is it worthwhile to finish? youth job-training programmes (yjtp) … · 2009. 5. 15. · projoven...
TRANSCRIPT
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Is it worthwhile to finish?
Youth job-training programmes (YJTP) and low completion rates: the case of Projoven-Peru
Denis de Crombrugghe, Henry Espinoza and Hans Heijke
4th IZA/WB Conference: Employment and Development
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Maastricht Graduate School of Governance
Outline
• Introduction / Motivation
• Country background
• Projoven description
• Data discussion
• Empirical model
• Results
• Conclusions
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Maastricht Graduate School of Governance
Introduction (1)
• YJTPs impact => mixed evidence
– Wages
• little or no effects in the U.S. and Europe (Heckman et al., 1999)
• positive and statistically significant in LAC (Betcherman et al., 2004)
– Employment
• no significant effects in the U.S. (Heckman et al., 1999)
• small positive returns in Europe and LAC, particularly for women(Betcherman et al., 2004, and Irribarán and Rosas, 2008)
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Maastricht Graduate School of Governance
Introduction (2)
• … but YJTP still implemented because of:
– Rising inequalities
• Wages skilled workers relative to unskilled workers
• Access to education and vocational training
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Maastricht Graduate School of Governance
Introduction (3)
• Low completion rates phenomenon in YJTPProgramme Country Year Completion
rate Source
Projoven1 Peru 1996-2005 60% de Crombrugghe et al. (2008)
Projoven2 Uruguay 2004-2005 51% Projoven Survey (2006)
ChileJoven3 Chile 1996-1999 74% Santiago Consultores Asociados (1999)
Proyecto Joven Argentina 1996-1997 90% Aedo and Nuñez (2004)
Procajoven Panama 2005 77% Ibarrarán and Rosas (2007)
Juventud y Empleo Dominican Republic
2004 60% Card et al. (2007)
Training programmes4 Germany 2000-2002 69% Kluve et al. (2007)
National Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA)5
USA 1987-1989 58% Heckman et al. (2000)
Notes:1 The figure corresponds to the average completion rate of the first 13 public calls.
2 10th public call.
3 Phase 2. The figures belong to the “training and job experience” component (CEL).
4 Only men sample. Includes "occupation specific training programmes" and "general training programmes".
5 Only classroom training. In this case dropouts are individuals who enrolled in the programme but did not show up.
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Maastricht Graduate School of Governance
Introduction (4)
• … Nevertheless, drop out rates in YJTPshave been neglected in estimations of treatment effects…
– Exceptions:
• Theoretical: Heckman et. al. (1998); Angelucci and Attanasio (2006); and…
• Analysis of training intensity: Mealli et al. (1996); Kluve et al. (2007); and Flores-Lagunes et al. (2007).
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Maastricht Graduate School of Governance
Introduction (5)
• Aim of the paper:
– Is it worthwhile to finish?
• Better understanding of YJTP by estimating the Projoven’s effects (on wages and employment) in the
presence of dropouts with partial treatment. Controlling for:
– Ashenfelter’s dip
– Partial/endogenous/heterogeneous treatment
– Selection into work
• It’s not about why trainees dropout, but about the
consequences of that decision.
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Maastricht Graduate School of Governance
Country background
• Projoven is implemented in a period of vigorous economic growth. Av. real GDP growth (1996-2007): 5%
• Youth unemployment rate (16-25 years old) : 13% (1996-2007)
• The average real monthly wages for youngsters fell between 1996 and 2007: -26%
• In addition youngsters work in precarious conditions: 60% working in informal labour market.
• Youths represent 22% of total population (around 5 millions individuals)
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Maastricht Graduate School of Governance
Projoven description (1)
• Projoven was conceived as a policy intervention to
mitigate the impact of economic reforms on
economically disadvantaged youngsters.
• It’s a training programme which has trained more
than 40,000 youngsters in 15 public calls since
1996.
• Projoven targets youngsters (16-24) with low
educational attainment (max. secondary level) in
poverty.
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Maastricht Graduate School of Governance
Projoven description (2)
• Projoven selects and finances training institutions (ECAPs) to provide low-skilled jobs training.
• ECAPs provide three-month classroom training and subsequently (in principle) place trainees in a three-month internships (on-the-job training paid by firms). Afterwards the training firm may or may not hire the trainee on permanent basis– 20% of the trainees are not placed in internships.– of those placed in internships only half complete the
training.
