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IN THE MATTER OF AN INTEREST ARBITRATION . 8 - M lf)/8fry Of' i '{}79 PURSUANT TO THE HOSPITAL LABOUR DISPUTES -.lf.DtA,/Jo '-ct/:JolJr .

ARBITRATION ACT, R.S.O. 1990, C.H. 14 -..:.:._-!i.§l~FJI, ~'.~j

BETWEEN

THE REGIONAL MUNICIPALITY OF PEEL (the "Employer")

and

CANADIAN UNION OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEES, LOCAL 966

RE: PEEL MANOR, MAL TON VILLAGE, SHERIDAN VILLA AND TALL PINES

BOARD OF ARBITRATION:

APPEARANCES:

For the Employer: B. Richard Baldwin - Mathews Dinsdale Shawn Adkins - Mathews Dinsdale Hilary Grice - Mathews Dinsdale

John Stout, Chair Paul Young, Employer Nominee Marcelle Goldenberg, Union Nominee

Jeff Sawchuck - Manager, Employee and Labour Relations Bruce Goldie - HR Associate Amandeep Malhi - HR Associate . Amy Gill - Labour and Employment Specialist Cathy Granger - Director Long-Term Care Susan Griffin Thomas - Administrator (Peel Manor) Jessica Altenor- Administrator (Malton Village) Valrie Lewin -Administrator (Sheridan Villa) Joan Jemmott- Supervisor Dietary Services

For the Union: Andrew Ward -Advocate Jenn Mizerovsky- CUPE National Rep Katherine Willis - President Salil Arya - Vice-President Bonnie Petri.e - Ri;icording Secretary Bridgette Osborne - Secretary Treasurer Mary Ann Drys - Unit Vice President (Peel Manor) Hollie Jolicoeur - Bargaining Committee (Peel Manor) Amrit Randhawa - Bargaining Committee (Peel Manor) Pam Hayer - Bargaining Committee (Tall Pines) Lola Silbourne - Bargaining Committee (Tall Pines) Dawn Wan Hue - Bargaining Committee (Tall Pines) Basmat Ramlogan - Bargaining Committee (Sheridan Villa) Sheldon Elie - Unit Vice Presdient (Sheridan Villa) Alex Manzano - Chief Steward (Sheridan Villa) Chuck Alatraca - Bargaining Committee (Sheridan Villa) Ese Atiyota - Bargaining Committee (Malton Village) Lakoya Brown - Bargaining Committee (Malton Village) Nordia Wright- Bargaining Committee (Malton Village) Sophia Brown-Reid - Bargaining Committee (Malton Village)

(the "Union")

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INTRODUCTION

[1] We were appointed by the parties pursuant, to the Hospital Labour

Disputes Arbitration Act, R.S.O. 1990 c.H. 14, as amended ("HLDAA"), to resolve

the outstanding issues between the parties with respect to a renewal collective

~greement.

[2] The parties filed extensive written briefs presenting their positions on the

issues remaining in dispute. The hearing was held on September 15, 2017. The

Board met in executive session to review the .briefs and the parties' positions on

November 2, 2017.

BACKGROUND

[3] The Region of Peel ("the Employer" or "the Region") operates five long­

term care facilities (the "Homes"). Peel Manor (177 beds), Malton Village (160

beds), Sheridan Villa (142 beds), Tall Pines (160 beds) and Vera M. Davis

Community Care Centre (64 beds).

[4] The Registered Practical Nurses ("RPN") and service employees at Peel

Manor, Malton Village, Sheridan Villa and Tall Pines are represented by the.

Canadian Union of Public Employee, Local 966 ("the Union"). There are

approximately 936 employees in the bargaining unit.

[5] The United Food and Commercial Workers Union represents RPN and

service employees at the Vera M. Davis Community Care Centre.

[6] The Ontario Nurses Association represents the Registered Nurses at the

Homes.

[7] The Union is a local of the Canadian Union of Public Employees

("CUPE"). CUPE represents approximately 643,633 public sector employees

across Canada, including 246,019 in Ontario. 62,308 of CUPE's members in

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Ontario work in the health care sector and 30,347 of those members work in

long-term care.

[8] The Union also represents four other bargaining units of employees

employed by the Region. These other bargaining units have the right to strike.

