jiabs 16-1

THE JOURNAL

OF THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF

BUDDHIST STUDIES

Peter N. Gregory

EDITOR-IN-CHIEF

Roger Jackson Dept. of Religion Carleton College

Northfield, MN 55057 USA

EDITORS

University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign, Illinois, USA

Alexander W. Macdonald Universite de Paris X Nanterre, France

Ernst Steinkellner University of Vienna

Wien, Austria

Jikido Takasaki University of Tokyo

Tokyo, Japan

Steven Collins University of Chicago Chicago, Illinois, USA

Robert Thurman Columbia University

New York, New York, USA

Volume 16 1993 Number 1

the watermark

THE JOURNAL OF THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF BUDDHIST STUDIES, INC.

This Journal is the organ of the International Association of Buddhist Studies, Inc. It is governed by the objectives of the Association and accepts scholarly

. contributions pertaining to Buddhist Studies in all the various disciplines, such as philosophy, history, religion, sociology, anthropology, art, archaeology, psychology, textual studies, etc. The JIABSis published twice yearly, in the summer and winter.

Manuscripts for publication (we must have two copies) and correspondence concerning articles should be submitted to the lIABS editorial office at the address given below. Please refer to the guidelines for contributors to the JIABS printed on the inside back cover of every issue. Books for review should also be sent to the address below. The Editors cannot guarantee to publish reviews of unsolicited books nor to return those books to the senders.

The Association and the Editors assume no responsibility for the views expressed by the authors in the Association's Journal and other related publications.

New Editor's Address

Donald S. Lopez, Jf. Dept. of Asian Languages and Cultures

University of Michigan 3070 Frieze Building Ann Arbor, MI 48109

EDITORIAL ADVISORY BOARD

Andre Bareau (France) M.N. Deshpande (India) R. Gard (USA) B.G.Gok/:lale (USA) John C. Huntington (USA) P.S. Jaini (USA)

Joseph M. Kitagawa (USA) Jacques May (Switzerland) Hajime Nakamura (Japan)

John Rosenfield (USA) David Snellgrove (U.K.)

E. Zurcher (Netherlands)

Both the Editor and Association would like to thank Carleton College for its [mancial support in the production of the Journal.

Copyright © The International Association of Buddhist Studies 1993 ISSN: 0193-600X

Indexed in Religion Index One: Periodicals, American Theological Library Association, Chicago, available online through BRS (Bibliographic Retrieval Services), Latham, New York, and DIALOG Information Services, Palo Alto,

California.

Composition by Institute of Budqhist Studies, Berkeley, CA 94704.

Printing by Thomson-Shore, Inc., Dexter, MI48130.

CONTENTS

I. ARTICLES

1. Religion, Kinship and Buddhism: Ambedkar's Vision of a Moral Community by Anne M. Blackburn

2.Vasubandhu on sarpskiirapratyayarp vijiIiinam by Robert Kritzer 2L1

3. Is It a Crow (P. dharpka) or a Nurse (Skt. dhiitnj, or Milk (Skt. k§ira) or a Toy-Plough (P. varpka)? by Stephan H. Levitt 5{

II. REVIEW ARTICLE

Issues on the Field of East Asian Buddhist Studies: An Extended Review of Sudden and Gradual: Approaches to Enlightenment in Chinese Thought, ed. Peter N. Gregory (T. Griffith Foulk) 9

ITl. BOOK REVIEWS

1. Collected Papers, vol. 2, by K. R. Norman (Nirmala Salgado) 18:

2. The Dating of the Historical Buddha. Die Datierung des Historischen Buddha, part I, ed. Heinz Bechert (A. K. Narain) 18'

3. Gender and Salvation: Jaina Debates on the Spiritual Liberation of Women, by Padmanabh S. Jaini (Serinity Young) 20:

IV. RESEARCH TOOLS

A Bibliography of Buddhist Materials in the Recorded Sound Collection . of the Library of Congress by Floyd B. Hooker 20'

V. NOTES AND NEWS

lABS Financial Statement, 1991 24:

Religion, Kinship and Buddhism: Ambedkar' s Vision of a Moral Community

by Anne M. Blackburn

Introduction

On October 13, 1935 Dr. B. R. Arnbedkar (1891-1957), a leader of the Mahar Untouchable community, of Maharashtra, India, announced his intention to renounce Hinduism. Just over twenty years later and shortly before his death, Ambedkar publicly converted to Buddhism. Today, a generation after this conversion, many Mahars identify themselves as Buddhists. Still more revere Ambedkar for offering Untouchables an alternative religious and social vision. Scholarly treatments of Ambedkar and his movement uniformly assert that Ambedkar's Buddhist conversion was an attempt to strengthen the Mahar community against the dominant Hindu social and political hierarchy by providing his followers with an alternative, and egalitarian, identity. These studies have not, however, explored either the historically conditioned nature of Ambedkar's view of Buddhism or the logic behind Ambedkar's choice of religious, and specifically Buddhist, conversion as a mobilization technique for Untouchables. The following pages are a preliminary attempt to understand the historical background to Ambedkar' s interpretation of Buddhism and the reasons for his choice of religious, and specifically Buddhist, conversion. I argue that Ambedkar understood Buddhism, religion, kinship and nationalism as a related set of terms with social and political implications, and that Ambedkar drew upon Indian cultural resources as well as "Orientalist" interpretations of Bud-

. dhism in order to create a model for a moral community ideologically

2 JIABS VOL. 16 NO.1

coexistent with, although not subordinate to, Brahmanical Hinduism and Iridian nationalism.1

Indic Culture and Moral Criticism: R.B. Khare

Studies of Ambedkar and Mahar (or Dalit, the term now preferred by the Mahar community) Buddhism typically conclude that its character as an Indian religion was a crucial reason for Ambedkar's choice of Buddhism rather than, for instance, Christianity. Common sense appears to dictate that compatibility with the surrounding Indian culture was essential to the psychological renewal promised by Buddhist conversion.2 Despite this, until recently scholars have not pursued in detail the links between Buddhism's Indian-ness and its apparent attraction as an alternative for Untouchable Hindus. However, R.S. Khare's new study of the Untouchable Chamars in Lucknow and their moral stance vis-a.-vis Brahmanical hierarchy suggests a way to refine discussions of Buddhism as an Indian cultural resource for Untouchables. In a move away from Dumontian models of Indian society which assume a holistic Indian social order defined by Brahmanical ideology, Khare argues against the caste system as a complete explanation of Indian society. 3 Insisting on the presence of multiple "evaluative and decision-making structures" within the contemporary "Indian social order," Khare asserts that "other indigenous moral orders may explain more and explain it better."4 This attempt to show the existence of, and relations among, several visions and moral criticisms of Indian society has suggestive implications for an analysis of Ambedkar' s choice of Buddhism.

Khare argues for a distinction between a Brahmanical and an "Indic" sphere of discourse and action whiCh is visible in the selfreflection and action of Lucknow Chamars. For this community, philosophical issues and categories which form part of Indic culture serve as a source for and site of moral challenges to Brahmanical authority. Khare describes Lucknow Chamar reflection on and action within an Indic philosophical frame as an effort to "show the hierarchical person an equalitarian mirror that the Indic civilization

Religion, Kinship and Buddhism 3

offers." 5 The relations between the spheres of discourse and action identified as Indic and Brahmanical are not, however, straightforwardly oppositional. Although a relation of contrast is fundamental to the criticism brought by Lucknow Chamars against upper-caste dominance, a successful attempt to wage a moral battle based on Indic issues and categories relies also upon the relations of "controlled difference and sharing" which obtain between Untouchable and uppercaste Indians.6 Khare is careful to note that in the ritual and political dynamics of the Chamar community social dependence as well as cultural antagonism characterize relationships between Untouchables, Brahmins and ascetics (who may be Brahmins or Untouchables with broadly ranging levels of anti-Brahmanical radicalism).

The locus of moral criticism within the Indic sphere, according· to Khare, is the figure of the ascetic, since the ascetic and the Brahmin are the two predominant "genres of moral power" in Indian culture. Here the ascetic is defined by a set of individual goals accessible to householders as well as to homeless renouncers. These goals are renunciation, self-control and austerities'? In other words, Khare posits two realms of moral authority within the Indian cultural sphere: ascetic and Brahmanical. The two may, and do, overlap at times but are seen by the Lucknow Chamars as participating in an ongoing pattern of moral contestation.s The ascetic ideal is, by this reading, the natural site upon which to contest Brahmanical dominance since it offers a source of indigenous philosophical criticism based on moral and spiritual ideals shared (although to varying degrees) by Brahmin and ascetic alike. Chamar reflections on the

. moral status of Brahmanical hierarchy do not rest on a simple opposition between Brahmin and ascetic. In order to contest Brahmanical assumptions of inequality, Khare· shows, Lucknow Chamars insist upon an understanding of asceticism which emphasizes the individual as locus of spiritual morality.

By achieving jdentity with "the Universal Spirit," the ascetic remembers the fact that equality and "innate sameness" are the fundamental characteristics of humanity.9 By identifying equality, in religious and philosophical terms, as a fun.damental characteristic of

4 nABS VOL. 16 NO.1

humanity Lucknow Chamars try to place Brahmanical assumptions of social inequality on the moral defensive. Khare argues that the ascetic as "cultural construct" helps Untouchables to clarify the moral nature of social deprivation, to identify "moral issues, para:.. doxes, and sources Of resentment" and to articulate the cultural foundations for "ultimate moral individuality and identity.' '10 Thus asceticism, understood as a form of spiritual discipline accessible to all Untouchables, be they householders or not, reinforces a view of the person which emphasizes equality and individual moral responsibility. This view, which is not, of course, that commonly found in Brahmanical sources, in tum helps Untouchables to identify the grounds upon which they can criticize Brahmanical social practices; that is, for failing a broader, Indic moral test of accountability. At the same tiine, moral individualism empowers Untouchables to battle existing upper-caste dominance. "Only a new moral accountability," Khare claims, "could combat [the Untouchable's] abject social dependency and disadvantage. 11

Khare's discussion of Lucknow Chamar ideology clearly helps· counter visions of a holistic Brahmanical Indian social order. The multiple religious exemplars (including Hindu sectarian and nonHindu figures) upon which Lucknow Chamars draw for their view of the ascetic ideal also challenges simple definitions of Hinduism 12

More important for my purposes, however, is the fact that Khare's account of Lucknow Chamars' distinction between Indic and Brahmanical cultural spheres and his consideration of the ways in which Lucknow Chamars understand Indic culture as a source for moral criticism of Brahmanical hegemony has implications for a discussion of the creation of Buddhist tradition within the contemporary Indian cultural sphere. For these Chamars, the Buddha serves as one of many ascetic exemplars. Buddhism is thus understood as but one representative of an encompassing cultural and moral spherethe Indicphilosophical and spiritual tradition.


Buddhist History and Intracommunal Morality: B. R. Ambedkar

Is this interpretation of the Buddhist tradition as one of many possible representatives of an Indic philosophical and spiritual tradition the only way Indian Untouchables understand Buddhism's relation to Brahmanical social and political dominance? It is clear from the writings of B. R. Ambedkar that this Mahar leader (famous also for his role in political negotiations with the British during the pre-Independence period and in the creation of a constitution for independent India) did choose to emphasize the distinction between a Brahmanical and an Indic cultural sphere. Ambedkar's oeuvre, furthermore, shows that he too saw Indic culture as a source from which to develop criticisms of the dominant Brahmanical caste structure. However, in contrast to the ideological focus of the Lucknow Chamars described by Khare, Ambedkar's primary focus is not criticism of the Brahmanical system with intent to change that system of social relations through emphasis on a shared and encompassing Indic morality. Instead, Ambedkar uses a polemical critique of Brahmanical religio-social dominance as the foundation upon which to develop an Indic-based alternative to the Brahmanical social order. This alternative is, significantly, designed to coexist with, rather than displace, Brahmanical Hinduism. Ambedkar's historical view of Brahmanical-Buddhist relations and his discussion of religion, morality, social welfare and nationalism reflect this strikingly different strategy for the mobilization of Untouchables.

Ambedkar's vision of two coexisting religious traditions is reflected in his view of the history of Buddhism and Untouchability, and in his view that the social and moral function of religion is the creation of communal identity. Ambedkar develops a history of Buddhism in India which highlights the teaching ofGotama Sakyamuni as an indigenous Indian cultural response ("Indic" in Khare's terms) to "degraded" Aryan society. The dominant society at the time of Gotama S[k:yamuni was, according to Ambedkar, a Brahmanical Aryan community suffering from social, religious and spiritual degradation. The Buddha's teaching, initially a "religious revolution," became a social and political revolution exemplified by equal opportunity for low-caste individuals and women as well as equal


access to education.!3 The Buddhist "revolution" was also marked by a challenge to the infallibility of the Vedas and a revision of regnant conceptions of kamma (Skt. karma).14

Ambedkar depicts a history of "mortal conflict" between Buddhism and Brahmanism. When today's Untouchables' ancestors, described as a single tribe separated from other communities only on tribal grounds, adopted Buddhism they did not revere Brahmins or employ them as priests. They even "regarded them as impure." The self-imposed isolation ofthese Buddhists angered the Brahmins, who responded by preaching ,"against them contempt and hatred with the result that [they] carne to be regarded as Untouchables."15 At this stage then, presumably pre-Asokan (although Ambedkar's chronology is unclear), untouchability was assigned to an isolated tribe of Buddhists on the basis of religious competition. Subsequently, however, the Mauryan empire marked the pinnacle of Buddhist authority in political and religious spheres. That the Brahmins "lived as the suppressed and Depressed Classes" during this period is shown, Ambedkar claims, by Asoka's restriction of sacrificial activity.16 Brahmanical subordination to the Buddhist Mauryan empire was followed, according to Ambedkar, by a Brahmanical revolution waged by Brahmins against the principles of Buddhism which had "been accepted and followed by the masses as the way of life.' '17 Buddhist principles were so well established at this point that Brahmin challengers were forced to promulgate Manusmrti in order to "embody" the principles of this Brahmanical revolution. For Ambedkar, the redaction of this text marks a crucial shift in the Brahmanical understanding of hierarchy, associated with the transition from Brahmanical to Hindu social identity. Manusm[ti codifies a new ly hereditary caste system, distinct from the more flexible va111a system which characterized pre-Buddhist Aryan society, and represents the antithesis of the Buddhist Mauryan social order.18 Mter the "Brahmanical revolution," as Brahmins attempted to counter Buddhist principles established during the Mauryan empire, Buddhist UntouchaNes were further stigmatized on the basis of meat-eating. Brahmins, realizing the power of Buddhist ideals, attempted to challenge Buddhism by adopting an extreme form of Buddhist


asceticism as standard behavior. Buddhists, by now Buddhist Untouchables, continued meat-eating since, in their peripheral relationship to Brahmin village life, they did not kill the animals and could therefore preserve the Buddhist precept of ahirpsa, or non-injury to sentient beings.19

In contrast to the Lucknow Chamar ideology depicted by Khare, Ambedkar's history of Buddhism and untouchability in tension with Brahmanism and Hinduism shows a decided emphasis on the formation of social identity through collective historical experiences. Where Lucknow Chamars refer to a lineage of ascetics drawn from several Indian religious traditions, Ambedkar stresses the continued historical identity of isolable and competing social groups. Instead of developing a sustained critique of Brahmanical hierarchy with reference to an array of moral exemplars representative of broader Indic values, Ambedkar locates a specifiable Buddhist tradition and community in historical time in order to show Untouchables that their disadvantaged position stems from a clearly demarcated religious identity prior to the institutionalization of a hereditary caste order linked to a discourse on ritual purity. Thus, while Chamar ideology attempts to show the moral inconsistency of the Brahmanical Hindu hierarchy within Indic categories, Ambedkar does not recognize the Brahmanical order as a moral system by criticizing it in Buddhist terms. This stems from his view that the Brahmanical social order, at least after the promulgation of Manusmrti, represents an inherently immoral manipulation of mass obedience to religious sanction in order to safeguard the interests of Brahmin elites. It is also the natural extension of Ambedkar's historical view of distinctive religious traditions that do not participate in any broader shared system of religious or moral principles.

