islamic militancy in east africa

Islamic Militancy in East Africa

JEFFREY HAYNES

ABSTRACT This paper examines the relative political significance of domesticand transnational Islamic militancy in three East African countries: Kenya,Tanzania and Uganda. It seeks to identify, describe and account for the sourcesand significance of such militancy, with a focus upon the significance ofal-Qaeda and regional affiliates. The paper argues that, encouraged by the post-9/11 international fall out, regional Islamic networks work towards improvingthe perceived low political and economic status of Muslims in Kenya, Tanzania,and Uganda. At present, however, the political significance of Islamic militancyin the three countries is low.

Al-Qaeda bomb attacks in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 ushered in a new eraof security concerns in East Africa linked to the perceived growth andinteraction of domestic and transnational expressions of militant Islam.1 Sincethen both local and Western governments and policy makers have frequentlyexpressed concern over the sub-region’s perceived potential to be a new frontfor Islamic militancy.2 They noted that sizeable Islamic communities live inthe hinterlands and coasts of a broad band of East African countries—fromSudan to Tanzania. Earlier developments in Somalia—involving seriousclashes in 1993 between local Islamic militants andUS troops—underlined thepotential for growth in influence of transnational Islamic militancy, especiallythat of al-Qaeda, which had built contacts with local warlords.3 Al-Qaeda wasimplicated in the killing of 18 US peacekeepers in 1993, leading to thewithdrawal of all US forces from the region. Contemporaneously Somaliabecame a haven for Arab fighters expelled from Pakistan, where manyunderwent religious and guerrilla training.During the 1990s Somalia was judged to be a key entry point for Islamic

militants into East Africa. Infiltration was facilitated by the fact that Somaliahas a lengthy border with Kenya, and an extensive, unguarded coastline alongthe Red Sea. A consequence has been an apparent growth in expressions ofIslamic militancy in, inter alia, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda.4 Each of thesecountries has been characterised by widespread political repression, economiccrises, rapid social change, uneven industrialisation, and swift urbanisation;each country has experienced extensive economic, social and politicalproblems. A consequence is that many Kenyans, Tanzanians and Ugandans,including members of their minority Muslim communities, are at or near the

Jeffrey Haynes is in the Department of Law, Governance and International Relations, London Metropolitan

University, Calcutta House, Old Castle Street, London E1 7NT, UK. Email: [email protected].

Third World Quarterly, Vol. 26, No. 8, pp 1321 – 1339, 2005

ISSN 0143-6597 print/ISSN 1360-2241 online/05/081321–19 � 2005 Third World Quarterly

DOI: 10.1080/01436590500336807 1321

bottom of the economic ands political hierarchy, and some harbour deepfeelings of disappointment and disillusionment in relation to economic andpolitical outcomes (Haynes, 1996). According to an American researcher, TedDagne (2002: 5): ‘From 1991, when Osama bin Laden was based in Sudan, al-Qaeda has been building a network of Islamist groups in both the Horn ofAfrica (Eritrea, Ethiopia and Somalia) and East Africa (Kenya, Tanzania,and Uganda)’. Dagne believes that, as in South Asia—especially Afghanistanand Pakistan—al-Qaeda was able to exploit extant circumstances ofwidespread poverty, ethnic and religious competition and conflict, poorlypoliced state borders, and often corrupt and inefficient government officials tocreate a regional ‘terror centre’ in East Africa.Concern over the growth of sub-regional Islamic militancy is expressed by

various sources, including the CIA: since 9/11 that agency has taken the threatof Islamic militancy in East Africa very seriously—to the extent ofwithdrawing from Asia some of its best agents in charge of observingIslamist movements and re-posting them to various countries in thesub-region (see http://www.cia.gov/cia/public_affairs/speeches/2002/dci_speech_02062002.html). Following the 7 July 2005 bombings in LondonUK security agencies have also paid more attention to the ‘Islamist threat’believed to emanate from East Africa.5 Observers suggest that Kenya,Uganda and Tanzania are targets for the expansion of transnational Islamicmilitancy, seeking to exploit novel spaces for growth.6 Ronfeldt and Arquilla(2001) contend that East Africa is the focal point for a ‘war of networks’,rather than a Huntingtonian ‘clash of civilisations’. That is, rather than atraditional army, a hierarchical political party, or guerrilla groups, there is aloose network of militant Islamic movements, whose operations areencouraged by the ease of communications provided by and via the internet.To Marchesin (2001) such Islamic networks comprise an important newrealm of threats, especially to incumbent, unrepresentative governments:non-military phenomena of general, vague and flexible forms, embodied in aplethora of ‘informal organisations’, typically autonomous cells actingwithout any imperative contacts with an organisational head.This is not to claim that 9/11 was the starting point for such Islamic

networks. Before 11 September there is evidence that Kenya and Tanzaniawere already targets of Islamic terrorism. On 7 August 1998 al-Qaedaoperatives used truck bombs against the US embassies in Nairobi, Kenya,and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. The explosions killed 240 Kenyans,12 Tanzanians and 11 Americans, and injured over 5000 people, mostlyKenyans. Four years later, on 28 November 2002, two simultaneous attackswere conducted against Israeli targets in Mombasa, Kenya. Suicide bombersdrove a truck into an Israeli-owned hotel, killing 10 Kenyans and threeIsraelis, and injuring over 20 Kenyans. Around the same time terrorists triedto shoot down an Israeli aircraft using surface-to-air missiles; had theysucceeded they would have killed more than 200 passengers on board.In sum, recent expressions of Islamic militancy in East Africa—involving

local operatives who may or may not be affiliated to al-Qaeda—are judged byboth local governments and Western security agencies and governments to be

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a significant and growing threat to stability and Western interests in the EastAfrican sub-region. Kenya and Tanzania—both countries attract hundredsof thousands of Western tourists each year—represent soft targets for suchattacks, with several factors, including poor security, inadequate bordercontrols, and the ability of terrorists to ‘blend in’ to local populations,facilitating the infiltration of foreign Islamic militants, including al-Qaedaoperatives.7 Following the London bombings there was increased focus onthe region by Western security agencies.8

Further, there are suggestions—and, according to both government andacademic sources in East Africa (see below), firm evidence—that someamong the burgeoning number of transnational and local Islamic NGOs aidand abet the growth of Islamic militancy in the sub-region. They pursue thisgoal by blurring distinctions between social, economic, political and religiousfunctions and goals in directions that are commensurate with the objectivesof the militants. Typically, the goals of Islamic NGOs active in East Africainclude:

. provision of relief and humanitarian assistance to poor (Muslim)communities during emergencies, natural disasters (prolonged droughtand floods), famine and epidemics;

. improvement of medium- and long-term development outlooks, with afocus on community development, improving agricultural yields, cleanwater and improved provision of health and education, especially in theleast-developed African Muslim countries;

. da’wa (that is, Islamic call, an equivalent to Christian evangelism) andconversion to Islam;

. publishing, broadcasting and disseminating Islamic teaching andvalues.

