islam, women, and politics: the demography of arab countries

Islam, Women, and Politics: The Demography of Arab CountriesAuthor(s): Carla Makhlouf ObermeyerSource: Population and Development Review, Vol. 18, No. 1 (Mar., 1992), pp. 33-60Published by: Population CouncilStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1971858 .

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Islam, Women, and Politics: The Demography of Arab Countries

CARLA MAKHLOUF OBERMEYER

THE IDEA THAT THERE IS SOMETHING PECULIAR about the demographic situation in the Arab region is common in the literature. Arab countries are said to have fertility levels that are higher, and health status indicators that are worse, than might be expected on the basis of socioeconomic indicators. Some researchers have argued that "a unique fertility model exists in the Arab World" (Omran, 1980: 97), while others have found an overrepre- sentation of Arab countries among the world's "poor health achievers" (Cald- well, 1986). Arab demographic patterns are thought to be exceptional because "instead of declining with development according to the Western model, Arab fertility demonstrates a weak and sometimes positive correlation with development indicators" (Omran, 1980: 97). Thus, the "correspondence between the epidemiologic and the fertility transition does not seem to apply" (Nagi, 1984: 196).

These unusual features of Arab demography have been attributed to Islam and to the low status of women in the region. One of the strongest statements about the status of Arab countries as negative "outliers" comes from Caldwell's analysis of the exceptional routes to low mortality taken by those low-income countries that have achieved substantial improvements in health. His analysis contrasts "superior health achievers" with "poor health achievers" whose infant mortality rates are higher than would have been predicted on the basis of per capita income. Of the 11 "poor health achievers," seven are Arab countries, and nine are wholly or largely Muslim. In "trying to decide what determines that a country shall become a superior or a poor health achiever," Caldwell finds that "the first contrast to strike the reader . . . is the religion of the two groups" (1986: 175). Contrasting Islam with Buddhism and Hinduism, he argues that the poor health per-

POPULATION AND DEVELOPMENT REVIEW 18, NO. 1 (MARCH 1992) 33



34 ISLAM, WOMEN, AND POLITICS

formance of Islamic countries is the result of the influence of their religion on the societal values related to women and children.

To evaluate the extent to which these analyses of the demographic evidence are accurate and useful, this article examines the three propositions that underlie these interpretations: that Arab countries do poorly in terms of demographic indicators, that this is due to Islam, and that the impact of Islam operates through the way in which it defines a low status for women. First, I review the available data on fertility and health in Arab countries. Second, I critically examine the claim that Islam is a pronatalist religion. Third, I summarize the evidence on the status of women in the Arab world and consider whether one can ascribe to it specific demographic outcomes. I argue that the "fateful triangle" model that sees a pernicious association between Islam, women, and demographic outcomes is inappropriate because it overlooks crucial factors of variability and ignores the ambiguities inherent in the normative structure of a society. I propose that a better understanding of demographic change must include attention to the political context of fertility and health behavior, and I sketch the dimensions of that context in the region.

The demography of Arab countries

Arab countries as discussed here are those in which Arabic is the official language.' This criterion was chosen because it constitutes a reasonable basis for delineating a relatively homogeneous culture area. These countries cover the geographic area of North Africa and West Asia (see Figure 1) .2 Predom- inantly Muslim,3 they account for about one-quarter of the world's Muslim population.

The total population of Arab countries is estimated at 220 million in 1991. The most populous country is Egypt, which has 52.4 million inhabitants; there are three countries of about 25 million each (Sudan, Morocco, and Algeria) and four countries of 10-20 million: Iraq (18.9), Saudi Arabia ( 14. 1), Syria ( 12.5), and Yemen (now united, 1 1. 7); the remainder are under 10 million, with six countries of 2 million or less. As a group, these countries have very high rates of population growth, averaging just under 3 percent annually,4 and very young populations, with about 40 percent of inhabitants under age 15 years.

Table 1 presents the latest available data on income per head, urbanization, education, total fertility rates, infant mortality, and life expectancy in Arab countries. The diversity in levels of development is striking: the economies of these countries have very different bases-rich oil producers, middle-income countries, and extremely poor countries5-and there are great disparities in GNP per capita, urbanization, and education. Levels of urbanization are about 75 percent in countries of the Arabian peninsula (with the exception of Oman), as well as in Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, and Libya; they



CARLA MAKHLOUF OBERMEYER 35

FIGURE 1 The Arab countries

NISIA YI LEBANON IRAQ

MOROCC JORDAN KUWAIT

ALGERIA BAHRAIN LIBYA EGYPT QATAR

Western" Sahara SAUDI ARABIA

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

MAURITANIA OMAN

SUDAN YM

SMALIA

are around 50 percent in Algeria, Egypt, Mauritania, Morocco, Syria, and Tunisia; and between 22 and 40 percent in Somalia, Sudan, and Yemen. Statistics on education show that most countries have primary enrollment ratios close to 100, but several (Mauritania, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, and Sudan) still lag behind. Secondary school enrollment is much lower. On average about one-half of the age groups are enrolled in secondary school (World Bank, 1991, 199 la).

In all these countries levels of fertility are high, and in over half total fertility rates are above 6 children per woman. Analyses from the World Fertility Survey carried out in the 1970s (summarized in Farid, 1987) document that marriage is early and quasi-universal, childbearing begins early and continues throughout the reproductive years, and contraceptive use is low.6 More recent data indicate that total fertility rates for the period 1985- 90 average 5.6 children per woman, compared to an average of 3.9 for less developed countries as a whole (United Nations, 1990, 1991).

Levels of mortality are more diverse. Life expectancy averages 64 years or more in Bahrain, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Syria, Tunisia, and the Emirates, but 59 years or less in the poor and predominantly rural countries of Somalia, Sudan, and Yemen. The range is similar for infant mortality rates, which are near or below 50 per thousand live births in the Gulf countries, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, and Tunisia but exceed 100 in Mau- ritania, Somalia, Sudan, and Yemen.

