ir theory inside out: the status of domestic...
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IR Theory Inside Out:
The Status of Domestic Political & Decision-Making Explanations of International Politics
Juliet Kaarbo University of Edinburgh
Paper prepared for presentation at the annual meeting of the International Studies
Association, 1-4 April 2012, San Diego, California.
DRAFT: PLEASE DO NOT CITE WITHOUT PERMISSION OF AUTHOR
ABSTRACT
This paper argues that there exists a paradox in current IR theory with regard to the role of domestic politics and decision-making. On the one hand, fairly recent developments have seen a resurgence of domestic political factors. Neo-classical realism, liberalism, and some variants of constructivism, for example, include references to state motives, perceptions, domestic political institutions, and political culture. Moreover, these factors seem critical in distinguishing current theory from previous versions. Similarly, constructivists have elevated concepts of agency and (inter-) subjectivity and security studies theorists speak of self-images and self-identities – all which lend themselves to decision-making and psychological analyses. On the other hand, much of IR theory ignores (at best) or violates (at worst) decades of research in foreign policy analysis on how domestic political and decision making factors affect actors’ choices and policies. In this paper, I make the case that domestic political and decision-making concepts are very much part of contemporary IR theory and theory-informed empirical investigations, but they are under-theorized and under-developed. In addition, I argue that foreign policy analysis research continues to be excluded (or self-excluded) from “mainstream” IR approaches, to the detriment of IR theory, foreign policy analysis, and our understanding of international politics.
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INTRODUCTION
There is a paradox in current International Relations (IR) theory with regard to the
role of domestic politics and decision-making: domestic politics and decision making is
simultaneously everywhere and nowhere. On the one hand, fairly recent developments in
realism, liberalism, and constructivism have incorporated domestic level and
psychological factors into their explanations. Compared to twenty years ago, domestic
political and decision-making concepts are very much part of contemporary IR theory
and theory-informed empirical investigations. On the other hand, much of IR theory
ignores (at best) or violates (at worst) decades of research in foreign policy analysis
(FPA) on how domestic political and decision making factors affect actors’ choices and
policies
The disconnect between the subfield of FPA and IR theory is not new and there
are many reasons for it. But as IR theory increasingly incorporates domestic and decision
making factors, it makes sense to revisit this lack of engagement. These factors are
under-theorized and under-developed in contemporary IR theory. Although FPA does
not provide a single, tidy theory to offer IR theorists, foreign policy research does have
much to say about the variables to which IR theorists are paying attention and it does
offer an alternative starting place for understanding international relations. If foreign
policy analysis research continues to be excluded (or self-excluded) from “mainstream”
IR approaches, it is to the detriment of IR theory, foreign policy analysis, and our
understanding of international politics. While others have recently called for more
dialogue between FPA and specific IR theories (e.g. Houghton 2007; Thies and Breuning
2012), this paper differs in that it is looking at the connection across a set of theories, not
just with bilateral engagements. I seek to highlight that the trend toward incorporating
domestic and decision making factors is occurring across IR theories and is a noteworthy
development for the field as a whole.1
This paper proceeds with the observation that foreign policy analysis is not
typically acknowledged as part of “IR theory,” despite the increasing role that domestic
politics and decision making (the domain of most FPA research) plays in IR theories. I
1 Goldgeier’s (1997) is does examine decision making/psychological variables across theories, but does not incorporate domestic political factors.
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then summarize the development of IR theory’s attention to domestic politics and
decision-making, focusing on neoclassical realism, liberalism’s democratic peace, and
constructivist theories of culture, role, and national identity. With each of these
theoretical perspectives, I show ways in which FPA research challenges or enhances the
treatment of domestic and decision-making factors. I conclude with an-FPA perspective
on international politics, as an alternative to other IR theoretical perspectives, that
stresses the role of the central decision making unit and the subjective understandings of
leaders as the filter for other international and domestic opportunities and constraints.
THE DISCONNECT BETWEEN IR AND FPA
FPA is a vibrant subfield of IR with roots in the 1950s (see Hudson 2005 and
2008 for review). It has “an actor-specific focus, based upon the argument that all that
occurs between nations and across nations is grounded in human decision makers acting
singly or in groups.” Organizationally, FPA is consistently one of the sections with the
highest membership in the International Studies Association. Yet it is often seen as
marginal to the ‘grand’ IR theoretical debates. If we take IR textbooks as a proxy for the
field, many introductory general and IR theory texts (e.g. Viotti and Kauppi 1999;
Sterling-Folker 2005; Burchill et al., 2009; Baylis, Smith, and Owens 2011) and specific
textbooks on security studies, international political economy, international
organizations, and international human rights policies do not present FPA research and
rarely offer domestic politics and decision making explanations as part of the theoretical
terrain for understanding international politics. Even some texts titled Foreign Policy
privilege IR theory over FPA research (e.g., Smith, Hadfield, and Dunne, 2008) and the
chapter on “Domestic Politics and International Relations” in the Handbook of
International Relations has surprisingly few references to work in FPA (Gourevitch
2002).
