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27 December 2012Year-end special edition

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27 December 2012

In their pursuit to assert their dominance against the military and the secular elites, the Brotherhood drifted further to the right, drawing once again on an overtly religious vocabulary

Short term gains, long term losses?The politics of the Brothers

By Noha El-Hennawy

xperts on Islamist movements and democratization have long held that Islamist groups, if they are allowed to engage

freely in the political system, tend to make significant ideological conces-sions, adopt democratic values, and act pragmatically.

Repeatedly referred to in these dis-cussions is the example of the Turkish Islamist movement that culminated in the emergence of the Justice and De-velopment Party. The party recognizes secularism, and this is taken as evi-dence to show that when Islamists are allowed to compete for power demo-cratically, they find enough incentives to give up some dogma, reaching out to a wider base.

By the same token, these studies held that Arab authoritarianism was a major impediment to the moderation of Is-lamist groups. The lack of any prospect for rotation of power provides zero incentive to Arab Islamists to move towards the center of the political spec-trum.

Then the Arab Spring came along, putting these theories and hypotheses to the test.

Looking back at the performance of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood in 2012, these arguments show themselves to be somewhat simplistic.

While in 2011, the group had drawn on a more secular discourse seeking to position itself among liberal and leftist democratic forces in the wake of Hosni Mubarak’s ouster, this year witnessed a major regression in this regard. In their pursuit to assert their dominance against the military and the secular elites, the Brotherhood drifted further to the right, drawing once again on an overtly religious vocabulary. This dual-ism has exposed the group’s failure to develop a consistent political discourse that could help them build a larger con-stituency that goes beyond their con-ventional conservative support base.

From positive to repulsive Soon after Mubarak’s ouster, the group sent a plethora of assurances to non-Is-lamists, Christians and Egypt’s western allies. Despite their apparent under-the-table deals with the military — turning many revolutionaries against them — the Brotherhood’s discourse was in no way alarming as far as the relationship between religion and state was concerned.

In the first post-Mubarak poll, it was not the Brotherhood who primar-ily used religious propaganda to entice voters to back the military-sponsored constitutional amendments. It was the Salafis who employed religion in their campaigns, questioning the faith of the amendments’ detractors, and arguing that a “yes” vote was a vote for Islam.

Even later, in the run-up to the No-vember 2011 legislative elections, the Brotherhood took everyone by surprise when they dropped their old contro-versial slogan “Islam is the Solution” for a more secular catchphrase “We Bear Good for Egypt.” The slogan attested to the group’s attempt to reach out to a wider audience on concrete rather than divine grounds.

Yet, the year 2012 witnessed a fla-grant reversion in the group’s electoral discourse. The Brotherhood’s presiden-tial campaign was a revealing milestone.

The Brotherhood rescinded their initial decision not to field a presiden-tial candidate at the last minute, some suggest, after the generals’ reluctance to cede any power to the Islamist-dominated parliament became clear. For them, winning the presidency was a life-or-death question. Amid threats that the Supreme Constitutional Court would dissolve the parliament, the presidency was seen as the group’s life-

line in their quest to cement control.In this pressing situation, the group

felt more comfortable reverting to their classic language of old.

After almost a year of preaching mod-erate politics and grooming themselves as the Egyptian equivalent of the Turk-ish Islamists, the Brotherhood leaned abruptly to the right. Once again, they employed old slogans and religious rhetoric, for example, declaring their presidential candidate Mohamed Morsy as the only Islamist nominee. His tours always featured Salafi cheer-leaders who had tweaked the revolu-tion’s famous slogan, “The people want to bring down the regime” into “The people want God’s Sharia to be imple-mented.” And the group’s old slogan "the Quran is our constitution" resur-faced.

At one of the campaign rallies, Su-preme Guide Mohamed Badie com-pared Morsy to one of the prophet’s most venerated companions and the first rightly-guided caliph. “The Um-mah swore allegiance to Abu Bakr, and by the same token the Ummah will swear allegiance to Morsy as president of Egypt, God willing,” he said in May.

Meanwhile, Salafi preacher Safwat Hegazy, who had shadowed Morsy at most of his rallies, told the crowd, “We believe that the dream of reviving the Islamic caliphate will be realized by Morsy, the Brotherhood and his party. Jerusalem will be the capital of this ca-liphate.”

Since then, each time that the move-ment has faced a crisis — one that per-haps threatens its very existence — the Brotherhood has adopted the same language. The reaction to the opposi-tion stirred by Morsy’s constitutional declaration passed on 22 November provides proof of this.

To back their man, the Brotherhood resorted, yet again, to their comfort zone. They mobilized their followers on religious grounds, giving enthusi-astic backing to a rally in defense of "Sharia and Legitimacy" that was held in Giza in early December.

Meanwhile, the Brotherhood’s influ-ential leader Khairat al-Shater appeared on television alongside controversial

Salafi sheikhs to offer the movement’s analysis of the sweeping protests against Morsy’s decree. He held that ongoing resistance was part of a larger conspiracy that targeted Islamists and was primarily fomented by Christians and the remnants of the old regime. It was the first time since Mubarak’s oust-er that a well-established figure made a statement with such flagrant sectarian connotations and language, undermin-ing the group’s past attempts to build bridges with the Christian minority.

Egyptian context: impediments to moderationIn fact, there are solid reasons explain-ing why the opening of the political system in Egypt has, so far, failed in compelling or encouraging the Broth-erhood to adopt a consistently moder-ate agenda.

Firstly, a democratic political system with an entrenched tradition of a rota-tion of power and protection of indi-vidual rights and liberties has not as yet been shaped.

Meanwhile, the Brotherhood and their Islamist partners are reaping the fruits of a procedural democracy that ensures all players free access to the ballot box, but gives the winner the ab-solute right to set the rules for the new order regardless of their democratic or autocratic inclinations. Hence, there is a great amount of leeway for undemo-cratic forces — whoever they may be — to abort the transition to fully dem-ocratic rule.

Secondly, the Brotherhood is faced with fierce far-right competitors in the form of a vast array of Salafi parties. After Mubarak’s ouster, these Salafi groups revisited their aloofness from politics, and engaged heavily in elec-tions. In only a few months, they had established themselves as a force to be reckoned with, taking almost one quar-ter of the parliamentary seats in the 2011 poll.

The fear of appearing less religious than their new Salafi contenders re-stricts the Brotherhood’s ability to make ideological concessions or move towards the center of the political spec-trum. The Brotherhood have chosen

to appease the Salafis. The content of the constitution is a case in point. In order to convince Salafis to sign off on a clause holding that “the principles” rather than the “rulings” of Islamic Sharia are the primary source of legisla-tion, the Brotherhood included a more controversial article towards the end of the 236-article text widening the scope of the term "principles".Gains and hurdlesOn the surface, this alignment with the far right could be deemed benefi-cial as it helps the Brotherhood make electoral gains. It qualified them for the second round of the presidential race and mobilized wide support for their constitution. However, a deeper look may suggest that the radicalization of the Brotherhood political discourse may easily seal their fate.

The group’s investment in the secu-lar-Islamist divide has sown the seeds of civil strife. The street violence that erupted over the course of the past month suggests that the Islamist-secu-lar animosity may spiral out of control. However, any future turmoil can be blamed only on the power holders —Morsy and the Brotherhood.

The continuation of the current political disorder coupled with street clashes may gradually inflict irrepa-rable damage to the Brotherhood’s legitimacy and credibility. Addition-ally, a tumultuous political scene will further delay economic recovery at a critical juncture, marked by brewing social disenchantment and the poten-tial of an uprising. With the absence of economic growth, political closure is a risky path.

Meanwhile, the Brotherhood cannot live up to their ultra orthodox pledges, given their persistent efforts to appease western governments. The Brother-hood’s current alliance with groups that hold the US as the great Satan is practically hard to sustain at a moment when they are selling themselves to the West as a force that can maintain stability and peace with Israel. Sooner rather than later, the Brotherhood’s far-right allies may bring to the public debate suggestions for ultra-orthodox bills envisaging a stricter implementa-tion of Islamic Sharia or a challenge to Egyptian-western relations.

Here comes the question: Do the Muslim Brotherhood still have a chance to rethink their contradictory stances, develop a more consistent centrist dis-course that could help them reach out to a wider base that goes beyond their conventional semi-rural conservative base of followers? Or have they already missed all their chances?

The answer remains to be seen.■

The Mohamed Morsy regime is appealing to only one constituency.

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3News27 December 2012

The ballot and the street The opposition movement is growing more mature, but not without challenges

We represent arevolutionary opposition and also an institutional opposition that works through the legitimate mechanisms ofelections and, when the rights of the people are being violated, we stand with them in the street through protests and sit-ins, which areadditional tools ofopposition

By Heba Afify“The President and the Brother-hood take credit for the most signif-icant achievement the opposition made this year,” says Tamer al-Mi-hy, member of the political bureau of the Social Democratic Party.

“That they started to unite and work together,” he reckons.

Mihy is speaking about the Na-tional Salvation Front, an umbrella group of various political groups and personalities that formed in November to oppose Islamist he-gemony over the political scene. The front offered a form of political representation to a growing anti-Islamist street movement.

Scores had been gathering out-side the presidential palace and in Tahrir Square to protest President Mohamed Morsy’s controversial power grab through a constitu-tional declaration, parts of which he later rescinded under popular pressure.

So far, the front has managed to remain relatively united through-out the fast-moving political de-velopments of November and De-cember.

The future, however, poses two challenges to this nascent political opposition.

The first is how to contest a ro-bust Islamist movement, which has on its side repeated electoral victo-ries. The second is how to repre-sent a street movement that often resists political representation.

Eye on the ballotOpposition parties and figures who rose to prominence after the revolution have learned the hard way that they cannot make politi-cal gains without uniting against more organized Islamist powers, especially those with decades-long organizational experience.

In the run-up to last year’s parlia-mentary elections, 14 liberal and leftist parties formed an electoral alliance, The Egyptian Bloc. How-ever, parties dropped out of the al-liance one by one due to disagree-ments over seat distribution; come election day, the alliance was com-prised of only three parties. The bloc also had to compete for non-Islamist votes with another liberal electoral alliance, the Revolution Continues.

Islamist groups, spearheaded by the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafi Nour Party, meanwhile, took 70 percent of seats in parliament.

In the presidential elections, the same non-Islamist players re-mained divided, and the revolu-tionary vote was split. Nasserist leader Hamdeen Sabbahi, Muslim Brotherhood defector Abdel Mo-neim Abouel Fotouh and leftist human rights lawyer Khaled Ali — all considered candidates of the revolution — ran separately. None of them made it to the runoffs.

The results of this month’s con-stitutional referendum suggest the united opposition is much more competetive. The 63.8 percent with which the Islamist-friendly constitution was ap-proved reflects a weakening of Islamists’ electoral prowess, with less than 33 percent of eligible

says. “Now there’s popular pressure that will make it difficult for a party to announce it is leaving the ranks of the united opposition. It would be political suicide.”

Mihy says that to improve its ability to mobilize voters, the front aims to build a strong, institution-alized mechanism and enhance communication between Cairo and the governorates. The referen-dum showcased the opposition’s significant weakness outside major urban centers.

He adds that over the last few months, opposition party bases have worked together in the gov-ernorates as teams, which they will be resistant to dismantle.

Amid speculation over what form future cooperation between front members will take, Wahid Abdel Meguid, a member of the front’s political bureau, tells Egypt Independent that the front is con-

voters showing up to the polls. With new parliamentary elec-

tions expected to be held within the next two months, the electoral field will become once again a proving ground for the opposition.

Hassan Abu Taleb, a political expert at Al-Ahram Center for Po-litical and Strategic Studies, says whether the front remains united will depend on whether its mem-ber parties can put aside their own political interests and continue to fight together against the domina-tion of the Islamist current.

There is more demand for unity now than in past elections, says Mihy, and steeper political conse-quences for parties that decide to run independently. Thus, there is a greater chance, he says, that the op-position will remain unified.

“We all agree on the general goals of restraining a fascist authority and changing the constitution,” he

sidering running its members on one list in the upcoming elections.

Abu Taleb says the front’s major task now is to work toward secur-ing at least half the seats in the par-liament and then to use those gains to bring down the constitution through legislative means.

“If they run on one list, [opposi-tion parties] will see a strong victo-ry and change the current political landscape, which is dominated by the Brotherhood and the Salafis,” he says.

Abdel Meguid denies rumors that the front will start a new party; however, he says some parties in the front are planning to merge.

Eye on the streetWhile the front says the upcom-ing elections are its priority, it also vows to continue working as a rev-olutionary force in the street.

The evolving opposition sees a role for itself in electoral battles.

Street mobilization remains a focus for the opposition.

Leading members of the front have stressed that while it will par-ticipate in electoral politics, the front refuses to accept the status quo the ruling Muslim Brother-hood has forced on the country.

“We represent a revolutionary opposition and also an institution-al opposition that works through the legitimate mechanisms of elec-tions, and when the rights of the people are being violated, we stand with them in the street through protests and sit-ins, which are ad-ditional tools of opposition,” says Abdel Meguid.

Many in the leadership value the street movement as the compass of the opposition.

“The most important develop-ment in the opposition is that it has learned that it’s not about fig-ures or stars. What determines their success is the amount of work they do in the street,” says Abu Ta-leb. “Without work on the street, the figures remain leaders without soldiers, and everyone loses.”

Meanwhile, Akram Ismail, a member of the Popular Socialist Alliance who credits the opposi-tion’s organizational development with an increasing ability to mobi-lize on a street level, is concerned with the movement’s potential.

“The opposition’s political power is capable of creating pressure on the rule of the Brotherhood, but not replacing it,” he says. “They can disrupt a lot of things, but they cannot take initiative.”

“The opposition is not one party with one agenda; it’s a wide alli-ance that spans from the liberal right to the socialist left,” he says, which can pose a structural imped-iment to its political ascendancy.

But for him, and at least for now, the opposition’s agenda is not to rule but to pressure the ruling Brotherhood to make compromis-es that lead to a more democratic state and hinder “their attempt to rebuild dictatorial rule.”■

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4 News27 December 2012

The court vs the palaceFace offs between the judiciary and the president look likely to continue over the coming year

By Omar Halawa As the year comes to a close, the judiciary’s en-grossing plotline culminates with quite a dra-matic scene: stones hurled and birdshot fired at the anti-Brotherhood head of the Judges Club, Ahmed al-Zend, as he leaves the premises.

It is perhaps the most striking summary of a rocky year for the Egyptian judiciary, which has seen judges boycotting the courtroom to engage in battles in the political arena.

Egypt’s political map has changed drastically in 2012 starting in late June with the military coun-cil’s power handover to the country’s first civilian president, Mohamed Morsy, who rose from the ranks of the Muslim Brotherhood and its politi-cal arm, the Freedom and Justice Party.

Less than six months into his tenure, Morsy’s political affiliations were arguably responsible for fueling intense conflicts between the judiciary and the presidency. The standoff is likely to sim-mer and peak in 2013 as stipulations in the con-tentious new constitution regarding changes in the composition of judicial bodies are applied.

Drafted by an Islamist-dominated assembly, the constitution was put to a snap referendum in late December via a decision made immune from judicial review by Morsy’s constitutional declara-tion that made all his decisions free from judicial scrutiny.

The process through which the constitution was born has polarized Egypt’s political forces and implicated society at large, as well as prompt-ing judicial bodies to aggressively challenge the presidency.

Amid a 32.9 percent turnout, 63.8 percent of voters said “yes” in the referendum, and once officially passed, the constitution will have an instant effect on the makeup of the Supreme Constitutional Court. On the longer run, the constitution is feared to blur the lines separating between different branches of government, and most notably the judiciary on one side and the executive and legislative on the other. For the time being, the crisis has strongly entrenched the judiciary in politics.

Hafez Abou Seada, head of the Egyptian Orga-nization for Human Rights, describes 2012 as a black year for the judiciary and expects the com-ing one to be even darker.

“The entire issue is political and I expect even more tension if the regime does not back down from moves that stir political conflict,” he adds.

A brewing crisisIn the past weeks, judicial bodies have raced to approve or reject the decisions of the ruling pow-er. In some cases, differing stances created rift within the same judicial body.

Morsy’s first brush with the judiciary came just days after swearing in, when he called parliament to convene for a session in defiance of a SCC rul-ing which dissolved the People’s Assembly two weeks earlier, due to the unconstitutionality of the electoral law.

Two days later, however, Morsy rescinded the decision — at the time, the military council had consolidated its powers through a constitutional declaration it issued just before the presidential runoff results. Later, Morsy would move to claim those powers for himself and force several of the generals into retirement.

The president has also impinged on the post of prosecutor general twice. The first time he issued a decree appointing former Prosecutor General Abdel Meguid Mahmoud as Egypt’s ambassador to the Vatican, but cancelled it a day later when members of the judiciary protested.

Mahmoud was removed for good and replaced with Talaat Abdallah as part of the 22 November constitutional declaration, which not only im-munized Morsy’s decisions from judicial review but also protected the Constituent Assembly and the Shura Council from dissolution.

The prosecutor general is typically immune from dismissal by the executive authority, so in response, judges suspended work in courts and prosecution offices nationwide, and 90 percent refused to oversee the referendum. Though Morsy revoked some of the declaration on 8 De-cember, the decision to remove Mahmoud is still protected from any possible reversal or review.

Legal experts foresee sequels to the above con-

frontations playing out in 2013. The first of these will arise due to articles in the

new constitution which stipulate that the num-ber of judges in the SCC be cut from 18 to 11, thus necessitating amendments to Law 79/1976.

The second issue concerns the post of prosecu-tor general, and whether Abdallah will remain in office, particularly since he recently resigned after protests by public prosecutors, but withdrew his resignation days later.

An endangered courtOnce the new constitution is in place, legislative powers will be transferred from the president to the Shura Council, which is dominated by Is-lamist members. This is critical, as the change in SCC composition requires legal backing, which will be drafted up by the Council.

Under the 1971 constitution, the president had the power to choose the head of the SCC, while the current law authorizes the court to then internally select the remaining members — with the final make-up comprising two-thirds from judicial bodies.

Article 176 of the new constitution, however, authorizes the president to appoint all members of the court, and the law will determine which “judicial or other entities” nominates them.

Mahmoud Kebeish, dean of Cairo University’s Faculty of Law, says since the change requires an amendment of the law to be carried out by the Shura Council, the “Council might pass a law that names certain legal entities or universities

with leaders who have Islamist orientations — it can be tailored to serve the Islamists [powers].”

According to the new Article 176, he explains, the SCC must be composed of a president plus 10 members rather than 17, which means that seven of the current members must be dismissed, with only the most senior members remaining.

When reviewing any single case, the supreme court will have seven members and four substi-tutes. If a plaintiff requests a change of the judges’ panel, a new panel must be formed with seven new members, which with a smaller court will now not be possible.

Kebeish argues what many have suspected in recent weeks, that the articles pertaining to the SCC were tailored to enable the removal of Tah-any al-Gebaly, the 12th member of the court and a key opponent of the Brotherhood.

Gebaly has the right to oppose the Brother-hood so long as that stance does not affect her judicial integrity, Kebeish says, adding that any talk about the SCC conspiring against the Broth-erhood is groundless.

Supporters of Islamist groups have held a sit-in outside the SCC since 2 December to prevent the court from carrying out its work and issuing any rulings, namely verdicts on the dissolution of the Shura Council as well as the constitutionality of Constituent Assembly.

In response, the judges suspended work and decried the besieging of their court.

On 14 December, Essam Haddad, presiden-tial aide for foreign affairs, issued a statement in

English claiming that the SCC is spearheading the counter-revolution, having “suspiciously” or-dered the dissolution of parliament.