Simple correlations between demographic and socioeconomic indicators (see Figures 2 and 3) show a moderate negative correlation between



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FIGURE 3 Relationship between total fertility rates and infant mortality rates in Arab countries, 1985-90

140 - - -

120-

100

*80

60-

40*

20

3.5 4 4.5 5 5.5 6 6.5 7 7.5 8

Total fertility rate

SOURCE OF DATA: United Nations, 1991

GNP per head, urbanization, and primary school enrollment on the one hand, and infant mortality on the other; the percentage of explained variance is lowest for GNP per capita (38 percent) and highest for primary school enrollment (59 percent). By contrast, the correlation of these same indicators with total fertility rates is very weak, as evidenced by the almost horizontal lines and the low percentage of variance explained. Such simple correlational analyses have been carried out in several studies of Arab demography.7 Findings from these and other studies have been used to support the claim that the demographic transition in the Arab world is a unique process. Given the diversity of demographic transitions, both historical and contemporary, however, there is no reason to expect countries to conform to a uniform model of change, and it should come as no surprise that socioeconomic factors do not fully account for demographic indicators. Clearly, correlation analyses based on cross-sectional data are of limited usefulness when at- tempting to understand demographic change, and it is necessary to consider trends over time.

Tables 2 and 3 provide data on fertility and mortality over the last four decades. Table 2 shows that between 1950-55 and 1985-90, total fertility rates decreased from 6.9 children per woman to 5.6 children-a decline of about 19 percent on average. Mortality by contrast has been changing more




TABLE 2 Trends in total fertility rates in Arab countries, 1950-90

Percent decline 1950-55 to

1950-55 1955-60 1965-70 1975-80 1985-90 1985-90

Algeria 7.3 7.3 7.5 7.2 5.4 26 Bahrain 7.0 7.0 7.0 5.2 4.1 41 Egypt 6.6 7.0 6.6 5.3 4.5 32 Iraq 7.2 7.2 7.2 7.0 6.4 11 Jordan 7.4 7.4 8.0 7.4 6.2 16 Kuwait 7.2 7.2 7.4 5.9 3.9 46 Lebanon 5.7 6.2 6.1 4.3 3.8 33 Libya 6.9 7.0 7.5 7.4 6.9 0 Mauritania 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 0 Morocco 7.2 7.2 7.1 5.9 4.8 33 Oman 7.2 7.2 7.2 7.2 7.2 0 Qatar 7.0 7.0 7.0 6.4 5.6 20 Saudi Arabia 7.2 7.2 7.3 7.3 7.2 0 Somalia 6.6 6.6 6.6 6.6 6.6 0 Sudan 6.7 6.7 6.7 6.7 6.4 4 Syria 7.1 7.1 7.8 7.4 6.8 4 Tunisia 6.9 7.0 6.8 5.7 4.1 41 United Arab Emirates 7.0 7.0 6.8 5.7 4.8 31 Yemen, YAR (North) 7.4 7.6 8.0 8.0 8.0 -8 Yemen, PDRY (South) 7.0 7.0 7.0 7.0 6.7 4

Regional weighted averagea 6.9 7.0 7.0 6.3 5.6 19

Weighted average calculated using female population aged 15-49. SOURCE: United Nations (1991).

rapidly. During the same period, the average decline in infant mortality rates was 58.5 percent. Whereas in the 1950s, 16 out of 20 countries had infant mortality rates above 175 deaths per thousand live births, for the period 1985-90 only seven countries are above 75 per thousand (Table 3). As recently as the 1970s, infant mortality rates for Arab countries as a group were higher than the average for less developing countries (1 13 per thousand compared to 106), but today the average infant mortality rate for the region is 78, equal to the average for less developed countries (United Nations, 1991).

The decline of mortality accompanied substantial investments in health care, especially in oil-producing countries. A health infrastructure has been developed in countries where none existed as recently as the 1970s, and today in Oman for example, infant mortality rates are 40 per thousand, down from a rate of well over 200 in 1950-55. Table 4 summarizes data on




TABLE 3 Trends in infant mortality rates in Arab countries, 1950-90

Percent decline 1950-55 to

1950-55 1955-60 1965-70 1975-80 1985-90 1985-90

Algeria 185 175 150 112 74 60 Bahrain 175 150 78 38 16 91 Egypt 200 183 170 131 65 68 Iraq 165 148 111 83 69 58 Jordan 160 145 102 65 44 73 Kuwait 125 101 55 34 18 86 Lebanon 87 73 52 48 48 45 Libya 185 170 130 107 82 56 Mauritania 207 196 173 149 127 39 Morocco 180 170 138 110 82 54 Oman 231 220 180 105 40 83 Qatar 180 160 85 46 31 83 Saudi Arabia 200 180 140 100 71 65 Somalia 190 180 162 149 132 31 Sudan 185 175 156 131 108 42

Syria 160 145 107 70 48 70 Tunisia 175 163 138 88 52 70

United Arab Emirates 180 160 85 38 26 86 Yemen, YAR (North) 231 220 186 149 120 48 Yemen, PDRY (South) 231 220 186 150 120 48

Regional weighted average' 188 173 147 113 78 56

a Weighted average calculated using number of births. SOURCE: United Nations (1991).

indicators of health care. Although countries that are poor and predominantly rural have unfavorable statistics for population per physician, immunization, and the provision of medical care at birth, in more than half of the Arab countries 75 percent of the population has access to health services, immunization coverage is 80 percent or higher, and at least three-quarters of births are attended by medical personnel. It appears from these statistics that neither mortality levels nor health care indicators support the notion of "poor achievement" in the area of health.8 Nor do these data suggest an incom- patibility between Islamic religion and vigorous efforts to improve health.

In short, while the regional decline in mortality fits well with prevalent models of demographic change, fertility trends appear to be lagging. The fact that fertility remains high after economic indicators improve and mortality begins to decline, while by no means a unique phenomenon, certainly de- serves further investigation. The explanations that are most commonly offered to account for it are the Islamic religion and the low status of women.




TABLE 4 Health and family planning indicators in Arab countries, most recent data

Percent of Percent of population

Percent of births Number of having women attended by persons Percent of access to using medical per one-year-olds health contraception personnel physician immunizeda careb (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)

Algeria 36 85 2,340 65 88 Bahrain 98 89 100 Egypt 38 24 770 87 Iraq 14 50 1,740 86 93 Jordan 26 75 1,120 98 97 Kuwait 35 99 640 69 100 Lebanon 53 88 540 91 Libya <15 76 690 62 Mauritania 1 23 11,900 28 30 Morocco 36 26 4,760 61 70 Oman 60 1,700 88 91 Qatar 90 80 Saudi Arabia <15 78 740 89 97 Somalia 2 2 16,080 25 27 Sudan 5 20 10,190 29 51 Syria 20 37 1,260 58 76 Tunisia 50 60 2,150 91 90 United Arab Emirates 31 96 1,020 71 90

Yemen, YAR (North) 1 12 6,010 29 35

Yemen, PDRY (South) <15 10 4,370 35 30

Weighted averagec 26 42 1,424 63 73

a Percent of one-year-olds who are immunized against poliomyelitis, diphtheria, pertussis, and tetanus. Percent of the population that can reach appropriate health services by local transportation in no more than one hour. See note 4.

