iraq strategic reconciliation, targeting, and key leader engagement pub938

8/7/2019 Iraq Strategic Reconciliation, Targeting, And Key Leader Engagement Pub938

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IRAQ:STRATEGIC RECONCILIATION, TARGETING,

AND KEY LEADER ENGAGEMENT

Jeanne F. Hull

September 2009

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FOREWORD

Military commanders and diplomats in Iraq andAfghanistan have been meeting with important localofcials since the inception of those conicts. TheseKey Leader Engagements (or KLE as they are nowtermed) have aided commanders and diplomatsalike in furthering their objectives by establishingproductive relationships with those who know andunderstand Iraqs complex human terrain besttheIraqis. However, these engagements frequently takeplace on ad-hoc bases and are rarely incorporated intoother counterinsurgency operations and strategies.In some cases, unit commanders fail to see the utilityof using KLE at allan oversight that contributes todeteriorating security situations and loss of popularsupport.

This Letort Paper discusses KLE as a nonlethaloption for countering insurgent organizations. Aswas the case with the Anbar Awakening, outreach toinsurgent organizations through KLE can be both aneconomy of force measure and, in some circumstances,could be more effective than engaging insurgentorganizations with lethal force. The challenge withinsurgent outreach to KLE, though, is that it must be tiedto a legitimate host-nation government effort towardsreconciliation or, at a minimum, accommodation withthe insurgent organizations in question.

Through the lens of the Multi-National Forces-IraqForce Strategic Engagement Cell (FSEC), the authoralso illustrates how KLEs can be incorporated as targetsin the U.S. militarys targeting process. FSECs mission

to reach out to Iraq-based insurgent organizationswho sought reconciliation with the Iraqi governmentwas entirely based in KLE-related targeting. FSECs


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activities, therefore, present a suitable case to studyhow including KLE as targets within the targeting

process can maximize the utility of the relationshipscommanders and diplomats alike establish duringcounterinsurgency and nation-building operations.The operations of this strategic engagement cell alsodemonstrate the employment of KLE as a part ofInformation Operations, and the challenges associatedwith developing and rening intelligence to supportKLE targeting. The other challenges FSEC personneldealt with highlight some additional difcultiescommanders and diplomats face with respect to KLEoperations with emphasis on managing expectations,continuity, capability, and synchronization of effort.Finally, FSECs endeavors in Iraq underscore theutility of outreach to both local leaders and insurgentpopulations in counterinsurgency operations.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.DirectorStrategic Studies Institute


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ABOUT THE AUTHOR

JEANNE F. HULL, a captain in the U.S. Army, isa Military Intelligence Ofcer at the Training andDoctrine Command, Washington, DC; and Ph.D.Candidate at Princeton University, New Jersey. Shereceived her commission from West Point in 2000, andher rst duty assignment was as a Company ExecutiveOfcer in Ft. Lewis, Washington. After September11, 2001, she spent 10 months in Sarajevo, Bosnia, asa counterterrorism analyst on the Stabilization Force, Joint and Inter-Agency Task Force (JIATF). CaptainHull later served in Iraq as the Division TargetingIntelligence Ofcer for the 101st Airborne Divisionduring the Iraq invasion and post-conict supportand stability operations from 2003-04. She returned toIraq 3 months after redeployment to work as a special

assistant to the Commanding General for the newlyformed Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I), then Lieutenant General DavidPetraeus. In late 2007, Captain Hull went back to Iraqand worked as an adviser to the Iraqi DirectorateGeneral of Intelligence and Security (DGIS) beforetransferring to the MNF-I Force Strategic EngagementCell (FSEC) as a strategic engager. She will join the WestPoint Department of Social Sciences as a professor ofInternational Relations in the summer of 2009. CaptainHull holds a Masters in Public Affairs from theWoodrow Wilson School for Public and InternationalAffairs through the Armys Advanced Civil Schooling(ACS) program, Princeton University, New Jersey.She is currently attending the Military Intelligence

Captains Career Course (MICCC).


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SUMMARY

When discussing new approaches to the insurgencyin Afghanistan, General David Petraeus emphasizedthat his experiences in Iraq had reinforced the notionthat You cannot kill or capture your way out of aninsurgency. That statement acknowledges that successfor U.S. forces in counterinsurgency operations is theresult of a combination of persuasive and coercivemeasures applied against insurgent organizationsand their bases of support. Some of the key principlesbehind that statement also suggest that the bad guyscan possibly be or become the good guys, in thatsome insurgent leaders and groups can transition fromviolence and dissention to constructive activities. Thattransition requires that the insurgents be encouraged toreconcile their differences with the establishments they

are resisting. Setting the conditions for those transitionsat all levels of a conict requires skillful, nuancednegotiations between leaders or representatives ofinsurgent groups, legitimate government forces, andrepresentatives of a neutral or intervening force asappropriate.

Coalition military outreach to Sunni shaykhsworking with al-Qaida in Anbar province revealed howKey Leader Engagement (KLE) with members of theinsurgent population could be a useful, if not necessary,tool for commanders in Iraq. Multi-National Force-Iraq(MNF-I) Commander General Petraeus subsequentlysupported the establishment of a cell specicallydesigned to conduct KLE with other Iraqi insurgentorganizations at the strategic level. The mission of that

strategic-level KLE cell, the Force Strategic Engage-ment Cell (FSEC), required it to conduct KLE withmembers of Sunni and Shia resistance elements and


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leaders to bring them into a political accommodationwith the Iraqi governmenta rst step towards

reconciliation.FSECs establishment and subsequent operations

did not want for challenges or detractors. To beginwith, many seasoned commanders and diplomatsviewed outreach to insurgent organizations as adangerous and untested new enterprise. In reality,that type of outreach had been used in previousinsurgencies and other conicts effectively, to includeVietnam. In addition, although U.S. military trainingcenters had begun to introduce the topic of negotiationin preparation for combat deployments in Iraq andAfghanistan, no template or structure existed forincorporating the routine or special engagementsthat military leaders conducted with members of thehost nation who had the ability to impact their area of

responsibility into other operations. By the same token,most of the Coalition personnel assigned to FSEChad little or no preparation for conducting strategicengagements and/or brokering dialogue betweenIraqi insurgents and the Iraqi government. In responseto these challenges and others, the FSEC leadershipapplied some precedents from other theaters and bothprinciples and doctrine of counterinsurgency andconict resolution that appeared to suit the missionrequirements to construct processes and mechanismsto assist them in achieving their objectives.

This Letort Paper uses FSECs operations in Iraqfrom 2008-09 to illustrate how KLE can be incorporatedinto existing targeting, information operations, andintelligence doctrine for counterinsurgency opera-

tions. It opens with a description of the principles ofcounterinsurgency and conict resolution that formthe basis for effective insurgent outreach and thusFSEC operations. It further highlights how FSECs


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employment of the U.S. militarys targeting processand how other U.S. agenciesincluding the U.S.

Department of Stateinvolved in counterinsurgencyoperations might incorporate those processes into theirown engagements abroad. The paper then identiessome of the challenges and risks associated with FSECsmission and recommends how insurgent outreach andother KLE operations might better be incorporatedwith concurrent operations in counterinsurgency.


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IRAQ:STRATEGIC RECONCILIATION, TARGETING,

AND KEY LEADER ENGAGEMENT

The supreme excellence is not to win a hundred victoriesin a hundred battles. The supreme excellence is to subduethe armies of your enemies without even having to ghtthem.

Sun Tzu

They will conquer, but they will not convince.

