japan, regional regulations

Culture as Ideology in the Conquest of Modernity: The Historical Roots of Japan's RegionalRegulation StrategiesAuthor(s): Maarten H. J. van den BergSource: Review of International Political Economy, Vol. 2, No. 3 (Summer, 1995), pp. 371-393Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4177153 .Accessed: 13/08/2013 02:53

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Review of International Political Economy 2:3 Summer 1995: 371-93

Culture as ideology in the conquest of modernity: the historical roots of

Japan's regional regulation strategies Maarten H.J. van den Berg

Facultad Latinoamericana De Ciencias Sociales, Quito

ABSTRACT

The preoccupation of critical IPE theory with the global neo-liberal programme of deregulation and restructuring tends to hide the emergence of alternative patterns of regulation in different sites of global transformation. Currently, Japanese capitalism projects on a regional plane, concepts of regulation that negate neo-liberal discourse. The contours of the regionalization of Japan's state and economy are taking shape in the form of tightly coordinated production networks, administrative guidance of investment patterns, and a regional division of labour. The paper traces the roots of Japan's regulation strategy for the Asian region to a historical logic of ideological, political and institutional responses of Japanese capitalism to structural change in the world order. At three successive moments in the history of Japanese capitalism, the strategic competence, conscious compromises and 'sense of direction' of administrators played a critical role. It is contended that an account of the history of this intellectual stratum in the process of social differentiation will not only shed light on the persistence of Japan's enigmatic political culture, but also clarify the absence of liberal ideas in Japanese concepts of regulation.

KEYWORDS

Japan; capitalism; modernity; regulation; history; ideology.

This paper posits that at the present conjuncture of global restructuring of production and accumulation, social change should be analysed as a process of situated transformation. Transnational forces are evidently pre-eminent in this process of change. Consequently, Neo-Gramscian scholars of International Political Economy (IPE) have identified the emergence of a 'transnational historic bloc' (Cox, 1987; Gill and Law, 1989). This bloc is clustered around the corporate-economic exigencies of transnationally oriented production and money capital. The combined

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efforts of these forces seek global deregulation, liberalization and expansion of markets for goods, capital, money and labour. Hence, neo-liberal discourse has become the cornerstone of a hegemonic global accumulation strategy - or 'comprehensive concept of control' (van der Pijl, 1984; Overbeek, 1990) deployed by a transnational ruling class.

However, transnational forces are not transcendental forces, that is, they do not operate in a coherent universe of relations between economic, political and cultural practices. The world order is not a single social space yet, but a dialectic ensemble of historical structures of social relations. Specifically, in terms of normative patterns, or ideas that are embodied in social practices, the world order is not a transparent symbolic order. Therefore, the currently prevailing ideas that are embodied in the practices associated with transnational forces require contextualization.

In adopting this perspective, I present the case of Japan's political economy as a site of global transformation. Notably, since the dramatic political reshuffles after the elections of 18 July 1993, foreign observers have presumed that Japan's ruling class sees itself faced with new choices and a new sense of responsibility. Newspapers have reported that 'all over Tokyo there is talk of deregulation' (NRC Handelsblad, 10 September 1993). Does this indicate that Japan's political economy is finally bound to embrace 'global perestroika' (Cox, 1992)? The answer is burdened with the record of past experience and analysis.

Despite US attempts to open the Japanese market for imports,' the trade surplus of Japan with the rest of the world continues to persist. This indicates that the free market paradigm is hard to impose upon Japan. The presence of a 'visible hand' (McMillan, 1984) is some- times obvious: when the economic downturn finally hit Japan too, the government did not hesitate to intervene. Two unprecedented 'rescue packages' were put forward by the government in August 1992 and April 1993.

However, notions of a visible hand in Japan's political economy do not necessarily refer to state intervention. For instance, the agricultural sector is controlled by an extended cartel of agricultural industry, trading companies and banks of the Nokyo (the central federation of agricultural cooperatives). The Nokyo also serves as a protectionist lobby for the maintenance of external barriers for agricultural products and extra- ordinarily high prices for rice (van Wolferen, 1990). Various authors have pointed at the tight corporate control of a limited number of conglom- erations (keiretsu) at the core of huge dependent networks of subcontractors in industry (Dore, 1987; Ruigrok and van Tulder, 1993).

In addition, the Japanese experience with 'administrative guidance' (Johnson, 1982) does not remain limited to Japan. As I will point out below, bureaucrats and managers of Japanese corporations promote their

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own 'recipe' for capitalist development in the Asian region. Recently, this recipe has been suggested to the former Soviet Union: the Japanese blueprint for the economic restructuring of the Commonwealth of Inde- pendent States (CIS), 'flies in the face of Western economic orthodoxy as espoused by the IMF'. While the IMF stresses the primacy of market principles, the Japanese recommendations 'stress the value of centrally guided policies based on common goals' (Far Eastern Economic Review, 13 August 1992: 59).

THE JAPANESE ENIGMA

In sum, the responses of Japanese capitalism to the exigencies of global restructuring are different from the free market paradigm emanating from the Atlantic area, echoed in the offices of the IMF. To explain persis- tent forms of regulation in Japan's political economy, various authors have pointed at the close cooperation between bureaucrats, business and politicians in the management of structural change (Johnson, 1987; Cox, 1989; Williams, 1994). This triangle constitutes an enigmatic form of interest coordination; a balance of rival domestic interests, expressed in elite-factions in the bureaucracy, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the private sector. The rationale of these semi-autonomous groups is the stabilization of their particular interests and a consolidation of the status quo. No one of the groups is ultimately in charge. 'The enigma of Japanese power' is that there is no responsible centre (van Wolferen, 1990: 5).

This power structure is, what van Wolferen calls, 'the System' (van Wolferen, 1990: 44). The System operates through a web of jinmyaku (network of special informal relations) among members of the elite triad. Jinmyaku tend to blur the lines of demarcation between the public and the private sector, as well as between the legislative and the executive branch of the government.

