iran security council resolution

104
United Nations Security Counci Provbdonal i7 July 2015 Original: English S/2015/547 Uÿffed States of America: draft resoluti@ÿ The SeNitiO' CoHnci/, Recalling the Statement of its President, S/PRST/2006/I5. and its resolutions I696 (2006). ÿ737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (200S), I835 (2008), and !929 (2010). ReaÿfirmhTg its commimÿem to @e Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the need ÿ'or all States Party to thin Treaty to comply fully with their obligations, and recÿTh'iÿg the right oi: States Party, in con[ormhy with Articles I and II of thin Treaty, to devNop ÿesearch, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination° E,,n!)hasi=iÿTg @e importance of political and dipbmatic efforts to find a negotiated solution guaranteeing that [ran% nut!ear programme is exclusively for peaceful purposes, and notilÿg @at such a solulion would benefit nuclear non-prolit%ration, Wcomitÿg diphmmtic efforts by China, Franc< Germany° @e Russiarÿ Federation, the United Kingdom, the United States, the High Representative o[ the European Union for Foreigÿ Affairs and Security PoJicy, and [ran to reach a comprehensive, hmgqerm and proper solutRm to the Iranian nuclear issue, c@minafing in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) concluded on 14 July 2015. (S/2015/544, as attached as Ampex A to flis resolution) and the establishmem of the Aim Commissiom Welcoming h-an's reaffirmation it, the JCPOA that iÿ will mÿder no circumstances ever seek. develop or acquire any nuclear weapons. Noti,'Tg the statement of 14 July 2015. i]om China. France, Germanyÿ the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, the United States. and the European UnRm aimed at pro, meting transparency and creating an atmosphere conducive to @e full implementation of the ]CPOA (S/2015/545, as mtached as Armex B to @is resolution ), z{£yhmitTg that conclusion of ÿhe JCPOA marks a fundamemal shift hs its consideration of this issue, and expressiÿTg its desire to build a new relationship with Iran strengthened b} the implememation of the JCPOA and ÿo bring to a satisfactory concIuskm its consideratRm of this mauer, k,f,)qrmiÿTg that I'uH implemer}tation of the JCPOA will contribute to buiIding confidence in flÿc exctusiveIy peaeef@ nmure of Iran's nuclear programme, 15-] 2004 tel

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  • United Nations

    Security Counci Provbdonali7 July 2015

    Original: English

    S/2015/547

    Uffed States of America: draft resoluti@

    The SeNitiO' CoHnci/,

    Recalling the Statement of its President, S/PRST/2006/I5. and its resolutionsI696 (2006). 737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (200S), I835 (2008), and !929(2010).

    ReafirmhTg its commimem to @e Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of NuclearWeapons, the need 'or all States Party to thin Treaty to comply fully with theirobligations, and recTh'ig the right oi: States Party, in con[ormhy with Articles I andII of thin Treaty, to devNop esearch, production and use of nuclear energy forpeaceful purposes without discrimination

    E,,n!)hasi=iTg @e importance of political and dipbmatic efforts to find anegotiated solution guaranteeing that [ran% nut!ear programme is exclusively forpeaceful purposes, and notilg @at such a solulion would benefit nuclearnon-prolit%ration,

    Wcomitg diphmmtic efforts by China, Franc< Germany @e RussiarFederation, the United Kingdom, the United States, the High Representative o[ theEuropean Union for Foreig Affairs and Security PoJicy, and [ran to reach acomprehensive, hmgqerm and proper solutRm to the Iranian nuclear issue,c@minafing in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) concluded on14 July 2015. (S/2015/544, as attached as Ampex A to flis resolution) and theestablishmem of the Aim Commissiom

    Welcoming h-an's reaffirmation it, the JCPOA that i will mder nocircumstances ever seek. develop or acquire any nuclear weapons.

    Noti,'Tg the statement of 14 July 2015. i]om China. France, Germany theRussian Federation, the United Kingdom, the United States. and the EuropeanUnRm aimed at pro, meting transparency and creating an atmosphere conducive to@e full implementation of the ]CPOA (S/2015/545, as mtached as Armex B to @isresolution ),

    z{yhmitTg that conclusion of he JCPOA marks a fundamemal shift hs itsconsideration of this issue, and expressiTg its desire to build a new relationship withIran strengthened b} the implememation of the JCPOA and o bring to a satisfactoryconcIuskm its consideratRm of this mauer,

    k,f,)qrmiTg that I'uH implemer}tation of the JCPOA will contribute to buiIdingconfidence in flc exctusiveIy peaeef@ nmure of Iran's nuclear programme,

    15-] 2004 tel

  • S/2015/547

    Stro,gly supporti,zg the essential and independent role of the InternationalAtomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in verifying compliance with safeguardsagreements, including the non-diversion of declared nuclear material to undeclaredpurposes and the absence of undeclared nuclear material and undeclared nuclearactivities, and. in this context, in ensuring the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran'snuclear programme, including through the implementation of the "'Framework forCooperalion'" agreed between Iran and the IAEA on 11 November 2013 and the"Roadmap for Clarification of Past and Present Outstanding Issues", andrecogrizilg the IAEA's important role in supporting full implementation of {heJCPOA,

    Affi'rmig that IAEA safeguards are a fundamental component of nuclear non-proliferation, promote greater confidence among Staes. inter alia by providingassurance {hat States are complying with their obligations under relevant safeguardsagreements, conlribute to strengflening their collecti,,e security and help to createan environment conducive to nuclear cooperation, and further recoglizitg thatelfective and efficient safeguards implementalion requires a cooperative effortbetween the 1AEA and States. that the IAEA Secretarial will continue to engage inopen dialogue on safeguards matters wilh States to increase transparency and buildconfidence and to interact with them on the implementation of safeguards, and inthis case, avoid hampering the economic and technological development of Iran orinternational cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities; respect health.safety, physical protection and other security provisions in force and the rights ofindividuals; and take every precaution In protect commercial, technological andindustrial secrets as well as other confidential information coming to its knowledge,

    E,couragi,g Member Slates to cooperate, including through IAEAinvolvement, with Iran in the framework Hf the JCP()A in the field of peaceful usesof nuclear energy and to engage in mutually delermined civil nuclear cooperationprojects, in accordance with Annex lIl of the JCPOA,

    Notillg the termination of provisions of previous resolutions and othermeasures foreseen in this resolution, and itvitig Member States to give due regardto these changes,

    Emphasizig that the JCPOA is conducive to promoting and facilitating thedevelopment of normal economic and trade contacts and cooperation with Iran, andhaving regard to States" rights and obligations relating to international trade,

    Uderscorig that Member States are obligated under Article 25 of the Charterof the United Nations to accept and

  • S/20! 5/547

    cooperate t'u]]v as the IAEA requests to be able to resolve a}i omstandhsg issues askJentffied in IAEA reports:

    4. Rcqn(,.Ls rise Director General of dee IAEA to prox, kle regular updates tohe IAEA Board of Oo'ernors and a,'4 appropriate, in parallel o fle Securhy

    Council on hans implementation of its commimems under the JCPt)A and also torcpor to de IAEA Board of Goxernors and is parallel to fle Securhy Council at anytime iI" the Director Genera has reas

  • S/2015/547

    II. Decides, acting under Article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations,that, within 30 (lays of receiving a notification by a JCPOA participant State of anissue thal the JCPOA participant State believes constitutes significant non-performance of commitments under fle JCPOA, it shall vote on a draft resolution toconlinue in etT"ecl ihe ierminations in paragraph 7 (a) of" this resolution, decidesfurther that if, within 10 days of the notification referred to above, no Member ofthe Securily Council has submitted such a draft resolulion for a wte, then tllePresident of the Security Council shall submit such a draft resolution and pul it to avote within 30 days of the notification referred to above, and exl)resses its intentionto take into account the views of lhc Stales involved in the issue and any opinion onthe issue by the Advisory Board established in ihe JCPOA:

    12. Decides, acting under Article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations,that. if the Security Council does not adopt a resolution under paragraph l l tocontinue in effect file terminations in paragraph 7 (a), then effective midnightGreenwich Mean Time after the thirtieth day after the notification to the SecurityCouncil described in paragraph 11, all of the provisions of resolulions t696 (2006),t737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), 1835 (2008), and t929 (2010) that havebeen terminated pursuant to paragraph 7 (a) shall apply in the same manner as theyapplied before tile adoption of this resolution, and the measures contained inparagraphs 7. 8 and 16 to 20 of this resolution shall be terminated, unless theSecurity Council decides otherwise:

    13. Ut?derscores that. in the event of a notification to the Security Councildescribed in paragraph 1t, Iran and the other JCPOA parlicipants should strive toresolve file issue giving rise to tile notification, expresses ils intention to prevent thereapplicalion of the provisions if the issue giving rise to lhe notification is resolved,decides, acting under Article 4l of tile Charter of tile Untied Nations, thai if lhenolifymg JCPOA participant Slate informs the Security Council that such an issue hasbeen resolved before the end of the 30-day period specified in paragraph 12 above,then the provisions of this resolution, including the terminations in paragraph 7 (a),shall remain in effect notwithstanding paragraph 12 above, and lotes Iran's statementthat if the provisions of previous resolutions are applied pursuant to paragraph 12 inwhole or in part, h-an will treat this as grounds Io cease performing its commitnaentsunder the JCPOA:

    14. AffTrms that the application of the provisions of previous resolutionspursuant to paragraph 12 do not apply with retroactive effect to contracts signedbetween any party and Iran'or Iranian individuals and entities prior to the date ofapplication, provided lhat tile activities contemplated under and execulion of suchcontracts are consistent with the JCPOA, this resolulion and the previousresolutions:

    15. Af/Trms that any application of the provisions of previous resolutionspursuant to paragraph 12 is not intended to harm individuals and entities that. priorto that application of those provisions, engaged in business with han or Iranianindividuals and entities that is consistent with the JCPOA and this resolulion,encourages Member States to consull with each other with regard to such harm, andto take action to mitigate such unintended harm for these individuals and entities,and decides' if the provisions of previous resolutions are applied pursuant toparagraph 12 not to impose measures with retroactive effect on individuals and

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  • S/20t5/547

    ertilics for business activities with Iran that were consisten with the JCPOA thisresolmhm ad the previous resolutions prior to ti7e applicaion of those provisiors:

    JCPOA hpbmentatio

    I6. D,cidr

  • S/2015/547

    22. Decides, acting under Article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations,that Member Slates engaging in the activities permitted in paragraph 21 shall ensm'ethat: (a) all such activities are undertaken strictly in accordance with the JCPOA;(b) they notify the Commillee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006) and,,a, hen conslituted, the Joim Commission ten days in advance of such activities;(c) the requirements, as appropriate, of the Guidelines as set out in the relevantINFCIRC referenced in resolution 1737 (2006), as updmed, have been met; (d) theyhave obtained and are in a position Io exercise effectively a right to verify the end-use and end-use location of any supplied item: and (e) in case of supplied items,materials, equipment, goods and technology listed in Hie INFCIRCs referenced inresolution 1737 (2006). as updated. Ihey also notify lhe IAEA within ten days of thesupply, sale or transfers:

    23. Decides, acting under Article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations,also tllat the measures imposed in resolutions 1696 (2006), t737 (2006). 1747(2007). !803 (2008), 1835 (2008). and /929 (2010) shall not apply lo the extentnecessary to carry out transfers and activities, as approved on a case-by-case basisin advance by the Commiltee eslabtished pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006). thatare:

    (a) directly related to implementation of the nuclear-related actions specifiedin paragraphs 15.1-15.11 of Annex V of the JCPOA:

    (b) required for preparation Ikr the implementation of the JCPOA: or.