Miguel de Unamuno

INTRODUCTION

When discussing new approaches to the insurgency

in Afghanistan, General David Petraeus emphasizedthat his experiences in Iraq had reinforced the notionthat You cannot kill or capture your way out of aninsurgency.1 That statement acknowledges thatsuccess for U.S. forces in counterinsurgency (COIN)operations is the result of a combination of persuasiveand coercive measures applied against insurgent

organizations and their bases of support. Some of thekey principles behind that statement also suggest thatthe bad guys can possibly be or become the goodguys in that some insurgent leaders and groups cantransition from violence and dissention to constructiveactivities. That transition requires that the insurgentsbe encouraged to reconcile their differences withthe establishments they are resisting. Setting the

conditions for those transitions at all levels of a conictrequires skillful, nuanced negotiations between lead-ers or representatives of insurgent groups, legitimate


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government forces, and representatives of a neutral orintervening force, as appropriate.

Some Coalition commanders in Iraq recognized theimportance of developing rapport and relationshipswith local leaders and inuential people early inpost-invasion Iraq. Others did not see the utility ofthat dialogue, and dissent and violence increased inthose areas.2 Discussions with leaders of insurgentorganizations did not surface until sometime later,largely in response to constraints imposed on Coalitioncivilian and diplomatic personnel not to engagewith terrorists and the novelty of the concepts tocommanders who spent most of their time ghtinginsurgents. Beginning in 2004 and 2005, however, U.S.military personnel initiated dialogue with membersof Iraqi Sunni tribes in Anbar and Baghdad provinceswho had begun to tire of their alliances with al-

Qaida in Iraq. Although controversial, the outreachsubstantially reduced violence in those provincesatleast in the short term.3

That outreach in Anbar revealed how Key LeaderEngagement (KLE) with members of the insurgentpopulation could be a usefulif not necessarytoolfor commanders in Iraq. Multi-National Force-Iraq(MNF-I) Commander General Petraeus subsequentlysupported the establishment of a cell specicallydesigned to conduct KLE with other Iraqi insurgentorganizations at the strategic level. The mission of thatstrategic-level KLE cell, the Force Strategic EngagementCell (FSEC), required it to conduct KLE with membersof Sunni and Shia resistance elements and leaders tobring them into a political accommodation with the

Iraqi governmenta rst step towards reconciliation.4FSECs establishment and subsequent operations

did not want for challenges or detractors. To beginwith, many seasoned commanders and diplomats


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viewed outreach to insurgent organizations as adangerous and untested new enterprise. In reality,

that type of outreach had been used in previousinsurgencies and other conicts effectively, to includeVietnam. In addition, although U.S. military trainingcenters had begun to introduce the topic of negotiationin preparation for combat deployments in Iraq andAfghanistan,5 no template or structure existed forincorporating the routine or special engagementsthat military leaders conducted with members of thehost-nation who had the ability to impact their area ofresponsibility into other operations. By the same token,most of the Coalition personnel assigned to FSEChad little or no preparation for conducting strategicengagements and/or brokering dialogue betweenIraqi insurgents and the Iraqi government. In responseto these challenges and others, the FSEC leadership

applied some precedents from other theaters and bothprinciples and doctrine of COIN and conict resolutionthat appeared to suit the mission requirements toconstruct processes and mechanisms to assist them inachieving their objectives.

Despite the fact that FSEC operations were basedon both precedents from previous conicts andhallmark COIN tenets, the conduct of these operationswas criticized by a number of parties, including unitswhose focus was defeating insurgent organizationsvia coercive measures, and career diplomats from theU.S. mission in Iraq. Those that sought to defeat Iraqsmulti-faceted insurgency with force were dismissiveof the value of dialogue, and argued that hostileelements would use that dialogue to cover planning

and organizing for future operations. Interestingly,diplomats and others working to defeat the insurgencyby persuasive means were also critical. DescribingFSEC as a capability without a mission, some U.S.


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Foreign Service ofcers acknowledged the utility ofusing military processes and techniques to organize

what was essentially a diplomatic mission, but as-sessed that trained, experienced diplomats were bettersuited to conduct the requisite dialogue.

The purpose of this paper is to use FSECsoperations in Iraq from 2008-09 to illustrate howKLE can be incorporated into existing targeting,information operations, and intelligence doctrine forCOIN operations. It opens with a description of theprinciples of COIN and conict resolution that form thebasis for effective insurgent outreach and thus FSECoperations. It continues with a detailed descriptionof FSECs organization, structure, and conduct ofoperations, followed by the doctrinal basis for FSECsprocedures for targeting, information operations, andintelligence as outlined by the U.S. Army and Marine

Corps Counterinsurgency manual, Field Manual (FM)3-24.6 It further highlights how FSECs employment ofthe U.S. militarys targeting process and how other U.S.agenciesincluding the U.S. Department of Stateinvolved in COIN operations might incorporate thoseprocesses into their own engagements abroad. Thepaper concludes by identifying some of the challengesand risks associated with FSECs mission, and byrecommending how insurgent outreach and otherKLE operations might better be incorporated withconcurrent operations in COIN.

Importantly, this paper does not attempt to suggestthat KLE is a new concept or technique as KLE has beenongoing in the Iraq and Afghanistan conicts for years.The paper also does not aim to show that strategic KLE

or FSEC was the most important factor in achievingstability in Iraq. Rather, the papers objectives are todemonstrate how incorporating KLE into the targeting


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processand conducting targeted engagements withinsurgents and other hostile elements in particular

can be a valuable tool for military, diplomatic, andother intervening forces in COIN operations.

CONTROL IN COIN AND CONFLICTRESOLUTION

Although FSEC operations (and KLE withinsurgents in particular) were viewed as somewhatradical by Iraq-based coalition military commandersand diplomats, the key concepts behind theseoperations were not new. FSEC operations were basedon both precedents from similar environments as wellas some of the basic precepts of COIN and conictresolution identied by theorists and practitionersalike. Specically, counterinsurgents who intervene

in a conict face a number of challenges when theywork with a legitimate host-nation government toquell an insurgency. They lack an understandingof the physical terrain as well as the human terrainin an areathe cultural and social norms that guidebehavior and choices within a population. The host-nation government they are working with may ormay not be viewed as legitimate and, in those areasunder insurgent control, the insurgent groups havelegitimacy. Rather than expend considerable resourcesattempting to take over insurgent strongholds andcontrolled areas by force, it would be more efcientfor counterinsurgents to nd means by which the host-nation and insurgent organizations can nd commonground and, ultimately, reconcile with each other.

The conict then, in theory, could transition from oneinvolving military force to more of a political battle,thereby allowing counterinsurgents to step back.


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Theory and Practice: Intervention, Hearts and

Minds, and Regaining Control.

Conicts involving insurgencies are typically messyaffairs that tend to be both violent and prolonged.Indeed, the very nature of insurgenciesthat forcesopposed to a legitimate government and its militarymust maximize the use of nontraditional intangiblessuch as propaganda and time and unconventionaltactics and techniques to wear down the initiallystronger and more power government forcesis whatmakes them so.7 Sometimes the conicts become soviolent and destabilizing that outside actors attempt tointervene in the conict to end the violence, protect theirinterests abroad, etc. States and forces that intervene orotherwise become involved in these types of conicts

often nd themselves confronted with highly complexand diverse situations in which they and their forces areviewed as outsiders, irrespective of whether or not theirintentions are good. The outsider status also entailsits own set of challenges including understanding (ormisunderstanding) the physical terrain, the underlyingroots of the conict, and the culture and society of theareas in which they operatefactors that only becomemore important as the conict continues.