Van Wolferen's account of the 'elusive state' suggests that not only liberal understandings of Japan's political economy should be rejected, but also state-centric approaches and popular notions of 'Japan Inc.' (Vogel, 1986). Also, orthodox Marxist conceptions of 'state-monopoly capitalism' (Morris-Suzuki and Seiyama, 1989) do not satisfactorily capture the modus operandi of the System. There is too much rivalry and competition in the ruling class to justify instrumentalist accounts of Japan's state-society relations. Furthermore, van Wolferen's 'System of irresponsibilities' is not a static monolith but is in fact susceptible to outside pressure (gaiatsu).

At the same time, the ad hoc modus operandi of the System does not align the ruling class behind a coherent comprehensive concept of control that defines foreign economic policy:

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It is difficult ... to identify any conceptual framework behind the international monetary policies espoused by Japanese politicians, if indeed any existed. Inherently they are pragmatists and rarely advocate an ideological preference, especially in matters of foreign economic policy.

(Funabashi, 1989: 97)

The absence of comprehensive world views, universally applicable principles, or identifiable norms that define 'the general interest in the eyes of the ruling class' is the most crucial factor in the understanding of the System. Generally applicable rules and universal values would undermine the complex webs of jinmyaku and (in)formal procedures (van Wolferen, 1990: 134). This argument is echoed in other studies of Japan's political economy (see: Dore, 1987; Cox, 1989; Williams, 1994), and expresses a lingering awareness that there is a 'Japan Problem' that transcends the familiar controversies between realists, liberals and neo- Marxists.

From the vantage point of numerous 'cultural explanations' (Nihonjinron, literally: 'theorizing on the Japanese') the 'Japan Problem' amounts to a cultural gap. Nihonjinron holds that the Japanese share a different set of social values from those that are dominant in 'the West' (Okimoto, 1988; Ishida, 1989; Nakane, 1972). These authors explain the raison d'etre of Japan's sociopolitical order by delineating culturally specific norms of behaviour, such as group-affiliation, loyalty and consensus orientation. Such static cultural explanations presuppose that the Japanese subordinate themselves to the demands of a fairly structured set of patron-client or hierarchical relationships. It is assumed that the Japanese are socialized to share such similar values and that consensus and acceptance of authority can, therefore, be said to exist a priori.

By contrast, other authors have argued that these ideas constitute a discourse of 'Japanese uniqueness' espoused and consecrated by Japan's ruling class to secure political power and to legitimize the condition of Japanese state-society relations (Mouer and Sugimoto, 1986; van Wolferen, 1990; Miyoshi and Harootunian, 1989). Nihonjinron theory juxtaposes Western 'universalism' to the unique cultural foundations of Japan's state-society relations and serves to legitimate the consolidation of power relations underpinning the System.

In the current light of waning Japanese nationalism, sluggish economic recovery and the exposure of political scandals, the viability of the System is questioned by many. Indeed, since the 1993 elections, subse- quent coalition governments have promised a democratic government free of corruption, major political reforms, the liberalization of Japan's economy and a more active foreign policy. Such a political programme

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seems to challenge the 'inescapable embrace' of van Wolferen's System. However, it is not the first time that it has been asserted that Japan's state-society relations are at the crossroads.2 Kenichi Ohmae argues that the recent political reshuffles are misleading, for they have not diminished the power of 'the iron triangle' of politics, bureaucracies and business (Ohmae, 1993). Both Ohmae and van Wolferen conclude that the System has become an anachronism. However, they share a scepti- cism as regards current political transformations.

Yet, both writers fail to specify the long term perspective of political and social transformation. Ohmae merely refers to inevitable developments in all economies, that is, 'the coming shape of global competition' (Ohmae, 1985). Such visions are perceived by revisionists like van Wolferen as liberal wishful thinking. In turn, the major deficiency of the revisionist approach is that it does not take into account structural transformation in the global political economy. The arguments remain limited to a behavioural framework of understanding power relations as an intra-elite bargaining process in a national setting.

REFRAMING THE 'JAPAN PROBLEM'

I want to suggest the need to reframe the 'Japan Problem' within a more comprehensive perspective of social transformation. Van Wolferen's System pertains to a historical process of political, ideological and institutional responses to structural changes in the global political economy, that is, Japan's historic bloc. First, this process should be considered on its own terms and not just as a 'deviant case' subsumed under global categories. In this respect, I object to the isolated notion of 'Japan's persis- tent ideological deviation' from the global neo-liberal programme of deregulation. Rather, I suggest a reassessment of the often presumed universality of neo-liberal discourse. Following Bob Jessop, I propose that the deployment of a hegemonic regulation strategy proceeds glob- ally as a series of differential moments of articulation between accumulation and politics in different social formations (Jessop, 1990: 193). In these terms, regulation strategies are reproduced through pre- existing cultural, ideological and political patterns in different sites of transformation.

Thus, neo-liberal discourse carries specific notions of state-society relations, ideological presentations and economic practices, mostly of Western origin. The typical liberal notions of the congruence between the market economy, democracy, individualism, civil law and the social contract are burdened with a particular cultural heritage. By contrast, in Japan hegemonic discourse has articulated a different heritage. As I will point out below, during crucial periods of capitalist development, Japan's ruling class consciously prevented liberalism from taking root.

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Second, this process of assimilation and embedding of capitalism in different social contexts is a sine qua non for any potentially hegemonic regulation strategy that sheds crude forms of repression and social dislo- cation. As Karl Polanyi pointed out, the self-regulating market is a myth, a fallacy that obscures the social embeddedness of economic practices (Polanyi, 1957). In addition, the reduction of social (re)production to the operation of market forces denies the actual history of capitalist development as a socialization process.3 This process has resulted in the increasing complexity of advanced capitalist societies. Since the end of the last century, the self-regulating market has been challenged by the development of 'rational knowledge': ideas coping with the organiza- tional requirements of production, 'social management and planning' and the distribution of the social product - hence, the typical concerns of modernity. The concomitant rise of technocratic management and the tertiary sector produced different forms of intervention in the accumulation process, ranging from modest forms of social regulation to state-led capitalist development.