SOURCES: Column 1: figures for Bahrain, Egypt, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Tunisia, and YAR are from World Bank (1991); figures for Algeria, Kuwait, Libya, Saudi Arabia, UAE, and PDRY are from Population Crisis Committee (1990); figures for Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Mauritania, Sudan, and Syria are from United Nations (1 989b); figure for Somalia is from World Bank (1989). Columns 2 and 3: World Bank (1991); figures for Algeria, Bahrain, Morocco, Qatar, and the Yemens are from UNICEF (1989); column 2 figure for Lebanon is from Zurayk and Armenian (1985); column 3 figures for the Yemens are from World Bank (1990). Columns 4 and 5: UNICEF (1990); column 4 figures for Bahrain, Libya, Qatar, and Sudan, and column 5 figure for Bahrain are from UNICEF (1989).

The Islamic hypothesis

The relevance of Islam for an understanding of population patterns in the Arab world has been a recurrent motif in the demographic literature. In a comparative statistical analysis of culture, religion, and fertility, Lutz (1987) finds that whereas in the United States there is no effect of "culture" on




fertility separate from the effect of socioeconomic factors, in Arab countries religious factors are significantly associated with fertility, even when socioeconomic status is controlled. Nagi (1984) draws similar conclusions about the role of Islam as a factor in high fertility. And a study of women's health in Saudi Arabia finds that of the crucial elements which influence health behavior, "Islam is the most basic, giving legitimacy and direction to the others" (Gallagher and Searle, 1983: 86).

The proposition that the demography of Arab countries can be explained with reference to the strength of Islam has an obvious appeal. It offers a broad explanation for patterns that have otherwise resisted fitting prevailing models. It is also in line with the increased attention in recent demographic literature to cultural factors. However, some of the statements concerning Islam's importance are cast in terms that unwittingly conform to a long "Orientalist" tradition that, implicitly or explicitly, presents Islam as militantly pronatalist, and also characterized by ignorance and fatalism (cf. Said, 1978; examples of Orientalism as applied to demography include Baer, 1964; Hamady, 1959; Kirk, 1968; Patai, 1973).

But even apart from the general implications of these studies, one of the problems with the "Islamic" explanation is that it treats as monolithic a trait that is shared by close to a billion people worldwide, and that has adapted to, and been affected by, diverse regional contexts. Historically, as Islam spread from the Arabian peninsula, it encompassed people with different languages, customs, and religions, and encountered a variety of legal systems. Given the lack of a hierarchical clerical structure in Islam, no effort was made to change these customary laws, as long as they did not conflict directly with shari'a (Islamic law). Today as a result, the more than 300 ethnic groups considered to be Muslim (Weekes, 1984) exhibit very different lifestyles. Moreover, like all religious texts, the Koran and the collected sayings and actions of the Prophet Muhammad (the Hadith) are variously interpreted by the schools of Islamic law and by the political leaders of Islamic nations, in ways ranging from liberal-reformist to puritan-fundamentalist. The many schools (madhahib) of Islamic jurisprudence vary according to the degree to which they emphasize qiyas (analogy), ijma' (consensus of the community of believers), and the hadith (traditions of the Prophet), in de- riving shari'a. 9 The diversity in the doctrine and the cultural context of Islam'0 calls into question the recourse to Islam as an explanation for demographic trends.

The diversity of religious manifestations, however, does not invalidate all generalizations. Islam is not merely a spiritual principle but the foundation for a way of life, and it is important to consider whether there are behavioral correlates, where fertility and health are concerned, of being Muslim. The first thing to note is that Islam does not share the ascetic ideals of other religions, has a generally positive attitude toward sexual enjoyment within




marriage, and encourages all believers to marry. " Moreover, a clear consensus exists among all schools of Islamic law that family planning is per- missible. This is based both on the absence of any prohibition against birth control in the Koran and on general statements in the Koran that God does not want to burden man but wishes to improve his life. More specifically, statements in the Hadith indicate that withdrawal ('azl) was practiced in Muhammad's time and that he did not discourage his followers from the practice.

The Sunni and Shi'a positions on birth control are in substance the same. They derive mainly from the writings of Al-Ghazali, the most celebrated medieval theologian of Islam. His works established the five reasons for which birth control may be allowed: the affliction of one of the partners with a disease that might be transmitted to the offspring; a disposition of the wife to have too closely spaced pregnancies; concern for the health of the wife from too frequent pregnancies; the husband's impecunious condition; and, perhaps surprisingly, concern for the wife's beauty (see Musallam, 1983).12 There are some qualifiers in the Hanafi, Maliki, and Hanbali schools as well as among the Shi'a concerning the relative importance of seeking the woman's permission to practice withdrawal, because of her right to sexual enjoyment and to have children if she wishes. On abortion, some differences relate to establishment of the point at which the fetus is considered to be formed, but except for the prohibition by the Malikis most schools allow it up until the time when the fetus is seen as being "ensouled" (variously defined as day 40, 80, or 120 of pregnancy) and prohibit it thereafter (Mu- sallam, 1983; Omran, 1980; Roudi, 1988). These traditional positions, which were developed in response to medieval ways of limiting births, have been reiterated to apply to modern methods as well, as is clear from the published legal opinions (fatwas) issued by several prominent Muftis allowing birth control conditional on mutual consent of the spouses (see excerpts from the fatwas by the Mufti of Egypt in 1937, 1953, and 1959 in Omran, 1980; the compilation of statements by Schieffelin, 1967; and the proceedings of the conference of Muslim leaders on family planning, in IPPF, 1974).

The lack of explicit objections to family planning still leaves the question of whether and to what extent the high natality of this world region derives indirectly from religious doctrine. One line of argument is that the pronatalist orientation of Islam is based not on direct injunctions, but on the ways in which Islam supports the conditions that are conducive to high fertility (Fagley, 1965). This leads us to consider patterns of marriage, polygyny, and divorce.

