending or to try to establish

intelligent priorities for the spending of limitedmoney" (p. 4).

The IQ SolutionIn response to the pressure for accountability,without question, the most often utilized outcomemeasure over the 20-year history of childhoodintervention programs has been the IQ score, ormore typically, the magnitude of change in thechild's IQ score. As a result of this misfortune,it became all too easy to avoid the rigors of goal-sensitive outcome evaluation and conclude that achildren's program was a success if it resulted inhigher IQs and was a failure if it did not. It isnot possible in this article to provide a review ofthe theoretical and methodological problems raisedwhen one decides to use the IQ score in this way.Suffice it to say that since the turn of the century,American social science has been terribly conflictedabout the value of the standard intelligence test(Cronbach, 1971). Some have considered it psy-chology's greatest achievement; others have viewedit as a technological trap that has resulted in acalcification of our theoretical views and/or hasmisled us as to the essential nature of human de-velopment and the optimization of such develop-ment. (See McClelland, 1973, for a particularlytelling critique of IQ testing.) Since this articledeals with social policy construction, perhaps somespecial mention should be made of those criticsof the IQ who have suggested or stated explicitlythat the IQ score is easily employed as a tool ofsocial injustice or political subjugation (e.g., Ka-min, 1975; Pastore, 1949). To anticipate ourargument somewhat, we do not feel the IQ scoreis as good as the IQ champions would seem to be-lieve, nor do we feel it is as bad as some of itscritics have stated.

What then recommends the use of the IQ asa measure in the outcome evaluation of childhoodintervention programs? There are several reasonswhy it became so popular. First, the standardIQ tests are well-developed instruments, the psy-chometric properties of which are so well docu-mented as to allow the user to avoid difficultmeasurement problems. Second, the ease of ad-ministration adds to the attractiveness of such ameasure. This attractiveness is enhanced furtherif one decides to employ the Peabody PictureVocabulary Test, the Ammons Full Range Vo-cabulary Test, or the Otis-Lennon Mental AbilityTest, justifying this decision on the basis of the

790 • SEPTEMBER 1978 • AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGIST

relatively high correlations found between such 10-minute tests and the longer Staniord-Binet In-telligence Scale or the Wechsler Intelligence Scalefor Children. Third, no other measure has beenfound to be related to so many other behaviorsof theoretical and practical significance (Kohlberg& Zigler, 1967; Mischel, 1968). Since early child-hood intervention programs are popularly regardedas efforts to prepare children for school, the factthat the IQ is the best available predictor of schoolperformance is a particularly compelling rationalefor its use as an assessment criterion. Beyondthe school issue, if compensatory education pro-grams are directed at correcting deficiencies acrossa broad array of cognitive abilities, the best singlemeasure of the success of such programs is im-provement on a measure reflecting a broad spec-trum of such abilities, namely, an IQ test.

The final reason for the attractiveness of theIQ as an outcome measure has less to do with thenature of this instrument than with the desire ofthose who mount intervention programs to demon-strate that these programs are beneficial (i.e., cost-effective). It is amazing how attractive as an out-come measure the IQ became, even to vehementcritics of the IQ tests, once it became obviousthat the most common outcome of just about anyintervention effort was a 10-point increase in IQ(even a hastily mounted 8-week summer pro-gram). (See Eisenberg & Conners, Note 1.) In-deed, with such leading figures as Hunt (1971)reporting IQ improvements of 50 and 70 points asa result of early intervention, it became increas-ingly seductive for program people to bet on im-provement in the IQ as the bedrock outcome mea-sure. Along with a few other dissidents includingthe Clarkes (Clarke & Clarke 1967; Clarke &Clarke, 1976), Elkind (1971), Ginsburg (1972),Kamii and Derman (1971), and Kohlberg (1968),the first author has argued for the past IS yearsthat the level of intellectual functioning is muchmore constant and the level of cognitive develop-ment much less plastic than was suggested by suchtheoretical godfathers of early childhood interven-tion as Hunt (1961) in his book Intelligence andExperience or Bloom (1964) in Stability andChange. Indeed, we and our colleagues, takingseriously the capacity-performance distinction,have now presented considerable empirical evi-dence that IQ changes resulting from preschoolintervention programs reflect motivational changesthat influence the children's test performancerather than changes in the actual quality of cog-

nitive functioning (Seitz, Abelson, Levine, & Zig-ler, 1975; Zigler, Abelson, & Seitz, 1973; Zigler& Butterfield, 1968; Zigler, Abelson, & Trickett,Note 2).