Third, rather than a teleological structural process, the socialization of capitalism has been mediated by concrete social agents. Modernity gave birth to a particular category of functionaries necessary for the social regulation of capital accumulation. Drawing on the work of Alain Bihr, Kees van der Pijl even conceives of a distinct 'cadre class' of bureaucrats, managers, and (other) intellectuals who come to realize the 'social embedding' of capital accumulation so to speak (van der Pijl, 1992). However, the cadre class cannot be merely considered as the agent of the ruling class, but performs an intermediary role in social (re)production. This informs a framework of reference for understanding society or 'habitus'. The cadre class 'habitus' does not so much reflect the economic position of its constituents but relates to their common role in the process of socialization (van der Pijl, 1992: 7).4

Adopting van der Pijl's notion of the emergence of cadre consciousness in advanced capitalist societies, I suggest we consider a diversity of 'cadre habituses' related to historically and culturally differentiated experiences of modernity. Consequently, the contending ideological tendencies that accompany global restructuring may not merely be traced to the outlook of economic interests in the accumulation process. They may also be associated with the responses of 'organic intellectuals' to the exigencies of social regulation in different sites of global transformation. From this angle, the Japanese defiance of the neo-liberal programme of deregulation may reflect the presence of an intellectual stratum that frames regulation strategies in alternative conceptions of social differentiation and state-society relations.

In the remainder of this paper, I will trace the roots of Japan's historic bloc. In the development of Japanese capitalism, the strategic com-

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petence, conscious compromises and 'sense of direction' of administrators played an important role. An account of the history of this intellectual stratum in the process of social differentiation is necessary to clarify Japanese concepts of social regulation, and the persistence of the System or, what has been called, 'the inertia of Japan's political culture' (Cox, 1989).

THE MEIJI RESTORATION: A PASSIVE REVOLUTION

The Meiji restoration - that is the restoration of the authority of the emperor by a proclamation issued on 3 January 1868 - should be seen as a political moment in a wider context of social transformation: a dialectic of internal social change in Japanese feudalism and external interference.

Social power relations in feudal Japan displayed some characteristics more akin to those in Marx's account of the Asiatic mode of production than to European feudalism. Dominated by the Tokugawa Shogunate (1603-1868), most lower ranked members of the aristocracy (samurai) were deprived of their land. Instead, they occupied positions in a central- ized and increasingly bureaucratized government, in return for a stipend in rice. Such a form of political rule cut across the direct peasant-lord mode of social relations of production.

The isolation of Japan from the outside world - which prevented the infiltration of universal values and transcendental belief systems5 - served the procurement of those normative patterns that reinforced the legitimacy of the existing sociopolitical order. Feudal values were principally centred on the maintenance and furtherance of local com- munities. During the Tokt-gawa period, this local 'in-group' consciousness became overlaid by a status structure which placed the samurai on top, followed by the peasants. The artisans occupied the middle position while the merchants (chonin) were considered lowest in rank - not counting the outcasts (hinin, or non-people). This status structure reflected the Confucian idealization of agriculture, partly signifying the ethical primacy of production over profit, partly the dependence of the samurai rulers on the farmers for revenue. Also, the Confucian principles of loyalty and filial piety that were supposed to guide samurai ethics, were mirrored in the emphasis on hierarchy and group loyalty fostered in the rural habitus. The status structure, reinforcing the cultural hegemony of the samurai, effectively repressed the development of bourgeois values and tied the domestic bourgeoisie to the existing political order.

However, the samurai became gradually more dependent economically on the urban bourgeoisie for they had to convert their stipends into

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money to pay for their expenses. The urban merchants further controlled the commercialization of the rice surplus via the samurai by providing interest and loans to the feudal aristocracy. Thus, while the chonin had no political or legal rights, they grew economically strong through the manipulation of the internal economic structure. In terms of class interest, the mutual dependency of the chonin and samurai laid the foundations for an emerging urban bourgeois-aristocratic bloc.

The intrusion of Western imperialism - preluded by Perry's gunboat diplomacy of 1853 pressing for Japan's ports to open for foreign trade - evoked a domestic response which took the form of a political alignment against the shogunal state. The progressive forces in this alignment consisted of the intellectual stratum of the feudal order: the low and middle ranking samurai or bureaucrats of the old regime consisting of an increasingly impoverished but highly educated governing elite. This intellectual stratum played a pivotal role in the stalemate between alliances within the ruling oligarchy. Thus, at first sight the Meiji Restoration merely represented a shift of power within the ruling class and a continuity of personnel in class terms. However, the role of this intellectual stratum rested as much on the political survival of samurai rule as on the underlying economic changes and redistribution of social power within the feudal order.

From this standpoint, the Meiji Restoration marks the introduction of capitalism in Japan. Although the bourgeoisie had no stake in the political developments, the international and domestic social context accelerated a process of transformation akin to a bourgeois revolution. Following Cox, I suggest that this process can be captured in Gramscian terms as a passive revolution (Cox, 1989). In the specific historical context of the Meiji restoration, Japan was faced by a world order of 'rival im- perialisms' (Cox, 1987: 151-210) and was forced to trigger the process of industrialization by capitalist development within the framework of the nation-state. This resulted in a stalemate between conservative constituents in the feudal oligarchy and 'progressive' elements that, along with an emerging bourgeoisie, associated itself with a new config- uration of social forces, without displacing the old order.

The common denominator that cemented the new ruling bloc consisted of the project 'to catch up with, and to surpass the Western Powers' (Ishida, 1989: 4). To accomplish this, the political leaders of the Meiji Restoration were faced with a huge dilemma. On one hand, they had to assimilate bourgeois ideas and institutions to strengthen Japan as an independent capitalist nation in the interstate system, as well as adopt Western technology to set the wheels of industrialization in motion. On the other hand, they had to avoid the infiltration of undesirable political influence. Specifically, the inevitable ascendancy of the bourgeoisie was to be prevented from undermining the new ruling bloc.

