jamuna bridge
TRANSCRIPT
Project EvaluationProject Evaluation
Project of Jamuna Multi-Purpose Bridge
Submitted to Rabia Shakir
Submitted by Uzair Tabani(MFE after PGD Semester I)
About:
Bangabandhu Bridge, also called the Jamuna Multi-purpose Bridge is a bridge
opened in Bangladesh in June 1998. It connects Bhuapur on the Jamuna River's
east bank to Sirajganj on its west bank.
It is the eleventh longest bridge in the world and the second longest in South
Asia (after Mahatma Gandhi Setu). It was constructed over the Jamuna River,
mightiest of the three major rivers of Bangladesh, and fifth largest in the world in
terms of volumetric discharge.
The bridge established a strategic link between the eastern and western parts of
Bangladesh. It generates multifarious benefits for the people and especially,
promotes inter-regional trade in the country.
Apart from quick movement of goods and passenger traffic by road and rail, it
facilitated transmission of electricity and natural gas, and integration of
telecommunication links.
The bridge is located on the Asian Highway and the Trans-Asian Railway which,
when fully developed, will provide uninterrupted international road and railway links
from South-east Asia to North-west Europe.
History of Construction
Jamuna Multi-purpose Bridge showing 8 rows of bolts for 4 rails
The river Jamuna (Brahmaputra), along with the lower stretch of
the Padma (Ganges) divides Bangladesh into nearly two equal halves. Until now all
road and rail communication between the two parts of the country has had to rely on
time-consuming ferry services that were often disrupted because
of navigability problems. The need for a bridge over the Jamuna River was felt,
especially by the people living in northwestern Bangladesh, for a long time. This
perceived need did not go unnoticed by the policy makers. The people and
successive governments always longed to bridge the mighty Jamuna and thereby
integrate the communication systems of the region.
Popular leader Maulana Abdul Hamid Khan Bhashani first raised the demand for
construction of the Jamuna Bridge at a political level in 1949. In the 1954 provincial
elections of East Pakistan, the 21-point manifesto of the united front contained a
demand for the bridge. On January 6, 1964, Mohammad Saifur Rahman, a member
from Rangpur in the Provincial Assembly inquired about government's intentions with
regard to the construction of a bridge over the Jamuna. On July 11, 1966, Shamsul
Haque, another member from Rangpur in the same Assembly, moved a resolution
for the construction of the bridge and the house adopted it unanimously.
Accordingly, a preliminary feasibility study was carried out in 1969 by Freeman Fox
and Partners of UK. They recommended a rail-cum-road bridge near Sirajganj with
an estimated cost of $175 million. The estimates were preliminary and a more
detailed study was recommended. On the other hand, in his address to the nation
over radio and television on the eve of general election in Pakistan in 1970,
the Awami League leader Sheikh Mujibur Rahman mentioned the construction of
Jamuna Bridge as an election pledge of his party. But all efforts were interrupted due
to political unrest and liberation war.
After Bangladesh attained independence in 1971, the new government publicly
stated its intention in 1972 to construct a bridge over theJamuna and budgetary
provisions were kept for the purpose in the 1972-73 budget. On being invited by the
Bangladesh government, theJapan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) funded
a feasibility study through Nippon Koei Co. Ltd. in 1973 on the construction of a
road-cum-rail bridge over the Jamuna.
The JICA study, completed in 1976, concluded that the Jamuna project would cost
$683 million with an economic rate of return (ERR) of only 2.6%. Considering that
the project was not technically and economically viable, the government abandoned
it. The government revived it in 1982 and commissioned a new study to determine
the feasibility of transferring natural gas to western parts of the country across the
Jamuna. The study concluded that an independent gas connector was not
economically viable. However, the consultants made an assessment of the
engineering feasibility and cost of a combined road-cum-gas transmission bridge,
which introduced the concept of a multipurpose. It was estimated that a 12-km long
bridge with three road lanes would cost $420 million. Upon consideration of the
report, the cabinet made a decision to take immediate steps in pursuit of the project.
The Jamuna Multipurpose Bridge Authority (JMBA) was set up by an ordinance
promulgated by the then President Hussain Muhammad Ershad on July 3, 1985 to
implement the project. For mobilisation of domestic resources, another ordinance
was promulgated by which a Jamuna Bridge surcharge and levy were introduced. A
total of Tk 5.08 billion was mobilised in the process till its abolition.