• ECAPs are heterogeneous regarding quality of training. It may be a factor explaining the probability of completion.
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Maastricht Graduate School of Governance
Data discussion (1)
• Projoven-Peru 6th public call
– Non-experimental design
– Voluntary programme (possibility of self-selection)
– 1014 participants and 1014 control group
– Base line survey: November 1999 (2-3 months before
the programme)
– Three follow-up comparison surveys: 6 months after the programme (May 2001), 12 months after the programme
(November 2001), and 18 months after the programme (May 2002).
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Data discussion (2) : Selection into treatment Official
Control
Group
Treated Group
New Control
Group
Total 1,014 992 992
City
Arequipa 205 205 205
Chiclayo 122 110 110
Cusco 117 117 117
Lima 368 361 361
Trujillo 202 199 199
Age (years) 19.8 19.6 19.7
Sex
Male 493 474 443
Female 521 518 549
Poverty Score 18.95 16.71 18.8
Household income per capita (S/.) 150.3 127.1 129.8
Lowest quartile hh income per capita (%) 19.9 29.6 31.9
Child (%) 24.5 14.2 15.3
Married (%) 21.9 10.3 11.9
Education Level (%)
No Education 0.0 0.2 0.0
Uncompleted Primary 0.6 0.5 0.6
Completed Primary 2.5 2.4 2.5
1st grade secondary 3.0 2.6 4.1
2nd grade secondary 4.2 3.7 3.4
3rd grade secondary 4.6 4.7 4.6
4th grade secondary 4.5 5.7 5.2
5th grade secondary 80.6 80.1 79.4
Official Control
Group
Treated Group
New Control
Group
Total 1,014 992 992
Labour market status(%)
Employed 60.4 60.3 60.28
Unemployed 29.5 26.8 26.41
Inactive 10.2 12.9 13.31
Transitions (%) (from October 1999 to November 1999)
Unemployed/OLF -> Employed 8.2 8.2 9.6
Employed -> Unemployed/OLF 4.0 4.1 3.1
Unemployed/OLF -> Unemployed/OLF 40.7 45.4 42.2
Employed -> Employed 47.0 42.3 45.1
No work experience (%) 27.6 37.1 34.6
Non-salaried family worker 6.7 13.5 16.8
Labour Income (S/. 2001)
Monthly1 238.71 158.54 173.65
Hourly 1.49 1.12 1.23
Working hours (week) 55.21 46.80 42.30
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Maastricht Graduate School of Governance
Data discussion (3)
• Dealing with non experimental design
– Control group formation
• 3 potential control group individuals per very trainee
• Search starts in the neighbourhood and district as limit
• Criteria
– For sex, they should have the same sex.
– For age, the control should be +/- 2 years with respect to the
participant.
– For poverty score, +/- 5 points.
– Education level, the same as the trainee.
• Programme operator choose as a control one individual among the three at baseline (2-3 months before the programme)
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Maastricht Graduate School of Governance
Data discussion (4)
• Dealing with non experimental design– Ashenfelter’s dip
• Although similar in observables, trainees are poorer than control group
• DiD misleading if not controlled for that.
– Propensity score matching with replacement• More comparable control group, using labour market
status change as regressors. (Heckman and Smith, 1999)
• Drawback: correlated observations which is controlled with cluster option (STATA)
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Maastricht Graduate School of Governance
Data discussion (5)
• Trainees distribution by completion level. Projoven 6th public call
2.2
57.0
15.9
16.1
8.9
0.0
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
1 2 3 4 5 6
Completed months in training
Pa
rtic
ipan
ts (
%)
Classroom training On-the-job training
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Maastricht Graduate School of Governance
Empirical framework: Diff-in-Diff (1)
• Effects on Wages
– Two-step GMM fixed effects (Mundlak’s terms) with sample selection correction [Semykina and Wooldridge, 2006]
• Selection into work:
• Introducing Mills’ ratios into wage equation
( ) ( )itiititit w+ζZ+δZΦ=Z|=S 1Pr ( )0,1 Normal~iit Z|w t= 1, .. . ,T
ittititititititit e+κλ +ζZ+η+H+βX+πfp+γp=Y ∑ˆ1 eit =ai +u it
it :ratio Mills'
:error term .di.-non
:effect time
:incomehh Ln child
:vector var.relatedlabour and cdemographi
:completionojt Projoven
: trainingclassroomion participat Projoven
λ
ei
H
Z++X
X)(
f
p)(
it
t
itit
it
it
it
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Maastricht Graduate School of Governance
Empirical framework: Diff-in-Diff (2)
• Effects on Employment likelihood
– Two-step GMM fixed effects (Mundlak’s terms) Linear probability model
• No Selection into work:
it
t
itit
it
it
it
ei
H
Z++X
X)(
f
p)(
:error term .di.-non
:effect time
:incomehh Ln child
:vector var.relatedlabour and cdemographi
:completionojt Projoven
: trainingclassroomion participatProjoven
( ) ittiitititittititiit e+H+ζZ+η+πpf+βX+γp=H,f,p,α|=L 11Pr
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Maastricht Graduate School of Governance
Empirical framework (3)
• Previous results
– Flores-Lagunes et al. (2007) [the U.S.] (2007)
and Chong and Galdo (2006) [Peru]: returns
classroom phase higher than OJT phase.