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STATE FORMATION: THE POLITICAL FATE OF THE BOURGEOISIE

In the struggle over the outlook of the new state, preferences shifted from Anglo-Saxon models to German concepts of state and society, notably Prussian organicist state theory and forms of 'bureaucratic constitutionalism' advocated by the writings of Stein and Gneist (Halliday, 1975: 37; Gluck, 1985: 192). From the perspective of political struggles within the ruling class, the shift reflected the growing influence of the bureaucrats in the process of state formation. From the vantage point of the class contradictions that accompanied the emergence of capitalism in Japan, the shift embodied an attempt by the old ruling class as a whole to ensure the continuation of samurai rule in the framework of the nation-state. Prussian state theory shed the reliance on liberal bourgeois concepts and institutions such as the Trias Politica, parliamentary democracy and the like.

In addition, the exposure of Japan to an outside world where nationalism and imperialism reigned rather than freedom and democracy, served as an imperative to integrate traditional values and norms into a 'national value system' (kokutai). Through the mobilization of familism, filial piety, love of one's native place and worship of imperial ancestors, the concentric sphere of influence of the closed in-group at the village level was extended to the national level.

In the final draft of the Meiji Constitution (1889), the Emperor was regarded as the embodiment of absolute values transmitted from the remote past. In what became known as the 'Emperor System', the absence of the principle of legitimacy in the bureaucracy contributed to a political culture in which 'decisions were shaped irresponsibly by an interplay of factional influences gyrating about the centre of power' (Cox, 1989: 855). This political culture served to depoliticize the rivalries within the ruling class. However, more importantly, it demobilized political aspirations of the emerging classes. 'The existence of the Imperial Institution placed the ultimate moral authority for all the state's acts outside the bourgeois democratic arena' (Halliday, 1975: 40).

The incorporation of the bourgeoisie in the superstructures of the new sociopolitical order was not brought about by the imbrication of bourgeois institutions in the realm of state-society relations. On the contrary, the integration of the bourgeoisie proceeded within the framework of the Emperor System and the cultural hegemony of the samurai.

CAPITALIST DEVELOPMENT

The development of capitalism in Japan has not been accompanied by an influx of dispossessed peasants to the cities, as was the case with the

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enclosures in the UK. With the rise of the textile industry in rural areas, workers were recruited from the villages. The bulk of the early prole- tariat in Japan consisted of women, sold off to labour bosses and forced to send wages back home. The preservation of family relations and traditional institutions secured a cheap labour supply from the villages to the small and medium sized factories in the countryside. The symbiosis of landlord and industrialist interests ensured maximum exploitation in the rural areas.

Also, the mutual dependency between the aristocracy and urban merchant capital in the old order was reproduced after the Meiji Restoration. Banking, (overseas) trading and shipping traditionally belonged to the core activities of a relatively small number of family companies, financed or owned by (ex)-samurai and the urban bourgeoisie. As a result of the political weakness of merchant capital, these companies came to function as semi-detached instances in the state economy. The state promoted oligopolies, each of which operated across the commercial, industrial and banking spectrum, leaving none of them with a monopoly in one area. As such, the growth of family-conglomerates (the zaibatsu firms) strengthened the ties between the aristocracy and the emerging bourgeoisie, and integrally connected core economic activities to the central state.

EARLY FORMS OF REGULATION

Partly because there was no labour force available from the countryside, the zaibatsu were faced with a shortage of labour. The type of industrialization in the zaibatsu (more complicated, capital- and knowledge- intensive production processes, for example, in shipbuilding) -also required better skilled workers than those occupied by industry in rural areas. For the recruitment of labour, the zaibatsu had to pay increasing fees to labour bosses. To counteract these practices, the zaibatsu agreed not to interfere in each other's labour force and began to experiment with forms of enterprise corporatism. Just like the ideology of the family state, managers in zaibatsu firms articulated ideologies of paternalism, resurrecting traditional values in response to the condition of the labour market and labour unrest. Individual firms began to adopt policies of pay and social welfare that encouraged long-term employment and commitment. The Home Ministry (Naimusho) backed these efforts by cultivating the idea of 'company-as-family' on a national scale.

The ideologies of the family state and the company-as-family complemented each other in the efforts of a new generation of government bureaucrats and managers of zaibatsu firms to counteract social demands. This new bureaucratic cadre, sharing a more or less liberal academic education, became increasingly concerned with the management of social

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change. No longer bound by feudal precepts, the 'way of the samurai' transmuted over time into 'the way of the bureaucrat', and became an 'ethic of commitment to service' (Cox, 1989: 853) for the new cadre.

On one hand, this ethic crystallized in the experiments with enterprise corporatism in the zaibatsu and the initiation of legislation (for example, the Factory Act of 1911, implemented in 1916) to improve working conditions by the government. Other reforms included the encouragement of local social organizations, educational programmes, moderate political reform (for instance, as when finally, in 1925, universal male suffrage became law).

On the other hand, their concerns were underpinned by a commitment to kokutai and the Emperor System. In effect, virtually all 'modern' ideas that informed the 'discovery of society and social problems (shakai mondai)' (Gluck, 1985: 27) were themselves affected by the ideological language of kokutai. During the period which became known as the 'Taisho-democracy' (1912-26) not even liberal thinkers challenged the interventionist role of the state in Japanese society or the position of the Emperor at its apex. Japanese liberalism did not adopt the classic 'laissez-faire' liberalism of Mill and Smith centred around the notion of individual freedom and autonomy. Rather, Taisho liberals drew heavily on the late nineteenth-century 'collectivist' liberals such as Green and Hobhouse (Hoston, 1992: 291).

THE FATE OF LIBERALISM

The aims of Taisho liberals were not rooted in the notion of civil society as an ensemble of free individuals engaged in contractual relations with others and vis-a'-vis the state. Hence, they did not demand a liberal infra- structure of social, legal and political arrangements ensuring 'the freedom' to do so. Rather, Japanese liberals appreciated the value of community and organic notions of state and society in Meiji political thought. The consensual dimensions of kokutai ideology served as a 'contextual frame of reference' (Hoston, 1992: 291) for an identifiable intellectual stratum - ranging from reformist bureaucrats, the technocratic manageinent of the large corporations, to political leaders, liberals, socialists and Marxists alike.

However, the adherence to kokutai ideology also crippled the ability of many progressive intellectuals to resist the identification of interests of the military, bureaucracy and the Emperor, rather than the people, with the well-being of the Japanese nation. They tacitly allowed for the crude repression of the rice riots (1915-17), strikes (for instance, in the shipyards in 1920), and democratic movements ranging from unionism to liberal and Marxist political organizations.