“The supreme court is not conspiring against the president or the Brotherhood, and if it is, why don’t they bring the conspirers to trial?” Kebeish asks.

“The court’s decision to dissolve the People’s Assembly was 100 percent legally sound, and the Brotherhood knows this,” he says. “Why else would they incorporate articles of the parliamen-tary elections law — which led to the dissolution of the People’s Assembly —into the new consti-tution, allowing party members to run for single-winner seats?”

Now that these stipulations are part of the constitution, he says, the supreme court has no grounds to contest them since it only reviews the constitutionality of laws.

A disputed prosecutorAlso set to be an issue of contention in the com-ing months is the post of prosecutor general.

Abdallah said on Monday that since his ap-pointment, some prosecution offices have sus-pended their work and leading members in the circuit have expressed interest in leaving the pros-ecution to work in courts.

There are other signs suggesting that public prosecutors and the judiciary reject his mandate.

On 27 December, Mostafa Khater, public pros-ecutor for East Cairo prosecution, released sus-pects arrested in clashes between Morsy’s sup-porters and opponents at the presidential palace. Morsy was thus duly embarrassed after claiming the previous day in a speech to the nation that the suspects in detention had confessed to being paid to create chaos.

Khater found no evidence to keep 137 suspects in custody, and kept only 12 pending investiga-tions. Five days later, Abdallah transferred Khater to work as a public prosecutor in Beni Suef for six months, sparking the fury of his colleagues. Soon after, Khater’s transfer was cancelled and Abdal-lah resigned.

Shady Khalifa, spokesperson for the Judges Club and director general of the Sembellawein prosecution, says, “all of these incidents show the gap between us and the man [Abdallah].”

Khalifa was surprised when Abdallah retracted his resignation and says he was subjected to pres-sure from the presidency.

Abdallah belonged to the Independence Cur-rent of judges, to which the minister of justice and the former vice president also belonged, which is closely affiliated with the Brotherhood.

“The Independence Current harbors historical hostility toward the Judges Club,” says Khalifa, adding that members of the public prosecution want a non-politicized prosecutor general.

“We are not retreating even by one step,” he says, “either Abdallah resigns or we continue sus-pending our work and then we will escalate.”■

This piece was translatedfrom Arabic by Dina Zafer

The Supreme Constitutional Court is expected to go through radical changes with the new constitution.

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The Shura Council might pass a law that names certain legal entities oruniversities with leaders who have Islamist orientations to nominate members of the supreme court. It can be tailored to serve the Islamists [powers]

The appointment by Morsy of Talaat Ibrahim was denounced by judges and prosecutors.

5News27 December 2012

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Tightening the reinsIn the name of morals and Sharia, media freedoms may contract

By Sarah Carr

resident Mohamed Morsy has largely picked up where Hosni Mubarak left off in terms of media freedom. A case in point is the constitution.

Critics argue that the constitution, which was just approved by 63.8 percent, does not go far enough to protect media freedoms.

Article 48 guarantees freedom of the press and media independence “while respecting the sanc-tity of citizens’ private lives and the requirements of national security.” It makes a court order man-datory for the closure of media outlets.

Article 49 guarantees freedom to publish and own newspapers, while the establishment of ra-dio and television stations is “regulated by law.”

In Article 215, the National Media Council is made responsible for regulating all forms of me-dia including the digital press. Notably, amongst its duties is to “observe the values and construc-tive traditions of society.”

Karim Abdel Rady, a lawyer with the Arab Network for Human Rights, expresses concern that this could open the door to the imposition of restrictions on media freedom in the name of morals and Sharia.

Meanwhile, Article 216 states that the National Press and Media Association is responsible for state-owned media.

Safwat al-Aalem, head of Cairo University’s committee on media performance and evaluation of the political media, says the formation of the National Media Council will be decisive for the future of media.

Aalem says factors such as its composition, the powers granted to this council and the extent to which it is subject to administrative interference will be critical in determining its role.

Abdel Rady tells Egypt Independent that the constitution is silent on custodial sentences for crimes concerning insulting the president.

Al-Dostor independent daily were seized in Au-gust and its editor then, Islam Afifi charged with defaming the president. Afifi was subsequently released after Morsy issued a decree banning the detention of journalists for media-related of-fences.

In October, controversial satellite television presenter Tawfik Okasha was found not guilty of insulting the president. His channel al-Faraeen was also suspended.

Veteran presenter Mahmoud Saad was ques-tioned for three hours earlier this month after his guest, psychiatrist Manal Omar, described Morsy as a “psychopath” on air. Omar herself is being in-vestigated on charges of insulting Morsy after the presidency took legal action against her.

Bassem Youssef also faces the same charges in a separate case in relation to a skit on Morsy aired on his satirical program “El Bernameg.”

Journalist Ibrahim Eissa also faces charges of in-sulting religion in comments made about Morsy following a case filed by lawyer Mamdouh Ismail. Eissa is the same journalist who faced a jail sen-tence for writing about former President Hosni Mubarak’s health.

In a mass protest at the beginning of Decem-ber, newspapers protested media violations and four satellite channels went black the next day. Several of Egypt’s independent dailies published the same full-page image on their front pages in protest at restrictions on press freedoms in the draft constitution.

Ibrahim Nawar, head of the Egyptian Organiza-tion for Freedom of the Press, suggests that the media war is a reflection of the division between Islamists and secular currents that will continue as long as polarization in the Egyptian street con-tinues.

The danger of this split, Nawar says, is illustrat-ed by the inflammatory tone adopted by many religious satellite channels, which “incites audi-ences whose political awareness is weak.”■

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“In Mubarak’s era, we faced the problem of insult crimes. It now seems that in the com-ing period we’ll also be facing problems such as blasphemy crimes. It will be easy to interpret any media content as being in conflict with society’s morals where individuals are criticized,” Abdel Rady says.

He expects increased restrictions on media freedom in the year to come, particularly if Is-lamist currents gain a majority in the upcoming People’s Assembly elections.

“The media is currently the target of Islamist groups. They will pursue it through legal cases, sieges and protests — as Hazem Abu Ismail’s supporters did outside Media Production City,” Abdel Rady says, adding that Islamist groups often stage protests before decrees are issued in order to make it seem that these decisions reflect a popular demand.

In December, Islamists staged a sit-in outside

the Media Production City in 6th of October City — where several independent media outlets are based — calling for media purging of anti-Islamist figures.

On the ground, restrictive moves have already been unfolding. In the summer, the Muslim Brotherhood-dominated Shura Council has ap-pointed the heads of 45 state newspapers.

Meanwhile, in October, and in an unprecedent-ed move, the Shura Council dismissed Al-Gom-hurreya editor-in-chief Gamal Abdel-Rehim after the newspaper published a story claiming that former members of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces had been banned from travel due to corruption investigations against them.

In the private media sphere, unchanged defa-mation laws continue to make the media vulner-able to litigation — with a chilling effect on free-dom of expression.

Copies of the vocally anti-Muslim Brotherhood

The Shura Council appointment of chief editors of national newspapers has raised tempers.

6 News27 December 2012

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Between the state and the churchCopts find a way for themselves, but both societal and state sectarianism remain a challenge

A constitution leaves much to desire for Egypt›s Copts. Sectarianism remains a social ill.

They were later released. Nevine al-Sayed, a pre-paratory school history teacher in Assiut, was ac-cused by one of her students of insulting Prophet Mohamed while teaching a lesson about his life.

A controversial video circulating online in De-cember featured the leader of the Salafi Dawah, the reference point of the Salafi Nour Party, saying that the constitution will pave the way for Hisba laws, which give third parties the right to raise cases against people they deem engaging in acts against Islam.

Beyond the constitution, the year also saw a new brand of state-sponsored sectarianism, ex-plicitly encouraged by the country’s rulers.

Following a contentious constitutional declara-tion issued by President Mohamed Morsy in No-vember granting him sweeping powers, a wave of protests erupted across the country demanding to cancel the declaration.

Accusations targeting the Copts and the church holding them responsible for the mobilization were made both by a number of Brotherhood leaders and various Islamist media.

“We have spotted many Copts protesting around Ettehadiya [presidential palace],” leader of the ruling Freedom and Justice Party Mo-hamed al-Beltagy said in a media appearance. Brotherhood strongman Khairat al-Shater fol-lowed suit in what was deemed unprecedented state-sponsored sectarian discourse.

SocietyThe incident of Sarah Ishaq Abdel Malak, 14, was the story of the year. Abdel Malak was allegedly abducted by a Muslim neighbor in the coastal city of Matrouh. The Salafi Front, a hardline Salafi movement, alleged that the adolescent was not

abducted, leading to conflict with a Coptic rights’ group.

The story recalled other cases of forced conver-sions which have served as a landscape for inter-religious tensions.

Founder of the Association for Victims of Ab-duction and Forced Disappearance Ibram Louis tells Egypt Independent that his organization reg-istered 75 cases of such “disappearances” in 2011, but that in far more cases, families were not will-ing to register their cases officially.

“There are extremists who abuse the fact that some girls have bad relationships with their fami-lies and force them to convert to Islam, while oth-ers willingly convert when they become involved in love affairs with Muslim men,” he says.

“We have been calling for the revival of sessions of advice and guidance done jointly by the church and Al-Azhar to make sure that those who con-vert from Christianity to Islam, or the other way around, are doing so willingly,” Louis adds.

These sessions were suspended by the Mubarak regime in 2004, when the president was said to use similar cases to fuel sectarian strife. Critics say that the ousted regime used sectarian strife to shift the attention of public opinion from its wrongdo-ings.

“We are calling for a campaign to revive these sessions to prevent any accusations of forced mar-riage or conversion. We want to revive the culture of religious freedom in Egypt,” Louis explains.

Yet, although state-sponsored sectarianism is believed to be at play, observers maintain that the issue is also societal. Writer Abdel Rahman Abu Zekry explained in an article published in Al-Quds newspaper that sectarianism is more sensed in rural areas because this is where people

By Mai Shams El-Din

opts, many would say, have been per-sistently subject to sectarianism at the hands both of the state, and society more broadly. But there are also persis-

tently ways out, ways that frame the “Coptic ques-tion” less as a Coptic question at all, but rather a national one. Here we look at the state of play within the state, society and the church itself.

The stateSocial media was awash with sarcastic jokes when Mohamed al-Sawy, a conservative member of the Constituent Assembly drafting the constitution, claimed that he represented the church, after it had withdrawn from the assembly. Like many other parties, the church withdrew when it saw that negotiations over the draft came to a dead-lock.

Article 2 of the constitution stipulates that principles of Islamic Sharia are the main source of legislation, but what is less commented upon is that the proposed constitution grants Egypt’s Copts the right to resort to their own religious ju-risdiction in personal and religious affairs, a move described by Islamists as an extraordinary shift in the Coptic issue.

But Hani Ramsis, coordinator of Maspero Cop-tic Youth Union (MCYU), believes that the con-stitution is “a sectarian one that revolves too much around identity.”

“In the constitution, Egyptian identity is just about the category of the Brotherhood and the Salafis, disregarding everything else about Egypt’s diverse identity,” Ramsis says.

He believes that this constitution will thus pave the way to social conflict when it is translated into legislation.

Many expressed concerns over Articles 76 and 81, for example. Article 76 states that there shall be no crime or penalty except in accordance with the law of the constitution, thereby broadening the reference when it comes to crime beyond the penal code and to the constitution itself. Critics are concerned that this may open the way for stricter Sharia implementation. Similarly, Article 81 limits the definition of freedoms and rights to elusive notions like “moral values,” and the “genu-ine nature of the Egyptian family” is cited in an earlier article.

Meanwhile, there have been several cases of re-ligious blasphemy, ringing alarm bells over how courts may further become a playground for sec-tarianism.

In October, two Coptic minors and a teacher were referred to prosecution over accusations of religious blasphemy. Nabil Nady Rizk, 9, and Mina Nady Farag, 10, were referred to a juvenile detention facility after they were accused of uri-nating on two copies of the Quran in a village in the Upper Egyptian governorate of Beni Suef.

are more aware of, thus affected by, their religious identity in contradiction to the more secular, capi-talist driven metropolitan cities in which religious identities are less crystalized.

The churchOn a gloomy Saturday in March, Copts mourned the death of Pope Shenouda III, who long served as the guardian of Coptic religious and political af-fairs mostly during the Mubarak regime.

The election of Pope Tawadros II in November, meanwhile, showcased a potential shift in the role played by the church in the life of Copts. It sug-gested a move towards the church playing its reli-gious role, but less so a political role.

“I think the message is clear by now. Copts do not want a politicized church,” chief editor of Coptic newspaper Watani Youssef Sedhom says.

“Pope Tawadros has said it clearly many times that Copts will not be pressured by the church concerning their own political choices,” he adds.

Groups like MCYU and Copts 38 have risen, since the eruption of the 25 January revolution, as a new class of politically engaged Coptic groups that stand against the hegemony of the church over the lives of Christians.

While MCYU softly opposes the church domi-nation, Copts 38, a group that aims to reform the church’s marriage and divorce laws, openly slams the church rulings. For one, they oppose the stip-ulation of the constitution giving Copts the right to refer to the church rulings in personal status is-sues, as they say this would subject Copts to the domination of the church.

Sedhom believes that it is the role of the Coptic community to heavily engage in civil political or-ganization to mobilize for their demands, a move that will never be achieved unless politically en-gaged Coptic movements become less sectarian.

“We have a strong battle with regard to the law to organize the building of houses of worship. This battle will be decided in the upcoming Par-liament. Organizing with other secular political groups and parties is our only way to make this cause an Egyptian cause and not a sectarian one,” Sedhom says.

Ramsis concurs. “We do not want to put our-selves as a guardian over the church, we just do not want the church to be our guardian. The church has the right to have its own stance, but it should not force it on us,” he says.

“For example, the MCYU is part of the National Salvation Front [the opposition coalition formed following Morsy’s controversial declaration]. We did not consult church leaders over this,” Ramsis adds.

“Less sectarian demands mean less encourage-ment for the Islamists to establish a theocratic state,” Ramsis concludes, in what could point the way towards joint actions between Coptic and pro-democracy actors against encroaching Islami-fication of the state.■

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In the constitution, Egyptian identity is just about the category of the Brotherhood and the Salafis, disregarding everything else about Egypt’s diverse identity

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The death of Pope Shenouda marks a change in the Church’s position.

7News27 December 2012

In an attempt to stifle dissent, police brutality since Morsy took power has targeted non-politicized citizens, with cases often beginning with daily interaction between police and ordinary people

Torture’s persistence

By Leyla DossOn 23 November, 25-year-old ac-countant Saad Saeed was found dead after being tortured and beaten to death by police officers in a Giza po-lice station. His face was disfigured, and he had been left on the pave-ment for nine hours before his family was notified.

Saeed shares the last name with Khaled Saeed, whose torture to death at the hands of police in the summer of 2010 ushered in a wave of protests, and helped fuel an uprising a few months later.

Yet, the 2012 Saeed is one among 150 documented cases of many who have died or suffered from police brutality since President Moham-med Morsy took power on 30 June, itself something made possible by this revolution.

A report published by the Nadeem Center for the Rehabilitation of Vic-tims of Torture in early October, claimed that during Morsy’s first 100 days as president, 88 torture cases had taken place in police stations and homes. Of these, 34 have died as a result of police torture.

The report also claims many more people have died under torture in such a short span of time than before Morsy’s presidency.

The Egyptian Organisation for Human Rights (EOHR) has report-ed that over a span of 15 years, 1993 to 2008, there were 204 deaths from police torture.

Everyone is a victimIn an attempt to stifle dissent,

police brutality since Morsy took power has targeted non-politicized citizens, with cases often beginning with daily interaction between po-lice and ordinary people.

Susan Fayyad, director of the Nadeem Center, says, “Average low-income citizens in impoverished slums continue to be targeted by police in increasingly violent ways. This could be because the 25 January revolution has fuelled a greater sense of entitlement.”

Magda Botrous, a researcher at the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights (EIPR) explains, “Confron-tations in impoverished areas often start with a police officer humiliating a person, this person then stands up for himself, and in return is gravely injured, or, sometimes, beaten to death.”

In early November, 21-year-old university student, Nabila Taha, was detained with her father, mother and brother at the Nasr City police station. They were subsequently thrown against the wall, beaten with sticks and punched in the face sev-eral times, she recounts to Egypt Independent. Taha’s father is the doorman at a residence in Nasr City where the father-in-law of the police officer accused of torturing her lives. She believes they were arrested be-cause her father closed the gate of the building.

In mid-July, Mohamed Saleh, 23, was continuously tortured when he was detained for three months in Tora Prison. He was arrested in the city of Badr, on the outskirts of East-ern Cairo, after being accused of car-rying a weapon on his person. Saleh was incarcerated with 29 people in a cell measuring 7 by 5 meters. He was beaten with water pipes and wooden sticks and verbally humiliated, he tells Egypt Independent.

Meanwhile, political activists have

Taqadom al-Khatib, 28, is professor at Cairo University and a member of the National Association for Change. During a trip to visit family in the southern city of Qena in October for Eid al-Adha celebrations, two police officers halted the bus Khatib was riding. After resisting humiliation by a police officer who had randomly re-quested to see his ID, Khatib claims he was consequently harshly beaten, detained, and allegedly falsely ac-cused of possessing hashish.

Khatib’s torture case was report-ed to the Prosecutor General and the interior and justice ministries. “What about poorer people who do not have these connections?” says Khatib.

Fayyad believes that lack of con-crete accountability of accused po-lice officers makes them feel more entitled to continue their torture practices.

Meanwhile, legal recourse for vic-tims of torture and abuse remains limited. The victim, or a representa-tive, may file a complaint to the pros-ecution office. However, the pros-ecution office has prosecutorial and investigative powers and can there-fore, easily dismiss the court case.

Many activists have called for increased reforms in litigation pro-cesses, the judicial system and the Interior Ministry.

The Prosecutor General, who is appointed by the president, has the power to collect evidence and con-tact forensic authorities. In practice, this cyclical system supports the in-terests of both the Interior Ministry and the police force.

In circumstances where the Pros-ecution Office chooses to delve further into the matter, it neverthe-less holds the power to investigate the complaint, interview witnesses, gather evidence and contact forensic authorities.

The result is that many of these cases are dropped for reasons such as “lack of evidence.”

also had their share of police torture in the last few months.

Kareem al-Keriany, 26, a mem-ber of the Social Democratic Party branch in Nasr City, was arrested in mid-July after participating in a march to raise awareness about the draft constitution. He tells Egypt In-dependent that he was subsequently detained in a military prison, blind-folded, handcuffed and beaten with wooden sticks.

According to a report by the Nadeem Center, on 16 September in Meet Ghamr, an industrial city in the Delta governorate of Daqahliya, police raided a cafe, known to be frequented by unionized workers. Worker Atef el-Mansi was detained and subsequently tortured to death at the nearest police station.

Meanwhile, many protesters have been subjected to police brutality in clashes, which took place in late No-vember on Qasr al-Aini and Moham-med Mahmoud streets in downtown Cairo. Mohamed Atef, one of the protesters and a 20-year-old univer-sity student, sustained injuries from police beatings at a police station, which resulted in 18 stitches in his head.

The difference between being po-liticized and non-politicized is mani-fested in the form of torture people are subjected to.

Reda Marai, a lawyer at EIPR, claims that while those from poorer backgrounds face extreme forms of torture, victims such as activists who have greater mobilization and litiga-tion capacities, are often tortured in a way that does not leave permanent scars or marks.

Extreme methods of torture such as electrocution, waterboarding and lashing are increasingly replaced with methods such as beating using plastic tubes, urination, or stripping detainees of their clothes.

