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Is it worthwhile to finish? Youth job-training programmes (YJTP) and low completion rates: the case of Projoven-Peru Denis de Crombrugghe, Henry Espinoza and Hans Heijke 4th IZA/WB Conference: Employment and Development

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  • Is it worthwhile to finish?

    Youth job-training programmes (YJTP) and low completion rates: the case of Projoven-Peru

    Denis de Crombrugghe, Henry Espinoza and Hans Heijke

    4th IZA/WB Conference: Employment and Development

  • Maastricht Graduate School of Governance

    Outline

    • Introduction / Motivation

    • Country background

    • Projoven description

    • Data discussion

    • Empirical model

    • Results

    • Conclusions

  • Maastricht Graduate School of Governance

    Introduction (1)

    • YJTPs impact => mixed evidence

    – Wages

    • little or no effects in the U.S. and Europe (Heckman et al., 1999)

    • positive and statistically significant in LAC (Betcherman et al., 2004)

    – Employment

    • no significant effects in the U.S. (Heckman et al., 1999)

    • small positive returns in Europe and LAC, particularly for women(Betcherman et al., 2004, and Irribarán and Rosas, 2008)

  • Maastricht Graduate School of Governance

    Introduction (2)

    • … but YJTP still implemented because of:

    – Rising inequalities

    • Wages skilled workers relative to unskilled workers

    • Access to education and vocational training

  • Maastricht Graduate School of Governance

    Introduction (3)

    • Low completion rates phenomenon in YJTPProgramme Country Year Completion

    rate Source

    Projoven1 Peru 1996-2005 60% de Crombrugghe et al. (2008)

    Projoven2 Uruguay 2004-2005 51% Projoven Survey (2006)

    ChileJoven3 Chile 1996-1999 74% Santiago Consultores Asociados (1999)

    Proyecto Joven Argentina 1996-1997 90% Aedo and Nuñez (2004)

    Procajoven Panama 2005 77% Ibarrarán and Rosas (2007)

    Juventud y Empleo Dominican Republic

    2004 60% Card et al. (2007)

    Training programmes4 Germany 2000-2002 69% Kluve et al. (2007)

    National Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA)5

    USA 1987-1989 58% Heckman et al. (2000)

    Notes:1 The figure corresponds to the average completion rate of the first 13 public calls.

    2 10th public call.

    3 Phase 2. The figures belong to the “training and job experience” component (CEL).

    4 Only men sample. Includes "occupation specific training programmes" and "general training programmes".

    5 Only classroom training. In this case dropouts are individuals who enrolled in the programme but did not show up.

  • Maastricht Graduate School of Governance

    Introduction (4)

    • … Nevertheless, drop out rates in YJTPshave been neglected in estimations of treatment effects…

    – Exceptions:

    • Theoretical: Heckman et. al. (1998); Angelucci and Attanasio (2006); and…

    • Analysis of training intensity: Mealli et al. (1996); Kluve et al. (2007); and Flores-Lagunes et al. (2007).

  • Maastricht Graduate School of Governance

    Introduction (5)

    • Aim of the paper:

    – Is it worthwhile to finish?

    • Better understanding of YJTP by estimating the Projoven’s effects (on wages and employment) in the

    presence of dropouts with partial treatment. Controlling for:

    – Ashenfelter’s dip

    – Partial/endogenous/heterogeneous treatment

    – Selection into work

    • It’s not about why trainees dropout, but about the

    consequences of that decision.

  • Maastricht Graduate School of Governance

    Country background

    • Projoven is implemented in a period of vigorous economic growth. Av. real GDP growth (1996-2007): 5%

    • Youth unemployment rate (16-25 years old) : 13% (1996-2007)

    • The average real monthly wages for youngsters fell between 1996 and 2007: -26%

    • In addition youngsters work in precarious conditions: 60% working in informal labour market.

    • Youths represent 22% of total population (around 5 millions individuals)

  • Maastricht Graduate School of Governance

    Projoven description (1)

    • Projoven was conceived as a policy intervention to

    mitigate the impact of economic reforms on

    economically disadvantaged youngsters.