By the 1930s, the Meiji restoration had accomplished the task of

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catching up with the West and of gaining, for Japan, acceptance as a major world power. However, the dilemma of the Meiji restoration, as to how to import modernity and, at the same time, restrict the infiltration of various undesirable political influences remained unresolved. As soon as progressive intellectuals articulated more explicitly the political aspirations of the bourgeoisie and the subordinate classes, they were silenced and displaced by regressive forces. The military came to dominate the Emperor System and acquired political power. The rapid industrialization of Japan was accelerated by the exigencies of warfare. The state became increasingly involved in capital accumulation itself, and fostered by imperialism, the army acquired its own material basis within the state (Halliday, 1975: 100). Kokutai deteriorated into ultra- nationalism. Japan's new status in the Asian region, formulated in the concept of the 'Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere' promoted by the military, was sustained by the symbiosis of the interests of (samurai) finance capital and industrial capital in economic and military expansion.

THE OCCUPATION PERIOD: THE SECOND PASSIVE REVOLUTION

The occupation period, from 1945 to 1952, may be considered as a second passive revolution. During a short period of time, the SCAP (Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers) imposed upon Japanese society a model of modernity based on liberal democracy and economic practice. Feudalism was abolished once and for all by land reforms. Landlords were forced to sell most of their land to the SCAP, who in turn sold the land to tenants. Also, capitalist practices were redefined by the dis- solution of the zaibatsu on the basis of the idea that the conglomerates were an obstacle to domestic competition. An anti-monopoly law was passed in April 1947 to prevent the emergence of any comparable successors.

To separate state from society, the Emperor System was abolished and the Naimusho, with its huge apparatus of social control, was dismantled. All those who had close connections with the former regime were removed from office and public life by the first 'purge' of January 1946. In the new constitution (enforced on 3 May 1947), the Emperor's presumed divinity was renounced. Legislative powers were given back to an elected Diet. Political parties, regardless of their orientation, were legalized and trade unions were granted the right to organize workers, allowing for strikes and wage bargaining. A Fordist model of regulation was pursued, featuring mass union membership, collective bargaining and a modest social safety net.

However, events in 1949 and 1950 - Mao Tsetung's victory in the Chinese civil war and the outbreak of hostilities in Korea - changed

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the priorities of the SCAP. The inclusion of Japan in the US strategy of containment led to a 'red purge' that marginalized the Communist Party, placed the Socialist Party in the opposition, and left popular movements of neutralism and pacifism fragmented. Reformist administrators who were initially encouraged by the social, political and institutional changes instigated by the SCAP, were now replaced by conservatives. Bureaucrats of the pre-war regime were reinstalled in office. The second purge marked the beginning of what is known as the 'reverse course': the successful attempt on the part of Japan's ruling class to undo the most crucial reforms of the occupation period.

Conservative intellectuals did not challenge the integration of Japanese capitalism into the emerging strategic and economic alliance under American leadership. However, they did reject the political and economic reforms that had been imposed upon them by the occupation authorities. Their objectives were sustained by the conservatism of the new peasant proprietors and the bureaucratic cadre of the dissolved zaibatsu. Both rejected the principles of liberal economic practice on which occupation reforms were based. The anti-monopoly law in particular met with fierce opposition. Actual implementation of the legislation was avoided, and gradually the old zaibatsu conglomerates returned in the form of keiretsu firms.

Another important objective concerned curbing the power of organized labour. The repression of strikes was backed by the state. Trade unions engaged in wage negotiations and strikes were locked out by 'second' unions set up by corporate management. At the beginning of the 1960s, class-based unions had been literally eradicated in the private sector and were displaced by enterprise unions. With the defeat of organized labour, the reverse course effectively silenced the political articulation of social demands.

THE POST-WAR CADRE TRIAD

The conservative alliance became a political fact with the formation of the LDP in 1955. However, party politics did not become the vehicle for the settlement of social compromises or the formulation of economic and social policy. Instead, the informal networks of patron-client relationships and political bargaining which had cemented the Meiji oligarchy were reproduced in the new political constellation. Politicians were recruited from the bureaucracies which undermined the functioning of the new parliamentary democracy. The representative function of the Diet was further weakened by an increasing number of deliberation councils attached to the ministries. The Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), in particular, directly consulted business repre- sentatives on the planning and implementation of policies. Indeed,

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before public political debate had a chance to mature, the bureaucratic cadre of the keiretsu firms and government bureaucrats set the postwar agenda of industrial development and economic growth. A triad of government, business and politics became operative beneath the surface of liberal political practice in the postwar era.

The administrators, managers and politicians within this triad rejuvenated the attitudes and practices from the political culture of the Meiji era, but without its military component (Maruyama, 1963: 264). Thus, the 'system of irresponsibilities' that resulted from the Emperor System found its postwar counterpart in the 'elusive state' in van Wolferen's System: a power structure of rival factions and 'interlocking decision-making' without an accountable centre. Modern institutions, such as parliamentary democracy, collective bargaining, jurisdiction and civil rights were not considered effective means of coordination and social regulation. In these respects, the socialization of Japanese capitalism after the war shed the liberal and social-democratic 'emanci- patory project' of modernity in Western advanced capitalism. In fact, amidst the elusive power relations and 'institutional ambiguity' (Williams, 1994: 9) of Japan's state-society complex, there was no 'discur- sive space' for such a project. The modus operandi of the system prevented rival interests from transcending their narrow outlook into a coherent conception of the social order based on class compromise.

Even so, it is argued here that it is possible to conceive of an identifiable category of functionaries that synthesized and consolidated its outlook on social regulation, political practice and economic management in postwar Japan. Indeed, the commonly held views of the tripartite establishment endorsed the ideological potency of traditional values (ranging from Confucian ethics, group-conformity to individual loyalty) in Japan's 'conquest of the modern' through economic development (Miyoshi and Harootunian, 1989: 86). An eclectic set of traditional values, fused with American management ideas and accounting methods (national statistics and the introduction of GNP measurements), was effectively incorporated into management practices. Gradually, a loose frame of reference was reconstructed to legitimize Japan's political culture, rendering a new 'cadre habitus' of corporate management and government bureaucrats alike. Befitting the Japanese aversion to macro- economic models as outlined by the SCAP, new concepts of regulation were worked out on the micro-level.