Ambedkar's apparent commitment to the formulation of a collective, tribal, history for Buddhist Untouchables can be clarified· with reference to his views on kinship and the social and psychological importance of ancestral identity. Arguing that the only way for Untouchables to end their social isolation is to "establish kinship with and get themselves incorporated into another community," Ambedkar (acknowledging a debt to Robertson Smith) elaborates the benefits of kinship:

8 nABS VOL. 16 NO.1

From the point of view of the group, kinship calls for a feeling that one is first and foremost a member of the group and not merely an individual. From the point of view of the individual, the advantages of his kinship with the group are no less and no different than those which accrue to a member of the family ... Kinship makes the community take responsibility for vindicating the wrong done to a member...It is kinship which generates generosity and invokes its moral indignation which is necessary to redress a wrong ... Kinship with another community is the best insurance which the Untouchable can effect against Hindu tyranny and Hindu oppression.20

In order to establish kinship, the members must all conceive themselves to be "sprung from one ancestor and as having in their veins one blood." It does not, however, matter whether this is in fact the case, since at this later stage of human evolution religion, rather than blood relations, establishes kinship bonds. Ambedkar's iriterpretation of Buddhist history thus establishes the historical basis for Untouchables' kinship with non-Indian Buddhists and depicts a return to Buddhism as a return to familial identity.21 Kinship bonds, established through shared religious identification, are thus expected to strengthen Untouchables' position with respect to other social groups within a broader Indian social order. Such bonds, however, while they are significant in providing the impetus to redress social inequities suffered by Untouchables, are insufficient for the creation and maintenance of a specifically Untouchable social and ethical order. Other aspects of religion, as understood by Ambedkar, guarantee this latter goal. -Ambedkar understands religion as the promulgation of an "ideal scheme" which aims to transform the social order into a moral one.22 Religion is equated with fraternity and defined by social rather than supernatural relations. Ambedkar defines the moral order toward which religion aims as one that maintains human unity and social equality.23 Equality is linked to a particular notion of individuality, understood as the ability to choose one's own social relations, an act denied, argues Ambedkar, by the


hereditary caste order and, presumably, by a social order in which kinship determines identity.24 Only the status of morality as a religious value safeguards the "growth of the individual" in a context bf equality.25

A morai commuIiity is formed out of shared religious identification because religion serves as a social force. "Those who deny the importance of religion," writes Ambedkar, "fail to realize how great is the potency and sanction that lies behind a religious ideal as compound [sic] with that of a purely secularideal."26 Secular law, Ambedkar declared in a 1954 All India Radio broadcast, may be broken by anyone, while religion must be respected by alL 27 Ambedkar's understanding of religion's social force relies explicitly upon his reading of Durkheim, which leads him to state that religiousness is characterized by both by its "sacral" and by its social character.28 Although Ambedkar does not detail the relationship between collective experience and the creation of "the sacred" it is clear that he sees social experience as a source of "the sacred" and as the site where individual awareness of religious sanction is expressed. Religious sanction, for Ambedkar, relies upon shared social experience and such shared experience is limited to equal individuals within the moral community of religious kin established by commensality and the adoption of a common ancestral tradition. Religion itself, as a social mechanism, also creates a moral community consisting in relations of equality and individuality among its members. Although this morality is intracommunal and so cannot by itself produce intercommunal justice, the moral value of equality and individuality help give community members the ability to assert themselves intercommunally.

Ambedkar's Buddhism: A ''New Vehicle"

This understanding of religion and its role in the creation of a moral social order makes it clear that Ambedkar's 1956 conversion to Buddhism aimed to develop a community of neo-Buddhist righteousness coexistent with other religious communities in post Independence India. 29 Further evidence of this attitude toward

10 nABS VOL. 16 NO.1

conversion is visible in Ambedkar's discussion of the relationship between the conversion of Mahar Untouchables under his leadership and the strength of an Indian nation. In 1936, shortly after the famous declaration that he would not die a Hindu, Ambedkar conceded that

what the consequences of conversion will be to the country as a whole is well worth bearing in mind. Conversion to Islam or Christianity will denationalise the Depressed Classes. If they go to Islam, the nUl11ber of Muslims will be doubled ... and the danger of Muslim domination also becomes real. If they go to Christianity .. .it will strengthen the hold of Britain on the country.30

On the eve of conversion Ambedkar described his choice of Buddhism as the least harmful route for the country since Buddhi~m is "a part and parcel of Bharatiya Culture." "I have taken care," he declared, "that my conversion will not harm the tradition of the culture and history of this land."31 Elsewhere Ambedkar sharply delineated between religious and civil status, stating that while kinship holds a community together it is citizenship which binds a society.32 His realistic assessment of continued social inequality also reflects this teligious-civil distinction:

The Depressed Classes may not be able to overthrow inequities to which they are being subjected. But they have made up th,eir mind not to tolerate a religion that will lend its support to the continuance of these inequities.33

Ambedkar thus places an interpretation of Buddhism in relation to several other views on social identity and social order. To guarantee morality within the Untouchable community, as well as a strong response to extra-communal forces, Ambedkar's Buddhist history emphasizes collective historical experience and religious distinctiveness within Indian cultural history. His choice to emphasize the indigenous, or Indic, nature of Buddhism is, like that evidenced by Lucknow Chamar ideology, an attempt to mobilize


Indian cultural resources for social change. Ambedkar's decision to build a separate Bud~hist moral community rather than to attempt alteration of Brahmanical ideology through the mobilization of shared moral values reflects Ambedkar' s distinctive awareness of the relationship between national pluralism and religious identity and his choice to separate inter-and intracommunal relations.

Ambedkar's complex response to the problem of forging a new identity for the Mahar community requires a particular vision of Buddhism. What is the view of traditional Buddhism upon which Ambedkar draws and from where does it emerge? In the first place, it is important to note that Ambedkar distinguishes between historical Buddhism, existing forms of Buddhism at the time of his conversion and the Buddhist ideals tb which he converted and which he was determined to spread. He develops the term "navayana"forthelatter, a Buddhist tradition appropriate for communities in the twentieth century. This "new vehicle" was understood as a direct expression of the "prior tradition" and "pristine purity" of "early" Buddhism, thus allowed Ambedkar to. skirt the distinction between Theravada and Mahayana.34 Ambedkar's navayana included some noticeably recent influences which might be called modemist.35 He charged contemporary monks to adopt Christian forms of social action and argued that . successful propagation of Buddhist dhamma (Skt. dharma) required a "Buddhist Bible."36 .

I have shown that Ambedkar depicted ancient Buddhism as a . "religious revolution," a social reform movement which redressed inequalities in caste and gender relations. To support his view, Ambedkar interprets key Buddhist concepts to link them more closely to a vision of Buddhist social reform. A Buddhist view of kamma, for instance, is depicted as a Buddhist revision of a Brahmanical philosophical position to transform the latter into a principle more conducive to social change. While the idea of kamma, "as formulated by the Brahmins, thought the Buddha, was calculated to sap the spirit of revolt completely," presumably by providing an explanation of social inequality, the Buddha revised the concept to cover only group (rather than individual) responsibility and restricted the efficacy of karmic processes to a single lifetime.37

---~------------------------------. - -- -------


Further, Ambedkar understands the Buddha's teaching that everything is characterized by dukkha, or unsatisfactoriness, as referring specifically to interpersonal relatiol!s. In one instance Ambedkar presents a dialogue in which the Buddha teaches that the root of dukkha is class conflict and asserts elsewhere that "the Buddha's conception ofDukkha is material."38 Nib ban a (Skt. nirvifI;1a) the state or process which describes enlightenment, is considered a precursor for moral action in the world and explicitly associated with a non-monastic lifestyle. Nibbana "means enough control over passion so as to enable one to walk on the path of righteousness."39 Ambedkar's interpretation of dukkha and nibbana implies that moral action, for which nibbana is preparation, will rectify the material suffering of inequality. Ambedkar sees a concern for human welfare (defined generally with reference to non-violence and social equality) as a central teaching of Buddhism and associates such welfare with rationality. For instance, Ambedkarexplains his principles for distinguishing between Buddhist dhamma and dangerous Brahmanical views:

Anything therefore which is rational and logical, other things being equal, maybe taken to be the word of the Buddha ... The Buddha never cared to enter into a discussion which was not profitable for man's welfare. Therefore anything attributed to the Buddha which did not relate to man's welfare cannot be accepted to be the word of the Buddha.40

In other words, Ambedkar articulates a view in which feelings of individual self-worth and moral responsibility are both generated and sustained by the forces of kinship and religious sanction. Kinship itself provides the psychological strength with which to recognize and redress social inequality. This strength does not, however, proceed simply from a sense of unity. It is engendered also by the intracommunal values of equality and individuality which are protected by religious sanction. Ambedkar's vision of ancient Buddhism as a tradition of egalitarian social reform and his exegesis of key Buddhist concepts are clearly crucial to his belief that


Buddhism would, indeed, protect such values. Although Ambedkar does not explicitly link these views to political mobilization, it appears from his continued involvement in political affairs as well as his views ori citizenship and nationalism that Buddhist individuals, fortified by the forces of religious kinship, are expected to contest social inequality in the political arena rather than in an arena of shared morality.41

Am bedkar , s Buddhism Reconsidered

Interpreters of Ambedkar' s views on Buddhism as a tradition of social reform and rationality adopt one of two general attitudes, both of which obscure the historically conditioned nature of Ambedkar' s historical vision. Some scholars accept Ambedkar's vision of Buddhist social reform as unremarkable, depicting a natural affinity between Ambedkar's interpretation and historical Buddhism in the development of Mahar ideology. Janet Contursi, for instance, in her analysis of Dalit resistance to caste Hindus in a Pune slum, simply states that:

The Buddha provided one of the earliest critiques of orthodox Brahmanism, which for centuries propagated social and spiritual inferiority of women and the lower castes. The Buddha attempted 10 counter Brahmanism with a philosophy of spiritual equality and a notion of atheistic morality as the essence of social and religious duty. Ambedkar coupled these aspects of the Buddha's philosophy with an emphasis on rationalism to create a vision of a secular, egalitarian society.42

Owen Lynch proceeds similarly, concluding that "Buddhism was truly Indian, yet it was also ideologically consistent with [the Untouchables'] goal of mobility and the new ideas they had come to accept."43


Eleanor Zelliot seems at times to adopt Ambedkar's interpretation 'of Buddhist history without question, as when she follows a comment on Ambedkar' s biography of the Buddha with a description of Buddhism as "egalitarian."44 On another occasion, however, in a piece co.-authored with Joanna Macy, Zelliot stresses the distance between Ambedkar's vision and what they call "traditional Buddhism."

As a scholar of political theory and a champion of the downtrodden, Ambedkar projected upon the Dhamma his own faith in rationalism and his over-riding concern for social reform.

Given the drive for equality that motivated Ambedkar to lead his people into Buddhism, it is clear why he interpreted the Dhamma in ~ocial terms. That this social emphasis led [sic] to exclude or distort some teaching, fundamental to traditional and canonical Buddhism is understandable ... 45

This stance is notable for its sympathy to Ambedkar's position and motivations and for its postulation of a stable "traditional" Buddhism. More recently, Timothy Fitzgerald has attempted a more subtle reflection on Ambedkar's failure to "give an adequate account of traditional Buddhism." After helpfully detailing specific areas in which Ambedkar's final work (published posthumously), The Buddha and His Dhamma, fails to follow standard Buddhist metaphysIcal positions, Fitzgerald concludes that "there is nothing distinctively Buddhist about the exposition given in The Buddha and His Dhamma ... And all of the key concepts of traditional Buddhism have been fudged over, so that one cannot legitimately hold that there is any serious re-interpretation of traditional Buddhism in this book."46

Neither view of "traditional" Buddhism-as a social reform movement or as some other stable entity interpreted (or misinterpreted) from a social reform perspective-is historically accurate. It is now clear that, although Pali Buddhist literature includes responses (sometimes satiric) to Brahmanical ideas and social institutions,


depictions of the Buddha as a radical social reformer are inaccurate.47 Although caste and gender are not depicted as absolute barriers to soteriological goals, neither gender nor caste relations appears to have been substantially refashioned in society at large in response to Buddhist teachings.48 The alternative view is also untenable. As the recent work of so-called post-Orientalist historians and anthropologists so clearly indicates, it is no longer possible to ignore the historically conditioned quality of a term like "Buddhism." Deconstructing many ofthe foundational categories and assumptions of scholarship on South Asia and other colonized cultural areas, these scholars have detailed the many ways in which nineteenth and early twentieth century contact between European colonialists and Asian peoples resulted in the creation of still dominant notions of "religion," "ethnic identity" and "nationalism."49 Such studies have also indicated the ways in which these notions, forged in the crucible of colonialism influenced by Enlightenment and Romantic philosophies, have been used by contemporary South Asians to develop local and national identities.50

In other words, the Buddhist "tradition" upon which Ambedkar drew in his formulation of Buddhist history and philosophy appropriate to the Mahar community was itself the product of interpretation. This point, now a commonplace in discussions of "modem" Theravada Buddhism, has until now eluded treatments of Untouchables' conversion. As Philip Almond has clearly shown, interpretations of Buddhism in the nineteenth and early twentieth century frequently stressed the rational and atheistic character of Buddhism, as well as the purity of its "original" (understood as that represented by Pali sources) teaching. The Buddha was often depicted as a social reformer, especially as a Luther-like figure attempting to root out superstition and idolatry.51 Such views of Buddhism (now termed "Orientalist") influenced many of the translations from Pali texts available during Ambedkar's era, as well as much of the secondary literature. Furthermore, Ambedkar's South and Southeast Asian partners in discussions of Buddhism and its potential revival were members of a generation educated under these same Orientalist influences. Ambedkar had clear ties to the Maha Bodhi Society (itself


partly the product of Orientalist agenda· in what was then Ceylon) and, from his youth, was exposed to works by a growing number of South Indian intellectuals interested in Buddhi~t philosophy.

Conclusion

I argue, then, that Ambedkar adopts the interpretations of Buddhism dominant during his lifetime and subjects this "constructed" vision to further refinement by creating a conceptual tapestry woven from diverse strands. Ambedkar thus link~d the Buddhism of his dayrational,· atheistic and bent on reform-to other ideas crucial to his vision-"religion," "morality," "kinship" and "nation." This interpretation of Ambedkar's views also offers, I would suggest, an important corrective to the post-Orientalistemphasis on the colonialistcolonized relationship as the chief site of "constructed" traditions. Such scholarship has critically enlarged our understanding of. the colonial experience by analyzing the ways in which colonized cultures were (re )conceptualized and essentialized by imperial scholars and civil servants. As a result, we have been forced to confront a politics of representation which has outlived the specific context of colonial domination. However, in the necessarily insistent attempt to document such processes, post-Orientalist scholars have restricted their vision to the conceptual products of colonialist-colonized contact. This, unfortunately, creates an argument from silence which suggests that re-presenting cultural traditions, and "constructing" them in the process, is an activity limited to Western minds and politics. This implies in turn a certain dearth of creativity on the part of those colonized?2 Ambedkar's Buddhist history thus provides a striking reminder that South Asians informed by their own visions further refined the "constructed" products of Orientalism.


Notes

1. I am grateful to Dominic Lopes, Steven Collins and Frank Reynolds for their responses to an earlier draft of this paper. I have consciously chosen to read broadly in Ambedkar's work, covering mueh of his career and examining published works and posthumously published manuscripts. I try to understand these works as a conceptual whole, leaving aside an analysis of the relationship between individual works and external political events, as well as an analysis of the audience to which Ambedkar directed each piece. Although my approach necessarily "flattens" the textual evidence of Ambedkar' s career, I believe that it is appropriate, although by no means exhaustive, to focus on the relations among key ideas present· in Ambedkar's immense oeuvre. For an accessible introduction to Ambedkar's life and word see Sangharakshita (1986). The classic biography of Ambedkar is Keer' s (1962). An attempt to link more closely the development of Ambedkar's views on conversion to those on constitutional reform should examine his attitude toward "state religion" (see Ambedkar (1989) an_d Ramteke (1983).

2. See Ling (1980), Lynch (1969) and Zelliot (1977, 1978)).

3. I understand "ideology" to mean self-reflective principles expressed through speech or action. See Appadutai (1986), Collins (1989) and Inden (1986a) for criticisms of the "holistic" view and alternative analytical perspectives.

4. Khare (1984), pp. 141-2.

5. Khare (1984), p. 17. See also Ling (1980).

6. Khare (1984), p. 23. See also Inden (1986a), p. 768.

7. Khare (1984), p. 25.

8. I am not concerned here with an evaluation of Khare's quite Dumontian description of Brahmin-ascetic tension as a structural feature of Indian culture, or \ with an analysis of the way Khare' s description of the ascetic as individual appears to reflect some of Dumont's views.

9. Khare (1984), p. 59.

10. Ibid. p. 24.

11. Ibid. p. 59.


12. Ibid. ch. 2-3.

13. Ambedkar (1987), pp. 153,221-2.

14. Ambedkar (1957), p. 89.

15. Ambedkar (1969), pp. 44, 96.

16. Ambedkar (1987a), p. 268).

17. Ibid. p. 274.

18. Ibid. pp. 285-6.

19. Ambedkar (1961), p. 47.

20. Ambedk:ar (1989), pp. 414-5

21. Ibid. pp. 416-7.

22. Ambedk:ar (1987a), p. 6.

23. Ramteke (1983), p. 184 and Ambedkar (1989), p. 407.

24. Ambedk:ar (1989), p. 260.

25. Ambedk:ar (1957), p. 325.

26. Ambedk:ar (1987a), p. 23.

27. Ramteke (1983), p. 184.

28. Ambedkar (1989), p. 179.

29. The adjective "neo-Buddhist" is appropriate given Ambedkar's own use of the term ''navaydna.'' See below.

30: Quoted in Ramteke (1983), p. 127.

31. Quoted in Ramteke (1983), p. 191.

32. Ambedk:ar (1989), p. 416.


33. Ibid, p. 383.

34. Ramteke (1983), p. 169 and Sangharakshita (1986), p. 131.

35. See Gombrich and Obeyesekere (1988) and Queen (1991) for a comparative, Sri Lankan; case.

36. Keer (1962), p. 50.3 and Ramteke (1983), p. 10.8.

37. Ambedkar (1957), pp. 91, 243.

38. Ibid. pp. 57-8, 511.

39. Ibid. pp. 237-8.

40.. Ibid. p. 3-5 1.

41. I do not mean to imply that the choice of arena presents a stark opposition between moral and political contestation. As Khare's study shows, political mobilization may be buttressed by the perceived power of shared mor3I values.

42. Contursi (1989), pp. 447-8-

43. Lynch (1969), p. 98.

44. Zelliot (1978), p. 97.

45. Zelliot and Macy (1980.), pp. 134, 142, emphasis added.

46. Fitzgerald (1989), p. 66, original emphasis.

47. In the Agganna-Suttanta, for instance, Brahmanical supremacy is graphically disputed (by pointing out the undeniably human at-'ibutes of Brahmin women) without questioning the existence of caste structures themselves.

48. See Gombrich (1988) and Sponberg (1992).

49. For instance, see Inden (1986b) and Guha (1989).

50.. For instance, see Kemper (1991) and Spencer (1990.).

5l. Almond (1988), ch. 3-4. Almond notes, however, that interpretations of the Buddha as social reformer varied with changes in the European political climate.