– Mealli et al. (1996) [the U.K.] completing YJTP
higher returns. Chacaltana et al. (2003) [Peru]
Projoven is only effective for those completing
OJT in the short run.
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Results: Projoven’s effects on wages (1)
T=4: Nov-99, May-01, Nov-01 and May-02. This represents, baseline before Projoven, 6 months after Projoven, 12 months after Projoven and 18
months after Projoven, respectively.
Naive model (A) 2S GMM w/ SSC (B) 2S GMM w/ SSC - only trainees sample (C)
Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Projoven 0.007 0.053 -0.068 0.099
Finish Projoven 0.092** 0.041 0.207 0.163 0.333* 0.172
Mill's ratio T=1 -0.613*** 0.156 -0.588*** 0.155
Mill's ratio T=2 -0.237* 0.133 -0.309** 0.127
Mill's ratio T=3 -0.174 0.121 -0.290*** 0.103
Mill's ratio T=4 -0.399** 0.178 -0.374** 0.183
Constant 5.338*** 0.204 5.578*** 0.221 5.800*** 0.219
Control variables yes yes yes
City dummies2 yes yes Yes
Time dummies yes yes yes
Mundlak's terms yes yes yes
Number of observations 4802 4802 2453
Wald test (overall) F(25, 1315) = 38.25 F(29, 1315) = 34.74 F(28, 894) = 41.91
R2 0.3022 0.3064 0.3727
Wald test significance of Mill's ratios ( )2
4χ = 16.52 ( )2
4χ = 19.07
p-value 0.0024 0.0008
Test relevance of Instrument (Anderson)
( )2
4χ = 315.303 ( )2
4χ = 143.984
p-value 0.000 0.000
Hansen J-test ( )2
3χ = 2.859 ( )2
3χ = 1.408
p-value 0.4138 0.7036
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Results: Projoven’s effects on wages (2) -
heterogeneity Heterogeneity regarding
individuals characteristics
Heterogeneity across time
Finish*Projoven 0.507*
(0.275)
Heterogeneity of treatment
Finish*Female -0.218
(0.650)
Finish*No work experience -0.088
(0.083)
Finish*Low hh income pc -0.350***
(0.103)
Finish*T=2 0.479***
(0.141)
Finish*T=3 0.270
(0.207)
Finish*T=4 0.282
(0.209)
Number of obs 2453 2453
Wald test (overall) F( 31, 894) = 37.18 F( 28, 894) = 1.98
R2 0.360 0.374
Wald test significance of Mill's ratios ( )2
4χ 9.23 17.99
p-value 0.056 0.001
Test relevance of Instrument (Anderson) ( )2
3χ = 27.655 ( )2
4χ = 138.776
p-value 0.000 0.000
Hansen J-test ( )2
2χ = 0.536 ( )2
3χ = 1.394
p-value 0.7648 0.7069
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Results: Projoven’s effects on employment (1) Naive LPM (A) LPM 2s GMM (B) LPM 2s GMM -
only trainees
sample (C)
Coef. Std.
Err.
Coef. Std.
Err.
Coef. Std.
Err.
