islamist threat in sub-saharan africa: arab spring in north africa and regional security in west...

7/30/2019 Islamist Threat in Sub-Saharan Africa: Arab Spring in North Africa and Regional Security in West Africa

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ISLAMIST THREAT IN THE SUB-SAHARA:ARAB SPRING IN NORTHAFRICA AND REGIONAL SECURITY IN

WESTAFRICA

BY

ALIYU MUKHTAR [email protected]

PH.D.CANDIDATE

PAPER PRESENTED AT THE DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

SEMINAR SERIES,

INTERNATIONAL ISLAMIC UNIVERSITYMALAYSIA (IIUM),KUALA

LUMPUR,MALAYSIA

MAY2012.


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Abstract

This article is a brief survey of the impact of the recent uprisings in North Africa,

notably in Libya where it is believed tons of weapons went missing after the overthrow

of the Gadhafi regime, and how this affects West African regional security. The article

builds its arguments based on the fact that besides weapons that were reportedly stolenand found their way in to West Africa, other extremists elements freed by the rebels

from prisons might have also slipped in to West African region and joined other Islamist

groups. This, we argue worsen the ever tense security condition in sub-Sahara which

even at the best of times is precarious.

Key terms: political Islam, Islamist threat, Arab-spring, North Africa, West Africa,

regional security

____________________________

This article has two broad objectives. First, it aims to analyze, albeit briefly, the impact

of the Arab Spring of 2010 that started in North Africa over the West African regional

security. Much has been said and written about the spring, including the rather dramatic

circumstances that led to it, the unexpected outcomes including toppling some of the

most entrenched dictatorships in Africa, and even the prospects for an enduring

democracy in North Africa (Way, 2011; Asseburg, 2012). Little is however said about

how the collapse of these regimes in North Africa is now making the flow of men across

previously closed and guarded borders easier. There is little appreciation of how the

mercenaries hired by these toppled leaders most notably Gadhafi in the dying days of

his regime are increasingly finding safe refuge in West Africa. Already, evidence has

begun to surface that show how arms stolen from armories in Libya and elsewhere, and

prisoners freed from state holding have moved into West Africa and may now and in the


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future pose real security threat to a region which even in the best of times is not known

for enduring stability (Obi, 2008).

The second broad objective of this discourse is that we intend to situate the

threats pose on West African regional security within the larger narrative of growing

Islamist threat in sub-Saharan Africa. Already, there are various manifestations and

indicators pointing to a resurging wave of Islamist fundamentalism in many parts of

Africa, most notably, Algeria, Mali, Chad, Sudan, Somalia, Niger, and Nigeria (Cohen,

2008; Storm, 2009). From the beginning of 2007, activities of various groups with the

purported agenda of promoting Islamic law and principles in all facets of social life, or

outright Islamization of the region have been on the rise (The Economist, April 21,

2012). Groups such as Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb (AQIM), the Movement for Unity and

jihad in West Africa, and Boko Haram, are believed to have transnational, if not

transcontinental affiliations with other groups sharing similar ideology and world vision

(Cohen, 2008; The Economist, April 21, 2012). Furthermore, many of these groups are

believed to either have participated actively in those uprisings, or have benefited

immensely from their outcomes (Bellamy, 2011). Even today, those instances we

alluded to above such as the movement of arms, freed prisoners, and mercenaries, could

not be separated from the cyclical push of many of these groups.

Some caveats are in order here before we proceed with our analysis. This article

does not aspire to an exhaustive survey of all these issues raised above. It only seeks to

highlight them, and brings them to the front burner of African political and security

studies. Having said this, the article proceeds as follows: the first section aim to briefly

qualify the term Islamist threat at least within the African context. This is followed by a


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survey of how West African security is traditionally linked to security in North Africa.

After this, we proceed with an examination of those specific incidences that occurred in

North Africa during the spring. The objective here is to understand how these affect

security in West Africa. The succeeding section offered a precise picture of some of the

events in West Africa such as the Toureg rebellion in Mali, which we consider as the

evident fallout of the spring. Based on this exploration, we conclude our article with

illustrating how these issues squarely fit into the larger Islamist threat narrative in West

Africa, and its impact on wider sub-Saharan stability and security order.

