irregular warfare & indirect approaches - contemporary security challenges

8/2/2019 Irregular Warfare & Indirect Approaches - Contemporary Security Challenges

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JSOUReport09-3

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mporarySecurityChallenges:IrregularWarfareandIndirectApproaches


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Joint Special Operations Universityand the Strategic Studies Department

Te Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) provides its publications

to contribute toward expanding the body o knowledge about joint special

operations. JSOU publications advance the insights and recommendations

o national security proessionals and the Special Operations Forces (SOF)

students and leaders or consideration by the SOF community and deense

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JSOU is the educational component o the United States Special Opera-

tions Command (USSOCOM), MacDill Air Force Base, Florida. Te JSOU

mission is to educate SOF executive, senior, and intermediate leaders a nd

selected other national and international security decision makers, both

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science and art o joint special operations. JSOU provides education to the

men and women o SOF and to those who enable the SOF mission in a joint

environment.

JSOU conducts research through its Strategic Studies Department where

eort centers upon the USSOCOM mission and the commanders priorities.

Mission.Provide ully capable special operations orces to deend theUnited States and its interests. Plan and synchronize operations against

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Priorities. Deter,disrupt,anddefeatterroristthreats.

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Te JSOU porta l is https://jsoupublic.socom.mil.

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Lieutenant Colonel Michael C. McMahon, U.S. Air Force, Strategic Studies Department Director

William W. Mendel, Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret.; Jerey W. Nelson, Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret.;and William S. Wildrick, Captain, U.S. Navy, Ret Resident Senior Fellows

Editorial Advisory Board

John B. AlexanderPh.D., Education, Te Apollinaire Group

and JSOU Senior Fellow

Joseph D. Celeski

Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret.

JSOU Senior FellowChuck CunninghamLieutenant General, U.S. Air Force, Ret.

Proessor o Strategy, Joint AdvancedWarghting School and JSOU Associate Fellow

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Institutional Integration Division Chie

Brian H. Greenshields

Colonel, U.S. Air ForceSOF Chair, Naval Postgraduate School

Tomas H. HenriksenPh.D., History, Hoover Institution

Stanord University and JSOU Senior Fellow

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Culture Program, Manseld Center, Universityo Montana and JSOU Senior Fellow

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18thUSAF Special Operations SchoolCommandant

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JSOU Associate Fellow

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Director o Homeland Security,Commonwealth o Pennsylvania andJSOU Associate Fellow

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Studies Program, Te Fletcher School, usUniversity and JSOU Senior Fellow

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and JSOU Associate Fellow

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Alutiiq, LLC and JSOU Associate Fellow

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On the cover. A U.S. Special Forces soldier conducts Security Assistance

raining or members o the Armed Forces o the Philippines in March2003, on the Zamboanga Peninsula o the Philippine Island o Mindanao.

Tis trainingto help Philippine orces rene their counterterrorism

capabilitieswas provided as part o Operation Enduring Freedom-

Philippines (OEF-P). U.S. Navy photo by Petty Ocer First Class Edward

G. Martens.


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JSOU Report 09-3

he JSOU Press

Hurlburt Field, Florida

Contemporary

Security Challenges:

Irregular Warfare and

Indirect Approaches

Richard D. Newton, Travis L. Homiak,

Kelly H. Smith, Isaac J. Peltier, and D. Jonathan White


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Comments about this publication are invited and should be orwarded to Director,Strategic Studies Department, Joint Special Operations University, 357 ully Street,

Alison Building, Hurlburt Field, Florida 32544. Copies o this publication may be

obtained by calling JSOU at 850-884-1569; FAX 850-884-3917.

*******

Te JSOU Strategic Studies Department is currently accepting written works relevant

to special operations or potential publication. For more inormation please contact

Mr. Jim Anderson, JSOU Director o Research, at 850-884-1569, DSN 579-1569,

[email protected]. Tank you or your interest in the JSOU Press.

*******

Tis work was cleared or public release; distribution is unlimited.

ISBN ---


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Te views expressed in this publication are entirely those o

the authors and do not necessarily reect the views, policyor position o the United States Government, Department o

Deense, United States Special Operations Command, or the

Joint Special Operations University.


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Recent Publications of the JSOU Press

2006 JSOU/NDIA SO/LIC Chapter Essays, June

One Valley at a Time, August , Adrian . Bogart III

Special Operations Aviation in NATO, September , Richard D. Newton

Beyond Draining the Swamp: Urban Development andCounterterrorism in Morocco, October , Stephen R. Dalzell

Filling Special Operations Gaps with Civilian Expertise, December ,James F. Powers, Jr.

Educating for Strategic Thinking in the SOF Community, January ,

Harry R. YargerThe Israeli Approach to Irregular Warfare and Implications for the U.S.,February , Tomas H. Henriksen

Psychological Operations: Learning Is Not a Defense Science Project,March , Curtis D. Boyd

2007 JSOU and NDIA SO/LIC Division Essays, April

Hunting Leadership Targets in Counterinsurgency and CounterterroristOperations, June , Graham H. urbiville, Jr.

Executive Report, JSOU Second Annual Symposium ( April May )

A Theory of Special Operations, October , Robert G. Spulak, Jr.

Block by Block: Civic Action in the Battle of Baghdad, November ,Adrian . Bogart III

Private Security Infrastructure Abroad, November ,Graham H. urbiville, Jr.

Intelligence in Denied Areas, December , Russell D. Howard

Is Leaving the Middle East a Viable Option, January ,Tomas H. Henriksen

Retaining a Precarious Value as Special Operations Go Mainstream,February , Jessica Glicken urnley

Disrupting Threat Finances, April , Wesley J.L. Anderson

USSOCOM Research Topics 2009

Indias Northeast: The Frontier in Ferment, September , Prakash Singh

What Really Happened in Nortern Irelands Counterinsurgency,October , Tomas H. Henriksen

Guerrilla Counterintelligence: Insurgent Approaches to NeutralizingAdversary Intelligence Operations, January , Graham H. urbiville, Jr.

Policing and Law Enforcement in COIN the Thick Blue Line,February , Joseph D. Celeski


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vii

Contents

Foreword ................................................................................ix

James D. Anderson

The Seeds of Surrogate Warfare ............................................. 1

Richard D. Newton

Expanding the American Way of War: Working Through,With, or By Non-U.S. Actors .............................................. 19

Travis L. Homiak

Surrogate Warfare for the 21st Century ............................... 39

Kelly H. Smith

Surrogate Warfare: The Role of U.S. Army Special Forces ..... 55Isaac J. Peltier

Legitimacy and Surrogate Warfare ....................................... 85

D. Jonathan White


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ix

Foreword

The JSOU Press presents this collection o writings rom ve currentand ormer practitioners in the eld o irregular warare. Te writers

delve into the concept osurrogate warare, dened as a substitute

orce acting on behal o the interests o another as well as its own interests.

For many special operators, the concept o unconventional warare provides

the paradigm or working through, with, or by other orces to achieve stra-

tegic objectives. Here the authors expand the concept by exploring surrogate

warare. Tis volume provides insights into this aspect o modern warareand should be considered by senior military leaders and policymakers.

Drawing upon their recent experiences in the eld, the authors provide

practical lessons or their colleagues consideration.

Te rst oering in this collection was contributed by Mr. Richard

Newton, a JSOU aculty member and a retired air commando. Mr. Newton

outlines the increased use and ramications o indirect approaches, made

essential by the post-World War II rise o the two superpowers, the United

States and the ormer Soviet Union. His account o three th century useso the through, with, or by concept (Philippines, El Salvador, and Aghani-

stan) makes clear that this type o conict is ofen strategically pragmatic

and eective at achieving U.S. as well as host national objectives.

Major ravis Homiak, U.S. Marine Corps, denes the ideas o working

through, with, or by surrogate orces to achieve national security objectives.

He oers three historical examples to illustrate the added value o indirect

approaches, including the nonpromotion o hegemonic intent. Major

Homiak posits that the through, with, or by principles are critical to U.S.

SOF, but applicable to conventional orces as well.