MICRO-CORPORATISM

In the first decade after the war, Japanese industry was faced with the cheap and qualitatively better products of the Fordist industries in the US and Europe. It was widely held that Japanese companies were highly

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inefficient and that the system of 'seniority wages' in the zaibatsu contributed to this (Gordon, 1993). In an effort to modernize production, the Japan Productivity Centre (JPC) was established in 1953, sponsored by the US government. The JPC encouraged companies to rationalize production through the introduction of American management techniques, such as quality control, payment according to merit, and 'job wages'. However, the restructuring of wages met with fierce resistance by workers. Therefore, as the anti-union offensive gathered strength through the 1950s, management revised its strategies by the introduction of 'bonus-wages', and the reintroduction of 'seniority wages' and 'lifetime employment'. This was done to lure workers away from trade unions into the new enterprise unions. Workers feared that opposition to their employer would result in the loss of a bonus-wage, which was increasingly determined by such criteria as cooperation, shop floor commitment and loyalty, rather than skill. This reflected a further shift in management ideas by which the original American innovations were adapted to the emerging pattern of capital-labour relations in Japan.

With the tightening of the labour market and the general increase in wages from the 1960s on, enterprise corporatism and the welfare practices of the large companies (providing housing, saving plans, pension funds, study grants, etc.) came to endow 'paternalism' and 'benevolence' - the consensual aspects of what has been coined 'Confucian management practices' (Dore, 1987) - with a tangible material meaning. In exchange for the self-discipline expected of the labour force at the shop floor, the long work days in the offices and factories, wage restraints in times of recession and the implicit agreement not to interrupt production through strikes, enterprise corporatism came to function as a social contract at the micro-level.

Just as in the late Meiji period, practices of enterprise corporatism remained limited to large-scale enterprise. Nevertheless, with regard to the condition of capital-labour relations in small- and medium-sized enterprises, Dorinne Kondo claims that social relations of production are embedded in mutual expectations of 'patronage' or 'paternalism'. Upon these mutual expectations, identities of employer and worker are crafted, and disputes over working conditions are negotiated (Kondo, 1990: 10). Under patronage, the owner accepts 'some responsibility in guaranteeing jobs and providing protection in return for worker loyalty and subor- dination, embedded in a model of "family" relations' (Ruigrok and van Tulder, 1993: 119). However, in contrast to enterprise corporatism in large companies, the diffused set of dispositions accompanying patronage is not sustained by any institutionalized form of social regulation other than 'the government's scanty health insurance schemes and minimum public pensions' (Shalev, 1990: 74).

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The contrast between capital-labour relations in the keiretsu and those in small- and medium-sized firms coincides with the production pattern that emerged on the meso-level as an alternative to Fordist production. In the course of the 1950s, the government restricted foreign producers from the Japanese market through an extensive system of quotas, tariffs and import requirements. Japanese industry, now barely confronted by foreign competition, was nevertheless forced to produce more flexibly to meet demand in the relatively small home market. In addition, MITI stimulated inter-firm cooperation, for instance through 'obligatory second-sourcing' to other Japanese firms (Ruigrok and van Tulder, 1993: 114). The production pattern that gradually emerged consisted of a limited number of core firms at the apex of a hierarchy of dependent small- and medium-sized subcontractors.

Pioneered by the Japanese car industry, 'Toyotism' represents the structural control of end-producers over supply (just-in-time delivery required from favoured suppliers), control over markets (through an extensive network of single franchising outlets, enabling firms 'to sell first and to produce later'), control over finances (through long-term commitment between banks and industry and shedding financing through open securities) and control over labour (Ruigrok and van Tulder, 1993: 113-31).

Enterprise corporatism and network production - or what Robert Boyer calls 'micro-corporatist' regulation of capital labour relations - evolved in the absence of (Fordist) macro-regulation of Japan's political economy. Nevertheless, micro-corporatism is intrinsically embedded in a 'mix' of several social and political forms of coordination. Therefore, Boyer considers micro-corporatism almost as an 'organic innovation' that posits an alternative to extensive forms of macro-regulation as well as to pure reliance on the market mechanism. Boyer claims that in international comparison:

coordinating mechanisms implementing more solidaristic or co- operative values between managers, workers, subcontractors and banks are more efficient in the competition on the goods market; on the contrary, individualistic and conflict prone societies [i.e. Canada, the US, and the UKl which rely on markets to monitor the capital-labour relations experience very poor results in the arena of international competition.

(Boyer 1991: 7)

Ironically, a similar conclusion lies at the core of the revival of cultural nationalism in Japan. Like kokutai ideology in the late Meiji period, nihonjinron underscored the superiority of Japanese culture. However, unlike kokutai, nihonjinron did not appeal to military prowess. Instead, nihonjinron '[appealed] to the ethos of an exceptional culture in order to

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explain the irreducible and unique source of Japan's status as a world "industrial power" and a global "economic giant"' (Miyoshi and Harootunian, 1989: 86). Notably Chie Nakane's work on the corporation as a social group explained the success of Japan's economy in terms of the traditional values that were preserved and cherished in management practices (Nakane, 1972). In turn, nihonjinron made the business firm the model for the wider socio-political order.

In contrast to kokutai, nihonjinron did not become a state-ideology; Japan's state-society complex had changed too much for that. However, nihonjinron provided Japan's cadre triad with a cultural frame of reference: an intellectual construct synthesizing various ideas embodied in political practices, concepts of control and regulation.

THE THIRD PASSIVE REVOLUTION: INTERNATIONALIZATION

While Japanese nationalism gained momentum during the 1980s, Japan's political economy became subject to the process of internationalization which was partly externally imposed, and partly self-induced. Gradually, the internationalization process uncovered the vulnerabilities of the system, as a consequence of major shifts in social power relations among its constituents, especially, as these shifts reflected structural transformations in Japan's economy. The most significant factor has been the erosion of administrative guidance (Cox, 1989; Williams, 1994). 'The guiding role of the state bureaucracy, especially MITI, diminishes as Japanese multinationals increasingly generate their investment capital abroad and Japanese finance has become internationalized' (Cox, 1989: 849).