“The decrease of extreme forms of torture does not mean that the Interior Ministry is reforming,” says

Despite promises, reform does not appear on the horizonMeanwhile, human rights advo-

cates account for the continuation of torture practices by pointing to the failure to purge the security sector.

“Unlike post-Soviet East Germany where the Stasi — the then state se-curity — was purged, we do not see sweeping Interior Ministry reforms taking place in Egypt,” said Moham-med Zaree, researcher at the Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies.

Ahmed Gamal El Din, the cur-rent interior minister, was one of the highest-ranking aides of the Mubarak-era minister, Habib al-Adly, and his current deputy, Major General Khaled Ghoraba, previ-ously served as Alexandria’s security chief. Activists claim Ghoraba was in charge of suppressing major protests prior to the 25 January revolution, notably the labor unrest in Mahalla in 2008.

Despite these setbacks, the current government has, in an unprecedent-ed move, publicly acknowledged the need for reform.

An amendment to the Penal Code in May 2012 penalized any public employee’s instigation or participa-tion in any form of torture with five years’ imprisonment.

However, the amendment was never passed due to the dissolution of Parliament.

Article 126 of the penal code lim-its torture to cases of physical abuse when the victim is “accused,” and when officials engage in torture in order to coerce a confession.

“The definition of torture does not include other forms of torture such as mental or psychological torture,” says Heba Morayef, director of the Middle East and North Africa divi-sion of Human Rights Watch.

“It also does not comply with the Convention Against Torture, of which Egypt is a signatory.”

In July 2012, then Interior Minister, Mohamed Ibrahim, announced the end of service for 454 major generals.

However, Fayyad claims many of these police officers were either transferred to other departments or were about to retire anyway.

Moreover, there is resistance in the ranks of the police to reform, as some insiders attest.

Mohammed Mahfouz, a former officer and currently the assistant coordinator of a pro-Interior Minis-try reform lobby, “Officers but with Honour,” says, “Low-ranking officers now feel their actions are justified, especially as their salaries were in-creased in recent months, and since they can get away with violations without being held accountable.”

“At the end of the day, they benefit from the system so why would they want to change it,” Mahfouz says.

And with no clear political will from the ruling regime to implement reform, there’s little hope. Khatib be-lieves that the relationship between the Interior Ministry and the ruling Muslim Brotherhood government is one of understanding.

“The relationship between them is a cold friendship. As long as one does not interfere with the work of the other, both can co-exist,” he says.

In May, Egyptian human rights NGOs and activists put together a draft on the reform of the police and presented it to members of the Peo-ple’s Assembly, Egypt’s lower house of parliament. However, the initia-tive was stalled following the disso-lution of Parliament in June this year.

On the ground, the fight against torture continues.■

Marai. “Rather, these practices are designed to not be visible in forensic investigations, which are often pur-posely delayed.”

Meanwhile, those who are for-tunate enough to be released from detainment continue to face great struggles afterwards.

Although tortured in prison, Saleh believes he suffered most after be-ing released. “I was traumatized and I also lost my job at an electrical cable company. My reputation was destroyed and, therefore, I was no longer fit to be hired,” he says.

Accountability remains absentAnother victim of police brutality,

Protesters have been subjected to torture.

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Low-income citizens continue to be targeted by police.

8 News 27 December 2012

Labor defiant

By Jano Charbelabor politics remain a thriv-ing form of contentious politics in Egypt through-out 2012, reinvigorated by a Muslim Brotherhood-led

ruling regime that many consider to be less than sympathetic to the labor movement.

On the macro-level, new laws have been a cause for concern for labor ac-tivists. On the ground, the tendency to unionize and strike is upheld. And in the middle, the political adminis-tration fails to show any signs of good management.

The laws don’t pleaseThe election of the Muslim Brother-hood’s Mohamed Morsy as Egypt’s president in June, the appointment of the Brotherhood’s Khaled al-Azhary as minister of manpower in August, the issuing of a presidential decree amending an old trade union law in November, and the passing of the new constitution in a referendum in December have all directly impacted prospects for the country’s labor and union movements.

Since Morsy granted himself sweeping powers with his constitu-tional decree on 22 November, the first decree issued he issued was Law 97/2012. This new decree amended Trade Union Law 35/1976 with provisions allowing the Ministry of Manpower to appoint replacements for the state-controlled Egyptian Trade Union Federation (ETUF) board members over the age of 60.

Furthermore, Morsy’s Law 97 post-poned ETUF elections for another six months, although these elections had already been postponed for a year. Law 97 stipulates that elections could be held before six months if a new trade union law replacing the in-cumbent Law 35 is issued to regulate the ETUF’s elections.

Karam Saber, director of the Land Center for Human Rights, explains that the Brotherhood have scrapped the “Trade Union Liberties” draft law which was finalized in September 2011, and are now drafting their own laws which regulate Egypt’s trade unions and professional syndicates.

Since June of this year, the Interna-tional Labor Organization has threat-ened to blacklist the Egyptian state as a violator of labor rights — once again — for failing to issue a trade union law protecting workers’ right to freely organize.

Meanwhile, the ruling authorities “have failed to establish either a na-tional minimum wage for workers or a maximum wage for administrators,” Saber says.

In April of this year, the People’s Assembly (legislative house of Parlia-ment) set a maximum monthly wage of LE50,000 (US$8,300) stipulating that the cap on wages — importantly, applicable only in public sector enter-prises — should not exceed 35 times the minimum wage. This rate greatly exceeds the common demand of trade unions and workers for a maxi-mum wage of not more than 15 times the minimum.

In October 2011, Egypt’s Cabi-net and National Council for Wages agreed to establish a unified mini-mum wage of LE700 per month ($116.) However, this rate has not yet been enforced in either the public or private sectors. This minimum wage is around half of that demanded by unions and labor organizers – which have been calling for either LE 1,200

or LE1,500 ($200-250) per month.With the passing of Egypt’s new

constitution, drafted primarily by Islamist forces, labor activists have expressed dismay regarding Article 14, which ties wages to production — as opposed to rising prices and inflation. Reservations have also been expressed regarding constitu-tional articles 63 and 70, which allow for certain sorts of forced labor and child labor (respectively) to be regu-lated by law. Furthermore, Article 53 stipulates that there can only be one syndicate per profession – intended as a blow to the growing independent union movement.

“Whenever unjust labor laws have been issued, Egypt’s workers have stood up against them and actively resisted them,” independent union-organizer Fatma Ramadan says. “The constitutional articles which violate labor and union rights will be chal-lenged and confronted.”

“If there is enough resistance against these laws the state will either back down, or it will not be able to enforce its interventionist legislation upon workers.”

Unionizing continuesIndependent union structures, like the Egyptian Federation of Indepen-dent Trade Unions (EFITU) and the

Egyptian Democratic Labor Con-gress (EDLC) — both of which were established in early 2011 — have grown exponentially, with thousands of new members and hundreds of new unions being established.

These two independent union structures claim to share a mem-bership of over 2.5 million workers among them. Yet the state controlled ETUF — established in 1957 — re-mains the largest union structure, claiming a membership of 4.5 mil-lion.

“Regardless of the Brotherhood’s increasingly right wing tendencies, workers are still organizing their in-dependent unions and federations,” explained Saber.

Unions for fishermen, artisans, and farmers which were established last year have grown significantly this year, according to Saber.

Moreover, previously non-orga-nized workforces including police-men, domestic workers, street ven-dors and garbage collectors have established their new unions in 2012; there are even efforts at unionizing the unemployed.

In addition to this, in mid-October the EFITU and EDLC sought to merge their unions into one unified structure. These two union struc-

tures are also coordinating their ef-forts with a host of opposition par-ties coming together as the National Front for the Defense of Labor Rights and Union Liberties.

Meanwhile, both Ramadan and Saber accuse the Morsy regime of at-tempting to “Brotherhood-ize” the trade union movement – particularly the ETUF – via the Ministry of Man-power.

Since September of this year a num-ber of ETUF board members have called for a unified front between this state-controlled union and the independent unions, to stand-up to Azhary’s alleged attempts at “Broth-erhoodizing” the union movement.

Protests persistWhile the exact number of industrial actions is still being tallied, estimates suggest that well over 150 strikes were reported in 2012, along with more than 2,000 labor protests and sit-ins in governorates across Egypt. Nearly one million workers and employees are reported to have em-barked on industrial actions this year.

“These strikes and protests con-tinue to take place, almost on a daily basis, because workers’ most basic demands have still not been met in the year 2012,” said Ramadan.

This year thousands of workers continued to demand their rights by protesting outside Parliament and

the Cabinet as well as outside the Ministry of Manpower. In July of this year, an unprecedented development took place with thousands of angry workers taking their protests to the Ettehadiya Presidential Palace.

Despite the issuing of a law crimi-nalizing strikes and protests in April 2011, industrial actions abound. Rul-ing authorities have reiterated that strikes have resulted in Egypt incur-ring tens of millions of pounds of lost revenue.

“Yet striking workers and profes-sionals have launched their industrial actions with the aim of eradicating corruption within their workplaces, and improving public services,” tex-tile union organizer Hesham al-Oql comments.

Oql expresses concern, however, “about the divisions and schisms which we have witnessed among the ranks of strikers this year. If these strikes continue to be divided then their impact will be far less effective.”

According to Saber, “The Brother-hood has generally dismissed labor protests and strikes as being narrow sector-based demands. Time and time again they’ve told Egypt’s work-ers that now is not the time for labor strikes or protests, insisting instead that it is time to push the wheel of production.”

The Muslim Brotherhood’s Has-san al-Brince declared that workers’ protests and sit-ins outside the presi-dential palace are being organized by “counter-revolutionary forces” that “aim to topple Morsy,” by giving “the impression that the president is un-able to resolve their problems.”

Another Brotherhood member, Sabry Amer, referred to the Public Transportation Authority strike as “an act of treason.”

Since the 25 January revolution, an estimated 300 unionists have been “punitively sacked” from their jobs for organizing unions and/or strikes, according to Ramadan.

“Ruling authorities have failed to prevent the punitive sackings of elected unionists. These sackings of unionists by private employers, and by state officials in the public sector, constitute blatant violations of the International Labor Organization’s conventions, which the Egyptian state has ratified,” added Saber.

According to Ramadan, “tens of workers and unionists have been re-ferred to the prosecution this year merely for exercising their right to strike.”

In August, police shot dead an un-employed worker demanding work at an Alexandria power plant, while a string of security crackdowns dur-ing the month of September targeted striking petroleum workers, protest-ing teachers, and tree-planting work-ers.

Government measures are not be-lieved to be detrimental to the labor movement, however.

With dwindling economic resourc-es through which the old regime used to partially appease labor agitation, questions loom around how much and for how long the current Broth-erhood regime can afford political restrictions.

“Egypt’s workers have confronted restrictions on the right to strike with hundreds of strikes, just as they con-fronted restrictions on independent unions and syndicates by establish-ing hundreds of these organizations nationwide,” says Saber.

“Egypt’s labor struggle will con-tinue.”■

Labor movement thrives in the midst of unfriendly legislation

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■ Sukari Gold Mine — March 2012■ Ceramica Cleopatra Com-pany — March 2012■ Mahalla’s Misr Spinning and Weaving Company — July 2012■ Public Transport Authority buses — September 2012■ Teachers — September 2012■ Doctors — October-De-cember 2012■ DP World Port in Ain Sokh-na — October 2012■ Cairo Airport — October 2012■ Metro workers — Novem-ber 2012■ Judges and prosecutors — November 2012 — ongoing■ The Eastern Company for Tobacco — December 2012

A year of strikes

■ Enforcement of adequate minimum and maximum wages■ Full-time contracts for full-time work■ Improved working condi-tions■ Legalizing the right to strike■ The right to establish in-dependent trade unions

With common demands

In different forms■ Work stoppages■ Slow-down strikes■ Hunger strikes■ Blocking roads and rail-roads■ Marches■ Rallies■ Sit-ins, sleep-ins■ Human chains■ Boss-nappings■ Public protests in under-wear (as undertaken by disgruntled workers from the Nile Cotton Ginning Company)

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The year has seen a plethora of industrial actions.

If there is enough resistance against these laws the state will either back down, or it will not be able to enforce its interventionist legislation upon workers

9Economy27 December 2012

Egypt’s economy will face tougher obstacles in 2013

The light at the end of the tunnel or so it seemed was the promise of a free and fair election culminating with a democratically elected president who would steer the economy back on track

While less volatile, the more gradual devaluation will still result in higher inflation and rising food prices amid the enduring economic slowdown creating few jobs and leadingto rising unemployment

More bumps to come

By Amira Salah-Ahmedalk of economic recovery has all but gone silent in Egypt, replaced by doomsday predictions about the depths to which the country’s dire

conditions will spiral.While the foundations for a robust economy

still exist, gross mismanagement continues to add stress to the country’s ailing finances and widening budget deficit. Much like in 2011, the economic turbulence of 2012 mirrored lapses in Egypt’s political transition, and the scenario is likely to carry on well into the com-ing year.

When asked about the main factor hindering recovery this past year, and which will contin-ue to plague the economy moving forward, five experts cited shortcomings in top-level policy formulation, decision-making and the frailty of the political structure.

Answers ranged from the “volatile domestic political environment” to lack of leadership and vision, the “absence of the state” and, of course, the current state of polarization which is unlikely to be letting up anytime soon.

Angus Blair, founder of The Signet Institute, a Cairo-based think-tank on MENA econo-mies, says, “I do not expect the political ‘noise’ to dampen any time soon given the clear po-larization in society, politically, and the slower economy has created further economic prob-lems.”

“The government’s economic plan is going to have to be more creative and brave to build domestic confidence and economic growth,” he adds.

Uncertainty loomed over the market and dented investor confidence in the months fol-lowing the 25 January uprising, and was fur-ther dampened under the rule of the military council and the prolonged transition process. The light at the end of the tunnel — or so it seemed — was the promise of a free and fair election culminating with a democratically elected president who would steer the econo-my back on track.

What has happened instead is that this un-certainty has gone from hovering threateningly above the economic stratosphere to taking root, and in turn, has struck the core of the state’s finances.

Wael Ziada, head of research at regional in-vestment bank EFG-Hermes, says the key in the coming year will be “reducing the budget deficit and trying to prevent a case of a sharp and disorderly devaluation [of the pound],” adding that the government must move quick-ly to meet rising local demand for energy and restructure subsidies.

Egypt’s budget deficit increased to LE80.7 billion ($13 billion) during the first five months of the current fiscal year 2012/13, increasing by an additional 37 percent since President Mohamed Morsy took office.

As a result of “poor and misguided measures and actions,” says Karim Helal, investment banking adviser and chairman of the Asean-Egypt Business Association, the coming year will see Egypt dealing with a “monstrous bud-get and fiscal deficit, dwindling reserves, infla-tionary pressure, pressure on the pound and its implications, deteriorating credit rating, inevi-table and long overdue hard to swallow pills in terms of economic reforms, and near zero for-eign direct investment.”

Foreign reserves have dwindled by more than half since January 2011, reaching US$15.035 billion, highly compromising the state’s ability to import vital food and petroleum products. In the past two years, the central bank has burned through around $20 billion to prop up the Egyptian pound, which has lost more than 5 percent of its value, recently hitting an eight-year low and last trading at 6.17 to the US dollar.

While facing criticism by some for not let-ting the pound fall to its real rate and main-taining instead the level of foreign reserves, the central bank’s policy has been lauded by others for saving the pound from a dramatic and sud-

den devaluation.It’s fair to argue that the strategy was ini-

tially a short-term measure, without realizing how long the state of political paralysis would continue to affect on the economy. In 2012, the government then resorted to relying on funds from Qatar to replenish foreign reserves. An expert recently said further support is an-ticipated from Turkey as well as the African Development Bank. That is yet another highly unsustainable short-term strategy, further in-creasing Egypt’s debts.

While less volatile, the more gradual devalu-ation will still result in higher inflation and ris-ing food prices amid the enduring economic slowdown creating few jobs and leading to ris-ing unemployment.

The exponentially deepening funding crisis is made worse by Standard & Poor’s recent cut of Egypt’s long-term sovereign rating to ‘B-’ from ‘B’, making it more costly to borrow.

“The negative outlook reflects our view that a further downgrade is possible if a significant worsening of the domestic political situation results in a sharp deterioration of economic indicators,” S&P said.

Further compounding the situation is the decision to postpone the final approval on the $4.8 billion International Monetary Fund loan.

While contentious in and of itself among rights groups and activists, many economists say at this point, there are few other options.

In a recent note on Egypt, Capital Econom-ics says, “Without an IMF deal (or financing assistance from the Gulf), Egypt could be tipped into a full-blown balance of payments crisis. This would see the pound collapse, bond yields surge and output slump.”

Much of the financing promised to Egypt is contingent on the IMF loan, which was set for 19 December, but delayed in the midst of political turbulence in the aftermath of Morsy’s November constitutional declaration.

The IMF has called on Egypt to curb energy subsidies, make modifications to taxes and has advised that it allow “the currency to move in line with market forces — while avoiding ex-cessive short-term volatility.”

But a batch of new taxes introduced incon-spicuously during the period in which Morsy’s decisions were immune from judicial review,

were swiftly suspended when they faced a harsh backlash the moment they were publi-cized.

The taxes will be implemented however, and the suspension was a temporary political ma-neuver.

Still, the move highlighted the inability of the president and the government to remain steadfast in their decisions. Whether or not these decisions and retractions are prudent is an afterthought; what’s become apparent is the lack of broad support for the president as well as the government’s inability to put together a solid economic program.

It was months before the Cabinet could come up with a clear economic program for Egypt. When it was finally made public in No-vember after being presented to the IMF del-egation, the program was criticized for bear-ing a stark resemblance to the one of Hosni Mubarak’s “reform” Cabinet.

On a more optimistic note, Alaa Ezz, secre-tary general of Egypt’s Federation of Indus-tries, says political unrest may ease after par-liamentary elections in the first quarter of the year, adding that “subject to the conclusion of the IMF agreement, and a highly necessary dialogue and consensus on major issues, it is expected that our [credit] rating will improve and investments will start flowing back, as well as tourism.”

But the proper environment that would bring back tourism and foreign direct invest-ment brings us back to the issue at hand: the failure of the state to guarantee security and make decisions that would build investor con-fidence.

After recovering slightly in 2012, tourism numbers began falling again in November when violent protests pitted supporters and opponents of Morsy against one other.

Christmas is typically a high season for tour-ists, but this year cancellations abound. This in addition to findings of a recent study released by the Tourism Ministry showing that the sec-tor has been losing $267 million a week since the onset of the 25 January uprising, leading to layoffs and revenue losses.

Cairo tourism had not been able to rebound throughout the transition, but in 2012, even areas that had been considered calmer and far from any direct action were hit first by a wave of kidnappings in Sinai then by a string of at-tacks on security premises in Arish.

If and until the president and government can sustain security in the area, there’s little reason for tourists to return — the sector can-not stand to be ignored much longer, and like Egypt’s economy, must be protected from bouts of political instability.

Capital Economics describes the situation eloquently: “Egypt’s post-revolution transition continues to be bumpy…and for every two steps forward the country seems to take one back. This looks set to continue for much of the next year.”

Going forward, what Blair recommends, is for Egypt to cut corporate tax by 2 percent and create incentives that would bring small and medium enterprises into the formal sector, among other measures.

All agreed that Egypt’s economic conditions need to be communicated openly and honestly with citizens in order to reach a level of con-sensus on the measures that need to be taken.

Moreover, Blair says the state needs to “fun-damentally tackle hydrocarbon subsidies [and] start an agricultural revolution, also using in-vestment incentives, to encourage industrial farming, hydroponics, and efficient water use.”