Salih (2002: 1 – 2) argues that some Islamic NGOs in East Africa ‘have beenused as a vehicle for spreading political Islam at an accelerated ratecombining faith and material rewards among the disfranchised Muslimpoor . . . becoming cronies to militant Muslim groups, including an emergenttide of indigenous African Islamic fundamentalist movements’. Ghandour(2002) contends that the characteristics of such Islamic NGOs include not onlyan exclusive reference to Islam and an often powerful social legitimacy, butalso sometimes ambiguous bonds with militant Islamists. This may placethem in conflict with African governments, as well as with Western NGOs andstates. In addition, Ghandour also claims that some Islamic NGOs act asintermediaries between

Islamic financiers and recipients operating in the environment of Islamistactivists. It is extremely difficult for Western intelligence services to identify,localise and block the financial flows towards violent [Islamic] groups, becausethe NGOs are very active mediators that cover their tracks. Practically there areno direct relationships between powerful Islamic financial backers and Islamicactivist organisations (Ghandour, 2002: 129).

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Following the August 1998 Nairobi bombing, Kenya’s government bannedfive Islamic NGOs—Mercy Relief International, the Al-Haramain IslamicFoundation, Help African People, the International Islamic Relief Organisa-tion and Ibrahim Bin Abdul Aziz Al Ibrahim Foundation—because of theiralleged sympathies towards the aims of local ‘Islamic fundamentalists’ andalleged mediatory role in relation to the financing of local militant Islamicorganisations (Achieng’, 1998; Salih, 2002: 24 – 25). In addition, Kenyanpolice and FBI agents from the USA raided the offices of Mercy ReliefInternational. According to John Etemesi, Director of the Co-ordinatingBoard for Kenya’s NGOs, the government’s actions were necessary as theNGOs had allegedly been ‘working against the security interests of Kenyans’(quoted in Achieng’, 1998).Following 9/11 there was a clampdown on numerous Saudi Arabian,

Sudanese and Gulf charities, businesses and NGOs in Tanzania; all were saidto have active links with al-Qaeda. In late 2001 the country’s central bankfroze 65 bank accounts of such companies (Kelley, 2001). Sources in thebanking industry in Dar es Salaam said the accounts belonged to severalbanks on the initial post-9/11 list issued by the US government of 20 globallysought international companies said to be al-Qaeda- owned and -runbusinesses. Most of the companies were said to have branches in bothTanzania and Kenya, having moved there when bin Laden left Sudan in 1996(Jamestown Foundation, 2003b). In addition, Tanzania’s government alsoexpressed concern about what it regarded as several ‘questionable’ IslamicNGOs. These included the African Muslim Agency, a Kuwaiti organisationengaged in the construction of mosques, schools and hospitals, and theCommunity Initiative Facilitation Assistance Development Group, a jointTanzanian – Saudi investment venture established in 1995, whose activitiesinclude a focus on gender-related poverty (Jamestown Foundation, 2003a:3 – 4; Intermediate Technology Development Group—Eastern Africa, 2002).As well as in Kenya and Tanzania, Islamic NGOs have also been active in

Uganda, with similar concerns, including: relief assistance to refugees andhomeless people; founding and running orphanages, health centres andvocational training centres; and dealing with displaced persons and victims ofnatural disasters. The International Islamic Relief Organisation (IIRO) is oneof the most active Islamic NGOs in Uganda; it is also active in Kenya. TheIIRO was established in 1978 as a humanitarian NGO to provide assistance tovictims of natural disasters and wars all over the world, because some 80% ofrefugees and victims, it claims, are Muslims. The IIRO claims that its reliefprogrammes are directed solely towards the provision of medical, educationaland social support for those in desperate need. It also aims to encourage localentrepreneurs by sponsoring viable economic projects and small businessesthat can help victims find employment and earn a living. To fulfil theseobjectives, the IIRO has established a wide network of national andinternational contacts with various Islamic and non-Islamic relief organisa-tions, institutions and individuals, operating in several countries in Europe,Asia and Africa (see http://www.gm-unccd.org/FIELD/NGO/IIRO/Res.htm). The major part of IIRO’s financial contributions come from private

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donations in Saudi Arabia, and an endowment fund (Sanabil Al-Khair) wasestablished to generate a stable income to finance IIRO’s various activities.The NGO has several departments, including Urgent Relief and Refugees;Health Care; Orphans and Social Welfare; Education; Agricultural Affairs;Architectural and Engineering Consultancy; and the ‘Our Children project’(see http://www.arriyadh.com/English/organizations/charity_org/islamic_relief_org.htm).The European Intelligence Agency contends that assistance to Ugandan

Islamists—both from al-Qaeda and the Sudanese National Islamic Front—was provided through various Islamic NGOs, operating in Uganda. Theseincluded, inter alia, the IIRO, as well as the Islamic African Relief Agency, theWorld Islamic Call Society, the International Islamic Charitable Foundation,Islamic African Relief Agency, and the Africa Charitable Society for Motherand Child Care (European Intelligence Agency, in Marchesin, 2003: 4).Table 1 lists the Islamic NGOs that have been alleged to be supportive ofIslamic militancy in Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania in recent years.Western intelligence sources suggest that the growth of Islamic militant

networks in East Africa was facilitated and promulgated by a shared sense oftransnational Islamic identity that stems from long-established historical,cultural, linguistic and trade ties to the Arab world. They also suggest that

TABLE 1. Islamic NGO s in Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania alleged to support Islamicmilitancy and terrorism