Major Kelly Smith, a U.S. Army Special Forces ocer, provides an

analysis o surrogate warare, mandating changes in policy and doctrine

to include comprehensive guidance rom the U.S. government to develop

and employ this capability. MAJ Smith outlines several advantages to the use

o surrogates, including decreased demand on U.S. orces, gaining political

legitimacy, and providing capabilities that U.S. orces lack. He also highlightsthe benets o a holistic approach, including conventional orces linkage

to surrogates as well as SOF. Smith oers nite methods to integrating these

concepts into U.S. policy and doctrine.


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x

Major Isaac Peltier, a U.S. Army Special Forces ocer, examines in detail

two recent historical operations, illustrating success in leveraging surro-

gate orces. His position is Army Special Forces-centric and concludes thatcultural/regional expertise, not amiliarity, was the single most important

actor in these successes. MAJ Peltier also calls or improvements in the

ability o U.S. SOF to establish and unction as an operational-level joint

headquarters in order to plan, execute, and support an unconventional

warare campaign.

Mr. D. Jonathan White, a retired Special Forces ocer, discusses many

salient points o surrogate warare, including legitimacy o allied regimes,

commonality o interests between the United States and host nations, and theeects o human rights considerations on the legitimacy o the relationships

involved. Te cautionary notes Mr. White examines in this essay must be

analyzed by any prudent planner regarding surrogate warare operations.

American military orces have served alongside host-nation orces

throughout history and across the globe. Te surrogate relationships orged

are critical to the continued deense against modern threats, and the points

put orth in this volume will contribute to operational and strategic successesin uture campaigns. Tese writings all ampliy the need or developing and

rening expertise in the use o surrogate orces in modern warare. I believe

the military proessional will benet rom reading and understanding the

various opinions oered in this volume.

James D. Anderson, Director o ResearchJSOU Strategic Studies Department


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1

Newton: The Seeds of Surrogate Warfare

The Seeds of Surrogate Warfare

Richard D. NewtonThe tenets of surrogate warfare as described in the following essays

by Majors Peltier, Smith, and Homiakadvising, assisting, and train-

ing indigenous forces in order to achieve the sponsors goals

were developed, tested, and perfected during the U.S.-Soviet Union

proxy wars of the Cold War. This essay examines three of those con-

icts: Philippines from 19471952, El Salvador from 19771989, and

Afghanistan from 19791989. They serve as examples ofcombatdevelopment laboratories where the principals of through, with,

or by were perfectedprinciples that a new generation of SOF

leaders would apply to surrogate warfare in the 21st century.

Introduction

In July o 1969, President Richard Nixon articulated a new approach to

U.S. national security objectives. As a newly elected president who had

inherited an unpopular war, President Nixons vision was to pursue

American national security goals through partnership with riends and

allies o the United States. Tat announcement, aferwards known as the

Nixon Doctrine, armed to the world that the United States would keep

all o its treaty commitments and in the case o aggression short o nuclear

conrontation, the U.S. would urnish military and economic assistance but

would look to the host nations to assume the primary responsibility or ur-nishing the manpower to deend themselves.1 Te Nixon Doctrine, allowing

advice and assistance, but eschewing direct military involvement, has been

rearmed by everyU.S. President since, albeit to diering degrees. More

importantly or the purpose o this volume, however, Nixons 40-year-old

pronouncement provided the policy basis or modern surrogate warare.

Mr. Rick Newton retired from Air Force Special Operations Command in

1999 after 21 years as an air commando and combat rescue pilot. He is

currently a faculty member of the Joint Special Operations University and

serves as an adjunct faculty member at the U.S. Army School of Advanced

Military Studies and the NATO School.


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2

JSOU Report 09-3, Irregular Warfare and Indirect Approaches

Troughout the Cold War, both the United States and the Soviet Union

used a collection o surrogates to urther their political, and by extension

their military, agendas around the world. In an era o mutual nuclear deter-rence, both the U.S. and the Soviet Union chose to support surrogates in

a series o proxy wars. Over 50 years o indirect conrontation between

the superpowers maniested itsel in scores o limited conicts in Arica,

the Middle East, Southeast Asia, South Asia, Central America, and South

America.2 Te Soviets and the U.S. conronted each other or inuence

and access on the periphery o what both considered the main arenathe

central plains o Europe. Te unexpected (perhapsunintended) result o

ve decades o indirect superpower conrontation was that U.S. SpecialOperations Forces (SOF) developed the skills, attitude, and ethos they

later needed or the very successul surrogate warare campaigns waged in

Aghanistan (2001) and northern Iraq (2003).

Te seeds to modern surrogate warare, at least in the U.S. version, go all

the way back to beore the Revolutionary War. Te Special Forces philoso-

phy o conducting operations through, with, or by indigenous populations

has its origins in the beginning o the Republic.3

Both the British and theFrench enlisted native American surrogates in their rontier battles o the

17th and 18th centuries. During the westward expansion beore and afer

the Civil War, the Army recruited or coerced Indians to ght against those

Indians who opposed the settlers, ranchers, and miners moving west. In

1901, afer the Spanish-American War, the U.S. Army organized riendly

Filipinos into the Philippine Constabulary to ght and paciy the indigenous

groups opposed to the U.S. occupation. Troughout World War II, the U.S.

Army Oce o Special Services, the orerunner to todays Special Forcesand the Central Intelligence Agency, used surrogates in Southeast Asia to

ght against the Japanese and in Europe to ght against the Axis powers.

It was only natural, then, or the U.S. to continue using native surrogates

during the Cold War to counter Soviet aspirations.

Aer the Allied victory in World War II many ormer European colonies

in Asia and Arica saw an opportunity to assert their native nationalism and

gain independence rom the colonial powers. Te Soviet Union used these

independence movements as opportunities to export the Communist orm

o socialism and to gain international supporters as a counter to the U.S. and

its European allies. Te U.S., ush with victory but tired afer years o war,

sought a low cost means o supporting its treaty commitments, assisting its


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3


allies, and countering the spread o Communism. As the U.S. government

provided equipment and unds, training indigenous orces and advising

riendly oreign governments and their armed orces became the SpecialForces raison dtre.

Te U.S. Army and the U.S. Air Force retained their organizational, train-

ing, procurement, and planning eorts to a near-exclusive ocus on peer

versus peer, conventional warare.4 Both the Army and Air Force lef the

uncomortable and oen messy environment o limited warare, guerrilla

warare, insurgency, counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, counterrevolu-

tionary warare, and irregular warare to their respective SOF.5,6

Tis division o labor was not necessarily a bad thing. While the biggreen Army and the big blue Air Force ocused on what the national

leadership perceived to be the most dangerous threat to the U.S. national

survivaldeterring direct conrontation with the Soviet Union, SOF con-

ducted economy-o-orce activities on the periphery o the main arena. For

over ve decades, the U.S. Army Special Forces, and to a lesser extent, the

Air Commandos o the U.S. Air Force, quietly practiced and perected the

regional, cultural, diplomatic, and trainer skills so necessary or success insurrogate warare. Teir quiet eorts in the ar-ung regions o the world

bred a cadre o special operators comortable with surrogate warare, away

rom the comortable and robust inrastructure o the conventional Army

and Air Force based primarily in central Europe.

Although these low intensity conicts 7 were the most prevalent orm o

conict the United States engaged in during the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, they

were decidedly an economy-o-orce eort. Small SOF teams would deploy

or months at a time to remotelocations; their ocus was to train,

assist, and advise the indigenous

orces and governments that

supported U.S. national goals. In

addition to the small-unit tactical

skills they employed and taught

their hosts, Special Forces train-

ing included a healthy dose o regional amiliarity, local languages, cul-

tural acumen, and instructor development. A Special Forces soldier had to

become part anthropologist, part diplomat, part organizational developer,

and part cultural attach as well as being an excellent soldier and trainer.

Small SOF teams would deploy for

months at a time to remote locations;

their focus was to train, assist, and

advise the indigenous forces and

governments that supported U.S.

national goals.