    • It’s a training programme which has trained more

    than 40,000 youngsters in 15 public calls since

    1996.

    • Projoven targets youngsters (16-24) with low

    educational attainment (max. secondary level) in

    poverty.

  • Maastricht Graduate School of Governance

    Projoven description (2)

    • Projoven selects and finances training institutions (ECAPs) to provide low-skilled jobs training.

    • ECAPs provide three-month classroom training and subsequently (in principle) place trainees in a three-month internships (on-the-job training paid by firms). Afterwards the training firm may or may not hire the trainee on permanent basis– 20% of the trainees are not placed in internships.– of those placed in internships only half complete the

    training.

    • ECAPs are heterogeneous regarding quality of training. It may be a factor explaining the probability of completion.

  • Maastricht Graduate School of Governance

    Data discussion (1)

    • Projoven-Peru 6th public call

    – Non-experimental design

    – Voluntary programme (possibility of self-selection)

    – 1014 participants and 1014 control group

    – Base line survey: November 1999 (2-3 months before

    the programme)

    – Three follow-up comparison surveys: 6 months after the programme (May 2001), 12 months after the programme

    (November 2001), and 18 months after the programme (May 2002).

  • Data discussion (2) : Selection into treatment Official

    Control

    Group

    Treated Group

    New Control

    Group

    Total 1,014 992 992

    City

    Arequipa 205 205 205

    Chiclayo 122 110 110

    Cusco 117 117 117

    Lima 368 361 361

    Trujillo 202 199 199

    Age (years) 19.8 19.6 19.7

    Sex

    Male 493 474 443

    Female 521 518 549

    Poverty Score 18.95 16.71 18.8

    Household income per capita (S/.) 150.3 127.1 129.8

    Lowest quartile hh income per capita (%) 19.9 29.6 31.9

    Child (%) 24.5 14.2 15.3

    Married (%) 21.9 10.3 11.9

    Education Level (%)

    No Education 0.0 0.2 0.0

    Uncompleted Primary 0.6 0.5 0.6

    Completed Primary 2.5 2.4 2.5

    1st grade secondary 3.0 2.6 4.1

    2nd grade secondary 4.2 3.7 3.4

    3rd grade secondary 4.6 4.7 4.6

    4th grade secondary 4.5 5.7 5.2

    5th grade secondary 80.6 80.1 79.4

    Official Control

    Group

    Treated Group

    New Control

    Group

    Total 1,014 992 992

    Labour market status(%)

    Employed 60.4 60.3 60.28

    Unemployed 29.5 26.8 26.41

    Inactive 10.2 12.9 13.31

    Transitions (%) (from October 1999 to November 1999)

    Unemployed/OLF -> Employed 8.2 8.2 9.6

    Employed -> Unemployed/OLF 4.0 4.1 3.1

    Unemployed/OLF -> Unemployed/OLF 40.7 45.4 42.2

    Employed -> Employed 47.0 42.3 45.1

    No work experience (%) 27.6 37.1 34.6

    Non-salaried family worker 6.7 13.5 16.8

    Labour Income (S/. 2001)

    Monthly1 238.71 158.54 173.65

    Hourly 1.49 1.12 1.23

    Working hours (week) 55.21 46.80 42.30

  • Maastricht Graduate School of Governance

    Data discussion (3)

    • Dealing with non experimental design

    – Control group formation

    • 3 potential control group individuals per very trainee

    • Search starts in the neighbourhood and district as limit

    • Criteria

    – For sex, they should have the same sex.

    – For age, the control should be +/- 2 years with respect to the

    participant.

    – For poverty score, +/- 5 points.

    – Education level, the same as the trainee.

    • Programme operator choose as a control one individual among the three at baseline (2-3 months before the programme)

  • Maastricht Graduate School of Governance

    Data discussion (4)

    • Dealing with non experimental design– Ashenfelter’s dip

    • Although similar in observables, trainees are poorer than control group

    • DiD misleading if not controlled for that.