Consequently, the main vulnerability of Japan's historic bloc has been exposed in the increased marginalization of labour. Labour-intensive industry is being transplanted to the Asian newly industrializing countries (NICs) and the general restructuring of production tends to weaken the social contract in terms of a decrease of lifetime employment jobs in the core industries and a segmentation of the labour force in the newly emerging service industries (Cox, 1989). In these industries, women and temporal workers in particular have become fully exposed to the uncer- tainty of the labour market. These developments are counteracted by a reaffirmation of micro-corporatism. Wage restraints are being negotiated in exchange for increased social security and commitment to employment security.

Another vulnerability of Japan's historic bloc consists of the expansion of Japanese transnational money capital, advocating more liberal, outward looking policies (Helleiner, 1989; Funabashi, 1989). The financial sector, notably through the increasing leverage of big security

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houses, has tried to gain influence in Japan's corporate establishment. The 1989 Recruit scandal, for example, 'was precipitated by a nouveau riche firm in [this] expanding industry trying to buy its way into the elite golden circle dominated by heavy industry and banking' (Williams, 1994: 47). Thus, the activities of the financial sector have certainly contributed to reshuffles within the system and have stood at the basis of the present crisis of Japanese politics. However, in Japan, 'the revolt of the rentier' (van der Pijl, 1992) has not been able to tilt the political and economic agenda in favour of neo-liberal policies based on deregulation. Domestic interest groups, such as agricultural federations and small-business-dominated regional chambers of commerce, remain powerful and dominate the 'clientelistic relationships with bureaucrats and politicians' (Calder, 1988: 530). In addition, the 'logic' of Japan's network-economy impedes the pre-eminence of, what has been called 'the ideological orientation of money capital' (van der Pijl, 1989). That is, in so far as money capital would assert itself in institutional form by the disruption of ties between the financial sector and industry.

Indeed, given the keiretsu ties and cross shareholdings, financial institutions remain loyal to the grouping of companies they belong to (van Wolferen, 1990: 391-3). In Japan, the liberalization of capital markets proceeds slowly and has not disrupted the relation between banks and industry, as is the case in the US and the UK (Ruigrok and van Tulder, 1993: 94). This is related to the low saving rates in those countries which can only be compensated for by a high international mobility of capital. 'Thus, the neo-liberal policies in the US and the UK to liberalize the international flow of capital aim to attract money capital from more successful economies' (Ruigrok and van Tulder, 1993: 94). In Japan, the saving rate is considerably higher, not least due to the Postal Savings system, established by the government in the 1950s. In addition, the average returns on assets and equity of the six major Japanese banks6 are dropping, to a large extent because of the unprofitability of overseas operations (notably in Europe and the US). This has depressed the profit margins in the financial sector, shifting the international orientation of Japanese financial institutions in favour of a regional focus (especially on the ASEAN countries) and the domestic economy (Far Eastern Economic Review, 8 April 1993: 70-4).

It is necessary to emphasize here that the reassertion of money capital may also be expressed in institutional form by the further integration of circuits of capital within one single transnational corporation (Overbeek, 1988: 285). From this standpoint, the neo-liberal programme of global deregulation can be seen to be propelled by the single process of trans- nationalization of capital. In this process, the relative mobility of money-capital over productive capital has been the progressive deter- minant.

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However, transnational companies do not by definition rely on global deregulation. In contrast to 'globalization' strategies which aim for a worldwide division of labour, companies that have adopted Toyotism follow a pattern of 'glocalization'. Glocalization displays a global pattern of 'geographically concentrated inter-firm division of labour' (Ruigrok and van Tulder, 1993: 10). Domestic financing and glocalization enable these corporations to maintain a strong vertical cohesiveness within the production network. Such production networks are also able to circum- vent trade barriers and the political sensitivities of the 'host-countries' or trade blocs that are penetrated. As such, Toyotist firms do not necessarily advocate global free markets, for the local (subcontractor) networks establish relatively independent and autonomous production units in different regional markets.

In the Asian region, glocalization has ceased to be merely an internationalization strategy of a particular firm. It may be considered a concept that now refers to the regionalization of the Japanese economy. Japanese capital controls a complete regional production regime, increasingly without any ownership relationship, but through hierarchical production networks. The Japanese core companies rely on their technological advan- tage, captive imports and exports, the control of marketing and access to (domestic) financing. The regional production networks are carefully coordinated with host governments and Tokyo planners. As such the emerging economic pattern is complemented by what may be coined the regionalization of the Japanese state. Coherent strategic plans organized and administered by Japanese bureaucracies such as MITI target invest- ments by country, industry and product. For example, Malaysia has been targeted for word processors and fax machines, Indonesia for textiles and plastics (Tabb, 1994: 32). Foreign aid is also an integral part of Japan's economic policy and attuned to corporate strategies. 'As in the case of domestic industrial policy coordination, the government "plans" markets in ways consistent with promoting the long term success of [Japanese] corporations' (Tabb, 1994: 33).

The complementary involvement of Japanese capital and its government in the Asian region has put Japanese concepts of regulation for the first time on a transnational plane and beyond the micro/meso- levels. In an organic fashion, management practices, financial flows and production patterns interact with Japan's foreign economic policy, regional diplomacy and bureaucratic planning. The regionalization of Japan's state and economy is further consciously promoted in a 'regional ideology'. Carefully wrapped in an elegant metaphor invented by ex-prime minister Nakasone - so as to avoid the painful reminders of the 'Co-Prosperity Sphere' - Asian economies are presented as 'flying geese'. Neither as subordinates, nor as equals, the Asian countries follow the leading goose Japan in V-formation. The idea is that the geese 'that

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go off later' can learn from the 'forerunners' experiences to 'shorten the time required to catch up' (Saburo Okita, in Tabb, 1994: 31). As far as the leading goose is concerned, the teaching materials consist of a capitalist reading of Confucius: trust, loyalty and commitment to the flock will bring economic progress; not the rules of the market place.