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4


Operating embedded with or alongside their native hosts around the world,

the Special Forces became this nations principal tool to recruit, organize,

train, and lead surrogate orces sympathetic to U.S. national interests.Te Special Forces operational methodologyembedding with their

host-nation counterparts, speaking the hosts languages, and using the hosts

equipmentproved to be relatively inexpensive or the United States to

sustain, kept the American presence to a minimum in areas that may have

political aversion to oreign involvement, and improved the ability o the

host orces to provide or their nations deenses. In return, U.S. Special

Forces gained tactical skills related to the native environment (e.g., jungle

warare or desert warare) they were able to bring home and teach to theirU.S. counterparts. Te lessons learned in scores o anti-Communist cam-

paigns around the world were applied with great success during the uncon-

ventional warare campaigns in Aghanistan (2001) and in northern Iraq

(2003). Te seeds o 21st century surrogate warare were sown during those

ve decades o anti-Soviet experiences and cultivated to maturity by the

Special Forces core purpose and core valuesaccomplishing their assigned

missions through, with, or by indigenous orces.8

The Philippines, 19461954

By 1942, the Hukbalahap (Peoples Anti-Japanese Army in agalog, nick-

named the Huks)the military arm o the Communist Philippines Party

(PKP)was actively attacking Japanese outposts and units in Luzon to gain

weapons and supplies. Americans who had reused General MacArthurs

surrender order and took to the hills helped the Huks organize their units,set up training camps, and served as advisors to the tactical units ghting

a guerrilla campaign against the Japanese. When MacArthur and the U.S.

Sixth Army landed on Luzon, they met a large, highly organized indig-

enous military orce led byU.S. advisors. Te 20,000 Filipino guerrillas

had eectively contained the Japanese to a series o coastal ortsthereby

providing a sae and secure, anti-Japanese environment or the populace.9

TePKP

, meanwhile redistributed lands rom absent large landowners tothe peasants, set up schools, and ormed local governments to manage the

villages.10

Afer the war, when the government o the Philippines returned

rom exile, it ailed to address the single greatest issue plaguing Filipino


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societyland reorm.11 When the government, the wealthy landowners,

and the industrialists returned aer the war, they reasserted their historical

claims to the land and returned to the 400-year-old plantation and tenantarming system that had been originally set up by the Spanish and main-

tained by the Americans and then the Filipino oligarchy. It was an unair

system that gave the PKP and the Huks the cause they needed, land or the

landless, to oppose the government.12

Te Huks did not initially oppose the return o the popular and power-

ul American military. Also, the ruman Administration had committed

to Filipino independence and was pumping reconstruction aid into the

islands. Tis quiet period gave the PKP time to organize itsel and gaincontrol o the many disparate socialist and Communist groups throughout

the Philippine archipelago. Te PKP, with Chinese and Soviet assistance,

reoriented itsel against the pro-Western government o President Manuel

Roxas and began a Maoist-style, protracted popular war to take over the

country. From 1946 to 1949, the Philippine governments mailed st tac-

tics and heavy handed anti-Huk policies ailed to address the root causes o

the insurgency and drove many disaected peasants into the ranks o theinsurgents.13 Philippine Army leaders and their American advisors ghting

against the Huks noted the success o the Huks integrated civil-military

programs, but their reports were ignored by conventional military leaders

who had been trained to ght against other organized armies in Western

sta schools and were ocused exclusively on a military solution.14

President Roxas was succeeded by President Elpidio Quirino. He recog-

nized that a new strategy was needed to counter the Huks and in 1949 began

a series o nancial and land reorms. President Quirino appointed a newsecretary or national deense in 1950, Ramon Magsaysay, a gied and char-

ismatic ormer guerrilla leader who had ought against the Japanese with

the U.S. Army Forces Far East, to lead the security eort. Also in 1950, the

U.S. recognized how close the Filipino government was to collapse. President

ruman committed the United States to support the Philippines eorts

against the Communist-supported Huks. Te Joint U.S. Military Advisory

Group (JUSMAG) Philippines was expanded, and aid and assistance began

to ow. In addition to money, equipment, and training, American advi-

sors helped the Philippine government develop a comprehensive assistance

program to complement the military, political, and social reorms being

instituted by Magsaysay.15


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Almost immediately afer assuming his duties, Magsaysay began an

intense eort to reorm the Army o the Philippines, weeding out corrupt

or inept senior leaders, demanding accountability or human rights abuses,and promoting ocers who supported his views on winning the support

o the populace. Magsaysay was tireless in his eorts to change the peoples

perception o the Philippine Army and National Police, spurred in part

by his close riend and advisor, U.S. Air Force Lieutenant Colonel Edward

Lansdale.

Lt Col Lansdale led the American program to assist Magsaysay. It is

interesting to note that U.S. eorts in the Philippines were constrained by

some very ortunate circumstances. First, the U.S. military was committedto the reconstruction o Europe and Japan, and also to the war in Korea.

Tere were no conventional U.S. Army units available or a counterinsur-

gency eort in the Philippines. Second, all arms and materiel given to the

Filipinos were taken rom excess World War II stocksthe weapons were

amiliar to the Filipinos, the arms and ammunition were plentiul and were

essentially ree, and they were airly easy to maintain. And third, Lansdales

leadership style and close riendship with Ramon Magsaysay encouragedthe Filipinos to take responsibility or the success or ailure o their war

against the Huks.

Te American advisors in the Philippines, rom the battalion level to

President Magsaysay, advised their counterparts on counterguerrilla tactics

and encouraged them to orm local solutions. During an interview aer he

had retired rom the Air Force, Lansdale noted that, the Filipinos best knew

the problems, best knew how to solve them, and they did itwith U.S. aid

and advice, but without U.S. domination o their eort. 16 American advi-sors were instructed to take a back seat and give their Filipino counterparts

credit or successes.

U.S. military trainers began teaching patrolling skills, especially night

patrolling, squad and platoon tactics o the main lines o communica-

tions, and the same hit-and-run tactics used by the Huk guerrillas. 17 More

important than teaching tactics, U.S. trainers imparted Magsaysays pas-

sion or improving the Armys treatment o the civilian population, and

they helped reorganize the Army o the Philippines (AFP) into lighter and

more mobile battalion combat teams. Tey also built a unctioning logistics

system to sustain the units and equipment.18U.S. trainers were prohibited

rom accompanying AFP units as advisors and observers during combat


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7


operations, however. Te thought was that the Americans would take over

or be thrust into a de acto leadership role at the tactical level and the Huks

would turn the presence o the Americans against the government by adver-tising their cause as a ght to expel another oreign occupier. Despite the

advisors desire to get into the eld with their units, at the strategic level,

this restriction proved to be sound.

In 1953, though, an important change took place in the U.S. philoso-

phyAmerican military advisors were nally permitted to accompany and

observe, but not actively participate in, AFP combat operations. Whenever

advice was shared, it was given directly to the tactical Filipino leader who

needed it, as low in the organization as possible, and given by an advisorwho the recipient knew and trusted. In addition, the advisors/observers

took note o the tactics employed, the eect military actions were having

on the populace, and the how the U.S.-supplied equipment was used. When

the advisors/observers returned to their base camps, these real-time lessons

were used to update and improve training programs.

Even though the U.S. government provided most o the material, arms,

and money to und the AFP and provided advice when it was needed, it wasFilipinos who ought the battles against the Communist-sponsored Huks

and ran the social and economic programs. By 1954, Filipino police, military,

and civilian ocials, along with their American trainers and advisors, had

successully neutralized the Huks through a coordinated military and civil-

ian campaign, addressed the peasants social, economic, and educational

grievances, and restored the legitimacy o the government. Te Filipinos,

with the help o American advisors, had taken back their country rom the

Communist insurgents.19

El Salvador, 19771992

In 1969, Salvador Cayetano Carpio, then the secretary-general o El

Salvadors Communist Party (PCES), recommended starting a Maoist-style

protracted popular war to overthrow the most recent military junta gov-

erning El Salvador. Tis position was rejected by thePCES

, and CayetanoCarpio was expelled rom the Party. In 1971, though, Cayetano Carpio and

a group o El Salvadoran Communists returned rom years o training and

indoctrination in Cuba and Vietnam to organize the countrys rst guerrilla

movement, the Farabundo Marti Popular Forces o Liberation.20 Trough


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the 1970s, competing dissident groups ought the successive corrupt, ofen

incompetent, and repressive governments and each other, struggling or

control o a nation racked by poverty, corruption, violence, and disease.Human rights abuses by both the rebels and the government orces were

common. By 1979 at least ve major insurgent groups were seeking to impose

a Communist-style socialist government in El Salvador.