In 1986, phase-I feasibility study for the bridge was carried out when the site
between Sirajganj and Bhuapur (Tangail) was found to be the best. Between 1987
and 1989, the phase-II feasibility study was carried out when a road-cum-rail-cum-
power bridge was found both economically and technically viable.
Funding arrangements for the bridge were finally made
with IDA, ADB and JBIC (formerly known as OECF) of Japan by the government of
Bangladesh in 1992. Tenders were invited through international bidding for
construction contracts in 1993. Contracts for the bridge, river training work and two
approach roads were awarded in March 1994. The foundation stone of the bridge
was laid on April 10, 1994. Physical implementation of the project commenced on
October 15, 1994, and all the components except gas transmission line were
completed by June 1998. The bridge was opened for traffic on June 23, 1998.
Jamuna Multipurpose Bridge was constructed at a cost of $62 million. The cost was
shared by IDA, ADB, OECF of Japan, and the government of Bangladesh. Of the
total, IDA, ADB and OECF supplied 22% each, and the remaining 34% was borne by
Bangladesh.
The main bridge is 4.8 km long with 47 main spans of approximately 100
meters and two end spans of approximately 65 meters. Connected to the
bridge are east and west approach viaducts each with 12 spans of 10 meter
length and transition spans of 8 meters. The total width of the bridge deck is
18.5 meters.
The crossing was designed to carry a dual two-lane carriageway, a dual
gauge (broad and meter) railway, a high voltage (230 kV) electrical
interconnector, telecommunication cables and a 750 mm diameter high
pressure natural gas pipeline. The carriageways are 6.315 meters wide
separated by a 0.57 meter width central barrier; the rail track is along the north
side of the deck. On the main bridge, electrical interconnector pylons are
positioned on brackets cantilevered from the north side of the deck.
Telecommunication ducts run through the box girder deck and the gas
pipeline is under the south cantilever of the box section. The bridge has been
built by Hyundai Engineering and Construction (Korea) as a 'design and build'
contract. TY Lin Assoc. of San Francisco carried out the design as a sub-
contractor for Hyundai. The approach roads were constructed by Samwhan
Corporation (Korea).
Considering the fact that the width of the main channel does not exceed
3.5 km, and after making allowances for floods, a bridge length of 5 km was
considered adequate. In October 1995, one year after the start of physical work
of the bridge, a bridge length of 4.8 km, instead of a flood-width of the river at
14 km, was finalized. This narrowing was essential to keep the overall project
cost within economic viability. It has, however, required considerable river
training work to keep the river under the bridge.
SPECIFICATIONS
To withstand predicted scourge and possible earthquakes, the bridge is supported
on 80-85 meter long and 2.5 meter and 3.15 meter diameter steel piles, which were
driven by powerful (240-ton) hydraulic hammer. The superstructure of the bridge is
pre-cast segments erected by the balanced cantilever method. Basic features of the
bridge are length (main part) 4.8 km; width 18.5 meter; spans 49; deck segments
1263; piles 121; piers 50; road lanes 4; railway tracks 1 dual gauge.
Sub-structure
The bridge is supported on tubular steel piles, approximately 80 meters in length,
driven into the river. Sand was removed from within the piles by airlifting and
replaced with concrete. Out of the 50 piers, 21 piers are supported on groups of
three piles (each of 2.5 m diameter) and 29 piers on groups of two piles (each of
3.15 diameters). The driving of 121 piles started on October 15, 1995 and was
completed in July 1996.
The pier stems are founded on concrete pile caps, whose shells were precast and in
filled with in-situ reinforced concrete. The reinforced concrete pier stems support pier
heads which contain bearings and seismic devices. These allow movement of the
deck under normal loading conditions but lock in the event of an earthquake to limit
overall seismic loads through the structure and minimize damage.
Superstructure
The main bridge deck is a multi-span precast prestressed
concrete segmental structure, constructed by the balanced cantilever method.
Each cantilever has 12 segments (each 4 m long), joined to a pier head unit (2 m
long) at each pier and by an in-situ stitch at mid span. The deck is
internally prestressed and of single box section. The depth of the box varies between
6.5 meters at the piers to 3.25 meters at mid-span. An expansion is provided every 7
spans by means of a hinge segment at approximately quarter span. The segments
were precast and erected using a two-span erection gantry.