These four bargaining units cover Public Health, Transhelp, Public Works and

Human Services employees. The total number of Region employees represented

by the Union with the right to strike is 1,027.

[9] The last three collective agreements between the Region and the Union

with respect to the Homes were resolved by interest arbitration. The most recent

being as a result of a December 22, 2015 award of a Board chaired by Arbitrator

Kevin Burkett (the "December 22, 2015 award").

[1 O] The most recent collective agreement was in effect from December 1,

2013 until it expired on November 30, '2015. The parties met in negotiations in

November and December 2016. C0nciliation occurred in February 2017.

[11] To their credit, the parties reached agreement on several items during

negotiations. These agreed upon items shall be included in the renewal collective

agreement.

[12] The following issues remain in dispute:

Union:

• Article 1.02 - Part-time payment in lieu of benefits • Article 13 - Promotions, Job Vacancies, Transfers • Article 18 - Bereavement Leave • Article 19 - Welfare Benefits (approved absences, dental, vision, orthotics,

paramedical) • Article 20 - Weekend premium • Article 26 - Retroactivity • Wages (3%) and RAI Coordinator • Letters of Understanding

3

Region:

• Article 1.02 - Definition of part-time employee • Article 1.04 - Duration of temporary assignments • Article 17 .02 - Bi-weekly payment of part-time vacation pay • Article 19.01 - Welfare benefits (mandatory generic, 80/20 drug cost

share, 90/10 dental share, scaling limit, health care spending account). • Vulnerable Sector Criminal Record Check • Letter of Understanding re vacation scheduling • Wages (0%)

[13] The Union's submissions focused on a comparison between the

bargaining unit and other municipal long-term care homes. The Union submits

that the appropriate comparator should be other collective agreements between

the Union and other municipal homes for the aged.

[14] The Region, on the other hand, focused on the voluntary settlements

they negotiated with right to strike bargaining units represented by the Union.

The Region submits that the results of free collective bargaining with the Union,

subject to strike and lockout, should be central to our award. The Region points

out that the last three interest arbitration f!Wards between these parties found that

the most relevant and applicable comparator was the right to strike employee

agreements between the Region and the Union.

DISCUSSION

[15] We have carefully reviewed and considered the parties submissions. In

making our award to resolve the outstanding issues, we are guided by the

legislative criteria set out in HLDAA, which includes the following:

• The employer's ability to pay in light of its fiscal situation;

• The extent to which services may have to be reduced, in light of the decision or award, if current funding and taxation levels are not increased;

• The economic situation in Ontario and in the municipality where the employer is located;

• A comparison, as between the employees and other comparable employees in the public and private sectors, of the terms and conditions of employment and the nature of the work performed;

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• The employer's ability to attract and retain qualified employees.

[16] In addition to the HLOAA criteria, we have considered relevant

jurisprudence and the well-accepted principles applied to interest arbitration,

including "demonstrated need", "total compensation", and especially "replication".

[17] The replication principle is succinctly summarized by Chief Justice

Winkler in the case, University of Toronto v. University of Toronto Faculty Assn.

(Salary and benefits Grievance) (2006), 148 L.A.C. (41h) 193 at paragraph 17,

where he states:

[17] There is a single coherent approach suggested by these authorities which may be stated as follows. The replication principle.requires the panel to fashion an adjudicative replication of the bargain that the· parties would have struck had free collective bargaining continued. The positions of the parties are relevant to frame the issues and to provide the bargaining matrix. However, it must be remembered that it is the parties' refusal to yield from their respective positions that necessitates third party intervention. Accordingly, the panel must resort to objective criteria, in preference to the subjective self-imposed limitations of the parties, in formulating an award. In other words, to adjudicatively replicate a likely "bargained" result, the panel must have regard to the market forces and economic realities that would have ultimately driven the parties to a bargain.

[18] It is now well established that the function of interest arbitration boards is

to attempt to replicate the result that would have occurred if the free collective

bargaining process had not been interrupted by interest arbitration. This is the

concept commonly referred to as "replication". The parties to this interest

arbitration did not take the position that the replication principle did not apply.

Rather, the focus of their dispute is how to apply the principle to the matter at

hand.

[19] Replication makes use of "comparators" to assist in determining what the

parties would have achieved in free collective bargaining. By comparators we

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mean boards of arbitration examine comparable collective agreements that were

either freely negotiated or awarded by other interest arbitration boards. The use

of comparators provides the objective evidence of the bargaining marketplace.