Te governments internal problems, its string o human rights abuses,

and the ailure to address the root causes o popular dissatisaction

unemployment, lack o educational opportunities, desperately needed land

reorm, and rampant government arrogancecaused disaected young

men to ock to the rebels cause. Even priests in the normally noncommittalRoman Catholic Church began to dey their superiors counsel to remain

neutral and took a more activist stance against the government. In 1979, the

PCES nally accepted armed struggle as the only means o changing the

government in El Salvador a position rst recommended 10 years earlier

by Cayetano Carpio.21

In December 1979, the ve major Salvadoran revolutionary groups

gathered in Havana, Cuba at Fidel Castros invitation to organize into asingle, coordinated eort. Although the groups had disparate goals and

backgrounds, the common theme was their desire to impose a Communist-

style government in El Salvador to rectiy the missteps and abuses o centu-

ries o colonial, then military, rule. In 1980, the Farabundo Mart National

Liberation Front (FMLN) asserted itsel as the single revolutionary party in

El Salvador. Te FMLN was able to secure economic and military aid, nanc-

ing, and training rom the Soviet Union, Libya, Cuba, Nicaragua, and even

radical groups in the United States to support its revolutionary goals.Although purporting itsel to be the single voice o revolutionary change

in El Salvador, the FMLN was an inherently weak organization. Te FMLN

had tenuous control at best o the various rebel groups.22 More a loose coned-

eration o local guerrilla organizations than a strong, united revolutionary

ront committed to new El Salvador, the FMLN was never able to reconcile

the diverging and usually competing strategies employed by the dierent

actions.23 For example, a Cuban-style oco model employed by an urban-

based group ofen conicted with the Maoist popular war strategy used by

a rural group. Te result was contradictory political, social, and military

FMLN operations over the course o the war that gave the government much


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9


needed time to adjust its own social and economic programs, change its

military tactics, and address its internal deciencies.

In January 1981, the FMLN called or a nal oensive, a Maoist-styleStage 3 eort to deeat the government using conventional military orce.

Te move was premature, however, and the army deeated the rebels and sent

the insurgents into the mountains or sanctuary. Te Carter Administration

in the United States reacted to this FMLN/Communist threat by restoring $5

million in military aid. In 1982, the newly elected Reagan Administration

committed the U.S. to political, economic, and military assistance in El

Salvador to counter Soviet-sponsored Communist expansion in the Western

hemisphere.24

Remembering the recent lessons o Vietnam, the size o the U.S. con-

tingent was limited to 55 military advisors and trainers. Te Americans

set up training camps in El Salvador and in neighboring Honduras; they

also sent two to three ocers or NCOs to live and work with each o the six

Salvadoran brigades. Te mission o these assigned advisors was to reinorce

the lessons taught in the training centers, provide assessments o the units

eectiveness, and change the El Salvadoran Armys historically terriblehuman rights record.

More like the American experience in the Philippines than in Vietnam,

advisors were prohibited rom engaging in combat operations in order to

maintain the perception that this

was an El Salvadoran war to be

won or lost by the El Salvadorans.

Another consequence o the small

U.S. presence was the ease by whichU.S. advisors and the accompany-

ing aid package could be withdrawn rom those units not actively correct-

ing their human rights problems. Te Armys treatment o noncombatants,

innocent civilians, and prisoners radically and quickly improved because

o this carrot and stick approach to behavior modication.

Changing the El Salvadoran Armys attitude towards its civilian popu-

lation allowed the government to begin ocusing on the root causes o the

insurgencyland reorm, the lack o educational opportunities, a sickly

economy, and a corrupt electoral process. Basing U.S. military aid on dem-

onstrated social and political improvements was beginning to pay o as

More like the American experience

in the Philippines than in Vietnam,

advisors were prohibited from

engaging in combat operations


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10


popular support or the FMLN began to swing to the government. But in

1983, FMLN guerrillas adjusted their tactics and sent small, highly trained

teams o commandos to execute a series o successul raids against heav-ily deended El Salvadoran bases. U.S. advisors also adjusted quickly and

reoriented the training and advisory programs to ocus on small-unit tac-

tics more appropriate to a counterguerrilla style o warare.25 More impor-

tantly, however, the changes in tactics, attitudes, and treatment o civilians

that resulted rom the actions oU.S. trainers and advisors supported the

larger, longer-term eorts o El Salvadors multiaceted national campaign

or deeating the FMLN.

As the El Salvadoran Army changed its tactics, its attitude, and its trackrecord, the climate or political change improved too. In March 1984, Jos

Napolen Duartea previous mayor o the capital, San Salvador, a graduate

o Notre Dame, and the president o El Salvador rom 1980 to 1982was

reelected to the presidency on a platorm o social and economic reorms,

eliminating human rights abuses, and negotiation with the FMLN. Duartes

election, El Salvadors rst ree election in 50 years, was marred by the act

that El Salvador was in near ull civil war. Over the next ew years, Duartewas unable to institute most o his promised economic and social programs

due to intransigence by both the insurgents and the hard-liners in his own

administration. In 1989 Duartes Christian Democratic Party was deeated

by Alredo Christiani and the ARENA party, the rst peaceul transer o

power to an opposition candidate in El Salvadors history.26

Te Soviet Unions troubles at home and abroad contributed to chang-

ing the FMLNs reluctance to negotiate. Te Soviets were trying to extricate

themselves rom Aghanistan, were dealing with nationalist independencemovements among their client states in the Soviet Union and the Warsaw

Pact, and had a ailing economy at home. In neighboring Nicaragua, the

newly elected Violeta Chamorro government had decided to ocus on inter-

nal problems; they also stopped supporting the FMLN insurgents. With the

insurgents external military, economic, and nancial support reduced to a

trickle, and the U.S. Congress threatening decreased support to the govern-

ment, both sides came to the negotiating table in 1990. By 1991, negotiations

with the FMLN produced a truce that ended the war in 1992, created a new

Constitution, established a civilian police orce, and transormed the FMLN

into a legal political party.


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11


Te government o El Salvador and its military and police orceswith

the aid, advice, and assistance o the United States and the U.S. military

advisorshad deeated the Communist-sponsored FMLN insurgency.

Afghanistan, 19791989

Aghanistan sits astride the crossroads o civilizations. For over two millen-

nia, trade routes rom China and India to Europe and Arabia have passed

through this mountainous and oen barren land. Great invading armies

rom Alexander to the Mongols, the British, the Soviets, and now the U.S.

and its European allieshave had to deal with the quandary that was andis Aghanistan.

Troughout its thousands o years o history, Aghanistan has main-

tained its traditional tribal and amilial culture. When Islam arrived with

Arab invaders in the 7th century, it provided a loose sense o pseudo-nation-

alism, giving the tribes a sense o culture, morality, and tradition that would

normally have come rom a shared development and common history. But

when aced with stress or conict, Aghans normally reverted to their ami-lies, clans, and tribes or security, saety, and comort. Te Soviets, during

their 50 years o involvement with Aghanistan during the Cold War, ailed

to address this key trait o Aghan society and culture.

As early as 1919, just afer the Russian Revolution, the Soviet Union

was unneling money, arms, and training to support Aghan rebels ght-

ing the British in India (present day Pakistan). According to Dr. Stephen

Blank at the U.S. Air Force Air University, Soviet involvement had turned

Aghanistan into a virtual client state. 27 By the mid-1960s, the Soviet Unionwas sending millions o dollars each year in economic, military, and political

aid to Aghanistan. Soviet investment in Aghanistan guaranteed they held a

strategic position between two U.S. allies in the region, Pakistan and Iran.

In 1973, Mohammed Daoud Khan became the rst president o

Aghanistan aer overthrowing the monarchy o Zahir Shah in a bloodless

coup. Daoud was a Pashtun who supported an independent Pashtunistan.

Tis position ensured theU.S.

would not look avorably on supportingAghanistan against the Soviets, as an independent homeland or the

Pashtuns would require the U.S. ally, Pakistan, to give up major portions

o its territory. In an eort to secure his position in the region, aced with


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12


a complex and unstable internal political situation, and recognizing that

Aghanistan was one o the poorest, least educated, and backward societies

in the world, Daoud continued Zahir Shahs policies o accepting Soviet aid,advice, and assistance.28 In 1977, however, Daoud began to move away rom

the Soviet Union and the Cuban-led nonaligned movement. With U.S. sup-

port and concurrence, he requested and received training rom Egypt and

aid rom both Iran and Saudi Arabia. Daoud began the process o shifing

Aghanistans orientation towards the oil-rich and pro-Western nations o

the Arabian Gul.29

In August 1978, a group o Soviet-trained Aghan ocers and the pro-

Soviet Peoples Democratic Party o Aghanistan (PDPA) seized control othe government and ounded the Democratic Republic o Aghanistan.