Given the impressive set of assets that makethe IQ test an attractive evaluation measure, whythen do we feel that the IQ taken alone is aninadequate outcome measure? As has been statedmany times, the quality and nature of formal cog-nitive processing typically assessed by the IQ testis but one factor in a myriad of factors that de-termine the quality and character of human func-tioning. Stated most simply, we believe that onecan obtain a very high IQ score and still not be-have admirably in the real world that exists be-yond the confines of the psychologist's testingroom. This fact is brought home to us in strikingempirical fashion in the very modest relationthat has been found between IQ scores obtainedin childhoood and everyday performance in lifein the postschool period. McClelland (1973) esti-mates this correlation to be around .20.

The IQ score reaches its maximum efficiency asa predictor of everyday performance when it isemployed to predict school performance. Mc-Clelland notes that it is not surprising to discovera correlation of approximately .70 here, inasmuchas good test performance and good school per-formance require superiority in playing the sametype of pointless and/or irrelevant "little games."As will be discussed shortly, we disagree withMcClelland on the issue of what exactly mediatesthe correlation found between IQ scores and schoolperformance. In a science that appears muchmore concerned with significance levels than inhow much of the variance in a behavior can beaccounted for by a particular measure, we havechosen to allow ourselves to be dazzled by a cor-relation of .70. What does not receive sufficientattention is the fact that this correlation indicatesthat only half of the variance in school perform-ance is accounted for by children's IQ scores.What then is influencing the other half of the vari-ance? Clearly, it must include some collection ofpersonal attributes or characteristics not very wellassessed by our standard IQ test.

Given our usual contact with empirically dis-covered correlations in the .30 to .50 range, wehave (become so impressed with a .70 correlationthat we have glorified the IQ score and given it aprimacy that it does not deserve. In the processwe have even managed to bastardize the languageof psychology and give names to phenomena that

AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGIST • SEPTEMBER 1978 • 791

are paradoxical. Think for a minute, of thoseoften-used labels underachiever and overachiever.(See, e.g., the book on this topic by Thorndike,1963). In operational measurement terms, theselabels mean no more than the disparity betweenthe IQ score and school achievement, with the IQscore being utilized as the ultimate benchmarkagainst which to assess school achievement. Ineveryday school practice, the specific operationsutilized to define the constructs are convenientlyforgotten, and unfortunate labels take their place.Thus, if a middle-class child does not do very wellin school, both the school and the family appearmore comfortable if we call the child an under-achiever. If an economically disadvantaged childdoes poorly in school, we are tempted to call himor her stupid, using the school performance itselfas the ultimate gauge of a child's intellectual level.This situation becomes even more ridiculous whenwe use the nonsensical label of overachiever. Ourrespect for the language is too great for us to bevery tolerant of a label that essentially assertsthat some individuals achieve more than they arecapable of achieving. Does psychology really wishto argue that human capacity is reflected better inthe IQ test than it is in the everyday school per-formance of a child? Only by adopting such aquestionable assumption can we continue to em-ploy the label of overachiever.

The IQ test appears to be most free of criticismwhen it is viewed 'as a measure of a collection ofprocesses that, taken as a totality, constitutes anindicator of the individual's level of formal cog-nitive ability. But there are many who find thismeasure inadequate even as a measure of formalcognition. We must be aware that there are twodistinctly different approaches to the developmentand assessment of human intelligence. One isthe psychometric approach, with the standardintelligence test forming its foundation. The sec-ond is the developmental approach, championedmost importantly by Piaget. The relation of thesetwo approaches has been discussed by Elkind(1971). We now have some interesting efforts tosynthesize the two approaches in the constructionof instruments that incorporate both the sophisti-cated measurement techniques of the psychometricapproach with the great sensitivity to sequentialchange in the nature of human information pro-cessing emphasized in the developmental approach(Laurendeau & Pinard, 1962; Tuddenham, 1971;Uzgiris & Hunt, 197S). At a practical level, per-haps we do not need to concern ourselves too much

with the differences in the assessment of formalfeatures of cognition generated by these two ap-proaches. When both types of assessment aremade, the correlation between the two is typicallyaround .70. Both types of measurement are ob-viously tapping some of the same formal cogni-tive processes. However, consistent with ourearlier argument, let us recognize that a correla-tion of .70 is far from representing an identity.We see little value in arguing now which of thetwo measures constitutes the most accurate as-sessment of the child's intelligence. The onlypoint that we would like to make here as a criti-cism of the IQ test is that even as a measure offormal cognition, the IQ test raises questions, andthe use of the scores poses still-unresolved prob-lems.