Islamist threat: The challenge of definition

What is Islamist threat; what constitutes an Islamist threat; and how does one determines

that a threat has Islamist connotation? These are value-laden questions. And typical of

all value-laden themes, answers are laden with the personal prejudices and values of the

one providing the answers. Thus, what one may consider an Islamist threat, another may

likely consider it a religious obligation and a necessity required of all believers. As a

result, much of what has been said and written is characterized by glaring incoherence

and inconsistencies. In the post-9/11 world, few issues are expressed with as much

sentiment and passion as questions related to Islam, terrorism, fundamentalism,

Islamism, and Islamist threat. A key, however, to decoding intellectual permutations

about Islamist threat comes from understanding of what is meant by political Islam or

in its more mundane usage, Islamism. In effect, to be able to pin down Islamist threat,

one has to understand first what is meant by Islamism. Fortunately, Mohammed Ayoob,

perhaps the leading scholar in the expanding field of political Islam, has made concerted


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efforts aimed at conceptualization these themes. These discourses make it easier for us

to reconstruct our discussions on Islamist threat and to ascribe meaning to the term.

According to Ayoob (2007), Islamism refers to the use of religious idiom and

religion-based historical references for the mobilization of Muslim populations for

political action both domestically and internationally. In effect, resort to all manner of

historical instrumentations for the purpose of mobilizing the Muslims, creating a

community of the believers and the inherent struggles this move entails amount to

political Islam or Islamism in contemporary period. It goes therefore that in pursuance

of this goal, objectives though significantly similar; means and strategies may differ,

which may explain the emerging fault line between fundamental Islam and its moderate

variant. What is important here is to note that as a mobilization force, political Islam is

bound to rankle many of the established socio-political orders, since in any case, it aims

primarily at their overthrow.

Since 9/11, political Islam has come to be seen and associated with violent

struggles to replace the dominant secular democratic order prevailing in most societies,

Muslim included, and its replacement with purely theocratic Islamic order. Although,

Islamism as Ayoob has argued is not a recent phenomenon, its violent variant at least in

contemporary period is in fact an unwanted diversion from the largely peaceful agenda

of the larger Islamist movement in many Muslim countries (Ayoob, 2007). Examples of

these diversions with the most counterproductive effect include Al-Qaeda and its other

affiliates (Ayoob, 2007). Islamist threat is thus the entirety of the struggles that aim at

the overthrow of the existing secular political order and its replacement with purely


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Islamic order as typified by many Islamist groups. It is a threat to the extent that it makes

no bones of its desire to uproot, by force if necessary, the dominant secular order.

How then does this form of threat plays out in the African context; and how does

the uprising in North Africa aids its spread to other parts of Africa, which by implication

means growing regional insecurity, especially to the West African sub-region. Let us

briefly first turn our attention to how traditionally, the security of West Africa is linked

to the politics of North Africa, more specifically, Libya under Gadhafi.

West African regional security: Trends and patterns

Its crippling poverty, higher level of corruption, cases of bad governance, and number

of weak and failing states is not the only remarkable narrative of West Africa over the

last fifty years. Another notorious feature, probably the most enduring and catastrophic,

is the precarious nature of its security situation these last fifty years (Curran &

Woodhouse, 2007). Ranging from internal political instabilities, violent overthrow of

governments, to rebellions and civil wars, West Africa comes on top of those parts of

the world whose stability index is very low (Williams, 2007). Many reasons may account

for this. And in fact, many of these reasons are directly traceable to the nature of the

political elite at the helm of political leadership (Ismail, 2008). Thus, we often talk of

corruption, poverty, unemployment, higher mortality rate, bad governance,

dictatorships, and weak state institutions in many of the West African states. However,

while it is true these factors are at the forefront of igniting fires of civil unrests, conflicts,

rebellions, and civil wars, there may in actual fact be other factors and forces that sustain

these fires (Curran & Woodhouse, 2007).


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If past indicators are to be used to gauge how these forces sustain division,

instability, conflicts, and establish culpability in West Africa, the role of external forces,

most specifically, interfering foreign powers is the most frightening. And in this regard,

no other non-West African country tops the list of these interfering powers like

Gadhafis Libya. The extent of Libyas interference in West African politics over the

last forty years will take years and groundbreaking studies to chronicle. It is however

sufficient for us to note that in the span of the last four decades, there was hardly a single

conflict, political instability, or even civil war in which the hands of Libya did not feature

prominently. From supporting Toureg rebels in Niger and Mali, to direct training of

rebel fighters for Charles Taylor and Niger-Delta militants in Nigeria, logistic support

to different factions in the Sierra Leonean civil war, Gadhafis role was ubiquitous

(Cook, 2008).