FM 3-24 notes that insurgents and counterinsurg-ents are competing for the same key terrain inthose conictsthe popular support of the peoplestuck in the middle. The manual also notes thatinsurgents use numerous methods to generatepopular support, including persuasive and coercive

techniques.8 Insurgents have some distinct advantagesover intervening counterinsurgents when it comesto competing for popular support. In particular,


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insurgents are present among the population andfundamentally understand the society in which they

operate. Those ghting the insurgentsparticularlythose not native to an areagenerally have morelimited means at their disposal. Even if the interveningforces are ostensibly present to provide tangiblebenets to a populationenforcing and monitoringpeace, provision of humanitarian aide, etc.theirstatus as outsiders combined with an indeterminatelength of stay frequently renders their motivations andactivities highly suspect and vulnerable to insurgentpropaganda campaigns.

Counterinsurgents of the 20th century repeatedlyasserted that winning the hearts and minds of thecivilian population is one of the key elements of winninga war.9 Despite the broad and often inaccurate contextin which this expression is used today, a successful

hearts and minds strategy in its original form is onethat isolates insurgents physically and psychologicallyfrom a population,10 which is much more difcult inpractice than it sounds. We have already addressedsome of the challenges intervening forces face whenattempting to isolate the population from insurgents.These difculties tend to increase when a populationis under the complete control of an insurgent organiza-tion. An insurgent-controlled population may not wishto transition back to government control because theinsurgent organization provides all the basic needssecurity and basic servicesthat a government cannotor will not provide. In a detailed study of the Greek CivilWar (1946-49), Stathis Kalyvas found that regardlessof whether an insurgent group or the government

controlled an area, there was relatively little violence orinstability in areas where there was complete control.11The lack of resistance in those areas suggested that suchcontrol was acceptable to the people living there, and


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that at least basic needs were being met. David Elliotfound similar outcomes in his study of the Mekong

Delta during the Vietnam conict. In that case, the VietCong lost control in areas of the Mekong Delta becausethey could not provide security for the peasants, andViet Cong policies prevented many of the peasantsin that area from access to their source of livelihood.The peasants responded by cooperating with U.S.and other forces working with the South Vietnamesegovernment to rid the area of the Viet Cong.12 A morerecent example of how insurgent control might beacceptable to a population is Hizballahs activitiesin areas of southern Lebanon and Beirut. In selectareas, Hizballah is viewed more positively thanthe government since it provides both security andessential services to the population through social andcharitable organizations.13 If the population is satised

with the group in control of an area, it will be difcultfor counterinsurgents to convince the population thatthe insurgent activity there is undesirable, much lesswrest control from the insurgent.

Transitioning Insurgent Groups, Dialogue, andVeto Players.

One means of ending a conict involving aninsurgency is by encouraging insurgent organizationsto stop ghting and enter the political process.14Examples of insurgent groups that transitioned to thepolitical process (with varying degrees of success)include Hamas and al-Fatah in Palestine, armedgroups during the Bosnia conict, and Sinn Fein in

Northern Ireland. In those cases, the insurgent groupssaw an opportunity to achieve some of their aims moreeffectively via political participation than violence.


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They were also able to organize political parties thatwere recognizedhowever grudgingly in some

casesby the governments they fought against.15

Transitioning an insurgent group into a recognized,legitimate political entity is not a speedy or simpleprocess. It requiresamong other thingsan insurgentleadership prepared to risk losing its raison detat,identity, and prestige, and a legitimate governmentleadership equally as willing to risk political capital byconceding to the demands of a group that attemptedto achieve its aims by force. Host-nation governmentlegitimacydened here as the degree to which anorganization or entity is thought worthy of supportis essential to success.16 In his study of Hizballah inLebanon, Cliff Staten argues that, for Hizballah tomake a successful transition, both Hizballah and theLebanese government must acknowledge that the

benets of Hizballahs participation in the politicalprocess outweigh the costs and risks associated withthat transition.17 If an insurgent organization and thepeople who accept its system of governance in insurg-ent-controlled areas do not believe the governmentis capable of meeting their physical and politicalneeds, they will not see any benet to rejoining thepolitical process. Under these circumstances, bothparties must recognize the legitimacy of the other.

The presence of an intervening force or partycan sometimes assist with the process by attemptingto establish or reestablish a relationship between alegitimate government and insurgent. Dialogue isone means of opening communications channels,encouraging accommodation and, ultimately,

reconciliation between government and insurgent.Traditionally, a states diplomatic corps is responsiblefor resolving interstate conict through dialogue.Some nations, including the United States and United


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Kingdom (UK) also on occasion, use their diplomaticrepresentatives to adjudicate intrastate conicts

in the Middle East and Europe via dialogue, theirinvolvement in the Arab-Israeli and Bosnian conictsbeing examples of the practice. Less common, however,are circumstances in which states use their diplomaticcorps or designated policy ofcials to resolve anintrastate conict in which that states own militaryand civilians are targeted by insurgents (in additionto the local governments forces). In fact, insurgentsattacking an intervening states forces and the civiliansthey protect are sometimes labeled as terroristsor hostile militias and tend to be precluded fromdialogue with a states ofcial diplomats or other policyrepresentatives. In those cases, the diplomatic corps ormission within a country must use the resources it hasat hand while still fullling its policy requirements,

including military forces operating in the country.There are two keys to success for brokering

reconciliation initiatives through dialogue. First, theintervening forces must engage with government andinsurgent leaders best able to inuence their followersto pursue dialogue over violence. A study oncontemporary conict resolution notes the importanceof insurgent groups swaying popular supporteven then, their ability to carry skeptical factionsand constituencies is essential for settlement.18 Likepolitical parties in democratic societies, insurgentgroups contain select personnel who have the abilityto sway opinions and, consequently, the majority ofa group. Known as veto players in political scienceliterature, these inuential insurgent group members

can make or break dialogue and efforts to brokerreconciliation.19 The government and intervening forceare, therefore, better served by engaging in dialogue


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with those veto players and their representativesthan ones who, while important, lack the clout and

persuasiveness of others.Second, the intervening force must be able to link

any initiatives involving dialogue with an insurgentpopulation with the host-nation government or itsappointed representatives. Although the outreachbetween U.S. military forces and Anbari shayks in Iraqwas initially successful in combating al-Qaidas supportin Iraq, dissention surfaced when the Iraqi governmentrefused to acknowledge or assume control for theinitiative and its requirement to integrate membersof Anbari tribes into the Iraqi Security Forces or othersalaried positions. Because the Iraqi governmenthad no buy-in to the original initiative, they weresuspicious of the concept and were unhappy withCoalition implementation. They were also skeptical

about the political party formed by the Anbari shaykhsinvolved in the initiative, and implemented legislationthat could have prevented that party and its afliatesfrom participating in the political process. Althoughthe Iraqi government eventually found an Iraqi wayto assume responsibility for the effort, the transition toIraqi control was tenuous for months, and the initiativevery nearly fell apart. The relations between the Iraqigovernment and the Sunni shaykhs who disavowedtheir allegiance to al-Qaida remains tenuous to thisday.20

Summary of the Theory and Application in Iraq.