In 1986, Steve Smith asked if FPA as a “…distinct (if eclectic) approach to the
study of foreign policy, has anything to offer other than footnotes to grand theories of
international relations or historical case studies…?” (Smith, 1986: 13). Over twenty years
later, David Houghton reiterated the point that FPA has a “persistent ‘minority status’
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within IR: it has not fully engaged with the rest of the discipline and does not appear to
fit anywhere within the framework of the contemporary debates going on in IR”
(Houghton, 2007:26). More recently Flanik agrees: “Despite the importance of its
subject, FPA is often treated indifferently by nonpractioners and lacks its own chapter in
most IR textbooks, which shoehorn it into approaches (realism and liberalism) that – at
best – fit awkwardly with FPA’s focus on decision makers” (Flanik, 2011: 1; see also
Carlsnaes 2002)
What explains this disconnect between FPA and IR? The primary reasons, in my
opinion, have to do with the historical development of the IR discipline, the evolution of
and problems in FPA itself, and misperceptions of FPA research. The birth of IR as a
discipline was very much affected by realism, the then-dominant IR theory. Realism
itself was based on the very idea that, due to the condition of anarchy, international
politics is different than domestic politics and that ‘politics stops at the water’s edge’ for
the sake of state survival. FPA’s focus on domestic variables (Rosenau 1966), decision
making (Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin 1954), and the psychological milieu (Sprout and
Sprout 1956) were seen closer to the study of comparative politics or public policy
(Smith, Hadfield, and Dunne 2008). Waltz’s structural realism specifically excluded a
theory of foreign policy as part of neo-realist theory (Waltz, 1979, 1986), Wendt’s
presentation of constructivism agreed that international politics and foreign policy were
separate (Wendt 1999:11), and tneo-liberalism challenged neo-realism on its on terms,
with assumptions of unitary and rational actors (Keohane 1984). The disconnect between
FPA and IR was undoubtedly also affected by the fragmentation of IR more generally
and the proliferation of subfields; FPA, despite its long heritage, became just one of many
approaches to IR.
Weaknesses and proclivities within FPA also help explain the distance between
the subfield and IR theory. James Rosenau, in his launch of the study of comparative
foreign policy, eschewed deductive theorizing for a pre-theory and a positivist, inductive,
quantitative search for general patterns, causal laws, and a grand theory of foreign policy
(Rosenau 1966, 1968). When a grand theory did not materialize, the comparative foreign
policy project was pronounced dead and much FPA research in late 1970s and 1980s
focused on single country, single case studies and islands of middle-range theories, with
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little cross-fertilization, accumulation of knowledge, or attempted connections to IR.2
Attempts to redefine the subfield in the 1980s (Hermann, Kegley, and Rosenau 1987) and
early 1990s (Neack, Hey, and Haney 1995) did not seriously engage the rest of IR
(Houghton 2007). Many theoretically-minded FPA researchers grew weary of their
challenges to neo-realism falling on seemingly deaf ears, and turned to engage, arguably
more productively, with psychologists within the interdisciplinary field of political
psychology. From the outside, FPA’s continued focus on the state seemed out of touch
with developments in global politics (Smith 1986; White 1999).
The final set of reasons for the disconnect between FPA and IR concerns the
perceptions that many IR theorists have about FPA research. These will be covered more
directly below, in relation to specific IR theories, so I will simply note a few here. First,
FPA is often seen as only actor-centered, with little or no social or intersubjective
component. Second, FPA is often seen as positivist, not fitting with post-positive
epistemologies of some IR theories. Finally, FPA is criticized for only offering a laundry
list of variables, without a single theory or theoretical perspective. I return to each of
these Clearing up any misconceptions and double-standards is important if FPA and IR
are to engage more directly and fruitfully.
There are good reasons for this engagement. FPA research has consistently shown
that domestic politics and decision making matters to questions and issues that are central
to international politics, including international interventions, state cooperation in
financial crises, regional dynamics, nuclear proliferation. Public opinion, domestic
political institutions, opposition, bureaucratic politics, group decision making, and
leaders’ beliefs, styles, and decisions are important to international relations. Some
argue that FPA research became particularly important after the end of the Cold War
(Hudson 2005) or after the attacks of September 11, 2001 (Smith, Hadfield, and Dunne
2008). Hudson calls FPA the “ground of international relations” – “the conceptualization
of the fundamental or foundational level at which phenomena in the field of study occur”
because of FPA’s focus on human decision makers and its ability to synthesize social
science research (Hudson 2005: 1). Many have suggested that FPA has much to offer IR
2 For a review of this period of decline and self-reflection, see Smith 1986, Carslnaes 2002, and Hudson 2008.
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theory with respect to preferences, motives, and agent-structure relationships (e.g.,
Schafer and Walker 2006; Breuning 2011) and Smith, Hadfield, and Dunne note that
“while IR yields a host of approaches exploring…the tenets of state behavior, it is rarely
deployed to discuss key aspects of FPA. This is odd, because both sides are effectively
talking about the same thing” (2008:4).
More generally, Walter Carlsnaes argues that ”the divide between domestic and
international politics…is highly questionable as a feasible foundational baseline for a
sub-discipline that needs to problematize this boundary” (Carlsnaes 2002: 342), Perhaps
this is happening. According to Wivel, “the prominence of foreign policy analysis is
increasing in the discipline of international relations….A new journal, Foreign Policy
Analysis, launched by the International Studies Association is one example of this trend.”
(Wivel, 2005:359). I agree that IR theory is increasingly incorporating domestic politics
and decision making factors, but I see his happening without much attention to or
consistency with FPA research.