Projoven -0.032 0.022 -0.048 0.049
Finish Projoven 0.059*** 0.020 0.084 0.079 0.125* 0.070
Constant 0.620*** 0.098 0.627*** 0.097 0.713*** 0.094
Control variables yes yes yes
City dummies1 yes yes yes
Time dummies yes yes yes
Mundlak's terms yes yes yes
Number of obs 7910 7910 3961
Wald test F(22, 1479) = 28.56 F(22, 1479) = 29.35 F(21, 991) = 26.19
R2 0.1151 0.1148 0.1094
Test relevance of Instrument
(Anderson)
( )2
4χ = 502.148 ( )2
4χ = 217.394
p-value 0.000 0.000
Hansen J-test ( )2
3χ = 3.247 ( )2
3χ = 2.612
p-value 0.355 0.4554
% of predicted val;ues out of range [0,1]
3.67 3.68 3.38
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Results: Projoven’s effects on employment (2) Heterogeneity
regarding individuals
characteristics
Heterogeneity across time
Finish*Projoven 0.311**
0.130
Heterogeneity of treatment
Finish*Female -0.081
0.279
Finish*No work experience -0.480***
0.046
Finish*Low hh income pc -0.100**
0.045
Finish*T=2 0.037
0.053
Finish*T=3 0.034
0.098
Finish*T=4 0.303***
0.098
Number of observations 3961 3961
Wald test (overall) F(24, 991) = 26.43 F(21, 991) = 25.22
R2 0.018 0.091
Test relevance of Instrument
(Anderson) ( )2
3χ = 48.838 ( )2
4χ = 198.723
p-value 0.000 0.000
Hansen J-test ( )2
2χ = 3.022 ( )2
3χ = 2.647
p-value 0.221 0.4493
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Maastricht Graduate School of Governance
Conclusions (1)
• Completing classroom training yields no returns [wages and employment].
• Completing on-the-job training is positive [wages and employment] – Nevertheless, Projoven fails to produce income and
employment gains on the poorest trainees and on those with no work experience prior to the training.
• Why?– It might be related to training content:
• work habits (low-skilled jobs training)
• signalling effect (only observed once completed)
• Quality of training providers (ECAPs) – main determinant of completion
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Maastricht Graduate School of Governance
Conclusions (2)
• Further remarks
– Dropping out as a rational decision
• Can better results be achieved if we improved the content of the on-the-job training phase?
– Should job-training programmes target the
poorest ones and those without working
experience?
– Dropping out because of the economic context
• Should job-training programmes be countercyclical?
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Maastricht Graduate School of Governance
AppendixOfficial sample
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
ago-99
oct-99
dic-99
feb-00
abr-00
jun-00
ago-00
oct-00
dic-00
feb-01
abr-01
jun-01
ago-01
oct-01
dic-01
feb-02
abr-02
Employment share (%)
Control Group Treatment Group (all)
Contol Group (lowest quartile) Treatment Group (lowest quartile)
Training PeriodBase Period
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
aug
-99
oct
-99
dec
-99
feb
-00
apr-
00
jun
-00
aug
-00
oct
-00
dec
-00
feb
-01
apr-
01
jun
-01
aug
-01
oct
-01
dec
-01
feb
-02
apr-
02
Mo
nth
ly w
ag
es
(S/
20
01
)
Control Group Treatment Group (all)
Control Group (lowest quartile) Treatment Group (lowest quartile)
Training PeriodBase Period
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Appendix
Probit regression – Selection into treatment ( to estimate propensity score) /
conditional on eligibility. Dep. Var. [Projoven = 1] Marginal
effects Standard error
Ln Family Income per capita -0.050* 0.027
Lowest quartile hh income per capita 0.063* 0.038
Age 0.014*** 0.005
Houshold size -0.004 0.005
Female 0.000 0.024
Married -0.171*** 0.039
Having Child -0.060 0.043
Years schooling -0.013 0.009
Father tertiary education 0.071* 0.040
Mather tertiary education 0.165*** 0.060
Additional training course 0.098*** 0.027
Unemployed/OLF -> Employed 0.008 0.043
Employed -> Unemployed/OLF 0.023 0.058
Unemployed/OLF -> Unemployed/OLF
-0.074** 0.036
No work experience (%) 0.175*** 0.037
Non-wage family worker 0.203*** 0.038
Num obs 2006
Wald X2(16) 151.97
Log Likelihood -1307.72
Pseudo R2 0.0594
Predicted outcomes
0 (%) 34.42
1 (%) 59.37
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Appendix
Selection into work. Probit models. Dep. Variable: [Employed = 1]
T=1 T=2 T=3 T=4
Marginal
effects
Std.
Err.
Marginal
effects
Std.
Err.
Marginal
effects
Std.
Err.
Marginal
effects
Std.
Err.