As well as investing in mass public transport and better roads, “the government still has enormous work to do to cut bureaucracy,” he adds.

Helal agrees, and adds that “infrastructure and mega projects are a priority, requiring massive investments which will trickle down fast…and create employment on a much need-ed large scale.”

Ezz, similarly, says the economic question needs to be thrust to the forefront. “The budget deficit has to be tackled through tax reforms (direct and indirect),” and the state’s expenses must be rationalized, with subsidies as a prior-ity.

“In all conditions, international commit-ments must be respected, otherwise, we are moving back by decades.”■

Tourism is expected to pick up only when security is restored.

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10 Economy27 December 2012

By Sherif ZaazaaIn the context of an increasingly intertwined global economy, when trying to predict what the year ahead has in store, it has become vi-tal to factor in all variables of change, ventur-ing beyond the parameters of local and even regional markets.

The US subprime mortgage crisis, as a case in point, created a tornado-like domino ef-fect of economic crises worldwide.

Most recently and closer to home, the Euro zone slump has taken a toll on Egypt’s for-eign reserves, resulting in a drop in tourism and exports from some of the markets on which the country heavily relies. The same connection may be attributed to a fall in global trade and Suez Canal receipts.

While this linkage is more direct, there are more subtle connections that impact region-al economies, including, for example, recent droughts in Russia and the US, which have pushed up the global price of grains, a trend likely to coincide with higher inflation as lo-cal food prices increase.

On the flipside, recovery in the US and Euro zone would serve to boost Egypt’s ailing economy through increased foreign direct investment, trade and tourism, all of which could replenish the country’s dimin-ished foreign reserves. In the broader spec-trum, the Bank of Japan’s purchase of Euro bonds is set to aid the Euro recovery, as will a jump in the US supply of oil production.

Taking all these factors into consideration and tying them together, three global fi-nance houses recently released their outlook on 2013 in an attempt to foresee potential

trends and possible setbacks. Deutsche Bank, Goldman Sachs and Mor-

gan Stanley made an assortment of predic-tions — some seem reasonable, while other extrapolations verge uncomfortably close to the edge of reason.

1. Global growthGrowth will be weak in early 2013 with in-creased fiscal restraint in the economies of the US and Europe. Euro risks, particularly those of Spain and Italy, should ease in the second half of the year as the output gap be-tween potential and actual GDP tightens, reported Goldman Sachs.

The scenario may apply to countries of the “Arab Spring,” as they gather some of the steam that was lost over the past two years.

The global price of energy is expected to grad-ually drop as supply increases, while demand is subdued. The loosening of energy supplies will push growth in the second half of 2013.

2. Interest ratesInterest rates should remain low in the world’s largest markets as they press on to spur economic growth. The Federal Reserve

will proceed with its quan-titative eas-ing program (QE3), by pur-chasing bonds as it takes as-sets from banks to supply them

with cash. The European Central Bank, which held

its main interest rate at 0.75 percent, will conduct similar private asset purchases. The Bank has said it was ready to buy bonds of debt-strained governments, such as Spain and Italy, once they had signed on to a Euro-pean bailout program.

While the Bank of England’s monetary policy committee voted against pumping further funds into the economy, putting the brakes on its £375 billion QE stock, it main-tained interest rates at a record low of 0.5 percent as the country’s economy lingers in weak growth, halving its forecast in 2013 to just 1 percent.

3. The Euro areaWhile the divergence in growth between

the Euro area core — no-tably Ger-many — and the periphery — notably Spain — is set to continue, further pol-icy progress

should enable growth throughout the zone with incremental gains in Euro area assets, reports Goldman.

Although Spanish economic risks and Ital-ian political risks intensified this year, the absence of fresh stresses should amount to a reasonable rate of growth in both countries. Both were able to complete their 2012 debt funding requirements through successful auctions in the ECB’s bond-buying scheme.

4. Emerging marketsEmerging markets will see growth accelerate in 2013, but less so than developed markets.

The upside potential to growth may be limited by over-heating of the economy, causing inflationary pressures to limit expan-sion. Higher prices may cause a shift towards monetary policy tightening and dampening economic growth, Goldman reported.

“Inflationary pressure and a potential shift towards tightening could come earlier than the market expects in places,” it said.

Responses to inflation and current account imbalances will likely differ among emerging markets in 2013; while some may underes-timate the price hikes, others may overesti-mate the scope for easing.

Morgan Stanley anticipates that emerging markets’ dependence for growth on exports and foreign investment may falter if the de-veloped world continues to suffer, stressing the need for “structural reforms to ensure sustainable growth for years to come.”

5. Commodity constraintsUS energy supply will gradually loosen global oil constraint, says Goldman Sachs, and markets are expected to return to a more stable position.

“The ability to bring in new supply into US$80-90 [per barrel] range is rapidly in-creasing. The relaxation of the energy supply constraint globally reduces one major ob-stacle to global recovery as we look to above-trend global growth into 2014 and beyond,” the report adds.

6. Bank of Japan Up for heated debate currently is whether the Bank of Japan will make a more con-

vincing shift toward eas-ing. The Bank stepped up its monetary eas-ing program from 91 tril-lion yen to 101 trillion yen by

buying more Treasury discount bills and

Japanese government bonds. The Central Bank has kept its policy rate at virtually zero since 2008, while adopting the asset-buying program in 2010, which currently stands at 27 percent of GDP, the largest among developed countries.

In conjunction with its dovish outlook, the BoJ will buy euro bonds in an attempt to de-value the yen against the euro until it “effec-tively becomes a lender of last resort for the euro area,” said Morgan Stanley in its report.

7. China powerhouse Chinese growth will be stable next year at a rate of just above 8 percent, according to Goldman Sachs, allaying concern spurred after the country recently released reports that indicated slowing growth.

While Goldman does not see much of a rebound from China, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development disagrees, expecting China’s economy to accelerate briskly over the next two years.

Morgan Stanley, however, says heavy re-strictions on lending may trigger a liquidity trap and credit defaults crippling China, and in turn, global economic recovery.

8. Climate change and inflationDeutsche Bank foresees accelerated ef-fects of climate change possibly impacting financial markets and currencies directly.

If the droughts in the US, Russia and Brazil contin-ues into next year, the effect on global food prices will be severe.

One of the consequences may be pressure on central banks to tighten policies. “Natural disasters such as typhoons and hurricanes can have significant negative impacts on GDP and may weigh on economic recovery.”

Inflation can be a direct result of drought, Morgan Stanley says, but can also result from stronger-than-expected recoveries from the world’s economic powerhouses China and the US, as well as central bank balance sheets.

9. Bank deposits If more central banks were to follow those of Denmark and Switzerland, Deutsche Bank remarks, financial investments would sky-rocket as banks adopt negative deposit rates, while at the same time avoiding excessive currency appreciation.

“With China widely seen as cheap, and [euro] periphery risks dissipating, 2013 could be another year where every major eq-uity market is up, aided and abetted by nega-tive rates,” the bank says.

10. Over the cliff? Chief US Economist Vincent Reinhart pre-dicts the fiscal cliff deal to get pushed into 2013, but an ultimate compromise will re-

invigorate con-fidence, says Morgan Stan-ley.

The debt ceil-ing resolution in July 2011 pushed the S&P 500 up-

wards, while boosting business investments and job market improvements. As mortgage rates remain low and lending conditions loosen, Goldman anticipates US housing ac-tivity to continue increasing.

“US domestic banks could benefit further from a gradual normalization of housing credit finance if home prices continue to drift higher,” it says.■

Market movers10 projections on the global economy

11World27 December 2012

The Egyptianopposition falsely imagines that there is a deal between the United States and the Muslim Brotherhood. In fact, America wants to know who it should deal with

Reassurances and doubts

By Mohammad Adam

Many would expect that, as an organization ascending to power from political isolation, the Mus-lim Brotherhood would engage in a foreign policy spree of weaving new relations with both old and new partners.

Idealists would certainly expect that, as an organization coming to power following a popular revo-lution, the Muslim Brotherhood would enact radical changes to foreign policy.

But in practice, neither expecta-tion has been met.

For some analysts, Egypt’s en-trenched global relations are too intricate to be undone, tied as they are to questions of regional secu-rity. For others, domestic unrest, coming in multiple forms and from various sources, poses an im-pediment to Egypt’s development of an astute and creative foreign policy.

Initial gestures to deepen rela-tions with non-traditional part-ners (since taking office President Mohamed Morsy has visited Afri-ca twice and China once) suggest-ed that the Brotherhood would take Egyptian foreign policy in new directions. But many observ-ers agree, all in all, that over the last six months the Muslim Broth-erhood has reproduced Mubarak-era policies, and that it will con-tinue to do so in the year to come. Despite this continuity, Egypt’s allies are adapting to the country’s new leadership in different ways.

The GulfA strong bond ties Egypt to the Gulf, based on both being coun-terbalances to Iran’s perceived Shia expansion in the region. Yet the configuration of political Islam in Egypt, in the form of Muslim Brotherhood rule, remains dis-concerting for some Gulf players.

Sultan al-Qassemi, a columnist on Gulf affairs, argues that the Gulf states, save Qatar, are concerned with the Egyptian Brotherhood’s choices and extent to which it will support regional Brotherhood off-shoots in Jordan, Yemen and Syria.

For example, the United Arab Emirates is expected to put al-leged affiliates of an unauthor-ized Muslim Brotherhood cell on trial in 2013. “How their Egyptian counterparts react will determine relations between Abu Dhabi and Cairo for years to come,” Qassemi says.

IsraelMorsy’s successful brokering of a truce between Israel and Gaza following November’s attack on the Strip was a relief to those con-cerned about the new Islamist leadership’s antagonistic rhetoric. Banking on the organic ties be-tween the Muslim Brotherhood and the militant Hamas govern-ment in Gaza, Israel may believe that Egypt’s new leadership will be an even more efficient security

falsely imagines that there is a deal between the United States and the Muslim Brotherhood. In fact, America wants to know who it should deal with,” Mi-chael Hanna, a fellow at the New York-based Century Foundation, argues. “Even if it prefers to deal with a secular opposition, it made mistakes in the past in not dealing with Islamists, and so now it is try-ing to work with them.”

Traditional interests will con-tinue to define the Egypt-US rela-tionship, with regional security at the top of the list.

“I expect relations between Egypt and the US to continue to be driven by the principle that in politics, there are no permanent friends, only permanent interests,” says Elijah Zarwan, an analyst with the European Council on Foreign Relations.

“So long as certain conditions are met, the US foreign policy establishment seems willing to

contracter than the Mubarak re-gime.

But the truce leaves the right-wing Israeli government con-cerned about the state of the peace accords and the perceived rise in threats from militants in the neighboring Sinai Peninsula.

Despite the truce, Iman Hamdy, a professor of political science at the American University in Cairo, believes that the most Egypt can do for Gaza is provide moral sup-port, as it did during the latest Israeli attack, and open its border with Egypt.

The United StatesThe US appears to be waiting to see how events in Egypt unfold, considering the unknown con-sequences of the passage of the constitution and upcoming par-liamentary elections. For now, the state of bilateral relations remains confused.

“The Egyptian opposition

Erdogan has taken interest in Egypt since the revolution and has repeatedly offered assistance when needed.

Egypt’s foreign policy won’t change, but its leadership is being put to testback whichever side they think will win, which for the moment remains the elected government,” he continues.

But Hanna contends that while America respects the results of the ballot box, this doesn’t mean that it is pursuing the same policies it practiced with the Mubarak re-gime, whereby it closed its eyes to repression of the opposition Mus-lim Brotherhood in return for con-crete foreign policy concessions. “[The US] knows the Egyptian people will not close their eyes to repression,” Hanna says.

Similarly, Zarwan argues, “I don’t know if the Brotherhood is fully aware of the problems that await it from the US Congress...they may confuse the Obama ad-ministration with Washington.”

TurkeyEgyptian-Turkish relations have seen the first signs of rapproche-ment. Turkish Prime Minister Re-cep Erdogan took a positive stance towards the Egyptian revolution, and Turkey repeatedly offered assistance to Egypt, in what sev-eral Turkish scholars describe as a quest to deepen Turkey’s position and influence in the region.

Meanwhile, Turkey’s Justice and Development Party serves as a source of inspiration for Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood in the way that it is a religious party — vari-ously described as moderate and modern — that has deployed its control gradually over the coun-try, as well as cultivated produc-tive foreign relations.

Mostafa al-Labbad, director of Al-Sharq Center for Regional and Strategic Studies in Cairo, says that while there is no fundamental change in Egypt’s policy toward Israel and the United States, and no serious reconciliation with Iran, the one clear change might be the consolidation of links with Turkey.

But while the warming of Egyp-tian-Turkish relations may seem to be a win-win for both parties, Hanna sees major ideological differences between the Justice and Development Party and the Brotherhood’s Freedom and Jus-tice Party.

“Religion plays virtually no role in political and social life in Tur-key, while religion is everywhere in Egyptian society. Erdogan’s par-ty and the Muslim Brotherhood are different,” Hanna says.

Indeed, Erdogan’s statements during a recent visit to Cairo that secularism is the most appropri-ate form of government attracted stinging criticism from the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafi groups.

Given these obstacles, develop-ments in bilateral economic rela-tions are more likely, particularly given the expanded regional role that Turkey seeks to play and its expressed support for Islamist movements.■

This piece was translatedfrom Arabic by Sarah Carr.

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12 The year in fiction27 December 2012

By Sarah Carr, Mohamad Adam and Omar Halawa

tanding on a wooden ladder, Rayes Morsy hammered the last nail into the new sign above the “Mooto be Gheizkom”1 co�eehouse, formerly known as “�e Pharoahs.”

A gentleman with an impressive full head of silver hair stepped out of the black Mercedes he had bought a�er 35 years of work-

ing in Libya. �e end notes of “Watany Habeeby Watany Al Akbar”2 �oated out of the car, competing for space in the ether

with an overpowering smell of a�ershave.“From the le� to the right we love you ya Hamdeen,” a young

woman shouted, eliciting a dirty look from Rayes Morsy on top of his ladder.

Hamdeen approached the cafe and looked up the ladder, at Morsy’s posterior.

“What exactly is going on here? Who gave you permission to change the name of the co�eehouse?” Hamdeen shouted.

�e enormous silhoue�e of Ma’alim3 Khairat appeared in the cof-feehouse’s doorway, a cigar in his mouth, his thumbs hooked on the braces holding up the huge expanse of his trouser waistband

as “Al Kebeer Kebeer”4 played on the radio behind him.“Salamu Aleikum Hamdeen. We bought this place with our

money and everyone in the alley is behind us except you and your gang. You can put your envy where the sun doesn’t shine.

Let us do our job in the cafe and the group. We know what’s best for the people.”

“What are you on about, Khairat? Who said that everyone in the alley is behind you? You be�er change your tune before we

get angry and teach you and your friends a lesson,” Hamdeen shouted.

Khairat laughed the laugh of a man with numerous successful business investments including a supermarket, a women’s acces-sory line and now a café, and then retreated back inside the cafe.

Still up his ladder Morsy appealed to Hamdeen below.“Hamdeen…let’s solve this through love. Give me a hug.”

With a disgusted look, Hamdeen withdrew to his second �oor apartment, the one with the giant picture of Nasser on the front

door.Nahda Alley, situated a few kilometers from Ramsis in down-

town Cairo has been host to numerous ba�les over the decades. Two years ago, however, all its residents decided to form a co-

operative to repair houses and provide jobs for the alley’s young people. �ey opened a cafe and called it “�e Pharoahs,” created

a kiosk selling cigare�es, and invested in a �ock of sheep.Uncle Naguib contributed to the cooperative fund through the

pro�ts of the television and satellite shop he opened in the alley.�e alley’s residents worked for 18 days. �ere was generally a high spirit, ruined only by Hag Tantawy who had been chosen

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13The year in fiction27 December 2012

by the residents to manage the cooperative for six months but, together with his pensioner friends, became increasingly posses-sive over it. �e alley’s young people were increasingly critical of Hag Tantawy, and clashes between the alley’s young people and Hag Tantawy’s extended family became a common occurrence.A�er months of rivalry, Ma’alim Khairat decided to do a deal with Hag Tantawy and it was agreed that Khairat would take over the cooperative fund from him in return for giving him a monthly stipend. Khairat never actually paid this stipend. Hag Tantawy put on his galabeya and retreated to his �at and was rarely seen a�er Khairat threatened that his men would beat him up if he complained or even appeared in public on Nahda Alley.Hamdeen and fellow alley resident Professor ElBaradei, a retired university lecturer specialized in the study of Egyptian dark tunnels, grew more and more agitated about Ma’alim Khairat’s domination of the cafe and �ock of sheep. �ey responded by taking over the cigare�es kiosk. Uncle Naguib and his television shop joined them and the two sides became increasingly more polarized.Rumors started spreading in the alley. �e most serious of these was started by Bakkar, the muezzin who one Friday declared via the mosque’s microphone that Professor ElBaradei and Ham-deen have never in their life prayed and that they “look like devil worshippers.”�e rumors put �re in the chest of Ma’alim Hazem, the alley’s butcher, known for his strong disapproval of the non-devout.He sent the young men who work in his shop to surround Uncle Naguib’s television shop because the television sets spread obscenity in the alley. During this protest a �re was started in the cigare�es kiosk. Everyone suspected that Hazem’s men were involved in it.During a meeting in “Mooto be Gheizkom,” Hazem denied any

connection with the protest outside Uncle Naguib’s shop and said that at the time of the �re he was doing an errand near the

Wafd Party headquarters.ElBaradei and Hamdeen a�racted the support of some of the alley’s youth, prompting accusations from Rayes Morsy that ElBaradei was paying them to spread destruction in the alley.Talks were arranged, moderated by Sheikh Gheriany. It was agreed that Khairat would keep the co�ee shop and the �ock of sheep in return for Hazem’s men keeping away from Uncle Naguib’s shop.Hamdeen and ElBaradei expressed doubts about the agree-ment because they hadn’t actually been invited to the meeting: Mohamed El-Sawy, head of the Youth Club, had volunteered to represent their side without anyone asking him to.Hamdeen and ElBaradei contacted Madame Tahany, who has a law o�ce in the alley, to �nd a legal means of ge�ing the agree-ment cancelled.�e next day Madame Tahany’s o�ce was entirely surrounded by Hazem’s employees.■

14 Opinion27 December 2012

Blood ballotsA world turnedupside down

Victories and betrayals By Adel Iskandar

en days before the March 2011 constitutional referen-dum, hundreds of soldiers went on a rampage in Tahrir Square, tearing up protesters’ tents, arresting dozens, and torturing them on the premises of the Egyptian Muse-um. Protesters were opposing the military’s monopoly of

power, the continued presence of old regime figures and the hasty patch-up of the constitution. Blood was spilled and no one was prosecuted.

Four days before the parliamentary elections, 47 protesters were killed, dozens lost an eye, and thousands were injured at the hands of the security forces on Mohamed Mahmoud Street. Pro-testers were rallying against the police attack on martyrs’ families and other demonstrators in Tahrir Square and the rush to parlia-mentary elections under military rule. Blood was spilled and no one was prosecuted.

Six days before the constitution went to vote, eight people were declared dead and tens severely injured following a violent attack by supporters of the president on protesters camping in front of the Ettehadiya Palace. Protesters were at the presidential palace to challenge President Mohamed Morsy’s constitutional declara-tion that rendered him omnipotent and his speedy push to put the Islamist constitution to referendum. Blood was spilled and no one was prosecuted.

With the country polarized like no time in its recent history, the parliamentary elections commencing in two months will likely be preceded by more waves of violence between two camps, both claiming to speak for the revolution.