In a conict involving an insurgency, governments

and intervening forces are competing with an insurgentpopulation for the hearts and minds of a population. Inareas under insurgent control, insurgents are sometimes


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able to provide security and basic services for theirpeople; activities that make the return to government

control appear unnecessary and/or undesirable.Furthermore, retaking physical control of those areasby force is costly in terms of resources and humanlife. Therefore, it is in the interests of a governmentand an intervening force to transition the insurgentgroup to the political process and, in so doing, regaincontrol of those territories controlled by the insurgentpopulation. Such a transition is only possible, however,if the host-nation government is viewed as legitimateby the insurgent organization and the populationunder its control and if the intervening force linksits reconciliation efforts with the government. Anintervening force can, furthermore, help broker thattransition only if the host-nation government is on-board with the proposed transition and initiatives that

lead to that transition.As 2005 came to a close, it was clear that Coalition

forces were ghting a variety of insurgent groups inIraq and watching the country descend into civil war.Not only were Sunni and Shia insurgent organizationsattempting to expel the occupation forces fromtheir homeland, but some had been inspired to killtheir fellow Iraqis as well. This complex situationcombining both an anti-occupation and anti-Iraqigovernment insurgency and civil war necessitatedsome drastic measures, including a signicant forcebuild-up to quell the short-term violence. Coalitionleaders also recognized that stemming the tide ofviolence required both military force and diplomaticinvolvement. Some Coalition units, including those in

Anbar, seized the initiative and conducted some KLEwith insurgents to broker discussions in Anbar andsome areas of Baghdad.21 However, there was little to


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no Iraqi government involvement or buy-in initiallyand no Coalition organization authorized to engage

the Iraqi insurgent leadership or at the strategic level.In July 2007, Coalition Forces commander GeneralPetraeus ordered the establishment of the FSEC at thebehest of his UK Deputy, Lieutenant General GraemeLamb. Lieutenant General Lamb had some experienceworking with insurgent groups in Northern Irelandand thought a similar outreach program would beeffective in Iraq.22

The purpose of FSEC at the time was to ll adiplomatic gapto generate an organization withinthe Coalition willing and able to open communicationschannels via discreet dialogue with serving and formermembers of Iraqs insurgent organizations. FSECsobjective wasthrough that dialogueto set theconditions for reconciliation between Sunni and Shia

insurgent groups and the Iraqi government. GeneralPetraeus further described the role of FSEC as to useKLE with those groups . . . to understand variouslocal situations and dynamics, and thenin fullcoordination with the Iraqi governmentto engagetribal leaders, local government leaders, and, in somecases, insurgent and opposition elements . . .23

At that time, Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki hadhis own reconciliation cell entitled the Iraq Follow-on Committee for National Reconciliation. FSECliaison with the Iraqi reconciliation cell, coupled withsimultaneous outreach to insurgent organizations,marked the initiation of a new chapter in Iraq COINoperationsthe acknowledgement that, even if policyrequirements forbade state diplomatic representatives

from engaging with so-called terrorist organizations,a military strategic engagement cell could establishthose relationships in the interests of national


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reconciliation and the greater Joint Campaign Planobjective of ensuring sustainable security and stability

in Iraq. In offering elements of the insurgent groupsan opportunity to reconcile to the Iraqi government(and, by default, the Coalition), General Petraeus andLieutenant General Lamb hoped to isolate members ofthose organizations who would ght to the death fromthose that sought peaceful, constructive alternativesto ghting. The FSEC founders and leadership readilyacknowledged that the Coalition could only do somuchat some stage in the process Iraqi governmentbuy-in and ability to carry the dialogue forward wouldmake or break any reconciliation initiatives.

The fundamental principle guiding FSEC opera-tions was the idea that persuading select individualsfrom Iraqi insurgent groups (or those sympathetic tothem) to engage in dialogue with the Iraqi govern-

ment was more efcient than trying to destroy thegroups with military force. Because the insurgents werealready in control of large swaths of territory insome Iraqi provinces, Coalition forces and the Iraqigovernment could gain control of those places moreefciently by engaging with insurgent groups thanbattling for territory one kilometer or village at a time.By identifying and engaging the veto playersthekey insurgent leaders and their supporterswithinthe insurgent organizations, the Coalition and Iraqigovernment could encourage them to address theirconcerns via the political process and let them gureout how best to direct the hearts and minds of theiradherents to pursue the political alternative. Those whochose not to take the proffered olive branch would be

exposed and identied as irreconcilable and wouldbe subject to elimination by military force.


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FSEC STRUCTURE, OPERATIONS, AND THE U.S

MILITARY TARGETING PROCESS

The FSEC structure and conduct of operationsevolved over time to meet the requirements of adynamic insurgent situation in Iraq and the changingpolicies and approaches of the Iraqi government. Thecomparatively small cell of 30 or so Coalition militarypersonnel organized itself based on the known structureof the Iraq-based insurgent groups and Iraqi governmentofcials. That structure was modied based on whatthe FSEC Director assessed as being the main emphasisof Coalition Iraqi government reconciliation objectives.FSEC operations were grounded in the U.S. targetingprocess where the targets became personnel withwhom the FSEC director wished to conduct KLE, and

the effects were linked to the outcomes of those KLEprocesses. In essence, FSECs coordinated efforts withother cells, directorates, and agencies operating in Iraqbecame a medium for KLE targeting synchronization.Specics for how FSEC was structured and how itused the targeting process to direct its operations areoutlined below.

FSEC Structure.

FSEC was a small cell of 30 personnelprimarilyCoalition military ofcersdirected by a UK GeneralOfcer. All FSEC directors had previous experiencein the conict in Northern Ireland and in Iraq orAfghanistan. To link this largely Coalition military

effort with civilian policymakers, U.S. Ambassadorto Iraq Ryan Crocker appointed a senior U.S. StateDepartment Foreign Service Ofcer (FSO) as hisrepresentative in the organization to work in concert


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with the FSEC Director. The Director was assigneda Chief of Staff at the rank of Colonel or equivalent

who was responsible for supervising the day-to-dayoperations of the cell, synchronizing FSEC operationswith other directorates within the MNF-I staff,and managing the administrative functions of theorganization. FSEC was also equipped with a smallintelligence cell with a reach-back capability into U.S.and UK national intelligence agencies and the MNF-Ijoint military and civilian intelligence cell, the C-2.

FSEC was organized along the assessed structure ofthe Iraqi insurgency in 2007. The Directorate developedlanes whose task was to identify and establishrelationships with members of the three main groupsthat could work within the reconciliation process: (1) toliaise with representatives and organizations workingreconciliation initiatives within the Iraqi Government,

(2) to conduct outreach to Sunni dissident andinsurgent organizations, and (3) to conduct outreachto Shia dissident and insurgent organizations. Eachlane contained a primary engager responsiblefor developing relationships with personnel in hisor her area of responsibility, a lane deputy, and anintelligence analyst who specialized in either the IraqiGovernment, Sunni insurgent groups, and/or Shiainsurgent groups. A generalized structure for FSECwith the proposed ranks/grades for each position isshown in Table 1.


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Table 1: Generalized Structure for FSEC withRecommended Ranks by Position.

Targeting in Counterinsurgency.

Much of the strategy for (and rationale behind)the KLE that the FSEC director chose to conduct wasgrounded in the U.S. military targeting process. As

is the case with most nonlethal targeting missions,however, there were some important differences inexecution of the targeting process between FSECoperations and traditional targeting in conventionalmilitary operations.

The traditional U.S. military targeting cycle is acontinuous process involving four primary steps.The commanders rst decide which targets to engageand then use available assets to detect the targets byidentifying their location. Both of these steps are very


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use the targeting process to identify which communityleaders and insurgents should be engaged and means

of obtaining access to those individuals. If people arethe primary targets in COIN and non-lethal targetstend to be more important, the desired effects and howto achieve them become signicantly more varied andcomplex than in conventional military operations.