Islamic NGO (home country in brackets) Where the NGO is active

The Africa Charitable Society for Mother and Child Care Uganda

Help African People (Kenya) Kenya

Islamic African Relief Agency* (Sudan) Kenya, Uganda

Muslim World League* (Saudi Arabia) Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda

World Islamic Call Society (Libya) Uganda

International Islamic Charitable Foundation (Kuwait) Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda

International Islamic Relief Organisation (Saudi Arabia) Kenya, Uganda

Ibrahim Bin Abdul Aziz al Ibrahim Foundation (Saudi Arabia) Kenya

Mercy Relief International (USA) Kenya

Al Haramain Islamic Foundation* (Saudi Arabia) Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda

The African Muslim Agency (Kuwait) Tanzania

Community Initiative Facilitation Assistance Development Group

(Saudi Arabia)

Tanzania

Note: *These organisations were on the list of 25 Islamic charities and NGOs whose records of their

activities the US Senate Finance Committee requested from the US Internal Revenue Service (IRS) in

January 2004 (for complete list, go to http://www.danielpipes.org/blog/164). This inquiry was part of an

investigation into possible links between Islamic NGOs and terrorist financing networks. Committee

Chairman Charles Grassley and senior Democrat Max Baucus stated in a contemporaneous letter to the

IRS that ‘many of these groups not only enjoy tax-exempt status, but their reputations as charities and

foundations often allows them to escape scrutiny, making it easier to hide and move their funds to other

groups and individuals who threaten our national security’. See http://usinfo.state.gov/ei/Archive/2004/

Jan/15-147062.html.

Source: Salih (2002).


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the proselytising of various Islamic militants—including but not restricted tobin Laden and his second in command, the Egyptian, Ayman al-Zawahiri—isaimed at exploiting popular dissatisfaction as a result of decades ofundemocratic rule, endemic and serious corruption, and growing povertyand developmental disappointments (Jamestown Foundation, 2003a;2003b).Concern with the influence of external Islamic militant groups was one of

the raisons d’etre of the US-sponsored East African counter-terrorisminitiative (EACTI), announced by President Bush in June 2003. The statedpurpose of EACTI was to root out local manifestations of ‘Islamic terrorgroups’ and to destroy their regional networks.9 The inauguration of EACTI

underlines how the US government believed that in recent years East Africahad become a ‘safe haven’ both for Middle East-based Islamic terroristgroups and indigenous militant Islamic organisations.In sum, explanations for the recent rise of Islamic militancy in East Africa

suggest that its increased prominence is linked to the growing influence ofregional networks with headquarters in various Arab countries known to belogistical hubs of Islamic militancy (Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Yemen andUnited Arab Emirates) (Marshall, 2003; Salih, 2002). Various countries inthe East African sub-region—including Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda—provide new opportunities for the recruitment and mobilisation of newmembers for militant Islamic organisations, including al-Qaeda, its affiliatesand offshoots. Further, East Africa is said to offer favourable grounds for thespread of transnational Islamic militancy as a result of highly porous landand sea borders, widespread corruption, largely dysfunctional structures oflaw enforcement, endemic organised criminality (involving everything fromdrugs and people smuggling to weapons trafficking) and growing numbers ofweak and failed states. These factors imply multiplication of ‘grey zones’where state power is much diminished or even absent.In the rest of this paper we will examine the recent impact of Islamic

militancy in Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda and assess the comparativeimportance in each country of domestic and transnational sources of Islamicmilitancy.

Islam and politics in Kenya

Domestic Islamic militancy

Muslims amount to around 6% of the total population of Kenya,concentrated in the coastal, northeast and eastern provinces.10 Over time,Muslim opposition to Kenyan African National Union (KANU) single-partyrule was linked to the perception that primarily Christian ethnic groups—including, the Luhya, Kamba and Kalenjin—benefited disproportionatelyunder KANU rule, while Muslims were politically and economically margin-alised. After nearly three decades of single party rule, legalisation ofpluralistic political activity in December 1991 was the catalyst for theemergence of political Islamic groups with strong ethnic connections. In

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February 1992 a senior KANU official warned mosque guardians not to allowtheir premises to be used for political meetings, as this would be illegal.Religious parties were not allowed to register for the 1992 elections,preventing the newly formed Islamic Party of Kenya (IPK), led by KhalidSalim Ahmed Balala, from competing at the polls. The IPK had its powerbase in Mombasa and in Lamu, a centre of the Yemeni Alawiyyabrotherhood. The party was founded by a group of Asian intellectuals andbusinessmen to tap popular Muslim discontent on two main issues. The firstwas the question of the introduction of sharia law for the country’s Muslimpopulation, many of whom felt discriminated against by the wholesaleapplication of perceived ‘Christian’ (that is, European-derived) law. Thesecond was a sense of economic resentment on the part of many coastalMuslims, especially over land issues (Africa Confidential, 1993). ManyMombasans saw that outsiders, including white skinned foreigners andKikuyus, were buying up quantities of local land at this time. This issuehelped to focus pre-existing economic resentment based on a perception thatKenya’s Muslims were discriminated against. As a response, the KANU

government sponsored a rival Muslim movement, the United Muslims ofAfrica (UMA), with the aim of countering the appeal of the IPK, whosepolitical muscle was demonstrated by a series of riots in Mombasa, Voi andseveral other coastal cities at this time. The aim of UMA was to split theMuslim constituency along ethnic lines in order to diminish its potentialcollective political impact. Abdullahai Kiptonui, a Muslim and prominentKANU figure, encouraged young Kenyan Muslims to fight for their ethnic andreligious grievances by targeting Asians.

Transnational Islamic militancy

At around this time several al-Qaeda cadres left Somalia for Kenya and withinmonths several had married local Kenyan women, settled into society andbegun to form sleeper cells (Bowers, 2002). Four years later, in 1998, afterlying low and plotting attacks, most al-Qaeda cell members left Kenya forPakistan days before two US embassies were bombed. Addressing themourners in Nairobi after the bombing, the then Kenyan president, Danielarap Moi, stated that those behind the bombing ‘could not have beenChristians’. These remarks were widely publicised and drew criticism fromMuslim leaders, who claimed that their religion was being wrongly associatedwith violence. Sheikh Ahmad Khalif, head of the Supreme Council of KenyanMuslims, commented that ‘Islam like any other religion does not support thekilling of innocent people for whatever reason’ (Salih, 2002: 24 – 25).The day following the bombing, the Islamic Liberation Army of the People

of Kenya (ILAPK), an al-Qaeda cover organisation, issued a communiquethat included the following:

the Americans humiliate our people, they occupy the Arabian peninsula, theyextract our riches, they impose a blockade and, besides, they support the Jewsof Israel, our worse enemies, who occupy the Al-Aqsa mosque . . .The attack


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was justified because the government of Kenya recognized that the Americanshad used the country’s territory to fight against its Moslem neighbors, inparticular Somalia. Besides, Kenya cooperated with Israel. In this country onefinds the most anti-Islamic Jewish centers in all East Africa. It is from Kenyathat the Americans supported the separatist war in Southern Sudan, pursued byJohn Garang’s fighters. (ILAPK communique in Arabic, published in London on11 August 1998 and quoted in English in Marchesin, 2003: 2).