What Does the IQ Test Really Measure?

The IQ test should not be viewed as a pure mea-sure of formal cognition, but rather as a polyglotsample of behavior that is influenced by threeempirically related but conceptually distinct col-lections of variables. First, it does measure acollection of formal cognitive processes such asabstracting ability, reasoning, speed of visual in-formation processing, and all those other formalcognitive processes that appear and reappear withregularity in factor-analytic studies of human in-telligence-test performance. Second, in keepingwith the well-known process-content distinction,the standard intelligence test is also an achieve-ment test highly influenced by the child's par-ticular experiences, which determine whether par-ticular knowledge is held by the child, withoutwhich he or she cannot pass the item in question.Since features of formal cognition and magnitudeof achievement are themselves related, it might beworthwhile to draw a clear distinction betweenformal cognition and achievement. If we askchildren what a "gown" is, and they reply thatthey do not know, we might assume that there issomething inadequate about their memory storageand/or retrieval systems, which are aspects oftheir formal cognitive systems. On the other hand,if in the children's experience they have neverencountered the word "gown," they will fail theitem even though their storage and retrieval sys-tems are perfectly adequate.

Finally, intelligence test performance is greatlyinfluenced by a variety of motivational and/orpersonality variables that have little to do with


either formal cognition or achievement variables.Again, perhaps a couple of simple but compellingexamples might be helpful. The senior authoronce asked a child, "What is an orange?" Thechild replied that he did not know and then wenton to do everything in his power to maximize thesocial interaction. This was a child residing inan institution, and what was conveyed was that,given the child's need system and motivation, hewas much more interested in obtaining a warmhuman interaction than he was in playing somegame of little interest to him concerning oranges.

We also often encounter a quite different phe-nomenon, especially among the economically dis-advantaged children whose performance is assessedin our early childhood intervention programs. Weare thinking here of the "I don't know" phenome-non, which reflects the lack of neither ability norknowledge but rather the child's strong desire toterminate and/or minimize the interaction withthe examiner. Why exactly do children insist onengaging in what our value system tells us to besuch self-defeating behavior? Do they dislike theadult examiner or do they dislike the testing situa-tion? Our best hunch is that they are fearful ofboth and therefore behave in an adaptive mannerhaving as its goal the termination of an unpleasantexperience. Clearly, given the demands of oursociety, children who have adopted the "I don'tknow" strategy are not very likely to utilize theircognitive systems optimally or, if they keep uptheir behavior, to obtain those rewards (e.g., highgrades in school, high salaries, and attractive jobsafter school) that society dispenses for behavingin the manner it prefers.

It is this tripartite conception of IQ test per-formance that explains why IQ test performanceis a successful predictor of such a wide variety ofbehaviors. If one examines closely many of thecriterion behaviors for which we would like the IQto be a predictor, one discovers that they arethemselves complex measures clearly influenced bythe same set of factors that influence the IQ score.Does anyone seriously question that the child withsuperior formal cognitive abilities, rich experiencein the middle-class world, and a high motivationto do well in school will display better school per-formance than the child who may have had morerestricted or at least less middle-class-relevantexperiences and who may also view the schoolexperience as not only taking place in an alienand/or hostile environment but also involving avariety of activities that have little relevance?

It is safe to conclude that the IQ test will alwaysbe a predictor of other variables, providing theseother variables are influenced by the three factorsthat influence the IQ test. Thus, if conceptual-ized properly, the IQ can continue to be employedwith profit in evaluations of early childhood inter-vention programs.

The Social Competence Alternative

We propose, as one of us has done several timesbefore (Zigler, 1970, 1973), that social compe-tence, rather than the IQ, should be employed asthe major measure of the success of interventionprograms such as Head Start. This proposal forcesus to be explicit about the relation between IQand social competence. The foregoing analysisshould make it clear that we do not believe thatthe IQ and social competence are one and thesame. However, we must also reject the infer-ence that could be drawn from McClelland's(1973) paper—that the IQ and competence arevery minimally related. The IQ and social com-petence are both influenced by some of the samevariables, and thus, if approached properly, theIQ can act as a weak and relatively imperfectmeasure of social competence.