Projoven 0.062** 0.034 -0.029 0.035 -0.030 0.033
Years schooling 0.023 0.017 0.039 0.033 0.018 0.019 0.014 0.017
Potential experience
0.019 0.033 0.025*** 0.008 -0.026 0.041 0.035 0.036
Female -0.199*** 0.037 -0.045 0.038 -0.063* 0.038 -0.014 0.036
Child 0.237** 0.125 0.070 0.144 0.018 0.154 0.100 0.107
Child*Female -0.209** 0.122 -0.399*** 0.068 -0.423*** 0.063 -0.314** 0.126
Married -0.066 0.097 -0.242*** 0.082 -0.163 0.102 -0.027 0.087
Ln hh income per capita
0.069*** 0.023 -0.047*** 0.018 -0.102*** 0.020 -0.075*** 0.016
Another job-
training course
-0.011 0.045 -0.036 0.054 -0.138** 0.062 -0.172*** 0.063
City dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mundlak's terms Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number observations
1984 1984 1970 1972
Wald tests (overall) ( )2
17χ = 124.20 ( )2
18χ = 112.09 ( )2
18χ = 133.54 ( )2
18χ = 79.65
Pseudo R2 0.1041 0.099 0.135 0.0919
Log likelihood -1194.24 -1200.97 -1096.46 -875.05
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Maastricht Graduate School of Governance
References (1)
• Aedo, C. and S. Núñez. (2001) “The Impact of Training Policies in Latin America and the Caribbean: The Case of Programa Joven”. ILADES/Georgetown University. Graduate Program in Economics.
• Angelucci, M.; and O. Attanasio. (2006) “Estimating ATT effects with non-experimental data and low compliance”. IZA Discussion Paper No. 2368.Becker, G. (1964) Human Capital. New York: National Bureau of Economic Research.
• Betcherman, G., K. Olivas, and A. Dar. (2004) “Impacts of active labour market programs: new evidence from evaluations with particular attention to developing and transition countries.” World Bank Social Protection Discussion Paper 0402, 2004.
• Card, D., P. Ibarraran, F. Regalia, D. Rosas and Y. Soares (2007) “The Labor Market Impacts of Youth Training in the Dominican Republic: Evidence from a Randomized Evaluation”. NBER Working Paper No. 12883.
• Chacaltana, J., G. Guerrero, H. Espinoza, and O. Pain. (2003) “¿Qué funciona y qué no funciona en Projoven: una evaluación de los procesos de capacitación y medición de impacto”. IADB Report.
• Flores-Lagunes, A., A. Gonzalez and T. C. Neumann. (2007) “Estimating the effects of length of exposure to a training program: the case of Job Corps”.IZA Discussion Paper No. 2846.
• Heckman, J., R. LaLonde and J. Smith (1999), “The economics and econometrics of active labor market programs,” in O. Ashenfelter and D. Card (eds.), Chapter 31, Handbook of Labor Economics, Vol. IV, 1865-2073.
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Maastricht Graduate School of Governance
References (2)
• Heckman, J. J., N. Hohmann, J. Smith and M. Khoo. (2000) “Substitution and Dropout Bias in Social Experiments: A Study of an Influential Social Experiment”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 115, No. 2, pp. 651-694.
• Heckman, J. J. and J. A. Smith (1999) “The pre-program earnings dip and the determinants of participation in a social program: implications for simple program evaluation strategies”. NBER Working Paper 6983.
• Heckman, J. J., J. A. Smith and C. Taber (1998) “Accounting for dropouts in evaluation of social programs”. The Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 80, No 1, pp. 1-14.
• Kluve, J., H. Schneider, A. Uhlendorff and Z. Zhao. (2007) “Evaluating continuous training programs using the generalized propensity score”. IZA Discussion Paper No. 3255.
• Mealli, F., S. Pudney and J. Thomas. (1996) “Training duration and post-training outcome: a duration-limited competing risks model”. The Economic Journal, Vol. 106, No. 435, pp. 422-433.
• Mincer, J. (1958) “Investment in human capital and personal income distribution”. Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 66, No. 3, pp. 281-302.
• Semykina, A. and Wooldridge, J. (2006) “Estimating panel data models in presence of endogeneity and selection: theory and application”, Discussion paper, Department of Economics, Michigan State University, East Lansing, MI.
• Santiago Consultores Asociados (1999): "Evaluación Ex-Post Chile Joven Fase II”, Mimeo