    – Propensity score matching with replacement• More comparable control group, using labour market

    status change as regressors. (Heckman and Smith, 1999)

    • Drawback: correlated observations which is controlled with cluster option (STATA)

  • Maastricht Graduate School of Governance

    Data discussion (5)

    • Trainees distribution by completion level. Projoven 6th public call

    2.2

    57.0

    15.9

    16.1

    8.9

    0.0

    0

    10

    20

    30

    40

    50

    60

    1 2 3 4 5 6

    Completed months in training

    Pa

    rtic

    ipan

    ts (

    %)

    Classroom training On-the-job training

  • Maastricht Graduate School of Governance

    Empirical framework: Diff-in-Diff (1)

    • Effects on Wages

    – Two-step GMM fixed effects (Mundlak’s terms) with sample selection correction [Semykina and Wooldridge, 2006]

    • Selection into work:

    • Introducing Mills’ ratios into wage equation

    ( ) ( )itiititit w+ζZ+δZΦ=Z|=S 1Pr ( )0,1 Normal~iit Z|w t= 1, .. . ,T

    ittititititititit e+κλ +ζZ+η+H+βX+πfp+γp=Y ∑ˆ1 eit =ai +u it

    it :ratio Mills'

    :error term .di.-non

    :effect time

    :incomehh Ln child

    :vector var.relatedlabour and cdemographi

    :completionojt Projoven

    : trainingclassroomion participat Projoven

    λ

    ei

    H

    Z++X

    X)(

    f

    p)(

    it

    t

    itit

    it

    it

    it

  • Maastricht Graduate School of Governance

    Empirical framework: Diff-in-Diff (2)

    • Effects on Employment likelihood

    – Two-step GMM fixed effects (Mundlak’s terms) Linear probability model

    • No Selection into work:

    it

    t

    itit

    it

    it

    it

    ei

    H

    Z++X

    X)(

    f

    p)(

    :error term .di.-non

    :effect time

    :incomehh Ln child

    :vector var.relatedlabour and cdemographi

    :completionojt Projoven

    : trainingclassroomion participatProjoven

    ( ) ittiitititittititiit e+H+ζZ+η+πpf+βX+γp=H,f,p,α|=L 11Pr

  • Maastricht Graduate School of Governance

    Empirical framework (3)

    • Previous results

    – Flores-Lagunes et al. (2007) [the U.S.] (2007)

    and Chong and Galdo (2006) [Peru]: returns

    classroom phase higher than OJT phase.

    – Mealli et al. (1996) [the U.K.] completing YJTP

    higher returns. Chacaltana et al. (2003) [Peru]

    Projoven is only effective for those completing

    OJT in the short run.

  • Results: Projoven’s effects on wages (1)

    T=4: Nov-99, May-01, Nov-01 and May-02. This represents, baseline before Projoven, 6 months after Projoven, 12 months after Projoven and 18

    months after Projoven, respectively.

    Naive model (A) 2S GMM w/ SSC (B) 2S GMM w/ SSC - only trainees sample (C)

    Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.

    Projoven 0.007 0.053 -0.068 0.099

    Finish Projoven 0.092** 0.041 0.207 0.163 0.333* 0.172

    Mill's ratio T=1 -0.613*** 0.156 -0.588*** 0.155

    Mill's ratio T=2 -0.237* 0.133 -0.309** 0.127

    Mill's ratio T=3 -0.174 0.121 -0.290*** 0.103

    Mill's ratio T=4 -0.399** 0.178 -0.374** 0.183

    Constant 5.338*** 0.204 5.578*** 0.221 5.800*** 0.219

    Control variables yes yes yes

    City dummies2 yes yes Yes

    Time dummies yes yes yes

    Mundlak's terms yes yes yes

    Number of observations 4802 4802 2453

    Wald test (overall) F(25, 1315) = 38.25 F(29, 1315) = 34.74 F(28, 894) = 41.91

    R2 0.3022 0.3064 0.3727

    Wald test significance of Mill's ratios ( )2

    4χ = 16.52 ( )2

    4χ = 19.07

    p-value 0.0024 0.0008

    Test relevance of Instrument (Anderson)