20 HilliS VOL. 16 NO.1

He argues that some scholars, notably Oldenberg, moved away from a reformist interpretation when that view appeared dangerously close to VIctorian socialism (1988, pp. 75-6).

52. I am grateful to Sheldon Pollock for suggestive comments and questions in this regard.

References

Almond, Philip C. 1988. The British Discovery of Buddhism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Ambectkar, B.R. 1989. Writings and Speeches. Vol. 5. Bombay: Government of Maharashtra.

---1987a. Writings and Speeches. Vol. 3. Bombay: Goveniment ofMaharashtra.

--1987b. Writings and Speeches. Vol. 4. Bombay: Government ofMaharashtra.

--1979. Writings and Speeches. Vol. 1. Bombay: Government ofMaharashtra.

--1969 (1948). The Untouchables. Shravasti: Jetavan Mahavihar.

--1957. The Buddha and His Dhamma. Bombay: R.R. Bhole.

--1946. lVllO Were the Shudras? How They Came To Be the Fourth Varna in the Indo-Aryan Society. Bombay: Thacker.

Appadurai, AIjun. 1986. "Is Homo Hierarchicus?" American Ethnologist. 13:745-61.

Cohn, Bernard S. 1959. "Changing Traditions of a low Caste." In Traditional India: Structure and Change. Milton Singer, ed. Philadelphia: The American Folklore Society.

Collins, Steven. 1989. "Louis Dumont and the Study of Religions." Religious Studies Review. 15: 14-20.

Contursi, Janet A. 1989. "Militant Hindus and Buddhist Dalits: Hegemony and Resistarice in an Indian Slum." American Ethnologist 16:441-57.


Deshpande, Gauri. 1988. Pan On Fire: Eight D8lit Women Tell Their Story. Sumitra Bbave, tr. New Delhi: Indian Social Institute.

Dumont, Louis. 1980. Homo Hierarchicus: The Caste System and Its Implications. Mark Sainsbury et al, tr. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Fitzgeraid, Timothy. 1989. "B.R. Ambedkar on Caste and Buddhism." Bulletin of

the Faculty of Humanities of Aichigakuin University. 19:54-67.

_1988. "Buddhism and Social Change in Maharashtra." Bulletin of the Faculty of Humanities of Aichigakuin University. 18:50-73.

Galanter, Marc. 1989. Law and Society in Modem India. Delhi: Oxford University Press.

_1966. "The Religious Aspects of Caste: A Legal View." In South Asian Politics and Religion. Donald Eugene Smith, ed. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Gombrich, Richard. 1988. Theravada Buddhism: A Social History from Ancient Benares to Modem Colombo. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

. Gombrich, Richard and Gananath Obeyesekere. 1988. Buddhism Transformed: Religious Change in Sri Lanka. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Guha, Ranagit. 1989. "Dominance Without Hegemony and Its Historiography." In Ranagit Guha ed. Subaltern Studies 11: Writings on South Asian History and Society. Delhi: Oxford University Press.

Inden, Ronald. 1986a. "Tradition Against Itself." American Ethnologist. 13:762-75.

--1986b. "Orientalist Constructions of India." Modem Asian Studies. 20:401-46.

Isaacs, Harold R. 1965. India's Ex-Untouchables. New York: John Day.

Juergensmeyer, Mark. 1982. Religion As Social Vision: The Movement Against Untouchability in 20th-Century Punjab. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Keer, Dhananjay. 1962. Dr. Ambedkar: Life and Mission. Bombay: Popular Prakashan.


Kemper, Steven. 1991. The Presence of the Past: Chronicles, Politics, and Culture in Sfuhala Life. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Khare, R.S. 1984. The Untouchable As Himself: Ideology, Identity, and Pragmatism Among the Lucknow Chamars. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Ling, Trevor. 1980. Buddhist Revival in India: Aspects of the Sociology of Buddhism. New York: St. Martin's Press.

Lynch, Owen M. 1969. The Politics of Untouchability; Social Mobility and Social Change in a City of India. New York: Columbia University Press.

Queen, Christopher S. 1991. "Blurred Genres of Protestant Buddhism: Olcott's Catechism and Ambedkar' s Bible." Paper delivered to th~ American Academy of Religion in Kansas City.

Ramteke,D.L. 1983. Revival of Buddhism in Modem India. New Delhi: Deep and Deep.

Sangarakshita. Bhikkhu. 1986. Ambedkar and Buddhism. Glasgow: Windhorse Publications. Shinde, J.R. 1989. "From Reforms to Revolt: An Analysis of Dr. Ambedkar's Revolutionary Thinking." In Political Ideas andLeadership of Dr. B R. Ambedkar. K.K. Kavlekar and AS. Chausalkar, eds. Pune: Vishwanil Publications.

Spencer, Jonathan, ed. 1990. Sri Lanka: History and the Roots ofContIict. London: Routledge.

Sponberg, Alan. "Attitudes Toward Women and the Feminine in Early Buddhism." In Jose Ignacio Cabezon, ed, Buddhism, Sexuality, and Gender. Albany: State University of New York Press.

Srinivas, M.N. 1952. Religion and Society Among the Coorgs of South India. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Tartakov, Gary Michael. 1990. "Art and Xdentity: The Rise of a New Buddhist Imagery~" Art Journal. 49:409-16.

Wilkinson, T.S. and MM. Thomas, eds. 1972. Ambedkar and the NeD-Buddhist Movement Madras: Christian Literature Society.


Zelliot, Eleanor. 1992a. From Untouchable to Dalit: Essays on the Ambedkar Movement. New Delhi: Manohar .

.-e----1992b. "B uddhist Women of the Contemporary Maharashtrian Conversion Movement." In Jose Ignacio Cabezon, ed. Buddhism, Sexuality, and Gender. Albany: State University of New York Press.

_1985. "The Buddhist Literature of Modern Maharashtra." South Asia Digest of Regional Writing. 11:134-49.

_1978. "Religion and Legitimation in the Mahar Movement." In Religion and the Legitimation of Power in South Asia. Bardwell L. Smith, ed. Leiden: EJ. Brill.

_1977. "The Psychological Dimension of the Buddhist Movement in India." In Religion in South Asia: Religious Conversion and Revival Movements in South Asia in Medieval and Modem Times. GA Oddie, ed. London: Curzon Press.

Zelliot, Eleanor and Maxine Berntsen, eds. 1988. The Experience of Hinduism: Essays on Religion In Maharashtra. Albany: State University of New York Press.

Zelliot, Eleanor and Joanna Rogers Macy. 1980. "Tradition and Innovation in Contemporary Indian Buddhism." In A.K. Narain, ed. Studies in the History of Buddhism. Delhi: B.R. Publishing Corporation.

Vasubandhu on sarpskiirapratyayarp. vijiiiinam

by Robert Kritzer

Introduction

The principle of conditioned origination (pratityasamutpiida) is one of the most fundamental and profound of all Buddhist teachings; Louis de la ValIee Poussin points out that it was, in fact, by discoverip.g pratityasamutpiida, that the Buddha became the Buddha (La Vallee Poussin 1913:v). Over the course of time, a formula to express this .principle, consisting of gradually increasing numbers of members (aiJ.gas) developed, until finally the 12-membered formula,

. with which all students of Buddhism are familiar, emerged (for studies of this process, see Aramaki 1986 and 1989). As Takasaki Jikido suggests, we cannot understand this formula in terms of a simple, linear chain of causes, in which each member is caused by a prior member and, in turn, produces a subsequent member. Instead, the members must be divided into groups, and the relationships among the members of each group, as well as the relationships among the various groups, must be examined (Takasaki Jikido 1987:151).

In fact, Buddhist philosophers, from the period of the early abhidharma texts onward, have interpreted the formula and explained the relationships among the members and groups of members in various ways, according to the degree of reality they attribute to the constituents of experience and their general understanding of causation. Not surprisingly, thinkers belonging to different schools have come to dramatically different conclusions about conditioned origination; for example, the Sarvastivadin school, which believes that dharmas are real, implies that a real entity is that which has arisen through conditioned origination, while the Madhyamika Nagarjuna,

24

Vasubandhu 25

who denies the reality of dharmas, says that entItIes are empty precisely because they arise through conditioned origination (yab pratityasamutpadab siinyatiiIp. tlim. pracak$mahe-Madhyamakakarikai) XXIV18ab; Madhyamakasastra: 220. See also Nagao 1989:5). .

Although the Yogacaras, unlike the Madhyamikas, speak the same abhidharmic language as the Sarvastivadins in analyzing the pratityasamutpada formula, they too disagree with the Sarvastivadin interpretation. Again, this is natural, since the Yogacara school ascribes a greater degree of reality, and hence causal efficacy, to vijiiiina than to the other dharmas, and vijiiiIna is perhaps the most important member of the fonnula. According to Sarvastivada, the members of the formula can be divided into three groups: avidya and sarpski'ira belong to the past life; vijiiiIna, nlimariipa, $ac;1ayatana, sparsa, vedana, tr$I).a, upadiIna, and bhava to the present; and jati and jarlimaraI).a to the future (Abhidharmakosabhif$ya: 131). In their "three lifetimes/twofold" (san shih Jiang ch 'ung; for a discussion of this subject, see Matsuda 1982a) causation system, the two members from the past life are the cause of the first five members of the present

~ life, which are considered resultant; the last three members of the present life, which are considered causal, are, in turn, the cause of the future life (AKBh:134). Thus, the Sarvastivadins consider vijiiiIna in the formula to be result rather than cause.

The Yogacaras, on the other hand, divide the members differently. According to them, there are four groups of members: the projecting (iIk$epaka) group (avidya, scupski'ira, and vijiiana); the projected (iIk$ipta) group (nlimariipa, $ac;1ayatana, sparsa, and vedan§), the actualizing (abhinirvartaka) group (tr$I).a, upadiIna, and bhava), and the actualized (abhinirvftf1) group (jati and jaramaraI).a) (Abhidharmasamuccaya:26). This arrangement is known as the "two lifetimes/single" (Jiang shih i ch 'ung) causation system; the projecting group, which belongs to the earlier lifetime, projects the seeds of thelaterlifetime (namely, the projected group), while the actualizing group, which also belongs to the earlier lifetime, activates these seeds and thus causes the later lifetime to arise (again, see Matsuda 1982a). In this system, vijiiiIna belongs to a causal group of members, and,


although Asanga does not explicitly identify it as such here, its funCtion of receiving the impressions of past karma and projecting them as the seeds of the next lifetime leaves little doubt that it is, in fact, iiJayavijiiiina.

It is clear, then, that in these two analyses of the pratityasamutpada formula, the nature and position of vijiiaila is particularly significant, and we can suppose, furthermore, that in any similarly abhidharmic discussion of pratityasamutpada, the treatment of vijiiiina will give us a clue to the fundamental doctrinal stance of the author. In this paper, I shall examine several conflicting expositions of pratityasamutpada in general, and vijiiiinfiilga in particular, all by Vasubandhu, and I shall discuss their broader doctrinal implications.

Part One

In Chapter Three of the Abhidharmakosa, Vasubandhu devotes nineteen verses (vo 20-38) to a discussion of conditioned origination (pratityasamutpada). During the course of this discussion, we can find two conflicting defini~ons of consciousness as a member (anga) of the pratityasamutpada formula, that is to say, of consciousness conditioned by the karmic forces (sarpskiirapratyaymp vijiiiinam). In verse 2Ic, consciousness is defined as the skandhas at the moment of conception (sarpdhiskandhas tu vijiiiinam - AKBh:13I). In his comment in the Abhidharmakosabha$ya on verse 28ab, however, Vasubandhu states that sarpskiirapratyayarp vijiiiinam actually refers to the stream of the "six ordinary kinds of mind" (for translation, see Schmithausen 1987:650) in the inteimediate realm, and he cites a siitra definition for support (karmak$epavasac ca vijiianasantatis tliip tliip gatirp gacchati / jvalagamanayogenantarfibhavasambandhat / tadanyasarpskiirapratyaymp vijiiiinam / evarp calqtva tad upapannmp bhavati vijiiiinfiilganirdese"vijiiiinmp katamat? / $a9vijiiiinakayiiJ)" iti - AKBh: 140).

In his translation of the A bhidh arm akosa, Louis de la Vallee Poussin does not mention which school accepts the second definition;

Vasubandhu 27

in his translation of the Ch' eng wei shih lun, on the other hand, he attributes it to the Sarvastivadins: "D' apres les Sarvastivadins, Ie membre Vijfiana = les six Vijfianas (Manovijfiana, oeil-vijfiana, etc.) de l'existence intermediaire" (La Vallee Poussin 1929:200). P. S. JaW makes the same attribution in the introduction to his edition of the Abhidharmadipa: "The other [i. e., not pratisazp.dhivijiiifna] meaning, viz., the six vijiiiinas, although occurring in the Vibhailgasutta of the Sazp.yutta-nikiiya, is most probably a later addition introduced by the Abhidharmikas. This becomes evident from the attempt of the Vaibha~ikas to apply this term not only to the moment of rebirth consciousness, but also to a long preceding period called antarii-bhava, where alone the six vijiiiinas could be understood to function" (Jaini 1977:58-59). More recently, Marek Mejor has introduced a translation of the Abhidharmakosabhii$ya' s comment on A.KIll28ab, together with the text and translation of the corresponding portion of Sthiramati's commentary, Tattviirtha, as "Vaibha~ikas on the pratityasamutpiida" (Mejo·r 1991:96), thus indicating that he, too, considers the six-vijiiifnakiiya defmition to represent the Sarvastivadin position.

Although N. H. Samtani has pointed out that the Arthaviniscayasiitranibandhana identifies another interpretation of the. six-vijiiifnakiiya definition, in which the six vijiiiinas are described as sazp.skiiraparibhiivitiil}., as a Sautrantika view (this is Vasubandhu' s position in another text, the Pratityasamutpiidavyiikhyii; see below), and recognizes that this contradicts Jaini's opinion, which he quotes, , he does not go into the matter any further (A VS, intro.:143-144). Kata Junsha shows that Vasubandhu, in his comment on AKIII28ab, is actually attacking the Sarvastivadin iivasthika interpretation of pratityasamutpiida; according to Kata, Vasubandhu makes this attack

. in the name of the Sautrantika. However, he, too, fails to explore Vasubandhu's interpretation of vijiiifna in detail (KatO 1989:315-317). In this paper, I hope to show that the, first of these two· definitions (sarpdhiskandhiis tu vijiiifnam) represents the orthodox Sarvastivadin position, while the second (vijiiiinarp. katamat? $agvijiiifnakiiyiil}.) is Vasubandhu's own opinion, and I shall try to explain the implications of Vasubandhu's position.

nABS VOL. 16 NO. 1

The Sarvastiviidin Definition - pratisaq1dhivijiiana

Since the exposition of conditioned origination in the AK is rather involved, I shall first explain the context in which each definition occurs. In the beginning of Chapter Three, the Exposition of the Universe (iokanirdesa), Vasubandhu enumerates the various realms, destinies, etc., into which. beings are reborn, and he explains antariibhava, the intermediate existence between death and rebirth. He then denies that there is any soul (iitman) that is reborn; rather, "the skandhas alone, conditioned by defilement and action, enter the womb by way ofthe series (that is given the name) of the intermediate existence, like a lamp" (niitmiisti skandhamiitrarp tu kiesakarmiibhisarps1q:tam/ antariibhavasarptatyiikuk$im eli pradipavat - .AKIlll8; AKBh:129). To explain this conditioning process, whereby defIlement and action result in rebirth, and birth, in turn, results in defIlement and action, Vasubandhu introduces the topic of pratityasamutpiida. The frrst definition of vijiiiina can be found at the beginning of this discussion.

In AKIll20, Vasubandhu states that the twelve members of the pratityasamutpiida formula can be divided among three lifetimes, and in AKIll21-24, he defines each member as being a "state" (dasiior avasthi) of the five skandhas. However, in verse 25, using the word ldla, he indicates that he personally disagrees with this interpretation, which he attributes to the Sarvastivadin or V aibh~ika school (iivasthikal). kile$to 'yam -AKIll25a; AKBh: 133. See also La ValIeePoussin 1971, v. 2: 66, n. 5). It is among the verses that present the iivasthika interpretation that our first definition of vijfiiina is found.

Thus, Vasubandhu, himself, has identified.the first definition as being that of the Sarvastivadins. Furthermore, as I mentioned above, near the beginning of his comment on verse 28ab, he attacks the entire iivasthika interpretation, to which, he says, the Sautrantikas object, questioning whether it accurately reflects the meaning of siitra Catra

Vasubandhu 29

tusautiantikavijiiapayantilkirpkhalvetai§[:aya ucyanteyayasye§til) iihosvit sfitrarthal) -AKBh: 136). Moreover, at the end of the same section, he again explicitly identifies everything contained in the avasthika interpretation as Vaibha~ika doctrine (sa eva tu vaibha§ikanyayo yal) pfirvam uktal) -AKBh: 140), a point noted by de la Vallee Poussin in his translation (La Vallee Poussin 1971, v. 2: 88).

Similar avasthika interpretations of pratityasamutpada, including definitions of vijiianiiilga resembling that found in AKIII21c, can be traced to earlier Sarvastivadin texts, although not to the earliest group. I have not found such interpretations in the Sarvastivadin Abhidharmapitaka, either in early texts, such as the Dharmaskandha (A pi ta mo fa yiin tsu lun) , which contains extensive discussions of both sazpskfirapratyayazp vijiianam and niimarilpapratyayazp vijiianam (T. l537:506c-508b; see Schmithausen 1987:464-465, ns. 1114, 1119), or in later texts, such as the Jiianaprasthana (A pi ta mo fa chih lun) , which is cited by de la Vallee Poussin as the source of the division of members into three lifetimes (T. 1544: 921 b; also, see the earlier translation, A pi t'an pa chien tu lun, T. 1543: 775b-c;La Vallee Poussin 1971 v. 2:60, n. 1). Nor does the Abhidharmamrta (A pi ta 'n kanlu wei lun), one of the earliest Sarvastivadin manuals, contain an avasthika interpretation, although it does divide the members among the three lifetimes, as well as classifying each member as klesa, karma, or du1)kha(T. 1553:97Oc-971c; Aams:70-73). However, at least three abhidharma texts prior to the Abhidharmakosa claim that the avasthika interpretation represents the correct understanding of the twelve-membered pratityasamutpada formula.