THE DOMESTIC POLITICS AND DECISION MAKING TURN IN IR THEORY
One seminal piece of research that marks the turn away from the neo-liberal vs. neo-
realist debate is Robert Putnam’s 1988 two-level game article (1988). Putnam’s
argument that leaders stood at the intersection of international and domestic win-sets was
not particularly surprising to FPA scholars, although it did offer a very novel way of
integrating second and third images of analysis. It also captured the attention of the
larger IR community and re-focused some attention on domestic politics and decision
making (Gourevitch 2002). Putnam’s article came at a time when IR was experiencing
other significant challenges and changes, including the constructivist turn (Onuf 1989;
Wendt 1992; Checkel 1998), the Third Debate (Lapid 1989), and the rediscovery of
liberalism in quantitative studies of the democratic peace (Russett 1993), adding
additional spotlights on culture and identities, subjectivity, and domestic political
institutions.
The following sections discuss the role of domestic politics in three contemporary
(post-1990) IR theoretical schools: liberalism, realism, and constructivism. A few
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caveats are important to note here. First, I am only focusing on certain variants of these
theories, as will become clear below. Not all realists, liberals, or constructivists include
domestic and decision making factors. Second, I am generalizing about these areas of
research. Not all ignore FPA or get it wrong; there are exceptions that I note. I do
believe, however, I am capturing some important central tendencies in these research
areas. Finally, while arguably the most prominent, these theories do not represent the
range of “IR theory.” I am not analyzing, for example, neo-Marxist and feminist
perspectives, work in international political economy, the English School, post-colonial
and critical theories.3 Although my main arguments might indeed apply to some versions
of these theories as well, my scope in this paper is limited to the IR theories chosen.
Liberalism
Current liberal theory is perhaps the most logical and expected place to find
domestic political variables. Indeed, the importance of domestic institutions and public
opinion is often folded into and presented only as part of liberalism in IR texts (e.g.,
Dunne, Kurki, and Smith 2010). And according to Doyle, “liberals pay more attention to
domestic structures and individual differences than do realists, and believe the
international system…has a less overriding influence and so distinguish themselves from
not only structural realists, but also from almost all realists” (Doyle, 2008:59).4 This has
not always been the case for liberal theory in IR. Although Keohane and Nye’s (1977)
liberalism in the form of “complex interdependence” included multiple channels for sub-
state actors to influence states, Keohane later moved liberalism into its neo-liberal variant
with assumptions of rationality and unitary actor in order to challenge Realism on its own
grounds (1984). Liberal-inspired regime theory also did not directly incorporate
domestic political variables (e.g., Krasner 1983).
Research on the ‘democratic peace’ revived the role of domestic politics in
liberalism, with institutions and public opinion, and cultural values and norms as the
dominant explanations (Maoz and Russett, 1993; Owen, 1994). In the cultural/normative
3 For a discussion of “critical foreign policy”, see Smith, Hadfield, and Dunne (2008: 5). 4 But see Sterling-Folker (1997) for an argument that liberalism does not seriously incorporate domestic factors.
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explanation, liberals in democratic societies have internalized norms of peaceful conflict
resolution and feel comfortable applying those norms in their interactions with other
democratic cultures that share these values. In the institutional explanation, peace-loving
publics (who are more adverse to war for cultural, welfare, or cost-bearing reasons) are
able to constrain their leaders from aggression via accountability and checks-and-
balances. These constraints supposedly lead to slow mobilization for war, giving more
time for negotiations and peaceful resolution between two democracies, prevent surprise
attacks because of the need to mobilize the public, and allow for transparency which
provides information to avert wars.
How do liberal treatments of domestic and decision making variables look from
an FPA perspective? The first concern for many FPA researchers is the stark dichotomy
drawn between democracies and non-democracies. This distinction not only assumes
differences between them, but uniformity within the families of democratic and non-
democratic states. FPA scholarship, on the other hand, stresses differences within
democracies (e.g., Katzenstein, 1976, 1978; Risse-Kappen, 1991; Volgy and Schwarz,
1991; Hagan, 1993, 2001; Auerswald, 1999; Leblang, 1999; Kaarbo, 2001; Hagan and
Hermann, 2002;) and how these differences influence foreign policy making processes
and outcomes. Although researchers have started to break down the category of
democracies to unpack the constraining effects on aggressive action (e.g., Peterson, 1995;
Prins and Sprecher, 1999; Elman, 2000; Ireland and Gartner, 2001; Reiter and Tillman,
2002; Palmer, London, and Regan, 2004; Chan and Safran, 2006; Clarke, 2010), these
studies have focused on institutional characteristics, have assumed that institutional
constraints are solely in the direction of peace, and have generally not traced the
underlying mechanisms that translate institutional constraints into peaceful decisions.
Foreign policy analysts would challenge these tendencies in this research (see Kaarbo and
Beasley, 2008; Kaarbo 2012).
Much research on the foreign policy of non-democracies would also challenge the
assumption in liberalism that leaders in non-democracies are unconstrained by societal
pressures and that non-democracies are equally unaccountable (e.g., Lawson, 1984;
Snyder, 1991; Hagan, 1993; Telhami, 1993; Mendelson, 1993; Hagan and Hermann,
2002; Davies, 2008; Stein, 2011). Rosato’s analyses support this: “there is little
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evidence that democratic leaders face greater expected costs from fighting losing or
costly wars and are therefore more accountable than their autocratic counterparts”
(Rosato 2003:594).
