The Asia-Pacific Journal | Japan Focus Volume 14 | Issue 17 | Number 2 | Article ID 4948 | Sep 01, 2016

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Japan’s Problematic Prefecture – Okinawa and the US-JapanRelationship

Gavan McCormack

Shifting the Focus

So rank are the injustices wrought uponOkinawa, and so long continuing, that I am ledto conjecture that the reason the world pays solittle attention to the issues and makes suchmuted criticism of the governments largelyresponsible for the injustices must be that thesituation is so complex and so little-reported asto defy understanding. Historians and politicalscientists pay close attention to the East ChinaSea, but tend to see it, and the militaryconflicts that occur around it, through theprism of the nation state. In what follows, I lookat the present and recent past of the “Okinawaproblem” through the prism of Okinawa, payingclosest attention to how the Okinawan peoplesee their recent past and present. I focusespecially on the years of the (second) AbeShinzo government (beginning December2012).

This essay is designed to chart a path and see apattern in the struggles in the courts and onthe Okinawan streets over recent decades, inthe hope that it might serve as a kind of basicc o m p e n d i u m o n t o d a y ’ s O k i n a w aproblem.1 How can it be that the Japanese stateshould now be attempting to sweep aside theoverwhelming opposition of the Okinawanpeople in order to enforce the reclamation andconstruction works for a major Marine Corpsfacility at Henoko and for a string of MarineCorps “Osprey” landing zones in the vicinity ofTakae hamlet in Higashi village, and that it byand large escapes international scrutiny fordoing this, despite deploying high levels ofdiscrimination and violence towards Okinawain the process?

The “Okinawa problem” is complicated becauseit combines inter-state and intra-stateelements. In its present, intense, form theantagonism between the Japanese nation stateand the people and government of Okinawadates to 1995 but its roots go back at least fourcenturies. For roughly half a millennium(1372-1879) these islands constituted theRyukyu kingdom, self-governed and part of theChina-centred “tribute system” world. Tributemissions plied the routes between Okinawa(then Ryukyu) and the China coast and ritualsubmission, evidently unmarked by violence orthreat, seems to have generated less dissentthan anywhere else in the then Sinic world.Twice, however, over these years, the mutuallybeneficial relationship was disrupted byviolence and the threat of violence, on bothoccasions emanating from Japan, from the pre-modern state of Satsuma in 1609, and thendecisively from the modern Meiji state in 1879,which simply incorporated the islands andabolished the kingdom.2

China protested, but those two interventions,taking place at moments of maximum Chineseweakness and disorder, the early 17th centurydecline of the Ming dynasty in the former caseand the late 19th century decline of the Qingdynasty in the latter, were decisive. On bothoccasions the disruptive force came fromJapanese militarism and imperialism, in thepre-modern form represented by Satsuma’ssamurai and in the modern by the MeijiJapanese state. In the context of imperialistencroachment, civil war, and general decline ofthe 19th century in particular, China had no wayto protest effectively against the Japaneseseverance of the China link and incorporation

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of Ryukyu as Okinawa prefecture. Negotiationstowards a diplomatic agreement on the EastChina Sea border (and its islands, including notonly Okinawa but also Miyako, Ishigaki andYonaguni) in 1880-81 ended without resolution– although Japan had signalled its readiness toabandon the border islands – and eventuallyJapan dictated its terms on the region byvictory in the Sino-Japanese war of 1894-5.When Chinese voices in a much later era wereraised to complain that there had been nonegotiated diplomatic settlement of the EastChina Sea, it was strictly speaking correct.3

In 1945 Okinawa was the sole part of Japanthat suffered the full force of American groundinvasion and the “typhoon of steel” thatpulverized the island, resulting in the deaths ofbetween one-quarter and one-third of thepopulation. As the war turned to occupation,and with the survivors in internment camps,the US enforced its claim to the prefecture’sbest lands, upon which it then constructed thenetwork of military bases that remain to thisday, a process remembered in Okinawa as oneof “bayonet and bulldozer.” In the peaceagreement eventually signed at San Franciscooccupation, the Japanese government, in partfollowing the express wish of the emperor,encouraged the US to retain full control overOkinawa, with the result that it was 1972before “administrative control” reverted toJapan. Even then, however, “reversion” wasnominal, because the US retained its assets,the chain of bases, and extraterritorialauthority over them, and even exacted a hugepayment from Japan accompanying the deal.

During the 27-year period when Okinawa wascompletely under US rule, when there was nodemocracy and no mechanism for registeringOkinawan protest, the American base structurewas reduced in Japan proper but concentratedand expanded in Okinawa prefecture. 74 percent of US base presence in Japan came to beconcentrated on Okinawa’s 0.6 per cent of thenational land. Over the 44 years since

“reversion “ Okinawan governments havesought in vain to regain the sovereignty thenlost, facing governments in Tokyo committed tofaithful service of the US. As the Cold War wasliquidated elsewhere, despite Okinawanexpectations of liberation, it was retained andreinforced for them, and they were subject topersistent lying, deception, manipulation anddiscrimination.4 Okinawa became, and remains,to today a joint US-Japanese colony in all butname.

Richard Falk sets the “forgotten” Okinawanproblem in comparative context:

“The tragic fate that has befallen Okinawa andits people results from being a ‘colony’ in apost-colonial era … captive of a militarizedworld order that refuses to acknowledge thesupposedly inal ienable r ight of sel f -determination. From a global perspective[Okinawa] is a forgotten remnant of thecolonial past … In this respect it bears akinship with such other forgotten peoples asthose living in Kashmir, Chechenya, Xinjiang,Tibet, Puerto Rico, Palau, [the] MarianasIslands, among others.”

Since the end of the Cold War, and especiallyunder the two Abe Shinzo governments(2006-2007 and 2012- ) Japan’s defence andsecurity systems have moved closer to fullintegration with those of the US. Major newfacilities are under way for the US in Okinawa,Guam and the Marianas, and for the JapaneseSelf-Defense Forces on the Southwesternislands of Amami, Miyako, and the Yaeyama’s(Ishigaki and Yonaguni), while Abe proceedstowards setting up Japanese versions of the CIAand the Marine Corps (an "amphibious rapiddeployment brigade"). In the first year of hissecond spell as Prime Minister, Abe alarmedWashington with his history and identityagenda (Yasukuni, comfort women, warmemory) but gradually and under intensepressure he shifted his focus to economy andsecurity, more than compensating, and setting

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aside for the time being the former. Hissecurity agenda depends on establishingOkinawa as joint American-Japanese militaryheadquarters for the East Asian region.

Henoko, 1996-2012

Just 16 kms east of the capital, Naha, lies thebustling city of Ginowan, about one-quarter ofwhich (including what should be its mid-city) istaken up by Futenma Marine Air Station. USforces first occupied the site around 70 yearsago when the residents of the area had beenrounded up into detention centres even beforethe formal Japanese surrender at the end of thewar, and have continued to occupy it, in breachof international law (Article 46 of the 1907Hague Convention on the Laws and Customs ofWar forbids occupying armies from confiscationof private property) even if with the consent, orencouragement, of the government of Japan,ever since. Okinawan resentment for long wassimmering, but with the gang-rape of anOkinawan schoolgirl by three US servicemen in1995, it came to the boil. A year later, in 1996,the governments of Japan and the US struck adeal: its main provisions were that Futenma AirStation would be returned to Japan “within 5 to7 years” on condition that an alternative“heliport” facility for the marine Corps beprovided, and that about half of the Yambaruforest area spanning Higashi and Kunigamivillages, known to the Americans as CampGonsalves and serving as a Jungle WarfareCentre, would also be returned when additional“helipads” were substituted for those in thearea to be returned.

As the 1972 “reversion” deal had cloaked“retention” of key US bases and extraterritorialprivileges under the Status of ForcesAgreement or SOFA, so this 1996 agreementfor apparent “reversion” cloaked a significantexpansion and upgrade of US military facilities.Henoko on Oura Bay was the designated sitefor a mega military complex, and the Yambaruforest for a supplementary chain of mini-bases.

The “Futenma Replacement Facility” (FRF)agreed between the two governments of Japanand the US in 1996 would be a “heliport” builtat Henoko on Oura Bay. Okinawans struggledby mass non-violent resistance, however, tosuch extent that the first (1999) design, for ademountable, offshore “floating base,” wascancelled in 2005 because, as then PrimeMinis ter Ko izumi put i t , o f “a lo t o fopposition”6 and, as was later learned, becausethe Japanese Coastguard was reluctant to beinvolved in enforcing the removal of protestersfrom the site for fear of bloodshed.7 In its steadthe current (2006) design, for extension of theexisting Camp Schwab Marine Corps site bysubstantial reclamation into Oura Bay, wasadopted. It grew into today's project to reclaim160 hectares of sea fronting Henoko Bay to theeast and Oura Bay to the west, imposing on it amass of concrete towering 10 metres above thesea and featuring two 1,800 metre runways anda deep-sea 272 meter-long dock, constituting aland-sea-air base with its own deep-water portand other facilities. Smaller in area, it would befar more multifunctional and amount to asignificant upgrade of the inconvenient andobsolescent Futenma.

Alongside the nearby massive Kadena US AirForce (USAF) base, the prospective Henokofacility would serve through the 21st century aspotentially the largest concentration of land,sea, and air military power in East Asia, fromwhich Japanese and US forces would combineto confront and contain China. The Abegovernment’s public and often repeatedrationale for Henoko construction, moreover, isthat it is the only way to accomplish reversionof the Marine Corps’ Futenma base.

However, though less densely populated thanthe Futenma vicinity, Henoko happens to beone of the most bio-diverse and spectacularlybeautiful marine and coastal zones in all Japan,core to the "Amami-Ryukyu island zone that theMinistry of the Environment wants to promoteas a UNESCO World Heritage Site. It hosts a

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cornucopia of life forms from blue–and manyother species of–coral (with the countlessmicro-organisms to which they are host)through crustaceans, sea cucumbers andseaweeds and hundreds of species of shrimp,snail, fish, tortoise, snake and mammal, manyrare or endangered and strictly protected. Inthe seas the dugong and Japan’s only intactcoral reef, and in the forest the Yambarukuinarail and Noguchigera woodpecker, have cometo stand for all the creatures of the site vicinity.

When the Democratic Party assumed office in2009, it found that its hands had been tied by aformal government to government agreement,the “Guam International Agreement,”negotiated in haste by Hillary Clinton to shieldthe Futenma substitution agreement from anyattempt by a new government to revisitit.8 Months later, as Clinton had foreseen,Hatoyama Yukio came to office pledging totransfer Futenma "at least outside Okinawa"(saitei demo kengai). His efforts to accomplishthis were feeble and the Guam InternationalAgreement locked his government intosubmission. His failed promise to Okinawanevertheless helped sowed seeds of hope thathave underpinned the anti-base movement eversince.

By the time Abe Shinzo formed a government inDecember 2012, he faced an unprecedentedOkinawan consensus, shared by the Governor,Prefectural and City Assemblies, prefecturalchapters of the major national political parties(including Liberal Democratic Party and NewKomeito), the two main newspapers andmajority opinion in general (according torepeated surveys): it was time to wind back theUS military presence, not reinforce it; Oura Bayhad to be saved. If a new base was needed, itcould be constructed outside Okinawa.