EVALUATION OF DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION
A. Relevance of Design and Formulation
The Project was designed in conformity with ADB’s operational strategy to reduce
poverty in Bangladesh by
(i) Accelerating economic growth through, among other things, improved
physical infrastructure;
(ii) Helping the poor improve their living conditions; and
(iii) Improving and protecting the environment.
The Project aimed at supporting growth by removing major bottlenecks in the railway
infrastructure caused by the need for ferrying traffic across the Jamuna River and for
trans-shipment between differently gauged tracks. The Project provided an
opportunity for seamless, economical, and environment-friendly rail operations
between the northwestern and eastern regions of the country. It also opened up
prospects for using rail for transporting long-haul bulk cargo and intercity passenger
traffic, for which it is ideally suited. The Project was therefore fully consistent with
ADB’s country strategy and program.
Under the Government’s Fifth Five-Year Plan (1997–2002), the main objective for
the transport sector was to develop a balanced and integrated transport network,
bearing in mind the target of achieving an average gross domestic product growth
rate of 7.0% per year and the projected growth of 7.5% per year in the transport
sector. The sector strategy was formulated in light of the increasing volume of
domestic traffic as well as future traffic from the Asian Highway and the Trans-Asian
Railway. For the rail subsector, the need to link the eastern and western zone
networks was identified by the Government, which was consistent with the planned
achievement of deficit-free operations by Bangladesh Railway as envisaged in the
Railway Recovery Program. The Project was therefore highly relevant to the
Government’s sector strategy.
The project design took into consideration lessons learned from previous ADB-
financed project, and current ADB practices. The lessons indicated the need to
(i) address institutional weaknesses;
(ii) strengthen project management to reduce the risk of delays and to
support timely implementation;
(iii) improve selection and prequalification criteria for contractors to
ensure adequate quality and better performance;
(iv) limit administrative complexity, inefficiency, and delays by careful
selection of medium to large procurement packages; and
(v) Submit regular monthly progress reports during project
implementation, including key operational and financial indicators.
Deviations in the Project design from that planned at appraisal included the use of
prestressed concrete sleepers instead of wooden sleepers as in the original
engineering design. The construction supervision consultant (CSC) determined that
significant benefits in terms of improved track geometry would accrue if such
sleepers were used. The CSC noted that the financial benefit resulting from the
longer life of concrete sleepers would substantially offset the cost increase. ADB
accepted the proposal subject to the Government financing the additional cost. In a
second deviation, the track design for contract 2 bypassed the station in Ishurdi to
avoid operational bottlenecks. As a result, the length of dual-gauge track was
reduced from 250km to 245 km. These changes did not affect the time schedules,
expected benefits, or any other measures of efficiency.
Institutional reform and restructuring of Bangladesh Railway and establishment of
Project Management Unit (PMU) supported by the CSCs were covenanted in the
Loan Agreement. Prequalification criteria for contractors were properly formulated,
leading to the selection of experienced and capable contractors. Contract packages
were kept large except where the co financing arrangement did not permit this. ADB
and Bangladesh Railway carried out regular project monitoring through the CSCs’
progress reports and ADB’s project review missions. The CSCs’ interventions were
timely and adequate when difficulties arose during project implementation.
B. Project Outputs
The project outputs envisaged during appraisal were
(i) the construction of 99 km of dual-gauge railway line from Joydebpur to
Jamtoil to connect Bangladesh Railways’ eastern and western networks,
including 5 km of track on Jamuna Bridge;
(ii) the conversion of 245 km of existing broad-gauge track to dual-gauge
track from Jamtoil to Parbatipur in northwest Bangladesh to connect to the
meter-gauge network there;
(iii) the provision of signaling equipment for component i;
(iv) the provision of telecommunications equipment for component
(v) the provision of rails for components i and ii;
(vi) the retrenchment of 3,500 staff through a staff separation scheme that
provided for compensation, retraining, and skills development for
retrenched staff.
All project outputs except component vi, were fully achieved, albeit with cost and
time overruns. The special staff separation scheme was postponed following a
request from Bangladesh Railway based on higher than expected natural attrition
and a forthcoming manpower analysis to be carried out under the ongoing ADB-
assisted study on Organizational Reform of Bangladesh Railway, Phase III7 to avoid
the loss of essential skilled personnel.