The earliest source that I have found is the Maha vibha§a (T. 1545 - Api ta mo ta pip'o sha lun ; T. 1546 - A pi t'an pi p'o sha lun), which is again cited by de la Vallee Poussin in a footnote to the translation of AKIII 21a (La Vallee Poussin 1971,v. 2:62, n. 1). The Mahavibhasa first distinguishes its own, avasthika, interpretation from the k§aIJ.ika interpretation of Sarmadatta (She ma ta to) and the sazpbandhika interpretation of the Vijiianakayasiistra (A pi ta mo shih shen tsu lun - T. 1539)(T. 1545: 118c-119a; T. l546:93c-94a).

30 nABS VOL. 16 NO. 1

In the k$aI)ika interpretation, all twelve members are present in a single moment, as in the case of someone who harms a sentient being due to passion: his mental confusion is a\j.dyii; his volition is saIpskiira; his consciousness (i.e., his awareness of the object of his crime) is vijiiiina, etc. (T. 1545:118c; identical to AKBh: 133). According to the siiIpbandhika interpretation, which de la Vallee Poussin explains as "par la liaison des causes et effets" (La Vallee Poussin 1971,v. 2: 65), a number of members can be present in a single moment: for example, when someone conceives of passion for an object, his ignorance (about the true nature of the object) is avidyii; his desire is saIpskiira; his discrimination of the object is vijiiiina, etc. But these members do not consist of all five' skandhas. Some members, on the other hand, do consist of all five skandhas: for example, the arising of all the skandhas in the new lifetime is jiiti, and their deterioration is jaramaraI)a But these members do not occupy a single moment (T. 1545:118c).

According to the Mahiivibhii$ii's own interpretation, each member refers to the five skandhas at a different moment; this is clearly the same iivasthika system described inAKIII21-24. Its definition of vijiiiina, however, appears somewhat different at first glance. According to Hsiian-tsang' s translation, vijiiiina is the pratisaIpdhicitta (hsii hsin), together with its accompaniment (chu pan), which the Kokuyaku Issaikyo explains as the remaining four skandhas (T. 1545:118c; KIK, Bidonbu, v. 8: 9, n. 19). The earlier translation (attributed to Kiityiiyaniputra) has hsiang hsii hsin instead of hsii hsin, which is not significantly different (T. 1546:94a). Nor, I think, is there any difference in meaning between this pratisaIpdhicitta and the saIpdhiskandhas of AKIII21; according to the iivasthika system, the five skandhas at this.point in the development of the new life can be called vijiiiina (or citta, since the terms are synonymous here; see AKII34ab; AKBh:69), because vijiiiina is the predominant element . (AKIII25b; AKBh: 133). Vasubandhu perhaps condensed the expression metri causa, and YaSomitra, judging from his comment on Vasubandhu's second definition (samskiirapratyayaIp vijiiiinaIp pratisaIpdhicittam eviibhipretaIp syiit- AKVy: 299), considers the expressions identical.

Vasubandhu 31

Similar to the Mahavibha$a's definition are those of the *Abhidharmahrdayasiitra (A pi t'an hsin Iun ching) and the * Sarpyuktabhidharm ahrdaya, or * K$udrakabhidharmahrdaya, (Tsa a pi t'an hsin Iun). The * Abhidharmahrdayasiitra defines vijiHina as the pratisarpdhicitta (hsiang hsu hsin) together with its associates (T. 1551:860c). The *Sarpyuktabhidharmahrdaya defines it as the present salPtati (hsien tsai hsiang hsin), which here seems to be equivalent to the five skandhas at the first moment of the present life, since the next member, namariipa, is defined in the following way: "that salPtati, (after) it already (exists), and while the six ayatanas are not completely differentiated, is called niimariipa" (Pi hsiang hsu i Jiu ju fen wei man shuo ming se - T. 1552:935b).

The * A bhidh arm ahrdaya or * A bhidharmasiira (A pi t'an hsin Iun) also agrees with the Mahavibha$ain maintaining that the twelve members of the pratityasamutpada formula refer to twelve sets, or states, of the skandhas and that the formula should not be understood in terms of a single moment. Its definition of vijiilina, on the other hand, is rather surprising; it states that vijiilina is the bijacitta produced by the previous member, salPskiira (pi sheng chung hsin shih shih - T. 1550:827a). This would seem to support Mizuno Kogen's statement that the * A bhidh arm ah[daya sometimes contains doctrines that diverge from orthodox Sarvastivada (Mizuno 1961:73). Although Willemen does not comment on it in his translation, this definition deserves further exploration, especially since the term chung hsin, or chung shih, is a synonym for aJayavijiilina in some vijiiaptimatratatexts (Nakamura 1975:650).

All·of the abhidharma texts mentioned above define vijiiliniiilga as the initial moment of the present lifetime and as the karmic link between the past life and the present. In the Mahavibha$a, * Abhidharmahrdayasfitra, and * Sarpyuktabhidharmahrdaya, moreover, this vijiilina cannot possibly be the six vijiilinakayas because, as we discover from the definitions of the following arlgas, the six sense organs are not yet present at the moment referred to as vijiilina. Furthermore, although the Dharmaskandha, which is much earlier than Mahavibha$a, defines salPskiirapratyayarp vijiilinam as the six vijiilinas (but not in the antarabhava - T. 1537:507a), in none of


these post-Mahiivibhii.$ii texts, to the best of my knowledge, is vijiiiiniiilga ever defined as the six vijfiiinakiiyas, nor is the definition from the Pratityasamutpiidasiitra that is quoted, by Vasubandhu in his comment on AKIll28ab ever discussed. Thus, I have found no evidence suggesting that the Sarvastivadins, from the period of the Mahiivibhiis!i, interpreted vijiiiiniiilga as the six vijfiiinakiiyas in the intermediate existence, while there are a number of Vaibha$ika texts that present the iivasthika interpretation as orthodox, not to mention the fact that Vasubandhu, himself, identifies it as Vaibha$ika doctrine.

Further confirmation can be found in Sarp.ghabhadra's two texts, * Nyiiyiinusiira (A pi ta mo shun cheng Ii lun) and * Abhidharmapitakaprakara1).asiisanasiistra or * Sam ayapra dipika (A pi ta mo tsang hsien tzung lun). In both texts, Sarp.ghabhadra quotes Vasubandhu's gloss on verse 21c and continues with a further explanation: "In the mother's womb, at the time of conception, the five skandhas in a momentary state are called Consciousness because, at this moment, consciousness is the most prominent (of the skandhas. This consciousness) is only manovijiiiina because, in this state, the causes of the production of the (other) five vijiianas (i. e., the sense organs) are not yet possessed" (yii mu t'ai teng chen chieh sheng shih i ch 'a na wu yiin ming shih. tz'u ch 'a na chung shih tsui sheng ku. tz'u wei i shih yii tz'u wei ching wu shih sheng yiian yu wei chii ku. - T. 1562:484b; also, T. 1563:841a). Again, in neither of these texts could I find the six-vijiiiinakiiyas definition.

Vasubandhu's Definition in Abhidharmakosabhiisya-The Six vijiiiinas in the Intermediate Realm

In order to show that the six-vijiiiinakiiyas definition in fact represents Vasubandhu's own opinion in AKBh, I must begin by summarizing his rather long and complicated comment on AKIII28ab: "The origination is the cause; that which originates is the result" (hetur atra samutpiidal) samutpannarp phalarp matam - AKBh: 136).

Vasubandhu 33

vasubandhu explains the verse, saying that all the members are both pratityasamutpada and pratityasamutpanna. He then mentions the differing opinion of a Sthavira PUIT.lasa, who adduces four reasons to prove that. that which is pratityasamutpada cannot be pratityasamutpanna (AKBh: 136). .

It is at this point that Vasubandhu attributes to the Sautrantikas the criticism of the avasthika interpretation, mentioned above; according to which nothing of the sort can be found in the sutras. There follows an argument between the Sautrantika and the Sarvastivadin concerning the authority and completeness of the sutra definitions of the members of the formula. In the course of this argument the Sarvastivadin maintains that they are not complete and the meaning is not clear (na vai sarvarp nirdesato nitartharp bhavatl). The Sautrantika, who has the last word in this dispute,. states that the sutra is, in fact, complete (evam ihfipy avidyadinarp paripu17)a eva nirde.sal) na savasesal}), and he proceeds to point out the logical flaws in the avasthika interpretation: "Why do you introduce something of a different kind (other than avidya; i. e., the five skandhas) into (your definition of) avidyfi? Although the five skandhas are found in these 'states,' only that (entity) whose existence or non-existence determines the existence or non-existence of some (other entity, i. e., the following member) can be established as a member. Although the arhat possesses the five skandhas, he does not have any sarpskaras (that, according to your interpretation would have to be) caused by the five skandhas. Why (not)? Because (the sarpskaras that constitute sarpskiiriIl;1ga) are only caused by avidya (which the arhat does not have). Likewise, (he does not have) any vijiiana that goes to good, bad or immovable destinies, or trSI)a, upadana, etc. (Therefore,) the meaning of the sutra is just as was stated (in the sutra)" (jatyantarasya tv avidyayarp kirpkrtai) praksepai) / yady api ca tasv avasthasu paficaskandha vidyante yasya tu bhavifbhavayor yasya bhavabhavaniyamai) tad eviIl;1garp vyavasthapayitum / saty api ca pancaskandhake sarpskiira na bhavanti paiicaskandhahetukal) / kirp tarhi/ avidyahetuka eva/ tatha pUI)yapuI)yanefijyopagarp ca vijiianarp na bhavati trSI)opadanadayas ceti / yathanirdesa eva siitrarthai) -AKBh:137; La Vallee Poussin 1971, v. 2:76). Yasomitra explains


that the vijiiana here is pratisaIp.dhivijiiana (AKVy:293). The point of this argument seems to be that, if the members of the

formula are defined as states of the skandhas, t!Ie arhat would still be ensnared in saIp.sara, simply because he still possesses the skandhas. However, we know that the arhat is able to reverse the samsaric process precisely because he destroys the first member, avidya. Thus, although he possesses the skandhas until his death, he does not produce the conditions for rebirth and the continuation of saIp.siira.

Vasubandhu next returns to the four points of Piil1).asa, refuting the first of them, and then discusses the question of whether pratityasamutpada is aSaIpslqia. This in tum leads into an etymological discussion of the term, pratityasamutpada, which is followed by various opinions regarding the question of why the Buddha expressed the principle of conditioned origination in two ways: asmin satidaIp. bhavati and asyotpadad idam utpadyate.

Finally, Vasubandhu offers his own interpretation of the formula. As KatO has remarked, although Vasubandhu rejects in principle avasthikapratityasamutpada and treats the formula largely in terms of a theory of cognition, his definitions of vijiiana, namariipa, and the $ac;Iayatanas are not inconsistent with an embryological interpretation, which is how Kata characterizes avasthikapratityasamutpada (Kata 1989:315). While Vasubandhu does not define these members as states of the skandhas, he does trace the early development of the new being from its beginning as consciousness, mentally projected by the past life, through the appearance of the other three mental skandhas, together with riJpaskandha (i.e., namariipa), to the development of the six sense organs ($ac;Iayatana). However, as I showed at the beginning of this paper, for Vasubandhu, vijiiana does not refer only to the moment of pratisaIp.dhi consciousness; rather, it encompasses the series of vijiianas that constitute the intermediate existence between one life and the next, as well as the moment of rebirth into the next life. This interpretation of the definition from the Pratityasamutpadasfitra, which he quotes here (vijiianaIp katamat / $ac;Ivijiianakaya iti - AKBh: 140), can be justified because, according to abhidharma, the sense organs are all present in the intermediate existence (sakaJaksal)-AKIII14c; AKBh:125), and thus conscious-

Vasubandhu 35

ness can include all six vijnanakayas (it is to this abhidharmic rule that Jaini alludes in the passage quoted above). If, on the other hand, explains Yasomitra, the sutra had intended for vijnanifilga to refer exclusively t~ pratis81p.dhivijnana, it would have said, "What is vijiiana? Manovijnana," because, at the moment of conception, only manovijnana is present, not the other five vijniinas (ev81p. tu

-vaktavy81p. syat / vijnanarp. katamat / manovijnanam iti / na hi pratis81p.dhik$ane pancavijnanakayasambhavo 'sti/manovijnanenaiva pratis81p.dhibandhat - AKVy:299). Yasomitra then quotes from AKIll42a-c to support his claim that pratis81p.dhivijnana can only be manovijnana, a point on which Vasubandhu and the Sarvastivadins agree (see Sarp.ghabhadra's comment, quoted above).

Curiously, Sarp.ghabhadra does not, as far as I can tell, comment on this portion of AKBh. The Chinese commentator, P'u Kung, on the other hand, does. In his Chu she lun chi, P'u Kuang first explains that Vasubandhu' s intention is to include both the stream of vijnanas in the intermediate realm 'and the upapattibhava, which is equivalent to pratis81p.dhivijnana, in his definition of vijniiniIiJ.ga: "This vijnana passes through both the intermediate realm and the moment of conception. Although the moment of conception is only manovijnana, in the state of the intermediate realm, (this vijnana) produces all six vijnanai' (tz'u shih t'ung yil chung sheng erh yu. sheng yu sui wei i shih yil chung yu wei t'ung ch'i liu shih.). Then, after quoting . Vasubandhu's approval of the Pratityasamutpadasutra 's definition of vijnana as the $a4vijnanakayas, P'u Kuang states, "If one relies on the Sarvastivadins, vijnanifilga is only the single moment of upapattibhava and does not pass through the intermediate realm; therefore, (for them) it is only manovijnana" (jo i sh.uo i ch 'ieh yu pu

. shih chih sui sheng yu i ch 'a na pu t'ung ch 'ung yu ku wei i shihT. 1821:172c). Clearly, P'u Kuang believes that Vasubandhu disagrees with orthodox Sarvastivadin doctrine.

I have puzzled over Vasubandhu's locating vijniinifilga in the intermediate realm, since I have found no other independent text in which it is similarly placed. Perhaps one could say that Vasubandhu here is trying to modify the SarvastivaCIins' unequivocal identification of vijnana with the present life, but his commentators (see P'u


Kuang, quoted immediately above; see also AKVy:299; Sthiramati's Tattviirtha, quoted in Mejor 1991:101-102) understand him to include the moment of pratisarpdhi into the pt:esent life as well, and it seems to me that, in terms of causation, the intermediate realm is more closely related to the present life than to the past. I can only conclude that his purpose here is simply to provide a rationalization for adopting the sutra definition; as I have mentioned above, placing vijiiiina in the intermediate realm is the simplest way for him to justify the six-vijiiiinakiiya definition in abhidharmic terms. In the second part of this paper, I shall speculate on Vasubandhu's reasons for adopting this definition.

Vasubandhu's Definition in the Pratityasamutpiidavyiikhyiisarpskiiraparibhii vi tiil;1 sac;Ivijiiiinakii yiil;1

Like P'u Kuang, Viryasridatta, also draws attention to the difference between two definitions of vijiiiiniiIiga, in a passage of the Arthaviniscayasutranibandhana. (This passage corresponds to a portion of the Pratityasamutpiidavyiikhyii, in which Vasubandhu quotes the view of an opponent whom he will soon refute [Honj6 1989: 173]; Viryasridatta, on the other hand, seems to approve of this view.) The Arthaviniscayasutra, itself, contains the text of the Pra tityasam utpiidasutra and hence the six -vijiiiinakii ya definition, but Viryasridatta, who, according to Mejor, follows the Kashmirian Vaibha-?ikas (Mejor 1991:18), points out that elsewhere sarpskiirapratyayarp vijiiiinam is identified with pratisarpdhivijiiiina, and he quotes AKIII21c (sarpdhiskandhiis tu vijiiiinam). He also refers to the well-known sutra statement, according to which niimarupa could not solidify into a fetus if vijiiiina did not descend into the mother's womb (Digha Nikiiya II 63; quoted in La Vallee Poussin 1913:12), and understands it to imply that vijiiiina in the pratityasamutpiida formula refers to pratisarpdhivijiiiina and hence can only be manovijiiiina.

He then points out the discrepancy between this interpretation

Vasubandhu 37

and the definition in the A VS, but he argues that there is no contradiction (virodha). According to him, the A VS (i.e., the Pratityasamutpadasiitra) definition is overly broad and not specific to the context of rebirth; therefore, he says, it is not lifk$a1J.ika. To support this assertion, he compares the siitra definitions of vijiiiina and the riipa portion of nifmariipa and shows that, in the case of riipa, too, the siitra likewise gives an all-inclusive definition that does not pertain to the specific context of vijiiiinapratyayarp namariipam. Furthermore, he states that the lifk$81J.ika definition is to be found elsewhere, i. e., in the verse of AK.