There is plenty of precedent for using the targetingprocess for nonlethal targets in conicts from Vietnam tothe present, including Iraq.27 During stability operationsin Mosul from 2003-04, the 101st Airborne Division(Air Assault) developed an Integrated Effects WorkingGroup (IE-WG) as a targeting synchronization meetingfor all operations in the 101sts Area of Responsibility(AOR), both lethal and nonlethal. The working groupfocused on a variety of nonlethal operations, includingmeetings and KLE with important Iraqi nationals and

Ninawa provincial government ofcials to furtherongoing reconstruction and stabilization activities.28However, the IEWG did not specically address astrategy for engaging the local government and itsopponents for reconciliation purposesmuch ofthe required reconciliation in Ninawa province,including some contentions situations in Tall Afar andZumar, was conducted on an ad-hoc basis as situationsdeveloped, rather than as part of a deliberate targetingprocess. Since then, various U.S. units in Iraq haveapplied similar targeting boards to integrate lethaland nonlethal effects, including KLE. For example,in 2008 the 4th Infantry Division conducted KLEassociated with reconciliation initiatives betweendifferent groups in Baghdad through the activities of

a small reconciliation cell and a cell operating out ofthe Division G-7 shop. The integration of KLE into thetargeting process across theater has, however, not beenuniformly applied.


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FSEC Operations and the Targeting Process.

In accordance with FM 3-24s guidelines forconducting targeting operations in COIN, FSECused the targeting process to achieve goals withinthe reconciliation line of operation as outlined inthe MNF-I Joint Campaign Plan (JCP).29 FSEC initialoperations included establishing liaison with the Iraqigovernment reconciliation cell with ofcers from theFSEC Iraqi Government lane. Outreach to Sunni andShia insurgent organizations proceeded through aplanning process involving a weekly EngagementSynchronization Meeting (ESM) and EngagementPlanning Meeting (EPM), which served as targetsynchronization meetings and targeting boardsrespectively. KLE targets for FSECs unique mission

included inuential people within IFCNR or otherswithin the Iraqi government, members of Sunni orShia insurgent organizations who had either reachedout to coalition forces or otherwise indicated a desire toparticipate in dialogue, and prospective interlocutorswho could act on behalf of FSEC in bringing in keyplayers from all elements in theater.

FSEC used the ESM to synchronize its KLE targetswith engagements conducted by other directorates,U.S. and U.K diplomatic missions in the country,and other agencies who had equity in those targets.Representatives of these organizations were invited toattend the meeting and discuss their own engagementsas FSEC personnel briefed their target list. The ESMalso allowed FSEC to socialize some of its strategy and

approach with different Iraqi insurgent groups withthose other agencies and elicit feedback and requestsfor additional information.


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During the EPMs (targeting board), the FSECDirector decided which proposed engagement targets

were either (1) unsuitable for engagement, (2) requireddeconiction with other agencies, and/or (3) wouldbe more appropriate to engage at a more opportunetime. Based on the priority of the targets to his missionrequirements, the director then decided which assetsto deliver to each proposed engagement target; hedifferentiated between the engagements he wouldconduct, those the Ambassadors representativewould conduct, and those the lane leaders and culturaladvisor would conduct. The director also identiedthe location and medium in which to conduct the KLEbased on known or assessed meeting requirements.For example, FSEC might have damaged or degradedan engagement targets reputations and, thus, theirinuence if the fact they were meeting with Coalition

personnel became known.Following receipt of the directors guidance, the

lane leaders arranged for the delivery phase of theprocess; setting up meetings between FSEC personneland the engagement targets. Once the meeting tookplace, a member of FSEC would write an executivesummary of the engagement outlining the key talkingpoints from both FSEC and the KLE target, requests, anda brief assessment of the effects of the meeting. The assessphase lasted long after the engagement, and subsequentengagements often resulted in reassessments of thevalue of the engagement target, whether or not theengagement was achieving the desired effects, and theidentication of any other effects FSEC might be ableto achieve via the relationship with the individual.


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Important Differences for KLE Targets.

Just as there are some differences in approachfor lethal versus nonlethal targets, there are someimportant requirements for KLE targeting that donot necessarily apply for other types of targets. Thisvariation in application primarily occurs during thedecide and assessment steps of the targeting process.

Decide. As previously discussed, targeting in COINis about people, and KLE targeting is no exception.Conducting a KLE with a targeted individual isessentially the beginning of a relationship insteadof a discrete event. That relationship can be used toachieve a variety of effects from which a commandercan choose. As such, FSEC carefully crafted each KLEto achieve a broad array of objectives depending onthe position, afliation, and assessed level of inuence

of the individual in question. In addition to a specicobjective for meeting with the engagement target, eachKLE had at least three additional purposes: (1) to gaineach individuals assessment of the current political,social, or security climate, (2) to deliver specic messagesfrom coalition forces and/or FSEC relevant to nationalreconciliation, and (3) to evaluate the inuence andreconciliation potential of each individual in ongoingand future reconciliation initiatives. KLE and the factthat it involves people also requires that commandersview each engagement not as an end in itself but, rather,in terms if its potential to achieve an end within oneline of engagement. Specically, commanders cannotlook at a single engagement with a single effect as apossibility; they should view an engagement target as

one with which a series of engagements might occur asthe relationship develops. It would be unreasonable,for example, for FSEC to expect an important Iraqi


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shaykh to use his contacts to help with a reconciliationproject during the rst meeting or perhaps even the

second. Deciding how and when to conduct an engagementis akin to choosing the appropriate ammunition to tar-get enemy forces in conventional warfare. However, itis arguably more difcult to discern how a meetingvenue and timing will affect the outcome of anengagement than in evaluating how a lethal munitionwill affect its target. Commanders conducting KLEmust also be able to understand the security, political,and reputational sensitivities of the engagement targetas well as how to approach the individual beforemaking that decision.

Finally, determining the sequencing of theengagements is somewhat more nuanced for KLEthan conventional targets. Like conventional targeting,

sequencing is important; it may be, for example, morebenecial to meet with one group of individualsbefore or after another depending on the objectives ofthe engagement and the character and nature of thegroups being engaged. During FSECs operations inIraq, FSEC had to be careful not to offend an intendedengagement target by meeting with his rival rst(or allowing that meeting to become known). And,in some cases, FSEC had to obtain the permission ofthe Iraqi government before it could meet with somemembers of insurgent organizations and proceed withreconciliation initiatives.

Assess. In the conventional targeting process, theeffects are almost always immediate. That is, it iscomparatively easy to determine how effective the

targeting was by the amount of damage the targetsustained. In KLE targeting, however, the effects maynot be so immediate, and measures of effectivenessare much more difcult to identify and ascertain. If a


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commander seeks a specic effectsuch as brokeringa meeting between a local shaykh and a representative

of a provincial governmentidentifying whetheror not that effect was achieved is relatively easy. If,however, a commander seeks a more general effectsuch as a cessation of hostilities between two opposinggroups or an engagement target keeping good on hisword to convince an insurgent leader to talk to theIraqi government representative, the effects are not soeasily discernable. In those cases, intelligence becomeseven more important, as well as the quality of therelationship between the unit and the engagementtarget.

There is one additional difference betweenconventional targeting and unconventional that KLEoperations reveal; sometimes targets can shift fromlethal to nonlethal and vice versa. The Anbar outreach

is a case in point; shaykhs and other Iraqis whocollaborated with al-Qaida were initially identied ashostile and were typically targeted lethally; once theydecided not to work with al-Qaida anymore, they wereapproached with nonlethal means, including offers ofemployment and KLE.

FSEC AND INFORMATION OPERATIONS

KLE in any form is also a means commanders canuse to deliver messages to the local population. Inthat sense, executing KLE operations can be part ofan Information Operations (IO) strategy. The FSECmission, as well as the messaging it developed andconducted as part of its KLE strategy, covered several

principles of IO recommended by U.S. COIN doctrine.FM 3-24 identies IO in COIN as one of the most

decisive of the various lines of operations used.30The IO section of the manual directs commanders to


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consider encouraging host-nation leaders to providea forum for initiating a dialogue with the opposition.