[20] The most compelling comparators are those settlements or awards that

mirror most closely the situation before the arbitration board, including

settlements and awards between the same two parties. There are also other

relevant comparators, which would include historical patterns or comparators and

agreements involving similar facilities with similar employees in similar

communities. The relevance of any given comparator is diminished the further

away you move from the facts before the arbitration board.

[21] This is not the first time that these parties have debated about the

appropriate comparators. In fact, the parties have made the_ very same

arguments before the interest arbitration boards that decided the last three

collective agreements.

[22] The first occasion was before an interest arbitration board chaired by

Arbitrator Rob Herman. In Peel (Regional Municipality) v. Canadian Union of

Public Employees, Local 966 [2011] O.L.A.A. No. 666 (Herman), the Herman

Board found that the freely negotiated agreements between the Region and the

Union were the "best comparators" and they replicated the wage award of those

freely negotiated agreements in the collective agreement operating between

December 1, 2009 and November 30, 2011.

[23] The most recent occasion was before the Burkett Board who decided the

last collective agreement between the parties. The following analysis, found in

the December 22, 2015 award, is instructive and worth repeating:

To reiterate, the same arguments that were made in 2014 are made in 2015. In its August 11, 2014 award, the Board responded to these arguments as follows:

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These proved to be difficult negotiations because the parties held different reference points with respect to the disposition of the major economic issues. The Union looked to the evolving pattern at other municipal long-term care homes in framing its demand for a 2%/year across-the-board salary increase and improvement to various benefits over the statutorily required two-year term. The Employer, on the other hand, looked primarily to four voluntarily negotiated three­year settlements between it and this same CUPE local covering Public Works, Human Services, Public Health and Transhelp. These voluntary three-year settlements, negotiated under a strike/lockout regime, provided for 1 % per annum wage increases for the period with which we are concerned. However, all were effectively cost neutral; that is, the cost of the wage increases was offset with cost reductions elsewhere. Accordingly, the Employer has offered 1 % per annum across-the-board salary increases with corresponding concessions. Given these two opposing viewpoints, it is not surprising that the parties were unable to conclude a collective agreement. In the result, the overarching decision that faces this Board is whether to be governed by the long-term care comparators, by the voluntary settlements between this Employer and this local in regard to four of its other bargaining units or by some combination of the two.

The legislature, in its wisdom, has created, as the preferred method of determining terms and conditions of employment, a collective bargaining regime under which the parties are free to resort to economic sanctions, i.e. strike and lockout, in support of their respective positions. Interest arbitration is substituted for free collective bargaining where the public interest dictates that there be no resort to economic sanctions, i.e. police, fire, health. The overriding objective of interest arbitration, therefore, must be to replicate what could. reasonably be expected from collective bargaining under normative conditions where the right to strike/lockout may be freely exercised. The statutory criteria, of which we are fully cognizant, are designed to guide the interest arbitration's deliberations toward this result. Not surprisingly, the interest arbitration jurisprudence is replete with cases decided on the basis of the replication principle.

Where, as in this case, there exist four voluntarily negotiated settlements between this Employer and this local of the Union covering other bargaining units for essentially the same time period, those settlements establish what could reasonably be expected had these parties had the right to strike/lockout. It follows, notwithstanding the Jong-term care parameters, that in this case we must be governed by the results of the freely negotiated collective agreements between this Union and this Employer and not by the long-term care parameters established through negotiations involving other employers and other locals in other locations without benefit of the right to strike/lockout. Given the overriding purpose of interest arbitration and given the four voluntarily negotiated settlements between this Union and this Employer for essentially the same time period, there is no basis upon which to seek a middle ground between what these parties have freely negotiated for other bargaining units of this Employer and what has· been negotiated with other employers in other locations without benefit of the right to strike/lockout. To repeat, in the circumstances, the application of the replication principle requires that we be governed by these freely negotiated settlements.