However, Viryasridatta is also able to rationalize the siitra definition; that is to say, he is able to understand it in the context of the pratityasamutpada formula. He mentions by name the Sautrantikas, who, he says, believe that the vijiiiina conditioned by the sarpskifras is not pratismpdhivijiiiina but rather the six vijiianas, which are permeated by the sarpskaras (sautriintikamatena tv avirodha eva / yasmat tasya sarpskaraparibhavitai) $ac;lvijiianakayai) sarpskarapratyayarp vijiiiinam i$tmp na pratisarpdhivijiianam eveti -AVSN:118-119; Honjo 1989:67-69). This passage is significant because it is the only explicit attribution of a six-vijiianakaya definition to the Sautrantikas that I have found. However, the interpretation of the six vijiianakayas here as sarpskiiraparibhavita is not identical to Vasubandhu's interpretation in AKBh, according to which they are the stream of vijiianas in the intermediate realm; I shall discuss the differences later in the paper. Moreover, as Honjo has noted, there are many passages in A VSN that correspond to

Vasubandhu's Pratityasamutpadavyakhya, including the first part of this one (Bonjo 1989: 173), and it is to this text, and not to the AKBh, that Viryasridatta is referring when he mentions the opinion of the Sautdintikas in the above passage.

In the PSVy, which has beel). studied notably by Matsuda Kazunobu, Muroji Gijin, and Lambert Schmithausen, Vasubandhu includes a long (folios 17 a5 - 26b5 in the Peking edition of the Bstan 'gyur) discussion of vijiiiinfiilga, in which he mentions the view of certain "others" (gzhan dag) who maintain that smpskiirapratyaymp vijiiifnam is the pratismpdhivijiiifna in the mother's womb (see above


concerning the correspondence between this . passage and AVSN). Schmithausen has identified a passage, beginning with f. 20b4 (Schinithausen 1987:467, n. 1128) and continuing to f. 22b4, in which Vasubandhu refutes this view as being'inconsistent with both siitra (mdo sde dang' ga1- f. 20b6-f. 21 b8) and reason (rigs pa dang 'gal-f. 21 b8-f. 22b4). Among the several opinions that Vasubandhu

. attacks is the one quoted with approval in A VSN, to the effect that the pratisaIp.dhivijiiifna definition is 1ak$a1)ika and the six-vijiiifnakaya definition abbiprayika, and that the siistra defmition does not contradict the siitra definition (PSVy:f. 20b7-21a2).

Vasubandhu ridicules this position, saying that the two definitions are indeed irreconcilable. He shows that, in the case of the riipa portion of namariipa, the siitra definition, namely that riipa consists of the four mahiibhiitas and the four upadayariipas, and the sastra definition, presumably that riipais the material portion of the embryo, are compatible since the embryonic riipa does, in fact, consist of the mahiibhiitas and the upadayariipas. In the case of vijiiifna, however, the six vijiiifnakayas are not present at the moment of conception, so

. sastra contradicts siitra (nying mtshamS sbyor ba na mam par shes pa gang yin pa de mam par shes pa 'i tshags drug ma yin pas / 'dir chos 'dra ba ci yod / 'dii ni 'du byed kyi rkyen gyis mam par shes pa bstan pa brtsams pa yin pas zla 1a ci 'i phyir bya - PSVy:f. 21a3-4; see also Wayman and Wayman 1974:55n., where this passage is referred to; howeve!, I am not sure whether Wayman understands it in the same way that I do).

Instead, Vasubandhu here defines sarpskiirapratyayarp vijiiifnam as vijiiifna Ci. e., the six vijiiifnakayas) penneated by the sarpskiiras (de Itar na 'du byed kyis yongs su bsgos pa mam par shes pa de nyid 'du byed kyi rkyen gyis yin gyi nying mtsham sbyor ba'i mam par shes pa ni ma yin no - PSVy : f. 23al-2). Schmithausen describes this vijiiifnaas follows: "the salJlskiira-pratyayaIp. vijiiifnam is the vijiiifna of the prior existence which receives the Impressions of kanna and - by continuously propagating itself along with this impression -becomes, in its tum, the cause of a new existence (beginning with namariipa)" (Schmithausen 1987:253, n. 51).

Furthennore, although Vasubandhu rejects the V aibh~ika asser-

Vasubandhu 39

tion that· the six-vijiianakaya definition is abhiprayika while the pratisarpdhivijiiana definition is lak$al)ika, he, too, as Matsuda points out (Matsuda 1982b:63-64), considers the sutra definition to be intentional: according to him, sarpskarapratyayarp vijiifinam is ultimately the stream of alayavijiiana penneated by the sarpskaras ('dir don nyid gang zhe na / 'du byed kyis yongs su bsgos pa'i kun gzhi mam par shes pa 'i rgyun yongs su gyur pas yang srid 'byung bar nus pa ni 'dir 'du byed kyi rkyen gyis mam par shes pa yin par dgongs pa yin no - PSVyf. 24al-2; Matsuda 1982b:64). The remainder of Vasubandhu's discussion of vijiifinailga concerns alayavijiiana, the discussion of which, according to Matsuda, is similar to that found in the Karmasiddhiprakaral)a, yet another text by Vasubandhu (Matsuda 1982a:44).

Part Two

In all interpretations of pratityasamutpada in the. context of rebirth, vijiifina is the most important member, since it is exactly at vijiiana that the kannic legacy of one life passes on to the next. However, as we have seen, different interpretations disagree regarding two interrelated questions: to what stage in the rebirth process does vijiifiniiilga correspond; and what is its causal nature - is it cause, result, or both cause and result? All three answers to the second question have been proposed in one text or another during the history of the exegesis of the fonnula (for an example of a text that takes vijiianailga to be both cause and effect, see Alex Wayman's description of Tsong kha pa's interpretation - Wayman 1984:181-185).

As I have shown above, vijiiana, in the Sarvastivadin system, refers to the first moment of the present lifetime, and it is result (ph ala) , since it is based on klesa and karma (AK III 26ab; AKBh: 134). There is some disagreement as to whether or not vijiiana is vipaka. According to the Sarvastivadins, it is not, because for them, pratisarpdhi is always defiled (upapattibhaval) kli$tal) - AKIII 38a;


AKBh:151), while viplika must be morally neutral (vipliko 'vyaJqto dhaimal). - AK IT 57 a; AKBh:95). However, as Schrnithausen has shown, pratisaIpdhivijiiana is, in fact, consid,ered to be viplika in Theravadin abhidharma, in the Abhidharmasamuccayabhii-5ya, and in parts ofthe Yogiiciirabhiimi (Schmithausen 1987:38;307 ns. 256-257). On the other hand, certain Yogacara texts, for example Ch 'eng wei shih lun (T. 1585:19a; La Vallee Poussin 1929:217) and Mahiiyanasa1!1grahabhii-5ya (MS:15; Lamotte 1973:53-54), have adduced the defiled nature of pratisaIpdhivijiiana as proof that it could not be sa1!1skfirapratyayaIp vijfianam, which, according to them, must be viplika and hence neutral. Regardless of the moral nature of pratisaIpdhivijiiana, there is certainly nothing about it that suggests the strongly causal and projecting qualities of the six vijiianakiiyas, permeated by the saJ.!1Skfiras, as described by Vasubandhu in PSVy.

In the PSVy, Vasubandhu locates vijiiana in the prior lifetime, and, by calling it sa1!1skfiraparibhiivita, he shows that, rather than being a resultant entity, projected by karma into the next life, it is a causal entity, whose ability to project the next life is conditioned by karma. As for pratisaIpdhivijfiana, it is, according to PSVy, the fIrst moment of niimariipa in the present life (mdo sde 'ill las mam par shes pa 'i rkyen gyis phung pO lnga pa 'i ming dang gzugs bstan pas nying . mtshams sbyor ba 'i mam par shes pa de ji ltar de dang lhan cig byung ba'i ming dang gzugs kyi rkyen du rung - PSVy f. 21b4; Schmithausen 1987:467 n. 1128).

The general similarities between the explanations of pratityasamutpiida in the Abhidharmasamuccaya and the PSVy have been noted by Matsuda (Matsuda 1982a:47-48), and the interpretations of vijiiana, in particular, coincide in substance. According to . the AS, vijiiana, which is considered a projecting (iik-5epaka) member of the formula and hence belongs to the prior life, "supports the bond of beings' actions" (sattvanii1!1 karmabandhaIp ca dhiirayati - AS: 25); the ASBh explains that this is "because it arises simultaneously with the impressions produced by the Karmic Forces" (saIpskiiriihitaviisaniisahotpattel)- ASBh:32). This seems to be the same function that is implicit in Vasubandhu' s vijiiana permeated by the sa1!1skiiras. Furthermore, "it is the condition of Individual

Vasubandhu 41

Existence" (pratyayas ca bhavati namariipasya - AS:25), because "Individual Existence attains growth due to the entrance of consciousness into the mother's womb" (matul) kuk$au vijiiiinavakriintya namariipavivrddhigamanat - ASBh:32). The consciousness mentioned by the ASBh here must be pratisarpdhivijniina and, being associated with the later lifetime, cannot be the same as. the vijiiiina that arises simultaneously with the karmic impressions. In the immediately following description of the function of nifmariipa, which "makes beings grasp the basis of personal existence" (iitmabhiivarp ca sattviin grahayati - AS:25), the identification of pratisarpdhivijiiiina with the initiation of nifmariipa, similar to that in PSVy, becomes clear.

Thus, both Asanga in AS and Vasubandhu in PSVyrecognize two types of consciousness, a causal one, which is identified (at least provisionally) with the six vijiiiinakayas, and a fruitional one, pratisarpdhivijiiiina, which is not considered sarpskfirapratyaya and which is associated with nifmarilpa. The idea that the six vijiianas can be permeated by the sarpskfiras, which has been attributed to the Sautrantikas (see A VSN:118-119, quoted above; also, La Vallee Poussin 1929: 217), is criticized in certain Yogacara texts that explicitly teach ilia ya vijniina, for example, TriIpsikiibha$ya (TrBh: 3 8) and Ch 'eng wei shih lun (T.1585:19a; La Vallee Poussin 1929:217), in order to prove that sarpskfirapratyayarp vijnanam must be iilayavijnana. However, a similar notion appears in the pratityasamutpada section of an earlier Yogacara text, the Savitarkasa vicarabhilmi of the Yogacarabhilmi: "For example, a person in the past has performed and accumulated acts, whether meritorious, unmeritorious, or immovable (iiniiijya), whether physical, verbal, or mental, which are conditioned by ignorance. His consciousness, accompanied by those acts, continues to exist up to the moment of death and becomes the cause of the consciousness at the moment of conception" (yathapihaikatyena pilrvam avidu$avidyagatenavidyapratyayarp PUlJyapuI)yiiniiijyarp kayavfii1manal)karma lqtarp bha va ty upacitarp / tatkarmopagarp [Schmithausen's correction from the manuscript of Bhattacharya's tatkarmopabhogarp; Schmithausen 1987:472 n. 1153] casya vijiiiinam amaraI)asamayad anuvrttarp


bhavati pratisandhivijiiiInahetubhiitarp - YBh:198-199; also, Schmithausen 1987:178). As for pratisarpdhivijiiiIna, it is explicitly called vipakavijiiiIna, and it is said to be con~itioned by the causal consciousness. The relationship between this vipakavijiiiIna and niimariipa is explained in tenns of the mutual dependence of vijiiiIna and niimariipa (YBh:199).

Schmithausen, who considers this passage to predate a systematized notion of aJayavijiiiIna, emphasizes that both the causal and the vipaka consciousnesses here are the series "consisting of one or the other of the ordinary six kinds of vijiiiIna" (Schmithausen 1987: 178). However, he does not suggest that it therefore represents a nonY ogacara, for example, a Sautdintika, doctrine. According to Schmithausen, the earliest Y ogacara thought, which he says is found in portions of the YBh, does not encompass a fully developed theory of aJayavijiiiIna, explicitly identified as such. This raises the question of the development of Yogacara doctrine and its relationship to the Sautrantika school, a question that is very pertinent to the study of texts such as AKBh and AS. Vasubandhu, whose name is associated with both the Sautrantikaand Y ogacara schools, of course figures critically in any discussion of the relationship between them.

There are many different opinions regarding Vasubandhu, especially concerning his dates and to how many people his name refers, but Hirakawa Akira, in his introduction to the Index to the Abhidharmakosa, summarizes the most commonly· held views regarding his philosophical beliefs: "It is generally accepted among scholars that the author of the Kosa was ordained in the Sarvastivada School, but his thoughts were closer to those of the Sautrantika School. The doctrine of the Salitrantika School is based on 'the prajfiapti,' which includes the teaching of bija; therefore, the developed fonn of this doctrine can be related to the doctrine of Vijfianavada. It does not necessarily mean that the Sautrantika School itself developed into the Vijfianavada, but it can be easily assumed that the author of the Kosa belonged to the Sautrantika School[and] later chariged to the Vijfianavada, for there is a certain common ground between the· doctrines" (Hirakawa 1973:xi-xii). According to this way of thinking, Vasubandhu wrote the AKBh

Vasubandhu 43

when he was a Sautrantika, the Trirpsikiiwhen he was a Yogacara, and texts like the KarmasiddhiprakaraJ).a and the PSVy at some time in between, while he was presumably in the process of conversion from Sautrantika to Yogacara. For example, Muroji suggests just such a development (Muroji 1985:[2]), while Matsuda implies something similar when he states that the iiJayavijiiiina that is expounded in PSVy and KS is different from that of the Yogadira school since it is "tinged with a Sautrantika hue" (Matsuda 1982a:44).

This model ofVasubandhu's literary and philosophical development is largely based on two types of evidence: traditional accounts of his life and the contents of his writings. According to Mejor, the reliable information in the Chinese and Tibetan biographies and historical sources "may be summarized in two points: 1) V asubandhu' s composition of the Abhidharmakosa-karikii and bhii$ya and a subsequent controversy with a Kashmirian V aibha~ika master, Sanghabhadra, 2) Vasubandhu's conversion to Mahayana under the influence of his elder brother Asanga" (Mejor 1991:7). As for the content of his works, in the AKBh, as is well known, Vasubandhu frequently criticizes V aibh~ika positions, while supporting positions that he identifies as, or we know from other sources to be, Sautrantika. In works such as PSVy and KS (to summarize Lamotte on the latter), Vasubandhu, although he mentions iiJayavijiiiina, does not propose a doctrine of consciousness-only; furthermore, he quotes almost exclusively from non-Mahayana siltras, mentions the opinions mostly of non-Mahayana schools and teachers, and takes recognizably Sautrantika positions on a number of important issues (Lamotte 1935-36:176-179). Finally, in Trirpsikii, his exposition is clearly and classically Y ogacara.

There may, however, be another way to explain why Vasubandhu asserts a "Sautrantika" position, at least in our case of sarpskiirapratyayarp vijiiiinam. Before I come to this, it is necessary to discuss briefly two differing opinions regarding the composition of the Y ogiiciirabhilmi, a text that precedes Vasubandhu and with which he was presumably acquainted (concerning the question of the relationship between YBh and AKBh, see Yamabe 1990, in which the possibility of Vasubandhu's bija theory being traceable back to


YBh is raised). In his monumental work, Alayavijiiiina, Schmithausen, in the

course of trying to explain the context in whic~ the Yogadira concept of aJayavijfilina first arose, concludes that the Yogacarabhfimi is probably "a compilation consisting of several (or at least two) heterogeneous (or at any rate chronologically distinct) layers" (Schmithausen 1987:13), rather than the work of a single author. He goes on to identify three layers of the text: an oldest layer, in which there is no reference to aJayavijfiana; a middle layer, in which there are occasional references to aJayavijfilina, but no reference to the Sarpdhinirmocanasfitra; and the newest layer, in which aJayavijiiana is discussed in detail and the Sarpdhinirmocanasfitra is fully utilized (Schmithausen 1987:14). The assumption that underlies Schmithausen's view of the stratification of Yogacarabhfimi is that, roughly speaking, the less mention of aJayavijfilina and reference to Mahayana sfitra there is, the older the layer. Aramaki Noritoshi, on the other hand, in a personal communication, takes a different approach in determining the strata of the text. Aramaki agrees with Schmithausen regarding the portions comprising the oldest layer, but he takes issue with his identification of the other two layers, locating some portions containing Sarpdhinirmocana material and detailed treatments of aJayavijfilina in the middle layer and some portions containing scant mention of aJayavijiilina in the newest layer. According to Aramaki's theory, his middle layer contains the Yogacara exposition of ultimate truth (paramfirth a vyavasthiina) , namely the doctrine of aJayavijfilina, while the newest layer contains an exposition of provisional truth (sam vrtivya vasthiina) , which presupposes aJayavijfiiina theory. In this layer, Aramaki sees the origin of the Yogacara abhidharrna.

In the case of Vasubandhu's texts, as well as Asailga's Abhidharmasamuccaya and Mahayiinasarpgraha, we are dealing with a different situation. All of these texts belong to a later period than even the newest layer of the Yogacarabhfimi; each is composed by a single, identifiable author, and by the time these works were written, the doctrine of aJayavijfiiina was no longer in the early stages of the process of formation. Nonetheless, Aramaki's distinction

Vasubandhu 45

betweeri paramarth a vya vas thana and saIpvrtivyavasthana can perhaps help us understand the intention of these texts.

First, let us consider the two works of Asanga. The purpose of MahayanasaJpgraha is specifically to expound the doctrine of alayavijiiana,or, to use Aramaki's terminology, the Yogacara paramarthavyavasthana, and it contains systematic proofs and elaborations. The Abhidharmasamuccaya, on the other hand, while it occasionally mentions the term, does not expound aJayavijiiana in detaiL Rather, as I hope to show in forthcoming work on this text, Asanga, having already worked out a philosophical system based on alayavijiiana, attempts in AS to produce an abhidharma, a samvrtivyavasthana, consonant with, and supportive of, his .. paramfirthavyavasthana. In the case of Asanga' s interpretation of the pratityasamutpada formula, his two-lifetime (liang shih i ch 'ung) system, in which the causal vijiiana of the past life projects the seeds of the present life, only makes sense if viIiiananga is really filayavijiiana. However, since his purpose is to explain the twelvemembered formula and not to prove the existence of alayavijiiana, Asanga sees no need to mention it by name. This is in contrast to MS 1.33, where, as one of a number of proofs of alayavijiiana, he states that saIpskiirapratyayaIp vijiianam can only be alayavijiiana (MS: 15; Lamotte 1973:53).