C. Project Costs
At appraisal, the cost of the Project was estimated at $269 million equivalent. This
comprised a foreign exchange component of $93.5 million (34.8%) and a local
currency component of $175.5 million equivalent (65.2%). The Project experienced a
cost overrun; and the final cost at the time of completion was $365 million equivalent.
The total increase in project costs was $96 million equivalent (35.7%) over the
original appraisal estimate. The foreign exchange component increased by 128.8%
to $213.91 million, whereas the local currency component was $151.09 million
equivalent (14% less than the appraisal estimate).
The cost overrun was attributed to
(i) higher than estimated bid prices (awarded at a price $22 million higher
than anticipated),
(ii) underestimation during the feasibility study of the extent of works needed
to convert the western zone broad-gauge tracks to dual gauge tracks
(iii) additional requirements for ballast and rail associated because of the poor
condition of existing track materials,
(iv) additional input of consulting services because of an extension of the
project implementation period,
(v) changes necessitated by the use prestressed concrete sleepers instead of
wooden sleepers,
(vi) start-up delays in implementing both contracts, and
(vii) Increased duties and taxes associated with both contracts, and the
settlement of contractors’ eligible claims.
The Project was financed by ADB for Special Drawing Rights (SDR) 80.67 million
($110.0 million equivalent) with co financing from a number of donors. Of the total
project cost of $365 million on completion, ADB provided a loan of $105.9 million
from its Special Funds resources (29% of the project cost). Co financing partners
included the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) Fund for civil
works and track construction ($14.91million), the Government of France for the
signaling subcomponent ($7 million), and the Government of Spain for the
telecommunications subcomponent ($6.96 million).
Commercial financing by the Export Development Corporation (EDC) of Canada for
$7.0 million (tied loan) was written off because of the unavailability of an eligible
manufacturer in Canada for procuring “employer-supplied rails” for the Project.
Counterpart funding by the Borrower, the Government of Bangladesh, was $230.19
million. ADB administered the OPEC component, while the respective governments
administered the French and Spanish loans, which were used to finance nominated
subcontracts. The loan was declared effective on 6 March 1998. The original
Loan closing date was 31 December 2001, which was extended to 18 December
2003.
ECONOMIC IMPACTS
Increased connectivity and enhanced economic opportunities
Reduce travel time (8 to 4 Hr)
Reduce freight Cost ( $6.61 to $4.7 )
0.97M person became economically stable
Transport cost reduced
Easy and reliable means of transport for natural gas, electricity,
telecommunication
High rate of revenue collection (recovery time 30YRs)
Annual toll revenue amounts to US$24 million for FY 2006- -07
IRR of the project 14.5%
Open up for more funding to other projects
Protection of environment
Safe journey
Poverty reduction
It generates multifarious benefits promotes inter promotes inter- -regional
trade in the country
SOCIAL BENEFITS OF THE PROJECT
(1) 30 million people 30 million people connected together connecting western part with the developed eastern part
(2) Safe journey: Replaced the traditional ferries, manually operated boat etc. which were time consuming and risky
(3) Poverty reduction: One of the biggest targets and greatest achievements
CONCLUSION
The Jamuna Bridge Project aims to achieve the strategic objective of connecting the
east and west parts of the country separated by the Jamuna River, thus stimulating
the economic growth by facilitating inter-regional, cross-river transport of
passengers, freight and transmission of electricity more economically and efficiently.
The project will also facilitate the transmission of natural gas and
telecommunications between the east and west in a cost-effective manner, as well
as a meter gauge railway connection.
The project consists of:
(a) construction of a bridge about 4.8 km long, with a design life of 100 years;
(b) construction of two end viaducts to connect the bridge to the approach roads;
(c) construction of two guide bunds, of about 2.2 km each and a flood protection bund on the east bank to regulate the river at the chosen site;
(d) construction of east and west approach roads;
(e) measures to mitigate the project's effects on the environment, including resettlement, compensation of project affected persons, fisheries and wild life, and environmental monitoring; and
(f) technical assistance and training.
It is one of the greatest targets and achievements of Bangladesh.
Transport cost reduced