Since the toppling of Hosni Mubarak, an intractable relation-ship between blood and ballots has been forged. Elections are held in the name of this blood. Politicians advocate on behalf of this blood. Brotherhoods and parties procure voters on the grounds of honoring this blood. Clerics speak of sacrificing more of this blood. And government officials claim reforms are neces-sary to avoid adding to this blood.

As the second anniversary of the revolution nears, those who sacrificed to make it happen are no closer to ruling than they were when it started. Nevertheless, everyone speaks for the revolution, shouts its now commodifed slogans, and contorts its principles. The political status quo — both the Muslim Brotherhood and the state apparatus — are sending a clear message to Egyptians: Blood spilled in the streets can only be redeemed in the ballot box. The blood that made their ascendency possible has now been reduced to symbolic ink stains on the voters’ fingers.

“That which is gained by the ballot box can only be lost in the ballot box.” But what of that which was lost in the streets, in the minds, in the hearts, in the souls? With every passing day, we dis-cover the growing gulf between the revolution’s aspirations and the plans of those who claim to speak for it. The masses, increasingly disenchanted by an empty political process, are participating in de-clining numbers in one vote after the other. Voters and non-voters alike realize the country’s future is a battle between two minorities — one idealistic and revolutionary and the other political and op-portunist. One donates blood and the other reaps it.

With the Egyptian calendar now filled with bloodied com-memorations, it would be wise for all to heed the lesson of the past two years: ballots do not blot blood.■

Adel Iskandar is a media scholar and lecturer at Georgetown University.

By Sarah Carr

hile I was outside a polling station covering the referen-dum, waiting to bother voters, a man sidled over to me.

“See that man over there?” he whispered conspirato-rially, pointing at a middle-aged man entering the poll-ing station who was in no way remarkable other than for

the Afghani style hat he was wearing. “El balad bazet” (the country has been ruined),” he declared be-

fore floating away without any further explanation.In Sharqiya, Muslim Brotherhood headquarters had been the ob-

ject of an arson attack during anti-Brotherhood protests. On our way to another Brotherhood office, the bawwab enquired as to who we were. My colleague joked, “Don’t worry; we’re just going to set fire to the office and leave right away.”

“Do you need a lighter?” the bawwab replied, deadpan, not miss-ing a beat.

My merry friend greeted a security guard who voted “yes” in the referendum with, “kharabto el balad” (you’ve destroyed the coun-try); an expression that in 2011 was the favorite refrain of the anti-revolution camp.

A man sitting next to the security guard riposted with, “so you’re feloul!”, using the term commonly used to refer to the remnants of the Mubarak regime.

For me, this repositioning of political groups has been the most disconcerting aspect of 2012. Mohamed Morsy made a constitu-tional declaration in November and a compass moved and suddenly what was north became south and the familiar landscape of the last 30 years got turned on its head.

The Brotherhood, through their stupidity and political avarice, have departed from the moral gray zone they inhabited as Mubarak’s mercurial opposition and are busy using up the people’s benefit of the doubt through decisions that out-Mubarak.

Fellow gray-zoners in Salafi movements express their discontent by mobilizing against their bugbears.

Both groups use the same techniques employed throughout the revolution, but tend to go the extra mile by bussing people to pro-tests and building semi-permanent toilets.

The group loosely referred to as feloul — which includes people who felt at best lukewarm about the revolution and voted for Ahmed Shafiq in the presidential elections — have taken to their battle stations now that The Beards Are Coming, and have proven to be the big surprise of 2012.

The lefty liberal neoliberal opposition movement(s) meanwhile plod onwards, at their best when united by a common figure of hate whose surname begins with M. But they are seemingly unable to harness any of the fragile spirit of their tenacious street protests and turn it into something robust with nationwide appeal — at least if we interpret the 64 percent “yes” in the constitutional referendum as the extent to which the voting populace endorses the Brotherhood or isn’t convinced by its opposition.

The army is finally back in its barracks, having managed the tran-sitional period in what is regarded as a diabolical fashion, but there are voices clamoring for a military intervention against Islamist rule.

Even Tawfik Okasha, enfant terrible of television who spent his entire life up to 23 December 2012 on the wrong side of history, has been semi-rehabilitated and his famous 13-13-13 prediction that the Masonic plot against Egypt will come to fruition in 2013 coincides nicely with the Brotherhood’s tightened grip on power.

There are constants, however. Conspiracy theories are still as popular as ever and remain particularly useful to leaders under fire as an alternative to public self-criticism and acknowledgement of fault. The media continues to be targeted by censorship poorly disguised as litigation. Healthy men die in police stations, children are crushed by trains and decades of negligence, people are just as poor and life goes on.■

Sarah Carr is a journalist with Egypt Independent and blogger.

By Dina El Khawaga

he second year after the breakout of the 25 January up-rising has been characterized by mixed developments and confused assessments.

The great hope in mobilizing the masses is accompa-nied with deep frustration in bringing about immediate

change, and in moving forward on the road to a genuine demo-cratic transformation.

This general feeling stems from what we have seen in the past year: several nominal achievements in the name of democratic transition, but no real response to popular demands or change in people’s day-to-day lives.

At the political level, exclusion and marginalization are still the rule of the game. The parliamentary elections produced a parlia-ment incapable of moving towards realizing the demands of the revolution. The presidential elections forced an unprepared pub-lic to pick between equally bitter options.

Then came a constitutional declaration that pushed the military institution out of politics, but gave it legal protection and immunized it against accountability. Another constitutional declaration hysterically polarized the Egyptian society like never before. And so, the year ends with a spate of violent incidents and non-party affiliated actors were even more ignored in political debates and negotiations.

But this general mixed feeling is also the natural result of what the revolutionary powers have done on the ground.

The first year of the revolution saw the breakout of spontane-ous micro-revolutions here and there, but the second year saw social demands for “bread, freedom and social justice” take root, particularly in light of increasing marginalization and suppres-sion. Professional strikes and sit-ins were organized and sponta-neous social movements grew, but failed to score any lasting legal or political victory.

Citizens engaged in fierce confrontations with security forces in informally built and poorer areas. Intimidation of protest leaders who have an ability to mobilize crowds took on various forms, and the same obsolete authoritarian discourse, accusing the crowds of collusion and treason, was employed by the new rulers.

To sum up: During the second year, the two parties to the con-flict scored simultaneous points, in different areas.

The fresh alliance between the military, the Brotherhood, Salaf-is and the deep state completed the nominal transition to de-mocracy as dictated by savvy transitologists, major powers, inter-national monetary institutions and neighbors who fear the hot winds of change will sweep across the region.

Meanwhile, the fledgling powers managed to expand and sus-tain the scope of protests, mobilize crowds and dig roots for the revolution amongst professional syndicates, labor, university and social sectors as well as groups that were not ready for all-out re-sistance in the first year.

A review of the past year cannot predict developments in the coming phase. There are signs of a victory for the revolution, just as there are for its being crushed under the heels of the powers

seeking to contain it. It is a year where the social revolution was betrayed by the “wise calls for sta-bility” and the need to overcome the economic crisis, as neoliberal economics in its global, re-gional and local versions dictates. It is also a year where the political transition was finalized, even though it was pure window dressing and did not even achieve a little of what the citizens hoped for.

And so, year three will be instrumental and eventually tough for all parties.■

Dina El Khawaga is a professor in Cairo Univer-sity’s Faculty of Economics and Political Science, and

programs director at the Arab Reform Initiative in Paris.

TTW

What the word “Jika” could possibly mean By Lina Attalah

uring the painful Ettihadiya battle ear-lier this month between Brotherhood supporters and youthful opposition, the violence was not just physical. The

scene was also a battlefield of chants. My friend drew my attention to this exchange. We chanted, “horriya” (freedom). They responded, “Sharia.” Then we uttered, “Jika.”

Then they fell into a temporary silence, bedaz-zled and confused about what the word “Jika” could possibly mean.

Those fighting on the side of authority hadn’t realized that a week earlier, we had marched in the funeral of Jika, a 16-year old activist shot in the head during the street fighting with police that ensued at the commemoration of the 2011 Mohamed Mahmoud battle. The funeral march, as burdensome and somber as it was, lent us strength every time we screamed, “Jika, Jika, oh

boy, your blood will liberate a nation.”At different points throughout the last two

years, many of us experienced profound mo-ments of defeat. Perhaps defeat is inevitable af-ter the glorious moment of erupting en masse in streets and squares only to topple a dictator 18 days later. What comes after is at best con-fusing, and in its worst form, defeating to many who strived for an idealized form of government following an idealized revolution.

But beyond the euphoria of the 18 days, I ar-gue that change, real change, has been unfolding afterwards, over the last two years.

For one, the notion of authority is incurring a profound change in our collective imaginary. Irrelevant to what shape it has come in — mili-tarized or Islamized — authority establishing itself on a pre-revolutionary logic of claiming control through the soft discourse of paternity is proving to be less easy.

The last two years have served as a laboratory

for two different attires of authority, albeit tradi-tional and conservative in form. Initial results of the experiment have shown that neither military prowess, often synonymized with the stability of the state, nor the religious legitimacy of a group once in the ranks of dissidents, are enough to reproduce old regime practices today. In two years, the authority has been mocked, ridiculed and insulted in every possible way. This is an in-dex of how the relationship between citizen and state is shifting, in a change mainly engineered by the masses, and which the authority does not appear to grasp.

And so the opposition’s nature is also changing in nuance. Its current configuration represents an interesting illustration of that change. The re-jection of the Islamist regime is not necessarily born from an essentialist rejection of Islamists as a political class defined through the language of identity. The rejection is constructed around what this regime is doing and not what it is.

True, there is much that the pro-democracy movement is lacking in the way of tactics, dis-course and more; but there is comfort in finding that, in most cases, its essence is one of chal-lenging the notions of fanaticism and division, and restaging the battlefield on the grounds of rights and inclusion.

These observations escape the language we already master. They are indeed beyond the lim-ited comprehension of democracy as imagined and constructed in the western world and trans-lated into simple relics like the ballot box.

With the changing notion of authority and the evolving nature of the opposition — with the in-ception of the Egyptian revolution by and large — comes a new political language that we have yet to decode fully, but which we’re living every-day. Its traces lie in keywords like “Jika.”■

Lina Attalah is editor-in-chief of Egypt Independent.

D

15Opinion27 December 2012

The poison in Egypt’s political life

The fog of the analytical class

By Paul Sedra

As year two of the revolution comes to a close, one can scarce-ly escape the conclusion in media circles that Egypt is polar-ized. Without question, the result of the referendum has left countless Egyptians, not least the revolutionaries who were the motive force behind the Tahrir sit-in from 25 January 2011 onward, deeply disappointed and cynical about the country’s purported transition to democracy.

But I would insist, among those who are eager to forget year two of the revolution after the trauma of the referendum, that this is a year worth celebrating.

Indeed, in year two, Egyptians witnessed the end of the mili-tary dictatorship that had, for 60 years prior, dominated politi-cal life in the country. This was one of the principal demands of the revolutionaries, and with the election of a civilian presi-dent, this critically important demand was finally realized.

In the revolutionary camp, there is an altogether under-standable reticence about celebrating the end of military rule. Egyptians remain largely in the dark about how exactly the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces withdrew — or was withdrawn — from executive authority. The lack of clarity on this point leads to legitimate questions about a possible ‘understanding’ or ‘deal’ between the civilian and military authorities. Further, that the Constituent Assembly has made the military essentially exempt from civilian oversight likewise raises the ire of those who wanted a transparent accounting of the military’s economic empire, to say nothing of account-ability for the crimes committed by SCAF during the junta’s time in power.

As much as I accept these caveats, I nevertheless view the end of the military dictatorship as a milestone. Indeed, the military may well still play a role in governance behind the scenes, but that Egypt has a civilian president matters a great deal. Year two saw the aura that had surrounded the military fi-nally shattered. The fractures began to emerge in year one, not least with the Maspero massacre; but the persistent failures of the SCAF leadership, and the Sinai debacle of August 2012 that saw the killing of Egyptian soldiers irreparably battered whatever goodwill Egyptians had retained toward the military from the days of the revolution.

As a historian of modern Egypt, I cannot help but regard the military’s return to the barracks as an unqualified good. Simply put, military rule was poisonous to Egypt’s political life. For even if one concedes that the military has always had the best intentions for Egypt, the fact remains that military organizations have little tolerance for discussion, debate, and deliberation.

Nasser’s military solution to the ‘problem’ of politics was the Arab Socialist Union, through which he sought to conceal control with a facade of participation. For their part, the fol-lowing presidents Sadat and Mubarak found that emergency rule afforded them the “efficiency” of military justice in the ci-vilian realm. When in power, military rulers cannot suddenly rid themselves of the martial ethos of control and contain-ment that has hitherto guided their actions.

No doubt Egypt still faces a long struggle to ensure civilian rule is preserved and military prerogatives are curtailed. But year two saw the first tangible victory in that struggle.■

Paul Sedra is an associate professor of historyat Simon Fraser University in British Columbia, Canada.

By Sharif S. Elmusa

hen asked last September about a title for a talk I was to give at Yale University, where I am currently a Fellow at the MacMillan Center, I suggested “The Fog of Revolution in Egypt.” I

spoke about three types of fog — the fog of the analytical class, of the political players and of the future.

My concern, here, is the fog of the analytical class. No expert had predicted the Egyptian revolution, not to mention the entire upheaval engulfing the Arab region. Popular revolutions were few and far between in history, it was maintained, and we just had one in Iran. The region itself was exceptional, others held, and authoritarianism was deep-rooted in the mind and culture of the people. Even after the Tunisian revolution, it was said that Egypt, unlike Tunisia, had a strong state, with a robust army and security forces.

Did observers have any inkling as to how the Armed Forces would react in the case that there was a popular revolt? Did analysts fathom that the judiciary would play such a key role in the shaping of subsequent events? Had scholars of Islamist politics foreseen that Salafis would emerge as a main political force? Even after Mohamed Morsy became president, pundits surmised that he would be a pliant tool in the hands of the military, only to soon see the two top army chiefs sent into gentle retirement.

How did this happen? Did Morsy or the junior officers end the generals’ service? Or was it the SCAF and not the president that was really shaky? How did the weak Morsy suddenly appear as a pharaoh?

Even today, the analytical class is divided about the nature of what happened in the 18 days that ended the Mubarak era. Some insist that it is not a revolution, but a “spring” or an “uprising.”

And with the constitution passed, no one seems to know what lurks behind the closed doors of the future. Serious instability or civil war? A military coup? Islamist dictatorship? Gradual building of a pluralist political sys-tem?

My point when I gave the talk was to warn my audience to keep a critical eye on what they read and hear. The oc-currence and pathways of revolutions are hard to predict; it is equally difficult to determine which course of action to advocate in order to give your ideas and the interests dear to you a chance to prevail. Much will be known in retrospect, if ever; historians still discover new things and disagree about past revolutions.

My point is not to discourage analysis or understand-ing; it is only a plea for intellectual humility and against dogmatism while in the middle of great social upheaval.

It may all be foggy, but one thing is clear: The 25 Janu-ary revolution has unleashed a new spirit among the people of Egypt against inequality and tyranny, a spirit I suspect will not be easy to suppress.■

Sharif S. Elmusa is a Palestinian poet and professorof political science at the American University in Cairo. He is

currently a fellow at the MacMillan Center at Yale University.

W

What about Egyptian democracy?

By Mohamed Muslehne night, a Lebanese friend, a professor who emigrat-ed to France, told me of his longing for his homeland, blaming his departure on the sectarian quota system which does not guarantee him a proper status at

home. An Iraqi friend carried on from there, sarcastically elabo-rating on the “progressive” state of democracy in his country.

I do not have a Pakistani friend, but I am aware of some of the developments there.

All these are supposed democracies. So what about Egyptian democracy?

Egypt does not seem to be on the right track at all. It’s been two years since the breakout of the revolution, but very few, if any, of its goals have been realized.

The goal of the revolution was not to enable people to go to the polls, with each outcome of a vote sparking political wars of varying intensity. That was not the democracy we meant.

The key slogan of the revolution was “bread, freedom and so-cial justice.” Yet none of these goals has materialized. Worse still, we do not even seem close.

The past year has revealed the fragility of the political course undertaken over the past two years and uncovered a frightening political void, the result of a decades-long lack of public engage-ment. It also uncovered the lack of wisdom on the part of most political actors, particularly the Islamist current with its authori-tative and monopolistic tendencies.

For the first time since the breakout of the revolution, both state and society were in the line of fire. The traditional trust between the political leadership and the state bureaucracy has been absent and the decision-maker seemed confused.

In the second year after the revolution, the state has been almost absent from political interactions. Society was left to address its fears on its own. It was forced, for the first time in modern history, to look at its reflection in the mirror and see its identity — and class-related contradictions — and to reclaim full responsibility for the unprecedented events rocking the country.

Perhaps for all those reasons, society seemed disappointed, confused and rebellious.

To be sure, however, society is also better aware and more pre-pared to bear responsibilities that political authority deprived it of in the past.

The second year may have given several answers, most of which may have not been happy or revolutionary, but it has also raised dozens of fresh questions. So is the third year going to give answers?

Is the new political leadership going to show greater wisdom? Is the revolutionary camp going to force itself onto the political scene? Is the revolution going to defeat dogma? Is it going to penetrate marginalized and poor areas? Is the society going to face the problems of identity and authoritativeness?

More importantly, is the new political leadership going to be able to solve socio-economic problems, both old and new? Maybe.

The answers to these questions are lost between guesswork and hope.

Whatever the outcomes, in the third year of the revolution, liberation and social empowerment will continue and taboos and restrictions will continue to be broken. The revolution’s fresh motto calling for bread, freedom and justice will live on.

And whatever the answers, the revolution will continue.■

Mohamed Musleh is an Egyptian writer and researcher.This article was translated from Arabic by Dina Zafer.

O

16 Environment27 December 2012

Food securityvs foodsovereignty

Mineral bottled water vs tap water

Urban encroachment vs agricultural land

A year of environmental ups and downs By Louise Sarant

2012 has had its share of environmental ups and downs — though as expected, a few more downs than ups. Nevertheless,

in the interest of New Year’s celebrations, these two pages look not only at the contradictions and challenges of the past year, but also present new green initiatives that have proven their me�le, and ability to inspire a greener tomorrow for Egypt.

Dozens of partipants threw seed balls in downtown Cairo during the ‘Bozoor Baladi’ campaign.

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Economic policy in Egypt is entrenched in the goal of food security, de�ned by the World Health Organization as ensuring that “all people at all times have access to su�cient, safe, nutri-tious food to maintain a healthy and active life.”

�e problem with the notion of food security, according to Reem Saad, a professor of social an-thropology at the American University in Cairo, is that it relies simply on there being enough to feed people. Food sovereignty, in contrast to se-curity, “emphasizes not only the quantity of food but the quality, and the work of the peasants who produce it.”

Food sovereignty is a concept coined by mem-bers of the international coalition “Via Campe-sina,” which groups over 148 organizations that advocate for family farm-based sustainable ag-riculture. At the center of the food sovereignty framework is the right of people to create food and agricultural systems according to their needs, rather than the needs of the global market.

Two recent campaigns point to Egyptians’ concern for realizing the goal of food sovereignty and not just food security.

�e ‘Bozoor Baladi’ (Seeds from my country) campaign was launched in October by organiza-tions such as Nawaya, Greenpeace, 350.org and Nabta to advocate for mainstreaming the use of local, organic seeds instead of the hybrid or ge-netically modi�ed seeds imported from Europe and the United States. Not only are these import-ed seeds expensive, but they necessitate huge amounts of fertilizers and pesticides to adapt to a new type of soil, climate and pests. �ese im-ported seeds also compete with native plants, thus contributing to their gradual disappearance.