Similarly, although he eloquently expounds alayavijiiana and vijiiaptimatrata in TriIpsika, Vasubandhu is writing for different purposes in ASBh and PSVy. PSVy is a commentary on a sutra, the Fenpieh yiian ch'i ch'u sheng fa men ching (T. 717; referred to by Matsuda as the * AdiviSe$avibhagasutra [Matsuda 1982a:42]), the subject of which, as its name suggests, is pratityasamutpada, and Vasubandhu, in commenting on it, does not have to refer to vijiiaptimatra theory, even though he uses the term alayavijfiana. The fact that he does not mention the system of eight vijfianas need not mean that he does not believe in it, contrary to Matsuda (Matsuda 1982a:44). Nor does his accepting on the level of "intentional meaning" the identification of vijfiananga with the six

. sarpskaraparibhavitavijfianas a position associated by some (see above) with the Sautrantika school, while rejecting the Sarvastivadin


identification of it with pratisarpdhivijiiiIna, prove that he is himself a Sautdintika, at least in the sense of accepting the doctrines of other teachers, such as Srilata, who are designated as Sautrantikas. Recently, Honja Yoshifumi, in an article that'explores a number of points raised by Kata Junsha in his book on Sautrantika (Kata 1989), has suggested the possibility that Vasubandhu was the proponent of a Mahayana Sautrantika doctrine, distinguishable from the "orthodox," Hinayana Sautrantika of SriIata (Honja 1990). My own, very tentative, theory is that Vasubandhu espouses Sautrantika or Sautrantika-like ideas for the purpose of constructing Yogacara abhidharma; this is, perhaps, not so different from Honja' s proposal. In any case, by contrasting the abhipraya of the sarpskiiraparibhavitavijiiiInas with iilayavijiiana, Vasubandhu implies that, for him; iilayavijiiiIna belongs,to the re,aIm of ultimate truth while the six vijiianas belong to that of provisional truth.

To return to the AKBh, there is some question in my mind as to whether or not Vasubandhu's definition of sarpskiirapratyayarp vijiiiInam in his comment on AK ill 28ab is substantially the same as his definition in PSVy. At first glance, they appear somewhat different. In AKBh, Vasubandhu does not use the expression sarpskiiraparibhavita. to describe vijiiiIna, and this expression, with its connotations of bija-theory, is one of the most striking features of his discussion in PSVy. Furthermore, in PSVy, he does not mention the intermediate realm, in which he locates at least a portion of sarpskiirapratyayarp vijiiiInam in the AKBh. Although Sthiramati, in his commentary on AKBh, calls the stream of vijiianas in the intermediate realm karmaparibhavita (Mejor 1991:101-102), he is perhaps, under the influence of what Vasubandhu says in PSVy, reading too mlich into AKBh. More important is the fact that, in AKBh, Vasubandhu, as I mention above, has been understood by his commentators to include pratisarpdhivijiiiIna, along with the stream of the six vijiianas in antarabhava, in his definition of sarpskiirapratyayarp vijiiiInam. This would seem to be inconsistent with the causal nature ascribed to vijiiiIna in PSVy as well as with the statement that pratisarpdhivijiiiIna is the first moment of niimariipa in the later lifetime.

Vasubandhu 47

However, AKBh is again quite a different type of text than either Trs or PSVy. Although in verse VllI40ab Vasubandhu claims to have presented an abhidharma system largely in agreement with the Vaibhii~.ika school (kasmiiravaibhasikaniitisiddhal) prayo mayiiyarp. kathito 'bhidJiarmal) - AKBh:459; quoted by Mejor, who takes this verse to mean that Vasubandhu's o\vn doctrinal standpoint agreed with that of the Vaibha$ikas [Mejor 1991:19]), it is well known that

. he rejects the Sarvastivadin position on many crucial points. Nevertheless, even if the author of the Abhidharmadipa· is correct in assuming, as J aini puts it, that "the Kosa is not an authentic Vaibhiishika treatise but only a mouth-piece of the Mahayanist Vasubandhu disguised as a Vaibhashika acharya" (Jaini 1977:129), his intention in writing AKBh is not to expound Mahayana, specifically Yogadira, doctrine, even less so than it is in PSVyor KS. In the case of his discussion of pratiyasam utpada, Vasubandhu seems mostly concerned with undermining the Sarvastivadin avasthika interpretation and with promoting the Pratiyasamutpadasiitra as scriptural authority. Having established in the AKBh that saIp.skfirapratyayarp. vijiiiinam is the six vijiiiinakayas without using any suspiciously Yogacara terminology such as paribhavita, he is free to interpret this six-vijiiiinakaya definition in a more overtly Yogacara fashion in PSVy. It thus seems possible that Vasubandhu, in the AKBh, is adjusting the a bhidh arm a system so painstakingly worked out by the Vaibha~ikas, in order to make it consonant with his Yogacara beliefs.

In his introduction to Abhidharmadipa, Jaini identifies sixteen points on which the author of AD attacks Vasubandhu for departing from orthodox V aibha~ika doctrine. In a significant number of these cases, the "Sautrantika" position taken by Vasubandhu is either virtually identical to that of the Y ogacara school (for example, regarding the cittaviprayuktasaIp.skfiras) or, as Jaini puts it, "foreshadows the theory of fIlaya-vijiiiina" (Jaini 1977:110), for example, regarding the anusayas. Jaini draws attention to the fact that the Dipakara accuses Vasubandhu of being a vaituiika, i.e., accepting Mahayana, (see above; also, Jaini 1977: 128), and, in a discussion of the controversy about sarvastivada, states: "Although the main attack


on the Sarvastivada comes from the Sautrantika Kosaldlra, the Dipakara's reference to the alaya-vijiiana and to the abhuta-parikaJpita unmistakably shows that his real opponel)ts were YogacharaVijfianavadins ... " (Jaini 1977:121). However, Jaini takes the Dipakara's accusations as confirmation of the traditional, and still commonly accepted, assertion that Vasubandhu was a Sautrantika when he wrote AKBh and later converted to Mahayana and Yogacara.

I, on the other hand, would like to suggest that the Dipakara may have been right, that Vasubandhu, when he wrote AKBh, may alreadyhave been a Yogacara, and that the Sautrantika views that he espoused provided a better abhidharmic infrastructure for the doctrine of aJayavijiiana than did the Sarvastivadin positions that he attacked. I believe that what he says about sarpskarapratyayarp vijiianam in AKBh and PSVy supports my speculation.

Conclusion

Thus, we have seen that the orthodox Sarvastivadin definition of vijiiananga from the time ofthe Mahavibhasa, is pratisarpdhivijiiana (consciousness at the moment of conception). This interpretation is compatible with the Sarvastivadin "three lifetimes/twofold" (san shih liang ch'ung) system of causation. Although Vasubandhu presents the Sarvastivadin avasthika interpretation of the pratityasamutpada formula, which includes this definition of vijiiana, in the verses of the Abhidharmakosa, he indicates that he personally disagrees with it, and, in the Bhasya, he gives his own opinion, that vijiiananga consists of the stream of the six vijiianas in the intermediate realm, as well as pratisarpdhivijiiana. In a later work, the Pratityasamutpadavyillya, he takes the sutra definition to mean that vijiiana refers to the six vijiianas, perfumed by the sarp.skaras (sarpskfiraparibhavita), in the past life. Furthermore, he states that this definition is only provisional and that vijiiana in the pratityasamutpada formula must ultimately be identified with alayavijiiana. My opinion is that Vasubandhu, at the time he wrote the A bhidharm akosabhasya, may have already held the beliefs that he expressed in later works such as the

Vasubandhu 49

PratityasamutpiIdavyakhyiI and KarmasiddhiprakaraI}.a, beliefs that can perhaps be better characterized as Yogadlra than as Sautrantika.

Bibliography

Chinese Sources

*Abhidharmahrdaya (A pi t'an hsin Iun). T. 1550.

*Abhidharmahrdayasiitra (A pi t'an hsin Iun ching). T. 1551.

* Abhidharmfirnrta (A pi t'an kan Iu wei Iun). Gho~aka. T. 1553.

* AbhidharmapitakaprakaraIJ.aSasanaSastra (A pi ta rno tsang hsien tzung lun) Sarp.ghabhadra. T. 1563.

Ch'eng wei shih Iun. DharmapaIa. T. 1585.

Chu she Iun chi. P'u Kuang. T. 1821.

Dharmaskandha (A pi ta mo fa yiin tsu Jun). T. 1537.

Jiifinaprasthfina (A pi t'an pa chien tu Iun). T. 1543. (A pi ta mo fa chih Iun). T. 1544.

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(A pi t'an pi p'o sha Iun). T.1546.

* Nyi'iyfinusara (A pi ta mo shun cheng Ii Iun). Sarp.ghabhadra. T. 1562.

*Sarpyuktiibhidharmahrdaya (Tsa api fan hsin Iun). T.1552.

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Abhidharmakosabh8$Ya. Edited by P. Pradhan. Second edition. Patna; K. P. Jayaswal Research Institute, 1975 (Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series Volume XVIII).


Abhidh8J.wakosavy§khya. Edited by U. Wogihara. Tokyo; Sankibo Buddhist Bookstore, ·1936 (1989 reprint).

Abhidhannfim[ta. Translated from Chinese into Sanskrit by Shanti Bhikshu Sastri. Santiniketan; Visvabharati, 1953 (Visvabharati Studies 17).

Abhidharmasamuccaya: "Fragments from the Abhidharmasamuccaya of Asarp.ga."Joumal of the Royal Asiatic Society: Bombay Branch, v. 23, 1947 (1979 reprint) pp. 34-33.

Abhidhannasamuccayabhasya. Edited by Nathmal Tatia. Patna; K. P. Jayaswal Research Institute, 1976 (Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series Number 17).

Arthaviniscayasutra and Its Commentary (Nibandhana). Edited by N. H. Samtani. Patna; K. P. Jayaswal Research Institute, 1971 (Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series Volume XIII).

MadhyamakaSastra ofNagJrjuna. Edited by Swami DwarikaDas Shastri. Varanasi; Bauddha Bharati, 1983 (Bauddha Bharati Series 16).

TrirpsikiibhaSYa. In VijiiaptimatratiIsiddhi: Deux Traites de Vasubandhu: Virpsatikii et Trirpsika. Edited by Sylvain Levi. Paris; Librairie Ancienne Honore Champion, 1925.

Yogacarabhiimi. Edited by Vidhushekhara Bhattacharya. Part 1. Calcutta;University of Calcutta, 1957.

Tibetan Sources

Mahayanasarpgraha. Edited by Etienne Lamotte in La Somme du Grand Vehicule D'Asailga. Tome 1. Louvain; Universite de Louvain, 1973.

Pratityasamutpadavyakhya (Rten cing 'breI par 'byung ba dang po dang mam par dbyeba Mad pa). Peking Bstan 'gyur 5496 (mdo 'grel XXXVI chi).

Modem Works

Aramaki, Noritoshi

1986 "On the Formation of a Short Prose Pratityasamutpada Sutra." In Buddhism and Its Relation to Other Religions: Essays in Honour of Dr. Shozen Kumoi on His SevendethBiIthday. Kyoto; Heirnkuji Shoten. pp. 87-121.

Vasubandhu 51

1988 "Tbe Fundamental Trutb of Buddhism: Pratityasamutpada." Machikaneyamaronso 22, 1988, pp. 27-44.

Honja Yosbifumi

1989 Bonbun wayaku KetS'ujOgikyo(Japanese translation ofArthaviniscayasutra and Nibandhana). Kyoto; privately printed.

1992 "Sautriintika." Indogaku Bukkyogaku Kenkyii, v. xl, n. 2, March 1992, pp. 148-154.

Hirakawa Akira

1973 Index to the Abhidharmakosabhfi$ya, Part One, Sanskrit-Tibetan-Chinese. Tokyo; Daizo Sbuppan Kabusbikikaisba.

Jami, P. S.

1977 Introduction to Abhidharmadipa with Vibhfi$aprabhiivrtti. Second edition. Patna; Kashi Prasad Jayaswal Research Institute (Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series Vol. 4).

Kokuyaku Issaikya

Bidon-bu 8 (Japanese translation of Mahavibhfi$8) .

. Kata J unshO

1989 Kyoryobu no kenkyii (Etude sur 1es Sautrantika). Tokyo; Sbunjiisha.

Lamotte, Etienne

1935-36 Introduction to Traite de 1a Demonstration de L 'Acte (edition and French translation of KarmasiddhiprakaraI}.a). In Melanges Chinois et Bouddhiques IV, 1935-36. pp. 151 ff.

1973 La Somme du Grand Whicule D'Asanga. Tome II (French translation of Mahayana-sarpgraha). Louvain; Universite de Louvain.

La Vallee Poussin, Louis de

1913 Theone des Douze Causes. Gand; Universite de Gand.


1929 Vijiiaptimiitratasiddhi: La Siddhi de Hiuan-tsang (French translation of Ch'eng wei shih lun). Paris; Paul Geuthner.

1971 L'Abhidharmakosa de Vasubandhu. (Melanges Chinois etBouddhiques XVI). New edition. Brnxelles; Institut BeIge des Hautes Etudes Chinoises.

Matsuda Kazunobu

1982a "[FumbetsuengishoshOhi5mongyo (AVVS)]-Kyoryobu Seshin no Enkisetsu." Buddhist Seminar, no. 36,1982. pp.40-70.

1982b "Seshin [Enkigyoyaku (PSVy)] ni okeru arayashiki no teigi." Indogaku Bukkyogaku Kenkyii, vol. 31, no. 1, December 1982. Pp. 63-66.

Mej or, Marek

1991 Vasubandhu's Abhidharmakosa and the Commentaries Preserved in the Tanjur. Stuttgart; Franz Steiner Verlag (Institut ftir Kultur und Geschichte Indiens und Tibets an def Universitat Hamburg, Alt- und Neu-Indische Studien, 42).

Mizuno Kogen

1961 "Abhidharma Literature," in Encyclopaedia of Buddhism. Colombo; Government of Ceylon. Fasc. 1, pp. 64-80.

Muroji Gijin

1985 Introduction to Jogoron Chibettoyaku koteibon (Tibetan text of Karmasiddhiprakara.IJ.a). Kyoto; privately printed.

Nagao, Gadjin

1989 The Foundational Standpoint of Miidhyamika Philosophy. Translated by John P. Keenan. Albany; State University of New York Press.

Nakamura Hajiroe

1975 Bukkyo Daijiten. Tokyo; Tokyo Shoseki Kabushikikaisha.

Vasubandhu 53

Schmitbausen, Lambert

1987 Alayavijiiana. Tokyo; The International Institute for Buddhist Studies (Studia Philologica Buddhica; Monograph Series IV).

TakaSaki Jikido

1987 An Introduction to Buddhism. Translated by RolfW. Giebel. Tokyo; The ToM Gakkai.

Wayman, Alex

1984 "Dependent Origination - The Indo-Tibetan Tradition," in Buddhist Insight. Delhi; M:otilal Banarsidass (Religions of Asia Series, number 5). pp. 163-192.

Wayman, Alex and Wayman, Hideko

1974 The Lion's Roar of Queen Srimfila. New York; Columbia University Press (Buddhist Traditions; Volume X).

Yamabe Nobuyoshi

1990 "B-ifa Theory in ViniscayasarpgrahaI,li" Indogaku Bukkyogaku Kenkyil, vol. 38, no. 2, March 1990. pp. 13-15.


Chinese Temls

A pi ta mo fa shih lun

A pi ta mo fa yun tsu lun

A pi ta mo shih shen tsu lun

A pi ta mo shun cheng Ii lun

A pi ta mo ta pi p'o sha lun

A pi ta mo tsang hsien tzung lun

A pi t'an hsin lun

A pi t'an hsin lun ching

A pi t'an kan lu wei lun

A pi t'an pa chien tu lun

A pi t'an pi p'o sha lun

. Ch' eng wei shih lun

chu pan

Chu she lun chi

chung hsin

chung shih

Fen pieh yuan ch'i ch'u sheng fa men ching

hsiang hsu hsin

hsien tsai hsiang hsin

:SJ\. JJrJ ~ Jtg fJJ MJ ~ r~ *~ ;;flUI/L\ ;E~1£m~

hsii hsin *I/L\ jo i shou i ch'ieh yu pu shih chih sui sheng yu i ch'a na pu t'ung

chung yu ku wei i shih

tffi<IDl--Wif~"um!£. if-*IJ JJB /P 3M r:p if" 1ft [}ft~ ~ "

liang shih i ch'ung mi!t-~

Vasubandhu 55

pi hsiang hsti i liu ju fen wei man shou ming se

t~ :tEJ *1 B 1\ .A 5J\. * ~1liI ~£ 1615

pi sheng chung hsin shih shih

p'u Kuang

san shih liang ch'ung

She rna ta to

-m:mm ~~~~

Tsa a pi t'an hsin lun ~/)iiJ !'E.~Jl.\~

tz'U shih t'ung yti chung sheng erh yu. sheng yu sui wei i shih yti

chung yu wei t'ung ch'i liu shih.

Ilt~JHtQ{-* <> ~=:ff <> ~:ffHnft~~M'*1f{l[Ji~1\~<>

yti mu t' ai teng chen chieh sheng shih i ch' a na wu ytin ming

shih. tz'u ch'a na chung shih tsui sheng ku. tz'u wei i shih yu tz'u

wei ching wu shih sheng yuan yu wei chu ku.