Effectively, this Libyan predilection for poking its nose in other countries

businesses created viable corridors through which money, arms, and mercenaries flow

perpetually between North Africa into West Africa and other parts of Sub-Sahara via

Chad, Niger, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Mali (Cook, 2008). The collapse of the Gadhafi

regime does not mean the collapse of these corridors. What it really portends is that they

are now less centralized, and more fluid. And before these could be brought back under

effective control, it will take time and resources. Meanwhile, the effects will continue to

be felt across West and other parts of Africa. Already, countries like Nigeria struggling

with Islamist Boko Haram, and Mali contending with the Azwad rebels under the

umbrella of National Movement for the Liberation of Azwad, are feeling the intense

pain (United Press International, April 12, 2012).


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Nevertheless, this is just one aspect of this relationship. Another less

pronounced, but equally devastating aspect is how mercenaries from many parts of West

Africa who fought in the Libyan war banished with their weapons without trace (Lacher,

2012). Many of the sprawling Islamist groups in West Africa are believed to have

directly participated in those wars, and have as a result benefited directly from the arms

and professional training acquired in those days (Ferran, November 10, 2011). Recall

how the foreign powers were dropping arms to the rebels strongholds as logistic

supports while justifying their actions under the Right to Protect (R2P) principle

(Bellamy, 2011). These weapons were in most cases used against Gadhafi, but many

found their way west of Libya, into the sub-Sahara. These, we could say have now either

become part of the arsenals being deployed by groups such as the Azwadi rebels in Mali,

Boko Haram in Nigeria, or have entered into sleep mode waiting for strategic openings

to unleash them on West Africa. In any event, what is clear is that in the past, Libyan

government under Gadhafi had played a role, which was not wholly gentlemanly in West

Africa, and today the fallout of the collapse of that regime is being reflected in the

expanding Islamist threat in the region (The Economist, April 21, 2012).

The Arab spring and regional security in West Africa

Security students have linked the escalating violence perpetrated by the Islamist group

in Nigeria, Boko Haram, with the larger Islamist network based in North Africa (United

Press International, April 12, 2012). Many, among these specifically believed that Boko

Haram might have in the past two years succeeded in establishing contacts with similar

groups in Somalia and the AQIM (France 24, February 23, 2012). These are

permutations, which are very difficult to substantiate in a small essay as this.


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Nevertheless, there are issues, which could not be attributed to pure coincidence. The

escalation in violence and the higher level of sophistication and precision with which

Boko Haram carried its activities at least since last year lend credence to this

observation. Then, there were the continuing uprisings in North Africa, and

mushrooming of other Islamist groups in both North and West Africa, most notably the

Ansar Eddine and the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (The Economist,

April 17, 2012). Is there any discernible pattern that could explain a relationship between

these groups, and the events in Libya and elsewhere in North Africa?

In order to understand this properly, we need to bear in mind the recent onslaught

launched by the Malian rebels, which culminated in their declaration of the sovereign

state of Azwad in North Mali. How do these events fit in to the larger argument, which

says that the Arab spring may have contributed to this situation? In early April, following

a resurging wave of hostilities between Malian armed forces and the Toureg rebels in

the northern parts of the country, which directly led to the overthrow of the democratic

government by elements of the armed forces, the rebels finally, declared their secession

from the sovereign state of Mali (The Economist, April 17, 2012). They announced the

formation of an independent state of Azwad. When we recall two important facts, it is

easy to see how the rebellion in Mali conforms to a wider regional security pattern

immensely aided by the flow of arms from North Africa during and immediately after

the uprisings. First, the conflict in Mali was not a recent one. In fact, it has been a

protracted one spanning over a decade, which at a point in time experienced a lull

because the rebels were starved of their sources of logistical support. Following the

breakout of the spring in North Africa, we saw renewal of fighting to the point where


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the weapons of the Malian armed forces could not compete with those of the rebels. The

second point is no less clear and convincing. Most of the forces that fought by Gadhafis

side in the twilight of his regime were hired mercenaries, mostly Barbers and Toureg,

from West and other parts of North Africa (Lacher, 2012). Many of the weapons these

mercenaries used found their way into Mali, and of course, many other parts of sub-

Saharan Africa (The Economist, April 17, 2012).

