islamic republic of mauritania lieutenant-colonel mohamed lemine from the mauritanian army forces

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ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF MAURITANIA LIEUTENANT-COLONEL MOHAMED LEMINE FROM THE MAURITANIAN ARMY FORCES

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ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF MAURITANIA

LIEUTENANT-COLONELMOHAMED LEMINE

FROM THE MAURITANIAN ARMY FORCES

PLAN

I - PRESENTATION OF MAURITANIA 11   - IN A NUTSHELL

12   - THROUGH PICTURES

II - THE MAURITANIAN ARMY

II- Collaborative Arrangements between Military and Civilian Institutions

CONCLUSION

INTRODUCTIONINTRODUCTION

I - PRESENTATION OF MAURITANIA

11 – IN A NUTSHELL

DESCRIPTION OF MAURITANIA

ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF MAURITANIA

MAURITANIA

OFFICIAL

LANGUAGE

Arabic /French

RELIGION

Islam

INDEPENDANCE

28/11/1960

TYPE OF

GOUVERNMENT

Republican

AREA

Land : 1.030.400 km2

Currency: OUGUIYA

Water  : 1.100 km2

MOROCCO

SENEGAL

1000 Km

ALGERIA

MALI

MALI

AT

LA

NT

IC

O

CE

AN

1561 Km

463 Km

313 Km

MAURIT

ANIA

2235 Km

LAND BOUNDARIES AND BORDER COUNTRIES

ECONOMIC RESOURCES

4 POLES

ORE

Petrlium In the North and south

AGRICULTURE / LIVESTOCK

IRON ORE in the North

GOLD - COPPER in the Center

OIL on Nouakchott offshore

in the South Eastern of the country

FISH

12 – MAURITANIA THROUGH PICTURES

II - MAURITANIAN ARMY

21 - INSIGHT

1994 : a new reorganization of these Units

1978 : setting up of Units and Detachments

TWO MAJOR STRUCTURAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL TRANSFERS

25 NOVEMBRE 1960

22 – MAURITANIAN ARMY ORGANIZATION CHART

GENERAL CHIEF OF STAFF

DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF

CENTRAL BODIES TRAINING FACILITIES

REGIONALBODIES

DEPARTMENTS

DIRECTIONS

ACADEMIES

CENTERS

MILITARY REGIONS

AUTONOMOUS BATTALIONS

AIR FORCE NAVY

23 - MISSIONS OF THE NATIONAL  ARMY  

DEFENCE OF THE NATIONAL TERRITORY INTEGRITY

ASSISTANCE OF THE POPULATION

PARTICIPATION IN THE PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

Civil-Military Relations Reconsidered: A Theory of Concordance

Civil control of the military is managed and maintained through the sharing of responsibility for control between civilian leaders and military officers. Specifically,

civil authorities are responsible and accountable for some aspects of control and military leaders are responsible and accountable for others. Although some

responsibilities for control may merge, they are not fused. The relationship and arrangement of responsibilities are conditioned by a nationally evolved regime of

principles, norms, rules, and expectations concerning civil-military relations. Although a regime may be stable for long periods, it can change as basic causal

factors such as values, issues, interests, personalities, and threats change. Alterations of rules and decision-making procedures account for the dynamic nature

of civil-military relations, while alterations of norms and principles account for conflict in civil-military relations. Regime differences between states account for the particular national character of civil-military relations, much as like-minded regimes

account for cross-cultural similarities in civil-military relations.

This perspective offers a new theory for examining civil-military relations. The current theory assumes that the military should remain separate from civilian political institutions in order to prevent domestic military intervention. By contrast, concordance theory, proposed in this article, argues that three partners-the military, the political elites, and the citizenry should aim for a cooperative relationship that may or may not entail the separation of political and military institutions. As a descriptive and prescriptive theory, concordance does not limit itself to one civil-military scenario, and it explains the institutional and cultural conditions that affect the distinctive relationships among the three partners. Furthermore, if these partners agree on four indicators-the social composition of the officer corps, the political decision-making process, and recruitment method and military style-domestic military intervention is less likely to occur

ARMED FORCES AND DEMOCRACY

• As we all know, the last two decades have seen a remarkable political revolution in which transitions from authoritarianism to democracy have occurred in roughly 40 countries. The previous authoritarian regimes varied considerably. They included military governments in Latin America and elsewhere; one-party regimes in the communist states but also in Taiwan; personal dictatorships in Spain, the Philippines, Romania, and elsewhere; and a racial oligarchy in South Africa. The transitions to democracy also differed greatly. In some cases, including many military regimes, reformers came to power within the authoritarian regime and took the initiative in bringing about the transition. In other cases, the transition came as a result of negotiations between the government and opposition groups. In still others, the authoritarian regime was overthrown or collapsed.

RELATIONSHIP

• Virtually all of these authoritarian regimes, whatever their type, had one thing in common. Their civil-military relations left much to be desired. Almost all notably lacked the kind of civil-military relations characteristic of the world's industrial democracies, which I once termed "objective civilian control." This involves:

• 1) a high level of military professionalism and recognition by military officers of the limits of their professional competence; 2) the effective subordination of the military to the civilian political leaders who make the basic decisions on foreign and military policy;

• 3) the recognition and acceptance by that leadership of an area of professional competence and autonomy for the military; and 4) as a result, the minimization of military intervention in politics and of political intervention in the military.

CONCLUSION

• Who will guard the guardians? Political scientists since Plato have sought to answer this, the central question of the civil-military relations subfield. Although civil-military relations is a very broad subject, encompassing the entire range of relationships between the military and civilian society at every level, the field largely focuses on the control or direction of the military by the highest civilian authorities in nation-states. This essay surveys political science's contribution to our understanding of civil-military relations, providing a rough taxonomy for cataloguing the field and discussing the recent renaissance in the literature as well as fruitful avenues for future research. The essay focuses on theoretical developments, slighting (for reasons of space) the many case studies and empirical treatments that have also made important contributions to our knowledge.