    (c) determined by the Committee to be consistent with the objectives of thisresolution:

    24, Notes that the provisions of paragraphs 21, 22, 23 and 27 continue ineffect if the provisions of previous resolutions are applied pursuant to paragraph 12:

    Other Matters

    25. Decides to make the necessary practical arrangements to undertakedirectly tasks related to the implementation of this resolution, including those tasksspecified in Annex B and the release of guidance:

    26. Urges all Slates, relevant United Nations bodies and other interesledparties, to cooperale fully with the Security Council in its exercise of the tasksrelated to this resolution, in particular by supplying any information at their disposalon the implementation of the measures in lhis resolution:

    27. Decides that all provisions contained in the JCPOA are only for thepurposes of its implementation between the E3iEU+3 and Iran and should not beconsidered as setting precedents for any other State or for principles of internationallaw and the rights and obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation ofNuclear Weapons and other relevant instruments, as well as for internationallyrecognized principles and practices:

    28. Recalls that the measures imposed by paragraph 12 of resolution 1737(2006) shall not prevent a designated person or entity from making payment dueunder a contract entered into prior to the listing of such a person or entity, providedthat the conditions specified in paragraph 15 of that resolution are met, andzzderscores, that if the provisions of previous resolutions are reapplied pursuant toparagraph 12 of this resolution, then this provision will apply:

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    29. EH/)",xize'x the impc, rmnce of all Staes aking the necessary measmes oerasure tha no caim shal lie at he instance of 8e Government of han. or mypersor or entity in hano or of persons or enliies designated pursuant o res,oluti(mt737 (2()06) and relaed tesolu/h}ns, or any person cla.iming through or for hebenefh of any such person or endly, ir connection with any contract or oherransacion where its performance was prevented by reason of he application of the

    provisions of resolulions !737 (2006), 1747 (20071. 1803 (20()g) 1929 (2()10)andthis resolution:

    30. D

  • S/2015/547

    Annex A: Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), Vienna,14 July 2015

    PREFACE

    The E3/EU+3 (China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the UnitedKingdom and the United States, wflh the High Representative of the EuropeanUnion for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy) and the Islamic Republic of lranwelcome this historic Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which wiltensure that Iran's nuclear programme will be exclusively peaceful, and mark afundame,ltal shif! in their approach o Ibis issue. They anticipate that fullimp!ementa|ion of this JCPOA will positively contribute to regional andinternational peace and security. Iran reaffirms that under no circumstances will hanever seek, develop or acquire any nuclear weapons.

    Iran envisions lhat this JCPOA will allow it to move lk)rward with an exclusivelypeaceful, indigenous nuclear programme, in line with scientific and economicconsiderations, in accordance witt the JCPOA, and with a view to buildingconfidence and encouraging international cooperation. In His context, the initialmutually determined limitations described in this JCPOA will be followed by agradual evolution, at a reasonable pace, of Iran's peaceful nuclear programme.including its enrichment activities, to a commercial programme for exclusivelypeaceful purposes, consistent with international non-proliferation norms.

    The E3/EU+3 envision that the implementation of this JCPOA will progressivelyallow them to gain confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran'sprogramme. The JCPOA reflects mutually determined parameters, consistent withpractical needs, with agreed limits on the scope of Iran's nuclear programme,including enrichment activities and R&D. The JCPOA addresses the E3iEU+3"sconcerns, .including through comprehensive measures providing for transparencyand verification.

    The JCPOA will produce the comprehensive lifting of al UN Security Councilsanctions as well as multilateral and national sanctions related to iran's nuclearprogramme, including sleps on access in areas of trade, technolo.gy, finance, andenergy.

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    PREAMBLE AND GENERAL PROVISIONS

    The Islamic Republic of 1ran and the E3/EU+3 (China, France. Germany fl-eRussian Federation .he Uni.ed Kingdom and the United S[a,es. wiff fl;e HighRepresemativc of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy)have decided upon flis k}ngderm Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action(JCPOA). This ]CPOA, reJlecing a sep-by-step includes thereciprocal commimems as laid down in His document and the annexes heretoand is o be endorsed by he United Nations (UN) SecuriU Council

    ii. The full implen)enufion of this JCPOA will ensure fl;e exclusiveJ}, pcacefu!naULre of han's nuclear 1orogramme.

    iii.

    V

    vii.

    viii.

    vi.

    i V.

    ]ran realfirms tism under no circumslances will Iran ever seek develop oracquire any nuclear weapons,

    Successfui implementation of dis ]CPOA will enable ]ran to fully enjoy itsright to nucIear energy for peaceful purposes under H-e rdevan articles of thenuclear Non-PrdiFcraion Treaty (NPT) in line with is obligations therein, andthe Iranian nuclear programme will be treated in the same manner as dlat ofany oher non-nuclear-weapon ate party lo the NPT.

    This JCPOA will produce the comprehensive lifting of all UN SecurhyCouncil sanctions as well as mu!tila{cral and national sargon.ions relaed {(han's nuclear prograli]llte, including seps on access in areas of trade,technology, finance and energy.

    The E3/EU+3 and Iran reaffirm their commitment to the purposes andprinciples el:the United Nations as set om in the UN Charer.

    The E3/EU+3 and lran acknowledge that the NPT remains he cornerstone of*.he nuclear non-proliferation regime and dae essential foundation for hepmsuit of nuclear disarmament and for tIe peaceful uses ('d" nuclear energy.

    The E3/EU+3 and lran commit R) implement dis JCPOA in good faith and in aconsruclive atmosphere, based on mutual respect, and to refrain from anyaction inconsistent wi[h the leucr, spiri and iment of {his JCPOA that wouldundermie is successful implementation. The EB/EU+3 will refrain fromimposing discriminatory regulatory arid procedural requirements in lieu of thesanctions and restrictive measures covered by His JCPOA. This JCPOA buildson the implcmenalion of le Joh!l P]atl of Action (JPOA) agreed in Geneva on24 November 2013.

    iX, A Joint Commission consisling of de E3/EU+3 and h-an will be established tomonitor de implemenuuh;n of Hlis ]CPOA and will carry out the functionsproxided [or in qais JCPOA, This Join Commission wi!I address issues arisingfl'om tl-c implemenmdon of tiffs JCPOA and will operate in accordance withthe provisions as deailed in de relevam annex.

    The International Aomic Energy Agency (tAEA) will be requested o monitorand verify the voluntary nuclear-related measures as detailed in this JCPOA.The IAEA will be requested to provide regular updates o H.e Board ofGovernors, and as provided for in this JCPOA, to de UN Secnriw Cou_ci[. Allrele',ant rules and regulations of de IAEA wifl regard o 1he pro.eclh)n ofinformation will be frilly observed by aI1 parties involved,

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  • $120151547

    xi. All provisions and measures contained in this JCPOA are only for the purposeof its implementatjon between E3/EU+3 and lran and should not be consideredas setting precedents for any, other state or for fundamental principles ofinternational law and the rights and obligations under ite NPT and otherrelevant instruments, as well as for internationally recognised principles andpractices.

    xii. Technical details of the implementation of this JCP()A are dealt with in theannexes to this document.

    XII1,

    X V.

    I.

    xiv.

    The EU and E3+3 countries and Dan, in the fi'amework of the JCPOA. willcooperate, as appropriate, in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy andengage in mutually determined civil nuclear cooperation projects as detailed inAnnex III. including through 1AEA involvement.

    The E3+3 will submit a draft resolution to the UN Security Council endorsingthis JCPOA affirming that conclusion of this JCPOA marks a fundamentalshift in its consideration of this issue and expressing its desire to build a newrelationship with Iran. This UN Security Council resolution will also providefor the termination on Implementation Day' of provisions imposed underprevious resolutions; establishment of specific restrictions: and conclusion ofconsideration of the lran nuclear issue by the UN Security Council 10 yearsafter the Adoption Day.

    The provisions stipulated in this JCPOA will be implemented for theirrespective durations as set forth below and detailed in the annexes.

    The E3/EU+3 and Iran will meet at the ministerial level every 2 years, orearlier if needed, in order to review and assess progress and to adoptappropriate decisions by consensus.

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    Iral ald E3/EU+3 will take the followitg votu!tary measures wfth#the timeflrame as detailed i this JCPOA a1d its Alexes

    NUCLEAR

    A ENRICHMENT, ENRICHMENT R&D, STOCKPILES

    1. Iran% long term plan includes ccrlain agreed limitados on ati uraniumenrichmem ad uranium enrichrnen-relaed activhies certainlimitations on specific research and developmen (R&D) activities for @e firs8 years, o be followed by g:adual evolution, at a reasonable pace, to @e rextsage of ]s enrichment acfix,]]es for exclusively peaccfuI purposes, asdescribed in Annex L ]ran will abide by its wquntary commiunems, asexpressed in its ow Rmg-/erm enrichment and emicbmem R&D plan t(; besubmitted as part of @c initial declaration for He Additional Pr(uocol o iran'sSafeguards Agreement.

    Iran will begin phasing out its IR-] centrifuges in l() years. Dmdng @is period,han il] keep its emichmem capaci{> at Nalanz 21 up o a ola] inslaHeduranium enNchmen capacib of 5060 IR-l centril%ges. Excess cen/rffuges andenrichment-related infrasuucture a Natgm7 witl be siored under AEAcon@uous monitoring, as specified in Aimex I.