Expanding Islamist threat: Whither West Africa?

The appropriate question here is what does this situation portends to the security and

stability of West Africa and by implication, other parts of sub-Saharan Africa. Even at

the best of times, West Africa is not a haven of peace and stability owing to problems

associated with bad governance, poverty, inequality, and corruption (Ismail, 2008;

Williams, 2007). Because of this situation, it would not be farfetched to argue that

groups, Islamists or otherwise, could easily mesh with the currents of discontents, which

these issues always generate, and provide an impetus for strong mobilization on their

basis. In short, discontent and alienation have always provided the cannon fodder that

triggers socio-political instability in human societies (Storm, 2009). West Africa is not

an exception to this historical rule. However, going beyond this portrayal, there are other

issues and implications that need elaboration here.

In the first instance, heterogeneous societies like Nigeria have a very alarming

history of religious intolerance owing principally to the machinations and other

manipulative activities of the political elites to score cheap political benefits. In its

period of statehood, most notably, the last one decade, the country has witnessed some


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of the most violent inter-religious crises and conflicts in which thousands of lives were

lost and properties worth billions were destroyed (Deegan, 2011). The implication of a

wider regional threat on such an already tense situation, where adherents of different

faiths live in suspicion, could be catastrophic especially when sophisticated and cheap

weapons are thrown into the mix. At least since 2009, the increasing audacity and

violence of the Islamist group Boko Haram has been linked to regional connections

(France 24, February 23, 2012). And even at present, it is not possible to dismiss

speculations that the group is not part of wider regional Islamist agenda of religious

intolerance that perpetrates violence.

Related to this, is the emerging evidence about the spread of Islamist cells and

splinter groups in other parts of West Africa and Central Africa, most notably Niger

Republic, Guinea, and Chad (The Economist, April 17, 2012; Cohen, 2008). While some

of these groups push separatists agenda in the name of religion, bulk of them however

prefer to remain from within their countries and push, always by violence, for the

adoption of their puritanical version of Islamic principles of life and governance. Often,

their methods include kidnapping of expatriates workers for ransom, assassination of

targeted individuals, to planting of bombs in which in most cases, innocent peoples are

the worst affected.

Conclusion

This essay briefly traced the impact of the Arab spring in North Africa on West African

regional security. The argument made by this article is that the collapse of the

dictatorships in North Africa facilitated huge flow of men and arms into various parts of


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West Africa. The situation we showed is largely responsible for escalating the wave of

violence in countries such as Nigeria and Mali by groups bearing the banner of Islamic

religion. It is our contention that the action of these Islamist groups is a serious source

of security threat, especially in heterogeneous countries such as Nigeria where history

of inter-religious harmony has never been exceptionally cordial. But as we have pointed

at the beginning of this essay, the linkage between the uprisings in North Africa and the

resurgence of Islamist threats in West Africa has not been fully and critically explored.

It is therefore important that students of African politics devote more attention to this

important question.

References

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Actors, challenges, implications and policy options. SWP Research Paper,

German Institute for International and Security Affairs, Berlin.

Ayoob, M. (2007). Challenging hegemony: Political Islam and the North-South divide.

International Studies Review, 9, 629-643.

Bellamy, A. J. (2011). Libya and the responsibility to protect: The exception and the

norm.Ethics and International Affairs, 2011, 1-7.

Cohen, H. J. (2008). In sub-Saharan Africa, security is overtaking development a

Washingtons top policy priority. American Foreign Policy Interests, 30, 88

95.

Cook, C. R. (2008). A question of intervention: American policymaking in SierraLeone and the power of institutional agenda setting. African Studies Quarterly,10(1).

Curran, D. & Woodhouse, T. (2007). Cosmopolitan peacekeeping and peace building

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Deegan, H. (2011). Religious conflict in Kano: What are the fundamental issues?

Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, 49(1), 80-97.

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France 24 (2012, February 23). Boko Haram has al-Qaeda ties, claims Nigerian

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boko-haram-al-qaeda-islamist-militant.

Ismail, O. (2008). Power elites, war and postwar reconstruction in Africa: Continuities,

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Lacher, W. (2012). Regional repercussions of revolution and civil war in Libya. In

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