Futenma/Henoko from 2012

The government of Abe Shinzo, in his secondterm commencing in December 2012, facedthis solid phalanx of opposition (in effect, the

entire prefecture), but was determinednevertheless that Henoko would be builtaccording to plan.9 In January 2013, anextraordinary Okinawan delegation, theKempakusho, made up of the heads ofOkinawan cities, towns and villages, andprefectural assembly representatives, called onthe government in Tokyo to demandunconditional closure and return of Futenma,abandonment of the Henoko base substituteproject and withdrawal of the MV-22 Ospreyvertical take-off and landing (VTOL) MarineCorps aircraft. The delegation was headed byNaha City mayor, Onaga Takeshi, and many ofits members were, like Onaga, staunchlyconservative. Abe brusquely dismissed themand the coldness and abuse they experiencedboth from him and in the streets of Tokyohelped feed the identity politics that laterbecame “All Okinawa.”

Thereafter, Prime Minister Abe concentratedon dividing and neutralizing that opposition.LDP party chief Ishiba Shigeru expressed whatwas probably the shared view withingovernment when he wrote of the burgeoningprotest movement in his blog (on 29 November2013) that after all there was little difference insubstance between vociferous demonstratorsand terrorists.10 Opposition to any Oura Bayconstruction rose steadily, from 74 per cent inlate April of 2014 to over 80 per cent in lateAugust.11

Through 2013, Abe secured the surrender,first, in April of two prominent OkinawanLiberal-Democratic Party (LDP) Diet members,followed in December by the Okinawa chapterof the LDP itself and eventually by theGovernor, Nakaima Hirokazu, who issued thenecessary license for reclamation of Oura Bayas site for the base. Abe then turned to seriouspreparations for reclamation and construction,declaring, at the beginning of July 2014, justover half of Oura Bay off limits and initiatingthe preliminary boring survey. Despite theunfailingly non-violent character of the

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Okinawan movement, large numbers ofprefectural riot police were sent against them,reinforced from late the following year bydetachments from all over Japan. The riotpolice land force was matched at sea by theNational Coastguard, whose armed vesselswere commissioned to fend off the canoes andkayaks of protesters.

The surrender of the Okinawa branch of theLDP in December 2013, however, was notenough to break the prefectural opposition.Instead it was the Okinawan LDP that split,turncoats submitting to Abe outweighed bythose who followed Onaga into what becameknown as the “All Okinawa” camp. The sense ofbetrayal stirred the Okinawan anti-base forcesto a new level of mobilization. Through 2014,an entire prefecture voted against the nationalgovernment’s plans (and rejected itsblandishments) at successive elections and atmultiple levels. In January, Nago City (whichincludes Henoko and Oura Bays, the designatednew base construction site) returned as itsmayor the anti-base (“no new base in this citywhether on land or on sea”) Inamine Susumu,in the process rejecting the extraordinary offerby the LDP Secretary-General of a 50 billionyen “inducement” fund for Nago Citydevelopment if only it would elect a pro-basecandidate. In September, Nago returned ananti-base majority to the City Assembly. InNovember, Onaga Takeshi was chosen asGovernor by an unprecedentedly large margin(380,820 to 261,076) over the turncoatNakaima Hirokazu, after pledging to do"everything in my power" to stop constructionat Henoko, close Futenma Air Base, and havethe Marine Corps' controversial Osprey MV 22aircraft withdrawn from the prefecture. Then inDecember all four Okinawan constituencies inthe lower house of the Diet returned anti-basecandidates in the national elections. It was adecisive democratic rebuff to the governmentin Tokyo.

Early in 2015, the Okinawa Defense Bureau

dropped 49 concrete blocks (each weighingbetween 10 and 45 tons), into Oura Bay asanchor for the works to come, causing damageto coral that was clear in photographs taken bynaturalists and journalists. Onaga orderedthem to stop (16 February) but declined toformally cancel the permit for rock and coralcrushing issued by his predecessor in August2014, despite strong urgings from Okinawanc iv i l soc ie ty and nature protect ionorganizations. Inexplicably, he declared,"unfortunately it is not possible to make ajudgement as to destruction of coral."12

Although works were several times suspendedduring the year that followed due to fiercecontinuing Okinawan protest, typhoon weather,and the exigencies of elections, budgetaryallocations continued to pass unchallenged,tenders to be let, landfill sought and allocated,workers hired. Abe repeatedly assured the USgovernment that the works would proceedaccording to his plan, irrespective of Okinawansentiment.

"All Okinawa" and Governor Onaga, 2014

From December 2014, therefore, Okinawa hada Governor and a prefectural assembly orparliament committed to stopping theconstruction works at Henoko and restoringOura Bay. Yet, new governor notwithstanding,prefectural riot police and national Coastguardforces continued to crush protesters andgovernment contractors bore into the bed ofOura Bay.

Onaga’s appeal to Okinawan mass sentimentwas based on his "re-birth" as an avatar of "All-Okinawa" identity politics, transcending thecategories of conservative and progressive,"left" and "right," and proclaiming the principleof "identity over ideology." Yet, the problemwith that “All Okinawa” mantra is thatidentities are commonly multiple. Okinawangovernor Onaga is both implacable opponent ofthe national government in certain respectsand yet in other respects the quintessential,

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conservative local government Japanesepolitician. He is not only Okinawan but, likePrime Minister Abe, a lifelong (to 2014)member of the Liberal Democratic Party. Whilehe poses a major challenge, rooted in identitypolitics, to the government of Japan (andbeyond it, to that of the United States), it is notclear how far he can be expected to lead theprefecture down the path of resistance to hisconservative colleagues and counterparts atthe helm of the nation state. WhetherOkinawan identity can trump ideology andgenerate a credible democratic politics remainsto be seen.

Upon taking office as Governor, Onaga wasshocked to find that major figures (PrimeMinister, Cabinet Secretary, Foreign Minister)refused to see him. Chief Cabinet SecretarySuga said bluntly, "I have no intention to meeth im dur ing [ the rema inder o f ] th i syear."13 Defense Secretary Nakatani said (13March 2015) it would be “meaningless.” Thatstance was of course not long tenable, but thehostility it expressed was palpable. At theHenoko site, where the sit-in at the gate ofCamp Schwab began in July 2014, protesterswere harassed and threatened. Ryukyu shimpoeditorialized,

"As far as we know, the government has neverunleashed such reckless disregard of the will ofthe people as we have seen at Henoko. … Wewonder if there has ever been a case like this,where the government has trampled on the willof the overwhelming majority of people in aprefecture elsewhere in Japan. This action bythe government evokes memories of thecrackdown against peasants during the Edoperiod. … The Abe government seems to be inthe process of moving from 'dictatorship' to'terror politics'."14

The US authorities refused (for "operationalreasons") permission to the Governor to enterthe site to conduct the survey he had promisedto assess damage to the coral from the

concrete blocks dropped into the sea-floor, andthe government, brushing aside protest,resumed the process. In a particularlyegregious act of violence, in March 2015 it sentin riot police to rip away the tent-l ikeprotection that had been put in place for aNational Sanshin Day performance at CampSchwab Gate by 20 Okinawan performers (onthe Okinawan three-stringed instrument knownin Japan as shamisen), leaving them to performin the rain. On 12 March 2015, it began to boreinto the sea floor from a gigantic drilling rig.15

Though Onaga's support level remains high inOkinawa, there are nagging doubts about howhe would reconcile his “All Okinawa” posturewith his conservative record. Onaga has limitedhis differences with Tokyo to two specificdemands: closure of Futenma withoutsubstitution (i.e., abandonment of the Henokoproject), and withdrawal of the MV-22 Ospreyaircraft, the subjects of the Kempakushoprotest delegation to Tokyo that he led inJanuary 2013. Onaga makes no secret of hissupport for the US-Japan Security Treaty andthe base system (obviously with the exceptionof the Futenma substitution project), and hewas silent during the summer of nation-wideprotest against the Abe government’s secrecyand security bills in 2015, suggesting that hesupported, or at least did not oppose, Abe’scontroversial interpretation of collective self-d e f e n s e a n d s e c u r i t y l e g i s l a t i o npackage.16 Onaga also remained silent on theOsprey-pad construction protest at Takae untilthe summer of 2016, and even then made novisit to the site and no attempt to assert hisauthority over the riot police who acted in hisname, reserving his criticism for the relianceon force, the “excesses” rather than the actitself. When riot police reinforcements weresent from mainland Japan to enforce works atHenoko from late 2015 and at Takae from July2016 they were sent under the provisions of theNational Police Law (1954) at the request ofthe Prefectural Public Safety Commission,whose members are responsible to and

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nominated (or dismissed by) the Governor.17 Itis one of the paradoxes of contemporaryOkinawan politics that Onaga has not beensubjected to any public demand that he attemptto exercise authority over prefectural policing,for example by cancelling or withdrawing therequest for such reinforcements. At least intheory, he could dismiss any or all of its fivemembers and appoint others who wouldrepresent Okinawan principles.18

Onaga could, however, be very forthright inmaking his prefecture’s case. While Abe and hisministers insisted that the Henoko projectamounted to a “burden reduction” for Okinawa,that it was the only way to achieve Futenmareturn and that it was irreversible, Onagaspoke of an inequitable and increasing burden,building upon the initial illegal seizure ofOkinawan land and in defiance of the clearlyand often expressed wishes of the Okinawanpeople; of a struggle for justice and democracyand for the protect ion of Oura Bay’sextraordinary natural biodiversity, worthy, ashe saw it, of World Heritage ranking. Onagaquoted the Okinawa Defense Bureau estimateof more than 5,800 kinds of biota in the Bayzone, (262 of them in danger of extinction), andreferred to the sea around Henoko as beingtwice as rich in biota as the sea aroundGalapagos,19 and noted the likely environmentaldevastation that dumping into the Bay of 3.4million dump-truck loads (20 million cubicmetres) of soil and sand for reclamation wouldbe likely to cause.20

The state under Abe has tended to adoptperverse or arbitrary readings of law andconstitution, and in regard to Henoko it hasrelied on superior force and intimidation. It iscertain that no other prefectural governor inJapan would ever refer to the nationalgovernment in the way that Onaga does, as“condescending ,” “unreasonable ,”“outrageous,” (rifujin) “childish” (otonagenai)and even “depraved,” (daraku).21 Before theUnited Nations Human Rights Commission in

Geneva in September 2015, he accused it of“ignoring the people's will.”2 2 He alsocomplained about the government’s weaknessin being “completely lacking in ability to sayanything to America."23 To the Prime Minister,Onaga said,

“Construction of Futenma and other bases wascarried out after seizure of land and forcibleappropriation of residences at point of bayonetand bulldozer, while Okinawan people after thewar were still confined in detention centres.Nothing could be more outrageous than [foryou] to try to say to Okinawans whose land wastaken f rom them for what i s now anobsolescent base [i.e. Futenma], the world’smost dangerous, that they should bear thatburden and, if they don’t like it, they shouldcome up with an alternative plan.”24

Judicial Proceedings (1) The ExpertsReport (2015)

To advise him on the legal and environmentalquestions arising from the consent given by hispredecessor to the reclamation of Oura Bay,Onaga early in 2015 set up an advisorycommittee of experts, the “Third PartyCommission on the Procedure for Approval ofReclamation of Public Waters for theConstruction of a Futenma ReplacementAirfield,” to identify possible flaws in the legalprocess that might warrant its cancelation.