    3.

    .

    6.

    ]]an will continue to conduc enrichment R&D in a manner that does m)1accunmlate enriched uranium, lran's emichment R&D wi@ uranium for10 years will only include IR-4, IR-5, IR-6 and ]R-S cenlrifuges as ]aid OtI! inAtmex I, and han will not engage in o@er isolope separation eclmologies orenrichment of uranium as specified in Annex I. Iran will continue testing iX-6and 1R-S centri[uges, and will commence lesting of up u> 30 IR-6 ad IR-Scenuifuges after eight and a half years, as deaiied in Annex ].

    As ]ran will be phasing om its ]R-1 centrifuges, it will not manufacture orassemble o@er centrifuges, except as provided for in Annex ], and >ill replacefailed centrifuges wi@ cen@l%ges of @e same type. Iran will manufactureadva,ced ccn@fuge machines only for @e purposes specified in this JCPOA.From @e end of @e eighth year, and as described in Annex l, han will siar tomarmfacturc agreed numbers of ]R-6 and ]R-S cenuqfuge madfines wi@ourotors and will s[ore all of @e manufactured machines al Natanz, under [AEAcontinuous monitoring until @ey are needed under han%enrichmem and enrichment R&D plan.

    Based on is own king-term plan, for 15 years, ban will carry out its uraniun]enrichmen{-rdated activities, including safeguarded R&D exclnsReb in @eNaanz Enr]chmem f'acili% keep its ]eve] of uranium enricbmen{ at up {o3.67q, and, a Fordow, refrain from any uranium enrichment and uraniumenrichment R&D and fron: t

  • S/2015/547

    other Jk}ur cascades with all associated infrastructure will remain idle. Allother centrifuges and enrichment-related infrastruclure will be removed andstored under IAEA continuous moniloring as specified in Annex I.

    7. During the 15 yea] period, and as h'an gradually moves to meet in!ernationalqualification standards for nuclear fuel produced in Iran. it will keep itsuranium stockpile under 300 kg of up to 3.67c, enriched uranium hexafluoride(UF6) or the equivalent in other chemical forms. The excess quantities are tobe sold based on international prices and delivered to the international buyer inreturn for natural uranium delivered to Iran, or are to be down-blended tonatural uranium level. Enriched uranium in fabricated fuel assemblies fromRussia or other sources for use in Iran's nuclear reactors will not be countedagainst the above stated 300 kg UF6 stockpile, if lhe crheria set out in Annex Iare met whh regard Io other sources. The Joint Commission will supportassistance to lran. includine throt>,h IAEA technical cooperation asappropriate, in meeling internalional qualification standards for nuclear fuclproduced in Iran. All remaining uranium oxide enriched lo between 59 and20/, will bc fabricalcd into fuel tkr the Tehran Research Reactor (TP, R). Anyadditional fuel needed for the TRR will be made available 1

  • S/20151547

    or reproeossing R&D activities ,o a spenl fue!reprocessin7 eapabilily, wi/h the solo e,eepti(m of n aclivities aimedexclusively al file production of mcdicaH and induslrial radhdsou)pes fromirradhded emqched uranium Jargets,

    Co TRANSPARENCY AND CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES

    13, Colsislent wifl fl_e respective roles of de Prcsiden and Majlis (ParliamenL]ran will provisionally apply de Additiorml Pro[ocol o its Comprehensivea -Safeguards Agreement in accordance with Article 17(b) of the AddifiomdProtocol, proceed wifl its ratification wifi?in the dmeflame as detailed inAnlex V and fully implement le modified Code 3.1 of theArrangemems toils Safeguards Agreement

    t4, han wilt fully implemem tl-e "Roadmap for Clarificalion of Pas and Present()mstandig Issue,V" agreed wifl fie tAEA. comaining allan.somewaYs toaddress pas ald preset issues of'eoncesx relating lo its nuclear programme asraised in de ampex .o lhe IAEA repo!l of g No,,,enlber !011 (GOV/2011165).Full implementation of aclh, ities undertaken under hc Roadnmp by }{ran willbe completed by 15 ()clober 2(115, and subsequenlIv the Director General willprovide by 15 December 2015 rise final assessmenl on the resolution of all pasand present outstanding issues to [he Board of Governors arid ll?e E3+3. intheir capacity as members of the Board of Gover,lors, will subni a resolutionto {le Board of Governors for Inking necessary aclhm, with a view to closingthe issue, without prejudice lo the competence of fle Board of Governors.

    15. Iran will allow tle IAEA lo monilor ffe implemenlation of ll]e voIurKarymeasures for fl-eh respective durations, as well as U implemem lransparencymeasures, as set ou in this JCPOA and its Asnexes, These measures include: a

    IAEA presece in han: ]AEA of uranium oreeonce,m'ale produced by ]ran from all uranium ore concentrate plants for25 years: comainment arid surveillace of centrifuge rotors and bellows for20 years; use of tAEA approved ad certified modern lechnologies includiIgon-line emichmem measurement and eteetr(mie seals; and a reliablen-cchaism to ensure speedy resolution of IAEA access concerns for 15 years,as defined i Annex I.

    16. han will not enoao-e in activities, includin al tte R&D level, thal couldcontribule to llse development of a nuclear cxpksive device, includinguranium or plulonium mela!lurgy ae/i\.'ilies, as specified in Ampex I.

    17. Dan will cooperate and acl in accordance with the procuremem ehannd in thisJCPOA, as detailed in Annex IV, endorsed by fle UN Sccurib' Councilresolution.

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    SANCTIONS

    /8. The UN Security Council resolution endorsing this JCPOA will lerminate allprovisions of previous UN Security Council resolutions on tile Iranian nuclearissue - 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), 1835 (2008),1929 (2010) and 2224 (2015) - simultaneously wilh the IAEA-verifiedimptemenlation of agreed nuclear-relaled measures by Iran and will establishspecific restrictions, as specified in Amaex V. l

    19. The EU will terminate all provisions of the gg Regulation, as subsequentlyamended, implementixg all nuclear-related economic and financial sanctions.including related designations, simultaneously with the IAEA-verifiedimplenaen{ation of agreed nuc!ear-related measures by h'an as specified inAnnex V, which cover all sanctions and resirictive measures in the followingareas, as described in Annex II:

    Transfers of funds belween EU persons and entities, including financialinstitutions, and Iranian persons and entities, including financia!institutions:

    ii. Banking activities, including the establishment of new correspondenlbanking relationships and the opening of new branches and subsidiariesof Iranian banks in the territories of EU Member Stales;

    iii. Provision of insurance and reinsurance:

    iv. Supply of spccialised financial messaging services, including SWIFT, forpersons and entities set out iF! Attachment 1 to Annex I[. including theCentral Bank of Iran and Iranian financial institutions:

    V, Financial support for trade with h-an (export credit, guarantees orinsurance):

    vi. Commitments for grants, financial assislance and concessiona! loans tothe Government of han:

    vii. Transactions in public or public-guaranteed bonds:

    viii. Import and transport of Iranian oil, petroleum products, gas andpetrochemical products;

    ix. Export of key equipment or technology for the oil, gas and petrochemicalsectors;

    x. Investment in the oil, gas and petrochemical sectors:

    xi. Export of key naval equipment and technology:

    xii. Design and construction of cargo vessels and oil tankers;

    xiii. Provision of flagging and classification services:

    xiv. Access to EU airports of Iranian cargo flights:

    xv. Export of gold, precious metals and diamonds;

    xvi. Delivery of Iranian banknotes and coinage:

    The provisions of this Resolution do nol constitute provisions of this JCPOA.

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    xvik Export of graphite, raw o semi-finished metals such as aluminum andseel and expo o sol]ware for inte.gratin$ indumrial processes:

    x,,iii. Designation of persons, entiHes and bodies (assd freeze and visa ban) setout in Attachment I o Annex H: and

    ix Associated services for each of the categories above

    2(L The EU will terminate aH provisions of @e El_] Regulmion irnplemendng allEU proliferation-related sarcdons, including reIacd designations, 8 years af]erAdoption Day or when the ]AEA has reached the Broader Conclusion that allnuclear ma.erhJ h [ran remains in peaceful acdNtics, whichever is eaNier.

    21. The United Smes wilt cease the application, and wit continue to do so, inaccordance with @is JCPOA o[ @e sanctions specified in Annex ]i o takeeff%ct imuJtaneously wi@ the IAEA-,,erified hnplementadon of rise agreednuclear-related measures by lran as specified [n Annex V. Such sanctions coverhe following areas as described h Annex H:

    Financial and banking transactions wi@ Iranian banks and ['inancialins@ufions as specified in Annex 1[I, indudhlg @c Centa) Bank of hanand specified individuals and entities identified as Government of han byrise Office of Foreign Assets Control on the Specially Designated Nationalsand Blocked Persons List (SDN List), as set om in Attachmem 3 oAnnex II (including tJe opening and main[emtnco

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    xiv. Trade in gold and other precious metals;

    xv. Trade with han in graphite, raw or semi-finished metals such asaluminum and steel, coal, and software for integrating induslrialprocesses;

    xvi. Sale. supply or lransfer of goods and services used in connection withIran's automotive sector:

    xvii. Sanctions on associated services for each of the categories above:

    xviii. Remove individuals and entilies set out in Attachment 3 to Annex II fromthe SDN List, the Foreign Sanctions Evaders List, and/or the Non-SDNlran Sanctions Act List: and

    xix. Terminate Executive Orders 13574. 13590, 13622, and 13645, andSections5 7and 15 of Execmive Order 13628.

    24.

    25.

    23.

    22. The United States will, as specified in Annex II and in accordance with Annex V.allow for the sale 1" commercial passenger aircraft and related parts and servicesto Iran: license non-U,S, persons that are owned or controlled by a U.S. personto engage in activities with Iran consistent with this JCPOA: and license theimportation into the United Slates of h'anian-origin carpets and foodstuffs.

    Eight years after Adoption Day or when the IAEA has reached the BroaderConclusion that all nuclear material in Iran remains in peaceful activities.whichever is earlier, the United Stales wilt seek such legislative action as maybe appropriate to terminate, or modify to effectuate the termination of, thesanctions specified in Annex 1I on the acquisition of nuclear-relatedcommodities and services for nuclear activities contemplated in this JCPOA.to be consistent with the U.S. approach to other non-nuclear-weapon statesunder the NPT.