From the earliest days of confrontation between Islam and Christianity, a certain fascination has attached to the way in which Islam condoned sexual enjoyment, permitting men to take multiple wives and to father large numbers of children. To a certain extent, images of the harem still color Western




perceptions of Islamic marriage, with an emphasis on the man's right to take up to four wives and on his unilateral and arbitrary right to divorce his wife (Baer, 1964; Kirk, 1968; Patai, 1973). In fact, in the Koran, polygyny is limited by the obligation to treat all wives equally, and it has actually been the privilege of the few who could afford to support more than one wife. The level of polygyny has been found to be as low as 1 percent in Damascus and 2 percent in Cairo (Ghallab, 1984), with most estimates putting it at no more than 10 percent (White, 1978). In a review of the levels of polygyny in Arab countries, Chamie finds that "polygyny is practiced by a compara- tively small minority of Arab Muslim men, i.e. probably by no more than 12 percent, and in most instances nearer five percent" (1986: 56). In any case, studies of polygamous marriages suggest that they are not more fertile than monogamous unions (Burch, 1983; Weeks, 1988; Garenne and van de Walle, 1989; Borgerhoff Mulder, 1989), and we can dismiss polygyny as a contributor to high natality.

As for divorce, the frequency with which it happens varies widely. The proportion of divorce within 20 years of marriage ranges from a high of 20 percent in Morocco to 11 percent in Egypt and only 4-6 percent in Jordan, Syria, and Tunisia (White, 1978; Farid, 1987). According to Farid, "This wide range of divorce levels indicates that divorce is not readily linked with religion" (1987: 347). In any case, the relationship between the rate of divorce and fertility levels is not uniformly positive: while a high divorce rate can be seen to encourage higher fertility because it "redistributes infertile, but not necessarily sterile partners," it also means that while a woman is divorced she is not exposed to the risk of childbearing (Fargues, 1989).' 3

It follows from the preceding discussion that Islamic doctrine does not directly explain the high fertility observed in the region. But is it possible that Islam's impact on fertility is indirect, that although the doctrine is not explicitly pronatalist, its application provides conditions that encourage high natality? Underlying this question is the idea that, through its effect on the status of women, the influence of religion is translated into demographic patterns. This is the hypothesis that we examine now.

The women's status hypothesis

It is often alleged that the low status of women is a central feature of Islam. Women's status is assumed to be uniform throughout the region and to constitute the crucial causal link between religious doctrine and the observed levels of fertility and mortality (Caldwell, 1986; Kirk, 1968; Roudi, 1988; Nagi, 1984). Yet, as an exhaustive review of the literature indicates, the idea of Arab women evokes two contradictory sets of images:

On the one hand, there is the image of the exotic and mysterious odalisque, the creature of the harem whose existence is dedicated to a life of luxury and




sensuous pleasure in the service of the man, her lord and master. On the other hand, there is the image of the silent and invisible "beast of burden," born and nurtured to suffer the twin burdens of childbearing and heavy household chores. (Rassam, 1984: 1)

In the literature, orientalists have contributed to the exotic image, while Christian missionaries have emphasized the exploitation and degradation of women (Rassam, 1984). Chapter headings in books on women in Islam regularly include veiling, mutilation, sexual abuse, virginity, abortion, female circumcision (see, e.g., Saadawi, 1980), 14 concubines, harem, aphrodisiacs, and slavery (Gaudio and Pelletier, 1980). '5 Thus, descriptions of Muslim women in the popular-and sometimes in the scholarly-literature illustrate a polarization of views: those with a more "Western" or "liberal" perspective attack the inequality and unfairness of the system, while apologists for Islam charge that such opinions are part of a general attempt by the West to subjugate their societies. In defense they point to statements in Islamic texts recommending fairness in dealing with women, and to examples of women who, both in the days of the Prophet Muhammad and in later centuries, achieved positions of power.'6 The status of women is a controversial issue, one that is often at the center of the confrontation between Islam and the West, hence unlikely to be resolved by purely scientific means. It is important, however, if we are to better understand the extent to which it affects demographic patterns, that we clarify its multiple dimensions.

In a thorough review of the relationships between the status of women and demographic outcomes, Mason ( 1984) finds that the concept of women's status is often measured as if it were unidimensional, ignoring the multiplicity of roles that women play. She cautions that the concept is complex and its indicators are heavily context-dependent. She argues that the status of women has three distinct, and not necessarily overlapping, dimensions- prestige, power, and autonomy-that need to be measured separately. The difficulty is compounded by a pervasive confusion of two aspects of inequality: those related to class and those related to gender. Caldwell and Caldwell (1988) have pointed to a degree of circularity in defining autonomy as the ability to make decisions about education, employment, and health care, and then proceeding to test whether women's autonomy is related to levels of education, employment, and health.

The link between lower status and high fertility/poor health is believed to operate in two mutually reinforcing ways. First, lower status means re- stricted access to education and employment, allegedly the two major determinants of improved health and lower fertility. Second, a woman's legal and economic dependence puts her in a precarious position vis-'a-vis her husband and his relatives, makes the threat of divorce and polygyny more menacing, and hence limits her alternatives to childbearing. This is because her one chance to improve her bargaining power and to insure against risk




is to produce sons whom she can influence and rely on for support. Although these explanations have made significant contributions to understanding the institutional context of high fertility, 17 they are in large part based on studies of South Asia. Given the differences in marriage and residence patterns between that region and the Arab world,'8 it is not clear to what extent these explanations are applicable to the latter context. Moreover, the presumption that men always want large families and are less inclined to seek good health care for their children or for their wives is a gross oversimplification of the motivations and decisions of both sexes (Cleland and van Ginneken, 1988; Mason and Taj, 1987).

It is also noteworthy that there is no one-to-one relationship between higher female status on the one hand and "good" health and low fertility on the other. In the course of industrialization in Europe, major improvements in the health of infants and children, as well as in reproductive health, occurred at a time when women were economically dependent and the ideal Western family evidenced much gender inequality (Mason, 1984). And although education and employment, the standard components of any scale of women's status, are thought to lower fertility and improve health through their effect on the status of women, "clearly female education can affect fertility by several routes, and these may not be directly indicative of women's status": education may not lead to a change in status, if the girls who are sent to school in the first place come from families with less discrimination (Sathar et al., 1988). Moreover, where few women work out of choice and those who do have stringent economic needs, employment is often associated with lower status, and even with worse health outcomes for their children (Basu, 1988, 1990). Studies of women's status and fertility outcomes in Arab countries have not always yielded the expected inverse associations between education, employment, and fertility (Cornelius, 1988) and have in fact emphasized the need for better measures of both "patriarchy" and women's status.

Thus before offering women's status as an explanation for a variety of demographic outcomes, one must examine the different, and often contradictory ways in which women's status is defined. We now review the evidence on definitions of women's status in the Arab world, considering three sources of information: the doctrinal statements (do the Islamic texts define a lower status for women?), the historical data (how did the emergence of Islam in the Arabian peninsula change the status of women?), and the contemporary situation (as seen through summary statistics and social science analyses).