M'-HJHi3~ <> lE*t~~ <> -~W{l[liD~.<>Ilt~W*<>.ftg~oIlt~ ~.<>M'Ilt{l[*oli~~~om*~~o

Is It a Crow (P. dhmpka) or a Nurse (Skt. dhatnj, or Milk (Skt. k$ira) or a Toy-Plough (P. 'varpka)? '

by Stephan Hillyer Levitt

I

In a recent article Alex Wayman raised the question as to whether in a certain -passage found in the Yogacarabhiirnisastra,· traditionally attributed in Tibet and China to Asailga-the verses of which are comparable to Suttanipata270-273 and SaIpyuttanikaya 1.207 -208-the reading of the Yogaclfrabhiimisastra as in the Tibetan Buddhist canon (Tanjur), Tib. rna rna "nurse" (Chinese equivalent in Taisho, "wet nurse"), presumably Skt. dhatri "nurse," was the more original or whether the reading in the Pili sources, P. dharpka "crow," was the more original.! The conclusion drawn was that the Northern Buddhist reading was the more original. The more general conclusion was that here was an example of· Northern Buddhist sources clarifying a point regarding the early Buddhist tradition. Of the Yogaclfrabhiimisastra's immediate source for the verses, it was noted that Asailga "presumably took the set [of verses] from the Sa:rp.yuktaAgama in the Sanskrit Buddhist canon."

I agree with Wayman that a component from the Northern Buddhist tradition should be included with an examination of Pili materials to place early Buddhism more in focus, but I question whether what he has pointed to here is an example of this. Wayman failed to consider the alternate reading in the PaIi tradition, which is the preferred reading in the 2nd edition of the text of the Suttanipata edited by Andersen and Smith, and he failed to look at a second and earlier reading in the Chinese tradition of the text in question. In the present paper I examine more thoroughly and in detail the tradition of the readings in question and examine more carefully Wayman's

56

Is It a Crow? 57

Suggestion -which deserves serious consideration, that the original Buddhist reading here should be *uddhailka, a theoretical form for "lap", which leads to dhaipka in the PiiIi capon and dhatri in the Northern Buddhist canon, intending reference to the ailka-dhatri "a nurse who carries a baby on her lap." The paper is thus an examination into the textual tradition of this passage. It is hoped that it will clarify the complicated situation regarding the textual tradition of the passage.

It should be added that one of the earlier Chinese translations preserves two lines of verse which appear to have dropped out of the Pali text of these verses. The Northern Buddhist tradition in this way seems to amplify the Pali tradition here.

TheSarpyuktagama, the suggested immediate source of the Yogacarabhfimisastra for the verses in question, known from fragments and quotations in Sanskrit, from Chinese translations, and translations of individual sfitras only in Tibetan, would probably have drawn on the same sources as the Pali canon, and probably can be dated to some time before the middle of the 2nd c. C.E. Two translations of the Sarpyuktagama exist in Chinese which in fact include the verses in question. One is a partial translation dating from 350-431 C.E. The other is a full translation dating from 420-479 C.E.

Asanga has been dated to the late 3rd c. - mid-4th c. C.E., the 4th c. C.E., the late 4th c. - mid-5th c. C.E., and to the 5th c. C.E. Alex Wayman has accepted a date of 375-430 AD. for Asanga. Against the traditional Tibetan and Chinese ascription of the Yogaciirabhfimisastra to Asanga, Hakuju Ui and Giuseppi Tucci have viewed it to be a work of Maitreya, Asanga's alleged teacher, dated by Ui to c. 270-350 C.E. (Asanga, c. 310-390 C.E.), by Hariprasad Sastri to c. 150-265 C.E. More recently, Paul Demieville has brought into question the historicity of such a personage as Maitreya, and Tucci has bowed to Demieville's opinion. (See in this regard G. P. Malalasekera (1966) on Asanga.) The earliest Chinese translations of a section of the YogacarabhfimiSastra were made in 414-421 C.E. and 431 c.E., which indicates that the text was extant by the early part of the 5th c. C.E. The entire Yogacarabhfimisastra


was translated into Chinese in 646-647 C.E. The Tibetan Buddhist canon (Kanjur and Tanjur) assumed its present form more or less by the 13th - 14th c. C.E., bringing together, translations of Indian Buddhist texts which had been made from Sanskrit since about the 9th c.C.E.

The Suttanipata and the SaIpyuttanikaya are each collections independent of one another in the Hili tradition. The Suttanipata is in particular noted for the primitive aspects of many of its verses. It has been viewed to be probably the most ancient part of the Pali Suttapitaka. Suttanipata 271 is repeated in Cul1aniddesa 420. The verses of SaIpyuttanikaya I.207-208, it can be added, arerepeated in Nettipakarana 147. There is no collection parallel to the PaIi Suttanipata in the Northern Buddhist tradition, though Anesaki has located over half the suttas from this collection in Northern Buddhist texts, and believes there is evidence that the Pili Suttanipata as such was consulted by the Northern Buddhist tradition. And, A. F. Rudolf Hoernle has drawn attention to a fragmentary Sanskrit version of the Attakavagga of the Suttanipata from eastern Turkestan. According to tradition the PITli canon, transmitted orally at first, was put in written form in Sri Lanka in the 1st c. C.E. It is the only canon of the various sects which grew up after the Second Council in VesaIi (circa 383 B.C.E.) that has remained preserved complete.

I mention these points so that we can gain clearer focus at the outset on the texts we are dealing with.

II

The variant reading in the Pili sources for the word in question, which is the preferred reading in the PITli text of the Suttanipata as in the seconnd edition of Dines Andersen and Helmer Smith (1913), accepted in the later printing of the text by Lord Chalmers in the Harvard Oriental Series (1936), is P. varpka. The 1913 edition of Andersen and Smith is generally accepted as authoritative.

In both V. Fausb61l's first edition of the Suttanipata (preface

Is It a Crow? 59

1885), based only on four manuscripts, and in Buddhaghosa's suttanipata commentary, Paramatthajotika ell), edited by Helmer

. Smith (1916-17) and also using four manuscripts, a variant reading, vamka, is given. The second edition of the Suttanipata by Andersen and Smith adopted this reading, varpka, as the preferred reading. This second edition was based on eleven manuscripts, including two of Buddhaghosa's Suttanipata commentary. Not all of the manuscripts, though, covered the entire text. At this point in the text use was made by Andersen and Smith of five manuscripts of the Suttanipata and two manuscripts of the Paramatthajotikathat is, use was made here fully of seven manuscripts, to which was added also reference to Fausby;l1' s edition. Lord Chalmers, in the preface to his printing of the text and translation, noted that he had come to the conclusion that "apart from minor matters and a very few real divergences of readings, the text of the Sutta-Nipata (thanks to this distinguished parampara of Danish scholars) was practically a textus receptus."

M. Leon Feer's edition of the Sarpyuttanikaya, which was published early (1884-1904), the volume with the passage in question appearing in 1884, and which was based on only four manuscripts of the text and one of its commentary, does not show this reading. Similarly, the reading does not appear in the manuscripts used for the more recent edition of Buddhaghosa's commentary on the Sarpyuttanikaya, the Saratthappakasini, edited by Frank L. Woodward (1929-37). This edition uses two Sinhalese manuscripts, Burmese readings in Sinhalese editions, two unfinished Sinhalese editions, and a transcription of a large part of the commentary on the Sagathavagga, with corrections and variant readings by a Sinhalese scholar. P. V. Bapat's Po ana printing of the Suttanipata (1924), which is based in general on adopted readings in Asian and European printings of the text, and which adopts dharpka as its reading, will not be considered here. The reason for the adoption of the reading dharpka by Smith for his edition of Buddhaghosa's Suttanipata commentary will be discussed below. It should be noted that the reading varpka is common in the Sinhalese manuscripts of both the Suttanipata and its commentary, and has been recorded to date only in Sinhalese manuscripts. There are two possible reasons, as I see it, why the


reading varpka does not appear in our editions of the Sarpyuttanikaya and its commentary, but both of these are uncertain until more manuscript work is done on the text of the passage in question. The possibilities will be noted below in their proper context.

A varpka in the context here is a toy, specifically a toy-plough. While the word for "toy-plough" is listed in T. W. Rhys Davids and William Stede (1921-25) as varpkaka, the word occurs in several related forms in a listing of toys and amusements, varpka being a standard one of these forms. For exam pIe, Dighanikaya 1.6 ( varpkaka), Dighanikaya commentary 1.86 (text, varpkaka; v.1. varpka), Vinayapitaka II. 10 (text, varpkaka; v.1. varpgaka, varpkata), Ailguttaranikaya Y203 (text, varpka; v.l. varpkaka). In the Dighanikaya commentary I.86, Buddhaghosa defines it as "gamadiirakanarp kijanakakhuddakanarpgalarp," "a small plough (used) for a toy of village youngsters," and this definition is accepted, for example, by Woodward in his translation of the Aflguttaranikaya ([1936], 41).

Showing the term's more basic meaning in such an application, DhammapiHa in his Therigatha commentary 15 uses it in an explanation of khujja in Therigatha 11 to mean "something crooked." ("Tihikhujjehi muttiya ti varpkakehi parimuttiya ti attho." "The meaning of 'by 3 khujja-s released' is '[from] crooked things set free. "') From the context here, the 3 khujja-s are a quem, a mortar, and the crooked backed lord. But in Theragatha 43 khujja is explained to be a sickle, a plough, and a spade. ("Sumuttiko sumuttiko sahu sumuttiko mhi tihi khujjakehi asitasu maya naflgalasu. maya khuddakuddalasu maya." "With gladness set free, gloriously set free with gladness, with gladness I am set free by the three crooked things - that of my sickle, my plough, my trifling spade.") In both cases the crooked things represent the ills of life. Implied by the use of the expression khuddakuddala is that they are basically trifling and insignificant, perhaps not unlike a varpka or toy-plough itself.

The term is also used figuratively in reference to crows, with the meaning "crooked, deceitful, dishonest," in such popular texts as Iiitaka III.313 (Vattakajataka), Jataka VI. 524 (Vessantarajataka), and Petavatthu IV.134 (aO). For instance, in Vattakajataka we read, "Niccam ubbegino kiika varpka papena kammuna, / laddho piI)c;1o na

Is It a Crow? 61

pined, kiso ten' asmi vattaka." ("Continuously full of anguish because of evil doing, a lump of food obtained does not satisfy deceitful crows. I am lean because of that, 0 quail.") The commentary notes, "varpka ti kakiinam eva niimmp.," "'Varp.ka' is a name of crows." In Vessantarajiitaka we read, "Adassanena mayharp te ji1)1)assa paridevato / bhiyyo Varpka ca palitii bahii hessanti brahmana ti." ( "Without seeing the wailing of the infirm, those many brahman teachers would be forme but more grey deceitful ones (i.e.,

crows)"). It is true that T. W. Rhys Davids and William Stede (1921-

25), note that the reading varpka in Andersen and Smith's edition of the Suttanipiita is "probably to be read dhiinka as SnA 303 [Smith's edition of Buddhaghosa's commentary], =kaka." But in context of the usage of the term varpka as an allusion to crows in Pali literature-and popular literature at that-the reading dharpka, "crow," is a logical, linguistically supportable development from varpka, "toy-plough." One can posit a logical development here which can explain the two readings in the Pali sources, "toy-plough" and "crow":

A

vrupka

"toy-plough"

["something crooked"]

(D 1.6, DA 1.86, A V.203, ... [Th2A lS!Thl, 43].)

B vrupka

"crookedness"

[applied to crows]

=

'''Crooked ones' is a name of crows."

B vrupka

(J ll.313 and c., J Vl.524,Pv IV.l 34 (aO).)

What we have charted here is a process of semantic shift, followed by the substitution of a more common word for a less common synonym. The process of semantic shift can be seen in English, for instance, in the word "bead." This originally meant "prayer." But on account of the use of rosaries it came to refer to a small, round object. Thus, the expression "to count your beads," which originally meant "to count your prayers," on account of the reckoning of prayers by small balls, lost its original sense. Similarly, "boon" originally meant "prayer ," but through the use of such phrases


as "ask a boon" and "grant a boon" it came to mean "a favor" or "a good thing received." With regard to the use of a more common word for a less common word we can look to the \lsage of such English words as "pens" and "pense," meaning "thought," loan-words from the French penser,. which are now represented only by the English words "pensive" and "pansy," more common native English usage having taken their place. In this regard, the word "pansy" has taken the place in popular usage for the more native English term "heartsease. "

With regard to the readings vmpka and dhmpka in the Suttanipata the opposite development would not be logical since one would not proceed from a common word for a thing to a rare word for the same thing. From a linguistic standpoint, a popular but infrequent usage might, out of context, readily supplant a usage for something looked down upon, as a toy, and this in tum might easily be replaced by a more common word.

The shift here from v to dh, is further supported by an . orthographic confusion in Brahmi script which has been recorded by K. R. Norman in the notes to his translations of the Thera- and Theri-

. gathaand,the Suttanipata. While the orthographic alternation seems to be recorded as going both ways, it is recorded as usually going from v to dh. Among the cases reported in the Suttanipata, in all but one case outside the present one it is recorded as going from v to dh. (K. R. Norman, it should be said, accepts at this point the reading dharpka as had T. W. Rhys Davids and William Sterle (1921-25) noted above, seemingly on the basis of the easiest reading in accordance with the commentary.)2

Further, the reading vmpka, "toy-plough," makes perfectly good sense here, while the reading "crow," as Alex Wayman clearly notes, presents difficulties and simply does not work well: "Arising from where, thoughts set loose (release) the mind as children set loose (release) a toy-plough" (Sn 270; Answer in Sn 271 - "Arising from this existence, thoughts ... ").

Firstly, we have here a dynamic image which, makes reference to something that sows seeds, a plough, albeit a toy-plough. Compare in this regard Sarpyuttanikaya I.172, where it is said that the

Is It a Crow? 63

Buddha is a farmer, or Petavatthu II.968 where a munificent person is likened to a farmer. In the same vein, Ariguttaranikaya I.239 states that a farmer makes a field into good firewood. Dighanikaya II.353 states that a farmer, having taken a plough with seed, ought enter a forest. And Majjhimanikaya 1.127 states that man makes the great earth into what is not earth. Sarpyuttanikaya 1.21 and Jataka IIL472 both make reference to sown seeds as in a good field. And Sarpyuttanikaya V.379 and 380 compare unbroken seeds to a good field and broken seeds to a bad field. The list is long.

Secondly, the image here, compares two things looked down upon in the tradition -1) a varpka, an amusement (see, for exarnple, Dighanikaya 1.6; or Ariguttaranikaya V. 203, where playing with a toy-plough is one step beyond playing with one's own excrement); and 2) vitakka, defined by Buddhaghosa in this context in his Sarpyuttanikaya commentary as "papavitakka," "sinful thought," and in his Suttanipata commentary as "nava kamavitakkadaya," "the nine beginning with sensual thought" (acc. to Cullaniddesa 269 -kamavitakka "sensual thought," vyapadavitakka "cruel thought," vihirpsavitakka, "malign thought," fiativitakka "thought of family," jan apa da vi takka , "thought of country," am aravitakka , "thought of immortality," par' anuddayatapatisarpyuttavitakka, "thought in sympathy with those bound to a master," labhasakkarasilokapatisarpyuttavitakka, "thought bound to gain, honor, and fame," and anavafifiatdpatisarpyuttavitakka, "thought bound to pride").3

The image of a varpka or "toy-plough" here, allows as an interpretation that just as a child sets aside his toy-plough as he becomes a bit more mature, and goes on to become prey to sensual desires (Ariquttaranikaya V.203-204), so the setting aside of sensual desires and other impure thoughts for more mature ones, such as buddhavitakka, dhammavitakka, sarighavitakka, etc., can remove the mind from its involvement with the world and lead to the cessation of rebirth. All is in the seeds sown. Such a dual interpretation of the image is in accord with the succeeding two verses, as in the P~li order of the verses, which expand on each point in turn.

Certainly, one is on firmer ground in taking the allusion to refer to an amusement mentioned not uncommonly in early p~ni


sourCes, rather than as an amusement not mentioned in Pali literature. until Buddhaghosa. Also, the usage of the word vaip.ka here is consonant with the context in which it is mentioped in AIiguttaranikaya V. 203-204 and other sources. And, its usage allows us to understand vitakka as sinful on one hand, and as meritorious on the other, which is to say that the verses have a positive didactic value .as their context would lead us to suspect, whereas referenve to a crow here does not allow this. We cannot have in the Indian context a noble crow. Herein, no doubt, lies Buddhaghosa's emphasis on sinful thought in this context. Further, reference here to a crow runs counter to the compassionate spirit of Buddhism in any period of its history, since such a reference, as understood by Buddhaghosa, involves an amusement in cruelty to creatures, which is against the precept of ahilpsif or non-injury. Can we expect such a reference to be placed on the lips of the Buddha in a very early Buddhist verse, or for such· a noble and holy personage as the Buddha to utter such a reference?

The real difficulty here has come from an over-reliance by translators on the reference to a crow introduced by Buddhaghosa in . his explanations of the passage in his two commentaries. All translations to date, even when the reading vaip.ka is accepted by the translator, translate here, "crow," and it is clear from Buddhaghosa's statements here that he most certainly understood "crow." It is simply not clear, however, whether itis the image introduced by Buddhaghosa which led to the reading dhaip.ka, or whether by Buddhaghosa' s time the tradition already had understood varpka to mean "crow" as in the Jiftaka usages, and had effected a change in the reading to dhaip.ka. In other words, it is not clear whether Buddhaghosa read vaip.ka and understood kaka "crow," or read dhaip.ka.