Noting that this type of dialogue does not equate tonegotiating with terrorists, the FM continues that thedialogue should . . . attempt to open the door to mutualunderstanding. . . if counterinsurgents are talking withtheir adversaries, they are using a positive approachand may learn something useful. If the host nationis reluctant to communicate with insurgents, othercounterinsurgents may have to initiate contact.31

The genesis of FSEC was a direct application of theseguidelines. FSEC was established to initiate contactbetween Iraqi insurgent organizations and the Iraqigovernment. By directly engaging with the adversariesof MNF-I and the Iraqi government at the strategic level,FSEC attempted to bring disparate elements together,develop discreet communications channels that those

elements could use, and, in so doing, facilitate Sunniand Shia-oriented national reconciliation initiatives.

IO proscriptions for COIN also acknowledgethat the host-nation government is much moreeffective at transmitting messages to its populationthan the diplomatic or military representatives of anintervening force. FM 3-24 advises that commandersinstead encourage host-nation ofcials to handle thedelivery of information to constituents themselves.32Recognizing that effective counterinsurgents work toconvince insurgent leaders that the time for resistanceis ended and that other ways to accomplish whatthey desire exist, similar guidelines would followfor portions of the population loyal to the insurgentleadership. Insurgent leaders have far more credibility

when speaking to their followers than an outside forceor international media would. FSEC messaging duringengagements frequently provided the engagement


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achieve the desired effects with an insurgent group orother segment of a population, the intelligence support

to the targeting process in KLE targeting should be onthose people.

FSECs Information Requirements and Sources ofIntelligence.

FSECs KLE targeting focused on identifying bothpotential reconciliation initiatives and veto playerswho could contribute to national reconciliation.Although the FSEC mission had numerous informationrequirements, it focused on four categories ofinformation in particular:

Information that could cue FSEC about ongoingreconciliation initiatives and key personnel whocould be used as interlocutors to link FSEC into

the reconciliation process. Information about the status of these

reconciliation efforts, how the people and partiesaffected by the initiatives were impacted, andsome sense of what the people involved believedthe role for FSEC/Coalition forces should havebeen.

Information that would allow FSEC and theCoalition to identify which individuals andorganizations in the insurgent/armed grouppopulation were potentially reconcilable, andthose who were irreconcilable.

FSEC sought to maximize the reconciliationvalue of those identied as reconcilable byassessing the individual or groups level of

inuence; that is, the ability of those individualsto inuence others to cease their unhelpfulactivities and peacefully transition to thepolitical process.35


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FSEC used several sources of information to meet

these requirements. In addition to information andatmospherics garnered from FSEC engagements, FSECrelied upon ve main sources of information to satisfyits requirements: Open-source (unclassied) reporting(OSINT), Human Intelligence (HUMINT) reportingfrom both national and tactical collection entities,Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), diplomatic reporting,and feedback from other MNF-I elements KLE. Ofthose sources, some of the best for the FSEC missioncame from OSINT, diplomatic reporting, and detaineesheld in Coalition custody.

Some of the more critical FSEC information needswere met by the use of OSINT. FSEC had access todaily media digests and OSINT summaries producedby the MNF-I OSINT cell and the Media Operations

Center (MOC). In addition, a substantial amount ofacademic literature was available on Iraq, its regions,and ethno-religious communities within Iraq fromnongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and regionalspecialists who helped FSEC better understand thebackground and contacts of the ongoing political andmilitary disputes in the country. Translation of somedocuments obtained in the course of engagements alsoyielded some important information about the Iraqigovernments strategy and intentions. Other sources ofOSINT key to the FSEC mission included polling dataon Iraqs political parties; International Crisis Group(ICG) products; and Iraq country studies produced bythe Rand Corporation, Strategic Studies Institute, andother think-tanks.

Diplomatic reporting, too, was an excellent t forFSECs needs. Records of diplomatic engagementsoften provided unique perspectives on personalities


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and political entities within the context of politics,political atmospherics, and Iraqi government existing

and intended policies. In theaters like Iraq, the valueof diplomatic reporting was enhanced with ProvincialReconstruction Team (PRT) reporting, which frequentlyprovided FSEC with Iraqi street-level perspectives on avariety of situations and incidents. At the tactical level,the Coalition military units that had reconciliationor civil affairs cells responsible for conducting KLEin support of reconciliation occasionally providedfeedback on their engagements, which was also usefulto the FSEC mission.

The reconciliation value of the detainee populationwas perhaps most surprising. Most MNF-I entitiesviewed the detainees as a source of intelligence supportto lethalversus non-lethaloperations. While FM3-24 identies detainees as a good source of intelligence

because of the information they provide about theinternal workings of insurgency, it makes no referenceto the reconciliation value of the detainees.36 Many ofthe individuals in Coalition custody were leaders of,or had signicant inuence within, various insurgentgroups operating in Iraq. Some of those detainees hadvaluable insights about which elements of those groupswere reconcilable and how the Iraqi government couldbest reach out to those groups to encourage a departurefrom violence. In addition, a few detainees had theability to inuence insurgent groups to transition to thepolitical process while still in detention. However, therewas little acknowledgement or understanding of howto use detainees for reconciliation purposes and, thus,little effort to direct collection efforts of that nature at

the detainee population.


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difculties associated with conducting and integratingFSEC KLE operations with others in theater, and (2)

cultural issues that minimized the effectiveness ofFSEC KLE operations.

Technical Challenges.

Synchronization of effort. FSEC had difculty withsynchronizing its engagements with other KLEmissions in theater as well as missions conducive toreconciliation initiatives. At the operational and tacticallevel, most Coalition military units were alreadyconducting KLE to generate peace and stability in theirareas of operation. At the strategic level, Coalitiondiplomats conducted their own engagements toachieve policy objectives with key Iraqi governmentpersonnel, build the capacity of Iraqi ministries, and

effect national reconciliation via political organizations.In addition to FSECwhich was established laterthan some other MNF-I directoratesthe ForceStrategic Effects directorate was devoted to strategicengagements designed to build Iraqi governmentcapacity, conduct outreach to religious entities,conduct information operations, and infrastructurereconstruction. Although the leaders of these entitiesroutinely met with each other to synchronize theirefforts and different cells contacted each other on anad-hoc basis, no formalized mechanism organized andsynchronized each organizations engagements acrosstheater. Since many of the desired effects from thoseengagements were potentially mutually supportive,the lack of synchronization resulted in a combination

of overlap and underachievement on some importantissues. FSEC often found itself stumbling on diplomatsestablished territory with respect to engaging Iraqi


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government ofcials and political party leaders andwas not always synchronized with Force Information

Operations objectives. At the same time, FSECfrequently needed to link reconciliation initiatives withhard deliverablessuch as improved infrastructure,vocational-technical programs to reintegrate formerinsurgents, etc.that were being implemented bythe Strategic Effects directorate. And, although FSECrepeatedly attempted to incorporate other agencies,directorates, and Coalition units into its targetingprocess to avoid these pitfalls, many agencies anddirectorates chose not to participate.

Recommendation: Establish a theater-level targetingboard to synchronize KLE and related efforts at thestrategic level, or incorporate all nonlethal effects,including KLE, into an existing theater joint-targetingboard.