Another major FPA criticism of democratic peace research concerns the
assumption in the institutional explanation that democratic public opinion influences
leaders and foreign policy through constraints. From the FPA perspective, the
relationship between the public’s views and elite choices is far from straight-
forward.5 The previous “Almond-Lippman consensus” (consistent with Realism) that
foreign policy elites are unconstrained by an apathetic, uninformed public with unstable
views was challenged by a number of studies, particularly after the Vietnam War (Holsti
2002). Shifts in foreign policy public opinion, for example, may not stem from instability
and indicate volatility, but can be quite predictable and “rational” in the sense that they
are responsive to external cues (e.g., Mueller 1973; Page and Shapiro 1992). While there
is little evidence that the public has a high level of factual information about foreign
policy, studies have shown that the public’s views are structured by underlying core
values or orientations (e.g., Wittkopf, 1987; Hurwitz, Peffley, and Seligson 1993;
Jenkins-Smith, Mitchell, and Herron 2004).
How much public opinion actually influences foreign policy (assumed in liberal
democratic peace research) is still unanswered in foreign policy research. We know that
foreign policy issues are more important in voting behavior than was previously assumed
(e.g., Aldrich, Sullivan, and Borgida 1989), that foreign policy issues matter for
evaluations of leaders’ performance, and that public opinion and foreign policy are
significantly correlated (see Holsti 2002 for a review). Case study research has also
demonstrated that in many decisions, leaders are both attentive and responsive to public
opinion (e.g., Foyle 1997; Graber 1968; Sobel 2001).
While this research in FPA does offer some support for the assumption in
liberalism that democratic public opinion (and their cultural norms and values) can
influence foreign policy via elites, other research challenges this. Case study research
shows that in many other decisions, leaders ignored or defied public opinion, even under
5 Note: this section on public opinion draws on research for and ideas presented in Cantir and Kaarbo (2012).
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democratic institutions (e.g., Fischer 1997; Hildebrand 1981; Elman 1997). And recent
studies have focused on the success of leaders to manipulate public opinion to support
their preferences (e.g., Foyle 2004; Shapiro and Jacobs 2000; Rathbun 2004). Media and
framing influences on public opinion also challenge the notion that mass views are a
stable and independent source of foreign policy (e.g., Entman 2004; Kull, Ramsay, and
Lewis 2003-2004; Boettcher and Cobb 2006). Research on the influence of public
opinion on foreign policy has turned toward investigations of intervening conditions that
affect this relationship. Foyle, for example, argues that leaders’ beliefs about the
appropriateness and necessity of considering public opinion affect the role that the public
will play in foreign policy decisions (Foyle 1997; see also Dyson 2006). Others suggest
the type of issue and the stage of decision making are important conditions in the mass-
elite linkage (e.g., Knect and Weatherford 2006).
Overall, FPA research questions the assumption in liberalism that democratic
institutions allow for public influence. According to Houghton, “the societal-level image
of “democratic peace” theory leapfrogs over much of FPA, ignoring what goes on inside
states other than regime type” (2007:25). Rosato (2003) complied a list of the key
arguments: democratic publics are unlikely to constrain war proneness because the costs
of war fall on a small subset, aversion to war may be overcome by nationalism, and
democratic leaders are as likely to lead as follow public opinion; there is little evidence
that anti-war groups capture the decision making process more than pro-war groups; there
is no evidence that mobilization is slow in democracies (many leaders have bypassed
constraints); and democracies are as capable of carrying out surprise attacks and not less
able to conceal their intentions. After exposing the “flawed logic” of the democratic
peace, Rosato concludes with a neo-realist explanation – that the post-1945 liberal zone
of peace was based on U.S. hegemony. While FPA scholars would largely agree with
Rosato’s criticisms of liberalism’s democratic peace assumptions, they would instead
conclude that the domestic politics and decision making factors are more complicated and
still matter. I would echo Sterling-Folker’s critique of liberal expectations that trade
creates zones of peace and apply it equally to the democratic peace expectation: it lacks
microfoundations and rests on “questionable, normative assumptions about individual
and domestic politics that remained largely unexcavated” (Sterling-Folker 2009:106).
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Some democratic peace theorists have also incorporated the decision making
factor of perceptions in their theoretical framework. Owen, for example, argues that
“history shows many cases where perceptions tripped up democratic peace….To
determine which states belong to the pacific union, we must do more than simply
examine their constitutions. We must examine how the liberals themselves define
democracy” (Owen, 1994: 96-97). FPA would agree with this subjective
conceptualization and decision maker focus, but criticize this research for not explicitly
theorizing and investigating how perceptions, and their inherent biases and information
processing tendencies, unfold. Rosato offers another critique of the introduction of
perceptions in democratic peace research. He argues that we cannot predict how
perceptions are formed, that there is rarely any agreement among elites on how other
regimes are perceived, and that regime types are often redefined during conflict,
independent of the objective characteristics of the regime. FPA, with its long history of
looking at the psychology of decision making (discussed in more detail below), would
disagree with Rosato that theoretically-based expectations about the formation and
change of perceptions cannot be made. FPA also has much to say about how
disagreements between elites affect the process and outcomes of decision making (also
discussed below) and therefore would theorize and investigate, rather than discard,
perceptions as a variable.