    ( )2

    4χ = 315.303 ( )2

    4χ = 143.984

    p-value 0.000 0.000

    Hansen J-test ( )2

    3χ = 2.859 ( )2

    3χ = 1.408

    p-value 0.4138 0.7036

  • Results: Projoven’s effects on wages (2) -

    heterogeneity Heterogeneity regarding

    individuals characteristics

    Heterogeneity across time

    Finish*Projoven 0.507*

    (0.275)

    Heterogeneity of treatment

    Finish*Female -0.218

    (0.650)

    Finish*No work experience -0.088

    (0.083)

    Finish*Low hh income pc -0.350***

    (0.103)

    Finish*T=2 0.479***

    (0.141)

    Finish*T=3 0.270

    (0.207)

    Finish*T=4 0.282

    (0.209)

    Number of obs 2453 2453

    Wald test (overall) F( 31, 894) = 37.18 F( 28, 894) = 1.98

    R2 0.360 0.374

    Wald test significance of Mill's ratios ( )2

    4χ 9.23 17.99

    p-value 0.056 0.001

    Test relevance of Instrument (Anderson) ( )2

    3χ = 27.655 ( )2

    4χ = 138.776

    p-value 0.000 0.000

    Hansen J-test ( )2

    2χ = 0.536 ( )2

    3χ = 1.394

    p-value 0.7648 0.7069

  • Results: Projoven’s effects on employment (1) Naive LPM (A) LPM 2s GMM (B) LPM 2s GMM -

    only trainees

    sample (C)

    Coef. Std.

    Err.

    Coef. Std.

    Err.

    Coef. Std.

    Err.

    Projoven -0.032 0.022 -0.048 0.049

    Finish Projoven 0.059*** 0.020 0.084 0.079 0.125* 0.070

    Constant 0.620*** 0.098 0.627*** 0.097 0.713*** 0.094

    Control variables yes yes yes

    City dummies1 yes yes yes

    Time dummies yes yes yes

    Mundlak's terms yes yes yes

    Number of obs 7910 7910 3961

    Wald test F(22, 1479) = 28.56 F(22, 1479) = 29.35 F(21, 991) = 26.19

    R2 0.1151 0.1148 0.1094

    Test relevance of Instrument

    (Anderson)

    ( )2

    4χ = 502.148 ( )2

    4χ = 217.394

    p-value 0.000 0.000

    Hansen J-test ( )2

    3χ = 3.247 ( )2

    3χ = 2.612

    p-value 0.355 0.4554

    % of predicted val;ues out of range [0,1]

    3.67 3.68 3.38

  • Results: Projoven’s effects on employment (2) Heterogeneity

    regarding individuals

    characteristics

    Heterogeneity across time

    Finish*Projoven 0.311**

    0.130

    Heterogeneity of treatment

    Finish*Female -0.081

    0.279

    Finish*No work experience -0.480***

    0.046

    Finish*Low hh income pc -0.100**

    0.045

    Finish*T=2 0.037

    0.053

    Finish*T=3 0.034

    0.098

    Finish*T=4 0.303***

    0.098

    Number of observations 3961 3961

    Wald test (overall) F(24, 991) = 26.43 F(21, 991) = 25.22

    R2 0.018 0.091

    Test relevance of Instrument

    (Anderson) ( )2

    3χ = 48.838 ( )2

    4χ = 198.723

    p-value 0.000 0.000

    Hansen J-test ( )2

    2χ = 3.022 ( )2

    3χ = 2.647

    p-value 0.221 0.4493

  • Maastricht Graduate School of Governance

    Conclusions (1)

    • Completing classroom training yields no returns [wages and employment].