The lack of a synchronized engagement strategyalso resulted in reporting problems. Much of theKLE ongoing at the tactical and operational levelhad strategic implications (and vice versa), but mostunits did not keep records of the KLE conducted byunit commanders, soldiers, etc., within their areaof operations. By the same token, units conductingoperations at those levels had difculty gainingsituational awareness of the reconciliation initiativesand other KLE ongoing at the strategic level thataffected their areas of responsibility because they hadno means of access to the reporting at that level. And,despite FSECs efforts to post the executive summariesof its engagements in a variety of locations accessible toCoalition units, most units had not been incorporating

KLE into their targeting boards or other operations;therefore, they saw little need to access KLE reportingfrom FSEC or any other units.


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Recommendation: Institutionalize KLE as anessential part of targeting and operations in COIN and

incorporate KLE reporting into intelligence reportingand intelligence databases available to units operatingin theater.

Continuity. In Defeating Communist Insurgency,Sir Robert Thompson identied that the Britishsuccess in the Malayan Emergency was, in part, aresult of continuity with key personnel who workedwith the insurgents and/or the established Malayangovernment.37 Iraq and other theaters involvinginsurgencies are no exception. One of the keys tosuccessful engagement outcomes was FSECs abilityto develop and sustain relationships with importantIraqi government personnel, tribal shaykhs, andinsurgent group representatives. The FSEC rotationcycle, however, was not conducive to the continuity

of those relationships. While the FSEC director andAmbassadors representative worked in FSEC for12-month tours, most of the FSEC ofcers were onlyin country for 6 months (with some exceptions). At thetime a relationship between FSEC and a KLE targetwas just beginning to solidify, FSEC would experiencea changeover in personnel; new personnel would thenhave to spend time rebuilding rapport with the Iraqis,who were constantly being introduced to new facesamid the development of some sensitive issues. Insome cases, the FSEC replacement was simply unableto reenergize the relationship after a trusted FSECofcers departure. Some of the Iraqis complainedthat they never knew which FSEC representative theywould be meeting, and at least a few were reluctant to

continue the relationship without the presence of thetrusted FSEC ofcer.


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The other problem with high turnover relatedto the volume of information new arrivals had to

consume. Effective engagements necessitated aworking knowledge of the key issues between the Iraqigovernment and insurgent group and an understand-ing of the history behind how those relationsdeteriorated and/or became reinvigorated. Most FSECengagers arrived in theater with little understanding ofthe situation, and acquiring that knowledge base took3-4 months, depending on the individual. By the timemany of the engagers had that knowledge, they wereonly 2 months away from leaving the country.

Recommendation. Engagement cell personnelshould be assigned for a period of at least 2 years, withregularly scheduled leave periods. Transition timebetween incoming and outgoing engagers should be atleast 2 months.

Capability. Most military personnel are not diplo-mats, and few have exposure to diplomatic operationsor training.38 FSEC ofcers were no exception. Most ofthe FSEC personnel in the organization from 2008-09had no formal training or experiences in diplomacy,negotiation, or KLE more broadly and, for some, it wasa somewhat awkward transition to an engagement role.FSECs one career diplomatthe representative of theU.S. Ambassadordid show, through his example,some diplomatic techniques. In addition, FSEC wasequipped with an excellent cultural advisor of MiddleEastern descent who was always prepared to assist theFSEC engagers with Iraqi cultural norms, practices,and expectations. For most of FSEC, however, it wasa case of learning by doing. Some ofcers struggled

and others excelled; success depended largely on theofcer and his or her initiative in learning a productiveapproach or using the interpersonal skills he/sheacquired during his/her time in service. In cases where


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the ofcer struggled, the relationship with the Iraqiengagement targets suffered, which was detrimental

to the overall mission.Recommendation: Provide training or, at a minimum,

exposure to the conduct of diplomatic operationsto personnel in units that will be responsible forconducting KLE beyond the occasional encounterduring predeployment training. If KLE cells were to beincorporated into other U.S. COIN operations, it wouldbe important to focus on training and development forpersonnel best suited to those engagements. ForeignArea Ofcers (FAOs) have a niche here; unfortunately,the U.S. Army and Marine Corps FAO programs lackthe requisite number of FAOs to meet the missionrequirements. Given that only a limited number ofthose conducting KLE will have regional expertise, along right-seat ride between outgoing and incoming

personnel is essential for success.

Cultural Challenges.

The dimension of time and expectations. Militariesare trained to be effects-oriented, and often theexpectation is that those effects will be immediate.These expectations tend to result in impatience withestablishing and building the relationships necessary tobrokering useful dialogue. All too often, commandersexpect that the desired outcome of a relationship orKLE can be achieved in a single engagement or veryfew engagements, and that direct engagement withan insurgent group leader, important members ofthe government, etc., is the best approach since it is

the most direct approach. During FSECs operations,the failure to exercise patience with the developmentof relationships and to recognize that an indirect


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approach to an engagement target could be benecialput some important relationships at risk or stalled

them altogether.In many cultures, and the Iraqi culture in particular,

it is important to develop a relationship before askingsomeone to reciprocate. While Westerners tend tosee relationships as tit-for-tat, Iraqi culture does notfunction in that manner. Multi-National DivisionBaghdad Reconciliation Cell leader Colonel RichardWelch mentioned that Iraqis consider it rude to be askedfor anything or to do anything before a relationshiphas been properly established.39 FSEC cultural advisorIhab Ali often advised that the objective of the initialengagements with Iraqis should be to establish trustthrough sincerity and respecttwo very importantfactors in Arab culture stemming from different societalconditions in the Middle East. Those conditions

particularly fear of exploitationtend to make Arabsvery suspicious of outsiders. Therefore, one mighthave to take several steps with the Iraqis before theycould be reasonably expected to reciprocate. Once theIraqi was convinced that the relationship was worthpursuing, however, the Iraqi would stop at nothing toassist FSEC or other personnel who engaged them.40

In addition, Iraqi leaders typically sendrepresentatives or interlocutors to negotiate on theirbehalf; rarely does a principal Iraqi decisionmakerengage directly with Coalition/other Iraqi leaders. IfIraqi principals did meet with FSEC, they tended tospeak broadly and make vague commitments or noneat all. The coalition tendency to sometimes ignore thevalue of interlocutors in an endeavor to go straight

to the principal resulted in missed opportunities andmisunderstandings on some important issues.


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Interagency difculties. FSECs difculties working

with other agencies were similar to those experiencedby other military and intelligence organizationsthrust together in Iraq. FSEC did, however, face someadditional skepticism from some of the intelligenceagencies and career diplomats in the U.S. Departmentof State working in Baghdad. Many of the diplomatssupported the FSEC mission and, in cases where themission overlapped, the diplomats worked closely withFSEC personnel to initiate and support reconciliationinitiatives. Others dismissed FSEC as a militaryorganization in its entirely and refused to coordinateengagements with FSEC. Although FSEC did not have the diplomaticexperience or knowledge of the career diplomats,the military processes FSEC used to organize its

engagementsthe U.S. military targeting processin particularserved as an excellent model forengagements more broadly. The targeting processcoupled with FSECs procedure for writing andreporting engagements was, arguably, more organized,more focused, and more accessible and digestible thanthe processes and reporting procedures used by someother agencies.

Recommendation: The U.S. diplomatic corpsshould consider institutionalizing the U.S. militarytargeting process or similar mechanism to structureits engagements in embassies abroad, with emphasison those theaters containing a signicant U.S. militarypresence.


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Additional Risks Associated with the FSEC Missionand KLE.

While FSECs outreach to insurgents via KLEyielded some benets, KLE of that nature wasnot without risk. Specically, the Coalition riskedsupporting an Iraqi government cell and programthat lacked longevity and/or legitimacy, and theinsurgent groups that FSEC engaged could have usedthe engagements and related meetings as stallingtechniques; targeting of specic individuals or groupswas suspended for engagement purposes from time totime.