Constructivism The rise of constructivist perspectives in IR also brought more attention to
domestic politics. Although some variants of constructivism focus more on the social
construction of international politics and the importance of shared norms of
appropriateness at the international/systemic level (e.g. Wendt 1999; Finnemore and
Sikkink 1998), other constructivists go inside the state, focusing on culture and societal
sources of identity, ideas, discourse, and roles. Constructivist attention to political
culture and identity, for example, has been used to explain why the foreign policy of
some states do not match expectations derived from realist or other material-based theory
(e.g., Berger 1998; Katzenstein 1996; Duffield 1999; Barnett 1999). Constructivist
discourse analyses focus on how meaning is constituted through language (e.g., Weldes
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1996; Gaskarth 2006) and often see language as residue of underlying cultural
understandings.
For many, the link between constructivism and FPA is natural, given
constructivists’ notions of agency. As Steve Smith notes, “social construction starts from
the assumption that actors make their worlds, and this assumption lies behind most of the
foreign policy literature….Social construction and foreign policy analysis look made for
one another” (Smith 2001: 38; see also Kubálková 2001; Breuning 2011; Houghton
2007). Checkel agrees that constructivists and FPA scholars share “a strong focus on
agency” (2008:74). He argues, however, that constructivism is not “simply warmed over
FPA – highlighting only the dynamics the subfield discovered many years ago” (Checkel,
2008:74). Instead, Checkel sees key differences between constructivism and FPA –
namely, constructivism’s social focus (contra FPA’s supposed individual focus) and
constructivism’s epistemological split between positivist and interpretive branches
(contra FPA’s supposed “loose” positivist orientation) (2008: 74).6
Checkel, for example, argues that FPA takes bureaucratic actors’ interests as
given, while constructivists would uncover “how interests are constructed through a
process of social interaction” (2008: 74). He also suggests that FPA sees actors as
rational, even if bounded and asocial: “They decided alone, as it were. If they are
instrumentally rational, individuals simply calculate in their heads; if they are boundedly
rational, they look to organizations and routines for cues. In neither case is there any
meaningful interaction with the broader social environment –interactions that in some
basic sense might affect how individuals decide.” Instead, Checkel says, constructivists
focus on communicative agents. “With this understanding of rationality, individuals are
seen as deeply social. They decide by deliberating with others. Arguing in fact becomes
a key decision-making dynamic, supplementing bargaining. Individuals do not come to
the table knowing what they want; the whole point of arguing is to discover what they
want….” (Checkel, 2008: 76).
Others have made similar comparisons between constructivism and FPA.
Houghton (2007) and Flanik (2011), for example, both categorize FPA as positivist and
6 Checkel also argues that constructivism transcends the external versus internal dichotomy, presumably embraced by FPA.
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individualist. Many in FPA, however, would reject these general categorizations. If
positivism simply means a search for explanations, causal mechanisms and “if-then”
hypothesis testing (Fierke 2010), then I would agree that FPA fits this mold (as do the so-
called ‘conventional constructivists’) (Hopf 1998). Positivism, however, also means an
assumption of a single, knowable objective reality. Much of the subfield of FPA
specifically challenges this by focusing on the subjective understanding of decision
makers as key for understanding foreign policy processes and choices. Indeed, the roots
of FPA lie with Snyder, Bruck and Sapin’s concept of “definition of the situation” and
since the mid-1970s, the bulk of FPA research has focused on subjective factors such as
leader beliefs (eg. Hermann, 1980; Schafer and Walker), perceptions (Jervis 1976; Levy
1983), framing effects (McDermott 1998) and problem representations (Sylvan and Voss
1998). Some of these studies compare these subjective understandings with “reality” to
explain ineffective policies, but many do not and this is certainly not an inherent feature
of FPA research.
The classification of FPA as individualist and asocial is also questionable. Even
those who focus on single leaders typically examine how those leaders interact with other
advisors (e.g. Hermann 1993; Preston 2001) or how they see the relationship between
themselves and others (Schafer and Walker 2006). More critically, much of the research
in FPA is not at the individual level and takes seriously how individuals’ beliefs,
understandings, and preferences are aggregated to the social level via institutional,
cultural, and small group rules, norms, and processes. Following Janis, many FPA
researchers investigate how groups (the primary type of decision unit in most foreign
policy cases) are more than the sum of their parts and process information, engage in
persuasion and other social influence processes, and make decisions in ways that are
different than (and inherently more social than) individual decision making (e.g., ‘t Hart,
Stern, and Sundelius 1997; Beasley 1998; Kaarbo 2008; Schafer and Crichlow 2010). As
Flanik admits in a footnote, an anonymous reviewer pointed out that FPA research draws
heavily on social psychology, not individual-level psychology (Flanik, 2011:2). Indeed,
constructivists and FPA scholars often cite the same social psychology research.7 To be
sure, FPA’s conceptualization of the social is different from constructivist
7 See, for example, Wendt 1999 and Checkel 2001.
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conceptualizations, but the point here is that FPA cannot be dismissed as only
individualist and asocial.