The Commission’s report, on 16 July, amountedto an unambiguous finding of multipleprocedural “breaches” (kashi) in the way theNakaima administration had made its crucialDecember 2013 decision to approve theenvironmental assessment. It adopted thecommon exper t v iew o f the Henokoenvironmental impact assessment (EIA) processas "the worst in the history of JapaneseEIA . " 2 5 I t found that “necess i ty forreclamation,” a crucial consideration under the1973 revision to the "Reclamation of PubliclyOwned Water Surfaces Act" (Koyu suimen

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umetateho, 1921), had not been established. Ofthe six specific criteria under Article 4 of thatlaw for reclamation, the Henoko project failedon three. It did not meet the tests of proof of“appropriate and rational use of the nationalland,” proper consideration for “environmentalpreservation and disaster prevention,” andcompatibility with “legally based plans by thenat ional government or local publ icorganizat ions regarding land use orenvironmental conservation.” It was alsoincompatible with other laws including the SeaCoast Law (1956) and the Basic Law forBiodiversity (2008). In short, the basis of thereclamation project was legally flawed.26 Thisopened the path for Onaga to cancel thereclamation license.

Following a one-month (August-September2015) lull in the Oura Bay confrontation while around of “talks” was conducted fruitlessly, thegovernment reiterated (through the Minister ofDefense) its stance that there had been no“flaw” in the license Nakaima had granted. Ittherefore ordered site works resumed. Itsagents scoured the coastal hills and beaches ofWestern Japan to identify and place orders formillions of tons of soil and sand to dump intoOura Bay. It also ordered an additional 100-plus riot police (units with names such as“Demon” and “Hurricane”) from Tokyo toreinforce the mostly local Okinawan forces whotill then had been imposing the state’s will atthe construction site. Eventually, on October13, Onaga formally revoked (torikeshi orcanceled) the reclamation license.27

The national government, its warrant for worksremoved, temporarily suspended them, but theOkinawa Defense Bureau (OBD) formallycomplained to the Ministry of Land,Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (MLITT),protesting that there were no flaws in theNakaima land reclamation approval ofDecember 2013 and that Governor Onaga'srevocation of it was illegal, asking MLITT toreview, suspend, and nullify that order under

the Administrative Appeal Act.28 Onagapresented a 950-page dossier in which heoutlined the prefectural case,29 but, following acabinet meeting on October 27, MLITT MinisterIshii Keiichi duly suspended the Onaga orderon grounds that otherwise it would be"impossible to continue the relocation" andbecause in that event "the US-Japan alliancewould be adversely affected."30 To GovernorOnaga, he issued first (October 27) an “advice,”and then, days later (November 6), an“instruction” to withdraw the cancellationorder. Onaga refused. On October 29, works atHenoko resumed, the government referring tothem as "main works" (hontai koji), evidently inorder to have them seen as a fait accompli,inducing despair and abandonment of thestruggle on the part of protesters, even thoughthe boring survey was still at that pointincomplete and the outcome of the struggle farfrom determined.

On 2 November, Onaga launched a prefecturalcomplaint against the Abe government with theCentral and Local Government DisputesManagement Council, a hitherto relativelyinsignificant independent review body set up in2000 by the government's Department ofGeneral Affairs. That Council took barely sixweeks, to 24 December, to dismiss thecomplaint, without calling upon any evidence.Despite the fact that it would be hard toimagine anything that could better qualify as adispute between those two wings ofgovernment, it ruled, mysteriously, that thecomplaint was "beyond the scope of matters itcould investigate."31

While this Disputes Council complaint wasbeing heard, on November 17 2015, thenational government (through the Minister ofLand, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism, orMLITT) filed suit against the Okinawangovernment under the Administrative AppealsAct, alleging administrative malfeasance andseeking to have Onaga's order set aside and a"proxy execution" procedure adopted.

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The presiding judge in this "proxy execution"suit was Tamiya Toshiro. Tamiya had onlytaken up office in this court two weeks earlier,on 30 October, following transfer by theMinistry of Justice from the Tokyo High Court.32

There was speculation that his appointment,weeks before the government’s suit againstGovernor was lodged, might have been theresult of bureaucratic/judicial collusiondesigned to ensure Okinawan submission to thebase construction plan. There was no doubtthat the government wanted at all costs tosecure a court ruling that would confirm theMLITT minister's reinstatement or “proxyexecution” of the land reclamation approval.But beyond that, and with Judge Tamiya’sverdict still some weeks away at time ofwriting, it is impossible to go at this point.

On 25 December, the prefecture launched itscounter-suit in the same Naha branch of theFukuoka High Court, seeking to have theOctober ruling by the Minister set aside. Theextraordinary nature of the conflict was thusevident as state and prefectural authoritiessued each other over the same matters and inthe same Naha court.

The prefecture insisted it was a breach of itsconstitutional entitlement to self-governmentfor the state to impose the Henoko constructionproject on it unilaterally and by force. Onagapointed to what he saw, on expert advice, asfatal flaws in the land reclamation approvalprocess. He objected to the ODB's use of theAdministrative Appeal Act, for which purposethe state was pretending to be just like a"private person" (ichishijin) complaining undera law specifically designed to allow individualcitizens to seek redress against unjustified orillegal acts by governmental agencies, andnoted that, while the state sought relief as anaggrieved citizen it deployed its full powers andprerogatives as state under the Local Self-Government Law to sweep aside prefecturalself-government and assume the right to proxyexecution of an administrative act (gyosei

daishikko). The state was in his view thusadopting a perverse and arbitrary reading ofthe law.

The state, for its part, argued that base matterswere its prerogative, having nothing to do withlocal self-government, and being a matter oftreaty obligations were not subject to anyconstitutional barrier. Abe spoke repeatedly of“Futenma return,” but only on condition thatthere was a substitute, and the substitute hadto be in Okinawa, and in Okinawa at Henoko.That new base would be more multi-functional,more modern, and almost certainly permanentbut, by his reasoning, its building wouldamount to a "burden reduction" for Okinawa.

Tamiya rejected applications by the prefectureto call expert witnesses on military and defensematters (who might dispute the need for aMarine Corps presence in Okinawa) or on theenvironment or environmental assessment law(who might challenge the compatibility ofOkinawa's unique bio-diversity with large-scalereclamation and militarization). The matter onwhich his court showed strong, evenexceptional, interest was the securing of anexplicit statement from Governor Onaga thathe would abide by its ruling.33 In proceedingsbefore the Tamiya court six months later(discussed below) this same pattern wasapparent.

J u d i c i a l P r o c e e d i n g s ( 2 )Wakai/Conciliation (2016)

As the flurry of writs and interrogatoriescontinued, and the tense and sometimes violentconfrontation continued between state powera n d p r o t e s t i n g c i t i z e n s a t t h ereclamation/construction site, it was hard toimagine where ground for compromise mightbe found. Yet that is precisely what ChiefJustice Tamiya ordered when, on January 29,2016, he advised the disputing parties in thesuit launched by the Government of Japanagainst Governor Onaga to consider an out-of-court settlement. He began with the following

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exhortation:34

"At present the situation is one of confrontationbetween Okinawa and the Government ofJapan. So far as the cause of this is concerned,before any consideration of which is at faultboth sides should reflect that it should not belike this. Under the 1999 revision to the LocalAutonomy Law it was envisaged that the stateand regional public bodies would serve theirrespective functions as independentadministrative bodies in an equal, cooperativerelationship (italics added). That is especiallydesirable in the performance of statutory orentrusted matters. The present situation is atodds with the spirit of this revised law.

The situation that in principle should exist isfor all Japan, including Okinawa, to come to anagreement on a solution and to seek thecooperation of the United States. If they didthis, it could become the occasion for positivecooperation on the part of the US too, includingbroad reform.35

Instead, if the issue continues to be contestedbefore the courts, and even if the state wins thepresent judicial action, hereafter it may beforeseen that the reclamation license might berescinded or that approval of changesaccompanying modification of the design wouldbecome necessary, and that the courtroomstruggle would continue indefinitely. Even thenthere could be no guarantee that it would besuccessful. In such a case, as the Governor'swide discretionary powers come to berecognized, the risk of defeat is high. And, evenif the state continued to win, the works arelikely to be considerably delayed. On the otherhand, even if the prefecture wins, if it turns outthat the state would not ask for Futenma returnbecause it insists that Henoko construction isthe only way forward, then it is inconceivablethat Okinawa by itself could negotiate with theUS and secure Futenma's return."

Tamiya thus rebuked and warned the statethat, unless it fundamentally changed its

strategy, it was heading towards defeat. Inparticular he focussed attention on the 1999revision to the Local Autonomy Act that turnedthe national-prefectural governmentrelationship from instrumental (vertical,superior/inferior) to equal and cooperative.Tamiya went on to urge the parties to"conciliate" (wakai), offering two alternatives,"basic" and "provisional." The “basic” solutionwould have Okinawa reverse its withdrawal ofthe reclamation permit in exchange for theJapanese government opening negotiationswith the U.S. to have the new base

“either returned to Japan or converted into ajoint military-civilian airport at some pointwithin thirty years from the time it becomesoperational."

The inclusion of provisos for the defendant[prefecture] and the plaintiff [the state] tocooperate in the reclamation and subsequentoperation [of the base] meant that this plan waspredicated on the contested base at Henokoactually being built and provided to the MarineCorps, probably until at least the year 2045 (orindeed much longer, because there could be noguarantee as to how the Government of theUnited States would respond to any Japaneserequest at such a remote future date). Therewas nothing conciliatory or amicable about it. Itwas hard to see in such ideas any inkling of asolution. Nakasone Isamu, himself a retiredjudge, noted,

“the success or failure of diplomatic negotiationwith the United States is contingent on thecooperation of a third party, namely the UnitedStates. In other words, the paragraph does notdescribe something that the Japanesegovernment has the authority to execute freely.Thus it fails to adhere to the requisites of aterm of settlement, and thus the settlementproposal as a whole lacks validity from a legalstandpoint.”36

Under the “provisional” plan the state wouldstop site works, and the parties open talks

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towards a satisfactory resolution (enmankaiketsu) pending outcome of a judicialdetermination, which both parties wouldrespect and implement. If the talks failed toachieve a solution, the government would thenfile a different, less legally forceful type oflawsuit to verify the legality of the permitwithdrawal.

Although it was hard to see how negotiations in2016 would accomplish more than the"intensive negotiations" of August-September2015, or how fresh court proceedings wouldovercome the problems the judge himselfalluded to, on 4 March the parties came, asdirected by Tamiya, to an "out-of-court" or“amicable” (wakai) settlement.37 Site workswere halted, both parties withdrew theirexisting suits under the Administrative AppealsAct and the state agreed to ask the prefectureunder Article 25 of the Local Autonomy Act tocancel the order cancelling the reclamationlicense and agree to the matter being referredto the Central and Local Government DisputesManagement Council in the event of itsdeclining. Clearly Tamiya’s court saw such asuit as more appropriate to the formally equalrelationship between the parties than theexecution-by-proxy suit that the Abegovernment had chosen. The parties woulddiscuss and seek "satisfactory resolution"pending the f inal outcome of judicialproceedings, and both would then abide bywhatever outcome then emerged.