    The E3/EU and the United States specify in Annex II a full and complete listof all nuclear-related sanctions or restriclive measures and will lift them inaccordance with Annex V. Annex II also specifies the effects of the lifting ofsanctions beginning on "Implementation Day". If at any time following theImplementation Day. lran believes that any other nuclear-related sanction orrestrictive measure o1" the E3iEU+3 is preventing the fu!l implementalion ofthe sanctions lifting as specified in this JCPOA, the JCPOA participant inquestion will consult with Iran with a view to resolving the issue and, if theyconcur that lifting of lhis sanction or restrictive measure is appropriate, theJCPOA participant in question wilt take appropriate action. If they are not ableto resolve the issue, Iran or any member of the E3/EU+3 may refer the issue tothe Joint Commission.

    If a law at the state or local level in the United States is preventing theimplementation of the sanctions lifting as specified in this JCPOA, the UnitedStates will take appropriate steps, taking into account all available authorities.with a view to achieving such implementation. The United States will activelyencourage officials at the slate or local level to lake inlo account the changesin the U.S. policy reflected in the lifting of sanctions under this JCPOA and torefrain from actions inconsistent with this change in policy.

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    26. The EU w[li refmin fom re-inx)duchsg o- rc.dmposing de sanctions Im[ ithas [ermhmted implemerfing under his ]CPOA whhou[ prejudice to thedispme resolution process provided for under dis JCPOA There will be nonew nuclear-related UN Sccurib, Council sanctions and no -ew EU nuclear-related sanctions or restrictive measures. The United Simon wilt make bcseft'errs in good f'aith o sustain this JCPOA and o prcvcm imerfeence wifl thercalisatk)n o[ fl-c [u]] bone[it by ]ran of the sanctions ]ifdng specified in AnneII The U.S. Administration, acting consistent with the respective rotes of thePresident and the Congress, will tel'rain from re-inlroducing o re-imposing thesanctions specified in Annex I] dsat it has ceased applying under finis JCP()A,without peiudice o de dispute resolution process provided I'o under thisJCP()A. The U.S Administration, acting consislent with file espeefive -oJes ofthe President and fie Congress, will efrain from imposing ,sew nuclear-relatedsanctions han has stated lha it will /rea! such a re-introduction o" re-imposition el he sanctions specified in Annex IL or such an imposition of newnuclear-related sanctions, as grounds o cease performing its comn-drnentsunder {Isis ]CPOA in whole or in pro1.

    27 The ES/EU+3 will take adequate administrafi',e and reguatot'y measures mensure clarib' and d'f'ecfivcness wi8 espect to fle litring of sanctums underflis ]CP()A The EU and its Member Staes as well us de Uni*,ed Sta[es witlissue relevant guidelines and make publicly accessible statements on tledetails of sanctions or restrictive measures which have been lifted under dds]CPOA. The EU and im Member States and _he [_!,sited Staes commit oconsuh with ]ran regarding he contem of such guidelines and smtcmems, on aregular basis and whenever appropriate.

    28.

    29.

    30,

    The E3/EU+3 and han commfl to impJement this JCPOA in good faith and in aconsruclive ammsphere, based on mutual respect, and {o refrain from anyaclion inconsisiem wilh rise le!ter, spirh and in!era of 4is ]CPOA dml wou$dundermine its successful implementation. Senior Government officials of IheE3/EU+3 and h-an will make ex.ery eft'on m supporl l-e successfulimplementation of this ]CPOA includ[n

  • SI2015/547

    infringements of such sanctions may be reviewed in accordance wilhapplicable national laws.

    31. Consistent with the timing specified in Annex V, the EU and ils Member Slateswill terminate the implemenlation of the measures applicable to designatedeniities and individuals, including the Central Bank of Iran and other Iranianbanks and financial institulions, as detailed in Annex I! a0d the attachmentsthereto. Consistent wilh fhe timing specified in Annex V, the United Stales wil!remove designation of certain enlities and individuals on the SpeciallyDesignated Nationals and Blocked Persons List, and entities and individualslisted on the Foreign Sanctions Evaders List, as detailed in Annex II and thealtachments lhereto.

    32. EU and E3+3 countries and inlernational participants will engage in .ioinlprojects wilh Iran, including fhrough IAEA technical cooperation pro iecls, inthe field of peaceful nuclear technology, including nuclear power plants,research reaclors, fuel fabrication, agreed .joint advanced R&D such as fusion,establishment of a state-of-the-arl regional nuclear medical centre, personneltraining, nuclear safety and securily, and environmental proleclion, as detailedin Annex 1II. They will take necessary measures, as appropriate, for theimplementation of hese projects.

    33. The E3iEU+3 and Dan will agree on steps to ensure Iran's access in areas oftrade, technology, finance and energy. The EU will further explore possibleareas lk)r cooperation between the EU. its Member States and Iran, and in thiscontext consider the use of available instruments such as export credits tofacililate trade, pro iect financing and inveslmenl in Iran.

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    IMPLEMENTA T1ON PLAN

    34. has and the E3/EU+3 ,,ill inplement heir JCPOA eornmimens according totlse sequence specified in Annex V. The milestones lor impkuemadon are asfollows:

    FinaXsaion Day is de dae on which neootiadons of dsis JCPOA areconcluded among de E3!EU+3 and Irart, u be followed pompl]y bysubmission of de resolmion endorsing his ]CP()A o the UN SecurityCouncil for adoption wihom de!ay.

    ii. Adoption Day is the date 90 days after the endorsement o this ]CP()Aby the UN Security Council, or such earlier dale as may be determinedby mmua] consent of the JCPOA participanu% at which time his JCPOAand the commitmen[s in this ]CPOA come into cffuct. Beginning on thatdate, JCPOA participants will make necessary arrangements andpreparations for the inplementation of their JCPOA cumnitments

    iii. h-nplcmentation Da\, is the date on which, simultaneously with de ]AEAreport \.erifying impJenenation by h-an of the nuclear-related measuresdescribed in Sections 15.1. to 15.1I of Annex V, the EU and de UnitedStates lake the actions described in Sections i6 and 17 of Annex Vrespectively and in accordance with the UN Security Council resolutiomdae actions described in Section I8 of Annex V occur at the UN los, el.

    Transition Day is the date 8 years after Adoption Day or tI-e dae onwhich the Director General of the ]AEA submits a report stating t!at thetAEA has reached the Broader Conclusion that all nuctear maeriaI inIran remains in peaceful activities, whichexer is canter. ()n that date, theEU and the United Sates will take the actions described in Sections 20and 21 of Annex V respectivdy and h'an will seek consistent with theConstitmional roles of the President and PaNiamen< ratilication of theAdditional Protocol.

    V, UN Security Council resolution Termination Day is d?e date on which theUN Securib, Council resolution endorsing this JCPOA terminatesaccording to its terms which is to be ]0 years from Adoption Day,provided that the provisions of previous reso]mions have not beenreinstmed. On tha{ date. the EU will {ake the actions described inSection 25 of Annex V.

    35. The sequence and milestones set ford aboxe and in Annex V arc withoutprejudice to the duration of JCPOA commitments sta{ed in this JCP()A.

    DISPUTE RESOLUTION MECHANISM

    36. If han believed that an or aH of the E3/EU+3 were no meeting theircommitments under this ]CP()A, Iran could re%r the issue to the JuimCommission for resoludon: similarb,< if any of the E3!EU+3 bdi e,,ed hat Iranwas no meeting its eomnhments mder this JCPOA. any of the E3/EU+3could do he same. The Joint Commission would have 15 days to resohe theissue, unless the time period was extended by consetlsus, After JointCommission consideration, any paHicipanl could retkr the issue o Ministers ofForeign Affairs, if it believed the comp!iance issue had ot been resoh'ed.

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    Ministers would have 15 days to resolve the issue, unless the time period wasextended by consensus. After Joint Commission consideration - in parallelwith (or in lieu of) review at the Ministerial le,el - either the complainingparticipant or tile participant whose performance is in question could requestthat the issue be considered by an Advisory Board. which would consist ofthree members (one each appointed by the participants in the dispute and athird independent member). The Advisory Board should provide a non-bindingopinion on the compliance issue within !5 days. If, after this 30-day processthe issue is not resolved, the Joint Commission would consider the opinion ofthe Advisory Board for no more than 5 days in order to resolve the issue. If theissue still has not been resolved to the satisfaction of the complainingparticipant, and if the complaining participant deems the issue to constitutesignificant non-performance, then that participant could treat the unresolvedissue as grounds to cease performing its commitments under this JCPOA inwhole or in part and/or notify the UN Security Council that it believes theissue constitutes significant non-performance.

    37. Upon receipt of the notification from {he complaining participant, as describedabove, including a description of the good-faith efforts the participant made toexhaust tte dispute resolution process specified in this JCPOA, the UNSecurity Council, in accordance with its procedures, shall vote on a resolutionto continue the sanctions lifting. If the resolution described above has nol beenadopted within 30 days of tile notification, then the provisions of the old UNSecurity Council resolutions would be re-imposed, unless the UN SecurityCouncil decides otherwise. In such event, these provisions would not applywith retroactive effect to contracts signed between any party and 1ran orIranian individuals and entities prior to tile date of application, provided tllatthe activities contemplated under and execution of such contracts areconsistent with this JCPOA and the previous and current UN Security Councilresolutions. The UN Security Council, expressing its intention to prevent thereapplication of the provisions if the issue giving rise to the notification isresolved within this period, intends to take into account the views of the Statesinvolved in the issue and any opinion on the issue of the Advisory Board. hanhas stated that if sanctions are reinstated in whole or in part, Iran will treat thatas grounds to cease performing its commitments under this JCPOA in whole orin part.

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    JCPOA Annex I - Nudearordated measures

    As GENERAL

    The sequence of implementation of {he corrimiurents deaited in @is Annex isspecified iri Annex V o @e Joint Compreherisive Plari el: Aclion (JCPOA).Uicss otherwise specified, @e durations of @e commi{melus in dfis Annexarc from Implerienlafion Day.

    B ARAK HEAVY WATER RESEARCH REACTOR

    2. l-ran wiI1 modernise @e Arak heavy water research reacor {o suppor peacefulnuclear research and radioisotopes production for medical and hdus{rialpurposes, lran will redesign and rebuild @e reac!or based on @e agreedconceptual design (as at{ached 1o @is Annex) o supper{ is peaceful nuclearresearch and production needs arid purposes including testing of fuel pins andassembly proo{ypes and struc{uraJ materials, The design wi] be such as tomirdmise @e producthm of pJt4oriium and no o produce weapon-gradeplmonium in normal operafiori. The power of the redesigned reactor will rioexceed 20 MW@. The ES/EU+3 and Iran share @e understanding @at @eparameters in the conceptual desi,n, _ are ,ubiec, to possible and necessaryadjusmems in devdoping @e final design while fully preserving @e above-mentioned purposes and principles of modernisafion.