Many observers attribute lower status of women in Islam to the influence of religious texts. Differences between the sexes as they are discussed in the Koran and the Hadith pertain to three major areas: men have been given a preeminent position in religion, sons are to receive twice as great an inheritance as daughters, and a man's testimony in court is worth twice that of a woman. Judged by the standards of individual autonomy and equality




that constitute the principles of contemporary legislation in Western countries, these are clearly inegalitarian statements. But the same texts emphasize the equality of all believers before God, and they assert that everyone is judged according to merit. Thus there is a certain ambivalence whereby, though all believers are equal, relations between the sexes are governed not by the principle of absolute equality but by the principle of complementarity.19

Another point to note in passing is that many of the key Arabic words in the Koranic statements about women have several meanings: this is true, for instance, of the word that refers to men's "preferred" position relative to women (some translations have emphasized men's superior position, while others have stressed their responsibility). In this and a number of other instances, religious texts have historically provided justifications for divergent positions. With respect to the status of women, it is entirely conceivable, given the relative flexibility of the texts, that statements traditionally taken to justify a subordinate position are subsequently reinterpreted in a more egalitarian manner. Indeed reformist and feminist movements both historically and in contemporary Islam have done exactly this. The need for such a process of reinterpretation is not unique to Islam: all three monotheistic religions include inegalitarian elements that reflect the temporal context of patriarchy in which the religions emerged.

To what extent does the historical context of the emergence of Islam illuminate the issue of women's status? Information on social conditions and gender relations in pre-Islamic Arabia is sketchy. In orthodox Muslim think- ing, pre-Islamic times are referred to as al-jahiliyya, the age of ignorance, and all that came before Islam is "interpreted as infidelity and chaos" (Ob- ermeyer, 1981: 366). Islamic tradition claims that this was a time when female infanticide was widely practiced, sexual unions were capricious and promiscuous, and the breakdown of traditional norms had left widows and orphans without recourse. By redefining men's responsibilities toward women, Islam is seen as protecting the rights of women and raising their status. On the other hand, an Arab feminist perspective focuses on examples of independent and outspoken women in the jahiliyya, on evidence of the opposition of some women to Islam in the seventh century,20 and on early social evolutionist claims for the existence of matriarchy in pre-Islamic Arabia (Smith, 1903). For the feminists, pre-Islamic society represents a genuine tradition of freedom and equality where women could be priestesses, war- riors, nurses, poets, and caravan owners-a tradition that is seen as having been thwarted by Islam. Each of these opposing views is in fact based on idealized notions of the jahiliyya period. Some progress has been made in analyzing the relationship between the pre-Islamic and the Islamic elements that define the status of women (Mernissi, 1985; Ahmed, 1986). In any event, the development of Islam meant the articulation of a new religious ideology with the political system of traditional Arab society.

Much has been written on the overlap of religious and civic spheres




in Islam. Explanations have included the definition of religion as a way of life that extends to the political sphere, the absence of a clear religious hierarchy, the centrality of kinship structures, and the mutually reinforcing authoritarianism of state and family. The articulation of the religious ideology of Islam with the patriarchal system can better be understood in light of the social conditions that prevailed at the emergence of Islam. In seventh-century Mecca, the thriving mercantile economy based on the caravan trade was undermining traditional tribal structure (Watt, 1953, 1956). The communal ideology of the tribe, which had ensured the protection of the weak, was breaking down and the rise of mercantile individualism left many insecure. The success of Islam was a function of Muhammad's ability in connecting

communal and self-serving tendencies and channelling these otherwise contradictory trends into the most cohesive social order Arabia had ever known. The communal tendencies were channelled into warfare for Pax Islamica, and the self-serving tendencies were mainly vented in the institution of the family. (Mernissi, 1985: 80)

This dynamic process shaped the Islamic family, sanctioned the responsibility of men to provide for women, and legitimated male authority. In defining these relationships, Islam put in place elements that contradict its egalitarian ideology. These elements are antithetical to Koranic rulings about the equality of believers and the relative economic independence of women (right to inherit and to keep their own property). Indeed, "It is only in the matter of the rights and responsibilities of males and females that the notion of equal human worth, otherwise so intrinsic to the Koran, seems momentarily suspended" (Ahmed, 1986: 678).

This ambivalence is also found in contemporary Arab societies. On the one hand, the inegalitarian aspects are quite apparent from comparative statistics on women's status. The lower levels of education and employment for women suggest an inferior status. Throughout the region, the ratio of girls to boys enrolled in school is considerably below unity. Labor force participation figures are less reliable, because of the inconsistency with which agricultural work is reported and because the jobs that women combine with household chores are most often not included in the statistics (Shorter and Zurayk, 1985). But where such figues are available, they show rates of female employment between 5 and 16 percent (Omran, 1980; World Bank, 199 la). In a widely circulated compilation of statistics on women, "Poor, powerless, and pregnant" (Population Crisis Committee, 1988), about half of those countries that are ranked either "very poor" or "extremely poor" are Arab.2'

On the other hand, the notion of uniformly low status that emerges from such aggregate comparative statistics is contradicted by anthropological and sociological field studies of women in the Arab world. One of the major developments in the anthropology of the Arab world has been to document




the rich variation in women's lives and their relationships to one another, to their children, and to men. From the accumulated ethnographies, especially those carried out by women, a complex picture is emerging of relations between the sexes in a rapidly changing environment (see the reviews by Rassam, 1984 and Abu-Lughod, 1989). Careful anthropological fieldwork has questioned the myth of the passive subordination of women and has revealed the contradiction between the ideologically legitimated authority of men and the power and autonomy that women have despite-or because of-the very system of male dominance which defines sexual segregation.22

A consideration of trends in indicators of women's position confirms both the variability among Arab countries and the rapid changes over the last two decades. Life expectancies for women are higher than for men by two years or more, whereas in the 1960s and even the 1970s there were indications of female disadvantage (United Nations, 1991). More specifically, with respect to mortality below age five, mortality ratios by sex clearly showed a male advantage before the 1980s,23 but thereafter this inequality is much attenuated and even absent from national mortality figures (see DHS, 1987, 1988; Al-Jem, 1990). The ratios of girls to boys enrolled in primary school, which were low in most Arab countries in the 1960s and 1970s, now range from 27 for the Yemen Arab Republic to over 90 for Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates, with most other countries having ratios in the upper 70s to low 80s (UNICEF, 1989; World Bank, 1984, 1989, 1990, 1991a).