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' I .1

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The only additional comment that I would make <;it this time is that replication does not necessarily mean duplication. While the right to strike settlements establish the parameters that govern, it would have been open to the Union in bargaining and before this Board to pursue priorities reflective of normative terms from the homes sector so long as the value of the right to strike entitlements and/or the cost impact of the most recent settlement right to strike are recognized. This could have been accomplished on the basis of a total compensation analysis as between the value of the right to strike entitlements versus the entitlements here or by simply modifying the most recent right to strike settlements in a cost neural (sic) way, i.e. by foregoing cost equivalent improvements provided under the right to strike settlements or by offering cost equivalent concessions in exchange for homes sector improvements. Although not attempted in this round, the parties will return to the bargaining table upon release of this award, at which time the Union will have another opportunity to assess its approach to bargaining in light of the collective bargaining reality.

[24] So, what if anything has changed since the last time these parties came

before an interest arbitration board to argue this point. The answer is absolutely

nothing has changed that would drive a different result with respect to what ought

to be the most relevant comparator.

[25] We acknowledge that in most other situations, the most relevant

comparator may be other municipal long-term care facilities. But that is because

the exercise is to examine the collective bargaining relationships that most

closely mirror the matter before the interest arbitration board. In this case, the

results of internal free collective bargaining between these two parties are the

most relevant comparators that reflect what may have been achieved in the case

before us if these parties freely negotiated an agreement. In other cases, there

may not be any internal comparator and external comparisons may not only be

relevant, but determinative.

[26] As alluded to by Justice Winkler in University of Toronto v. University of

Toronto Faculty Assn. (Salary and benefits Grievance), supra, it is just too easy

for one side in an interest arbitration to say, "we would never have agreed to

that". Such posturing ?tan interest arbitration is quite easy to make when there is

8

no threat of an economic reprisal. In this case, we have a comparator that

illustrates just what the parties would agree to in free collective bargaining where

both sides have the option of invoking economic sanctions to force their point.

[27] We note that applying the replication principle does not end the analysis.

We are also compelled, by the legislature, to apply the statutory criteria. In this

regard, we make the following comments:

• The Region has not raised any argument regarding its ability to pay.

• The Region asserts that any increases awarded by this board may result in the reduction of staff. CUPE responds by indicating that the Region has provided no financial information to support such a claim. We note that the Ministry of Long-Term Care has modestly increased funding and the Region has not provided any evidence to support their claim that they may need to reduce staff. Therefore, we do not see this factor driving us towards restraint.

• The economic situation is not a significant factor. The economic evidence presented by the parties suggests that the economy continues to grow, although it can't be characterized as "firing on all cylinders". In our view, the economic growth appears to be modest and forecasts continue to be guarded.

• There is no evidence indicating that the Region is having any problem attracting and retaining qualified employees. In fact, the evidence reveals that the turnaround of employees is quite low.

[28] In terms of the legislative criteria requiring a comparison between the

employees and "other comparable employees," the Union submits that the

primary group that should be considered is other CUPE represented employees'

working in a municipal home for the aged. The Region submits that this factor

should be given little weight due to the replication principle.

[29] We are of the view that this factor must be given some weight,

particularly since the nature of the work performed by the employees in this

bargaining unit is different from the work performed by the Region's other

9

employees represented by the Union. In this regard, we also note that it is not

unusual for interest boards to examine other agreements in the sector with

employees who perform similar work and in certain circumstances provide

additional compensation (such as "catch up") where it has been shown that the

employees' terms and conditions of employment are well outside the industry

norm.

[30] Turning to the issues before us, the Region argued, quite persuasively,

that the benefits received by these employees are "in the ballpark" with other

comparable employees. We agree with this characterization of the current

benefits that are received by the employees in this bargaining unit. Accordingly,

we see no reason to provide additional benefits based on external comparators.

However, the same cannot be said with respect to the Region's benefit reduction

proposals. In this regard, the Region could not point to any other comparable

employees in the long-term municipal homes sector, that have similar benefits. In

addition, both the ONA and UFCW groups, who perform similar work, do not

have the benefit reductions that the Region seeks in this proceeding.

[31] We acknowledge that the Region's other employees, represented-by the

Union with_ the right to strike, accepted a reduction in benefits. We also accept

that these other bargaining units accepted the reduction in benefits as a trade-off

for wage increases in the first and last year of their four year collective

agreements. However, in our view, the difference in this situation, is that the

benefit reductions being sought are not in the "ballpark" of what other

comparable employees receive and to impose such a reduction would place

these employees well outside the norm in relation to other comparable

employees performing similar work in the sector. We also do not feel it is

appropriate to reduce benefits while at the same time imposing a wage freeze.