Setting aside constructivists’ characterizations of FPA, how do FPA scholars read
constructivist accounts of foreign policy and their attention to internal factors such as
culture and ideas? Generally, FPA research would challenge constructivism for
privileging the social over agency. Flanik, for example, writes that “constructivists
endorse co-constitution in principle, but in practice, much constructivist works favors
structure” (2011: 9; see also Goldgeier 1997). Barnett offers a similar critique:
“constructivism has tended to operate with an oversocialized view of actors, treating
them as near bearers of structures and, at the extreme, as cultural dupes. The real danger
here is the failure to recognize that actors have agency, can be strategic, are aware of the
cultural and social rules that presumably limit their practices, and as knowledgeable
actors are capable of appropriating those cultural taproots for various ends” (1999: 7).
FPA, on the other hand, approaches politics from a much more agent-centered standpoint
(Houghton 2007; Shannon 2000 and Breuning 2011).
For foreign policy analysts, constructivism also lacks attention to how the social
is constructed (black-boxing the process) and assumes a strong connection between
culture at the mass-societal level and policymaking at the elite level. Constructivist
research on identities, for example, largely assumes that there is a single national identity
and that this is either shared between the elites and masses or resides at the society level
and constrains elites.8 Some constructivist analyses allow for a disconnect between elite
and masses, but see cultural values and identities of the public constraining elites from
adopting foreign policies more commensurate with these states power in the international
system (e.g., Berger 1998; Duffield 1999).9
Both of these assumptions – that identities are shared or that they reside at the
societal level and constrain elites – are not consistent with much FPA research. As
discussed above (and therefore not repeated here), FPA scholarship points to the
complicated relationship between public opinion and values and elite decision making. It
8 Barnett (199) is a notable exception to this. 9 This research, however, often confounds this relationship by measuring societal culture through elite statements (e.g., Duffield 1999; Gaskarth 2006).
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is certainly not an automatic determinant as many identity studies assume. On the issue
of how shared identities are, research in FPA suggests that elites and masses may
disagree on their country’s identity. Indeed, there is often a disconnect between leaders’
and the public’s views on a number of specific issues, as well as more general foreign
policy orientations, such as national identity. According to Page and Barabas, for
example, “the most conspicuous gap between citizens and leaders [in the United States] is
a familiar and long-standing one: more leaders than citizens tend to be ‘internationalists’
at least in the simple sense that they say they favor the United States taking an ‘active’
part in world affairs” (Page and Barabas 2000:344). Similarly, Risse and his colleagues
argue that elite and mass attitudes toward the Euro differed over a long period, partly due
to different conceptions of German identity (Risse et al. 1999:177).
More directly, FPA research suggests that identities are likely to be contested at
the elite level as well. Although this research has not focused specifically on contested
identities, it does demonstrate that there is considerable intra-elite disagreement over
foreign policy and it has much to say about the way in which conflicts over foreign policy
affect both the policymaking process and resulting foreign policy behavior.10 FPA
research on elite conflict over foreign policy has concentrated on conflicts between
governing elites and political opposition (e.g., Hagan, 1993; Howell and Pevehouse 2007;
Kesgin and Kaarbo, 2010; Pahre 1997; Martin 2001; Born 2004; Hänggi 2004; Rathbun
2004; Wagner 2006), within governing coalitions (e.g., Binnur Ozkececi-Taner 2005;
Kaarbo 2012), in small decision making and advisory groups (t Hart, Stern, and
Sundelius 1997; Garrison 2003, Hermann 1993; Hagan and Hermann 2002; Kaarbo 2008;
Beasley 1998) and across bureaucratic agencies (e.g., Allison 1971; Stern and Verbeek
1998).
Neo-Classical Realism Neo-classical realism is the place where current theorizing most directly includes
domestic politics and decision-making factors. This is ironic since early realists were
instrumental in advancing the division between the international and the domestic realms
10 This discussion draws on Cantir and Kaarbo (2012).
16
of politics. Rejecting neo-realist arguments that unit-level characteristics do not matter
and that IR theory is not a theory of foreign policy, neo-classical realists have sought to
create a coherent realist perspective on foreign policy (for an overview of neo-classical
realism and specific references to neo-classical works, see Rose, 1998, Zakaria, 1992;
Brooks, 1997; Wivel, 2005; and Lobell, Ripsman, and Taliaferro, 2009; for a comparison
of domestic variables in realism and systemic liberal theory, see Sterling-Folker 1997).
Neoclassical realists place primacy on the international system and relative material
power capabilities, but see these as filtered through the state and state responses as
affected by a wide range of domestic political and decision-making variables, including
perceptions (Wohlforth 1993), states’ motives (Schweller 1998), political tradition and
identity (Friedberg 2000; Monten 2005), domestic political institutions and coalition-
building (Snyder 1991; Zakaria 1998) and perceived lessons of the past (Mouritzen and
Wivel 2005). According to Schweller, the “complex domestic processes act as
transmission belts that channel, mediate and (re)direct policy outputs in response to
external forces (primarily changes in relative power). Hence, states often react
differently to similar systemic pressures and opportunities, and their response may be less
motivated by systemic-level factors than domestic ones” (Schweller 2004: 164). Neo-
classical realists concede that systemic dynamics explain long-term trends, but argue that
domestic factors are needed to understand specific foreign policies, or ‘why state X made
a certain move last Tuesday’ (Waltz 1979: 121; see also Wivel 2005 and Taliaferro,
Lobell, and Ripsman 2009).11
There are variations in orientation within the neoclassical realist school. Some,
for example, focus more on domestic politics and state-society relations. These scholars
put the national security executive at the center, with the ability to define the national
interest but who must bargain with domestic political actors to extract resources and
make policy (e.g., Taliaferro, Lobell, and Ripsman 2009; Lobell 2009; Dueck 2009;
Ripsman 2009). In the concluding chapter to Neoclassical Realism, the State, and
11 For a good defense of how neo-classical realism as a coherent set of foreign policy theories, as true to its realist roots, and as no different from most realists in terms of the rationality assumption, see Taliaferro, Lobell, and Ripsman 2009.