It is suggested that al-Qaeda’s ‘brand’ of Islamic militancy will beunlikely to appeal to many Kenyan Muslims, mainly because of itsapparently indiscriminate use of extreme violence in pursuit of itsreligious and political goals (‘Al-Qaeda hiding in plain sight’, 11 January2004, available at http://www.jihadwatch.org/archives/000607.php). Sucha view is underpinned by the claim that, for centuries, a relatively liberaland mystical brand of Islam has developed on the East African coast, aperception of Islam quite different from the rigid interpretation of theQuran promoted by al-Qaeda. It therefore comes as a surprise that thereare indications that Islamic militancy has made some progress, especiallyamong young and poor Muslim constituencies in Kenya, particularly incertain urban areas, including Nairobi and Mombasa. According toProfessor Moustapha Hassouna, professor of security studies at theUniversity of Nairobi:

Kenyans do not have the wherewithal, nor the character, to start up their ownhomegrown international terror organization. . . .But Muslims here are becom-ing more ‘radical’ or political in their outlook—and I can see their sympathiesbeing used by outside terror interests (quoted in Harman, 2002).

Supporting this view, Sheikh Ali Shee, chairman of the Council of Imamsand Preachers of Kenya and a prominent religious leader in the Indian Oceanport of Mombasa, contends that al-Qaeda has ‘corrupted some of our youngpeople . . .We were not always like this . . .we have a history of openness’ (seehttp://www.jihadwatch.org/archives/000607.php).As noted earlier, the coast’s distinctive Arab flavour—the region has

absorbed waves of immigrants from Yemen and Oman over the centuries—issaid to make it relatively easy for Arabs to fit in among the local population.Moreover, Kenya’s notoriously weak security forces, coupled with thehistorically poor relations between the police and coastal Muslims, haveapparently allowed al-Qaeda operatives to work undetected (AssociatedPress, 2004). In sum, it is clear that some Muslims in Kenya are resentful, notjust about calamities across the larger Islamic world, but also aboutdiscrimination—real and perceived—at home. Seeking to recruit, al-Qaedahas tried to exploit the resentment many Kenyan Muslims feel towards theirgovernment. This is not only because of the perception that they arediscriminated against compared with Christians. It is also fuelled by the factthat since independence in 1963 successive governments have enjoyed strongties with both the USA and Israel.

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According to Harman (2002: 1), some of the same outside influences thathave spread radical Islam to other parts of the world—‘the Internet, arallying to the Palestinian cause, and outsiders fomenting anti-Westernsentiment’—have encouraged some among Kenya’s hitherto moderateMuslim community to be drawn to radical acts in pursuit of fundamentalpolitical and religious change. Second, Kenya has been targeted by SaudiArabian money, with Wahhabi Islamic schools and mosques growing innumber. This is said to encourage the transformation to militancy amongKenya’s traditionally tolerant Muslim communities, not least because someof the imams are notable for preaching anti-Western rhetoric, in the context ofreferences to extra-regional conflicts. Such conflicts include the Palestinian –Israeli conflict, the Chechen war and the US-led campaigns in Afghanistanand Iraq. This focus enables the imams to present a picture of a beleagueredIslam under sustained assault by the West.A third factor encouraging growth of Islamic radicalism in Kenya is the

country’s close proximity to Somalia—a country that lacks a viablegovernment and law and is the home of both numerous weapons and al-Qaeda training camps (Phillips, 2002). A Somalia-based militant Islamicorganisation, al-Ittihad al-Islamiya (the Islamic Union) actively spreads itsinfluence in Kenya (http://www.meta-religion.com/Extremism/Islamic_extremism/al-ittihad_al-islami.htm).11 The ease of penetration of militantgroups from Somalia is almost certainly facilitated by a further factor:Somalis, with their vast regional diaspora, have good communications andtransport routes, and are said to be East Africa’s best black-marketmerchants, not only in cars and spare parts, but also in drugs, ivory andarms. Kenya has a large Somali population, including more than 250 000Somali refugees, many in refugee camps along the border. According toProfessor Hassouna, ‘Somalis are everywhere . . . If they wanted to set up anetwork, they could’ (quoted in Harman, 2002, p. 1). Difficulties experiencedby Kenyan authorities in guarding the coasts and borders in the northeastregion may well encourage the activity of Islamic militants from Somalia.12

With such concerns in mind the Kenyan government engaged enthusias-tically with the US-sponsored EACTI. The USA strongly backed anti-terrorism legislation proposed by the government of Kenya in 2004.However, Kenyan democracy advocates and civil society groups, havingonly recently got rid of one-party, one-man rule, were opposed to theinitiative, seeing in the legislation the seeds of new political oppression. Inaddition, some Kenyan Muslims argued not only that EACTI was part of ageneralised anti-Muslim initiative but also that the proposed new legislationwas basically ‘anti-Muslim’. It would, they feared, aggravate ‘the alienationin that community that opened the door to terrorist infiltration in the firstplace’ (Lyman, 2004: 2). As a result of pressure from civil society, the Kenyangovernment eventually agreed to redraft the legislation.In conclusion, the political and economic circumstances of Kenya’s post-

colonial history have served to make many of the country’s Muslim minoritybelieve that they are second-class citizens. The proximity of Kenya toregional hubs of Islamic militancy—notably Somalia—have facilitated the


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growth of transnational Islamic militant networks, including some linked toal-Qaeda. It is difficult, however, to estimate the appeal of an Islamicmilitancy that appears to regard use of indiscriminate bombs as a legitimatepolitical and religious tool. Partly as a result, the likelihood is that the appealof such Islamic militancy in Kenya will be restricted to a relatively smallstratum of Kenya’s Muslim minority.