    . Iran will no{ pursue construction a[ @e exfs@sg unfimshed reacRr based on itsoriginal desion and will remove {he exisfim, calaridria and retain it in Iran. ThecalandNa will be made inoperable by filling any openings in @e calandria wi@coricr@c such that tile IAEA can verif} @at il will not be usable lbr a furoreriuclear application. M redesigning and eco,sUucfing of @e modernized Arakheavy waer research reacor, han will maxbise @e use el existinginflastructure already installed at he curren Arak research reactor.

    4. Iran will u@e @e leadership role as {he owner and as @e projec manager, andhave responsibili%, for overall implementation of @e Arak modernisationpro iccR x,i@ EB/EU+3 participants assuming responsibilities regarding @emodernisafion of @e Arak reacur as described in this Annex. A WorkingGroup composed of E3iEU+3 parlicipams will be established to faciliale @eredesigriirig and rebuilding of @e reacRm An international partnershipcomposed of tran and 1.he Working Group would implement the Arakmodernisafion projecu The Working Group could be enlarged o include @hercountries by consensus of he participaris of @e Working Group and Iran.E3/EU+3 parficipan{s and h'an wiJ! conclude an officia] doeumenl expressing@eir srong commitments o @e Arak modernisafion project in advance of]mplemenafio Day which would provide an assured pa@ forward omodernise the reacor arid would define @e responsibilities assumed by @eE3iEU+3 paricipari{s, arid subsequetltly com'racts wo@d he cow, eluded. Theparticipants of the Working Group will provide assistance needed by Iran forredesignirig and rebuilding @e reac{or, consistent wi@ their respective m4ionallaws, iri such a mariner as lo enable the safe and timely conslrucfiori aridcommissioning of @e modernised reactor.

    5. Iran and the Working Group wiI! cooperae o develop @e l'inal design el" @emoderriised reacor arid @e desfgri of the subsidiary laboratories .o be carried

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    out by Iran, and review conformity with international safely slandards, suchthat the reactor can be licensed by the relevanl Iranian regulatory authority forcomnaisshming and operation. The final design of the modernised reactor andthe design of the subsidiary laboratories will be submitlcd to the JointCommission. The Joint Commissh>n will aim to complete its review andendorsement within three months after the submission of the final design. Ifthe Joint Commission does not complete its review and endorsement withinthree months, h'an could raise the issue (hrou,he the dispute resolutionmechanism envisaged by this JCPOA.

    6 The 1AEA will monitor the construction and report to the Working Group forconfirmation that the construction of the modernised reactor is consistent withthe approved final design.

    7.

    ,

    10.

    As the project manager, Iran will take responsibility for the constructionefforts. E3/EU+3 parties will, consistent with theil" national laws, takeappropriate administrative, legal, technical, and regulatory measures tosupport co-operation.

    E3/EU+3 parties will support the purchase by lran, Ihe lransfer and supply ofnecessary materials, equipment, instrumentation and control systems andtechnologies required for the construction of the redesigned reactor, throughthe mechanism established by this JCP()A, as well as through exploration ofrelevant funding contributions.

    E3!EU+3 parties wilt also support and facilitate the timely and safeconstruction of the modernized Arak reactor and its subsidiary laboratories,upon request by Iran, through IAEA technical cooperation if appropriate,including but not limited lo technical and financial assistance, supply ofrequired materials and equipment, state-of-the-art inslrumemation and controlsystems and equipment and support for licensing and authorization.

    The redesigned reactor will use up to 3.67 percent enriched uraniurn in theform of UO2 with a mass of approximately 350 kg of UO2 in a full core load,with a fuel design to be reviewed and approved by the Joint Commission. Theinlernational partnership with the participation of Iran will fabricate the initialfuel core load for the reactor outside lran. The international partnership willcooperate with Dan, including through technical assistance, to fabricate, testand license fuel fabrication capabilities in Iran tkr subsequent fuel core reloadsfor future use with this reactor. Destructive and non-destructive testing of thisfuel including Post-Irradiation-Examination (PIE) will take place in one of {heparticipating countries outside of lran and that country will work with Dan tolicense the subsequent fuel fabricated in Iran for the use in the redesignedreactor under IAEA monitoring.

    Iran will not produce or test natural uranium pellets, fuel pins or fuelassemblies, which are specifically designed for the support of the originallydesigned Arak reactor, designated by the IAEA as IR-40. Dan will slore underIAEA continuous monitoring all existing natural uranium pellets and IR-40fuel assemblies until the modernised Arak reactor becomes operational, atwhich point these natural uranium pellets and IR-40 fuel assemblies will beconverted to UNH, or exchanged with an equivalent quantity of naturaluranium. Iran will make the necessary technical modifications to the natural

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    uraMurn fuel production process line tha was intended to supply fuel for {heIR-40 reactor design, such dat i can he used %r the fabricaior of /he fuelrdoads for rise modernised Arak reactor.

    tl. All spent fuel from tte redesigned Arak reaetor regardless of its origin, for fhelifetime ,q" the reactor, will be shipped out of Jhan o a mutually deterrrdscdlocation in E3/EU+3 countries or .hi]d countries, for fmlher treatment ordxposhion as provided for is l-elevast contracts [o be concluded, consistentwith national laws. ,s.id the party, wiflin one year from theunloadhg from rise reactor or whenever deemed to be safe for transfer by therecipient co,4nlrv.

    ]ran w}H submit the D]Q of the redesigned reactor o /he IAEA which wiiinclude information on file planned radio-isotope production and reacoroperation programme. The reactor will be operated m-der ]AEA monitoring.

    13. Iran will operate tile Furl Manufacturing Plan only to produce fueI a;sembliesfor light water reactors and reloads for fle modernixed Arak reactor.

    C HEAVY WATER PRODUCTJON PLANT

    14. All excess heavy water which is beyond han's needs for fle modernised Arakresearch reactor, the Zero power heavy water reactor, quanfiiies needed formedicM research and production of deu{erate solutions and chemicalcompounds including, where appropriate, contingency stocks, will be madeavailable for export to fle hternational market based (m mernafioia[ pricesand delixered to tle international buyer for t5 years. Iran's needs, consistemwith the parameters above, are estimated to be 131) metric onnes of nucleargrade v, ater or iis equivalent in different emichmems prior k}commissioning of the modernised Arak research reactor, and 90 rnelric tonnesal]er the corriniissioning including the anmmt contah]ed in i.l]e reactor.

    15. ]ran will inform file IAEA about de hp,'entory and the production of leHWPP and wilt allow rile IAEA re monitor tIe quantifies of ,to heavy waterstocks and tile amount of heavy >ater produced, including flsrough [AEAvisits, as requested, to fle HWPP

    D OTHER REACTORS

    16.

    7.

    Consistent with its plan, h-an wil! keep pace \v]th the uend of internationaltechnological advancement in relying only on light water for its fmure nuclearpower and research reactors with enhanced international cooperationassurances of supply of necessar3 fuel,

    han intends to ship out all spent fuel for all future and present nuclear powerand research reactors, for further treatment or disposition as presided for inrelevam contracts to be concluded consistent >ith national laws >[th flerecipien path",

    E. SPENT FUELREPROCESSING ACTIVITIES

    !S, For 15 years ]ran will oL and does not intend to flereaf{er, engage in anyspent fuel reprocessing or speit fuel reprocessing R&D activities, For deepro'pose of this annex, spoilt fuel incIudes al] Wpes of irradial.ed I:teI.

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    19. For 15 years Iran will not, and does not intend to thereafter, reprocess spentfuel except for irradiated enriched uranium targets for production of radio-isotopes for medical and peaceful industrial purposes.

    20. For 15 years han will not, and does not intend to thereafter, develop, acquireor build facilities capable of separation of plutonium, uranium or neptuniumfrom spenI fuel or tom fertile targets, other |ban for production of radio-isotopes for medical and peaceful industrial purposes.

    21

    23.

    25.

    26.

    24.

    22.

    For 15 years, Dan will only develop, acquire, build, or operate hot cells(containing a cell or interconnected cells), shielded ce]ls or shielded gloveboxes with dimensions less {han 6 cubic meters in volume compatible with thespecifications set out in Annex I of the Additional Protocol, These will be co-located with the modernised Arak research reactor, the Tehran ResearchReactor, and radio-medicine production complexes, and only capable of theseparation and processing of industrial or medical isotopes and non-deslrucivePIE. The needed equipment will be acquired through the procurementmechanism established by this JCPOA. For !5 years, Iran wilt develop,acquire, build, or operate hot cells (containing a cell or interconnected cells),shielded cells or shie]ded glove boxes with dimensions beyond 6 cubic metersin voJume and specifications set out in Annex ] of the Additional Protocol,only after approval by the Joint Commission,

    The E3iEU+3 are ready to facilitate all of the destructive and non-deslructiveexaminations on fuel elements and/or fuel assembly prototypes including PIEfor all fuel fabricated in or outside Iran and irradiated in h'an, using theirexisting facilities outside Iran. Except for t!le Arak research reactor complex.lran will not develop, build, acquire or operate hot cells capable of performingPIE or scek to acquire equipment to build/develop such a capability, for15 years.

    For 15 years, in addition to continuing current fuel testing activities at theTRR, Iran will undertake non-destructive post irradiaIion examination (PIE) offuel pins, fuel assembly prototypes and structural malerials. Theseexaminations will be exclusively at the Arak research reactor complex.However, the E3/EU+3 wilt make available their facilities to conductdestructive testing with Iranian specialists, as agreed. The hot cells at the Arakresearch reactor in which non-destructive PIE are performed will not bephysically interconnected to cells that process or handle materials for theproduction of medical or industrial radioisotopes.

    For 15 years, Iran will not engage in producing or acquiring plutonium oruranium metals or their alloys, or conducting R&D on plutonium or uranium(or their alloys) metallurgy, or casting, forming, or machining plutonium oruranium metal,

    Iran will not produce, seek, or acquire separated plutonium, highly enricheduranium (defined as 20(/ or greater uranium-235), or uranium-233, orneptunium-237 (except for use as laboratory standards or in instruments usingneptunium-237) for 15 years.