Moreover, a closer look at fertility indicators suggests the onset of a downward trend. Total fertility rates, which were uniformly high for most Arab countries in the 1950-55 period, began to diverge in the 1960s and 1970s, and now range from a low of about 4 in Lebanon, Kuwait, Tunisia, and Bahrain to a high of 7.2 in Saudi Arabia and 8 in North Yemen (Table 1). While fertility rates have remained high in most countries, substantial declines have occurred in some: between 1965 and 1985 the total fertility rate declined by two births or more in Bahrain, Egypt, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, Tunisia, and the United Emirates (Table 2). In fact, one of the countries with the steepest fertility decline in the third world is Tunisia, whose total fertility rate declined from 7 in 1960 to just over 4 in 1988 (DHS, 1988). Two other countries with major fertility declines are also Islamic: Indonesia and Malaysia (Weeks, 1988). In an analysis of recent data from Arab countries, Fargues finds three major changes in fertility determinants: an increase in the age at marriage, steadily reducing the traditionally large age difference between spouses;24 an increase in women's education; and larger cohorts of younger women entering the labor market. Where detailed data are available, analyses indicate that these three factors are associated with reduced fertility (Fargues, 1989).

In sum, neither the indicators of women's status nor its demographic




correlates are uniform throughout the Arab countries. A very striking contrast in most countries today is that between a younger generation of women that has achieved at least primary schooling and an older generation that is for the most part illiterate. To what extent the trend toward universal schooling for girls will spread throughout the region and how it will affect the reproductive choices of the next generation are important questions, both for research and policy. But the answers to these questions cannot be sought only through analyses at the aggregate level: they must include in-depth investigations of the context in which decisions about fertility and health are made.

To understand the ways in which the institutional context affects fertility patterns in the Arab world, we must develop more complex models that contribute to an explanation of how changes in broad structures and ideas are correlated with individual decisions. This article has argued that simplistic hypotheses linking Islam and the status of women cannot provide a satis- factory explanation for observed demographic patterns. The "fateful triangle" model that sees an inevitably ill-fated association between Islam, women, and demographic outcomes is inadequate because it ignores the diversity of Islam and the variations in the status of women in the region; equally important, such a model is inappropriate because it is inattentive to the contradiction between norms and behavior, and to the ambiguities within the normative structure of a society. To criticize such a model is not, however, to deny the importance of religious ideology and women's status. On the contrary, religious doctrine and gender relations are crucial to an understanding of demographic behavior, but their interplay is not merely a mech- anistic association. In the remainder of this article, I argue that to understand this interplay requires a consideration of the political context in which it operates.

The political context of health and fertility behavior

The political dimension is usually absent from discussions of demographic change, although (in its quasi-mystical form as "political will") it has sometimes been invoked to account for unexpected progress in health (Halstead, Walsh, and Warren, 1985; Caldwell, 1986). The influence of politics has been underplayed in most studies, yet the "analysis of political economy constitutes an essential element in understanding health transitions" (Reich, 1991). Demographic processes are less the direct product of explicit concerns about numbers of desired children, preferences for health care services, or religious rules, and more the result of individual strategies and decisions reflecting the structure of power in society.25 Hence the need to focus on the "ipolitical-economic context of health care" in the Middle East (Morsy, 1981) and to develop a "political economy of fertility" (Greenhalgh, 1990).




Defining a political framework for analyzing demographic change requires concerted efforts toward a multidisciplinary approach on the part of demographers, political scientists, historians, and anthropologists. Political science research on the Arab world has mainly been concerned with the stability of systems and their ability to respond to demands and stresses.26 It does not readily provide a method that would link the structural char- acteristics of political entities to demographic policy and reproductive behavior. Conversely, demographic analyses of population programs and of family planning "effort"27 tell us little about the decisionmaking process through which population policies are defined, how such policies fit into the political agendas of local and international leaders, and how leaders make and implement decisions affecting health and reproduction. On balance, few efforts have been made to link political ideas to the reproductive strategies of individuals and groups. While this broader task is beyond the scope of this article, the following discussion sketches the linkage between political and demographic change in the Arab world.

While the subordinate status of women is common to all patriarchal societies, be they Islamic or Western (see Rosaldo and Lamphere, 1974), in contemporary Islamic societies the link between gender relations and political structures seems more inextricable than it is elsewhere. This is most dra- matically illustrated in the resurgence of veiling that accompanies the development of anti-Western sentiment and the appearance of fundamentalist movements in the region. But although the persistence of the social and ideological structures that support patriarchy (Mernissi, 1985) and are indicative of a pretransitional demographic regime may be associated with particular fundamentalist interpretations of religion, this is not necessarily a function of Islam itself. Rather, the political context defines the role played by religion and determines whether historically defined tensions concerning the status of women persist and are reflected in particular demographic outcomes.28

The way in which political elites articulate their ideology of development in relation to Islam is a crucial determinant of differences in the status of women. The ambivalence of many Arab/Muslim leaders toward female emancipation29 stems from their need to address two conflicting demands in their societies: prosperity, which means modernization; and identity, which is partly rooted in tradition. The satisfaction of both demands makes it necessary to define a national identity in relation to two sources that are often at odds: the Islamic tradition and the West. Where the definition of a national identity is the central issue in the struggle between competing political groups, conservative ideologies often appear as the least risky option, and fundamentalism offers reassurance against the crisis in aspirations and identity. "The elite defense of the family, religion, and culture, demonstrated by the reactivation of patriarchal traditions, may serve as evidence of un-




swerving national loyalty" (Marshall, 1984: 513). A strict interpretation of the religious tradition is also favored by those who have reason to be dis- satisfied with the central government and have little hope for improvement from existing development policies.

In such situations, the issue of gender relations is either avoided or dealt with defensively in terms of the need to protect authenticity against encroachments by hostile powers. Traditional roles may thus come to be endowed with a positive political significance, as when veiling is used to express opposition to a regime or when producing many children is a forceful statement in a political struggle. Women may freely choose such traditional roles and behaviors, or, as an Algerian feminist points out, they can be caught between two conflicting loyalties-to their fellow-women and to their nation (Helie-Lucas, 1987)-and may sacrifice some of their rights as women to reaffirm their identity as Arabs, Muslims, or nationals of a given country.30 Some Arab feminists in fact question a "women's issues" approach to problems like polygyny or wife abuse,3' because they feel that it is more pressing to deal with the broader issues of development and their country's relationship with the West.