[32] Finally, there is one other issue that we believe should be briefly

addressed. The Union sought changes to the posting language in article 13. The

Employer points out that the parties agreed to Minutes of Settlement on January

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28, 2013, which provide, amoung other things, that such Minutes of Settlement

shall "apply on a go-forward basis only and will remain in effect until the lang1,1age

in Article 13 is amended by the parties." In light of the parties' settlement and in

the absence of any evidence of demonstrated need, we do not feel it is

appropriate at this time to alter the existing language. That being said, the parties

are free to incorporate the Minutes of Settlement as a Letter of Understanding, if

they so choose to clarify the application of article 13.

AWARD

[33] After carefully considering the submissions of the parties, we hereby

order the parties to enter into a renewal collective agreement that contains all the

terms and conditions of the predecessor collective agreement, letters of

understanding, and appendices, save and except as amended by this award as

follows:

• The term of the renewal collective agreement shall be two years from December 1, 2015 until November 30, 2017.

• All matters agreed between the parties prior to the date of this award.

• The RAI Coordinator. classification shall be added to the wage grid with a notation that the October 29, 2015 Minutes of Settlement (OLRB File Nos. 1668-13-M and 1669-13-JD) shall apply with respect to the application and appropriate bargaining unit

• The Letter of Understanding re "Pay for Additional Shifts for Part-time Employees" shall be renewed for the term of the renewal collective agreement. The Letter of Understanding re "Pay Equity Maintenance Committee" shall be remitted back to the parties and we shall remain seized to address the issue if the parties can't resolve it on their own.

[34] Unless specifically addressed in this award, all outstanding proposals are

dismissed.

[35] We remain seized in accordance with subsection 9(2) of HLDAA until the

parties have signed a new collective agreement.

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Dated at Toronto, Ontario 22nd day of January 2018.

John Stout - Chair

"I dissent" "I partially dissent" Marcelle Goldenberg- Union Nominee Paul Young- Employer Nominee

L:'. 12 '.:

Dissent of Union Nominee RE: Region of Peel and CUPE Local 966 Homes for the Aged

I respectfully dissent from this award on the issues of weekend premium, job posting and especially the imposition of a wage freeze.

Specifically with regards to the wage freeze, this award relies on the principle of replication when instead it should have considered and given significant weight to the principle of comparability.

The chair reviewed the interest arbitration history of this unit and arrived at the conclusion that the previous chair was correct in the interpretation and application of the replication principle to impose a two year wage freeze. My concern is that this award replicates the wage outcome of the right to strike units with the workers in the municipal homes for the aged. Reliance on the replication principle was due to the current local union structure where the municipal homes for the aged bargaining units are members of the same composite local as the right to strike/lockout units.

CUPE Local 966 is a composite local. Internal union organization and how locals are organized should not be used to justify the application of the replication principle. Internal union organization structures involving composite units should not be the basis of deciding which terms and conditions of employment should apply for the homes for the aged bargaining unit.

The bargaining decisions made should be reflective of the priorities of each bargaining committee and the mandate provided by their membership. What one committee agrees to, reflecting the priorities of their membership, should not be imposed on other bargaining units.

The work performed by employees in the homes for the aged sector is dissimilar to the work performed by the right to strike municipal employees. The skills, qualifications and working conditions of the homes bargaining units are unique and have no resemblance to the work performed by the right to strike workers.

lri comparison, there are other CUPE municipal homes organized as one composite local; however none have been subject to a wage freeze for these two years. This outcome is not reflective of CUPE provincial homes for the aged norms. CUPE filed evidence that all other homes for the c;iged in 2016 and 2017 received average wage increases of 1.55% and 1.67% respectively.

Awards filed by the Union showed that many other arbitrators followed the comparability principle, and copied the pattern established by other CUPE

13

municipal homes for the aged. For the same time period and with similar circumstances no other municipal homes for the aged organized by CUPE or ONA resulted in a wage freeze.

The lack of any wage increase in this award will now further widen the wage gap between these homes and other CUPE municipal homes for the aged. The current single digit gap will now widen to a double digit gap. These workers will be falling further behind than their comparators in other municipal homes for the aged.

In this instance the blind application of the replication principle further erodes the purchasing power of these workers vis a vis their counterparts in other municipal homes for the aged .