    If Dan seeks to initiate R&D on uranium metal based TRR fuel in small agreedquantities after 10 years and before 15 years, lran will present its plan to, andseek approval by, the Joint Commission.

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    Fo ENRICHMENT CAPACITY

    27. lratl willmaehhsescurrently10 years.

    28 ]{ran will15 years.

    keep its enrichmem capacity at no more Ilat 506(} IR-I centrifugein no more tJlaI1 30 cascades il heh current configuratiolls hioperating mlits at flit Natarz Fuel Etsrichmen Pa (FEP) for

    keep its level of uranium esrichmel a up o 367 percem for

    29. ]ran will remove rise followin excess cemrifu,es and infrastructure n(associaled witl 5060 IR-i ccrifuges il FEP, which will be stored at Naturalila Hal B of FEP urder AEA c

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    36.

    37.

    h'an will test a single IR-5 centrifuge machine for 10 years.

    h'an will continue testing of the IR-6 on single centrifuge machines and itsintermediate cascades and will commence testing of up to 30 centrifugemachines from one and a halt" years before tile end of year 10. Iran willproceed from single centrifuge machines and small cascades to intermediatecascades in a h)gical sequence.

    38.

    39.

    42.

    43.

    41.

    40.

    Iran will commence, upon start of implementation of the JCPOA, testing of theIR-8 on single centrifu*,e machines and its intermediate cascades and willcommence the testing of up to 30 centrifuges machines from one and a halfyears before the end of year 10. Iran will proceed from single centrifuges tosmall cascades to intermediate cascades in a logical sequence.

    For 10 years, Dan, consistent with the established practice, will recombine theenriched and depleted streams from the IR-6 and IR-8 cascades through theuse of welded pipework on withdrawal main headers in a manner thatprecludes Ihe wifldrawat of enriched and depleted uranium materials andverified by the IAEA.

    For 15 years, Iran will conduct all testing of centrifuges with uranium only atthe PFEP. Iran will conduct all mechanical testing of centrifuges only al thePFEP and the Tchran Research Centre.

    For tile purpose tel" adapting PFEP to the R&D activities in Hae cm-ichment andenrichment R&D plan. Dan will remove all centrifuges except those needed fortesting as described in the relevant paragraphs above, except for tile IR-1cascade (No. 1) as described below. For file full IR-I cascade (No. 6), Iran willmodify associated intastructure by removing UF6 pipework, includingsub-headers, valves and pressure transducers at cascade level, and frequencyinverters. The IR-I cascade (No. 1) centrifuges will be kept but madeinoperable, as verified by the IAEA, through the removal of centrifuge rolorsand the injection of epoxy resin into the sub headers, feeding, product, andtails pipework, and the removal of controls and electrical systems for vacuum,power and cooling. Excess centrifuges and infrastructure will be stored atNatanz in Hall B of FEP under IAEA continuous monitoring. The R&D spacein line No. 6 will be left empty until Iran needs to use it for its R&Dprogramme,

    Consislent with the activities in the enrichment and enrichment R&D plan,han will maintain the cascade infrastructure for testing of single centrifugesand small and intermediate cascades in two R&D lines (No. 2 and No. 3) andwill adapt two other lines (No. 4 and No. 5) with infrastructure similar to thatfor lines No. 2 and No. 3 in order to enable future R&D activities as specifiedin this JCPoA. Adaptation will include modification of all UF6 pipework(including removal of all sub headers except as agreed as needed for the R&Dprogramme) and associated instrumentation to be compatible will1 singlecentrifuges and small and intermediate cascade testing instead of full scaletesting.

    Consistent with its plan and internationally established practices, Iran intendsto continue R&D on new types of centrifuges through computer modelling andsimulations, including at universities. For any such project to proceed to a

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    prototype stage for mechanical leming wiflin lO years, a fu!l presentation Ruand approval b}< @e Joim Commission is needed

    He FORDOW FUEL ENRgCHMENT PLANT

    44. The Fordow Fuel Emqchment Ham (FFEP) will be converted into a nuclear,and echnology centre and ]mernafional collaboration will be

    encouraged in areas of research. The Joim Commission will beirq'ormed in advance o[ @e specific projects that will be undertaken a Fordow.

    45. Iran wi!l no[ conduc any uranium enricbmem or any masium cnrichmcmrehned R&D and will have no nuclear maleriat m @e Fordow Furl EnrichmcnPlant (FFEP) for 15 years.

    46, For 15 years, h-an will maimain no more than 1044 IR-1 centrifuge machinesat one wing of rise FFEP of which:

    46.1. Two cascade,' @al have not experienced UF6 before will be rood!tied for@e production of stable isotopes. The uansidon o stable isotopeproduction of @ese cascades at VFEP will be vonducled in ,iohvpartnership between the Russian Federation and [ran on @e basis ofarrangements to be mutualb, agreed upon. To prepare @cse two cascadesfor installation of a new cascade architecRre appropriate or sableisoupe production by rise ,iuint partnership tran v, ilI rernove riseconnection to he UF6 feed main header, and move cascade UF6pipework (except for @e dump line in order to maimain vacuum) mstorage in Fordow under IAEA cominuous monhoring. The AimCommission will bc informed about @e concepma! framework of stableisotope production at FFEP.

    46.2. For four cascades wkh all associated in!'ras[rucmre remaining except forpipework flsat enaNes rosso,,er tandern connections, wo will be placedin an idle smL not spinnino,. The other txo cascades will continue tospin until the tra?sifion to stable isotope production, described in theprevious subparagraph has been completed. Upon comNefion of risetratsition t( stable isotope production described in @e prexioussubparagraph, these two spinning cascades will be placed in an idle stae,not spinning,

    47. Iran wil!:

    47.l,remove the other 2 cascades of IR-] cen[rifuges from @is wing byremoving all cemrifuges and cascade UF6 pipcwork, includingsub-headers, valves and pressure transducers a cascade level, and

    frequency inverers.

    47.2. also subsequently remove cascade electrica] caning, individual cascadecontrol cabincls and vacuum pumps. All @ese excess centrifuges andhfrastructure will be mored at Namnz in Hall B of FEP under IAEAcontinuous monitoring.

    4S, Iran wil!:

    48. t.remove all excess aml uranium enrichmem rehnedin'rasructure from @e o@er wing of @e FFEP. This wil! include removal

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    of all centrifuges and UF6 pipework, including sub headers, valves andpressure gauges and transducers, and frequency inverters and converlers.and UF6 feed and withdrawal stations.

    49.

    48.2. also subsequently remove cascade electrical cabling, individual cascadecontrol cabinets, vacuum pumps and centrifuge mounting blocks. Allthese excess centrifu,,es and infrastructure will be stored at Natanz inHall B of FEP under IAEA continuous monitoring.

    Centrifuges from the four idle cascades may be used for the replacement offailed or damaged centrifuges in stable isotope produclion al Fordow.

    50. han will limit its stable isotope production activities with gas cenlrifuges tolhe FFEP for 15 years and will use no more than 348 IR-1 centrifuges for theseactivities at the FFEP. The associated R&D activities in Iran will occur at theFFEP and aI Iran's declared and monitored centrifuge manufacturing facilities['or esting, modification and balancing these IR-1 cemrifuges.

    51. The IAEA will establish a baseline for the amount of uranium legacy from pastenrichment operations that will remain in Fordow. Iran will permit the 1AEAregular access, including daily as requested by the IAEA. access {o the FFEPin order to monitor Iran's production o[" stable isotopes and the absence ofundeclared nuclear maleriat and activities at the FFEP for 15 years.

    I. OTHER ASPECTS OF ENRICHMENT

    52. Iran will abide by its voluntary commitments as expressed in its own long termenrichment and enrichment R&D plan to be submitted as part of the initialdeclaration described in Article 2 of the Additional Pro|ocol.: The IAEA willconfirm on an annual basis, for lhe duration of the plan that the nature andscope and scale of h'an's enrichment and enrichment R&D activities are in linewith this plan.

    54

    55,

    53. Iran will start to install necessary infraslructure for the IR-8 at Natanz in HallB of FEP after year 10.

    An agreed template for describing different centrifuge types (IR-1. 1R-2m, 1R-4,IR-5, IR-6, ][R-6s, IR-7. IR-8) and lhe associated definitions need to beaccomplished by implementation day.

    An agreed procedure for measuring IR-1. IR-2m and IR-4 centrifugeperformance data needs to be accomplished by implementation day.

    J. URANIUM STOCKS AND FUELS

    56.

    57.

    lran will maintain a lotal enriched uranium stockpile of no more than 300 kgof up to 3.67c/ enriched uranium hexafluoride (or the equivalent in differentchemical forms) for 15 years.

    All enriched uranium hexafluoride in excess of 300 kg of up to 3.679enriched UF6 (or the equivalent in different chemical forms) will be downblended to natural uranium level or be sold on the internationa! market anddelivered to the international buyer in return for natural uranium delivered to

    : lran will permit the IAEA Io share the content of the enrichment and enrichment R&D plan. assubmitted as parl of the initial declaration, with the Joint Commission participants.

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    Iran [ran will eter isle a commercial contract with an entity outside han forthe purchase and transfer of its enriched uranium stockpile in excess of 300 kgUP6 in return for na[ura[ uranium delivered to lran. The E3/EU+3 willfacititaL where applicable, /he conclusion and o hiscontract. ]ran may choose to seek o sell excess enriched urahfulss [o he IAEAfuel bank in Kazakhstan wher [lie fuel bank becomes operational.

    58. All urankus oxkte enriched .o between 5% and 20/ wilt be fabNcaed imofuel plates for the Tehran Research Reactor or wansferred, based on acommercia! ransacion, omside of ]ran or dilu[ed [o an enrichment level ol3.67G or ess. Scrap oxide and other R}rms not in plates ha cannot befabricated into TRR fue plaes will he ransferred, based o a commercialransacdon, outside oflran or diluled to an enrichmem level of 3.d7g/ or less.In case of [:uure supply of I9.75% enriched uraniun-t oxide (U3OS) for TRRfuel pJaes fabrieadom all scrap oxide and o.her forms not in piates dial cannotbe fabrica{ed imo TRR fuel pates, comaining uranium enriched Io between5g and 2(}g, will be transferred, based on a commercial transaction, outsideof ]ran or dib{ed {o an enrichment level of" 3.67/ or less wi{hin 6 months ofits producNon. Scrap plaes will be {ransl'erred, based on a comrnercia{ransacdon. ou{side lran. The commercial transactions should be slruclured {(}return an equivalent amoun of naRHat uranium .O han. For 15 years, ]ran wilInot build or operate facilities for converting fuel plates or scrap back o UP6.