Spanish artist Asuncion Molinos developed an art project revolving around the concept of food sovereignty with the opening of a temporary res-taurant in the neighborhood of Ard al-Lewa. ‘Al Matam el Mish-Masry’ (the non-Egyptian res-taurant) served food made of the highest quality fruits and vegetables grown in Egypt, which are mostly exported and thus not accessible to 90 percent of the population. Conceived as more than a restaurant, the idea was that it become a space for people of the neighborhood and vis-iting art a�cionados to discuss issues related to food.

Molinos believes that only a grassroots move-ment, in which farmers, researchers and univer-sity professors are all involved, can e�ectively de-fend the right to decent food and farmers’ rights to a be�er standard of living. Molinos says that Egypt should grow healthy, nutritious food for its population, and sell the excess produce on the international market.■

�is past summer, two water-related crises hit Egypt hard during Ramadan: on the one hand, seven brands of local bo�led water were taken o� the market overnight a�er tests revealed the presence of a parasite. Al-pha, Hadir, Seway, Aqua Delta, Tiba Aqua Mina and Aqua Soteir’s production lines were closed down, considerably reducing the availability of bo�led water for consum-ers at a time of high demand.

�ough Nestle group is Egypt’s largest bo�led water company, controlling about 50 percent of the market through its two brands, Nestle Pure and Baraka, it was un-

able to meet the spike in demand. Ahmed Shaaban, vice president of the Na-

tional Research Center and a water special-ist, explains that the cause of the presence of the parasite in well water, and then in bo�led water, was pollution from nearby sources of wastewater discharges from septic tanks and agricultural waste water.

�e other crisis hit the residents of Sansa�, a village in Monu�ya Governorate, which su�ered an epidemic of severely con-taminated local water supplies that a�icted thousands.

“Monu�ya has the worse waste manage-

ment infrastructure in all of Egypt,” Mo-hamed Fathy, a plant pathologist at the Uni-versity of Monu�ya, states ma�er-of-factly. He explains that almost 90 percent of the governorate’s villages do not have access to proper infrastructure.

Despite the contamination of tap water in Monu�ya Governorate, Shaaban says peo-ple living in major cities can consume tap water, where the infrastructure is in much be�er shape than in more rural areas.

“But no one in the Delta should drink tap water,” he says. “�e derelict state of the in-frastructure makes it too risky.”■

Egypt’s viable agricultural land is limited to the fertile Delta and the narrow banks of the Nile. �is area, only 4 percent of Egypt’s territory, is also where over 90 percent of the population resides, posing a constant con�ict between housing and agriculture.

More than 400 cases of illegal building on land designated for agricultural use took place since the revolution, damaging 16,000 acres of valuable agricultural land, according to a report produced by the Agriculture Ministry. Other �gures estimate that urban-ization damages between 16,000 and 20,000 acres of viable ag-ricultural land every year. It is estimated that up to 30 percent of the country’s good soil is now buried under urban development. Several of Cairo’s most highly urbanized neighborhoods were farmlands just two decades ago.

�e encroachment on agricultural land is tied to Egypt’s challenge of growing enough food to sustain its population. One of the largest consumers of bread

internationally, Egypt imports 40 percent of the wheat it con-sumes from Russia, the US and

Europe. As the Delta and Nile valley regions continue to urbanize, cut-

ting into usable farmland, some believe that �nding ways to make desert farming sustainable is becoming increasingly important. One proposal involves giving farmers plots of land between 2.5 and 5 feddans — much larger than the average plot in the Delta, as desert land is far less productive than rich, Nile-side soil.

Richard Tutwiler, director of the Desert Development Center at the American University in Cairo (AUC), says that farming on desert land poses an exciting new frontier, where people are �nd-ing innovative ways to to be�er incomes.

Not everyone is convinced by the future of desert agriculture, however. For Habib Ayeb, a professor at AUC’s Social Research Center, this practice is a costly and temporary solution.

“Even with enough water, soil and seeds, small plots are rarely pro�table, and most families rely on a second source of income.” For him, desert farming is pro�table only for the already wealthy, who can a�ord to set up large farms exporting luxury crops to Europe.■

Food securityvs foodsovereigntyEconomic policy in Egypt is entrenched in the goal of food security, de�ned by the World Health Organization as ensuring that “all people at all times have access to su�cient, safe, nutri-tious food to maintain a healthy and active life.”

�e problem with the notion of food security, according to Reem Saad, a professor of social an-thropology at the American University in Cairo, is that it relies simply on there being enough to feed people. Food sovereignty, in contrast to se-curity, “emphasizes not only the quantity of food but the quality, and the work of the peasants who produce it.”

Food sovereignty is a concept coined by mem-bers of the international coalition “Via Campe-sina,” which groups over 148 organizations that advocate for family farm-based sustainable ag-riculture. At the center of the food sovereignty framework is the right of people to create food and agricultural systems according to their needs, rather than the needs of the global market.

Two recent campaigns point to Egyptians’ concern for realizing the goal of food sovereignty and not just food security.

�e ‘Bozoor Baladi’ (Seeds from my country) campaign was launched in October by organiza-tions such as Nawaya, Greenpeace, 350.org and Nabta to advocate for mainstreaming the use of local, organic seeds instead of the hybrid or ge-netically modi�ed seeds imported from Europe and the United States. Not only are these import-ed seeds expensive, but they necessitate huge amounts of fertilizers and pesticides to adapt to a new type of soil, climate and pests. �ese im-ported seeds also compete with native plants, thus contributing to their gradual disappearance.

Spanish artist Asuncion Molinos developed an art project revolving around the concept of food sovereignty with the opening of a temporary res-taurant in the neighborhood of Ard al-Lewa. ‘Al Matam el Mish-Masry’ (the non-Egyptian res-taurant) served food made of the highest quality fruits and vegetables grown in Egypt, which are mostly exported and thus not accessible to 90 percent of the population. Conceived as more than a restaurant, the idea was that it become a space for people of the neighborhood and vis-iting art a�cionados to discuss issues related to food.

Molinos believes that only a grassroots move-ment, in which farmers, researchers and univer-sity professors are all involved, can e�ectively de-fend the right to decent food and farmers’ rights to a be�er standard of living. Molinos says that Egypt should grow healthy, nutritious food for its population, and sell the excess produce on the international market.■

17Environment27 December 2012

Egypt Independent picks the 3 best green initiatives

awaya (intention, seed or nucleus in Ara-bic) is an initiative launched by a team of young “green” Egyptians — Sarah al-Sayed, Adam Molyneux-Berry and Laura Tabet —

who are proponents of sustainable agriculture to co-create self-reliant, bottom-up and resilient rural communities in Egypt.

Co-creation, the Nawaya team believes, occurs when they work in partnership with communities in order to determine local needs. Their working ap-proach has three steps: community participation in program design, education and training, and hands-on prototyping.

Convinced that we learn best when physically en-gaged, throughout the year Nawaya has organized several compost workshops with farmers and city dwellers alike, as well as workshops on sustainable design.

They have also initiated a campaign to throw seed balls — a mix of clay, compost and seeds — all over Cairo to boost food production in urban spaces.

Their plans for the next year include organizing courses on biological water filtration, natural pest and disease control for crops, water and energy suf-ficiency, animal and crop rotation systems and natu-ral buildings.

To address the issue of climate change, two renowned environmentalists, Lama El Hatow (IndyAct, Water Insti-tute of the Nile) and Sarah Rifaat (350.org), created the National Coalition on Climate Change for Egypt.

�e coalition brought together a diverse range of biogas experts, sanitation specialists, green energy students, anti-nuclear campaigners, Nile river researchers, hydroponics developers, urban planners, bike a�cionados and coral reef conservationists.

In its �rst meeting, the group discussed how climate change relates to the issues of urban planning, agriculture, biodiversity, energy, community development, water san-itation and public transportation, then outlined priorities for each theme.

Determined to act as a citizen platform that creates campaigns to raise awareness on climate change issues, the coalition had a second meeting in December to re�ne its goals.

Egypt’s share of emissions may be small when com-pared to developed countries (0.59 percent of global emissions), but climbing temperatures, rising sea levels, the decreasing availability of fertile soil and water evapo-ration have already taken a toll on Egypt’s economic, in-dustrial and agricultural sectors. Still in its early days, the coalition has its work cut out.

he Nile Project was founded in August 2011 by Egyptian ethnomusicologist Mina Girgis and Ethiopian-American singer Me-klit Hadero.

They hope to create an intercultural dialogue be-tween the peoples of the Nile Basin countries using an innovative approach that combines music, edu-cation and an enterprise platform. Aswan will wit-ness the Nile Project’s first event in January, when participants will have the opportunity to see the river in a new light, and not simply as a waterway.

Girgis explains that the Nile is a living organism that holds together a complex network of interrelat-ed ecosystems on which tilapias, egrets, crocodiles and papyrus are as dependent as humans for their survival.

“I really think the project will provide a good plat-form for cultivating the critical connections neces-sary to create a new reality with our environment,” Girgis adds, “and an opportunity to think together and take a leap into a more sustainable Nile future.”

The Nile Project is also an invitation to work together to understand the Nile as one system in which fishing, irrigation, tourism and transport are intricately connected to climate change, floods, droughts and dams.

Nawaya The National Coalition on Climate Change

The Nile Project

2012’s best conservationist: Usama GhazaliUsama Ghazali was the head ranger of Geb-el Elba National Park for 10 years, since he graduated from South Valley University’s faculty of science in 2000. The 32-year-old’s task of protecting the immense Gebel Elba National Park, which spans 4 percent of Egypt’s territory, has been deeply diffi-cult.

The 35,600-square-meter national park stretches from 50 kilometers north of Shalateen all the way south to the Sudanese border and includes dozens of islands that sprinkle its 250-kilometer-long maritime coast. It extends westward roughly 100 ki-lometers into the Eastern Desert.

Gebel Elba’s various ecosystems host a thriving biodiversity, with 458 plant species that include acacias, moringas and dragon trees; 86 different corals; 104 fish spe-cies; 60 resident birds, including vultures, eagles and falcons; 26 mammals, including gazelles, Barbary sheep and ibexes; and 38

reptile and amphibian species that account for 35 percent of Egypt’s herpetofauna (rep-tiles and amphibians of a particular region).

After persistent lobbying from conserva-tionists and scientists, Gelba Elba was de-clared a national park in 1986. Since then, it has received little attention or interest from the Ministry of Environment.

Ghazali, who earlier this year won a con-servation prize for his work to preserve the park, says that to this day Gebel Elba’s only infrastructure is a visitors’ center at the park entrance, while the annual budget allocated to park management and rangers does not exceed a few thousand pounds.

“We only have three cars to survey 35,600 square kilometers. This is absolutely insuf-ficient. Budgets for parks should be allocat-ed by taking into consideration the wealth of flora and fauna, and evaluating the re-sources needed for each park.”

The conservation award Ghazali received

Usama Ghazali

will open a window for Egyptian rangers and conservationists to become members of the International Rangers’ Federation as well as the World Commission on Pro-tected Areas, which is administered by the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN).

“Egyptian rangers and conservationists will now have access to professional coun-sel and training from the international com-munity,” said Ghazali. “This status also puts Gebel Elba [and all of Egypt’s protector-ates] on the international map, which will lead to improved financial support in the future to develop Egypt’s parks.”

Although Ghazali stepped down as head ranger of Gebel Elba, he continues work-ing in conservation as a part of the NGO Nature Conservation Egypt. He hopes to form an independent body that will man-age Egypt’s national parks and establish an Egyptian rangers association.■

awaya (intention, seed or nucleus in Ara-bic) is an initiative launched by a team of young “green” Egyptians — Sarah al-Sayed, Adam Molyneux-Berry and Laura Tabet —

who are proponents of sustainable agriculture to co-create self-reliant, bottom-up and resilient rural communities in Egypt.

Co-creation, the Nawaya team believes, occurs when they work in partnership with communities in order to determine local needs. Their working ap-proach has three steps: community participation in program design, education and training, and hands-on prototyping.

Convinced that we learn best when physically en-gaged, throughout the year Nawaya has organized several compost workshops with farmers and city dwellers alike, as well as workshops on sustainable design.

They have also initiated a campaign to throw seed balls — a mix of clay, compost and seeds — all over Cairo to boost food production in urban spaces.

Their plans for the next year include organizing courses on biological water filtration, natural pest and disease control for crops, water and energy suf-ficiency, animal and crop rotation systems and natu-ral buildings.

NawayaNawaya

To address the issue of climate change, two renowned environmentalists, Lama El Hatow (IndyAct, Water Insti-To address the issue of climate change, two renowned environmentalists, Lama El Hatow (IndyAct, Water Insti-To address the issue of climate change, two renowned

tute of the Nile) and Sarah Rifaat (350.org), created the environmentalists, Lama El Hatow (IndyAct, Water Insti-tute of the Nile) and Sarah Rifaat (350.org), created the environmentalists, Lama El Hatow (IndyAct, Water Insti-

National Coalition on Climate Change for Egypt.�e coalition brought together a diverse range of biogas

experts, sanitation specialists, green energy students, anti-nuclear campaigners, Nile river researchers, hydroponics developers, urban planners, bike a�cionados and coral reef conservationists.

In its �rst meeting, the group discussed how climate change relates to the issues of urban planning, agriculture, biodiversity, energy, community development, water san-itation and public transportation, then outlined priorities for each theme.

Determined to act as a citizen platform that creates campaigns to raise awareness on climate change issues, the coalition had a second meeting in December to re�ne its goals.

Egypt’s share of emissions may be small when com-pared to developed countries (0.59 percent of global

Egypt’s share of emissions may be small when com-pared to developed countries (0.59 percent of global

Egypt’s share of emissions may be small when com-

emissions), but climbing temperatures, rising sea levels, pared to developed countries (0.59 percent of global emissions), but climbing temperatures, rising sea levels, pared to developed countries (0.59 percent of global

the decreasing availability of fertile soil and water evapo-ration have already taken a toll on Egypt’s economic, in-dustrial and agricultural sectors. Still in its early days, the coalition has its work cut out.

The National Coalition The National Coalition on Climate Changeon Climate Change he Nile Project was founded in August

2011 by Egyptian ethnomusicologist Mina Girgis and Ethiopian-American singer Me-klit Hadero.

They hope to create an intercultural dialogue be-tween the peoples of the Nile Basin countries using an innovative approach that combines music, edu-cation and an enterprise platform. Aswan will wit-ness the Nile Project’s first event in January, when participants will have the opportunity to see the river in a new light, and not simply as a waterway.

Girgis explains that the Nile is a living organism that holds together a complex network of interrelat-ed ecosystems on which tilapias, egrets, crocodiles and papyrus are as dependent as humans for their survival.

“I really think the project will provide a good plat-form for cultivating the critical connections neces-sary to create a new reality with our environment,” Girgis adds, “and an opportunity to think together and take a leap into a more sustainable Nile future.”

The Nile Project is also an invitation to work together to understand the Nile as one system in which fishing, irrigation, tourism and transport are intricately connected to climate change, floods, droughts and dams.

The Nile ProjectThe Nile Project

N T

On 14 November, 11 falcons were released in the Egyptian desert a�er a captivity at the Giza Zoo that lasted for over a month. In September, 17 falcons were seized at Cairo airport and were transferred to the zoo, which acts as a rescue center. Six of them did not survive captivity.

84 marine turtles were found dead in October in Lake Bardawil, an area on the Mediterranean coast in North Sinai Governorate. A group of scientists are currently running tests to �gure out what caused so many turtles to die in this one location. Although the �nal results have not been disclosed yet, some scientists are convinced that the turtles were poisoned by �shermen who wanted to get rid of the turtles, which eat small �sh. Others blame their death on the pollution, as sea turtles are vulnerable to pollution at all life cycles, from eggs to hatchlings to adults.

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Wildlife: The best and the worst of 2012

18 Culture27 December 2012

Refreshing buzzes of creativity

By Jenifer Evansespite some disappointments and tragedies, this has been an unusually exciting year for contemporary art in Egypt. Signi�cant independent ini-

tiatives that may have seemed unimaginable a couple of years ago have been launched, while some well-established arts organizations upped their game.

In July, two important organizations took over impressive new spaces in Cairo. Medrar for Contemporary Art (founded in 2005), which supports young artists with an em-phasis on new media arts, moved to a large space in a grand building in Garden City. 100Copies, founded as a record label in 2006, launched its live venue and recording studio in an o�ce building o� Talaat Harb Street in downtown Cairo, creating a buzz with at least two concerts per week.

An alternative space for cinema, Ci-matheque, though still being constructed and scheduled to launch o�cially next year, has been hosting regular screening programs for much of 2012. �e venue, housed in two apartments knocked together in an old build-ing on Adly Street, will have an analogue �lm laboratory, viewing stations, and a library as well as its screening room. �ey have plans also to organize training programs over the next year.

An art space with a marvelously slippery

name, Beirut, which has taken over a 1940s villa in Agouza, seemed to open gradually over the second half of the year. Its �rst exhibi-tion, of a series of work by Maryam Jafri called “Global Slum” opened in October. Able to bring foreign artists of international renown to Cairo, it has also hosted a workshop run by

German �lmmaker Harun Farocki and cura-tor Antje Ehmann, and a screening program of Farocki �lms alongside discussions. �e current group exhibition “What does a draw-ing want?” involves talks, screenings and other events — including an artistic intervention in a previous printed edition of this newspaper.

In the atmosphere of �ux and upheaval over the past year, various other smaller art initia-tives emerged. To give two quite di�erent examples in Cairo, a community arts space called 10 Mahmoud Basiouny was set up in downtown at the beginning of the year, while 6 Contemporary Arts, a commercial gal-lery a�ached to an antique store in Zamalek, opened in October.

�e short-lived Table Museum, an artist-run “micro art space” in a �at in Garden City, com-missioned small month-long solo exhibitions from January to August. �e exhibitions were accompanied by discussions. �e space’s un-usual dimensions o�ered artists a challenge, some showing work that was completely dif-ferent from what they usually do, and others showing for the �rst time in Egypt.

Meanwhile, the participants of the second year of the independent study program MASS (founded in Alexandria in 2010) completed the program with a brief group show, and the fruits of the Contemporary Image Collective’s �rst two artist-led mentorship programs were shown in the critically acclaimed “Parenthesis Show” and as part of Photo Cairo 5.

�ough the situation in the country means nobody knows what will happen next, there are rumors that more art spaces will open and major changes will be made to already existing spaces over the next year. It certainly feels like an important moment to be involved in art-making in Egypt.■

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Medrar for Contemporary Art was among the spaces that expanded their operations in 2012.

Many have closely followed the graffiti boom that continues to color the streets of the city. Others have been lured in by the spontaneous creativity of online humor groups like “ASA7BY.” Such initiatves have been directly tied to the political turmoil we’ve experienced over the past year — from celebrations of a sup-posedly ongoing revolution, to presidential decisions made and revoked, to political promises that remain unfulfilled. Refusing to

be subdued by the overriding political situation, many artists, mu-sicians, writers and filmmakers have continued with their creative outpour. New faces, voices and spaces for artistic expression have emerged, and unorthodox approaches broke new ground in 2012. As the year comes to an end, we have handpicked some of the most stimulating works and initiatives of 2012 for you to enjoy during the holidays.

By M. Lynx Qualeyhe judges on the panel of the International Prize for Arabic Fiction have come out with their list of the year’s best Arabic novels. But Egypt Independent wanted to know what prominent regional writers really enjoyed reading in 2012. What books grabbed their a�ention and refused to be put down?