. The evidence filed by the union, which the board should have placed greater weight, is the recent interest arbitration decision by Arbitrator Burkett between The Region of Peel and the ONA RN homes for the aged units. This decision was to follow the outcome of other ONA municipal homes for the aged and awarded increases of 1.4% in each of 2 years. Furthermore paramedics working for the Region of Peel received wage increases of 1.7% in each of 2 years. All other health care professionals in the homes sector or as paramedics working for the Region of Peel received wage increases, while the CUPE homes units was subject to an unjustified wage freeze.

Apart from the wage freeze I also dissent on two other provisions that should have been awarded- weekend premiums and internal job posting criteria.

If the principle of comparability had been considered rather than the replication principle, and given the evidence from the union, the award should have increased the amount of weekend premium.

Furthermore, the Union proposal for job posting ought to have been awarded as ample justification was provided. The current criteria for internal applicants for job postings had recently been the subject of two rights arbitrations. The union sought to have those modified criteria included in the collective agreement as it is imperative that union members are able to refer to their collective agreement to be cognizant of the rules governing job postings. The notation in the award of the existence of the Memorandum of Settlement is helpful but I would have preferred for the MOS to be attached to the collective agreement.

The award was correct when it did not impose the regressive dental plan concessions sought by the Region of Peel.

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I would have followed the well established pattern that has already been set in the homes for the aged sector. The principle of comparability should have been the governing principle to apply. There were ample precedents to follow the CUPE homes for the aged voluntary settlements and arbitrated decisions.

For all these above noted reasons this award should be considered an outlier

Marcelle Goldenberg- Union Nominee

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.! (;

PARTIAL DISSENT OF THE EMPLOYER NOMINEE

I have read the decision of the Arbitrator in this matter and must, with respect, dissent in respect of two issues.

1. Benefits Reduction

As noted by the Arbitrator in paragraph 8, the Union represents four other bargaining units of employees employed by the Region. These bargaining units have the right to strike. With respect to this right to strike group, the parties freely negotiated four year collective agreements covering the years 2015 through 2018. These collective agreements provided for wage increases in the first and fourth years of the agreements. The middle two years (which correspond to the two years covered by the instant Collective Agreements before this Board) did not provide for any wage increases. Moreover, each of the collective agreements for the right to strike groups provided for benefit reductions in 2016 and 2017.

As part of the second Burkett interest arbitration award between these parties for the collective agreements preceding the instant ones, the bargaining units before this Board were awarded the first wage increase negotiated by the right to strike groups.

In this case, the Region was prepared to accept a three year Collective Agreement which would have provided the bargaining units with a wage increase in the third year based on the replication of the final year of the right to strike groups' collective agreements. This would have resulted in a wage increase in the third year for these bargaining units. The Union rejected this proposal and sought the two year term mandated under the statute.

By virtue of the Union's insistence that this Collective Agreement's duration be limited to the two years mandated by the statute, the replication principle endorsed by numerous prior boards of arbitration between these same parties and endorsed by the Board in this case (at least as far as the Union's proposed wage and benefit increases are concerned), should have led this Board to award increases of zero percent in each of the two years under consideration as well as the benefit reductions proposed by the Region.

Failure to award the Region's proposed benefit reduction has, in my respectful opinion, ignored the replication principle and allowed the Union to gain the benefits of the right·to strike group's negotiations but avoid the trade-offs made by the right to strike groups in order to achieve them. I trust that should these

16

parties end up in interest arbitration with respect to their next Collective Agreement, the Board of Arbitration in that case will take this into account when determining whether to award this group a wage increase equal to that negotiated in the final year of the right to strike group's Collective Agreement.

The majority argues that the Region's benefit reductions being sought an;i not in the "ball park" of what other.comparable employees in the sector receive. Respectfully, this ignores the fact that previous arbitration boards between these parties have recognized that the most appropriate comparators are the CUPE right to strike groups. Moreover, the Union did not argue in this case that awarding the Region's benefit reduction proposals would result in the employees covered by these collective agreements to fall outside of the "ball park".

For the forgoing reasons I would have awarded the benefit reductions sought by the Regio'.1.

2. Letter of Understanding re Pay Equity Maintenance Committee

I would not have remitted this issue to the parties based on the absence of any demonstrated need made out by the Union.

Dated at Toronto this 22nd day of January, 2018.

Respectfully submitted,

Paul Young, Employer Nominee

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