jan uythoven, ab/btlhccwg, 3 may 2006 page 1 450 gev commissioning machine protection needs to be...

Jan Uythoven, AB/BT LHCCWG, 3 May 2006

450 GeV Commissioning450 GeV CommissioningMachine ProtectionMachine Protection

Needs to be commissioned to: Prevent damage with the used, higher intensities at injection Prepare for the next phases of commissioning

The commissioning of the MPS needs to be well defined and procedures agreed upon BEFORE we get there

Good example JW note for CNGS commissioning: “Interlocked Equipment of the CNGS and LHC Transfer Lines”, edms 714582

Took about 8 months to get this all written down and agreed For LHC @ injection: can not be treated in one presentation

All MP systems should be active from the start of operation with and without beam

Avoid masking interlocks for start up Systems need to be verified once they are ‘obligatory’ =

their protection is required Need a reliable limitation of LHC and SPS intensity!


First tests without beamFirst tests without beam

Commissioning of MPS and connected equipment First test in the laboratory Followed by equipment test in the machine Followed by hardware Commissioning

Equipment tests under ‘normal operating conditions’ Interface between systems

A maximum of functions should be tested without beam Individual equipment, interface between systems, Post Mortem

analysis, Sequencer, Safe Beam Parameters, etc. Also if they can only be tested partially without beam, the partial

tests should be done as soon as possible

Copy JU “Cham06”

3

Discussion : first pilot @ 450 GeV

•Some very central systems will be tested and ready to go:

•The Beam Interlock System

•Key beam interlock clients:

• Vacuum

• Access

• Powering interlock system

• Dump system

• Critical BLMs

• Experiments(*)

Un-maskable input signals to the BIS

Does not mean that those systems are 100% operational – e.g. Dump

System

(*) The experiments request un-maskable inputs, they must therefore be ready during the machine checkout with all other un-maskable inputs !

From JW “Cham06”


Systems to CommissionSystems to Commission The core of the system

The Beam Interlock System (BIS) The LHC Beam Dumping System (LBDS)

All the systems connected to it BLM QPS – PIC – WIC FMCM Injection system Collimator System ….

Related systems Hardware

Safe Beam Parameters Beam Presence Flag

Software Post Mortem system Management of critical settings Software Interlock System Sequencer

Beam Energy Tracking

Beam Dumping System

4 x DCCT Dipole Current

(4/5, 5/6, 6/7, 7/8)

RF turn clock

Powering Interlock System

Quench Protection

Power Converters

Discharge Switches

AUG

UPS

Cryogenics essentialcircuits

auxiliarycircuits

Safe LHCParameters

Beam Current Monitors

CurrentEnergy

Energy

SafeBeamFlag

Required also for safe beam

SPS ExtractionInterlocks

TL collimators

Timing PM Trigger

BLMs aperture

BPMs for Beam Dump

LHC Experiments

Collimators / Absorbers

NC Magnet Interlocks

Vacuum System

RF + Damper

dI/dt beam current

BLMs arc

BPMs for dx/dt + dy/dt

dI/dt magnet current

OperatorsSoftware Interlocks

Screens

Machine Protection System and connected equipment

Injection Kickers

LHCBeam

Interlock System

Access Safety System

Beam DumpTrigger

Required for unsafe beam


ProceduresProcedures

Need to check that previous diagram is complete + Need to define the subsystems

Have to agree upon checks to be performed on these systems for the different phases Phases also to be defined in more detail

Check interplay between the different systems First outline on the next slides, based on

“Chamo06” presentations

7

Stages for Machine Protection

Comm. before first beam

First pilot 1012 protons 43 bunches156 bunches

936 bunches

0.45 / 7 TeV 0.45 / 7 TeV 0.45 / 7 TeV 0.45 / 7 TeV 0.45 / 7 TeV

SAFE at 450 GeV

Hardware commissioning

Machine checkout

Beam commissioning

43 bunch operation

?75ns ops

25ns ops IInstall Phase II and MKB

25ns ops II

Stage I II III IV

No beam Beam Beam

‘Just’ SAFE at 7 TeV


System

Commissioning before

beam possible ?