It’s clear that literary produc-tion in post-revolutionary Egypt has slowed, which is normal. �is is particularly the case with the novel, as the world around us is still transforming. It’s also natural that some are trying to ride the wave of increased literary production about the revo-lution. �ese books are, for the most part, wretched and cheap. Among the works that drew my eye this year was Mohammed Rabie’s second novel, “Year of the Dragon.” It is a promising novel, repre-senting a turning point from what was wri�en before the “spring” to what has been wri�en a�er.

From the older generation, I like the novel “House of Fire” by Mahmoud Al-Ward-ani, and I consider it the high point of his literary career.

I have recently �nished reading three ambitious Iraqi novels. �ey all examine the relationship between pow-er and culture and represent an allegory for the role of the novel in Iraqi cultural life.

“�e President’s Gardens” by Muhsin al-Ramli is a novel about three friends living in a northern Iraqi vil-lage. It has strong political themes drawn from Iraqi social history and critically examines power during the Saddam Hussein regime and the era of American occupation, as re�ected in civil strife, unlawful killing, torture and ill treatment, and kidnapping and hostages. It re-�ects, albeit in �ctional guise, on the nature of authority, while also analyzing the eco-nomics and politics of Iraq as a history book might.

Murtadha Gzar in “Mr. Azger Akbar” creates a �ctional story about three granddaughters of a genealogist who have been living near the shrine of Imam Ali in Najaf city since the end of the 19th century. By means of lyrical prose and surrealist events, Gzar reviews the di�erent historical stages of this Iraqi city up until the time of the American occupation. �e novel achieves the same narrative end as that of al-Ramli, portraying power as a composite genre assembled from political and theocratic factors.

“�e Diary of Iraqi Dog,” by Abdul Hadi Sadoun of-fers the reader a more intimate view of Iraqi life. �e dog becomes the protagonist, and the world is o�en seen from his point of view. �e work reminds us of Ka�a’s short story “Investigations of a Dog,” with a focus on Iraqi political and social life. As with many Iraqi novels, it is centered on the role of dictatorship in Iraq.

YasserAbdellatif,Egyptian novelist

Ali Badr, Iraqi novelist

Saudi writer Ashraf Fagih’s “�e Impaler” is the �rst adult horror book I read in Arabic. It is also a mix of horror, fantasy and history, which is another �rst. I was catapulted into a di�erent ancient world from the �rst page. Gone were modern amenities and civilization as a whole. �is is gri�y stu� and it doesn’t apologize for it. I loved the unlikely hero Orhan and the con�icting sides of him. He’s supposed to be educated and as close to a scientist as one would �nd in that day and age, yet he also harbored superstitions and misgivings about new ideas. I was also quite grateful to Fagih for trying to get the reader to see things from di�erent perspectives; too long have we allowed our young gen-eration to think there is only one faith and one way of living.

Noura Noman, Emirati novelist

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Regarding the books I read this year, I can men-tion a very good novel by young Kuwaiti writer Souod al-Sanousi, “Bamboo Stalk.” It is a well-wri�en novel about a young half-Kuwaiti, half-Filipino guy who spent his early years in the Phil-

ippines then went back to his father’s country, Kuwait, to face his destiny in a very racially con-scious society. �e novel draws a very good and detailed picture of both cultures and of the con-tradictions in both of them. I liked it a lot.

“�e Qasr al-Nil Cinema” by Mohamed Farouk is a collection of short stories that mark the emer-gence of a new writer with a playful imagination. Farouk has a tendency to humanize inanimate objects, blending realism and fantasy and comedy and tragedy. He provides the reader with stories that experiment, while still pu�ing things simply and without claim to profound questions.

“�e Phoenix” by Louis Awad is a novel wri�en

in the 1940s, but reprinted this year for the Family Library project. It is a novel about which Taw�q al-Hakim said when he read it in 1965: “If this novel had been published when I wrote, it would have changed the course of the Arabic novel!” Blending realism and fantasy, Awad constructs the atmo-sphere in Cairo a�er the Second World War, focus-ing on the problem of violence in human society.

Ibrahim Farghali, Egyptian novelist

Mansoura Ezz Eldin, Egyptian novelist“�e Impaler”

“�e President’s Gardens”

New arts spaces sprout about

Arab authors pick their fictional favorites

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19Culture27 December 2012

Game changing sounds from the alternative scene

Arabian Knightz‘Sisters’ featuring Shadia Mansour and Isam Bachiri In October, Egypt’s most prominent rap crew, Arabian Knightz, successfully released their debut LP “Uknighted State of Arabia.” In “Sisters,” their direct, raw, and unapolo-getic lyrics, combined with their seamless Arabic and English flow, sets the bar for the local rap game. Since 2006, band members Rush, Sphinx, and E-Money have continued to lead the pack with their keen production, professionalism, sound quality, and down-right good rap music. It also helps that they collaborate with venerable hip-hop produc-ers like FredWreck and members of the Wu-Tang Clan.

Maryam Saleh‘Ana Mesh Baghanny’ (I’m Not Singing)Teetering on the edge of rap music, elec-tronica, Oriental, Arabic trip-hop, and rock, Maryam Saleh is one of the most unique sounds coming out of Egypt today. Her crooning singing style and deep, trebled vo-cals add a distinguishable drama to the tonal-ity of her overall sound. Listening to songs like “Ana Mesh Baghanny,” the emotion in her vocals is reminiscent of Egyptian singers from the golden 1920s, with a twist of mo-dernity resembling M.I.A.

Maii Waleed‘Moga’ (Wave) Maii Waleed and her rare crossbreed of Ara-

bic, indie-dream pop music is truly out of this world. No really, she claims to have a deep fascination with outer space and her ruling planet Neptune, both of which provide her with a great source of inspiration. Her music speaks directly to the freewheeling, stargaz-ing spirit — filled with tales of lonerism, ga-lactic musings, and shaky relationships. With hit indie singles like, “Moga,” Waleed caught the ears of venerated Lebanese music pro-ducer Zeid Hamdan, and together they are releasing her debut EP any day now.

MC Amin‘Al-Thawra Mostamera’ (The Revolution Continues)

While he often collaborates with Arabian Knightz and other rappers or producers from the region, MC Amin, aka “The Gen-eral,” is his most dissenting self in his solo projects. In “al-Thawra Mostamera,” the fourth in his ongoing series of dissident singles, he uniquely combines his notori-ous gangster rap persona with grimy beats,

and his trademark in-your-face yet poetic lyrics.

Wetrobots + Bosaina‘Disco Me’

There’s nothing quite like the magical com-bination of electrifying synthesizers, infec-tious beats, and sardonic lyrics sung by a wild blonde in a cat suit. Bosaina El Kahal and the Wetrobots (producers Ismail Hosny and Hussein El Sherbini) are one of the more invigorating acts to enter the local music scene. Hailing from different musical back-grounds including rock, 90s pop, and French electro, this synth-pop trio is one of the more raucous and captivating musical acts in the country. Their party-anthem, “Disco Me” is pure, audacious energy — it’s certain to intoxicate any listener, particularly on the dance floor.

Dina El Wedidi‘A7eih a7eih’There’s something so powerfully raw about

singer, songwriter Dina El Wedidi. With ele-ments of traditional Arabic music, folk, and spoken-word poetry, Wedidi’s guitar-based music and political lyrics have attracted at-tention both locally and abroad. In 2012, the 24-year old musician was announced winner of the Rolex Mentor and Protégé Arts Initiative, which gave her the opportunity to be mentored by the world famous Brazilian singer, guitarist and political activist, Gilber-to Gil. Her recent track “A7eih a7eih” is full of tension, social observations, and just the right amount of oriental funk.

Oka W Ortega 8%‘Al-Elba al-Thahabiya’ (The Golden Box)Unless you’ve been living under the pyra-mids for the past couple of years, it would be nearly impossible to miss the shaaby electronic-rap craze that’s dominating the musical sound waves in Egypt. Nearly ev-ery passing tok tok, falouka, and car fills the air with that unmistakable trance-like beat, auto-tuned vocals, and dance party synthe-sizers. Musicians Oka and Ortega may not be the pioneers of this new wave of shaaby sounds, but they are succeeding time and again at bettering their production and ex-panding their audience base. One of their slower tracks, “The Golden Song,” allows for a more clear delivery of their rather witty lyrical content and their talent for storytell-ing. When it comes to Egyptian pop music, Oka and Ortega just might be crowned the new kings come 2013.■

In “Coming Forth by Day,” Hala Lotfy overcame common critiques made of “independent” filmmaking.

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Independent filmmaking ‘coming forth by day’ By Mohamed Beshir

At some point during the shooting of “Ein Shams” in 2008, Ibrahim El Batout had a camera rigged on a moving car. Without a shooting permit, he was recording tracking shots of Cairo’s streets, to be used as a backdrop for the film credits. As the car crossed Qasr al-Nil Bridge, the camera came face to face with a police checkpoint, framing three policemen vigilantly waving for the car/camera to pull over; as it does, the frame glides slowly to a stop in front of a blinking yellow street sign. This shot — an example of the spon-taneous rewards filmmakers might get from adopting such a guerrilla approach — struck Batout as the perfect closing shot he could have never planned for.

Four years later, the closing scene of “Winter of Discontent” shares the same location. The key difference is that this time, Batout has a permit to halt the flow of traffic, and the bud-get to have a full film crew execute complicated flying crane move-ments, achieving high-end shots of actors and actresses taking protest-ing poses over the bridge.

Tempting as it may be, comparing the artistic merit of these two scenes is futile. But they still work well as landmarks to visualize the linear pro-gression of the independent cinema scene in Egypt from 2008 to 2012, in terms of production modules and cinematic language.

Another important marker in this timeline is the work of Hala Lotfy, whose debut feature film “Com-ing Forth By Day” premiered at the 2012 Abu Dhabi Film Festival, win-ning the Best Director from the Arab World and the FIPRESCI awards.

Back in 2008, Lotfy and Batout, along with fellow filmmaker Tamer El Said, decided that uniting forces was the only way they could stand up to the commercial cinema in-dustry. Their idea of collaboration developed into the low-budget proj-ect unofficially titled “Backdoor to a Morning,” a self-produced feature film composed of nine segments, with each director writing and di-recting three of them. But the mem-bers of the new front found they agreed more on what they rejected than on an alternative. The film proj-ect sunk soon after Lotfy finished shooting one of her segments, sig-naling the beginning of different routes toward achieving “indepen-dence” in cinema.

In the last four years, two paths have been forged in the attempt to take filmmaking away from the deeply established entity that is mainstream Egyptian cinema. The reform-minded path focused on

presenting alternatives to address certain flaws in the existing system: new actors versus movie stars, docu-mentary style versus artificial stu-dios, and improvisation versus me-ticulous scripts. But this path did not have core issues with mainstream cinema, allowing some filmmakers to make use of established distribu-tion channels and production fa-cilities. Interestingly, this proximity allowed the mainstream to benefit from the freshness of this new scene growing in parallel to it, whether through attracting talents grown in the indie field, or even imitating the low-budget filmmaking model in a period of economic crisis.

The more radical method decided that the conflict with mainstream cinema was about core principles and cut all ties with the existing sys-tem. It put its energy into imagining and realizing a new system of pro-duction and distribution. Consider-ing every aspect of the cinema estab-

lishment to be virulent, proponents of this method insist that establish-ing a real alternative is worth the ef-fort spent, even if the production process is slower and more difficult.

Filmmakers from both camps, however, share the same predica-ment when it comes to financing film projects. They are faced with the natural skepticism toward any-thing new and the callous attitude of television channels and other popu-lar outlets toward alternative culture. While independent filmmakers can do much to reduce their budgets, filmmaking is ultimately a costly practice that cannot practically de-pend on personal funds or crowd-sourcing schemes.

Since Shady Abdel Salam failed in the 1970s in his decade-long project to produce the epic film “Akhenaton” exclusively with sovereign Egyptian money, filmmakers working outside of the commercial field have mostly relied on foreign funding.

Yet concerns over capital’s influ-ence on artwork persist; everyone has an agenda, and this challenges the basis of the “independent” cin-ema movement. In this regard, it is relevant to stop again at Lotfy’s “Coming Forth by Day.”

Lotfy’s approach was self-reflec-tive from the start. She identified her strengths and weaknesses, and exer-cised a meditative process to explore her identity as a filmmaker. This was evident in the film’s cinematic style as well as in her production struc-ture. With most of the scenes occur-ring indoors, and most of these in-door scenes shot in one apartment, Lotfy constructed a safe incubator for her first film. And by renting that apartment on a monthly intead of a daily basis, she minimized the nega-tive impacts in quality that usually come with tight shooting schedules.

The same apartment now hosts the headquarters for her newly-founded production house, Hassala.

2012 thus marked a breakthrough for the Egyptian alternative cinema movement. Lotfy raised the bar for local art house cinema, and Batout took steps, whether deliberate or not, toward creating wider public appeal. Alongside those trends was a surge in the production of short films that confirms the steady in-flux of creativity and talent integral to this independent cinema move-ment.

The result is that the alternative scene is becoming more dynamic, as more filmmakers turn the theo-ries of these two unorthodox pro-duction approaches into practice. For filmmakers and audiences alike, the contrast beteween inde-pendent and maintstream cinema is clearer than ever.■

By Maha ElNabawihere is something to be said for the solace and inspiration found within Egypt’s evolving musical land-scape over the past year. It may not be for everyone; it is certainly not for those who seek the evolved or pristine sounds from the West. Yet the potential and energy of it all is absolutely alluring. Below is a com-pilation of game-changing songs and sounds from Egypt’s 2012 burgeoning alternative music scene.

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20 Life & Society27 December 2012

Engaging young minds

Resolutions for personal revolutions By Nevine El Shabrawy

ith revolutions and resolutions, winter in Egypt has become a time of change and resistance, and as the winter chill rises, Egyptians plan

ahead for 2013. “Resolutions this year are all about the coun-

try,” says Ahmed Ibrahim, 52, a resident of Mo-handiseen. “We’ve got to get ourselves back on track. Each of us is responsible.” For Ibrahim, his top resolution is to get his tourism company back on track by looking at new and interesting ways to entice people to Egypt without putting them in danger.

“Taking initiative,” says Tarek el-Mahdy, 47. “Not only in my life and in my business, I have to go out and make a difference in politics.”

Amira Ali, 35, a yoga instructor in 6th of October, says, “I’m planning to be more un-derstanding.” Despite “believing” in freedom of thought, she has become bitter toward those who think differently in the last year, she ad-mits. “I must free myself of judgment based on

political belief — we all want what’s best for the country.”

“Cleaning up clutter,” Mona Salah, 62, says is her resolution for 2013 — but not just in her home. “We need to clear out clutter and gar-bage in our streets, conditioned clutter in our brains and the useless clutter in our govern-ment.”

“My main resolution is to help the poor,” says Mai Salam, 47. “I finally make enough money to put some on the side and I’d love to get into development.” Salam believes that neither Hos-ni Mubarak nor Mohamed Morsy have focused enough on the large percentage of the popula-tion who cannot find food or clean water. “We need to re-focus our attention — it’s not about what we wear or what we believe in, it’s about a roof over our heads.”

“One of my resolutions is to reconnect with family,” says Mohamed al-Sayed, 32. Sayed be-lieves this resolution can also be applied to a country torn apart by vicious political games. “We all need to reconnect,” he adds, “in our buildings, communities and as a country.”■

Innovative, themed workshops expand children’s horizons

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By Heba Helmy

here has been a notice-able rise in instructional workshops for children in Egypt over recent years,

designed to deepen their intellec-tual, social, emotional and physical skills through engagement in mean-ingful, artistic activities. This year, a widening range of workshops has introduced innovative and themed classes that encourage young peo-ple’s creative exploration.

Adli Rizkallah graffiti courseThe revolutionary graffiti that has sprung up on Cairo’s streets since the 25 January revolution is the main inspiration behind the re-cent launch of Adli Rizkallah Art’s course for teens.

The rise of graffiti since the revo-lution, on the walls of Mohamed Mahmoud Street and across the country, has attracted a lot of atten-tion. Dalia Rizkallah, founder of Adli Rizkallah Art program, argues that street art holds much more than political processes.

“Graffiti helps young participants convey meaningful ideas or messag-es, whether social, environmental or political, through demonstrating their artistic skills,” says Rizkallah.

This course gives students in-depth background in graffiti tech-niques and prominent artists, as well as its history and functions. However, Rizkallah says drawing skills are not a must for participants.

“Some people just write a word, not necessarily a painting, to ex-press themselves. So, it is all about having a sense of art, whether colors or calligraphy font, with which you can create your own piece of art,” Rizkallah explains.

Participants engage in hands-on activities to get acquainted with the concepts of teamwork and coopera-tion. All of the courses — inspired by the work and attitude of late art-ist Adli Rizkallah, Dalia Rizkallah’s father — seek to instill a love for creativityin children.

“Students work in groups to choose the theme they are inter-ested in. Then, each one adds their

own personal touch on the paint-ing,” Rizkallah concludes. This workshop takes place at Diwan bookstore’s Heliopolis branch, Designopolis on the Cairo-Alexan-dria Desert Road and My Gym in Heliopolis.

Big Brain AcademyBig Brain Academy is a center in Egypt that offers all kinds of cog-nitive and educational services for children who struggle with learning to read and processing information.

The 72-day program is based on brain training, which fosters the student’s core ability to develop cognitive skills including memory, attention, sensory processing, and reasoning.

“The brain is a complex network of nerve cells that can respond to learning challenges by engaging in specifically designed exercises so

that the child can accomplish learn-ing or thinking tasks easier and fast-er,” says Maysa Abdal-Latif, founder of BBA.

The intensive program is divided into two types of classes tutored by a certified brain trainer coach. While the first class is based on brain games working on stretch-ing the children’s imagination to

improve the accuracy of recall, the second course provides interesting computer games to build quicker processing.

The program provides one-on-one tutoring classes to cater to the learning challenges of each student.

“The student is the focus of atten-tion in this program. Consequently, the neural development happens so fast that kids see changes for them-selves and experience soaring self-esteem and a huge boost in motiva-tion,” Abdel-Latif says.

Besides cognitive development therapy, all children enrolled in the program also benefit from speech and language therapy, behavior management therapy, and social skills development sessions.

Classes are held daily 6-9 pm, 90 Ahmed Orabi Street in Mohandi-seen.

Teddy TennisAimed at injecting fun into a profes-sional, educational, and challenging tennis experience, Teddy Tennis was born.

Teddy Tennis provides a chance for children to engage in unique sporting activities that integrate music, stories, and illustrations re-volving around teddy bear charac-ters.

Before starting an activity, kids are shown a picture of the tennis skill they are about to learn or a game they are about to play. The trainer then plays the songs that will ac-company the game so that the chil-dren can become familiar with the music and the rhythm. Utilizing the visual and the auditory senses stim-ulates children and enhances their ability to master the movements be-ing taught.

“The teddy bear characters pique children’s interest in the sport and accelerate the learning process,” says Christopher Larter, a British national who brought the Teddy Bear franchise to Egypt last Octo-ber.

“So, after very few sessions, chil-dren can already do both forehands and backhands; it is quite a sight to see a three-year-old hitting solid shots over the net.”

Teddy Tennis is currently offered at the Community Services Associ-ation in Maadi on Fridays. The pro-gram has six levels, each one with 10 sessions, open to children from age two and half to six.

The TreehouseAt the Treehouse workshop, young people practice the basics of the art of folding paper with the pro-fessional expertise of Mohamed al-Sherbiney. The art of origami or paper-folding is used as a tool to teach children how to be accurate, patient and have an artistic eye and a sense of accomplishment by fol-lowing step-by-step instructions to eventually come out with their own achievements.

Children ages 4-15 can attend the two-hour workshop at 3 pm on Fridays in Zamalek’s Sequoia res-taurant.■

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The brain is a complex network of nerve cells that can respond to learning challenges by engaging in specifically designed exercises

Young people at a Rizkallah session learn to express themselves through art.