Islam and politics in Tanzania


One cannot dismiss the possibility of Tanzania being brought into thefrontline of anti-Western terrorism, something that was graphically under-scored by the August 1998 US embassy bombing in Dar es Salaam. However,the notion that the country has begun to degenerate into a new territorialbeachhead for transnational Islamic extremism is misplaced, reflecting a poorunderstanding of the specific sociopolitical and religious makeup that ischaracteristic of this part of East Africa (Jamestown Foundation, 2003a: 1).13

About a third of mainland Tanzania’s population is Muslim, scatteredamong the country’s numerous ethnic groups, although the greatestconcentrations are found in the coastal areas. Over 95% of the populationof the island of Zanzibar (around 700 000 people) are Muslim. In general,there is a high percentage of Muslims living on the coast and along the pre-colonial trade routes that linked the mainland to a larger Muslim-orientated,Indian Ocean trading system. Inland pre-colonial centres of trade, such asTabora and Kigoma, also have high percentages of Muslims. In other areas itis possible to find high percentages of Christians, especially in the southwestand north-central areas of the country. While there are some ethnic identitiesand geographic areas that coincide with a certain religious tradition, oftenother identities, such as class divisions or support for political parties, arecross-cutting and do not reinforce these religious divisions (Heilman &Kaiser, 2002: 697 – 698).As in Kenya, the general context of the emergence of Islamic-based

opposition to the state in the early 1990s was that of the fracturing of the one-party system and the tentative beginnings of political pluralism. Also as inKenya, many among Tanzania’s Muslims have long argued that they areeconomically discriminated against. Yet, until recently, there appeared to belittle tension between Tanzania’s Muslim communities and the government,no doubt in part because Muslims enjoyed senior political positions, orbetween Muslims and Christians, a reflection of the almost unique socialconsensus achieved under the rule of President Nyerere (1964 – 85).Tanzania is one of the poorest countries in the world and any benefits of

economic liberalisation from the 1990s affected relatively few people. Inaddition, hoped-for benefits accruing from political liberalisation have beenslow to arrive and this has begun to place strains on national social cohesion.It is plausible that economic and political disappointments and frustrationsmight be channelled into religious—including Muslim—extremist movements.

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On the other hand, to date religion has not served as a primary fault-line forsustained political violence and conflict in the country (Haynes, 1996).It is important, however, to note a significant catalyst for the emergence of

political Islamic groups in Tanzania: a government announcement in early1992 that, in order to reduce public spending, it would henceforward transferthe country’s health and education system to the control of the country’spowerful Catholic Church. This fuelled an outburst of resentment from theCouncil for the Propagation of the Quran in Tanzania (CPQT, known asBalukta), which had earlier risen to prominence with fierce criticism ofTanzania’s national Muslim organisation, Baraza Kuu ya Waislamu waTanzania (Bakwata). Balukta radicals accused Bakwata representatives ofself-serving, corrupt practices, while denigrating its attempts to promoteIslam in the country. Attempting to take over Bakwata, Balukta militantsoccupied its headquarters until ousted by order of President Mwinyi.Bakwata’s wider resentment against Christians was made plain in a series ofinflammatory sermons broadcast from Dar’s central mosque in March 1992;this action triggered street battles in the capital between Christian andMuslim youths (Shaikh, 1992: 240). In April 1993, following furtherreligious-based violence, Balakta was banned. In the mid-1990s a Muslim-based political party emerged, the Civic United Front (CUF), whose mainsupport base was on the islands of Zanzibar and Pemba. In a move that wascondemned by the ruling Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) government, the CUF

publicly raised the issue of separation from the mainland in a move thatreflected deep-seated resentment among the Muslims of the islands of whatthey perceived as mainland domination of the union between Tanganyikaand Zanzibar (Africa Confidential, 1994).In late 2001 some among the Muslim community in Dar es Salaam

protested at the US bombing of Afghanistan, while expressing support forOsama bin Laden. As Bakari and Ndumbaro (2001: 5) note, the ‘domesticconflict between the ruling CCM and CUF took place in a global context wherethe USA and many of its Western allies are quick to interpret organisedpolitical activity by Muslims as a terrorist security threat. In contrast, inTanzania some Muslims view the USA, Western capitalism and Christianityas a challenge to Islam.’ After 9/11, in common with its counterparts inKenya and Uganda, the Tanzanian government sought the West’s co-operation in fighting terrorism and took part in EACTI. On the other hand,the Tanzanian government, with a much larger Muslim minority than that ofKenya, was reserved in its support for post-9/11 US policy in Afghanistan.Part of its reluctance can be linked to the problem of longstanding tensionbetween the mainland and the islands of Zanzibar and Pemba, more than95% Muslim. According to Shinn (2002), the government did not want ‘tostir up this potential hornet’s nest and will probably focus the debate on theneed to alleviate poverty and other ills’. In Zanzibar two groups openlychallenge the authority of traditional elders: Imam Majelis (Imam Society)and Daawa Islamiya (Islamic Call). Both organisations have gained somepopular following in Pemba (the smaller of the two main islands that makeup the Zanzibar chain) (Jamestown Foundation, 2003b).


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In 2002, before the announcement of EACTI, there was a spate of violentincidents, including armed takeovers of moderate mosques in Dar es Salaamand a firebombing of a tourist bar in Stone Town that left several peopleinjured. A militant Islamic movement, Simba wa Mungu (God’s Lion), wasspecifically singled out for fomenting much of this unrest. A covertorganisation, Simba wa Mungu, was alleged to take its lead from a radicalcleric, Sheikh Ponda Issa Ponda, who was accused of actively inciting attacksagainst foreigners and ‘morally corrupt’ Muslims who failed to adhere to apurist Islamic line.