President Daoud was assassinated and a Marxist, Nur araki, was installed

as president.30 Unortunately, the PDPA was not ready to govern such a

large and diverse country as Aghanistan. With its urban base, its Marxist-

Leninist orientation, and with the concurrence o its Soviet advisors, the

PDPA attempted to change Aghan traditions.31 Te PDPAs Marxist-Leninist

antipathy towards both religion and the peasantry resulted in misguidedpolicies regarding land reorm, emale emancipation, language, and religious

observances. Tese unpopular changes were strongly resisted by the local

political and religious leaders and resulted in open rebellion against the

PDPA-led government.

With entire units deecting and the Aghan army down to hal its

strength, the Aghan government looked to the Soviet Union or help to

quell the rebellion. In July 1979, the Soviets sent an airborne battalion to

Bagram Air Base to protect President araki. Shortly thereaer, the arakigovernment requested an additional two motorized rie divisions and an

airborne division be deployed to Aghanistan. While the Soviets were anx-

ious to keep Aghanistan in their sphere o inuence, they were not in a

hurry to honor the araki governments requests or a large commitment

o troops and equipment, however.

By December 1979, the situation in Kabul had deteriorated to the point

that the Soviet General Sta sent a group o specialized airborne and intel-

ligence troops to help liberate Aghanistan. Te Soviets installed Babrak

Karmal into power.32 In the spring o 1980, Soviet ground troops deployed

to Aghanistan and an airborne division deployed to Bagram Air Base. Te

Soviet incursion had the opposite o the desired eectinstead o calming


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13


or controlling the rebellion, the Soviets presence incited an unexpected

eeling o Aghan nationalism. It was as i the only thing the disparate tribes

would agree on was that they did not want oreigners in their country.From 1980 to 1985, the ght in Aghanistan devolved into a classic guer-

rilla campaign. Te Soviets and their Aghan clients occupied the cities and

controlled the main transportation arteries, while 80 percent o the coun-

tryside was controlled by the opposing tribes.33 By 1985, over 110,000 Soviet

troops were deployed to Aghanistan to combat approximately 100,000

mujahideen ghterssignicantly short o the doctrinally recommended

ratio o 10 soldiers or every guerrilla combatant.34

Almost as soon as the Soviets began their deployment to Aghanistan,the United States sought ways o countering the Soviet incursion. President

Carter and then President Reagan both authorized intelligence and aid

packages to assist the Aghan guerrillas. President Reagan increased the

pressure on the Soviets by encouraging U.S. allies and regional partners to

provide arms, money, and training to surrogates willing to challenge the

Soviets growing inuence and presence in South Asia.

U.S. support o the Aghans was intentionally low key. Although theCarter and Reagan administrations were keen to challenge Soviet expansion

in South and Southwest Asia, they had to be mindul o national and cul-

tural sensitivities in the region and o provoking the Soviets to expand the

conict by engaging their own proxies in the regionIndia, Iraq, and Syria.

Te U.S. supported Middle Eastern surrogates rom Saudi Arabia, the United

Arab Emirates, Egypt, and Iran to supply military, humanitarian, and nan-

cial aid to the mujahideen, through Pakistan.35 Te external aid consisted o

modern light inantry weapons, primarily rom the Soviet Union and theWarsaw Pact, and the training provided built upon the Aghans traditional

ghting methodsambushes and raids against the vulnerabilities inherent

in the Soviets mechanized, conventional style o warare. Tese were the

same guerrilla techniques the Aghans oreathers had employed in the 19th

century against British conventional battalions.

From sanctuaries outside o Aghanistan, primarily in Pakistan, advi-

sors and trainers worked with the Aghan resistance on individual and

small-unit skills. More importantly, though, they developed communi-

cations techniques and ostered coordinated operations between tactical/

tribal unitsan inherent deciency in the Aghans clan-based and amilial

traditions. With a supply o amiliar arms and ammunition assured rom


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14


external sources, the Aghans learned to integrate modern heavier weap-

ons such as machine guns, wired-guided antiarmor missiles, and rocket-

propelled grenades in a supporting role, yet still retaining their traditionalghting methods.

Te Soviets countered improved Aghan guerrilla tactics with air mobil-

ity and aerial re support to great eect. Mi-24 attack helicopters and Su-25

attack aircraf oset the Aghans inherent mobility, knowledge o the ter-

rain, and improved weapons.36 In 1986, though, the U.S. changed the equa-

tion again in avor o their surrogates by providing Stinger antiaircraf

missiles and training to the Aghans.37 Te threat o the Stingers neutral-

ized the Soviets heliborne advantage, and the war returned to its previousunpopular, costly, and near stalemate conditions.

When Mikhail Gorbachev became the prime minister o the Soviet Union

in 1988, he promised to withdraw Soviet orces rom Aghanistan within the

year. Te rst Soviet units began their withdrawal by the spring o 1988, and

the entire Soviet Army had lef Aghanistan by February 1989.38 Te Soviet

Union paid a terrible price or its adventure in Aghanistanin lost con-

dence in the Communist ideology at home and among its client states, intens o thousands o physical and psychological casualties, and in lost power

and prestige worldwide. Tough it was not one o the expected outcomes o

U.S. actions in Aghanistan at the time, U.S. surrogates and their American

advisors helped orce the eventual collapse o the Soviet Union.

Conclusion

Te war in Vietnam ocially ended in April 1975 when North Vietnamesearmored columns deeated the Army o the Republic o South Vietnam,

although U.S. involvement had ended in 1973 with the signing o the Paris

Peace Accords. In the afermath o Vietnam, Americas ocer corps reori-

ented itsel away rom those activities they perceived had ailed to win in

Vietnam.39 Among their rustrations was that despite years o military assis-

tance, the South Vietnamese Army had been unable to eliminate Viet Cong

insurgents in the South or to stem the invasion by North Vietnamese regularorces attacking rom the north.

Te Nixon Doctrine reected the Presidents rustration and the nations

determination to not place large bodies o American soldiers in harms way

again, deending another nation against an internal or an external aggressor.


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15


Tough the series o proxy wars over the next three decades was widespread

and requent, these politically uncertain, unconventional, irregular, and/or

low intensity conicts provided a persistent and unwanted distraction romthe Department o State and Department o Deenses main task o deter-

ring direct conict with the Soviet Union. Conventionally minded Deense

leaders happily passed responsibility or the U.S. militarys response to the

Soviets proxy wars to the nations SOF. Tat orce evolved into a low cost

and low ootprint unconventional orceorganized, trained, and equipped

to advise, assist, and train U.S. surrogates in distant regions and to counter

Soviet-sponsored aggression in the developing world.

Over the course o the Cold Wars proxy wars, the U.S. had to relearnthat indigenous opposition groups were rarely unied. Tey, like con-

stituent groups in every country, had personal agendas and specic goals.

Successul U.S. advisors studied and learned as much as they could about

their opponents objectives, ideologies, cultures, motivations, heritage, and

traditionsthis was the anthropologist, diplomat, and cultural attach part

o their advisory role. Special operations advisors exploited those dierences

and sensitivities when helping their hosts develop, implement, and adjustthe social, economic, political, and security programs needed to counter

insurgents around the world. Tose young Special Forces ocers held onto

the lessons they learned during these surrogate/proxy conicts around the

world; and as they became senior leaders and mentors, they passed those

lessons on to the next generations o special operations advisors.

Te Philippines, El Salvador, and Aghanistan are three o the major

instances where U.S. military advisors developed and rened the tactics,

techniques, and procedures or successul surrogate warare. Te Kennedyand Johnson Administrations seemingly ignored the lessons learned in the

Philippines, Americanized the South Vietnamese Army into a modern

conventional orce, and thus the U.S. and their South Vietnamese allies

ailed to deeat the Communist North Vietnamese.40 In El Salvador and

against the Soviets in Aghanistan, political restrictions kept the U.S. pres-

ence small, but the U.S. took great advantage oSOFs unconventional war-

are skills in physically and politically risky environments. Te indigenous

surrogates, with the economic and military aid and the corresponding

training originally promised by the Nixon Doctrine and implemented by

Presidents Carter and Reagan, deeated the Soviets and Soviet-sponsored

adversaries.