JAPAN'S HISTORIC BLOC IN THE LONGUE DUREE

Like the Meiji revolution and the 'reverse course', the present regionalization of Japan's political economy involves a process of economic, political and ideological responses to structural change in the world order. The concept of the passive revolution captures the process as successive 'differential moments' of capitalist development in this site of global transformation. Indeed, each moment produces new configurations of social ideas, political relations and economic structures. At the same time, each moment reproduces pre-existing historical structures of social relations.

In these terms, the internationalization of Japan's political economy cannot be presumed a priori to 'follow' a global strategy. Indeed, Japan's internationalization process has its own 'logic'. In economic terms, this logic rests on the projection of domestic micro-corporatism and network production on a regional scale. These economic patterns were partly based on late-Meiji experiences, and emerged as alternatives to Fordist production after the Second World War. In political terms, the logic rests on Japan's experience with state-led capitalist development or administrative guidance. Although the guiding role of the state has diminished domestically, bureaucracies have shifted their attention to regional articulation of long-term economic goals, institutional design and cooperation. In ideological terms, the logic rests on the reconstruction of a frame of reference proliferating patterns of social differentiation embedded in networks, associations and hierarchies. This cultural frame of reference has served different purposes in different historical periods, but has always appealed to intellectuals who occupied key roles in the socialization of Japan's state and economy.

The resulting historical modes of regulation have always eschewed both political and economic forms of liberalism. The samurai bureaucrats challenged the ascendency of bourgeois liberalism to secure the political and cultural hegemony of the aristocracy in the new nation state. Their successors - the bureaucrats and managers of the late Meiji period - relied on the consensual potency of kokutai to cope with the increasing complexity of Japan's society. Even Taisho 'liberals' articulated their social concerns in terms of appeals to the organic state rather than in terms of a social contract in the realm of civil society. Again, after the Second World War, the 'reverse course' rejected the liberal economic and political reforms imposed upon Japan's state and society by the

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SCAP. The postwar cadre triad rejuvenated a political culture that chan- nelled political bargaining and social coordination outside the public realm of civil society. In the mean time, they experimented with regulation concepts and institutional forms more closely related to the organization of production and the guidance of economic expansion.

The present 'glasnost' of Japan's political culture, providing lip service to both political as well as economic reforms, may very well indicate the erosion of the system. Nevertheless, to assume that, because of this, Japan's political economy has no alternative left than to embrace the neo-liberal project, dismisses the historical logic of current developments. In light of its historical roots, the regionalization of Japan's state and society may challenge visions of an emerging global liberal order. The recognition of this 'Japan Problem' may serve as an antidote to IPE theories that fail to address differentiated processes of capitalist development in different sites of global transformation.

NOTES

This article is based on my graduate work at the Department of Political Science of York University and the Department of International Relations of the University of Amsterdam. I am grateful to Robert Cox, Johan Kaufmann and my supervisor Henk Overbeek for their critical reviews of earlier versions of this paper. I would also like to thank Gina Castillo and the anonymous reviewers of this Journal for their helpful comments and advice.

1 For instance, by monetary policies (the Nixon shocks), exchange rate agree- ments (the Plaza Accord of 1985 resulting in the revaluation of the yen) and political pressure to liberalize the Japanese economy (resulting in the Maekawa Reports of 1986 and 1987 reflecting Prime Minister Nakasone's commitment to macro-economic reform).

2 Nakasone's turn in office (1982-8), appealing to LDP-supporters 'with more emphasis on the liberal and internationally minded metropolitan constituents' (Funabashi, 1989: 93), raised international expectations with regard to Japanese foreign economic policy initiatives and domestic reform. However, the aforementioned Maekawa reports, presented by Nakasone to prove Japan's commitment to liberalization and internationalization did not crystallize into any solid strategy or set of economic policies.

3 The process of socialization consists of the dialectical interaction between, on one hand, the development of patterns of accumulation and the division of labour, and on the other hand, the development of ideological patterns and political forms (Habermas, 1973).

4 To avoid possible confusion with regard to the usage of the term 'class', the author will only adopt the notion of an emerging 'cadre habitus'. This habitus will be associated with the emergence of 'organic intellectuals' (Gramsci, 1971) who come to identify themselves with the project of social regulation rather than with their original class background.

5 Only Dutch merchants were allowed to keep a trading post at the island of Deshima after the Portuguese had been expelled for the attempts by mission- aries to convert the population to Christianity.

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6 The six major banks are: Sumitomo, Sanwa, Fuiji, Dai'ichi, Kangyo and Mitsubishi.

Editors' note: This paper is drawn from Maarten van den Berg's thesis which won the Prize for the Best Master's Thesis in International Relations presented at a Dutch University in 1994. The Prize is awarded each year by a Jury appointed by the Dutch Society for International Affairs. This paper was previously presented at an international workshop in October 1994 sponsored by the MUNS programme of the United Nations University, which took place at the University of Amsterdam.

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http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jspArticle Contentsp. [371]p. 372p. 373p. 374p. 375p. 376p. 377p. 378p. 379p. 380p. 381p. 382p. 383p. 384p. 385p. 386p. 387p. 388p. 389p. 390p. 391p. 392p. 393Issue Table of ContentsReview of International Political Economy, Vol. 2, No. 3 (Summer, 1995), pp. 371-565Front MatterCulture as Ideology in the Conquest of Modernity: The Historical Roots of Japan's Regional Regulation Strategies [pp. 371-393]Territorial Development in the Global Learning Economy: The Challenge to Developing Countries [pp. 394-424]Capital Taxation with Open Borders [pp. 425-445]Bringing Capital Accumulation Back in: The Weapondollar-Petrodollar Coalition-Military Contractors, Oil Companies and Middle East 'Energy Conflicts' [pp. 446-515]Competing Conceptions of Economic Regionalism: APEC versus EAEC in the Asia Pacific [pp. 516-535]Review EssaysReview: Japan's Ministry of Finance and the Politics of Complicity [pp. 536-547]Review: The ERM Crises and Maastricht [pp. 548-560]Back Matter [pp. 561-565]

japan, regional regulations

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