    59. Russian designed, fabricated and licensed fuel a,;sembies for use in Russian-supplied reac[ors in h'an do not cou,W against the 300 kg UF6 s{ockpiie timil,Enriched uranium in fabricated fue! assemblies flom other sources omside ofhan for use in Iran's nuclear research and power teat!ors, including thosewhich wili be 'abricatcd omside of h-an for the ini{ial fuel toad of themodernised Arak research reactor, which are certit'icd by lhe fuel supplier andhe appropria{e Iranian atHhority {o meet imernationan standards, will no{ count

    against the 300 kg UF6 stockpile HmiR The Joint Commission will establish aTechnical Working Group with he goal of enabling fuel to be fabricated inh'an hile adhering to he agreed sockpile parameters (300 kg of up to 3.67 5enriched UF6 or 1he equivalent in different chemical forms). This TechnicalWorkig Group will alSOo within one )'ca,. work o develop objective technicacriteria for assessing whether fabricated fuel and hs imermediate producs canbe readily convened to UF6. Enriched uranium in fabricated fuel assembliesand ils imermediae products manufactured in ]ran and cerufied 1o meeimernadonaI standards, including hose for the modernised Arak researchreactor will no[ count against the 300 kg UF6 stockpile limit provided IheTechnical Working Group o[de Join Commission approves hat such fuelassemblies and their intermediale products cannot be readily reconvered imoUF6. This could for instance be achieved hrough impurities te.g. burnablepoisons or otherwise) contained in fuels or {hrough the fuel being in achemical form such that direct conversion back o UF6 would be technicallydifficult widHmt dissolution and purification. The objecuve technical criteriawil! guide tle approval process of he Technical Working Group. The [AEAwill m,,mhor he fuel fabrication process [or any fue! produced h lran to verifyha tle fuel and imermedhHe producs comport with he fuel fabNcaiou

    process that was approved by the Technica! Working Group. The .JointCommission will able support assistance lo ]ran including through IAEA

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  • S/2015/547

    technical cooperation as appropriate, in meeting international qualificationstandards for nuclear fuel produced by [ran.

    60. Iran will seek to enter into a commercial contract with entities outside Iran forthe purchase of fuel for tile TRR and enriched uranium targets. The E3/EU+3will facilitate, as needed, the conclusion and implementation of this contract.In the case of lack of conclusion of a contract with a fuel supplier, E3/EU+3will supply a quantity o[" 19.75(} enriched uranium oxide (U308) and deliverto h'an, exclusively for the purpose of fabrication in Iran of fuel for the TRRand enriched uranium targets for the lifetime of the reactor. This 19.75%enriched uranium oxide (U308) will be supplied in increments no greater thanapproximately 5 kg and each new increment wilt be providcd only when theprevious increment of this material has been verified by the 1AEA to havebeen mixed with aluminum to make fuel for the TRR or fabricated intoenriched uranium targets. Dan wilt notify the E3/EU+3 within 2 year beforethe contingency of TRR fuel will be exhausted in order to have the uraniumoxide available 6 months before the end of the 2 year period.

    K. CENTRIFUGE MANUFACTURING

    61. Consistent with its enrichment and enrichment R&D plan, lran will onlyengage in production of centrifuges, including centrifuge rolors suitable forisotope separation or any other centrifuge componems, to meet lhe enrichmentand enrichment R&D requirements of this Annex.

    62. Consistenl with its plan, Iran will use the stock of IR-I centrifuge machines instorage, which are in excess of the remaining 5060 IR-t centrifuges in Natanzand the [R-I cenlrifuges installed at Fordow, for the replacement of failed ordamaged machines. Whenever during the 10 year period IYom the slart of theimplementation of the JCPOA. the level of stock of IR-I machines falls to 500or below. Iran may maintain this level of stock by resuming production of IR-!machines at a rate up to the average monthly crash rate without exceeding thestock of 500.

    63. Consistent with its plan, at the end of year 8, lran will cormnencemanufacturing of IR-6 and IR-8 centrifuges without rotors through year 10 at arate of up to 200 centrifuges per year for each type. After year 10. Iran wiltproduce complele centrifuges with the same rate to meet its enrichment andenrichment R&D needs. Iran wilt store them at Natanz in an above groundlocation, under IAEA continuous monitoring, until they arc needed for finalassembly according to the enrichment and enrichment R&D plan.

    L. ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL AND MODIFIED CODE 3.1

    64. Iran will notify the IAEA of provisional application of the Additional Protocolto its Safeguards Agreement in accordance wilh Article 17(b) of the AdditionalProtocol pending its entry into force, and subsequently seek ratification andentry into force, consistent with the respective roles of the President and theMajlis (Parliament).

    65. Iran will notify Ihe IAEA that it will fully implement the Modified Code 3.1 ofthe Subsidiary Arrangement to Iran's Safeguards Agreement as long as theSafeguards Agreement remains in force.

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    Mo PASTAND PRESENT ISSUES OF CONCERN

    66, han a, il] compiete all acd\,'ides as set ou/ in paragraphs 2 4, 5, and 6 of he"Roadmap for Carificadon of Pas and Presem ()mstanding Issues", asverified by @e ]AEA in its regular updates by @e Dhecor General of @eIAEA on the implementation of @is Roadrnap.

    N MODERN TECHNOLOGIES AND LONG TERM PRESENCE OF 1AEA

    67 For @e purpose of increasing the efficiency of monitoring for @is JCPOA, 'or15 years or longer, t:or @e specified verification measures:

    67.1. han will permi @e IAEA the use of on-line enrichment measurememand elecuonic scab; which communicate their status wi@in nuclear sitesto ]AEA inspectors, as welt as o@er AEA approved and certifiedmodern cchnologies in line wi@ internationally accep[ed IAEA practice.[ran will t'acilhae aulorna.ed collection of tAEA measurementrecordings registered by installed measurement devices and sending mtAEA working space in individua! nuclear si*es.

    67.2. [ran will make @e necessary arrangements to al!ow for a long-term IAEApresence, including issuing hmg4erm visas as well as providing properworking space al nuclear sites and, wi@ best efforts a locations nearnuclear sites in lran for @e designated tAEA inspectors for working andkeq-ing necessary cquipmcnu

    67.3. tran will increase @e number of designated tAEA inspectors o @c rangeof 130-150 within 9 nmmhs from @e dae of {he implemenmti{m of @eJCPOA, and will generally allow the desigmHion of inN}ectors fromnations @a have diph}mmic relations wi@ -kan, consimem with its lawsand regulations.

    O. TRANSPARENCY RELATED TO URANI{UM ORE CONCENTRATE (UOC}

    68. han wiI1 permi @e IAEA to monitor, @rough agreed measures that willinclude containment and surveillance measures, for 25 years. @at all uraniumore concentrae produced in h-an or obtained from any o@er source, istransferred Hy @e uranium conversion facility (UCF) in Esfahan or to any o@crfulure uranium conversion faciiib, which hmn might decide to build in h'anwi@in @is period.

    69. han will provide the AEA with all necessary information such @at @e IAEAwill be able to verify @e production of the uranium ore concemrae and @einventory of uranium ore concentrate p, oduced in Iran or obtained from anyother source R)r 25 years.

    P. TRANSPARENCY RELATED TO ENRICHMENT

    70. For 15 years, tran wiII permi @e IAEA u implement eominuous monitoring,includin @rouh_ containment and surveillance measures, as necessary, mx, erifv that stored cemrit'ues and infrastructure remain in stora,e and are onh,used 1o replace failed or damaged centrifuges, as specified in @is Annex.

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    71. Iran will permit the IAEA regular access, including daily access as requestedby the IAEA. Io relevant buildings at Natanz, including all parts of lhe FEPand PFEK for 15 years.

    72. For 15 years, the Natanz enrichment site will be tile sole location for all ofIran's uranium enrichment related activities including safeguarded R&D.

    Q.

    73. han intends to apply nuclear export policies and practices in line with theinternationally established standards for the export of nuclear material,equipment and technology. For 15 years, han will only engage, includingthrough export of any enrichment or enrichment related equipment andtechnology, with any other country, or with any foreign entity in enrichment orenrichmenl related activities, including related research and developmenIactivities, following approval by the Joint Commission.

    ACCESS74.

    75.

    76.

    77.

    78.

    Requests for access pursuanl to provisions of this JCPOA will be made ingood faith, with due observance of the sovereign rights of Iran, and kept to theminimum necessary to effectively implement the verification responsibilitiesunder this JCPOA. In line with normal international safeguards practice, suchrequests will not be aimed at interfering with Iranian military or other nationalsecurity activities, but will be exclusively for resolving concerns regardingfulfilment of tile JCPOA commitments and Iran's other non-proliferation andsafeguards obligations. The following procedures are for tile purpose ofJCPOA implementation between the E3!EU+3 and h'an and are withoutprejudice to the safeguards agreement and the Additional Protocol thereto. Inimplementing this procedure as well as other transparency measures, the IAEAwill be requested to take every precaution to protect commercial, technologicaland industrial secrets as well as other confidentia! information coming to itsknowledoe

    In furtherance of implementation of the JCPOA, if the IAEA has concernsregarding undeclared nuclear materials or activities, or activities inconsistentwith the JCPOA, at locations that have not been declared under tilecomprehensive safeguards agreement or Additional Protocol, |he IAEA willprovide lran the basis for such concerns and request clarification.

    If Iran's explanations do not resolve the IAEA's concerns, tlle Agency mayrequest access to such locations for the sole reason to verify the absence ofundeclared nuclear materials and activities or activities inconsistent with tileJCPOA at such locations. The IAEA will provide Iran the reasons for access inwriting and will make available relevant information.

    Iran may propose to the IAEA alternative means of resolving the 1AEA'sconcerns that enable the IAEA to verify the absence of undeclared nuclearmaterials and activities or activities inconsistent with the JCPOA at thelocation in question, which should be given due and prompt consideration.

    If the absence of undeclared nuclear materials and activities or activitiesinconsistent with the JCPOA cannot be verified after the implementation of thealternative arrangements agreed by Iran and the IAEA, or if tile two sides areunable to reach satisfactory arrangements to verify the absence of undeclarednuclear materials and activities or activities inconsistent with tile JCPOA at the

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    speciiied Rcafions within t4 days of @e [AEA% original request lbr aeccs%1ram in e

  • S/2015/547

    82.2. Designing. developing, fabricating, acquiring, or using multi-pointexplosive detonation systems suilabte for a nuclear explosive device.unless approved by the Joinl Commission for non-nuclear purposes andsubject lo monitoring.