The progress and setbacks that have been observed in the Arab region with respect to the status of women reflect the dilemmas of national development. Where development is not entirely successful in responding to national aspirations, or where, as in some of the oil-rich countries, it has happened so fast that its incongruity seems overwhelming and threatening, leaders lack a sound base of popular support. The traditional bases of identity present themselves as the safest choice, and religion is used selectively to cope with political exigencies and to legitimate the power of individual leaders. The balancing act between traditional structures and modernization is perhaps most striking in Saudi Arabia, but the outcome throughout the region has been a record of timid reforms that have fallen short of real political change. For instance, attempts have been made to give women more choice in matters of marriage by making it easier for them to initiate divorce proceedings, and by requiring the intervention of the court in order to limit the husband's right to divorce and polygyny (Coulson and Hinchcliffe, 1978). But in the absence of broad political reforms, the enactment of small legal changes can produce only slow improvements in the status of women and a limited expansion of the options open to women outside of childbearing.

In addressing population issues the various Arab governments have adopted a range of policies, with various degrees of success. Such countries as Iraq, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates aim at increasing their population by raising fertility levels, though fertility levels are rapidly declining in Kuwait. Other countries such as Oman, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia seek to maintain fertility levels (which is equivalent to increasing their population at a rapid rate). Countries that have policies to reduce fertility show different




rates of decline: substantial in Tunisia, moderate in Morocco and Egypt, and inconsequential in Yemen. While the remaining countries in the region have no stated population policy, they place no restrictions on family planning (United Nations, 1987, 1989, 1990a).32 This diversity can be analyzed in terms of socioeconomic setting, family planning program, and contraceptive prevalence,33 but the crucial questions remain why some governments make efforts (or allow forces outside the government to operate in this area), to what extent these efforts are translated into functioning programs, and how these processes are related to policies at the national level and to reproductive decisions at the household level. Without attention to the political context it is difficult to address these questions. Through comparative research both at the aggregate level of nations and at the micro-level of households, it may be possible to test the hypotheses suggested by the available evidence: that where substantial declines in fertility have taken place, they have invariably been associated with broader political changes; and where setbacks to women's status are observed, they too have accompanied a re-traditionalization of political structures and the abandonment of an egalitarian definition of society.

Analyses of lagging fertility transitions must also take into account the regional circumstances in which governments define population policies. Most of the countries in the region are pluralist states that include more than one religious or ethnic group. The dynamic interaction between these groups within a state and across national boundaries has profound implications for the balance of power, and fertility-limiting strategies are clearly unappealing to states and ethnic groups that are in conflict with their neighbors. In the most extreme case of war, numbers represent power, and this in part explains the persistently high fertility of Iraq, Jordan, the Palestinians, and Syria. But even in times of peace, the competition between minorities for resources and the anxiety caused by increasing numbers of outsiders can constitute a major disincentive for fertility decline. In the absence of a more egalitarian system, then, the call for a "modern" fertility regime appears pointless, suggesting to some observers that demography and democracy are inevitably linked.34

Conclusion

The preceding discussion suggests that, on balance, Arab countries will con- tinue to experience modest reductions in total fertility, but that declines will be neither rapid nor uniform. The pace of change will be slower in the context of the failure of economic development, the persistence of tensions between Islam and the West, and the fundamentalist reinterpretation of the religious tradition concerning the status of women. Such setbacks may not necessarily halt the mortality decline, inasmuch as investments in health that increase




life expectancy can be achieved without radically altering women's legal, economic, and social position. These setbacks are more likely to be reflected in persistently high fertility because changes in family planning policy and contraceptive use require a redefinition of the family and of gender relations. Whether and in which countries rapid transformations in fertility behavior will occur depends in part on the extent to which the political climate allows a redefinition of gender roles and the structure of the family.

Notes

The author acknowledges helpful comments from David Bell, Joseph Chamie, Lincoln Chen, Allan Hill, Robert LeVine, Karen Op- penheim Mason, Gerald Obermeyer, Michael Reich, Frederic Shorter, and Rachel Snow. She also thanks Rosario Cardenas for help with the tables and figures.

1 The countries that are included on the basis of this criterion are also members of the Arab League. (The West Bank and Gaza have been excluded because of lack of data, and most figures for North and South Yemen are presented separately.) Although Arabic is the native language in all these countries, there are populations within Algeria, Morocco, So- malia, and the Sudan for whom the mother tongue is not Arabic. The linguistic criterion has been selected, while recognizing the com- plexity of the association between language and religion and the sometimes tumultuous entanglement of national and supra-national (pan-Arab/pan-Islamic) allegiances that has characterized the history of the region.

2 This area corresponds to the two regions of North Africa and West Asia as defined by the United Nations. (The UN division includes, in addition, the three non-Arabic-speaking countries of Cyprus, Israel, and Turkey.)

3 The proportion of the population that is Muslim is 95 percent or more in all Arab countries, with the exception of Egypt, Jor- dan, and the United Arab Emirates where it is between 90 and 94 percent; Syria where it is 87 percent; Sudan, 72 percent; and Leba- non, 60 percent (estimates from Weeks, 1988).

4 Throughout this article, averages are weighted. They have been calculated using

population size as the weight for annual growth, GNP, percent urban, life expectancy, and population per physician. The number of women aged 15-49 has been used in averaging total fertility rates, percent of women using contraception, and proportion of births attended by medical personnel. The number of births per year has been used in averaging infant mortality rates and the proportion of one-year-olds who are immunized. The population 5-14 has been used in averaging primary school enrollment ratios.

5 A recent analysis of the political economy of the Middle East (Richards and Wa- terbury, 1990) suggests a taxonomy that dis- tinguishes the "coupon clippers," whose economy is based solely on oil revenues (Bah- rain, Kuwait, Libya, Oman, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates); the "oil industrializ- ers" (Algeria, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia); the "watchmakers," who have limited resources and concentrate on human capital and skill- intensive manufactures (Jordan, Lebanon, Sy- ria, Tunisia); the "newly-industrializing" countries (Egypt and Morocco); and the "agro-poor" (Sudan and Yemen).

6 World Fertility Surveys were carried out in Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, and Yemen. At that time, total fertility rates were above 8 for Yemen; 7-8 for Jordan and Syria; and just under 6 for Egypt, Morocco, and Tu- nisia. The proportion of teenage marriage was 60 percent in Yemen and about 22 percent for Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Syria. Contra- ceptive use was 1 percent in Yemen and 20- 25 percent for the other five countries (Farid, 1987). In the 1980s, Demographic and Health Surveys in Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia have found total fertility rates of 4.5, 4.5, and 4.1




respectively (DHS, 1987, 1988). Additional DHS surveys are planned or being completed in Jordan, Sudan, and Yemen.