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16


By the time U.S. and Aghan Northern Alliance orces had deeated

the aliban, the Soviet Union had died and the ideological motivation had

changed. In the Philippines, El Salvador, and Aghanistan, U.S. advisorsand trainers developed and perected the principles o through, with, or

by described in the essays by Majors Homiak, Peltier, and Smith. Te doc-

trine and the integrated social, political, economic, and military tactics,

techniques, and procedures or surrogate warare these ocers and their

contemporaries applied as combat leaders in Aghanistan and Iraq are the

product o ve decades o uncomortable, politically dicult, and ofen

messy proxy wars between the U.S. and the Soviet Union.

Endnotes. Richard M. Nixon, Address to the Nation on the War in Vietnam, November

; available rom www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid= (accessedon December ).

Also Bard E. ONeill, Insurgency & errorism: Inside Modern RevolutionaryWarare (Dulles, VA: Brasseys, Inc., ), .

. Afer the end o the World War II, and once the Soviets gained nuclear weap-ons and the ability to deliver those weapons onto U.S. soil, the two superpowersengaged in over ve decades o surrogate conrontation. In proxy wars romVietnam to Angola, El Salvador, Aghanistan, and Yemen (and the list goes on),the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. armed, equipped, trained, and at times lead the soldiersand the guerrillas o rd World nations, seeking to bring or retain those nationsin their competing camps o democracy or communism.

. COL Mark Boyatt, Special Forces: Who Are We and What Are We? SpecialWarare, Summer , .

. A conventional American general told an interviewer rom the Rand Corporationin , Ill be damned i I permit the United States Army, its institutions, itdoctrine, and its traditions to be destroyed just to win this lousy war. Quotedin Ian F. W. Beckett,Modern Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies (London:Routledge, ), .

. GEN John Galvin, as the commander o U.S. Southern Command, coined theterm Uncomortable Wars when reerring to this environment in the winter edition oParameters, the U.S. Army War College proessional journal.

. Air Force Manual -, actical Air OperationsSpecial Air Warare (Washington,DC: HQ Air Force, March ), . Basically, the task o Air Force COIN orces

is to provide advice, training, and assistance to indigenous orces.

. Low intensity conict was a pseudonym used in the s and s to reer to theconicts usually ought by guerrillas, most oen revolutionaries and insurgents,seeking to change the political status quo. Unortunately, the term is misleading,


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17


as combat may have been contained to a particular country or region, or by thedestructive capacity o the weapons involved, but it was rarely o low intensity.

. Boyatt, . Te Special Forces core purpose is to accomplish its missions through,with, or by indigenous populations, and their core values are unconventionalism,strength o character, doing what is right, and making a dierence.

. Robert B. Asprey, War in the Shadows: Te Guerrilla in History, Vol. 1 (New York:William Morrow and Co, ), .

. Ian F.W. Beckett, Modern Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies (London:Routledge, ), .

. Asprey, .

. Walter Laqueur, Guerrilla: A Historical and Critical Study (Boulder, CO: Westview

Press, ), . Potentially, the Huks had even greater peasant appealthan had either the Chinese or Vietnamese Communists; they had laid the broadoundations or it during the war on the dual count o ghting the invader andtheir insistence on a just redistribution o the land.

. Beckett, .

. Napoleon D. Valeriano, Counter-Guerrilla Seminar at Fort Bragg, NC, June; received rom www.icdc.com/~paulwol/colombia/hukcampaignju-neI.htm (accessed on December ). COL Valeriano led the Filipinoth Battalion Combat eam against the Huks.

. MAJ Lawrence M. Greenberg, Te Hukbalahap Insurrection: A Case Study o aSuccessul Anti-Insurgency Operation in the Philippines, 1946-1955 (Washington,DC: U.S. Army Center or Military History, ), .

. Greenberg, .

. Greenberg, . Luis aruc, leader o the Huks, noted that American aid andadvice was causing the tide o battle to change as the Philippine governmentwas changing its tactics and addressing the social and economic causes o theinsurgency.

. Greenberg, .

. Ibid., .

. Asprey, .

. Ibid., .

. Ibid., .

. ONeill, .

. Ibid., .

. Aprey, .

. www.nationsencyclopedia.com/Americas/El-Salvador-History.html (accessed on

December ).. Dr. Stephen Blank, Soviet Russian and Central Asia, in Low-intensity Confict in

the Tird World, Lewis B. Ware, editor (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press,August ), .


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18


. Asprey, .

. Blank, .

. Ali Ahmad Jalali and Lester W. Grau, Te Other Side o the Mountain: Mujahideenactics in the Soviet-Aghan War(Quantico, VA: U.S. Marine Corps Studies andAnalysis Division, no date), vxi.

. Anthony J. Joes, Resisting Rebellion: Te History and Politics o Counterinsurgency(Lexington, KY: University o Kentucky Press, ), .

. Asprey,.

. Beckett, .

. Joes, .

. Grau, xviii.

. Richard A. Clarke,Against All Enemies: Inside Americas War on error(NewYork: Simon & Schuster, Inc., ), .

. Beckett, and Clarke, -. Clarke goes on to quote Assistant Secretary oDeense, Richard Perle, as insisting that the U.S. Army advisors conduct all Stingertraining rom bases in Pakistan.

. Clarke, .

. Te Economist, Afer Smart Weapons, Smart Soldiers, no author given, October , .

. Joes, .


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19

Homiak: Expanding the American Way of War

Expanding the American Way of War:

Working Through, With, or ByNon-U.S. ActorsTravis L. Homiak

The indirect method of through, with, or by seeks to use relation-

ships with non-U.S. actors and shared recognition of a common

problem to produce mutually benecial outcomes. This indirect

approach supports achieving U.S. operational objectives with-out promoting perceptions of U.S. hegemony. Consequently, this

method offers the combatant commander a viable alternative to

traditional, direct applications of U.S. military power.

Te U.S. is widely perceived as emphasising military power as a tool

o oreign policy, at the expense o the complexities o diplomacy and

other orms o sof power. Francois Heisbourg, American Hegemony? Perceptions

o the U.S. Abroad, Survival, (Winter 19992000), 13

Introduction

T

he United States has unparalleled national power and global reach.

Logic dictates that such power should acilitate the United States

achieving its national objectives. Americas national power has reallimits in what it can achieve, however.

Te United States currently has no peer competitors able to realisti-

cally challenge them in a conventional military conict. As a result, the

Major Travis Homiak is a U.S. Marine Corps Intelligence ofcer currently

serving as the Plans Ofcer, Marine Forces Special Operations Command.

He submitted this paper while attending the School of Advanced Warghting

(Quantico, Virginia) where he was pursuing his M.S. in Operational Studies.

He would like to thank Lieutenant Colonel Anthony Abati, U.S. Army, for

acting as his mentor during this project and Messrs. Wade Ishimoto and Mark

Boyatt for reviewing earlier drafts.


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U.S. increasingly chooses direct applications o military power to achieve

national security objectives.1 Te direct use o military power (or the threat

thereo) is one element o the nations hard power and constitutes a tradi-tional approach to employing military orce.2 Te invasions o Aghanistan

in 2001 and Iraq in 2003 are both examples o Americas traditional employ-

ment o hard power.

Yet, U.S. military power, applied traditionally in Iraq and Aghanistan,

has proven incapable o achieving its intended policy goals. Particularly in

the case o Iraq, one can argue that Americas decision to directly apply mili-

tary powernotwithstanding the act that the U.S. arguably acted unilat-

erallyhas signicantly hamperedits ability to realize stated policy

objectives. Tis example illustrates

a concern upon which this paper

is basedthat the direct applica-

tion o military power to achieve a

policy objective, at the expense o

less obtrusive military alternativesand balanced employment o national power, may retard rather than enable

the realization o those objectives.