    82.3. Designing. developing, fabricating, acquiring, or using explosixe diagnosticsyslems (streak cameras, framing cameras and flash x-ray cameras) suitablefor the development of a nuclear explosive device, unless approved by theJo]ili Commission for non-nuclear purposes and subject to monitoring.

    82.4. Designing. developing, fabricating, acquiring, or using explosively drivenneutron sources or specialized materials for explosively driven neutronsources.

    34/104

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    Attachmet: Arak corceptual design

    Fudamenta[ Principles:

    o Maximize use of @e currem infrastructure of oN2inal desion of Arak researchreacor, designated by @e AEA gs [R-40, accordfig {o @eir respective ratings.

    o Modernizin of the oriMna desim in order to be a muhi-pmposc rcsearchreactor comprising radio-isotope production, structural materials md fuel (pinsand assembly proRtypes) testing and able to conduct other neuronicexperiments which demand high neutron fJuxes (more @an t()N).

    Using heavy wafer as coolanL moderator aK] reNecRv. Ligh water v,'ouId beutilized as an ann@m" ring at

  • S/2015/547

    Preliminary Characteristics:

    Core ParametersPower (MW)Number of fuel assembliesActive length (cm)Lauice configurationFuel pellets MaterialFuel enrichment levelClad materialBurnable poison

    attice pitch (cm)Coolant mediumModerator mediumRel]cctor mediumRcfleclor thickness (cm)Purity of D2()Mass of D20 (mtons)Yearly makeup

    KelTCore Excess reaclivity (pcm)Cycle length (days) Pu at EoC (g)230pu purity at EoC235U consumptionMaximum Thermal Flux. E0.625evMinimum Thermal Flux, E0.625ev

    Values2O

    78-1t0

    H_onal

    UO2)p to 3.67 '

    Zr AlloysYes, if necessary

    D2()D,OD20- 50- 99.8(-

    - 60-70Yes< 1.25< 20000- 250- 850- 78c,

    60c73.10H

    . l,!Ol"

    1,10Hl,lOla

    Fluid velocit- in channels (m/s) 3.8Channel mass flow rate (kg/s) 2.4Working pressure (MPa) 0.33Fluid inlet temperature (C) 47Fluid outlet lemperature (C) - 78Core material Mainly S.S. 304Core wall Thichness (ram) - 30Fuel Pellet Diameter (cm) 0.65Inner Clad Diameter (cm) - 0.67Outer Clad Diameter (cm) 0.8Number of pins per assembly 12Mass of UO2 in full core load (Kg) 350Core diameter (cm) 240

    361104

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    ,}CPOA Annex H - Sanctions-reated commitments

    The sequence of implementation of the commiiments deailed i ibis Annex is.'pecified in Annex V ([mplementaion Plan) to his Jtin Compehensive Plan ofAction (JCPOA).

    Ao European Unions

    Tie EU and EU Member Sates commh w eHinate all pFovision: oi" CouncilReguIaion (EU) No 267/202 (as subsequen.Jy amended} implementing al!nuciear-re}aed sanc{%ns o -esric{ive measures as specified in See{ionsl.l-l.lO below, to !eHlinae all of Comcii Decis%n20I(}/413/CFSP (as subsequently amended} as specit'icd in SecYons 1,1-1.10below, and to cninate or amend naliomi1 implementing legislation anteqfiled, in accordance with Annex V:

    Financial banking and insurance measu rest'

    ProhibiYon and authorisaion regimes on financial !ansl'els to and from Iran(A'{icle l(} of Council Decision 2(71 (7/413/CFSP; Aicies 3(}, 30a, 30b ald31 of Council ReguIakm (EU) No 267/2012);

    l J.4.

    11.3.

    Sanctions on banking activities (Article I I of Council Decision2(}1 (}/413/CFSP: Aqicle 33 of Comcil Regulaion (EU) No 267/2012):

    Sanch)ns on ilsulance (Article 12 of Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP;Alicle 35 of Council Regulation/EU') No 267/20!2):

    Sanctions on financial messaging selvices (AFiiele 20(12) of CouncilDecision 20101413iCFSP: Article 23(4) of Council Regulation (EU)No 267/2012):

    1 1.5, Sanctions os financial suppol- f(u- trade wiih han (Altic}e 8 of CouncilDecisior 20! 0/4 [3/CFSP):

    I 1.6. Sanctions on g-anls, financhtl assistance and cotcessional loans (Article 9of Council Decisio 20 I(7/413/CFSP):

    I 1.7, Sane{ions on Go',ernmem of han puhiic-guai-aneed bonds (AlticIe 13 ofCounci! Decisktn 2010/413/CFSP: Ar{icle 34 of Council Regulation (EU)No 267/2012): aid

    l.S. Sanctions on associated services7 lbr each of the categories above (see {hereferences above).

    s For the purposes of EU Dgislation, "iranian pcrsom enlity or Body'" means:(i} the State of ltan oF any public aW.ho-ily thereof:(ii} aiD natural peson n. or esident in, h-an:

    (iii} ayJegaIperson, entity or body having its registered office in lran:(ix) any Jega} pe-son, entily or body. inside of outside Jr}n. o\ ned or cow, trolled directly or

    indirectiy by one o: more of the abo e :::ntioned pe:sons o1 Bodies.

  • S/2015/547

    Oil, gas and petrochemical sectors

    Sanctions on the import of oil and gas from Iran (Articles 3a, 3c and 3e ofCouncil Decision 2010/413iCFSP; Articles 1t, 12 and !4a. and Annexes IVand [VA of Council Regulalion (EU) No 267/2012);

    1.2.2. Sanctions on the import of Iranian petrochemical products Articles 3b and3d of Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP: Articles !3 and 14, and Annex V ofCouncil Regulation (EU) No 267/20t2);

    1.2,3. Sanctions on the export of key equipment for the oil, gas and petrochemicalsectors (Articles 4. 4a and 4b of Council Decision 20101413/CFSP: Articles8, 9 and 10. atad Annexes VI and VIA of Council Regulalion (EU) No26712012):

    1.2.4. Sanctions on investment in the oil, gas and petrochemical sectors (Articles6. 6a and 7 of Council Decision 2010/4t3iCFSP: Articles 17(11, 17(2)(b) and(c), 17(3), 17(4), 17(51, 20 and 21 of Council Regulation (EU) No 267/20121:and

    1.2.5. Sanctions on associated services for each of the categories above (set Ihereferences above).

    Shipping, shipbuilding and transport sectors

    Sanctions related to shipping and shipbuilding (Articles 4g, 4h, ;a, !8a and18b of Council Decision 20tO/413iCFSP: Articles 10a. 10b, 10c. 37a. and37b. and Annex VIB of Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012):

    1.3.2. Sanctions related to the transport sector (Articles 15, 16, 17 and 18 ofCouncil Decision 2010i413iCFSP; Articles 36 and 37 of Council Regulation(EU) No 267/20121: and

    1.3.3. Sanctions on associated services for each of the categories above (see thereferences above).

    1.4.2.

    Gold, other precious metals, banknotes and coinage

    Sanctions on gold, precious metals and diamonds, banknotes and coinage(Articles 4c and 4d of Council Decision 2010!413iCFSP: Articles 15 and t6,and Annex VII of Council Regulation (EU) No 267/20121: and

    Sanctions on associated services for each of the categories above (see thereferences above).

    1.5.2.

    Nuclear proliferation-related measures

    Sanctions related to proliferation-sensilive nuclear activities (goods andtechnology, investment and specialised training) (Articles 1(11 (a), (b). (d),(e), (2), (3) and (4), 2, 3, 5, 14 and 21 of Council Decision 2010/4 13/CFSP;Articles 2, 3, 4, 5, 6,7. 17(11 and (2)(a), !8, 19 and 22, and Annexes I, II andIII of Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012): and

    Sanctions on associated services for the category above (set the referencesabove),

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    Metals

    t X2.

    Sanctions on metals (Articles 4e and 4f of Comwi Decision20Oi4]3/CFSP; Articles 15a, 15b and i5c. ap, d Annex VHB of CouncilReg@a'don (EU>No 267/202); and

    Sanctions on assoeialod service-; for the category above (see he reference.'above).

    1o9o

    ] S.2.

    1.7.2.

    oftware

    Listing of persons, ertities and bodies {asset freeze and visa bar0

    1.9.1. Asset freeze and visa ban measures applicable to:

    19.1.!. lised Ira@an banks and financial institufions includilg the CentralBank of han;

    1.9..2.

    !.9..3.

    1.9.].4.

    1.9.1.5.

    1.9. I.6.

    Sanctions on software (Articles 4i and 4j of Council DecisRm2010/413/CFSP: Articles 10d 10e asd 101", and Annex VHA of CounciIRegulation (EL?) No 267/20? 2): and

    Sanctions on associated >;ervices for rise category above (see the rcl'erencesabove).

    Arms

    Sanctions on arms (Articles J(1)(c), (3) and (4) and 3 oJ'Council Decision2010/413/CFSP: Articles 5(1)(a) and (c), I7(1) aild (2)(a), and t9 ofCouncil Reg@afion (EU) No 267/2012): and

    Sanctions on assockHed services for the category above (see the referereesabove )

    listed persons, enfifics and bodies relaed o the oil gas andpetrochemical sectors;

    liscd persons, entities ald bodies related o shipping sMpbui]dingand transport:

    o@er lis(ed persons amides and bodies not related R} proliFeraion-sens;idve nuclear-, arms- and ballistic missiJe-rehned activit}es:

    listed persons, entities and bodies rNated to proliJ%rafior-sesifivenuclear-, arms- and ba}li,qic missile-relacd activities; and

    entities and indivkluals lised by @e UN SecuriW Council, as seom in A{mchmen 1, pall I to @is Annex for categories 1.9.1.I-1.9.1.4, A{achmea 2, part I to @is Annex for category 1.9.1.5, a,d

    Parts IX of Attachments 1 and 2 o Ibis Annex for category 1.9.1.6(Articles 19 and 20o and Amexes I and IX to Council Decision2010/413/CFSP: Articles 23, 24, 25 26 27, 28, 28a, 28b and 29,arid Amexes VII! and IX o CounciI (EU) No267/2012).

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    Other provisions