Some progress in the task of determining the re-lation of IQ and social competence has been pro-vided by Schaefer (1975), who proposed a hier-archical relation between these two constructs. Hedeveloped a model in which adaptation is viewedas an even broader measure and is therefore treatedas a third-order construct. While we are not inagreement with all aspects of Schaefer's model,this proposal of a hierarchical relation between in-telligence and social competence does make senseand also provides a useful framework for the evenmore arduous task of rigorously denning socialcompetence per se.

Efforts to arrive at such a definition are indeeddifficult. This is so even though the use of theterm in discussion with social scientists, publicofficials, or other laypersons results in a generalsense in both speakers and listeners that somethingmeaningful is being transmitted. But what exactlyis it? The construct seems to evaporate upon theapplication of the heat of even minimal debate.Social competence appears to be one of those con-structs that is definable only in terms of otherconstructs whose own definitions are vague. Socialcompetence theorists thus quickly find themselvesadrift on a sea of words.


The senior author is not a newcomer to thatsizable band of theorists who utilize social com-petence in their explanatory edifices. He hasutilized the social competence construct in fourdistinctly different bodies of work during the last15 years. These areas include (a) the previouslymentioned work promoting the use of social com-petence as the only legitimate goal of programsin the compensatory education field (Zigler, 1970,1973); (b) the relation between social competenceand a variety of phenomena of theoretical andpractical interest in the area of psychopathology(e.g., Phillips, Broverman, & Zigler, 1966; Zigler& Phillips, 1961); (c) the controversy in the men-tal retardation area over whether social compe-tence should be included in our basic definition ofmental retardation (Garfield & Wittson, 1960a,1960b; Mercer, 1975; Zigler, 1967); and (d) thedevelopmental etiology of effectance or masterymotivation derived from White's (1959) work(e.g., Harter, in press; Harter & Zigler, 1974).Unfortunately, the use of the construct of socialcompetence across these four bodies of work hasnot been consistent. It is with the knowledge thathas accrued from all these efforts, and with arecognition of their inconsistencies, that we saythat we know of no rigorous or even mildly satis-fying definition of the construct or term socialcompetence. The intelligence variable, in contrast,presents no definitional dilemma to the extent thatwe are satisfied with the definition that intelligenceis nothing more nor less than what standard in-telligence tests measure.

We have witnessed no very wide adoption ofthe construct of social competence as the primarygoal of early intervention programs for the verysimple reason that there is little consensus as toexactly what measures should be employed to de-fine social competence. It was with an eye tosolving this problem that the Office of Child De-velopment (OCD) funded a conference at theEducational Testing Service in which a sizablegroup of workers was brought together and giventhe task of constructing a definition of social com-petence that could be used by those agencies thatdesired to use social competence in their outcomeevaluations. A report of this conference as wellas a good analysis of the complexities involved indefining social competence was presented by An-derson and Messick (1974). While the group'sanalysis was sound, little progress was made insupplying OCD or the field with a definition ofsocial competence or the methodology to assess it.

The group delivered no less than 29 indicators ofsocial competence, any one of which would requiremuch greater refinement and solution of numerousdifficulties. Even if all the measurement problemsin this list were resolved, the sheer time neededto evaluate any child on the 29 items would makethe task impossible. Finally, the list was so filledwith our usual psychological jargon as to be forthe most part incomprehensible to the taxpayerwho foots the bill for our massive interventionprograms and to policymakers who must continu-ally make decisions concerning further fundingallocations to these programs.

Is There a Solution?Hundreds of millions of dollars will continue to bespent on children's programs, and outcome evalua-tions will continue to be made. These evaluationswill either be done badly or well. We are con-vinced that good social science and its offspring,good output evaluation, can play a useful andbeneficial role in the construction of sound socialpolicy. By the same token, bad social scienceand bad evaluation can undermine the construc-tion of sound social policy and lead to seriousdetrimental effects on our citizenry. We referyou to the history of the Westinghouse evaluation(Westinghouse Learning Corporation/Ohio Uni-versity, Note 3) for a specific instance in whicha poor evaluation came very close to causing ournation to jettison the most popular and highly re-garded program ever mounted for children inAmerica. However, the hour grows late, and un-less the social sciences develop a practical andcoherent measure of social competence, social com-petence will never replace the IQ as our primarymeasure of the success of intervention programs.