According to Robert Kagan, Americas preeminent military power spawns

a proclivity or direct, unilateral action in pursuit o its policy goals. Kagan

maintains that it is precisely Americas vast military power relative to the

rest o the world that makes its direct use so dicult to sanction.3 Moreover,

the direct, unbalanced employment o military power tends to paint the

United States as a hegemon vis--vis the rest o the world. Consequentlyother nations, to include potential partners, eel threatened by Americas

actions and tend to oppose them as a counterbalance.4

I Americas preeminent military power makes direct applications o

military power problematicspecically, traditional applications o military

powerthe United States must develop an alternative approach. Such an

alternative must include a less intrusive, indirect method that emphasizes

nontraditional applications o military power. Unlike the of ill-perceived

direct approach, this indirect technique should ocus on building mutually

benecial relationships with other agents or actorsnamely, relationships

that enhance our partners capacity and will to take actions that promote

the realization oU.S. national security goals.

the direct application of military

power to achieve a policy objec-

tive, at the expense of less obtrusive

military alternatives and balanced

employment of national power,

may retard rather than enable the

realization of those objectives.


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It is useul to consider unconventional warare (UW), a acet o military

operations that emphasizes indirect methods while seeking to dene and

develop an indirect alternative to the traditional, direct approach. A keycomponent oUW ocuses on working through, with, or by indigenous

or surrogate orces that are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and

directed in varying degrees by an external source. 5 Working through,

with, or by non-U.S. actors oers combatant commanders an indirect

method or resolving dynamic, highly complex problems and achieving

operational-level objectivesa method that, depending on circumstances,

can be politically more palatable and practically easible than employing a

traditional, direct approach. Tis paper will explore through, with, or byas a methodology: dening the terms, discussing the methodologys appli-

cation at the operational level, and considering the associated implications

at the combatant-command level.

What is Really Meant by the PhraseThrough, With, or By? 6

Te phrase through, with, or by can be explained by examining dierent

relationships between two notional actors (i.e., Actor A and Actor B) and

their relative capacities and will or undertaking action. In broad terms,

working through, with, or by reers to the idea that Actor A directly or

indirectly builds Actor Bs capacity and will to take action to address a

given problem, the resolution o which benets both parties. Within this

construct, capacity reers to an actors ability to undertake action in a given

situation, while willreers to an actors ability to decide his own actions. Willhas three components: recognition o the problem, desire to take action,

and determination to see that action through to completion. For clarity, the

terms through, with, or by will be addressed rom most to least visible

with regard to the overt nature o underlying interactions, rather than den-

ing them in the order in which they appear in the Joint UW denition.

With is the most overt association in the methodology, necessitating

a physical presence and associated interaction between Actors A and B.

Accompanied by or accompanying best denes the concept o working

with another agent. 7 In a relationship dened as working with, Actor A

works alongside Actor B to address a given problem while providing Actor B

with the capacity, will, or both required to act. In this relationship, Actor A


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works side by side with Actor B, while acilitating the resolution o a mutual

problem.8 Working with another actor is an on-the-scene activity where

Actor A is physically present with Actor Bthat is, sharing ideas, providingadvice, and combining resources.

A special operations assistance mission whereby Actor A trains and

equips (builds capacity) in Actor B and then ghts alongside him (provides

will) demonstrates working with in terms o a military task. An excellent

historical example is provided by Special Operations Executive/Oce o

Strategic Services (SOE/OSS) operatives who equipped and ought alongside

itos partisans in Yugoslavia during World War II. SOE/OSS operatives

built the partisans capacity or action through aerial-delivered equipment,bolstered their will through their presence as representatives o the Western

Allies (at least initially), and ought side by side to deeat the Germans in

the Balkans.9

Te second o the three relationships in order o observability is working

through and reers to achieving an objective by means o. 10 Working

through implies a relationship in which Actor A works behind the scenes

to provide Actor B with the capacity, will, or both to take action against agiven problem, the resolution o which benets both actors. Te key compo-

nent to working through is Actor As reduced level o direct involvement

in eorts to address the shared problem. In a through relationship, Actor

A employs Actor B as a surrogate, enabling actions intended to resolve a

shared problem by precursor counsel, training, equipping, or combination

thereo.

According to this denition o through, capacity building is not

restricted to increasing physical capability, but can also apply to empower-ing the actions o other actors. I Actor B possesses the physical capability

to take action but lacks the reedom to do so, and Actor A can sanction

Actor Bs actions, then Actor A is working through Actor B by granting

Actor B permission to act. Furthermore, in contrast to working with,

working through necessitates sharing ideas and providing advice with-

outovertly taking action against the common problem. While through

demands cooperation between the actors, it has no requirement or com-

bined action.11

In terms o military tasks, through can best be illustrated by advising

and training missions that all under the aegis o oreign internal deense

(FID). Since 2002, the U.S. has perormed multiple FID missions, working


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through several countries. Specically, a low-visibilityFID mission was

conducted in Yemen in mid-2003, providing their security orces with

enhanced capacity.12

In June o that same year, Yemen used its increasedcapacity to eliminate elements o the Islamic Army o Aden-Abyan (IAA), an

Al Qaeda aliate linked to the bombing o the USSCole.13 Tus, by working

through Yemen to eliminate a terrorist threat, the U.S. enhanced Yemens

internal security while concurrently supporting the war on terrorism.

By is the third and nal relationship o the indirect context, promoting

achievement o a desired outcome through the agency or instrumentality

o another.14 By assumes that an actor, who possesses the capacity and

will sucient to address a given problem, is going to engage that problem.Te essence o by is that Actor B takes action to achieve an objective

desired by Actor A, without Actor A necessarily prompting Actor B to do so.

One can reasonably expect Actor B to address the problem, because Actor

B recognizes the problem and has both the capacity and will to undertake

action toward resolving it.

When the relationship o by is operative in a system composed o

at least three actors, the system can be considered to be sel-regulatingbecause no input is required rom Actor A to elicit action on the part o

Actor B. What is required or by to unction is that both actors recognize

the problem and perceive that solving it will yield a benecial outcome. By

is the least obtrusive o the three relationships because it may not require

any initiating action on the part o Actor A. Actor B simply acts because

he recognizes the benet. In Actor Bs mind, it may be merely coincidental

that Actor A also benets rom Bs actions. On the other hand, a relation-

ship characterized as by can be the result o having previously workedthrough and with an actor, building the capacity and will required or

the uture action. Tus, working through and with may be viewed as

stepping stones to creating a sel-regulating system in which actors take care

o problems that aect the entire system without the prompting or direct

involvement o others to do so.

Te Iranian role in the Dhoar Rebellion in Oman (19621975) is an

excellent example o the U.S. working by another actor. Beginning in 1959

and continuing into the late 1970s, the U.S. worked through Iran in an

eort to contain the Soviet Union.15 During this period, America provided

the Pahlavi monarchy with signicant military assistance against exter-

nal, notably communist, threats.16 In 1973, Iran used its increased military


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capacitywithout America promptingto intervene in the Sultan o Omans

ongoing counterinsurgency campaign against the communist Peoples Front

or the Liberation o Oman (PFLO). Irans military and economic supportmade an indispensable contribution toward turning the tide in Oman. 17

Tis case demonstrates working by because the Shah o Iran indepen-

dently took action against a mutual problem. In act, Americas previous

eorts to build Iranian capacity to counteract regional Soviet inuence

activities conducted under a through relationshipenabled a subsequent

by relationship in which Iran achieved U.S. objectives, while pursuing its

own interests.

What Makes Through, With, or Bya Compelling Alternative to Direct Action?

Te strategy o through, with, or by relies on the proposition that an actor,

possessing or provided with sucient capacity and will to act upon a given

problem, can be reasonably expected to address that problem. Te actors

motivation or action is the perceived benecial outcome that will resultrom solving the problem. Perceived benet is also the motivating actor in

cases where Actor A supplies capacity or will to Actor B. In the latter case,

both parties engage in a relationship that will yield an outcome perceived as

being mutually benecial. In other words, both actors cooperate with one

another to achieve a better endstate than that achievable by acting alone.

At a minimum, three prerequisites must exist or a mutually benecial

exchange to occur between two actors: each actor must have inormation

about the other, each must believe that the exchange will bring about anadvantageous result, and each must be willing to enter into a relationship

with the other. More directly stated, Actor Awhether an individual, orga-

nization, or nation statemust be aware o Actor Bs existence and have

some idea o Bs capacity or action. Without both actors having inormation

or awareness o the other, a relationship would have no basis to develop.