We have already discussed the importance of host-nation government legitimacy during COIN opera-tions. After the 2005 elections, the Iraqi governmentstruggled to establish its legitimacy; it was widely

viewed as corrupt and, as the violence escalated,was incapable of securing its citizens on its own. TheIraqi government was, furthermore, perceived to be apuppet of an occupying force and acting in its owninterests rather than that of the Iraqi people. Sinceinsurgent groups and citizens alike viewed the Iraqigovernment as illegitimate for a variety of reasons,linking reconciliation initiatives with the governmentwas also viewed with suspicion.

The legitimacy problem also illustrates why settingup a reconciliation-related strategic engagement cellin Afghanistan would be difcult, if not impossible.The Afghan government is widely viewed as corruptand ineffective by the Afghan population.41 There isno legitimate government entity with which Coalition

forces could engage in Afghanistan, and engagingwith insurgent organizations without tying them to theAfghan government risks the development of solutions


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established process for conducting and reporting onKLE also forces diplomats, military commanders, and

others involved in the process to develop and operatewithin a clear strategy rather than via haphazardengagements that may or may not be linked to ongoingefforts in information operations, intelligence, andthings of that nature. That strategy could ultimately beintegrated with a units other COIN efforts and has thepotential to complement those efforts at comparativelylittle cost in terms of resources.

Some principles of practices in other insurgenciesand FSEC operations in Iraq also demonstratethat there is some value in outreach to insurgentorganizations, even if they have targeted host-nationand outside forces in the past. Although there are somerisks associated with that particular brand of KLE,the benets can far outweigh the costs; commanders

can expend energies on building local relationshipsand then use those relationships to stabilize an arearather than attempting to seek out and destroy everysingle insurgent in the sector. Furthermore, almost alloperations entail a certain amount of risk; it is up to thecommanders or leaders to nd the means of mitigatingthat risk. As long as the efforts of this type of KLEremain tied to the reconciliation efforts of a legitimatehost-nation government or government representative,the risks are kept to a minimum.

FSEC operations provide only one example of howunits operating in Iraq used KLE to initiate and furtherreconciliation. Anecdotes from several personnelinvolved with reconciliation in the Multi-NationalDivisions (MND-Ds) from 2007-09 indicate that some

units developed their own strategy to broker dialoguewith members of organizations involved in destructiveactivities in their battle spaces. Although this articledoes not attempt to prove that this type of KLE is


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and its mission were one mechanism that was useful inthe Iraq scenario, and some of its basic operations have

applications to the conduct of U.S. COIN operationsmore generally. How those concepts are implementedrests with the environment in which they are employedand the commanders that must operate within them.

ENDNOTES

1. Carlotta Gall, Insurgents in Afghanistan are Gaining,

Petraeus Says, New York Times, October 1, 2008.

2. Colonel Richard Welch, Interview, November 2008. ColonelWelch was the Multi-National Division Baghdad ReconciliationCell Director from 2006-09. He served in Baghdad from 2004-05and from 2006 until the present in a civil affairs and reconciliationcapacity. He was responsible for Key Leader Engagements inthe Baghdad area of responsibility and observed rst hand howthe presence or absence of an engagement strategy impacted the

Baghdad area. I had an opportunity to witness something similarin Northern Iraq in 2003-04 in comparing the operations of the101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) in Mosul, Iraq, and the 4thInfantry Division in Tikrit. While the 101st had an engagementstrategy of sorts, the 4th ID was more focused on kinetic operations;the 101st area remained more peaceful and stable than the 4th IDarea, in general.

3. Major Niel Smith and Colonel Sean MacFarland, U.S. Army,

Anbar Awakens: The Tipping Point, Military Review, March-April 2008, pp. 41-52.

4. Sources and authorities on conict resolution and my ownexperiences in Iraq and Bosnia view reconciliation as a phasedprocess, where reconciliation is dened as restoring relationshipsand learning to live nonviolently with radical differences. OliverRamsbotham, Tom Woodhouse, and Hugh Miall, ContemporaryConict Resolution: The Prevention, Management, and Transformations

of Deadly Conict, Cambridge, United Kingdom: Polity Press,1999, pp. 231. The initial phases of reconciliation tend to involveopening communications channels between the various parties,


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11. Stathis Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War, NewYork: Cambridge University Press, 2006, Chap. 2.

12. David Elliot, The Vietnamese War: Revolution and SocialChange in the Mekong Delta 1930-1975, Vol. II, Chap. 17, Armonk,NY: M. E. Sharp Inc., 2002.

13. Cliff Staten, From Terrorism to Legitimacy: PoliticalOpportunity Structures and the Case of Hezbollah, The OnlineJournal of Peace and Conict Resolution, Vol. 8, No. 1, 2008, pp. 32-49, especially p. 38.

14. Barbara F. Walter, Designing Transitions from Civil War,Barbara F. Walter and Jack Snyder, eds., Civil Wars, Insecurity, andIntervention, New York: Columbia University Press, 1999.

15. Staten, pp. 32-49.

16. Max Manwaring and John Fishel, Insurgency andCounterinsurgency: Towards a New Analytical Approach, inSmall Wars and Insurgencies, Vol. 3, No. 3, Winter 1992, p. 274.Manwaring and Fishel conducted their own empirical analysis ofdifferent insurgency models and concluded that legitimacy is vitalto maintaining popular support and thus winning a civil war.

17. Staten, pp. 32-49.

18. Oliver Ramsbotham, Tom Woodhouse, and Hugh Miall,Contemporary Conict Resolution, 2nd Ed., Boston, MA: PolityPress, 2005, p. 166.

19. George Tsebelis, Decision Making in Political Systems: VetoPlayers in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism,and Multipartyism, British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 24, No.3, July 1995, pp. 289-325.

20. Ned Parker, Iraqs Awakening: Two Tales IllustrateForces Birth and Slow Death, Los Angeles Times, April28, 2009,www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-iraq-awakening28-2009apr28,0,115151.story .


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21. Smith and MacFarland, pp. 41-43; Welch, interview.

22. Britains Armed Forces: Losing Their Way? TheEconomist,January 31-February 6, 2009, pp. 61-62.

23. Carlotta Gall, Insurgents in Afghanistan are Gaining,Petraeus Says, in New York Times, October1, 2008, www.nytimes.com/2008/10/01/world/asia/01petraeus.html.

24. FM 3-24, p. 191.

25. Ibid., pp. 192-193. (Emphasis by author.)

26. Ibid., p. 193.

27. I am indebted to one of my Military Intelligence CaptainsCareer Course instructors (who wished to remain anonymous) forpointing out this fact in earlier drafts of the paper. I had originallyviewed FSECs use of the targeting process as a modication ofexisting doctrine when, in fact, the processes are identical.

28. Lieutenant Colonel Isaiah Wilson III, Thinking BeyondWar: Civil-Military Operational Planning in Northern Iraq,paper delivered at the Peace Studies Program, Cornell University,October 14, 2004.

29. The Reconciliation Annex to MNF-Is Joint Campaign Planof 2007-08 is and remains classied; therefore, the specic goalscould not be used in this paper.

30. FM 3-24, p. 160.

31. Ibid., p. 162.

32. Ibid. Commanders are encouraged not to attempt toexplain actions by the host-nation government.

33. There are many forms of resistance, only one of which isviolence. Acceptable forms of resistance in Iraq included peacefuldemonstrations, written work, protest votes, and things of thatnature.


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