Decision makers now understand the need fora well-developed measure of social competence.The Administration of Children, Youth, and Fam-ily Services has contracted with Mediax Associa-tion, Inc., to develop a carefully defined and vi-able measure of social competence. The policyneed for this measure is so pressing that we wishto offer some immediate definitions and sug-gestions.

We thus propose an arbitrary definition for so-cial competence. We are not particularly con-cerned by our arbitrariness inasmuch as all defi-nitions are arbitrary. In regard to definitions, theissue is not whether a definition is true or untrue


but rather whether it is useful or not (Farber,197S).

Since so many variables could be included inthe definition, let us begin the task by asking thequestion of whether there are any conceptualschemas that would direct us to the particularvariables that would finally be part of our defini-tion. Building on the work of Kohlberg andMayer (1972) and White (1959), Anderson andMessick (1974) provide us with a four-fold ap-proach to the problem of defining social compe-tence. We believe this four-fold approach can bereduced to a two-fold approach in which measuresof social competence should reflect one of twomajor criteria. The first is that social competencemust reflect the success of the human being inmeeting societal expectancies. Second, these mea-sures of social competence should reflect some-thing about the self-actualization or personal de-velopment of the human being.

It is our early hunch that for the most part thesocial competence indexes meeting either of thesecriteria will prove to be positively related to eachother. There is some early evidence in support ofthis hunch in Anastasiow's (Note 4) argumentthat children who display high exploration be-havior (a personal development attribute) will dobetter in1 school achievement (a social expectancyvariable) than children low in exploration be-havior. However, as is usually the case, there isalso evidence that such a straightforward andsimple positive relation between these two facetsof social competence does not exist. Certain per-sonal development attributes may clash with meet-ing societal expectancies. Lytton (1972), for ex-ample, reviewed several studies indicating thatteachers rate highly creative students as less like-able than those who are less creative. Possibly,being viewed as less likeable could affect a stu-dent's achievement. It also appears that an in-teractional relation between setting and personaldevelopment attributes can exist. For example,Kelly (1967) found that in high schools with lowstudent turnover rates, students who were highexplorers were more apt to be labeled as deviantby school personnel than were similarly high-ex-ploring students at schools with high student turn-over rates. Thus, the relation between these twoaspects of social competence appears to be anopen question.

What then are our candidates for inclusion in asocial competence index? First, there should bemeasures of physical health and well-being, in-

cluding appropriate weight for age, inoculationhistory, etc. (See North, in press, for a reviewof physical health measures that have been usedin the assessment of early childhood interventionprograms.) We list physical health measures firstsince many thinkers in the social competence areahave been so reluctant to view the physical healthof the child as a major determinant of the child'ssocial competence. Second, a social competenceindex should include a measure of formal cogni-tive ability. Here we would settle for either astandard IQ test or a Piagetian measure of levelof cognitive functioning. Third, there should bean achievement measure. There are many goodcandidates for inclusion such as the Caldwell Pre-school Inventory, the Peabody Individual Achieve-ment Tests, and a variety of standard school-ageachievement tests. Finally, the fourth componentof social competence should be the measurementof motivational and emotional variables.

Obviously, there are numerous measures of mo-tivational and emotional variables that could beincluded. We are aware of the measurement prob-lems involved in assessing motivational and emo-tional attributes, but we do not view these prob-lems as insurmountable. Relying on our ownevaluation efforts, we suggest that emotional/moti-vational measures be selected from the followingcollection: (a) measures of effectance motivation,including indicators of preference for challengingtasks, curiosity, variation seeking, and masterymotivation (Balla, Butterfield, & Zigler, 1974;Harter, in press; Harter & Zigler, 1974); (b)outerdirectedness and degree of imitation in prob-lem solving (Balla & Zigler, 1968; Turnure & Zig-ler, 1964; Zigler et al., Note 2); (c) positiveresponsiveness to social reinforcement (Robertson,1978; Zigler, 1961; Zigler & Balla, 1972); (d)locus of control measured for both the childrenin the program and their parents (Coleman, Camp-bell, Hobson, McPortland, & Mood, 1966; Stipek,1977); (e) expectancy of success (Gruen & Zig-ler, 1968; Ollendick, Balla, & Zigler, 1971); (f)wariness of adults (Weaver, Balla, & Zigler, 1971;Zigler et al., Note 2 ) ; (g) verbal attention-seek-ing behavior (Kohlberg & Zigler, 1967; Robertson,1978); (h) aspects of self-image, including realimage and ideal image (Katz & Zigler, 1967; Katz,Zigler, & Zalk, 1975; DeMott, Note 5); (i) mea-sures of learned helplessness (Achenbach & Weisz,1975; Weisz, 1975); (j) attitude toward school(Stipek, 1977); and (k) creativity (Yando, Seitz,& Zigler, Note 6).