The fact that Judge Tamiya combined formal,procedural critique of the Abe government'with support for its case, evident in thisrecommendation of a "solution" that involvedconstruction of the very base that Okinawanswere determined to stop, held ominousimplications for the prefecture. The barb in the“Amicable Agreement” was the superficiallyinnocuous "sincerity" provision eventuallyincorporated in Paragraph 9, designed toremove any possible further recourse to thecourts once the Supreme Court comes to its

decision. It read:

"The complainant and other interested partiesand the defendant reciprocally pledge that,after the judgment in the suit for cancellationof the rectification order becomes final, theywill immediately comply with that judgmentand carry out procedures in accord with theruling and its grounds, and also that thereafterthey will mutually cooperate and sincerelyrespond to the spirit of the ruling."38

Challenged in the Okinawa PrefecturalAssembly on 8 March 2016 as to what thiscommitment to "cooperate and sincerelyrespond to the spirit of the ruling" meant,Governor Onaga explained his understandingthat, although his October 2015 order mightthereby be cancelled, and the Nakaima licenserestored, in respect of all other matters hewould make "appropriate judgement in accordwith the law."39 He did not go into detail, butthat would seem to mean that, even if defeatedin court, he could still resort to his ultimatesanction - repeal of the Nakaima reclamationlicense (umetate shonin tekkai), going beyondthe "cancelation" order he had issued inOctober 2014. Not only that but he could, andevidently would, refuse or obstruct requestsfrom the state for detailed adjustments to thereclamation plan or engineering design.40 NagoCity mayor Inamine has also made it clear onmany occasions that he would follow suit.

Since the March 4 "amicable settlement” wasdrawn up and agreed in accord with courtdirectives, it was neither "out-of-court" nor a"settlement." Nor was there anything“amicable” about it. Under it the governmentshifted its case against Okinawa from theAdministrative Appeals Act, where its positionwas procedural ly weak, to the LocalGovernment Act, where it might be stronger.

Japan versus Okinawa, 2014-2016 - MajorEvents

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2014 10 December Onaga Takeshi assumes office as Governor of Okinawa. 2015

16 JulyOkinawan “Third Party [Experts] Committee advises Oura Bayreclamation license issued December 2013 by (former) GovernorNakaima “flawed.”

13 October Governor Onaga cancels Oura Bay reclamation license.27 October Government (Ishii, MLITT Minister) “suspends” Onaga order.

2 November Okinawa prefecture complains to Disputes Council (Central and LocalGovernment Disputes Management Council).

17 NovemberNational Government (Ishii, MLITT) launches malfeasance suit underAdministrative Appeals Act in Naha Court (Fukuoka High Court, Nahabranch) against Okinawa seeking “proxy execution.”

24 December Disputes Council refuses to act on prefectural complaint.25 December Prefecture launches suit in Naha court against government. 2016 29 January Naha Court advises government and prefecture to settle.4 March Wakai (out-of-court) Settlement.7 March State (Ishii, MLITT) demands Onaga retract his cancelation order.

14 March Onaga (Prefecture) refuses MLITT request (as an “illegal intervention bythe state”).

17 June Disputes Council refuses to rule, urging “sincere discussions” to resolve“continuing undesirable” relations between state and prefecture.

22 July State launches new suit against prefecture in Naha Court.

16 September Naha court verdict expected (likely to be followed by appeal to SupremeCourt).

Judicial Proceedings (3) “Out of Court”

However, no sooner had the "AmicableSettlement" with Okinawa promising those"discussions aimed at satisfactory resolution"been reached than Prime Minister Abe insistedanew that Henoko was "the only option,"implying that there was nothing to negotiatebut Okinawa's surrender.41 Just three days afteragreeing to engage in discussions, and withoutso much as a preliminary meeting, MLITTMinister Ishii (for the government) sentGovernor Onaga a formal request that heretract his cancellation of the Oura Bayreclamation license (i.e. that he restore thelicense granted by Nakaima in December2013). It was exactly as prescribed underParagraph 3 of the agreement, committing theparties to proceed in accord with Article 245 ofthe Local Autonomy Law, but it was plainly atodds with the prescription under Paragraph 8:that they negotiate.

"Until such time as a finalized court judgementon the proceedings for cancellation of therectification order is issued, the plaintiff andother interested parties and the defendant willundertake discussions aimed at 'satisfactoryresolution' (enman kaiketsu) of the Futenma

airfield return and the current [Henoko]reclamation matter."

On March 14, Governor Onaga responded,refusing. He pointed out that the Governmenthad given no reason for its request andtherefore his cancellation order could not beseen as a breach of the law.42 Submitting thematter to the Disputes Management Council,he referred to Ishii's act as "an illegalintervention by the state."43 It was, he said, a"pity" that the government had seen fit to issuesuch a Rectification Order immediately afterentering the Amicable Agreement.

The five-member Disputes ManagementCouncil, since its establishment in 2000 hadonly twice been called upon to adjudicate adispute and on neither occasion – both mattersof relatively minor importance – had it issuedany ruling against the government.44 It was anunlikely avenue for resolution of a majordispute between national and regionalgovernments especially since it had abstainedfrom doing so just months earlier, in December2015, without so much as a statement of itsreasons.

While the national government insisted therewas no alternative to Henoko construction,Onaga told the Dispute Resolution Council thatthe project was “a monumental idiocy likely tocause a treasure of humanity to vanish from theearth.”45 There was little or no room forcompromise between the prefecture’sargument that the Nakaima consent toreclamation was wrongful because it failed tomeet the requirements of the Reclamation Actand the state’s argument that reclamation waswithin its powers because it had exclusiveresponsibility for defense and foreign relations.

The Council, however, on June 17, 2016delivered an astonishing judgement:unanimously, it refused to rule on thelegitimacy of MLITT Minster Ishii’s Marchorder to the Okinawan Governor. The panel

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head, Kobayakawa Mitsuo, told a pressconference,

“We thought issuing either a positive or anegative judgement on the rectification orderwould not be beneficial in helping the state andlocal governments create desirable relations.”46

The panel lamented the “cont inuingundesirable” state of relations between stateand prefecture , and urged “s incerediscussions” to reach agreement.47 Since itissued no ruling, it meant that GovernorOnaga’s cancelation order remained in place,and that site works could not be resumed. Inthat sense it might be seen as a victory for theprefecture. But the constitutional problem wasleft: if a Commission especially set up to decideon disputes between national and regionalgovernments could not resolve them, who orwhat could?

Judicial Proceedings (4) Back to JudgeTamiya’s Court

With the door thus closed by the DisputesManagement Council, on July 22, the nationalgovernment filed a fresh suit with the Nahabranch of the Fukuoka High Court (i.e. JudgeTamiya’s court), seeking a ruling that theOkinawan government comply with the MLITTminister’s order and amend (reverse) itsrevocation of permission for landfill work onOura Bay. It declared that it had alreadysubmitted its detailed case on grounds offoreign affairs and defence policy in theprevious hearings and would not repeat it. Itmade no reference to Judge Tamiya’s injunctionthat central and regional government bodiesperform “their respective functions asindependent administrative bodies in an equal,cooperative relationship.” Nor did it mentionhis call for resolution of their differences bynegotiation. It thus turned its back on theconciliation process ordered by Tamiya’s courtwhen in January it called for:

“all Japan, including Okinawa, to come to an

agreement on a solution and to seek thecooperation of the United States. If they didthis, it could become the occasion for positivecooperation on the part of the US too, includingbroad reform.”

And likewise on the Disputes Council’s call for“sincere negotiations.” Its position that therewas no alternative to Henoko construction andtherefore nothing to negotiate bordered oncontempt of court, and presented a dilemma forJudge Tamiya. As the Asahi Shimbun noted inMarch, the Abe government’s actions

"suggest the arrogance that comes fromregarding Okinawa as an inferior, despite theHigh Court's statement that the centralgovernment and all local governments are'equals'."48

As for Okinawa, through its Governor and itsPrefectural Assembly, its parliament, andthrough repeated mass gatherings of itscitizens, as well as through its panel of lawyersin the Naha court, it made clear that it accepts,indeed embraces, the principle of equalityenunciated by Tamiya and that, as an equal, itrules out any new base construction on itsterritory. Governor Onaga insisted (5 August)that he had exercised his authority properlyand that there was no reason why he shouldsubmit to a contrary, improper “rectification”directive from the state. At issue, he insisted,were “fundamentals of regional self -government and by extension fundamentals ofdemocracy.”49

Tamiya, undoubtedly under pressure from thegovernment, adopted an extraordinarily fast“speed trial” schedule. From issue of the writson July 22 there were just two open days ofhearings (5 and 19 August), with verdict to beannounced on 16 September. Tamiya dismissedthe prefecture’s request to call eight expertwitnesses (including Mayor Inamine of NagoCity), and gave Onaga himself short shrift,again repeatedly asking him to confirm that hewould obey the ruling of the court (a highly

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irregular query from the bench, according tolawyers present).50

Tamiya will rule on these vexing matters on 16September. Whichever side “loses” at thatstage is certain to appeal to the SupremeCourt. Even then, however far from necessarilysignifying an end to the problem that presumed"final" and "irreversible" judgement mightsimply spark a more intense level of politicaland social crisis, affecting in turn the Japan-USrelationship and the frame of regional order.One of Okinawa's most respected figures, theprize-winning novelist Medoruma Shun, who asa Henoko canoeist has formed part of the non-violent civic blockade designed to blockreclamation works, commented,51

"It seems very unlikely that the Henoko newbase construction problem can be solved solelyby the administration, the law, or theparliament. Public opposition will keepdelaying the construction. And the Japanesegovernment will probably only give up onconstruction if public protest extends beyondCamp Schwab to US bases throughout theprefecture, and comes to affect the functioningof Kadena Air Base ..."

That, Medoruma adds, is a far from impossibleprospect.

Judicial precedents are not encouraging forOkinawa. In December 1959, the SupremeCourt held in the "Sunagawa case" that matterspertaining to the security treaty with the USare "highly political" and concern Japan's veryexistence, so that the judiciary should not passjudgement on them. That ruling, on expansionof the existing US base at Tachikawa (outsideTokyo), in effect elevated the Security Treatyabove the constitution and immunized it fromany challenge at law, thus entrenching the USbase presence. It would be surprising if the2016 (or 2017) court, addressing the project tocreate a new base at Henoko, did not followthis precedent.

Furthermore, it is just 20 years since thenOkinawan Governor Ota Masahide (Governor1990-1998) was arraigned before the SupremeCourt facing the demand by the Prime Ministerthat he exercise his duties of state under theLocal Self-Government Law to sign the proxylease agreements on privately owned landappropriated by the US military (which he hadrefused to do). Ota made an eloquent plea, butthe court dismissed it, contemptuously, in atwo-sentence judgement.52 For Ota, theSupreme Court ruling was the last word. Hesubmitted and signed the proxy leaseagreements.