    • Completing on-the-job training is positive [wages and employment] – Nevertheless, Projoven fails to produce income and

    employment gains on the poorest trainees and on those with no work experience prior to the training.

    • Why?– It might be related to training content:

    • work habits (low-skilled jobs training)

    • signalling effect (only observed once completed)

    • Quality of training providers (ECAPs) – main determinant of completion

  • Maastricht Graduate School of Governance

    Conclusions (2)

    • Further remarks

    – Dropping out as a rational decision

    • Can better results be achieved if we improved the content of the on-the-job training phase?

    – Should job-training programmes target the

    poorest ones and those without working

    experience?

    – Dropping out because of the economic context

    • Should job-training programmes be countercyclical?

  • Maastricht Graduate School of Governance

    AppendixOfficial sample

    0

    10

    20

    30

    40

    50

    60

    70

    80

    ago-99

    oct-99

    dic-99

    feb-00

    abr-00

    jun-00

    ago-00

    oct-00

    dic-00

    feb-01

    abr-01

    jun-01

    ago-01

    oct-01

    dic-01

    feb-02

    abr-02

    Employment share (%)

    Control Group Treatment Group (all)

    Contol Group (lowest quartile) Treatment Group (lowest quartile)

    Training PeriodBase Period

    0

    50

    100

    150

    200

    250

    300

    350

    400

    aug

    -99

    oct

    -99

    dec

    -99

    feb

    -00

    apr-

    00

    jun

    -00

    aug

    -00

    oct

    -00

    dec

    -00

    feb

    -01

    apr-

    01

    jun

    -01

    aug

    -01

    oct

    -01

    dec

    -01

    feb

    -02

    apr-

    02

    Mo

    nth

    ly w

    ag

    es

    (S/

    20

    01

    )

    Control Group Treatment Group (all)

    Control Group (lowest quartile) Treatment Group (lowest quartile)

    Training PeriodBase Period

  • Appendix

    Probit regression – Selection into treatment ( to estimate propensity score) /

    conditional on eligibility. Dep. Var. [Projoven = 1] Marginal

    effects Standard error

    Ln Family Income per capita -0.050* 0.027

    Lowest quartile hh income per capita 0.063* 0.038

    Age 0.014*** 0.005

    Houshold size -0.004 0.005

    Female 0.000 0.024

    Married -0.171*** 0.039

    Having Child -0.060 0.043

    Years schooling -0.013 0.009

    Father tertiary education 0.071* 0.040

    Mather tertiary education 0.165*** 0.060

    Additional training course 0.098*** 0.027

    Unemployed/OLF -> Employed 0.008 0.043

    Employed -> Unemployed/OLF 0.023 0.058

    Unemployed/OLF -> Unemployed/OLF

    -0.074** 0.036

    No work experience (%) 0.175*** 0.037

    Non-wage family worker 0.203*** 0.038

    Num obs 2006

    Wald X2(16) 151.97

    Log Likelihood -1307.72

    Pseudo R2 0.0594

    Predicted outcomes

    0 (%) 34.42

    1 (%) 59.37

  • Appendix

    Selection into work. Probit models. Dep. Variable: [Employed = 1]

    T=1 T=2 T=3 T=4

    Marginal

    effects

    Std.

    Err.

    Marginal

    effects

    Std.

    Err.

    Marginal

    effects

    Std.

    Err.

    Marginal

    effects

    Std.

    Err.