17
Foreign Policy, Ripsman, Taliaferro and Lobell argue that neo-classical realism is not the
same as rational actor models of executives bargaining with domestic and external actors:
neoclassical realists would take issue with the implicit assumptions of…these models that state leaders have automatic access to all national resources, that they do not have to bargain with societal groups to enact or implement policy, and that they can, therefore, respond to shifts in the balance of power in a fluid and flexible manner. Empirical evidence presented in this volume supports this theoretical challenge to rationalist theories (2009: 289).
Others focus more on ideational elements at the domestic level, such as
nationalism and ideology (e.g., Sterling-Folker 2009; Taliaferro; Schweller 2009).
Finally, decision making processes and perceptions and motivations are seen as
important, as “ neoclassic realist foreign policy analysis stresses that foreign policy
decisions are made by human beings, political leaders and elites” (Wivel, 2005: 361).
Indeed, according to Wivel, “assumptions about motives and ideas are already integral to
the realist framework, and moreover, impossible to escape” (Wivel 2005: 368). Even
within neo-realism, the primary debate between offensive and defensive branches turns
on state motivations. As Snyder notes “it seems ironic that…structural realists should
differ most basically about a ‘unit-level’ factor: that is how much security do states
desire?” (Snyder 2002: 155).12
While neo-classical realism looks very similar to many studies in contemporary
FPA, and some neo-classical realists build directly on FPA research (e.g. Ripsman 2009),
the FPA perspective would question some of the assumptions in neo-classical realism and
critique neo-classical realism for its under-development of domestic political and
especially decision making factors. The primary assumption in neoclassical realism (and
what makes it realist) privileges the international system over the domestic system.
Domestic politics and decision making are intervening conditions on leaders’ reactions to
the international system.13 Yet this ordering is not convincingly justified or accurate
12 Also see Goldgeier (1997) for a discussion of psychological variables in Stephen Walt’s balance of threat theory. 13 Ripsman (2009), for example, puts the executive as the filter, but argues that international pressures and constraints are prioritized and that national executives have a “view from above” that leads to divergence from domestic political actors. Ripsman does, however, acknowledge diversionary motives of executives.
18
from the perspective of FPA research, which sees domestic political and decision making
factors at times equal to, or more important than international factors. More basically, as
Fordham argues, the
neoclassical assumption that domestic and international pressures are easily separable and identifiable is problematic. The nature of international threats is determined to a great extent by the interests of the domestic coalition that governs the state, and domestic political and economic interests are often affected by international circumstances. Therefore, it makes little sense to treat domestic and international variables in an additive manner, by assuming an objective set of national interests and seeing how domestic political actors respond to them (Fordham, 2009: 251). Wivel makes a similar critique of Walt’s balance of threat theory’s reliance on
aggregate power, geographic proximity, offensive power, and aggressive intentions as the
objective, material sources of threat perception: “What is the inner logic of the theory?
Obviously, these variables are important sources of threat, but so are historical
experience, political tradition and culture, the personality of decision makers and
ideology. Why should our explanation rely on the first set of variables rather than the
second, or a third for that matter?” (Wivel, 2005: 366-7). Similarly, neoclassical scholars
often do not justify why certain domestic factors are chosen over others, and the addition
of unit-level characteristics seems ad hoc in nature (Wivel 2005).14
Neoclassical realism’s objective and material characterizations of the international
system and the domestic political constraints on the national executive are also
problematic, from an FPA perspective. According to Wivel, neoclassical realism needs
more attention to how objective material factors, such as power, are perceived and
interpreted by decision makers. He argues:
Once the analytical boundary between theories of international politics and theories of foreign policy is rejected, it becomes difficult to separate material power from the interpretation of it. Thus, if we acknowledge that foreign policy is made by real people interpreting their environment, including the structure of the international system, then we need to engage in a discussion of how we understand the interplay between materialist and idealist variables (Wivel, 2005: 367-8).
14 An important exception is Ripsman’s (2009) discussion of which domestic groups matter, the international conditions and types of states in which they will influence foreign policy, and the ways in which domestic groups have an effect.