Inormation about the other actor becomes particularly important at the

international level or in cross-cultural exchanges. Cultural knowledge acili-

tates identiying points o commonality between dierent actors that, when

exploited, might yield a mutually benecial result.

Second, each participant in the exchange must believe, or have reason-

able assurance, that the exchange will result in a benecial outcome (i.e., the


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actor will be better o in the end). Tis implies that each actor is rational

and will choose the option that benets him most rom a range o pos-

sibilities.18

Understanding the other actors rationale, although desirable,is not required to achieve a mutually benecial exchange. Indeed, many

conicts are the result o diculties inherent in understanding the ratio-

nale o another nation or culture. Each actor must merely acknowledge

that the other actor is making the best choice or himsel and is, thereore,

acting rationally.19 What really matters is that the two actors are aware o

one another and have recognized that cooperation will result in a mutually

benecial exchange.

In order to cooperate, the two actors must enter into a relationship withone another. Tereore, the building and maintaining o relationships is

another key component o generating a mutually benecial outcome. o

unction eectively, these relationships must be based upon trust and reci-

procity. rust is a vital component in any relationship. Building trust is a

straightorward concept at the interpersonal level; trust results when each

actors expectation that the other will perorm or act as expected is satis-

ed over time. However, trust is not so easily achieved across nation statesand cultures, diverse entities with a myriad o conicting interests and

divergent viewpoints. Pre-existing relationships, interpersonal relation-

ships between the actors representatives, and recurrent exchanges between

actors are mechanisms or creating and maintaining the trust required to

cooperate in such cases.

Through, With, or By at the Operational LevelHow are the principles o through, with, or by applied at the operational

level? Could combatant commanders employ through, with, or by to

achieve operational-level goals? Tis section will address this question, illus-

trating the application o the methodology with three historical examples.

When applied at the operational level, through, with, or by is an

indirect method by which the combatant commander can achieve desired

endstate conditions or operational objectives that directly contribute tocampaign goals. Tis indirect approach is not a panacea. Instead, it provides

combatant commanders with an alternative method, diversiying the locus

o possible employment options. Trough, with, or by can serve as the


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cornerstone method o a campaigns operational design, or it can support

another method that more directly applies U.S. military power.20

Te indirect nature o through, with, or by emphasizes causal rela-tionships (i.e., cause and eect), complementing the doctrinal idea that

logical lines o operation (LOOs) link nodes and decisive points to achieve

the desired endstate when positional reerence to the enemy has little rel-

evance. 21 In its most basic orm, the methodology is nothing more than a

group o actors (i.e., nodes) that recognize a common problem and share a

desire to resolve the problem (i.e., links). Under this approach, harnessing

surrogate desires and resultant actions is essential to achieving the desired

endstate. In act, the ability to tie through, with, or by into a logical LOOwill be determined primarily by the surrogate actors respective capacity

and will, as well as the strength and depth o underlying relationships with

those actors.

Trough, with, or by has application not only as a primary or sup-

porting method o a logical LOO but also within the concept o operational

phasing as described in Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Operation Planning and

illustrated in Figure 1.22

As depicted, the level o direct military eort varies

Figure 1. Notional Operation Plan Phases vs. Level of Military Effort(Joint Publication 5-0)


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across operational phase, rising and alling in accordance with phase-depen-

dent intermediate objectives and the associated logical LOO. Depending

upon specic operational requirements (e.g., time horizons, acceptablerisk, and asset availability/applicability), working through, with, or by

other actors can have applicability in multiple operational planning phases

and LOOs. For example, a FID mission with a regional partner in Phase 0

could contribute directly to deterrence goals in Phase I, raising a partners

capacity and will to deend against the actions o a potentially hostile third

party. Furthermore, surrogate assets, created via through, with, or by in

Phases I and II to support Dominating Activities, could be employed in

Phases IV and V to support both Stabilizing and Enabling Civil AuthorityActivities.

Trough, with, or by can create signicant value or operational plan-

ning when conducted during Phase 0 or Phase I operations. Local- and

theater-shaping activities undertaken indirectly can produce eects that

transcend Shaping Activity objectives, contributing directly to Deterrence

and/or Dominating Activity goals. Additionally, employing through, with,

or by approaches during Phase 0 could minimize the direct military eortrequired in subsequent operational phases, acting as a orce multiplier while

addressing targeted problems.

Historical Examples of Through, With, or By

As previously stated, Americas employment o military orce is not tra-

ditionally associated with an indirect approach. Te United Statesor a

variety o cultural, historical, and economic reasonsofen chooses directconrontation and relies on technologically advanced conventional orces

to wage short, sharp conicts to deeat opponents. However, in the past, the

U.S. military has employed indirect approaches in support o more direct

methods. In some instances, success has validated the use o the indirect

approach. In other instances, the indirect approach was mistakenly applied

and ailed to produce the desired outcome.

During World War II, the Western Allies employed an indirect approachwhile working with itos Partisans in Yugoslavia. Although the Western

Allies successully employed this approach in the Balkans in support o

larger eorts to deeat Germany, indirect methods had the unintended con-

sequence o rustrating their postwar position in Europe. Small OSS/SOE


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teams parachuted into occupied Yugoslavia and worked with Partisan

groups to achieve a dual purpose. Militarily, they tied down the maximum

possible number o German units in the Balkans, hindering movements oGerman troops and assets to other ronts. Politically, these teams provided

the Partisans and local population with tangible evidence o the Western

Allies support or their cause, thereby building Yugoslav will.23

Franklin Lindsay, one such OSS operative, parachuted into Slovenia in

May o 1944 and operated in Yugoslavia through the end o the war. His

specic mission was to cut German rail lines connecting Austria, Italy,

and the Balkans. 24 o accomplish his task, Lindsay worked with a Partisan

group in the Stajerska region, building their capacity or oensive actionthrough regular airdrops o Allied weapons and supplies.25 Te act that the

Germans launched a multi-division, anti-Partisan sweep through Stajerska

in late 1944 illustrates Lindsays success in attaining the military purpose

o the missionto tie-up German units in the Balkans.26

On the surace, the Western Allies indirect approach in Yugoslavia

appears to have been a success. However, the capacity or action provided

by the Allies substantial airdrops produced unintended consequences evenbeore the Germans deeat. Instead o directing all o his energy against the

Germans, ito used his newly acquired military capacity to eliminate Draa

Mihailovis Chetniksthe prime threat to a postwar Yugoslavia under

communist rule.27 Likewise, ito sparked the rst Cold War clash in May

1945, when he tried to use his Allied-equipped orces to expand the borders

o pre-war Yugoslavia by occupying rieste and portions o Austria.28

Tis example provides several lessons. First, capacity or action, once

supplied, has application beyond the scope o the problem it was urnishedto solve. Furthermore, the Western Allies and ito, despite a shared rec-

ognition o the necessity o deeating the Germans, had widely divergent

motives or entering into a relationship with the other.29 Finally, the Western

Allies would have done well to ully appreciate itos long-term goals and

underlying motives prior to equipping the Partisans.

Te second historical example illustrates a successul application o

working both through and with indigenous orces to achieve operational

goals. From 1971 until 1973, the U.S. Army Vietnam Individual raining

Group (UIG) undertook one o the least known, but most eective FID

missions conducted byU.S. Special Forces. 30 Te missions purpose was to

build the newly installed Khmer governments military capability against


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communist insurgency.31 Operating under its initial mandate to train

the Forces Armee National Khmer(FANK), U.S. Special Forces trained,

equipped, and operated alongside 78 Cambodian battalions at acilitiesin South Vietnam.32 In May 1972, UIGs mandate expanded to include

retraining elements o the Army o the Republic o Vietnam (ARVN) aer its

near collapse during the 1972 Easter Oensive. Employing only 150 Special

Forces trainers, the UIG retrained 64 ground maneuver battalions40

percent o the ARVNs ground orce.33 Although both South Vietnam and

Cambodia were overrun by their enemies, Special Forces enabled the end

to be signicantly delayed. 34

Te UIG experiences oer multi

irregular warfare & indirect approaches - contemporary security challenges

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