In May 2003 the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office warned that an‘international terrorist group could be planning an attack on the island ofZanzibar’ (The East African, 2003). In addition, the government of the USAhas repeatedly advised its nationals in recent years to avoid all non-essentialtravel to Tanzania as long as the current poor security situation prevails.Both London and Washington appear to be particularly worried that animported radical Wahhabist undertone is making inroads in Tanzania andthat it is a focal point for al-Qaeda indoctrination, recruitment and training(Jamestown Foundation, 2003a: 1). In short, in recent years the US andBritish governments have expressed concern that external extremistinfluences—from, inter alia, Sudan and Saudi Arabia—have infiltratedTanzania, serving to radicalise indigenous Muslim beliefs and underminingTanzania’s well known political moderation.Most attention has focused on Zanzibar for two main reasons: 1) it has an

overwhelmingly Muslim population; and 2) it has not enjoyed the same rateof economic growth and social development as the mainland. In addition, atleast two al-Qaeda operatives have been identified as originating from theisland: Khalfan Khamis Muhammad, one of those convicted in connectionwith the 1998 US embassy bombings in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam;and Qaed Sanyan al-Harithi, a suspected East African al-Qaeda cadre killedin Yemen in 2002 by a CIA operative (Jamestown Foundation, 2003a: 1;2003b).The preaching of a radical cleric, Sheikh Ponda Issa Ponda, has evoked

particular interest. The sheikh is an outspoken individual who has been linkedto the storming of the Mwembechai Mosque in Dar es Salaam in 1999 (duringthe liberation of which four Muslims were killed) and has frequently beendetained as a threat to Tanzanian national security. Sheikh Ponda is, in thewords of oneWestern diplomat, ‘the public face of radicalism in Zanzibar’, animportant theological instigator for contemporary militant activism in bothTanzania and, more generally, East Africa (Jamestown Foundation, 2003a:4). In February 2002 riot police used live ammunition and tear gas to dispersea banned demonstration by a Muslim group at Mwembechai Mosque. Manydemonstrators were beaten and 53 people were arrested. Most were releasedafter some weeks, but eight were charged with the killing of a police officer atthe demonstration. The eight, who included Sheikhs Ponda Issa Ponda and

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Mussa Kanducha, were released in August 2002 and the murder chargesdropped (Amnesty International, 2003). In 2003 Ponda was on bail pendingcharges that he had sought to forge pan-regional Islamic ties with extremistsin Kenya and Burundi.In addition, the influence of Saudi Arabia—the effective ideological source

of much of today’s radical Wahhabism—is said to be growing in Tanzania.On the one hand, this appears to reflect the curtailment of availablescholarships from states such as Yemen, Egypt and Algeria. On the otherhand, it is indicative of the lucrative financial incentives that continue to beoffered by Saudi educational and non-governmental charities. Saudi Arabiaspends $1 million a year building new mosques, madrasas and Islamic centresin Tanzania (Dalrymple, 2004). This is said to deflect Tanzanian Muslimsaway from states that the West considers to be relatively ‘acceptable’, such asEgypt, and towards one—Saudi Arabia—that is judged to have influentialindividuals and groups with extremist religious outlooks and interpretations(Jamestown Foundation, 2003b).In sum, there appear to be signs of a gradual hardening of indigenous

Muslim identity in Tanzania, a development with political connotations.Armed takeovers of moderate mosques are a recurrent problem in Dar esSalaam, while some radicalised students returning from overseas religiousstudy trips seek to promulgate militant Islamic beliefs among the country’sMuslims. There appear to be growing links between militant Muslimsindigenes and foreign radicals, including some with al-Qaeda links.

Islam and politics in Uganda


Along the East African littoral Islam is by and large the religion of discreteethnic groups, communities often excluded from the exercise of state power.14

As a result, Islam has periodically assumed the mantle of mobilising theideology of resistance to central rule, as some Muslims judge power to beexercised primarily in the interests of certain (Christian) groups. In extremecircumstances various sectarian forms of Islam, such as Asian Ismailis, havefound themselves the focal point of what can only be described as ‘ethniccleansing’. This occurred in 1972 in Uganda, when the late president, IdiAmin Dada, himself a Muslim, expelled the Asian Ismailis at very shortnotice, and without compensation for their assets, which they were forced toleave behind. As a result, Amin and his cronies were able to enjoy theirconfiscated land and property at no cost, in a move that was, however,politically popular with some non-Muslim Ugandans.Whereas in some other Muslim minority African countries, such as Ghana,

Islamic leaders have managed intermittently to enter the framework of statepower, their counterparts’ experience in Uganda has been different, anoutcome reflective of deep-seated religious and ethnic tensions that haveendured over time. Religious rivalries between Catholics (around half thepopulation), Anglicans (a quarter to a third) and Muslims (under 10%) have


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been both contextualised and exacerbated by wider regional divisionsbetween north and south.Over time religious establishments, both Christian and Muslim, were

manoeuvred and controlled by those in power to ensure their firm grasp onauthority. The National Association for the Advancement of Muslims(NAAM) was founded in 1964, a year after independence from colonial rule.Adoko Nekyon, a cousin and close confidante of Milton Obote, thenUganda’s prime minister, initially led the NAAM. Later, however, theallegiance of Uganda’s Muslims divided between two competing nationalbodies. Kakungulu, an uncle of the Kabaka (king) of Buganda, led theUganda Muslim Community (UMC), while the NAAM was closely associatedwith the interests of non-Bugandan Muslims. The government regarded non-Bugandan Muslims who by and large did not belong to the NAAM as ‘disloyalto the state’ (Mutibwa, 1992: 68). Nevertheless, the state found it impossibleto control ‘dissident’ Bugandan Muslims, just as these were unablesignificantly to influence state policies. UMC leaders were used asintermediaries between the state and the Bugandan Muslims, althoughwithout leading to a rapprochement between the two groups.Under Amin’s rule (1971 – 78), prominent Muslims, both Bugandan and

non-Bugandan, found themselves targeted as putative recipients of Arabfinancial largesse. Rich Arab states—especially Libya and Saudi Arabia—believed that it was incumbent upon them to proselytise Islam in Africa, andespecially in a country such as Uganda, so centrally placed in the region.Colonel Qaddafi, who appeared to believe that as many as 70% of Ugandanswere Muslims, condemned Christianity as an agent of imperialism in a speechat Makerere University in March 1974 (Mutibwa, 1992: 109 – 10). Pirouet(1980: 19) alleges that Qaddafi’s visit to Uganda led directly to the murder oftwo prominent Christian politicians: Michael Ondoga, the Foreign Minister,and Charles Arube, a prominent Kakwa.15 Following Amin’s politicaldemise and exile in 1979, Uganda’s Muslims were politically marginalised inthe 1980s and 1990s, not least because many non-Muslim Ugandans regardedIslam in the country to be intimately associated with Amin’s excesses.During the 1970s and 1980s, Chande (2000: 355) reports, ‘several hundred