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21Life & Society27 December 2012

Fashion picks for 2012The fashion we’ll take into the new year

By Nevine El ShabrawyAs the year comes to a a close, winter settles in on our wardrobes, piling over memories of sleeveless tops, warm nights and flip flops. While Cairo struggles through its political crises, young fashion designers have been struggling through their own efforts

to find an identity and bring their designs to the forefront. And Cairo fashion has never been so local — from glasses to bags, shoes and outfits, Cairenes have been looking at Cairo’s design-ers for wardrobe updates. We’ve seen beautiful clothing, jewelry and beauty products throughout 2012, but narrowing it down to our favorite four has been easy.

By Amany Aly Shawky

ith so many restaurants reviewed in 2012, it’s hard to pick our favorites, so we’ve decided to cheat! Here are our top 10 foods from the year from different restaurants and representing dif-

ferent cuisines. More restaurants opened around the city of light and the choice of luscious bites is rocketing.

Liver sandwiches? Rediscover the essence of street food with Ezz al-Menoufy; this humble cart off Dokki Street of-fers the best liver and oriental sausage sandwiches in town. The meaty delights are wonderfully spiced with chili and pepper giving the mini sandwich a zesty tinge. The meat is well cooked and the liver is thinly chopped and done the Alexandrian way, stir fried with green and hot peppers.

Casual fusion. Cocoon Restaurant in Maadi does the best chicken breast with prunes…the strange mixture is simply heavenly. With tender chicken breasts (juicy!) and a brown sauce sweetened with prunes, you’re likely to lick the plate clean. Accompanied by rice cooked with oranges.

Pomegranate sausages. Tamara took the world of Leba-nese food by storm when it opened this year…the Maqanek (oriental sausages) are doused in pomegranate molasses mixed with chili, which creates an incomparable rush of tastes.

Mixed grill. With Turkish soaps on TV and Turkish poli-tics in the news, it’s not surprising that Turkish restaurants have been cropping up left, right and center. Our pick for

favorite koshary ingredients, with the additions of cracked wheat, shrimp in tomato sauce and lentil soup with chicken, you’ve got some very unique koshary options. Don’t forget the fried onion shreds; they are the heart of the dish.

Tex Mex delivery. Gringos — not yet a restaurant, only tdelivery — has taken a bite out of Maadi’s delivery services this year and if it’s not because of the good timing, proper service and yummy food, it’s because of the roast pepper salsa. A concoction that could only come from a chef who is willing to experiment, this condiment has just the right kick of spice and flavor. Dip your chip (or quesadilla) from roast pepper salsa to sour cream to guacamole for a perfect bite.

Yoghurt and cashews. Despite a mediocre review to say the least, the shahi korma at Begum still lingers in our palate memories and we couldn’t leave it out of the mix. Eat the chicken with some pulai rice and wipe the dish clean with garlic butter naan.

Decked out in red velvet. Despite a close battle of cup-cake wars, Crumbs red velvet takes the cake (pun intend-ed). With its sour cream frosting and moist red fluffiness, red velvet lovers were mesmerized. For an over-indulgence of red velvet, order their red velvet layer cake a couple days in advance.

Turkish crowned jewels. The jewel in the food crown this year must be the baklava at Osmanly Restaurant, Kem-pinski. The soft dough is coated with a mildly sweet syrup and layered with generous amounts of buttery paste of pis-tachio. Savor it.■

Best bites of 2012Our reviewer’s top picks

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the best mixed grill in town is the karisik izgara at Anadol downtown. It is not your traditional mixed grill; the meat is tender and the sumac added to the marinade, simply divine.

East meets west. At Wings in Flavors (WIF), the labnah wings simply blew our minds. Although an unconventional mixture — we would have never ordered them if we hadn’t been on a tasting mission — the wings are covered in a generous layer of labna and garlic and the combination is intoxicating.

Contemporary koshary. The koshary bar at Cairo Kitch-en is one of the best additions to the town’s delicious menu palette this year. Not only can you pick and choose your

Foot scrub by Nefertari

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Silah al-Tilmeez t-shirt by FC Studio for Zafir

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Whether it’s using khayameya tent fabric for designs, putting Egypt-loving designs on the front of T-shirts, Egyptian designers have been expressing Egyptian pride through many of their designs. Azza Fahmy featured her “Rumuz” line with Egyptian folkloric symbols, Hiba el-Awadi made plastic bracelets with the Egyptian eagle and P.E.G.by O! (Proud Egyptian Girl by Ola Bitar) featured cotton T-shirts with funky traditional ico-nography.

Proud to be Egyptian

Chill pants by Thalath

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Comfortable, striking and tummy-flattening, these loose and baggy pants are attributed to everything from fishermen to MC Hammer and Afghanistan. Thalath Fashion for everyday wear calls them the “chill pants” and sells a colorful pair for LE160.

MC Hammer pants

While foreign beauty product companies mar-ket the organic naturalness of their new lines, local producer Nefertari is an expert in the all-natural. Their body care line includes natural kohl eye liner, scrubs, candles, massager and shea butter soap (LE90) for the face and body.

Mixing gold, silver, thread and plastic has never looked so great. As “Boho Chic” continues to lurk about the fashion scene these days, the layered bracelet look mixes the cheap and the expensive, the colorful and the meaningful, creating artwork that accentuates a slender wrist. Pair Retro Chic’s fun rubber bracelets sell for LE63, and bracelets with beads and threads from Fortheloveof for LE154.

Natural beautyproducts

Bracelet layering

Cairo has been generous in introducing different tastes throughout the year.

22 Travel27 December 2012

Changing destinations

2012 family vacation spots

2012 has seen shifts in travelling habits

Worry-free local destinations for the holidays

By Heba Helmy

olitical instability has taken its toll on the tourism in-dustry since the 25 January revolution. The continued

security vacuum and the border at-tacks in Sinai this year have added to the woes faced by Egypt’s once-thriving sector.

According to the chairperson of the Chamber of Travel Companies Hossam al-Shaar, the tourism sec-tor is losing $300 million every week. The industry has a work-force of millions and is one of the nation’s largest sources of foreign currency.

Sinai has suffered a sudden, dra-matic decline in tourist numbers this year, says Mona Hegazy, sales manager at a travel agency, attrib-uting this to weak security.

“Sharm el-Sheikh used to enjoy the highest demand in the east coast of the Sinai Peninsula, but it has seen a sharp drop in revenues in comparison to last year,” says Hegazy.

“Anarchy and the absence of po-lice personnel cause foreign travel agents to cancel reservations, as well as to freeze contract renewals for the coming seasons.”

Masked assailants attacked the North Sinai town of Rafah on 5 August leaving 16 Egyptian bor-der guards dead and at least seven injured, adding significantly to se-curity concerns. Earlier, the Israeli raid on the Egypt-Israel border, in which six Egyptian security and military personnel were killed, was another blow to tourism.

Mariam al-Attar, a senior tour operator, echoes a similar senti-ment, adding that the rapidly dete-riorating security situation in Sinai has scared holidaymakers away from the cities of Taba, Nuweiba, and Dahab as well.

“Hurghada is the new Sharm el-Sheikh,” says Attar. “Hurghada witnessed a surge in the number of visitors this year as the situation is more stable there. The city offers

similar entertainment, but it is still not enough for tourism to recover.”

Ain Sokhna became another alternative destination. Ahmed Arafa, a father of two young girls, says this year he preferred to travel to Ain Sokhna rather than his usual vacation in Sharm el-Sheikh.

“I no longer feel comfortable let-ting my daughters move around alone in these unsafe cities,” says Arafa. “Ain Sokhna is a lot safer now because we spend the vaca-tion at the hotel or its surrounding facilities, away from the crowded markets and coffee shops.”

However, the “catastrophic

losses”, as Attar puts it, of tourism-related revenue, have not only been caused by fewer tourists but also Egyptians choosing not to holiday within the country.

“Some holidaymakers chose to spend their vacation this year in Middle Eastern destinations, in-cluding Turkey and Lebanon, over Egypt’s Red Sea cities,” says Attar, explaining that Middle Eastern countries provide tempting offers at approximately the same rates.

Egyptian travelers are reluctant to spend their vacations in the country for a number of reasons.

Hesham Moatez, 43, an accoun-

tant, believes that road hazards pose a serious threat to him and his own family’s safety.

“I used to take my family to Da-hab during mid-year vacations, but it is so risky nowadays to drive on the highway, we keep hearing about incidents of robbery and kidnapping,” Moatez says.

Imposing tight security mea-sures in Sinai and on the border, according to Saeed Maghwary, former dean of the tourism faculty in Monufiya University, is the key to getting tourism back on its feet again.

“The Armed Forces in Sinai and the Interior Ministry should work hand in hand to adopt effective mechanisms in order to prevent any potential border attacks and suppress any violence and chaos,” says Maghwary.

Maghwary also suggests that me-dia and Egyptian embassies in for-eign countries should play a vital role in enabling the sector to flour-

ish by presenting a positive image of Egypt.

“Egypt should launch intensive campaigns to convey that it is ca-pable of welcoming tourists from around the world, and that the problem of security is only limited to certain areas in the country,” Maghwary says.

According to figures released by the Tourism Ministry, the country received six million vacationers this year, 9.8 million in 2011 and 14.7 million in 2010.

Despite the slowdown, Hegazy ends on an optimistic note expect-ing a rise in the number of tourists at the end of next year if the coun-try stabilizes.

“There is a slightly increasing demand, especially with Coptic Christmas and mid-year vacations approaching,” says Hegazy.

“The country cannot restore sta-bility overnight. Maybe this year was a tough one, but indicators show that there is a ray of hope in the future.”■

Some holidaymakers chose to spend their vacation this year in Middle Eastern destinations, including Turkey and Lebanon, over Egypt’s Red Sea cities

P

By Nevine El ShabrawyWe’ve covered a number of local desti-nations this year in the travel section — from east to west and north to south — and while the holidays offer a little time to get out of town, the last thing you want to worry about when traveling with children is safety. Egypt has a lot to offer when it comes to different terrains and sites — here are some of our favorites from 2012.

Soma BayThis all-encompassing enclave by the Red Sea is still in its finishing stages but has lots to offer for the entire family. Depending on your choice of hotel, you can do water sports, use the aqua spa or dine at different restaurants around the bay. Soma Bay may not yet be as sophisticated as Gouna or as expansive as Hurgada, but each hotel goes out of its way to make sure that you and your

family are enjoying your vacation.

SiwaFor more adventurous travel, head to Siwa. Rent bikes from a hotel or from any bike rental place in the town center and bike around to Shali (an ancient fortress) or take a dip in a natural spring. Other spots to see include Temple of the Oracle, Fatnas Island and Abdu’s Restaurant, a lunch spot with traditional Egyptian food.

AswanWhether you take a cruise down the Nile or settle into Aswan for the holi-days, the weather in the south is great this time of year. Fly into Aswan and settle at the Movenpick, Aswan’s most child -friendly hotel. Day trips to Nu-bian Village and to see Abu Simbel are worth the effort and the city’s natural beauty will replenish your energy.■Take in the view from Fatnas Island in Siwa.

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23Social Media27 December 2012

tians wear Co�onil in the heat to deal with electricity shortages.

El Bob: Love him or hate him, or rather his iPad, El-Baradei is a Twi�er super star. Still, he doesn’t make

it to Google’s top 10 searched for politicians in Egypt.

Mohamed Morsy: �e president apparently enjoys being a tease, he lets you know when he’s

about to address the nation on Twi�er a couple of hours earlier.

Mubarak trial: �e most frequent question asked during the historic trial was how much fuel the

helicopter parading him around consumes.

New taxes: Announced on Facebook one night and withdrawn on Face-book a few hours later,

these new taxes caused an in�ux of instagrams of cigare�e boxes bought and stored for economic winter days.

Sonic boom: Common-ly referred to as “hagez al-sot,” sonic booms were

not infrequent in Cairo in 2012, accompanied by vague explana-tions from the army.

A7eboosh: TV actors Mostafa Shaaban and Ay-ten Amer introduced the Arabic equivalent of “me

no likey” to Egypt’s sphere, caus-ing a likey joke fest.

SpongeBob: Hamada Helal introduces the squishy cartoon charac-ter in his song with, “I’m

SpongeBob, cumin yellow is my color.” SpongeBob can be found on T-shirts, headscarves and even boxer shorts all over Tahrir Square.

Taw�q Okasha En: Pen-etrating milk. �is tweet from the spoof account of television presenter

Taw�q Okasha sparked a �urry of tweets ponti�cating on what this might refer to.

Ahmed Sha�q: Some believe a career shi� is due for the former presi-dential candidate, be it

standup comedy or the circus, he’s got mojo.

Hesham Qandil A� Hesham Co�onil: He made his �rst entry as prime minister accompa-

nied by the question: Who exactly is Hesham Qandil?! He is also re-ferred to as Hesham Co�onil be-cause of his suggestion that Egyp-

Obama victory tweet: �e words “Four more years,” along with a photo of Barack and Michelle Obama embracing in a hug, immediately went viral a�er Obama’s re-

election in November, becoming the most retweet-ed Twi�er post of all time.

London 2012: �e 16-day Summer Games took place on social media as much

as it did in the city of London, generating a total of 150 million Tweets and becoming the �rst social media Olympics.

�e Paralympics: Unlike the Olympics, the summer Paralympics got limited cov-erage on traditional media, so the online element of the games was particularly

important. �e Egyptian twi�ersphere in particu-lar kept a close eye on Egypt’s paralympians who scored a total of 15 medals.

Gangnam Style: Korean singer Psy took the world by storm with his signature dance moves and the catchy tunes of “Gangnam Style.” �e music video made

Internet history in December when it became the �rst YouTube link to reach 1 billion views.

Hurricane Sandy: In the wake of Hurri-cane Sandy’s devastation in late October, a new social platform emerged as a power-ful tool to share photos of the superstorm.

Over 1.3 million images were snapped and upload-ed on the photo-sharing platform, Instagram.

Live, from Mars: NASA landed a car-sized robotic science laboratory on Mars this summer, and live-tweeted it. �e rover made other social media leaps when the

team proceeded to “check-in” on Mars using the location-based social network Foursquare.

Felix Baumgartner: �e Austrian sky-diver became the �rst person to break the sound barrier on his own in October, when he broke the skydiving world record. He

also took social media engagement to new heights with his dive becoming the �rst live YouTube event to receive over 7 million viewers.

Rockets and tweets: 2012 saw the �rst ever Twi�er war declaration when Is-rael announced its Gaza assault through a tweet on 14 November. �e IDF spokes-

person and Hamas continued to ba�le on social media, not just on the ground. As the war on Gaza continued, reports showed that social media users were more supportive of Gaza than they were of Is-raeli a�acks.

Syria: �e most tweeted country in 2012 was Syria. As the Syrian government barred most media from the country, Syrian citizen journalists turned to social

media like Facebook, Twi�er and YouTube to help spread news of the regime assaults. �ere has been debate as mainstream journalism relies on these re-ports for news coming out of Syria, o�en with the disclaimer that they cannot be veri�ed.

Internet 1 - Congress 0: Two contro-versial anti-piracy bills SOPA/PIPA (the Stop Online Piracy Act and the Protect IP-Act) were the most discussed topics

on Twitter in January 2012. Some argued that it was the huge social media opposition that de-feated the bills and prevented them from being passed.

Obama victory tweet: �e words “Four more years,” along with a photo of Barack and Michelle Obama embracing in a hug, immediately went viral a�er Obama’s re-

election in November, becoming the most retweet-

team proceeded to “check-in” on Mars using the location-based social network Foursquare.

Felix Baumgartner:diver became the �rst person to break the

tians wear Co�onil in the heat to deal with electricity shortages.

El Bobhim, or rather his iPad, El-

A7eboosh: TV actors Mostafa Shaaban and Ay-ten Amer introduced the Arabic equivalent of “me

no likey” to Egypt’s sphere, caus-

book a few hours later, these new taxes caused an in�ux these new taxes caused an in�ux of instagrams of cigare�e boxes of instagrams of cigare�e boxes bought and stored for economic bought and stored for economic winter days.winter days.

Sonic boom: Common-ly referred to as “hagez al-sot,” sonic booms were

not infrequent in Cairo in 2012, not infrequent in Cairo in 2012, accompanied by vague explana-accompanied by vague explana-tions from the army. tions from the army.

dential candidate, be it standup comedy or the circus, he’s

Hesham Qandil A� Hesham Co�onil: He made his �rst entry as prime minister accompa-

nied by the question: Who exactly is Hesham Qandil?! He is also re-ferred to as Hesham Co�onil be-cause of his suggestion that Egyp-

In the wake of Hurri-cane Sandy’s devastation in late October, a new social platform emerged as a power-ful tool to share photos of the superstorm.

Over 1.3 million images were snapped and upload-ed on the photo-sharing platform, Instagram.

NASA landed a car-sized robotic science laboratory on Mars this summer, and live-tweeted it. �e rover made other social media leaps when the

debate as mainstream journalism relies on these re-debate as mainstream journalism relies on these re-ports for news coming out of Syria, o�en with the ports for news coming out of Syria, o�en with the disclaimer that they cannot be veri�ed. disclaimer that they cannot be veri�ed.

Internet 1 - Congress 0: Internet 1 - Congress 0: Two contro-versial anti-piracy bills SOPA/PIPA (the versial anti-piracy bills SOPA/PIPA (the Internet 1 - Congress 0: versial anti-piracy bills SOPA/PIPA (the Internet 1 - Congress 0: Internet 1 - Congress 0: versial anti-piracy bills SOPA/PIPA (the Internet 1 - Congress 0:

Stop Online Piracy Act and the Protect Stop Online Piracy Act and the Protect IP-Act) were the most discussed topics IP-Act) were the most discussed topics Stop Online Piracy Act and the Protect IP-Act) were the most discussed topics Stop Online Piracy Act and the Protect Stop Online Piracy Act and the Protect IP-Act) were the most discussed topics Stop Online Piracy Act and the Protect

on Twitter in January 2012. Some argued that on Twitter in January 2012. Some argued that it was the huge social media opposition that de-it was the huge social media opposition that de-feated the bills and prevented them from being feated the bills and prevented them from being passed.

Here’s to 2013We asked our readers to raise a toast to 2013 and tell us their wishes for the new year.

2012’s 10 biggest international social media hitsSocial media is no longer a trend, but a way of life. A�er exceeding 1 billion users in September, it was suggested that if Facebook were a country, it would be the third largest in the world. We look back at the biggest international social media moments of the year.

�e Egyptian social media scene continues to contribute to national discussion, but perhaps more importantly, to provide comic relief to a nation dealing with political turbulence and economic upheaval.

The 10 most popular 2012 sounds of Twitter

@DalyaElSheikh1: Here’s to staying sane amidst mind-blowing, changing by the second, probably untrue, so-called news. And even more, making fun of it all.

@MonaElHusseini: Here’s to idealistic goals coming to reality. Here’s to hope in the darkest times. Here’s to u ya masryeen.

@AwsemYa: Here’s to housing to the homeless, money to the poor, health care to the ill, educa-tion to the illiterate, and peace to everyone.

@SaraFarag: Here’s to more art by this coun-try’s truly talented revolutionary visual artists, musicians, �lmmakers, actors. Art is life.

@Mazloum: Here’s to a country that - regard-less of how o�en it breaks your heart - you can’t really completely give up on it.

@TahrirSupplies: Here’s to the Egyptian he-roes that stand together when it’s safest to stay at home.

The year in 140 characters By Nadia Ahmed and Deena Adel

24Printed by Al-Masry Media Corp

Issue no.33 27 December 2012