First pilot beam 10^12 43 bunches

1.7 10^12

156 bunches 6 10^12<N<1.4

10^13

936 bunches >5 10^13

Powering interlock system YES

Beam interlock system YES

Safe distribution of energy YES

Safe beam flag PARTIAL

Beam presence flag PARTIAL

Safe distribution of mode YES

Safe distr. of squeezing factor PARTIAL

Beam interlocks SPS to LHC YES

Injection protection NO

Access system YES

Vacuum system YES

Magnet current change monitor YES

BLMs, collimators & apertures PARTIAL

BLM in the arcs PARTIAL

Collimators and beam absorbers

NO

Beam position change monitors NO

Fast beam current decay monitors

NO

Transverse feedback NO

RF NO

Experiments PARTIAL

Beam Dumping System PARTIAL

TCDQ / TCS NO

BPM for BDS NO

Injection See V. Kain’s presentation !


9

System

Commissioning before

beam possible ?

First pilot beam 10^12 43 bunches

1.7 10^12

156 bunches 6 10^12<N<1.4

10^13

936 bunches >5 10^13

Post-mortem PARTIAL

Software Interlock System PARTIAL

Critical settings management YES

Sequencer PARTIAL

Critical softwareInjection

Checks will need to be repeated when going up in intensity!


PhasesPhasesAs taken from LHC-Com web pagesAs taken from LHC-Com web pages

Beam at 450 GeV safe up to of 1e12 p+, with nominal emittance Phase 1

1 x 1, 1e10 p/ bunch: safe 43 x 43, 3e10 p/bunch: int. in one beam = 1.3e12 p+

Above the safe threshold: MP system needs to be commissioned at the first step of intensity increase

Will need to be (partly) re-checked for intensity dependent effects at the following sub stages

Check again at 156 bunches Check again …intermediate… ? Check again at 936 bunches Check again at 2808 bunches

Will need to repeat (part of) the check when operating conditions change

Optics (squeeze ) Emittance Polarities of the magnets of the experiments Ion operation


Different SystemsDifferent Systems

Can only commission one system at a time. Proposed logical order of commissioning:

1. Injection Systema) But needs some collimation

2. Beam Dumping Systema) But needs some collimation, BLMs and BPMs

3. Other Systems – expected or unexpected beam dependence (BPMs, FMCM, noise pick-up in general)

4. BLM System5. Collimation System


Injection SystemInjection System

Special injection BIC Check all the inputs – can this be done completely without

beam? additional input: SPS safe beam intensity, SPS intensity, LHC

beam presence, LHC beam intensity, LHC energy

TL collimation system Mainly after the TI 8 TED, so can not be tested independently

of the LHC 7 collimators per line (momentum TCDI at start of the lime) 6 betatron collimators in last 300 m

TCDIs need beam for setting-up TCDI beam commissioning needs LHC beam permit


Injection System ctd.Injection System ctd. Check setting of active element. These settings (MCS) and

read backs will now need to be interlocked. Verify interlocking.

magnet currents with ROCS surveillance and Fast Magnet Current Change Monitor

Septa, kickers (voltage and timing)

Check position of protection elements TDI, TCLIs, TCDD Alignment with beam, use transmission measurements Check that BLM readings in this area as expected

TCLIs enhance performance of TDI. TCLIs are needed above 50% of nominal injected intensity and can be commissioned later

14V. Kain AB/OP

Systems concerned (3)Passive Protection: TDI-TCDD-TCLI

• 4.25 m long TDI, mask TCDD and auxiliary collimators TCLI to protect against MKI failures

– setting for TDI-TCLI 6.8 to protect LHC at 7.5

– need beam for setting-up From VK “Cham06”

Inject and Dump Mode

very useful: needs to be

commissioned

15V. Kain AB/OP

Systems concerned (6)Software

• Software interlocking system (SIS)• Trajectories, screen positions, MCS, maximum allowed injection intensity …

• Management of Critical Settings (MCS)• Remote management of interlock settings in a secure way (needs SIS)

• MKI, MKE, TDI, TCLI, TCDI, ROCS, BLMs, BPCE, MSE

• First version for extraction/transfer tests 2006. Single client.