In the case of civil suits too, by Okinawancit izens and civic groups against thegovernment of Japan, the record points tosimilar judicial inclination to endorse the state,dismissing the Okinawan case against it. Onelong-running (2009-2014) suit brought by acitizen group to have the environmental impactstudy on Henoko reopened because of its beingfundamentally unscientific was dismissed atboth initial hearing and later on appeal, thelatter judgement so brief that it took just 30seconds to read out. Other long-running suitshave been pursued against the governmentover the intolerable levels of noise andnuisance emanating from the US bases.Between 2002 and 2015, courts have issuedaltogether seven judgements on this matter,repeatedly accepting evidence (in the words ofthe most recent judgement of Naha DistrictCourt in June 2015) that the 2200 plaintiffs ofGinowan City did indeed suffer "mentaldistress, poor sleep, and disruption to theirdaily lives" from "serous and widespread"violations that "could not be defended on anyground of public interest" and that they shouldt h e r e f o r e b e p a i d 7 5 4 m i l l i o n y e n(approximately $9 million) compensation.Courts have, however, refused to order a stopto that nuisance. By so doing, in effect theyconcede that the US military is beyond andabove the law, and that the government ofJapan is complicit in enforcing its ongoing

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illegality and the accompanying suffering of itspeople. As Ryukyu shimpo commented, "howcould a government that enforces continuingillegality upon the citizens of one of its regionsbe considered a law-ruled state?"53

Confrontation

While court battles engage a small army oflawyers and officials, it is the citizenengagement on the front lines, at Henoko andTakae, that best embodies the Okinawan spirit.Despite being relatively remote and difficult ofaccess from major population centers,especially in the early mornings, Henoko hasbecome one of the longest sit-in protests ofmodern times, sustaining a ten-year protestencampment at the fishing harbour which sawoff the first design for a floating heliport basein 2005 and then continued till July 2015, whenit was joined by the encampment at the gate toCamp Schwab marine base, a couple ofkilometres from the fishing harbour. From July2014, this Schwab-gate site became the mainaccess route to the construction site. Coreprotesters are often supplemented by “AllOkinawa” chartered buses bringing volunteersfrom throughout the island. On an average day,the core group may be between sixty and onehundred or so protesters, but on specialoccasions many more, as on the 500th day of theCamp Schwab Gate camp, 18 November 2015,that attracted over 1,000. The impromptuexchange of experience and ideas, interspersedwith performances of song or dance, grewduring 2016 to such extent that the gatheringdeclared itself “Henoko University” andorganized a series of “lectures” by activists andscholars.

While the citizenry remained resolutely non-violent and exercised the right of civildisobedience only after exhausting all legal andconstitutional steps to oppose the base project,the National Coastguard and Riot Policeflaunted their violence, dragging awayprotesters (quite a few of whom are in their 70s

and 80s), dunking canoeists in the sea, pinningdown one protest ship captain till he lostconsciousness, and on a number of occasionscausing injuries to protesters requiring hospitaltreatment.54 On 20 November 2014, 85 year oldShimabukuro Fumiko (a Battle of Okinawasurvivor) was carried off to hospital from theCamp Schwab protest gathering suffering asuspected concussion. On the following dayjournalists from the Okinawan daily Ryukyushimpo were manhandled, abused and forciblyremoved from the site. On 20 January 2015, aCoastguard officer gripped a woman filmmaker around the neck with his legs (a "horseriding" assault) intent on wrenching away hercamera. Protesting canoeists and kayakerswere intimidated and driven off or on occasiondumped at sea, as far as four kilometres fromshore, after being held for varying periods.

On 22 February 2016, just before the openingof a mass protest meeting at the gate of CampSchwab, local Japanese security agents for theUS Marine Corps arrested three protesters,including the head of the Okinawa PeaceMovement Centre, Yamashiro Hiroji, onsuspicion of breaching the special criminal law(adopted in 1952 at the height of the KoreanWar to prescribe stringent punishment forunauthorized entry or attempted entry into USbases in Japan). Film footage showedYamashiro, ordering demonstrators to beespecially careful not to cross the boundaryline, being suddenly attacked, flung to theground, handcuffed, and dragged feet-first intothe base by US Marine Corps securitypersonnel. As the Okinawa Times noted, itappeared to be a clear case in which theconstitutional right to freedom of assembly,opinion, and expression had been sacrificed tothe overarching extraterritorial rights enjoyedby the US.55 For Okinawans, it suggested areturn to the lawless 1950s when US forcesconfiscated land and constructed bases at will(under “bayonet and bulldozer”), and treatedOkinawans with violence and contempt. Twomonths later, on 1 April 2016, the prize-

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winning novelist, Medoruma Shun, was pulledfrom his kayak and held, first by US and thenby Japanese authorities, for a total of 34 hoursunder the stringent Special Criminal Law – as ifhe were planning to attack the base.56

As these matters were prominently reported inthe Okinawan (but barely mentioned in themainland) media, Abe’s close friend and hisappointee (in 2013) to the board of governorsof Japan's public broadcasting corporation,NHK, the novelist Hyakuta Naoki, expressedthe view that the two Okinawan newspapers(Ryukyu shimpo and Okinawa Times) should beclosed down because they express “traitorous”views.57

Even as the confrontation continued anddeepened at the Henoko site, the governmentstrove to “buy off” opposition where it could.Since Nago City had from 2010 twice returneda mayor and local assembly majority thatresisted all attempts at suasion and refused toaccept any monies linked to it, Abe, Shimajiri,and other members of government worked tofind ways to divide and weaken the city’s anti-base movement. Late in October, the heads ofthree of the city’s 55 sub-districts (ku) -Henoko, Kushi and Toyohara (populationrespectively 2014, 621, and 427) - were invitedto the Prime Minister’s office in Tokyo. They setout their wish list, asking for repairs to theloca l communi ty ha l l s , purchase o flawnmowers, and provision of one (or perhapsseveral) “azumaya” (a kind of summer-house orgazebo).58 They were told they were to beallocated the sum of 13 million yen each in the2016 budget, a subsidy that would bypass therepresentative institutions of the city andprefecture. It was to be (as Chief CabinetSecretary Suga later put it), “compensation”for the noise and nuisance caused them by theprotest movement.

Suga declared that the local ku districts“agreed” to the Henoko construction albeitwith some strings attached, and suggested it

was only natural that they be given everyencouragement. However, within weeks, allthree heads contradicted him, saying he hadmisunderstood them. The head of Kushiinsisted that the district had not changed itsopposition to Henoko base construction sincetaking that position in 1997, and the head ofToyohara stated that “absolutely no-one inToyohara” wanted a base.59

It was a trifling enough sum (less than half amillion dollars in all), but the appropriation ofpublic funds, with no accountability, toencourage a cooperative, base-tolerant spirit ina few corners of a stubbornly anti-base cityw a s , a s R y u k y u s h i m p o p u t i t , a n“unprecedented politics of division."60 It wasalso an almost certainly illegal attempt to evadedemocratic will and constitutional procedure.61

Elections, 2016

In 2016, while the contest continued andintensified at Camp Schwab gate and in thecourts, three important elections were held: inJanuary for mayor of Ginowan City, in June forthe Okinawan Prefectural Assembly, and in Julyfor the upper house (House of Councillors) inthe national diet. In the second and third ofthese, Tokyo-supported candidates weresoundly defeated, an “All Okinawa” majoritysupporting the Governor was confirmed in theprefectural assembly, and in the Upper Houseof the Diet one of the best-known opponents ofbase substitution within Okinawa, Iha Yoichi,(Ginowan mayor for two terms, 2003-2010) waschosen by a huge majority over the Abegovernment’s favourite (and from late 2015actually Minister for Okinawa), Shimajiri Aiko.The margin of defeat, 100,000 votes, signifiedher humiliation. Both of these may beconsidered “All Okinawa” victories.

In Ginowan City the outcome was morenuanced.62 The Abe government’s anointedcandidate, the incumbent Sakima Atsushi, hadbeen elected to the office in 2012 on a “no new

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base for Okinawa” pledge but, like Shimajiri,was party to a collective Okinawan “tenko”(conversion under pressure) the following year,abandoning his campaign political pledge andswitching to favour construction of the“Futenma replacement facility” at Henoko. Inthe January 2016 election, he defeated the “AllOkinawa” candidate, Shimura Keiichiro, by acomfortable margin, 27,668 to 21,811. PrimeMinister Abe declared himself "greatlyencouraged" and said he would "continueefforts at dialogue in order to lessen the burdeno n O k i n a w a a n d p r o m o t e i t sdevelopment."63 But the outcome can scarcelybe seen as an Abe victory since both candidatespromised to secure reversion of Futenma,Sakima within three years (by 2019) andShimura within five years (by 2021). Thevictorious Sakima did not so much as mentionthe word “Henoko” during his campaign (theonly difference in their speeches was Shimura’sphrase “without allowing any new base to bebuilt”) and both he and his Abe governmentsupporters must have known full well thatthere would be no Futenma return withineither three or five years. Sakima made oneother campaign promise, to attract a“Disneyland” to the City, but it was equallyunrealistic, and was dismissed as pipedream byDisneyland (Oriental Land Company)executives shortly after the election. Therewould be no Futenma return within three (orfive) years and no Ginowan City Disneylandever.

Apart from consistently returning anti-basecandidates, Okinawa showed itself unforgivingof candidates who, once elected on an anti-Henoko base construction platform, thenreversed themselves. Most notable in thiscategory is Nakaima Hirokazu (Governor2006-2014), (re-) elected in 2010 on an anti-base platform who famously “turned coat”during a week secreted in a Tokyo hospital inDecember 2013. In the subsequent November2014 gubernator ia l e lect ion he wasresoundingly dismissed by the electorate.

Likewise, Upper House member Shimajiri Aiko,elected in 2010 on an anti-base platform who“turned coat” in April 2013 and later that sameyear led the “surrender” of conservative Dietmembers. She was highly appreciated in Abecircles not only for her role in orchestrating thecrucial 2013 reversal but for the views sheexpressed later: calling for the Riot Police andCoastguard to be mobilized to curb the “illegal,obstructionist activities” of the anti-basemovement (February 2014), denouncing Nagomayor Inamine for "abusing his power (April2015), and referring contemptuously to the"irresponsible citizens' movement" (October2015). With such views, she rose meteoricallyin the Tokyo establishment, becoming Ministerfor Okinawa in the third Abe cabinet (withresponsibilities that included also the NorthernTerritories, science and technology, space,oceans, territorial problems, IT, and “coolJapan”). But to rise in Tokyo is to fall inOkinawa, and in July 2016 Okinawansdismissed her by a massive 100,000 votemargin.64

Futenma – Reversion?

Already twenty years have passed since 1996when Tokyo and Washington first promisedFutenma return "within 5 to 7 years," i.e., by2003. In December 2013, Prime Minister Abepromised Governor Nakaima to accomplish itby February 2019, but when Abe conveyed thisrequest to Washington in February 2014,Marine Commander Wissler explicitly ruled itout.65 In the Ginowan City mayoral election ofJanuary 2016 the Abe-supported conservativecandidate gave that same date as his pledge tothe city. Already by then, however, at the inter-governmental (US-Japan) level the date forcompletion and handover of the new facilityhad been set as "no earlier than 2022."66 In2016, as the 20th anniversary of the originalagreement passed, the Marine Corps' “MarineAviation Plan 2016" pushed it further back tofiscal year 2025 (October 2024-September2025).67 Admiral Harry Harris, Commander-of

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US Pacific forces, gave that date in evidence toCongress early in 2016.68 Harris noted that, of200 base transfer-related items carried inJapan's 2015 budget, just nine had beencompleted, eight were still underway, and thesituation at the Henoko site was not improvingbut rather protest was "continuing toescalate." 6 9

But even as that date was being reluctantlyaccepted by the Marine Corps and Congress, atthe beginning of March 2016, Japandespatched its top security official, YachiShotaro, to Washington to seek the Obamagovernment's understanding for a furthersubstantial delay.70 Only after the US consenteddid the Abe government come to an "out-of-court" March 4 agreement (with OkinawaPrefecture) that involved a complete andindefinite suspension of site works at Henoko.Lt. General Robert Neller, commander of theUS Marine Corps, told a Senate military affairscommittee meeting that the wakai suspensioncould be expected to last a further 12-months.71 President Obama, advised of theimpending delay, is said to have respondedwith "So there will be nothing happening for awhile then."72

It means that the Government of Japan haspromised the Government of the United Statesthat Henoko works will resume aroundFebruary 2017, for a base that will becompleted and handed over to the MarineCorps around 2026. Even for that to happen,somehow in the remaining months it mustextract the legal warrant to resume works atHenoko. Given the well-demonstrated ability ofthe protest movement to delay and obstructconstruction of the new base, even 2026 couldprove a conservative estimate.