19
Wivel’s suggestion for neoclassical realism is to borrow from psychology for
theoretical foundations of perceptions, interpretations, and motivations (see also
Goldgeier 1997). But psychology has already been incorporated in and adapted by FPA
research. Indeed, the psychological approach to foreign policy has a long and robust
history. Rooted in Snyder, Bruck and Sapin’s (1954) work on the policymaker’s
definition of the situation and Sprout and Sprout’s conception of the psychological milieu
(1956), it arguably become the dominant approach since the 1990s: the “cognitive
approach has grown in visibility, prominence, and sophistication since the 1950s, as
social scientists have attempted to be more systematic in identifying and explaining major
patterns of foreign policy” (Rosati, 2001: 51; see also Levy 2003). These patterns stem
from a variety of (related) psychological sources, including personality traits (e.g.,
Hermann 1980; Winter 1992), leadership styles (e.g., George 1980; Hermann 1993;
Kaarbo 1997; Dyson 2006), leader beliefs (e.g., George 1969; Schafer and Walker 2006),
images (e.g., Herrmann and Fischerkeller 1995; Cottam 1986), analogies (e.g., Khong
1992; Breuning 2003), framing effects (e.g., McDermott 1998; Levy 2000), consistency-
based and schema-based information processing (Holsti 1976; Jervis 1976; Vertzberger
1990), attribution biases (e.g., Larsen 1985), threat perception (e.g., Jervis, 1976; Lebow,
1981; Levy 1983), problem representations and problem solving (Sylvan and Voss 1998;
Knecht 2009), and the psychology of small group social influence dynamics (e.g., ‘t Hart,
Stern, and Sundelius 1997; Garrison 2003; Kaarbo 2008; Schafer and Crichlow 2010).
This research area in FPA can provide neo-classical realists (and others that reference
ideational variables and subjective understandings) with considerable theoretical and
empirical leverage. More generally, I agree with Wivel that “realists should devote less
attention to specific case studies and more attention to the general conceptual and
theoretical basis of their foreign policy analyses” (2005: 374).
AN FPA PERSPECTIVE OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS
With the increased attention to domestic politics and decision making in IR
theories, FPA is ideally-situated to provide insights to further develop liberalism,
constructivism, and realism. Indeed, many have started to link FPA research with each
of these traditions in IR theory (e.g., Houghton, Walker and Schafer 2006, Thies and
20
Breuning 2012, Ripsman 2009). More than this, FPA can provide an alternative
perspective to these theories. FPA looks at the world and international relations from a
complementary but distinct standpoint. An FPA perspective stresses the role of the
central decision making unit and the subjective understandings of leaders as the filter for
other international and domestic opportunities and constraints.15
FPA does not offer a single theory of international relations, but this does not
make it unique or less-developed than other IR “theories.” Neoclassical realism and other
realist variants are typically characterized as belonging to a “school of thought” rather
than a single, unified theory (Wohlforth 2008). Constructivism also has different
variations, which are “not a substantive theory of world politics” (Fearon and Wendt
2002: 56). Liberalism also breaks down into various branches (Doyle 2008).
Table 1 delineates the key differences between these three IR theories and the
FPA perspective. Similar to many neo-classical realist writings, the decision making unit
(be it a leader, a small group, or a coalition of autonomous actors), is a funnel through
which other factors are transmitted and interpreted (Hagan and Hermann 2002)16. The
FPA perspective differs from neo-classical realism in that international system variables
are not necessarily more important, and FPA pays more theoretical, conceptual, and
empirical attention to the social psychological processes that influence decision makers’
interpretations. Similar to constructivism, the FPA perspective does not take objective,
material forces as given, but instead focuses on the meaning that is given to them and the
ideational environment that is constructed by agents in their social contexts. The FPA
perspective differs from constructivism in its attention to conflicting ideas and
understandings in the domestic political system, the institutionalization of ideas, and the
instrumental manipulation of ideas such as norms and identities. Similar to liberal
perspectives on the democratic peace, the FPA perspective acknowledges potential
15 Presented here is a very state-centric FPA perspective. While states remain very important actors in international politics, they are not all of international relations and this perspective does not capture non-state activities. Others, however, have made the argument that FPA research can stretch to help us understanding the actions and processes of non-state actors (e.g., Thies *in Schafer and Walker, White *, Verbeek *; Smith, Hadfield, and Dunne 2008). 16 I am not suggesting the formal Decision Unit model, but rather the idea that decision units vary and matter for policy making processes and outcomes.
21
conflict and constraint over foreign policy and particularly the disconnect between
leaders and masses. The FPA perspective differs from liberal democratic peace research
in that it does not assume automatic constraints in democracies and allows for constraints
in non-democratic systems.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 1
FPA & IR THEORY: Similarities & Differences
FPA
Similarities Differences IR THEORIES Neoclassical decision unit as funnel international factors not privileged; more Realism attention to social psychological processes Liberalism potential constraint from constraints not automatic and elite-mass disconnect operate across regime type Constructivism subjective focus more focus on contested, institutionalized, and manipulation of ideas ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
As an alternative perspective, FPA foregrounds the decision maker – this is its
distinct contribution. How decision makers interpret and respond to their domestic and
international environments is then subject to a number of factors – psychological,
ideational, political, institutional, and material. As IR theories have turned toward
domestic and decision making variables, the FPA perspective can bring them together
and bridge them. This is important as each theory is developing along different
trajectories with regard to these variables. Neoclassical realists tend to focus on elites,
liberals on institutions and societal constraints, and constructivists on ideas and
discourse.17 FPA research has something to offer each of these avenues of thought.
More than this, FPA has a history of investigating – with a track record of theoretical
17 My thanks to Ryan Beasley for this point of observation.
22
conceptualization, methodological development, and empirical examination – all of these
domestic and decision making orientations that currently separate the dominant IR
theories.
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