• Extraction/transfer/injection data analysis and diagnostics• Shot-by-shot beam quality check to allow next extraction/injection

• Analysis after abnormal situation e.g. interlock (post mortem)

• First versions planned for CNGS commissioning/Sector Test.

• LHC injection sequencer• setting-up of TDI/TCDD/TCLI

• inject & dump

From VK “Cham06”

16V. Kain AB/OP

Timeline: Systems required for different commissioning stages

installed & prototype testneeded, but may not be fully available

installed & fully operational

beam 1beam 2

2006 2007

Need almost everything


Beam Dump SystemBeam Dump System

Check and optimise settings of active elements MKD, MSD, MKB

Check amplitude and fine timing (2 x 15 individual MKD systems) Optimisation requires local HARDWARE changes!

Check interlocking of these settings, BPM interlock LSS6 Check and optimise settings of protection elements

TCDQ and TCS (partial commissioning required, setting at ± 10 ) Dependence of collimator system and orbit feedback

Check apertures MSD, MKD, TCDS, TCDQ, TCS, TCDQM Check that BLM readings agree with expectations

Check Post Mortem, commissioning of the extraction lines (TD) IPOC, XPOC Interlock on PM !

Check re-triggering with beam (sweep across TCDS, TCDQ)? Commissioning of abort gap watchdog

Present MKB system limits LHC max intensity at full energy to half nominal but full intensity up to 2 TeV

See BG “Cham06”


BIC SystemsBIC Systems

Injection BIC Ring BIC Can all be tested without beam?

Additional tests with beam? Want to see the whole chain working

emc


BPM SystemBPM System

Check dependence of beam position on measured beam intensity

Number of bad BPMs acceptable? Special attention:

Interlocked BPMs in dump area Test dumping beam for different orbits in dump area, part

of tests LBDS Stability of beams, especially collimator area

Will need a working orbit feedback


BLM SystemBLM System

Check dependence of measured beam losses on beam intensity All linear? Agrees with models? Differences understood? If not: acceptable?

Test a beam dump initiated by a BLM, triggered by beam loss?

Procedures of adjusting BLM thresholds (MPWG)


CollimatorsCollimators

See talk Ralph Collimators interaction with

Injection system collimators Beam dumping system collimators Beam loss monitors (for setting up) Beam position monitors (for setting up)

Orbit feedback

Interaction with optics Beta beat

Need ‘global coordination’


Safe Beam FlagSafe Beam Flag

Need to check the proper functioning of the safe beam flag In this stage only intensity dependence


Systems not discussed in Systems not discussed in detaildetail

Further QPS tests? RF

phasing with LBDS, max frf

dI/dt beam current Screens out Software interlocks


Conclusions and Conclusions and DiscussionDiscussion

The Machine Protection System is complicated, already at injection Many tests can be done before beam operation (esp. BIC) Main systems identified

BIC, Injection, LBDS, BLMs, Collimators Other systems….(MCS, QPS, FMCM, dI/dt, Software interlocks, Sequencer) Many cross links between systems

This presentation is useless without follow-up Soon! Sub-groups?

Detailed and agreed upon procedures will be required Start with overview tables as presented at Chamonix by JW and VK Define more details

By the people responsible for equipment or systems Plus check links between the different systems

Document procedures and check consistency (see next talk: “LHCCWG Web Follow Up”)

Documentation of test results required Profit from experience of Hardware Commissioning?


Conclusions and Conclusions and Discussion, ctd.Discussion, ctd.

How do we move between the different phases of MPS commissioning?

Use sequencer to be sure not to run outside the bounds of commissioned operating conditions?

Is this safe enough? Operation in certain mode allowed, depending on

Intensity, Energy, Squeeze, Ions,… Who is looking after the sequencer, what will it do?

Use Safe Beam Parameter system to create interlock when“intensity x energy” is outside the commissioned region?

ICFA-HB2006 workshop end of this month Session on commissioning MP Systems Experience from other labs

jan uythoven, ab/btlhccwg, 3 may 2006 page 1 450 gev commissioning machine protection needs to be...

Documents

beam interlock system

lhc beam dumping system

beam commissioning of

unsafe beam slide

central systems

mp systems

cngs commissioning

interlocked equipment