Takae – Reversion?

Takae deserves a special place in anyconsideration of the Okinawa struggle. LikeHenoko, its travails date to 1996. Under the

agreement of that year, as condition for thereturn of about half of the Marine Corps’ CampGonsalves’ Jungle Warfare Center in theYambaru forest, six "Helicopter Landing Pads"were to be constructed. Only after completionof the environmental impact study (2007-2012)did the government reveal that they would beused, not by the conventional CH 46 helicopterbut the ear-crushingly noisy and dangerousvertical takeoff and landing “Osprey.” Whenthe residents of Takae village (population ca150) began a roadside protest in 2007, thegovernment resorted to various devices,including "SLAPP"-type restraining courtorders against it.73 In February 2015 Japanhanded over to the Marine Corps in advancetwo completed Osprey pads. As it did so, theHigashi Village Assembly adopted unanimouslya resolution declaring that the Osprey-padconstruction contravened the wishes of thelocal community and banning US aircraft fromusing them. Days later, on 25 February 2015,the Marine Corps' Osprey appeared at the siteand began training flights. From the start, itwas flying roughly twice as often as the CH-46it replaced. 74 By June 2016, the OkinawaDefense Bureau reported that the especiallyaggravating night flights had increased 8-foldover 2014, to 400 that month.75 These wereespecially terrifying when conducted withoutlights. When the Noguchigera woodpeckerbegan to die mysteriously, some suspected thatthe avian nervous system too could not copewith the disturbance to their world brought bythe Osprey.76 But the US military enjoyedpriority over all the forest dwellers, not onlyhuman but animal, avian, insect or botanical.

The once peaceful, bio-diverse, forestedenvironment became a virtual war zone. A localnewspaper conducted a door-to-door survey ofopinion among local residents and foundopposition running at 80 per cent, with not onesoul in favour.77

On 22 July 2016, weeks after the Upper Houseelection in which the Abe government’s key

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Okinawa policy person, Shimajiri Aiko, washumiliated, the government launched a full-scale assault on Takae (following prolongedsuspension of operations partly to avoiddisturbing forest birds during breeding timeand partly to avoid political damage in theforthcoming Upper House election), mobilizinga small army of over 500 riot police fromvarious parts of mainland Japan to lay siege tothe 150-person population of Takae, creating ineffect a “law-less” zone.78 This Abe “army”aimed to crush the Okinawan resistance at apoint where it was most difficult to mount,sweeping aside the Takae protest tents andvehicles and periodically closing or limitingtraffic on Highway 70.79 As Ryukyu shimpopointed out, it was the sort of mobilization offorce with which a major assault on a yakuzag a n g s t e r h e a d q u a r t e r s m i g h t b elaunched.80 For the people carrying on theresistance year after year, mostly smallfarmers, the experience of being overwhelmedby state force, outnumbered roughly 5:1, was“akin to martial law” as novelist Medoruma putit.81 Late in August 2016, the 87 year-oldShimabukuro Fumiko, front-line heroine of theOkinawan resistance, was carried off tohospital for a second time after falling in themelee at Takae.

For the first time, the prefectural parliament,the Prefectural Assembly, adopted a resolutioncalling for immediate halt to the works.82 TheAmerican veterans’ organization, the 3,000-strong Veterans for Peace, issued a statementfrom its Berkeley California annual meetingdenouncing the action to crush demonstratorsat Takae.

“Whereas, on July 22, reportedly as many as800 riot police, collected from all over Japan,swarmed into the tiny village of Takae (which issurrounded by a sub-tropical forest that couldqualify as a world heritage site), tore downtheir tents and towed away their cars,reaffirming that the Government viewsOkinawa as a colony …”

and urging the US government to distanceitself from such repressive, shameful acts.83

Frontier Islands

The problem of Okinawa’s Frontier orSouthwest (Sakishima or Nansei) islands has tobe understood in the same frame as the"Okinawa problem" and the "Henoko problem."As noted above, these islands were assigned toChina in the draft Sino-Japanese treaty of 1880,only remaining in Japan’s hands because Chinahad second thoughts. Throughout the ColdWar, the 600 kilometre chain of SouthwestJapanese islands stretching through the EastChina Sea from Naha to Taiwan remainedpeaceful and stable, with no significant militarypresence despite the Cold War. Yonaguni wasas much "offshore" from Taiwan and China inthe East China Sea as from Japan, and it reliedon two policemen, a hand-gun apiece, to keeporder.84

From the time of the Democratic Partygovernments of 2009-2012 the commitment toestablish a military presence on these islandshas been part of a bipartisan securityconsensus, especially following the 2010incidents at sea between Japan and China overthe Senkaku or D iaoyu I s lands ( foradministrative purposes part of the OkinawanYaeyama Island group). As in Henoko andTakae, for these islands too national policyexigency overrides all other considerations.

In the midst of a booming region, Yonagunisuffers population attrition and economicdecline because of the lack of direct transportor communications links with either Taiwan orChina. Populated half a century ago by over10,000 people but now a mere 1,500, uniquelyin Japan it has twice in the past decadeformally debated its collective future, in 2004-5and in 2008-2015. In 2005, it formulated a"Vision" for a future based on regional (EastChina Sea) cooperation and open door trade,fishing and tourism link with Taiwan, but Tokyoforbade it. Then, following a US naval

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intelligence-gathering visit to the island in2007, a different, even opposite, idea of amilitary centred future began to gatherattention. A petition to urge a base presencewas organized in 2008 by a local "DefenseAssociation." In June 2009, the Yonagunimayor, Hokama Shukichi, approached theMinistry of Defense and the Ground Self-Defense Forces to suggest they set up a baseon the island. There followed a series ofelections, referenda, and bitterly divisivecampaigns contested by pro- and anti-baseforces. The matter was eventually resolved bythe narrow election victory of the pro-basemayor in June 2013 (553:506) followed by a“Yes” to the SDF in an island referendum inFebruary 2015 (632:445). Early in 2016, thebase was ready and the Ground Self DefenseForce (GSDF) unit marched in.

Fatigue from years of bitter struggle in thesmall, close-knit island community played alarge role in the outcome. Many werediscouraged by the silence of Governor Onaga.They had assumed, following his victory inNovember 2014 that he would incorporate theisland within his general “All Okinawa” anti-base camp. Without external support, andknowing that Minister of Defense Nakatani Genhad said that construction was going toproceed irrespective of the 2015 poll result, itseemed futile for a few hundred islanders toattempt to resist the determined centralgovernment. Still, 41 per cent of islanders didreturn a “No” vote, showing that divisions inthe community remained deep. As the GSDFbegan its surveillance of Chinese shipping andother communications, islanders could be surethat they had at least earned a place on theChinese missile target list. Those whoremember the consequences of an Okinawanrole in defence of “mainland” Japan in 1945contemplate the new arrangements with deepmisgivings.

Some in the other Japanese SDF services (Airand Marit ime) suspected that " turf"

considerations were a major factor behind theGSDF deployment to Yonaguni (and otherfrontier islands), compensating for the loss ofrole in Hokkaido where, through the Cold War,they prepared for a putative land attack bySoviet forces. In the post-Cold War, post-Waron Terror era, the South-West was the growtharea for Japan's military. Apart from Yonaguni,Miyako was targeted for an 800-strong securityand missile force, with another 500 likely to besent to Amami Oshima in Kagoshimaprefecture.85 500-more had been ear-markedfor Ishigaki Island, where the conservativemayor is known to be supportive and MaritimeSDF ships welcomed.86

Outlook

Okinawan people’s faith in justice anddemocracy has been sorely tested ever since its“reversion” to Japan under a secret deal over40 years ago in which Okinawan opinion wasignored and the prosecution of the US war inSoutheast Asia prioritized. However manytimes and in however many different forumsOkinawans insist that no new base be allowed,it makes no difference. Construction of theHenoko base and the "Osprey pads" designedto accommodate them, is a core national policy,and the key raison d'être for Okinawa in theeyes of Tokyo is as a joint US-Japan bastionprojecting force where required for theregional and global hegemonic project.

The role of “base island” long imposed on theOkinawan people by the US and Japanesegovernments has meant for them not justdeprivation of sovereignty and territory butdeprivation of personal security in the name ofnational security. As the current phase ofOkinawan protest had been triggered by therape case of 1995, so it was again in May 2016.Sadness and anger stirred the anti-basemovement again over the rape and murder of a20-year old Okinawan woman, to which anA m e r i c a n e x - M a r i n e b a s e w o r k e rconfessed.87 Indelibly etched on the Okinawan

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collective memory are not just the 1995 casebut many others going back to the rape-murderof 6 year-old Yumiko-chan in 1955 and thecrash of a fighter jet onto Miyamori PrimarySchool in 1959 (killing 17 people, including 11children). A protest and mourning meetingattended by some 400 citizens at short noticeon 25 May adopted five demands: drasticoverall reduction of US bases, basic revision ofthe US-Japan SOFA (Status of ForcesAgreement), closure and return of Futenma,withdrawal of Osprey, and abandonment ofHenoko. Two days later the PrefecturalAssembly adopted almost identical demands,but adding that all Marine Corps bases andsoldiers (i.e., not just Futenma but also thelarge, sprawling bases at Camp Schwab, CampHansen, and the Northern Training Area)withdraw from the island.88

Then, a prefectural mass meeting on 19 June,in sombre, mourning mood under a blazing 35degree sun, heard a message from the father ofthe victim asking for prefectural unity indemanding withdrawal of all bases. A coalitionof 16 Okinawan women’s organizations makingup the “Okinawa Women Act against MilitaryViolence” announced the same demand, for thewithdrawal of all military bases and armedforces (thereby including also the massive USAir Force base at Kadena and Japan’s own Self-Defense Force units).89 As posters held by manyof the 65,000 who gathered to mourn the victimat the prefectural mass meeting on June 19declared, the people’s anger “has gone beyondany limit.”

Over the 43 years since Okinawa was resumedwithin Japan in 1972, by official count USforces and their dependents and civilemployees had been responsible for 5,896criminal incidents, one tenth of them (574)crimes of violence including rape.90 Countlessresolutions of protest had been met withcountless promises of good behavior. TheOkinawan mood was such that the samepromises of future “good behavior” no longer

sufficed. A gulf began to open between thosecalling for withdrawal of all Marines or even allmilitary forces from the island and the “AllOkinawa” leadership, including GovernorOnaga, who stuck resolutely to the morelimited (if nevertheless major) demands: CloseFutenma without substitution (no Henoko), andwithdraw Osprey.