Finally, we must insist that adequate social com-petence assessment can come about only if (a)we commit ourselves to assessing the long-termeffects of our intervention programs, and (b) wecommit ourselves not only to fine-grained analysesof developmental features, but also, to molar mea-sures that are fully comprehensible and of greatinterest to both taxpayers and Washington de-cision makers. (For a particularly striking in-stance of such molar measures being employed inoutcome evaluation, see Lazar, Hubbell, Murray,Rosche, & Royce, Note 7.) The molar behaviorswe have in mind are related to our social expect-ancy criteria and include the following; (a) inci-dence of juvenile delinquency; (b) incidence ofteenage pregnancy; (c) incidence of child abuse,either as a victim or a perpetrator; (d) being inschool rather than out; (e) being in the appro-priate grade for age; (f) being in a regular class-room rather than a special education classroom;and (g) being self-supporting rather than onwelfare.

A Final Word of Caution

In light of the Anderson and Messick (1974) anal-ysis, we see that an immediate problem with thisearly and tentative competence index is that it ishopelessly infused with values that are far fromuniversal. We get a very clear indication of howthe value issue undoes social competence theor-ists when we look at such premorbid social com-petence scales as those constructed by Phillips(19S3) and Wittman (1941). In these scales, anindividual gets a high score (i.e., is consideredsocially competent) if he engages in heterosexualbehavior. Does this mean that a homosexual isa person of low social competence? We ratherdoubt it. Perhaps the value problem is not asgreat as we think and these scales can be rescuedfrom their value-laden bias by drawing the dis-tinction, in this instance, not between homosexualand heterosexual contact, but rather between theindividual who has some other-person orientationversus the individual who is a loner. On theother hand, society is not value free, and usefulmeasures of social competence will reflect someof the deeply ingrained values in which societyinvests its resources. Examples of such valuesinclude our commitment to education and our op-position to child abuse.

Despite the difficulties raised by the value issue,we believe it is possible to develop a useful scale

of social competence quickly. Some of the mea-sures we have suggested are already being em-ployed in outcome evaluation of large-scale pro-grams. For example, we are currently using manyof these measures in a follow-up study of childrenwho took part in an intensive infant interventionprogram.

We hope that social scientists will be skepticaland cautious about developing a useful social com-petence index, but not so skeptical and so cau-tious that they hand the field over to bureaucratsin Washington and in our statehouses. Socialcompetence constructs will be employed in out-come evaluation and, given the critical importanceof these evaluations to the future of early child-hood intervention programs, they merit the atten-tion of trained and sensitive social scientists.

REFERENCE NOTES

1. Eisenberg, L., & Conners, C. K. The effect of HeadStart on developmental process. Paper presented atthe 1966 Joseph P. Kennedy, Jr., Foundation ScientificSymposium on Mental Retardation, Boston, April 11,1966.

2. Zigler, E., Abelson, W. D., & Trickett, P. K. Is anintervention program necessary in order to improveeconomically-disadvantaged children's IQ scores? Un-published manuscript, Yale University, 1978.

3. Westinghouse Learning Corporation/Ohio University.The impact of Head Start: An evaluation of the effectsof Head Start on children's cognitive and affective de-velopment. Springfield, Va.: Clearinghouse for FederalScientific and Technical Information, U.S. Departmentof Commerce, June 12, 1969.

4. Anastasiow, N. J. Developmental parameters of knowl-edge transmission. In M. Scott & S. Grimmett (Eds.),Current issues in child development. Washington, D.C.:National Association for the Education of Young Chil-dren, 1977.

5. DeMott, D. P. Children's self-concept disparity: Ef-fects of age, race, social class and gender. Unpublishedmaster's thesis, Yale University, 1978.

6. Yando, R. M., Seitz, V., & Zigler, E. Intellectual andmotivational characteristics of children in differing so-cial class and ethnic groups. Unpublished manuscript,Yale University, 1978.

7. Lazar, I., Hubbell, V., Murray, H., Rosche, M. M., &Royce, J. The persistence of preschool effects: A long-term follow-up of fourteen infant and preschool ex-periments (Final report of the Consortium on Develop-mental Continuity, Education Commission of the States,Grant 18-76-07843). Washington, D.C.: U.S. Depart-ment of Health, Education, and Welfare, September1977.