    Projoven 0.062** 0.034 -0.029 0.035 -0.030 0.033

    Years schooling 0.023 0.017 0.039 0.033 0.018 0.019 0.014 0.017

    Potential experience

    0.019 0.033 0.025*** 0.008 -0.026 0.041 0.035 0.036

    Female -0.199*** 0.037 -0.045 0.038 -0.063* 0.038 -0.014 0.036

    Child 0.237** 0.125 0.070 0.144 0.018 0.154 0.100 0.107

    Child*Female -0.209** 0.122 -0.399*** 0.068 -0.423*** 0.063 -0.314** 0.126

    Married -0.066 0.097 -0.242*** 0.082 -0.163 0.102 -0.027 0.087

    Ln hh income per capita

    0.069*** 0.023 -0.047*** 0.018 -0.102*** 0.020 -0.075*** 0.016

    Another job-

    training course

    -0.011 0.045 -0.036 0.054 -0.138** 0.062 -0.172*** 0.063

    City dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes

    Mundlak's terms Yes Yes Yes Yes

    Number observations

    1984 1984 1970 1972

    Wald tests (overall) ( )2

    17χ = 124.20 ( )2

    18χ = 112.09 ( )2

    18χ = 133.54 ( )2

    18χ = 79.65

    Pseudo R2 0.1041 0.099 0.135 0.0919

    Log likelihood -1194.24 -1200.97 -1096.46 -875.05

  • Maastricht Graduate School of Governance

    References (1)

    • Aedo, C. and S. Núñez. (2001) “The Impact of Training Policies in Latin America and the Caribbean: The Case of Programa Joven”. ILADES/Georgetown University. Graduate Program in Economics.

    • Angelucci, M.; and O. Attanasio. (2006) “Estimating ATT effects with non-experimental data and low compliance”. IZA Discussion Paper No. 2368.Becker, G. (1964) Human Capital. New York: National Bureau of Economic Research.

    • Betcherman, G., K. Olivas, and A. Dar. (2004) “Impacts of active labour market programs: new evidence from evaluations with particular attention to developing and transition countries.” World Bank Social Protection Discussion Paper 0402, 2004.

    • Card, D., P. Ibarraran, F. Regalia, D. Rosas and Y. Soares (2007) “The Labor Market Impacts of Youth Training in the Dominican Republic: Evidence from a Randomized Evaluation”. NBER Working Paper No. 12883.

    • Chacaltana, J., G. Guerrero, H. Espinoza, and O. Pain. (2003) “¿Qué funciona y qué no funciona en Projoven: una evaluación de los procesos de capacitación y medición de impacto”. IADB Report.

    • Flores-Lagunes, A., A. Gonzalez and T. C. Neumann. (2007) “Estimating the effects of length of exposure to a training program: the case of Job Corps”.IZA Discussion Paper No. 2846.

    • Heckman, J., R. LaLonde and J. Smith (1999), “The economics and econometrics of active labor market programs,” in O. Ashenfelter and D. Card (eds.), Chapter 31, Handbook of Labor Economics, Vol. IV, 1865-2073.

  • Maastricht Graduate School of Governance

    References (2)

    • Heckman, J. J., N. Hohmann, J. Smith and M. Khoo. (2000) “Substitution and Dropout Bias in Social Experiments: A Study of an Influential Social Experiment”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 115, No. 2, pp. 651-694.

    • Heckman, J. J. and J. A. Smith (1999) “The pre-program earnings dip and the determinants of participation in a social program: implications for simple program evaluation strategies”. NBER Working Paper 6983.

    • Heckman, J. J., J. A. Smith and C. Taber (1998) “Accounting for dropouts in evaluation of social programs”. The Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 80, No 1, pp. 1-14.

    • Kluve, J., H. Schneider, A. Uhlendorff and Z. Zhao. (2007) “Evaluating continuous training programs using the generalized propensity score”. IZA Discussion Paper No. 3255.

    • Mealli, F., S. Pudney and J. Thomas. (1996) “Training duration and post-training outcome: a duration-limited competing risks model”. The Economic Journal, Vol. 106, No. 435, pp. 422-433.

    • Mincer, J. (1958) “Investment in human capital and personal income distribution”. Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 66, No. 3, pp. 281-302.

    • Semykina, A. and Wooldridge, J. (2006) “Estimating panel data models in presence of endogeneity and selection: theory and application”, Discussion paper, Department of Economics, Michigan State University, East Lansing, MI.

    • Santiago Consultores Asociados (1999): "Evaluación Ex-Post Chile Joven Fase II”, Mimeo