The crisis today pits the "irresistible force" ofthe nation state against the "immovable object"of the Okinawan resistance in a grand, andmassively unequal, struggle. At sea, a minisculeflotilla of canoes and kayaks confronts a solidwall of National Coastguard ships and on land afew hundred protesters face off 24 hours a dayagainst riot police outside Camp SchwabMarine Corps base and Takae, trying to blockreclamation and construction works on OuraBay and in the Yambaru forest.

Prime Minister Abe has staked so much oncompleting and handing over the new facility tothe US Marine Corps that it is almostunimaginable that he could ever abandon it.Governor Onaga is in a similar, if opposite,position. He constitutes the unlikely figure of aconservative politician at the helm of aprefecture in rebellion against a key policy ofthe national government. Even if he were tosubmit to a court ruling and withdraw hisopposition, far from resolving matters thatwould infuriate the Okinawan people as abetrayal and heighten their resentment of theirown government and of the base system. Thesupposed linchpin of the regional securitysystem could then become its Achilles heel.

In a democratic polity, when different units ofthe polity are in dispute, resort to the lawwould normally be seen as the necessary pathto resolution. But as the Henoko problem isreferred to the judiciary, there is a question asto whether Abe’s Japan enjoys the division ofpowers and independence of the judiciary thatare the hallmark of a modern, constitutionalstate. As the Abe government in July 2014 had

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effectively amended the constitution by thesimple device of adopting a new interpretation,so in 2015 it showed scant respect for therelevant laws in the way it addressed Henokoreclamation. As constitutional lawyers had,overwhelmingly, condemned Abe’s 2014 defacto revision of the constitution, so in 2015they criticized as manipulation or breach of thelaw the way the Abe government wasproceeding in the dispute with Okinawaprefecture.91

In the event of the decision, or series ofdecisions, going against Okinawa, Onaga mightsimply submit, though that seems unlikely andwould cause bitter recriminations in theprefecture; or he might refuse and take a standwith the Okinawan people in resistance. In thislatter case the government could arrest him,indict him and his “All Okinawa” supporters,and press ahead with construction, gamblingon evading serious national or internationalattention. But sending in the prefectural police,who nominally are under the Governor'scommand, to arrest him would be a high riskpath.

In the meantime, however, there are manylegal options open to Okinawa and to GovernorOnaga to delay and obstruct the government. Ifordered to do so by the Supreme Court, Onagahas said that he would cancel his cancellationof his predecessor’s reclamation license, but hehas said that, even in such event, he will stillpersist in doing “everything in my power” tostop base construction. That evidently includesissue of a fresh reclamation license cancelation(umetate shonin tekkai) order, and non-cooperation at every ongoing stage of thestate’s worksto be seen. The law had neverenvisaged the carrying out of a massive projectof this kind in the teeth of local non-

cooperation. Under an ordinance adopted bythe Okinawan Prefectural Assembly in 2015,prefectural authorities could, if they so chose,stop and inspect every truckload of soil or sandbeing imported from outside the prefecture(and at least in principle forbid its entry)because of the fear of pathogens (includingArgentine ants) being introduced into theisland’s environment.92 Other ordinancesempower the prefecture to protect important“natural monuments” in Oura Bay such ashermit crabs, and of historically importantcultural relics era such as “anchor stones”dating back to the pre-modern Ryukyu era.93

The project the state now attempts to pushthrough has been underway since 1996,repeatedly delayed by the determined, non-violent resistance of the “weak” (Okinawa)against the “strong” (the Japanese state). Sincehe assumed office for his second term inDecember 2012 Abe has devoted considerableeffort to trying to subject Okinawa to his will,thus far signally without success. The more thedelay, the more the frustration and anger inboth Washington and Tokyo. The more Aberesorts to deceit, intimidation or violence, themore the resistance stiffens and the Okinawandemands widen and deepen: from Futenmareturn, Henoko abandonment and Ospreywithdrawal to the removal of all marine bases,and perhaps eventually to the removal of allbases. By refusing to listen to Okinawans, Abepushes the relationship between state andprefecture towards open clash, weakens the USmilitary ties that he is intent on strengthening,irritates the Pentagon he is committed toserving, and exposes Japan to the world as astate that denies basic democratic principleand human rights to the people of one of itsprefectures.

Gavan McCormack is an emeritus professor of Australian National University, editor of theAsia-Pacific Journal, and author of many texts on modern and contemporary East Asian

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History, including Resistant Islands: Okinawa Confronts Japan and the United States,Boulder: Rowman and Littlefield, 2012 (co-authored with Satoko Oka Norimatsu). His work iswidely published in Japanese, Korean and Chinese, as well as English.

Notes1 Since my book with Satoko Oka Norimatsu (Resistant Islands – Okinawa versus Japan andthe United States, Rowman and Littlefield, 2012) covers the years to 2012, this essay may beseen as a supplement. My essays since 2012 have appeared mainly in The Asia-Pacific Journal– Japan Focus, but also in Le Monde Diplomatique (in French and other languages), Sekai (inJapanese) and as chapters in several books in English and Japanese.2 For fuller treatment of this background, Gavan McCormack, “Ryukyu/Okinawa’s Trajectory –From Periphery to Center, 1600-2015,” in Sven Saaler and Chris Szpilman, eds, RoutledgeHandbook of Japanese History, London and New York, Routledge, forthcoming, 2017.3 Ibid.4 Details in McCormack and Norimatsu, Resistant Islands.5 Richard Falk, “Remembering Okinawa,” published in Japanese in Ryukyu shimpo, 22 August2016 as part 39 of Satoko Oka Norimatsu’s series “Seigi e no sekinin” (“Responsibility forJustice), original English version to be published in Falk’s blog,https://richardfalk.wordpress.com/.6 McCormack and Norimatsu, p. 987 According to Moriya Takemasa. Senior official in the Defense Agency, later Department ofDefense, 1996-2007, responsible for Henoko matters, in his 2010 book Futenma koshohiroku,” noted in “Henoko shimin 700 nin kesshu, taishu undo no seika da,” Okinawa taimusu,25 November 2015.8 Gavan McCormack, “Hillary in Japan – the enforcer,” The Asia-Pacific Journal – Japan Focus,22 February 2009. Sakurai Kunitoshi, “The Guam treaty as a modern ‘disposal’ of theRyukyu’s,” The Asia-Pacific Journal – Japan Focus, 21 September 2009.http://apjjf.org/-Sakurai-Kunitoshi/3223/article.html/9 For a detailed account, McCormack and Norimatsu, Resistant Islands, 2012.10 Quoted in Torigoe Shuntaro, “Boso suru Abe seiken – Heisei no fashizumu no ashiato,”Ryukyu shimpo, 7 December 2013.11 “Seron chosa: Henoko chushi isetsu kyoko hantai hirogaru,” Ryukyu shimpo, 5 May and 26August 2014.12 Kihara Satoru, “Onaga chiji tadachi ni ‘gansho hasai kyoka’ o toikaese,” Ari no hitokoto, 14January 2016. See also my “The Ginowan mayoral – Okinawan currents and cross-currents,”The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus, February 2016.13 “Mendan moshiire fuhatsu seifu wa Okinawa no koe o kike,” Okinawa taimusu, 27December 2014.14 “Kussaku sagyo ni chakushu, mohaya ‘kyofu seiji’ da, banko chushi min-i o toe,” Ryukyushimpo, 18 August 2014. (Also posted on the web as “Abe administration signals future reignof terror in Henoko.”)15 “Henoko umetate Beigun, ken no tachiriiri chosa o kyohi,” Okinawa taimusu, 12 March

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2015.16 See inter alia on this question Kihara Satoru's "Senso 'ampo-ho'-ho haishi ni sansei shinaiOnaga chiji," Ari no hitokoto, 27 February 2016.17 Police Policy Research Center and National Police Academy of Japan, “Laws and Ordersrelevant to Policing,” n.d., https://www.npa.go.jp/english/seisaku7/hourei1-4.pdf/18 The sharpest critic of Onaga on this ground is Kihara Satoru. For one recent essay, “Onagachiji wa naze ‘Takae no kidotai’ o hikiagesasenai no ka,” Ari no hitokoto, 27 August 2016.19 Onaga, “Chinjutsusho,” 3 August 2016, Statement to Fukuoka Court, Okinawa prefecturehome page, and (Galapagos) “Henoko kakunin sosho, umetate zehi de honshitsu tsuke,”Ryukyu shimpo, editorial, 3 August 2016.20 Figures given by Onaga, “Chinjutsusho.”21 Gavan McCormack, “‘Ceasefire’ on Oura Bay: The March 2016 Japan-Okinawa ‘amicableagreement” – Introduction and six views from within the Okinawan anti-base movement,” TheAsia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus, 1 April 2016. http://apjjf.org/2016/07/McCormack.html/.22 “Henoko koji, ichinen chudan, Bei kaiheitai toppu ga shogen,” Ryukyu shimpo, 17 March2016.23 Onaga Takeshi, "Okinawa wa shinkichi o kobamu," Sekai, (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten), January2016, pp. 66-74 at p. 73.24 Onaga chiji, Abe shusho kaidan zenbun (boto hatsugen),” Okinawa taimusu, 19 May 2015.25 Sakurai Kunitoshi, “To whom does the sea belong? Questions posed by the Henokoassessment,” The Asia-Pacific Journal – Japan Focus, 20 July 2015.http://apjjf.org/2015/13/29/Sakurai-Kunitoshi/4346.html/26 For an analysis by a prominent member of the panel, delivered immediately aftersubmission of the formal report, see Sakurai, ibid.27 “Governor’s Comment,” 13 October 2015.http://www.pref.okinawa.lg.jp/site/chijiko/henoko/documents/revoke.pdf/28 Press Conference by Defense Minister Nakatani,http://www.mod.go.jp/e/pressconf/2015/10/151027.html/, 13 October 2015.29 On the 950 page document, Miyamoto Kenichi, "Okinawa no jichi to Nihon no minshushugi,"Sekai, January 2016, pp. 75-83, at p. 76. For other details see my previous texts, especially“Battle Stations - Okinawa in 2016,” The Asia-Pacific Journal – Japan Focus, 18 January 2016.30 “Tokyo overturns Futenma works plan,” Japan Times, 1 November 2015.31 “Kokoku sosho teiki, Onaga chiji kaiken,” Ryukyu shimpo, 26 December 2015.32 Kyodo news agency reports of high-level bureaucratic/judicial collusion through a secretplanning group headed by Suga Yoshihide, Chief Cabinet Secretary, and including ForeignMinister Kishida Fumio, Defense Minister Nakatani Gen, and Tezuka Makoto, head of theJustice Ministry's Litigation Bureau and a specialist in "out-of-court" settlements, werecarried in Chugoku Shimbun, Okinawa Times and other papers, on March 24, under theheading (Chugoku Shimbun) "Henoko wakai no butaiura, Suga-shi shudo, gokuhi no chosei,sosho furi no kyu tenkai," and taken up again later in articles or editorials. For a convenientresume, Kihara Satoru, Ari no hitokoto – "Wakai no butaiura – Abe seiken to saibancho gagokuhi ni sesshoku?" Ari no hitokoto, March 25, 2016.33 "Dai shikko sosho dai yon kai koto benron," Ryukyu shimpo, February 16, 2016. See alsodiscussion in Kihara Satoru, "Henoko saiban judai kyokumen (2) 'mizukara torikesu wa riteki