Ugandan Muslim students studied at the Islamic University of Medina’.Returning home, some preached a ‘strict’ or ‘puritanical’ form of Islam—influenced by Wahhabist ideas encountered in Saudi Arabia—that until thenhad been virtually unknown in Uganda. The growth of this reformist trendwas influential in strengthening an international network that for the firsttime linked Ugandan Muslims to the major centres of Islam in the MiddleEast. Pan-Islamic activism in Uganda, associated with the Wahhabist and/orSalafi movements, coincided with growing Islamic awareness both in EastAfrica and more generally. This activism was eventually to turn in a politicaldirection, a development not new to Uganda, where religion and politics haveoften interacted, notably with state attempts to control the institutions ofcivil society. By the mid-1980s, according to Chande (2000: 355), theemerging divisions between the young Salafis and the traditional ulama ofpopular Islam had begun to harden.16

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This period also saw ‘growing activism by the international Jama’atTabligh, a movement that originated on the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent’(Chande, 2000: 355). From the early 1990s, various indigenous butnumerically small groups—including, the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF),the Uganda Liberation Tigers, Sheikh Abdul Kyesa’s ‘Saved’ and desertersfrom the Uganda Muslims Salvation Front—were influenced by the ideas ofJama’at Tabligh, calling themselves Tabligh, meaning ‘militant faith’(Marchesin, 2003; Perouse de Montclos, 2000). Kayunga (1993) claimedthat Tabligh was a serious threat to Uganda’s domestic security, benefitingfrom networks of sympathisers scattered in the country’s largest urban areas.From the mid-1990s to the early 2000s Tabligh was associated with a numberof minor terrorist attacks on southern and central towns and cities, including‘a wave of grenade attacks carried out from 1995 to 1997’. Although since1998 Tabligh has been seriously undermined by government reprisals, itmanaged to carry out ‘three new bomb attacks in the Ugandan capital onJune 4, 2001’ (Marchesin, 2003: 4). Partly as a result, Marchesin (2003: 4)recently claimed that Uganda was ‘the country in East Africa where Islamicfundamentalism seems to be most deep-rooted’.


Regarding external ties to domestic Muslim militants, from the 1990s theradical Islamic movement in Uganda built ties with foreign Islamic radicals,notably among Sudanese and Afghan extremist groups. Both the SudaneseNational Islamic Front and al-Qaeda (then based in Sudan) played animportant role in providing support to Ugandan Islamic militants. Al-Qaedahelped to set up camps for training the fighters of the ADF (see http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/adf.htm). When Osama binLaden’s organisation settled in Afghanistan in 1996, members of the ADF

went there to undergo training as explosives experts. Following bin Laden’sdeparture, Sudan continued to support Ugandan Islamists, including theADF. However, this support is said to have stopped after Sudan and Ugandasigned a peace agreement in December 1999. Meanwhile, al Qaeda plannedto assassinate Uganda’s president, Yoweri Museveni, in Kampala in 1999(European Intelligence Agency, in Marchesin, 2003: 4).After 9/11 Museveni was strongly supportive of the US-led ‘war on terror’,

to the extent that Uganda emerged as the main ally of the USA in East Africa.In addition, the leader of the Muslim minority, the mufti of Uganda, statedpublicly his support for US attacks against bin Laden and the al-Qaedanetwork in Afghanistan. President Museveni, drawing on documentscaptured by the US armed forces, stated publicly at the end of 2001 thatbin Laden and al-Qaeda had targeted Uganda for attack. According toMuseveni, bin Laden’s goal was to extend the militant Islamic network to theGreat Lakes region; he added that bin Laden condemnedUganda for workingwith the US government on behalf of southern Sudanese rebels opposed to thegovernment in Khartoum (Shinn, 2002). In May 2003 the Ugandanauthorities arrested a Somali and a Pakistani suspected of planning an attack


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in Kampala. Following the arrests, Ugandan security services arrested about200 foreigners, mainly from Somalia, Arab countries and Asia.In conclusion, as in Kenya, the political and economic circumstances of

Uganda’s post-colonial history encouraged some among the country’sMuslim minority to believe that they were second-class citizens, muscledout of political and economic favour by Christian groups. Also as in Kenya,Uganda’s proximity to regional hubs of Islamic militancy—notably Sudan—appears to have encouraged development of a network involving local andforeign Islamists. While it is difficult to estimate the overall appeal of Islamicmilitancy in Uganda, it seems likely that not many local Muslims would betempted join Islamic militant groups, for two main reasons. First, the brandof Islamic militancy—sometimes involving the use of extreme politicalviolence—is unlikely to appeal to the mass of ordinary Ugandan Muslims.Second, such a perception may well be linked to the fact that much ofUganda’s post-colonial history has been characterised by conflict betweenethnic and/or religious groups. It may well be the case that, as Uganda isfinally enjoying a prolonged period of—relative—political stability17 andeconomic growth, then decreasing numbers of people, including Muslims,will be willing to join political campaigns rooted in violence. Consequently,the likelihood is that in the short and medium term the appeal of Islamicmilitancy in Uganda will be restricted to a relatively small stratum.