REFERENCES

Achenbach, T., & Weisz, J. R. A longitudinal study ofrelations between outer-directedness and IQ changes inpreschoolers. Child Development, 1975, 46, 650-657.

Anderson, S., & Messick, S. Social competency in youngchildren. Developmental Psychology, 1974, 10, 282-293.


Balla, D., Butterfleld, E. C., & Zigler, E. Effects of in-stitutionalization on retarded children. American Jour-nal of Mental Deficiency, 1974, 78, 530-549.

Balla, D., & Zigler, E. Cue-learning and problem learningstrategies in normal and retarded children. Child De-velopment, 1968, 3, 827-848.

Bloom, B. Stability and change in human characteristics.New York: Wiley, 1964.

Clarke, A. D. B., & Clarke, A. M. Prospects for pre-vention and amelioration of mental retardation: Aguest editorial. American Journal of Mental Defickncy,1977, 81, 523-533.

Clarke, A. M., & Clarke, A. D. B. (Eds.). Early experi-ence: Myth and evidence. London: Open Books, 1976.

Coleman, J., Campbell, E., Hobson, C., McPortland, J., &Mood, A. Equality of educational opportunity. Wash-ington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Health, Education andWelfare, 1966.

Cronbach, L. I. Five decades of public controversy overmental testing. American Psychologist, 1971, 30, 1-14.

Elkind, D. Two approaches to intelligence: Piagetianand psychometric. In D. R. Green, M. P. Ford, & G. B.Flamer (Eds.), Measurement and Piaget. New York:McGraw-Hill, 1971.

Farber, I. E. Sane and insane: Constructions and mis-constructions. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 1975,84, 589-620.

Garfleld, S. L., & Wittson, C. L. Comments on Dr. Can-tor's remarks. American Journal of Mental Deficiency,1960,64, 957-959. (a)

Garfield, S. L., & Wittson, C. L. Some reactions to therevised "Manual on Terminology and Classification inMental Retardation." American Journal of Mental De-ficiency, 1960, 64, 951-953. (b)

Ginsburg, H. The myth of the deprived child: Poorchildren's intellect and education. Englewood Cliffs,N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1972.

Gruen, G., & Zigler, E. Expectancy of success and theprobability learning of middle-class, lower-class andretarded children. Journal of Abnormal Psychology,1968, 73, 343-352.

Barter, S. Effectance motivation reconsidered: Towarda developmental model. Human Development, in press.

Harter, S., & Zigler, E. The assessment of effectanc? mo-tivation in normal and retarded children. Develop-mental Psychology, 1974, 10, 169-180.

Hunt, J. McV. Intelligence and experience. New York:Ronald Press, 1961.

Hunt, J. McV. Parent and child centers: Their basis inthe behavioral and educational sciences. AmericanJournal of Orthopsychiatry, 1971, 41, 13-38.

Kamii, C., & Derman, L. Comments on Englemann'spaper. The Englemann approach to teaching logicalthinking: Findings from the administration of somePiagetian tasks. In D. R. Green, M. P. Ford, & G. B.Flamer (Eds.), Measurement and Piaget. New York:McGraw-Hill, 1971.

Kamin, L. G. The science and politics of IQ. New York:Halsted Press, 1975.

Katz, P., & Zigler, E. Self-image disparity: A develop-mental approach. Journal of Personality and SocialPsychology, 1967, 5, 186-195.

Katz, P., Zigler, E., & Zalk, S. Children's self-image dis-parity: The effects of age, maladjustment, and action-thought orientation. Developmental Psychology, 1975,11, 546-550.

Kelly, J. G. Naturalistic observations and theory con-firmation: An example. Human Development, 1967,10, 212-222.

Kohlberg, L. Early education: A cognitive-developmentalview. Child Development, 1968, 39, 1013-1062.

Kohlberg, L., & Mayer, R. Development as the aim ofeducation. Harvard Educational Review, 1972, 42, 449-496.

Kohlberg, L., & Zigler, E. The impact of cognitive ma-turity on the development of sex-role attitudes in theyears four to eight. Genetic Psychology Monographs,1967, 75, 89-165.

Laurendeau, M., & Pinard, A. Causal thinking in the child.New York: International Universities Press, 1962.

Lytton, H. Creativity and education. New York:Schocken Books, 1972.