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hanshin koi," Ari no hitokoto, February 17, 2016.34 Major documents, in Japanese only, are to be found on the Okinawa prefecture home page,including both the January 29 conciliation proposal and the March 4 agreement. See (for theformer) Chiji koshitsu Henoko shin kichi kensetsu mondai taisakuka, "Heisei 28 nen 1-gatsu29 nichi ni saibansho ga teishi shita wakai-an."35 It is not clear exactly what Judge Tamiya was referring to but he was most likely makingoblique reference to the need to get the US to agree to a revision of the status of ForcesAgreement (SOFA).36 Nakasone Isamu, “Henoko” The ‘amicable settlement’,” in “‘Ceasefire’ on Oura Bay” op. cit.37 Chiji koshitsu Henoko shin kichi kensetsu mondai taisakuka, "Wakai joko," 4 March 2016.38 The tortuous prose of this Article 9 confirmed several courtroom oral exchanges to thesame effect. Onaga was repeatedly asked for assurances. "Will you abide by the judgement?"to which he replied, repeatedly "Shitagau" (I will follow it.).39 "Chiji, haiso demo kengen koshi, Henoko sesei shiji, keiso-i ni uttae e," Ryukyu shimpo,March 9 2016.40 Quoted in Kihara Satoru, "'Chiji kengen koshi' no shikinseki wa shonin no 'tekkai'," Ari noHitokoto, 10 March 2016.41 Reiji Yoshida, "Tokyo settles lawsuits, halts landfill at Henoko," Japan Times, March 4,2016.42 "Ken, keiso-i ni fufuku moshide 'zesei shiji' no torikeshi kankoku motome," Ryukyu shimpo,March 14, 2016.43 "Henoko isetsu, keiso-shori i ni shinsa moshide hasso, Okinawa ken," Asahi shimbun, March14, 2016.44 "Keiso-i handan wa yosoku konnan," Okinawa taimusu, November 2, 2015.45 “Shin kichi ‘sodai na guko,’ chiji, keiso-i de umetate hihan, kuni ‘shonin ni kasha nai’,”Ryukyu shimpo, April 23, 2016.46 “Panel refrains from supporting Okinawa in base relocation spat,” Mainichi shimbun, June18, 2016.47 “Keiso-i tekihi handan sezu, jichi o kobamu kuni e no keikoku da,” Ryukyu shimpo, June 182016. For documents from the hearings, see Okinawa prefecture home page:http://www.pref.okinawa.lg.jp/site/chijiko/henoko/48 “Abe looks down nose at Okinawa despite court’s advice on issue,” Asahi Shimbun, 10March 2016.49 “Okinawa, Henoko sosho, chiji ‘zesei shiji ukeru iwarenai’,”NHK News web, 5 August 2016.50 Matsunaga Kazuhiro, quoted in “Henoko, iho kakunin sosho, Okinawa ken wa zenmen-tekini arasou shisei, jokoku fukamaru ugoki mo,” Okinawa taimusu, 20 August 2016.51 Medoruma Shun, “’Wakai’ o kangaeru – fukutsu no shimin undo kuni ugoku,” Okinawataimusu, 21 March 2016.52 For Ota’s speech, see Chalmers Johnson, ed., Okinawa: Cold War Island, Cardiff Ca: JapanPolicy Research Institute, 1999. http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0967364205/53 "Futenma soon sosho, seiji kokka to ieru no ka," Ryukyu shimpo, June 12, 2015. See also"Futenma soon sosho' iho jotai o hochi suru na," Okinawa taimusu, June 12, 2015.54 Details on this and the following cases, in “‘All Japan’ versus ‘All Okinawa’ – Abe Shinzo’smilitary firstism,” The Asia-Pacific Journal – Japan Focus, 16 March 2015. On Shimabukuro

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Fumiko, “Henoko 85-sai josei kega, ichiji ishiki ushinau,” Ryukyu shimpo, 22 November 201455 “’Keitokuho de futari taiho’ shinjigatai futo kosoku, naze,” editorial, Okiinawa taimusu, 24February 2015.56 Urashima Etsuko, “Medoruma Shun shi ga futo taiho,” Shukan kinyobi, 8 April 2016, pp.7-8.57 Ando Kenji, “Kono kuni wa zentaishugi ni ippo ippo susunde iru, Hyakuta Naoki ni Ryukyushimpo to Okinawa times ga hanron,” The Huffington Post, 2 July 2015.58 Discussed in Gavan McCormack, “To the Courts! To the streets! Okinawa at December2015,” The Asia-Pacific Journal – Japan Focus, 7 December 2015.http://apjjf.org/-Gavan-McCormack/4405/59 Gavan McCormack, “To the courts! To the streets,” op. cit.60 “Kube 3-ku kofukin, Seiken no ichite wa gyaku koka unda,” Ryukyu shimpo, November 30,2015. See also “Kuhe 3-ku kofu yoko o sakutei, kaku-ku ni 1300-man en,” Ryukyu shimpo,November 27 2015.61 Takeda Shinichiro, professor of administrative law at Seikei University, quoted in SuzukiTakuya, Uechi Kazuki, Yoshida Takushi, “Seiken, Henoko 3 chiku ni chokusetsu shinkohi noshishutsu, ken, machi no atamagoshi ni,” Asahi shimbun, October 26, 2015.62 For detailed analysis, Gavan McCormack, “Battle stations – Okinawa in 2016,” and “TheGinowan mayoral – Okinawan currents and counter-currents,” op. cit.63 “Sakima-shi saisen, Abe shusho ‘yukizukurareta’, Suga-shi wa chiji hihan,” Okinawataimusu, 26 January 2016.64 Despite the dismissal at the hands of the Okinawan electorate, Abe decided to retainShimajiri as deputy (hosakan) to the newly appointed Minister (her successor), TsuruhoYosuke. (“Shimajiri-shi ga hosakan ni, Okinawa sho ni jogen, eikyoryoku hoji,” Ryukyushimpo, 10 August 2016.)65 “Marines won’t leave Futenma till new base built,” Japan Times, 12 April 2014. PacificCommander Admiral [Samuel] Locklear told a senate hearing the same (“‘Gonen inai teishihitei’ kyoko no tanpo to shonin no tsumi,” Okinawa taimusu, 13 April 2014.66 Boeisho, “Beigun saihen zainichi Beigun no churyu ni kansuru shisaku,”http://www.mod.go.jp/j/publication/wp/wp2013/pc/2013/pdf/25020305.pdf (April 2013).67 Heianna Sumiyo, “Henoko shin kichi kassoro chakko wa 2024 nendo, Futenma henkan wa25 nendo igo da,” Okinawa taimusu, 23 January 201668 Admiral Harry Harris, Commander-in-Chief US Pacific Forces, Congressional evidencequoted in "Beigun no honne, hirogaru hamon, Bei shireikan no Henoko isetsu okurehatsugen," Okinawa taimusu, 3 March 2016.69 Quoted in Heianna Sumiyo,"Harisu Beigun shireikan 'hantai undo kakudai shite iru'Nakatani shi ni Henoko okure ken-en tsutatsu," Okinawa taimusu, 25 February 2016.70 Shimada Manabu, "Henoko isetsu 'isogaba maware' kuni, sosho ipponka e Okinawa-ken towakai shikirinaoshi ni 'shosan,' Bei mo rikai," Nihon keizai shimbun, 14 March 2016.71 Heianna Sumiyo, "Obama daitoryo Henoko okure o yonin 'shibaraku ugokanai no da na,"Okinawa taimusu, 20 March 2016.72 Heianna Sumiyo, “Obama daitoryo Henoko okure o yonin ‘shibaraku ugokanai no da na,”Okinawa taimusu, 20 March 2016.73 SLAPP: Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation. Lawsuit filed by the state to secure

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an order restraining citizen protest. For background on the Osprey deployment and Takae,McCormack and Norimatsu, Resistant Islands, pp. 167-172.74 “Chakurikudai senko teikyo, hajisubeki taibei juzoku da, editorial, Ryukyu shimpo, 19February 2015.75 According to Okinawa Defense Bureau, quoted in Jon Letman, “Fighting to save a remoteOkinawan forest,” Honolulu Civil Beat, 12 August 2016.76 “Higashi-son de Noguchigera mado ni shotsushi, kotoshi yon-wa me,” Oknawa taimusu, 29October 2014.77 “Chakurikudai hantai, Takae 80%, sansei kaito wa zero, Honshi ga 2-ku jumin anketo,”Ryukyu shimpo, 3 August 2016.78 “Ho keishi no chakurikudai koji ‘hochi kokka no na ni ataesezu,” Ryukyu shimpo, 2 August2016.79 Watase Natsuhiko and Morizumi Takashi, “Kyukyu hanso tsuzuku kogi genba,” Shukankinyobi, 5 August 2016, pp. 42-43.80 Ryota Nakamura, “Riot squad sent to subdue Takae protesters similar in scale to that sentto eradicate yakuza gangsters,” Ryukyu shimpo, 18 July 2016.81 Quoted in Letman, op. cit.82 Okinawa Kengikai, “Beigun hokubu kunrenjo heripaddo kensetsu ni kansuru ikensho,” 21July 2016.83 VFP (Veterans for Peace), “Emergency resolution opposing arbitrary resumption of helipadconstruction at Takae, Okinawa,” adopted 14 August 2016. Text (in English) reproduced inOkinawa taimusu, 16 August 2016. (Two resolutions were adopted, one for Henoko, the otherfor Takae.)84 On Yonaguni, Gavan McCormack, “The end of the postwar? The Abe government, Okinawa,and Yonaguni Island,” The Asia-Pacific Journal – Japan Focus, December 5, 2014.http://apjjf.org/2014/12/49/Gavan-McCormack/4233.html/85 “Miyako rikuji haibi jumin no fuan ni mukiae,” Okinawa taimusu, editorial, 16 June 2016.86 “Japan to deploy 500 GSDF troops on Ishigaki Island,” Japan Times, 29 November 2015.“200 protesters surround Ishigaki City Hall to oppose SDF deployment,” Ryukyu shimpo, 14June 2016.87 Detailed accounts in Okinawan and some national media from late May. For the messagefrom the victim’s father, “‘Zen kichi tekkyo o’, higaisha no chichioya ga Okinawa kenmintaikai ni messeji,” Ryukyu shimpo, 20 June, 2016.88 “Moto kaiheitai-in no Beigunzoku ni yoru josei shitai o iki jiken ni kansuru ikensho,”. 26May 2016, http://www.pref.okinawa.jp/site/gikai/documents/h285gatu26nitiikensyo.pdf//89 Kihara Satoru, “Okinawa Beigunzoku josei satsugai (2) Onaga shi wa chiji ni fusawashii ka,”Ari no hitokoto, May 22 2016. http://blog.goo.ne.jp/satoru-kihara/90 Maedomari Hiromori, “Towareru kenmin no honkido,” Ryukyu shimpo, 30 May 2016.91 Lawrence Repeta, “Construction of an outlaw base in Henoko,” Japan Times, 15 November201592 Gavan McCormack, “To the courts! To the streets!” op. cit.93 The discovery of 17 culturally significant earthen and stone ware objects in the Oura Baysite vicinity was announced in November 2015. Ibid.