Conclusion

Islamists in Kenya are pushing to expand Islamic law, or sharia, to includesentences of amputation in certain crimes, as well as stoning in cases ofadultery, practices already in place in Nigeria. The chairman of Kenya’sCouncil of Imams and Preachers, Ali Shee, has warned that Muslims in thecoastal and northeastern provinces will break away if sharia is not expanded.Tanzania is experiencing a similar push for Islamic law. Saudi Arabia is

funding new mosques there, and fundamentalists have bombed bars andbeaten women they thought inadequately covered. Mohammed Madi, afundamentalist activist, told Time magazine in September 2003: ‘We get ourfunds from Yemen and Saudi Arabia . . .Officially the money is used to buymedicine, but in reality the money is given to us to support our work and buyguns’ (Marshall, 2003).Militant Islamic individuals and groups associated with al-Qaeda, such as

Somalia-based Al-Ittihad al-Islami, have been active in recent years inKenya, a development that has alarmed Kenya’s government. However, theprospect of any of the East African countries we have examined degeneratinginto bastions of radical Islam is at present a relatively remote possibility. Thisis for three main reasons. First, although as we have seen there are radicalelements in all three countries, their influence is currently quite marginal.None is likely to emerge as a major recruiting pool for al-Qaeda’stransnational terrorism. In addition, the proselytising influence of Islamicmilitants is inherently constrained by the broader Islamic context in Kenya,Tanzania and Uganda: many Muslims are relatively apolitical (when it comes

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to religious issues), moderate and tolerant in orientation. Even in Zanzibar,with a majority Muslim population with political and economic grievances,there is no indication that at present there are serious moves to islamicisesociety, for instance by introduction of a fully fledged Islamic sharia criminalsystem.Second, even the groups that do seek a more Islamic agenda pursue their

objectives through discussion and negotiation. For example, in Tanzaniaboth Imam Majelis and Daawa Islamiya are legitimate registered entities.Neither encourages the type of revolutionary civic action that characterisesthe radical theorising of Islamic organisations in, for example, Indonesia,Malaysia, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia.Third, there is no evidence that Muslims in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda

are interested in taking up arms against the ‘infidel’ West. Many may beunhappy about US or UK policies in relation to Afghanistan, Iraq and thePalestinians, but this does not imply that more than a tiny minority activelyseek to belittle Western society as a principle or practice tout court. Despitethe alleged connection between East African Islamists and bomb attacks inLondon in July 2005, at the time of writing (early August 2005) there is noevidence suggesting that they were anything but the work of a few disgruntledradicals.Finally, with the exception of a few militants—some of whom are noted in

this paper, such as Khalfan Khamis Muhammad and Qaed Sanyan al-Harithi—there have been remarkably few examples of individual Islamicmilitants committing themselves to the wider al-Qaeda cause. This is not tosuggest that there will be no future acts of terrorism carried out in East Africabut it is to propose that the likelihood of such an event is linked more toconsiderations of the region’s porous borders and sometimes less thanefficient police and security services than to any concerted indigenous supportfor transnational Islamic extremism.

Notes

1 I refer to various sources of information in the first section of the article—both governmental andacademic. While the individual reliability of sources may be called into question, their overall import isto affirm the growing significance of transnational Islamic militancy that may or may not have an al-Qaeda dimension. I suggest, however, that this does not necessarily lead to the growing significance ofIslamic militancy in relation to the politics of the individual countries in focus in the article.

2 It is possible, although at the time of writing (early August 2005) not verified, that there were linksbetween Islamist groups in East Africa, notably Somalia, and the bomb attacks on London in July2005. Several of the alleged perpetrators of the failed 21 July attacks were of Somali or Eritrean origin.

3 The infiltration of al-Qaeda into Somalia was facilitated by the fact that the country had become acollapsed or ‘failed’ state by this time; that is, a polity without an effective central government and witha generalised breakdown of law and order.

4 Kenya and Tanzania are a focus of this paper because of the destructive terrorist attacks in thosecountries in the late 1990s and early 2000s with which Islamic militan ts were implicated. Uganda isalso a focal point as that country has also been identified as a likely source of Islamic militancy in EastAfrica.

5 The bombings were claimed by a previously unknown organisation, The Secret Organization of al-Qaeda in Europe (http://news.com.com/E-mail+traffic+doubles+after+London+bomb+blasts/2100-1038_3-5778088.html?tag=nl).

6 McGrory et al. (2005).


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7 The US Foundation for the Defense of Democracies claims that Islamic ‘terrorists can easily blend intothe Muslim populations of the coast’. See http://www.defenddemocracy.org/research_topics/research_topics_show.htm?doc_id=157584&attrib_id=7451.

8 McGrory et al (2005).9 A US Department of Defense official, Vincent Kern, told more than 120 senior African military officersand civilian defence officials gathered at the Africa Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS) seminar on 10February 2004 that, in June 2003, ‘President Bush announced a $100 million, 15-month Eastern Africacounter-terrorism initiative under which the United States is expanding and accelerating [US] counter-terrorism efforts with Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Uganda, Tanzania and Eritrea’. The programme,Kern said, was designed to counter terrorism by focusing on coastal and border security; police andlaw enforcement training; immigration and customs; airport/seaport security; establishment of aterrorist tracking database; disruption of terrorist financing; and ‘community outreach througheducation, assistance projects and public information’. Kenya, for example, was to receive training andequipment for a counter-terrorism police unit aimed at ‘building an elite Kenyan law enforcement unitdesigned to investigate and react to terrorist incidents’. See http://japan.usembassy.gov/e/p/tp-20040212-24.html.

10 For accounts of the relationship between Islam and politics in Kenya, see Cruise O’Brien (1995) andOded (2000).

11 Al-Ittihad is on the US list of terror groups, and has been watched closely since 9/11. In 1993 membersof al-Ittihad killed 18 American soldiers in Somalia, speeding up the withdrawal of the USA from thatcountry. According to Marchesin (2003), al-Itahaad provided logistical support to those whocommitted the 1998 attack in Nairobi. The organisation is also suspected of having co-operated withal-Qaeda during the dual attack in Mombasa in 2002.

12 Concerned with the influence of Somali Islamic radicals in Kenya, the then president, Daniel arap Moi,actively engaged in peace efforts in Somalia from the early 1990s. During the 1990s Kenya organisednumerous peace conferences as the Kenyan government was concerned that continuing instability inSomalia could lead to region-wide instability. In July 2001 Kenyan officials closed the border withSomalia because of illegal arms smuggling into Kenya (Dagne, 2002: 18; Kelley, 2001).

13 For accounts of Islam and politics in Tanzania, see Heilman and Kaiser (2002); and Lodhi andWesterland (1997).

14 For accounts of Islam and politics in Uganda, see Constantin (1995); and Oded (1995).15 The Kakwa people amount to less than 1% of the total population of Uganda.16 According to Chande (2000: 355), ‘The Salafi reputation rests on their scholarly activities and the

challenge they pose (given their skills in the Arabic language) to the monopoly on religious educationheld by traditional scholars. Their efforts have made Islamic education more accessible’.

17 I duly note the continued conflict between the government and the Lord’s Resistance Army that hasseriously affected parts of the Acholi-dominated north.

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