7 For example, Omran (1980), Nagi (1984), and Caldwell (1986). Omran's study found that fertility did not correlate well with measures of economic development (GNP per capita and energy consumption), social development (percent literate, percent urban, labor force in agriculture), and health indicators (population per physician, energy consumption). Nagi's study covered all of the Arab countries discussed here and, in addition, six African countries and seven Asian countries (different parts of the study focused on different combinations of these countries). He found no association between fertility levels and national scores based on education, life expectancy, and nonagricultural labor force. Caldwell used correlations between infant mortality and GNP to label nine Arab countries "poor health achievers."

8 Caldwell's "poor achiever" argument was based on figures up to 1982, just before substantial declines in mortality became apparent throughout the region.

9 On the many schools of Islamic jurisprudence, their location, and their doctrine, see Watt (1961), Weekes (1984), and Gold- ziher (1981).

10 There are numerous historical and social studies of this diversity. See for instance the comparison between Moroccan and In- donesian Islam (Geertz, 1968).

11 Bouhdiba (1975) argues that Islam provides a synthesis of sexual enjoyment and religious faith.

12 Musallam's discussion, which covers sources as diverse as jurisprudence, medicine, materia medica, belles-lettres, erotica, and popular literature, indicates that, in the medieval Middle East, contraception was sanctioned by Islamic law and supported by moral and aesthetic attitudes.

13 Fargues (1989) finds that in the early phase of the "stabilization of the marital family," the decline in divorce in the Arab world is associated with a rise in fertility, although in a later phase lower divorce rates are associated with higher age at marriage and a drop in the birth rate.

14 It is worth noting that the sensation- alist literature is not limited to Western au- thors.

15 For a composite-and implausible- picture of many of these fascinating practices in a novel set in Arab countries, see Accad (1982).

16 Muhammad's wife Khadija was a successful trader and one of his daughters, Fa- tima, was an important figure in religious and political life. In fact the claim by the Shi'a that Fatima's husband, Ali, should have succeeded the Prophet emphasizes the importance of the link to Muhammad through his daughter. This importance is reflected in the greater share of inheritance given to daughters in Shi'a than in Sunni jurisprudence.

17 See Cain's (1984) "safety first" model of high fertility in patriarchal societies.

18 The two key differences relate to residence patterns and marriage payments. In most of South Asia, marriage is exogamous and residence is neolocal, which means that the new bride moves to her husband's village and is completely cut off from all female net- works: she is thus, vis-a-vis her in-laws, in a position similar to that of household servant. In the Arab world, by contrast, there is a preference for endogamous marriage and a woman retains stronger links with her family of origin. Moreover, whereas in the Arab world the groom makes marriage payments to the bride's family, in most of South Asia marriage is accompanied by the payment of a dowry, which makes it a heavy economic burden for parents to have many daughters and may constitute an important factor in the devaluation of daughters.

19 See for instance the statements by the Muslim scholar Ahmad Galwash (1945) re- printed from Al-Azhar University's Official Magazine: "The ruling idea in the teaching of Islam with regard to man and woman is that the husband and wife should supplement each other."

20 The famous revolt of the "harlots of Hadramaut" is one such instance. See the discussion of this event in Memissi (1985) and Ahmed (1986).

21 Although they are not precisely the same countries as those that were ranked as




poor achievers according to Caldwell's clas- sification, and although Caldwell was trying to explain health indicators in terms of women's status, while the Population Crisis Com- mittee was trying to measure the status of women by using health and fertility indicators, the report is another example of 'fateful triangle" reasoning.

22 See for example Davis (1983), Dorsky (1986), Dwyer (1978), Makhlouf (1979), and Memissi (1985). Memissi points out that in fact, unlike the ideology of women's inferi- ority that pervaded Western societies in the past, the assumption underlying relations between the sexes as defined by Islam is that women are powerful and dangerous.

23 The female disadvantage was especially pronounced in certain countries and subgroups (Cook and Hanslip, 1964; Kimm- ance, 1972; Tekce and Shorter, 1984; Mak- inson, 1985), and it is possible that it persists among some groups even though it can no longer be discemed in aggregate statistics.

24 See Cain (1984, 1988) for analyses of the association between large age differences between spouses, patriarchal structure, and the persistence of high fertility.

25 On this topic, see for instance Kreager (1985) and Handwerker (1990).

26 For typologies of Arab political systems, see Hudson (1977), Curtis (1981), Carr6 (1982), Tuma (1987), and Richards and Wa- terbury (1990).

27 See the summary in Lapham and Mauldin (1985).

28 In contemporary Arab societies the contradiction between egalitarian and inegalitarian elements conceming women in Is- lam is reflected in the legal sphere. In all the nation-states of the region except Tunisia, "personal status" laws derived from shari'a principles of gender differences regulate marriage and family relations, while civil codes based on the notion of equality of all citizens regulate economic transactions. This duality has been called a "constitutional chasm" or legal "schizophrenia" (El-Saadawi, 1988), because the notion of equal rights for women

as citizens is in conflict with their duty of obe- dience as believers (Memissi, 1988). To some, this tension is even manifested in the psycho- logical disorders that women suffer from in a transitional situation (Chelhi, 1988).

29 Mernissi (1985) suggests that this ambivalence is due both to the anxiety caused by "ghosts of the women in the pre-Islamic aristocracy" and to the disturbing images of "liberated" Westem women.

30 Women may willingly resort to such traditional symbols as the veil, which becomes endowed with new meanings: the rejection of Westernization and the need to rely on traditional sources of identity (Touba, 1985). This phenomenon is often overlooked by researchers, who tend to see the veil as a static expression of women's subordination. In reality, the veil is a symbol that can be manip- ulated to express complex realities (Makhlouf, 1979).

31 Joubeh argues that while such an approach may be valid in developed countries, "for women in developing countries, it is clearly less pressing to tackle such specific phe- nomena than to try to change the whole context in which they live. Women who live under political, economic, or racial oppression believe that their oppression as women is part of their oppression as people" (1987: 53).

32 As for abortion, most countries permit it for limited medical reasons, while Algeria, Egypt, and Jordan allow it on broader grounds and Tunisia makes it available on demand (Faour, 1989; Roudi, 1988). The legal aspect, however, is only one dimension of the reality of abortion, and its true prevalence is un- known.

33 Faour (1989) applies the Lapham and Mauldin (1985) framework to the Arab world. While it offers useful details on individual countries, its conclusion that "increased contraceptive use is the outcome of improved socioeconomic conditions as well as stronger program effort" is not particularly enlightening.

34 See Memissi (1991).




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