McClelland, D. C. Testing for competence rather thanfor "intelligence." American Psychologist, 1973, 28,1-14.

Mercer, J. Psychological assessment and the rights ofchildren. In N. Hobbs (Ed.), Issues in the classificationof children (Vol. 1). San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1975.

Mischel, W. Personality and assessment. New- York:Wiley, 1968.

North, F. Health services in Project Head Start. InE. Zigler & J. Valentine (Eds.), Project Head Start:A legacy of the war on poverty. New York: FreePress, in press.

Ollendick, T., Balla, D., & Zigler, E. Expectancy of suc-cess and the probability learning of retarded children.Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 1971, 77, 275-281.

Pastore, N. The nature-nurture controversy. New York:King's Crown Press, 1949.

Phillips, L. Case history data and prognosis in schizo-phrenia. Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease, 1953,117, 515-525.

Phillips, L., Broverman, I. K., & Zigler, E. Social com-petence and psychiatric diagnosis. Journal of AbnormalPsychology, 1966, 71, 209-214.

Proxmire, W. Funding research. Newsweek, June 13,1977, pp. 4; 7.

Robertson, A. B. Group day care and children's social-motivational development. Unpublished doctoral disser-tation, Yale University, 1978.

Schaefer, E. S. Factors that impede the process of so-cialization. In M. J. Begab & S. A. Richardson (Eds.),The mentally retarded and society: A social scienceperspective. Baltimore, Md.: University Parks Press,1975.

Seitz, V., Abelson, W. D., Levine, E., & Zigler, E. Effectsof place of testing on the Peabody Picture VocabularyTest scores of disadvantaged Head Start and non-HeadStart children. Child Development, 1975, 46, 481-486.

Solkoff, J. Strictly from hunger. New Republic, June 11,1977, pp. 13-15.

Stipek, D. J. Changes during first grade in children'ssocial-motivational development. Unpublished doctoraldissertation, Yale University, 1977.

Thorndike, R. L. The concepts of over- and underachieve-ment. New York: Columbia University Teachers Col-lege, 1963.

Tuddenham, R. D. Theoretical regularities and individualidiosyncracies. In D. R. Green, M. P. Ford, & G. B.Flamer (Eds.), Measurement and Piaget. New York:McGraw-Hill, 1971.

Turnure, J. E., & Zigler, E. Outer-directedness in theproblem-solving of normal and retarded children. Jour-nal of Abnormal Social Psychology, 1964, 69, 427-436.

Uzgiris, I. D., & Hunt, J. McV. Assessment in infancy.Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1975.

Weaver, S. J., Balla, D., & Zigler, E. Social approachand avoidance tendencies of institutionalized and non-


institutionalized retarded and normal children. Journal ofExperimental Research in Personality, 1971, 5, 98-110.

Weisz, J. R. A developmental analysis of relations amonghypothesis behavior, helplessness and 1Q. Unpublisheddoctoral dissertation, Yale University, 1975.

White, R. C. Motivation reconsidered: The concept ofcompetence. Psychological Review, 19S9, 66, 297-333.

Wittman, M. P. A scale for measuring prognosis inschizophrenic patients. Elgin State Hospital Papers,1941, 4, 20-33.

Zigler, E. Social deprivation and rigidity in the per-formance of feebleminded children. Journal of Abnor-mal Psychology, 1961, 62, 412-421.

Zigler, E. Mental retardation. Science, 1967, 157, 578-579.

Zigler, E. The environmental mystique: Training theintellect versus development of the child. ChildhoodEducation, 1970, 46, 402-412.

Zigler, E. Project Head Start: Success or failure? Learn-ing, 1973, 1, 43-47.

Zigler, E., Abelson, W., & Seitz, V. Motivational factorsin the performance of economically disadvantaged chil-dren on the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test. ChildDevelopment, 1973, 44, 294-303.

Zigler, E., & Balla, D. Developmental course of respon-siveness to social reinforcement in normal children andinstitutionalized retarded children. Developmental Psy-chology, 1972, 6, 66-73.

Zigler, E., & Butterfield,. E. C. Motivational aspects ofchanges in IQ test performance of culturally deprivednursery school children. Child Development, 1968, 39,1-14.

Zigler, E., & Phillips, L. Social competence and outcomein psychiatric disorder. Journal of Abnormal and So-cial Psychology, 1961, 63, 264-271.


iq, social competence, and evaluation of early childhood

Documents