It must also be added that, since the image is first uttered by a yakkha, understood in the Buddhist context to be a demon, it is conceivable that we have in the word vaip.ka in Sn 270 and 271 an instance of the common Indian predilection for punning. In the mouth of the Yakkha the reference is to vaip.ka,"deceitful one, i.e. crow," whereas when spoken by the Buddha the image is reversed, referring wittily to varpka "toy-plough." Certainly, there is a priori reason for arguing this, since if I can see the wit here, certainly the Buddha, or

Is It a Crow? 65

the author' of his words here, both of whom most certainly had more wit than I, and a greater familiarity with Pali or any allied language than I, must have seen it. Further, the verses are filled with wit in that

they contain· images which can be taken, depending on one's understanding, to lead either to further involvement with sensual desires, etc., or to enlightenment, And, we have the testimony of Buddhaghosa's understanding of the image in question. I have two main difficulties with the image of a crow here: firstly, the lack of testimony to such an amusement prior to Buddhaghosa (though he perhaps can be considered to present an old interpretation); secondly, . vaIPka as a toy-plough seems to be an older usage from a linguistic standpoint than varpka as a word for "crow," (though the usage of ) vaIPka meaning "crow" seems to be a popular usage and may perhaps be considered old on this account).

Since the three Sinhalese manuscripts of Buddhaghosa's commentary on the Suttanipfita which were used by Smith in his edition are unanimous in reading varpka, while the single Burmese manuscript used reads dhazpka, we perhaps should adopt this reading simply because it is the less obvious. Smith's adoption of dhazpka in . this context would appear to have been because it is the more obvious and easier reading, since what follows refers to a children's game

.. with crows. On the other hand, we may have in varpka in the Sinhalese manuscripts of Buddhaghosa's commentary a hyper-

. correct reading. The resolution to the situation must await additional manuscript work with the Smpyuttanikfiya and its commentary. Certainly, we must assume that such a Sinhalese reading as varpka in Suttanipfita manuscripts would not have been unknown to

.. Buddhaghosa, since he spent a number of years studying Pali texts in Sri Lanka.

With regard to the reading vazpka in general,we must recall that Pali manuscripts in Southeast Asia in the main are based on those from the Mon kingdom of Dvaravati, whose Theravada tradition would seem, on the basis of archeological evidence, to have come from Amaravati in South India. While there may have been some contact with Sri Lanka during this period, there is no c1earindication of major contact with Sri Lanka until the 11th - 12th c. C.E. It is not·


unlikely, therefore, that the readings in Pali manuscripts in Sri Lanka, which according to the MahavaIpsa, preserved an archaic Buddhism going back to the mission of Mahinda during the reign of Asoka in the 3rd c. B.C.E. (though there may have been even earlier Buddhist contact), might reflect archaic readings not incorporated in Burma and elsewhere in Southeast Asia - especially if these readings are not supported by Buddhaghosa, whom Burmese tradition regards as one of its own. It can be emphasized that Sinhalese manuscripts today preserve many old traditions. There are, for example, three Sinhalese manuscripts of a pre-canonical version of a section of the Apadana which treats the former human births of the Buddha.

It is altogether conceivable that Suttanipata manuscripts might reflect an older Sinhalese tradition on the point in question, or perhaps simply an older tradition in general, while Sarpyuttanikaya manuscripts might not. It should be kept in mind that theSuttanipata is generally judged to be older than the Sarpyuttanikaya. On this account, its textual tradition might preserve an older reading not found in the Sarpyuttanikaya tradition, regardless of the Sinhalese factor which appears to be present here.

III

It might be worthwhile to note here Buddhaghosa's state-ments.

Suttanipata commentary -kuta samutthaya ti kuto uppajjitva; mana ti kusalacittarp; vitakka ti Abhayasutte (v.1. Ba Uragasutte) vutta nava kamavitakkadayo; kumarakadharpkam (v.l. skgn varpkam) iv' assajanti ti yatha gamadaraka kilanta kakarp suttena pade bandhitva ossajanti khipanti, evarp kusalamanarp akusalavitakka kuto samunhaya ossajanti ti pucchati.

"Kutasamutthaya" means "having arisen from where?" "Mana" . means "pure state of mind (heart)." "Vitakka" is called in the Abhayasutta (v.1. Uragasutta) "the nine beginning with sensu-

Is It a Crow? 67

ous thought." "Kumfirakfi dharpkam iv' ossajanti"" means "as village youngsters playing, having bound a crow with a string to the foot let (him) loose (ossajanti) and throw him forth so, having arisen from somewhere, impure thoughts dismiss (ossajantl) pure thought, thus it is questioned."

sarpyuttanikfiya commentary -

Kuto nidana ti, kinnidana, kirp. paccaya? ti attho. Kumfirakfi dharpkam 4 iv' ossajanti ti, yatha kumarald kakarp. gahetva ossajanti khipanti, evarp. papavitakka kuto samunhaya cittam ossajanti? ti pucchati ... . Ito samutthaya manovitakko (so in text) ti, yatha dighasuttakena pade baddharp. kL.\:arp. kumaraka tassa suttapariyaritarp. anguliyarp. vethetva ossajanti, so dlirarp. gantva pi puna tesarp. padamUle yeva patati, evam evarp. ito attabhavato samuttthaya papavitakka cittarp. ossajanti.

"Kuto nidfina," "what is it tied to," "what does it rest on," this is the meaning. "Kumfiraka dharpkam iv' ossajanti" means, "as children, having seized a crow let (him) loose and throw (him) forth, so having arisen from where sinful thoughts let loose (ossajanti) the heart, thus it is questioned." ... "Ito samutthaya manovitakko" means "as children let loose (ossajantl) a bound crow with a long string to the foot, having twisted around a toe of it the end of a string, and having gone a distance, just so again it falls to their foot, just so having arisen from one's own nature from this existence sinful thoughts let loose (ossajantl) the heart."

B uddhaghosa never uses another verb form to define ossajan ti, and there is no indication that he means by it anything other than the standard meanings for the word which would indicate "let loose, release, dismiss." The translations of the verses in question are for the most part poetic, and the translators at this point with regard to the verb ossajanti are for the most part far from literal. Instead, they are trying to indicate in few words the image presented by Buddhaghosa. The translations here are interpretive. Wilhelm Geiger notes at this


point in his translation (1925-30; vol. 1, 1930, p. 325) that, "Das Original istdunkel, die Ausdrucksweise iiusserst knapp," but it is not that the words themselves, and the verb ill particular, presented trouble, but that the idea spelled out by Buddhaghosa is not spelled out in the text. Thus Geiger, whose rendering here is perhaps the most literal, although not quite literal, translates (Saipyuttanikaya I.207, equivalent to Suttanipata 270):

Woher sind die Herzensgedanken5 aufgetaucht, (Die da sind), wie (wenn) Knaben eine KrBhe freilassen [italics mine]?

Following Geiger closely on this point is Karl Seidenstticker (1931). In a footnote, Seidenstticker quotes from Buddhaghosa's commentary. Interestingly, he makes reference to the reading vaIpka, which he construes as amounting to the same thing as dhaIpka. Seidenstticker translates (Suttanipata 270):

W oher erheben sich die Regungen des Denkens, wie Kinder eine Krahe fliegen lassen?

Also somewhat literal in this regard, but clearly based on Buddhaghosa's commentary and particularly on Buddhaghosa's usage of the verb khipanti, is the recent translation of K. R. Norman (1984-92) (Suttanipata 270):

Whence arising do thoughts toss up the mind, as young boys toss up a (captive) crow.

It might be noted that K. R. Norman's translation in part seems to be in reaction to Alex Wayman's emphasis on Mrs. Rhys Davids' translation; this will be addressed below.

Against these translations, we have the translation of M. Coomara Swamy (1874) (Suttanipata 270):

Whence emanating, do thoughts harass the mind, as boys drive

Is It a Crow? 69

a crow (here and there)?

'v. Fausb¢ll (1881) translated (Suttanipata 270, numbered 273 in translation): '. .

Whence arising do doubts vex the mind, as boys vex a crow?

Lord Chalmers (1932) translated (Suttanipata 270):

Whence thoughts which plague the mind as boys a captive crow?

Mostrecently, H. Saddatissa (1985) translated (Suttanipifta 270):

From where do evil speculations arise and harass the mind as do boys a crow?

And, consonant with these translations, yet set off from them, we have Mrs. Rhys Davids' translation (1917?-30; pt. 1, [1917]) (Sazp.yuttanikaya 1.207, equivalent to Suttanipiita 270):

And whence spring thoughts into our minds down sinking, Like [tethered] crow pulled by boy-captors earthward?

Mrs. Rhys Davids' translation appears to have been influenced greatly by the comment of M. Coomara Swamy to his 1874 translation (n. 2,p. 155): "This freak: of Hindu boys may even now

. be witnessed in India. Having captured a crow, and attached a c0rd . to one of its legs, they let him fly here and there, with the sole object

of pulling him in repeatedly. Even thus childish thoughts harass one's mind." this is clearly different from the description of Buddhaghosa in which, it would seem, it is the string breaking the crow's flight which. causes it to fall. Mrs. Rhys Davids' phrase, "minds down sinking," may perhaps reflect an extension of Buddhaghosa' s usage of the verb patati here, but with a transference of image, together with Coomara Swamy's notice to childish thoughts harassing our minds.


In accord with Mrs. Rhys Davids' translation, and also following M. Coomara Swamy's comment, Karl Eugen Neumann (1905; 2nd ed., 1924) earlier had translated (Suttanipata 270):

W oher erheben geistig sich Gedanken, Wie Kindernach dem Vogel hinzuhaschen?

Lord Chalmers' image of a "captive crow" in his 1932 translation, followed by K R Norman, relies on Mrs. Rbys Davids' translation and ultimately on Buddhaghosa' s image. And E. M. Hare ([1944]), relying on Mrs. Rhys Davids' interpretation as well, translated (Suttanipata 270):

Whence risen mind-perplexities Drag down as boys will drag a crow?

It is not that we have a problem with the translation of ossajanti here, but rather that we have an omission of its translation and a substitution of such English words as "harass," "drive," "vex," "plague," "pull," "drag," and the German "hinzuhaschen," in an act of poetic license.

IV

I give here a literal translation of the verses complete, utilizing the reading vazpka:

"Passion and anger have their basis wherefrom? Aversion, attachment, horripilation [from aversion or attach

ment] are born wherefrom? Having risen from where, thoughts set loose the mind As children [set loose] a toy-plough6?"

"Passion and anger have their basis from here. Aversion, attachment, horripilation [from aversion or attach-

Is It a Crow?

ment] are born from here. Having risen from here, thoughts set loose the mind As children [set loose] a toy-plough."

71

"Things sprung from desire (punningly, sap) are come into existence from oneself as if born from the trunk of a Banyan,

Each clinging to (or, hanging on to) objects of desire, as a stretched out creeper in a wood or, jungle, as the case

. may be.7

"From whence the basis the ones who know, Each dispels8 Hear, 0 yakkha (a being bound by passion and

anger, which on this account exercises control over them in others, which is to say, has the power to create aversion and attachment).9

They cross this hard to cross flood Not crossed before, for no renewed existence."

v

The reading for varpka, or dharpka, in the Tibetan Tanjur is Tib. ma ma "nurse," and this word is listed in Sarat Chandra Das' Tibetan-English dictionary with reference to four different types of nurses for which Das has provided Sanskrit equivalents. On one of these forms, ailkadhatri, Wayman bases his argument that the Pl'iJi original form from which dharpka developed was *uddhfiilka, theoretical form for "lap," which the Sanskrit Buddhist canon is supposed to have replaced with a word for "nurse," intending reference tothe ailkadhatri. The Chinese equivalent in Taisho at this point is "wet nurse."

Wayman notes that these verses in the YogacarabhilmiSastra are probably taken from the Sarpyuktagama of the Sanskrit Buddhist canon. They are not contained in the Tibetan Kanjur, though. They do, however, occur four times in the Chinese Buddhist canon, twice in Nanjio 544 translated by GUI).abhadra, dated 420-479 C.E., Taish6


vol. 2 (Agon Bu 2), pp. 361ab (No. 99(1314» and 363b-364a (No. 99(1324»; and twice in Nanjio 546, an anonymous partial translation dated 350-431 C.E., Taisho voL 2 (Agon B,u 2), pp. 479bc (No. 100(313») and 481c-482a (No. 100(323»). In the later Chinese translation (No. 99), the reading in both places is that the child relies on a "wet nurse," as the text reads also in the Chinese translation of the Yogficfirabhiimisastra. But in the earlier translation, the text of No. 100(313) reads that the child grasps, or seizes the "mother's milk," the verb being different and the two characters used later for "wet nurse" being here in the opposite order; and in No. 100(323) the text reads that the child grasps, or seizes the "milk," no character for "mother" being used here. There is, in short, not just one Northern Buddhist reading. There is the reading "nurse" in the Tibetan version of Asanga's text, the reading "wet nurse" (literally, "milk mother") in the Chinese version of Asanga's text and in both versions of the text in the later complete Chinese translation of the Sarpyuktfigama, and the readings "mother's milk" and "milk" in the two versions of the text in the earlier incomplete Chinese translation of the Sarpyuktfigama. The verb in the earlier translation of the Sarpyuktfigama is "seize, or grasp", not "rely on" as in the later translation and the translation of Asanga's text.

There are two other differences found in Chinese texts of the verses as in the Sarpyuktfigama which are significant. Firstly, the Yogficfirabhiimisastra reverses the order of Suttanipata 271 and 272. However, in all the Chinese translations of these verses in the Sarpyuktfigama, Suttanipfita 271 is simply· dropped. It would seem that in the text given by Asanga, verse 271 was reinserted. This presents the very strong possibility that it was reinserted in a different position than its original position. Secondly, the translation of the verses in No. 100(313) appears to contain two extra lines of verse for Suttanipfita 272 between the first and second lines of verse. Since Suttanipfita 272 contains two fewer lines of verse than do Suttanipfita 270,271, and 273, it is entirely possible that we have preserved here two lines of verse which dropped out in the PaIi version and most North~rn Buddhist presentations of these verses. Wayman argues that the Northern Buddhist reading "nurse" in these verses clarifies

Is It a Crow? 73

· a point regarding early Buddhism, an argument this writer questions. But here, on the other hand, the reading of these two lines of verse I1lay well amplify and make a correction to the. tradition of early Buddhism against that preserved in the Piili canon.1°

But let us return to the list of nurses. What is the source for

.this? The list occurs toward the very beginning in the 'dul-ba

section of the Kanjur, which is to say the section on vinaya. The Sanskrit equivalents as given by Das would be based on a listing in the Sanskrit-Chinese dictionary MahiIvyutpatti, entries no. 9478-9481 as in Sakaki'sedition (Kyoto, 1916), nos. 283.1-4in Wogihara's 1959 edition and in the 1910-11 2nd ed. of Minaev's edition in

. Bibliotheca Buddhica, provided with an index and prepared for press 'by Mironov.

These terms, with only two exceptions, occur only in Buddhist Sanskrit literature: in the MiilasarviIstiviIdavinaya (which would no doubt be the source of the Kanjur list), in the A vadiInasataka

. (2nd c. C.E.) T. Thich draws on the (itself perhaps not completed · before the 3rd c. C.E.), and in the DivyiIvadiIna (4th c. C.E., with

. some passages prior to the 3rd c. c.E.), which draws on the A vadiInasataka and the MiilasarviIstiviIdavinaya. I must add that while in general the A va diIn asa taka is seen to draw on the

· MiilasarviIstiviIdavinaya, and the DivyiIvadiIna is seen to draw on the A vadiInasataka and the MiilasarviIstiviIdavinaya, considering the dates involved, it may well be that the A va dan aSataka and DivyiIvadana are simply drawing on the same tradition as or a parallel tradition to the MiilasarviIstiviIdavinaya. The forms occur in Buddhist Sanskrit literature only in a cliche list (see Edgerton [1953], 200a).

Further, the form in currency in the literature for the ailkadhiItri . the specific nurse on which Wayman focuses, is aIpsadifhtri also

written aIpsadhiItri and in manuscripts atsadhiItri not aiJ.kadhiItri itself. AilkadhiItri occurs in its stead in Buddhist literature only in the MahiIvyutpatti and in an aberrant listing in DivyiIvadiIna 475.12-18, which contrasts with the six other listings in DivyiIvadiIna, as also with the listings elsewhere in the literature (Edgerton [1953] cites two instances in the MiilasarviIstiviIdavinaya and four instances in the


A va diin asa taka, and indicates that there are other instances as well), in substituting as well stanyadhiitri (1. 16; 1. 13 stanadhiitri is printed) for ksiradhiitri, in substituting kricjapanikiidhatri (1. 13 kricjapanikay for kricjanikii (onakff) , with or without dhatri following, and in providing only one of each sort of nurse instead of two as elsewhere. The aberrancies of Divyiivadiina 475.12-18 can be attributed to the list's providing descriptions of each type of nurse and using in the name of the nurse the word used in the description. For instance, ksiadhiitri, "a nurse for milk," is described as :'yii darakarp stanyarp piiyayati," "she who has an infant drink the milk of her breast," and so in this passage she is called the stanyadhiitri. Just so~ the arpsadhiitri (arpsaO) is described, with less ambiguity than the terms arpsa or arpsa in Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit allow, as "ya darakarp azikena parikarsayaty azigapratyazigani ca sarpsthapayati," "she who carries by the side an infant and places the limbs and minor limbs," and she is called the azikadhatri.

With regard to the forms arpsadhiitri(arpsaO) and azikadhiitri, Edgerton's mind on this matter was divided. While he notes that azikadhari "a nurse who carries a baby on her hip" would seem to be the original form "since in India babies are carried on the hip" (p. 5b), he also notes that this is not supported by Mfllasarvastivadavinaya 3.134.12, which reads "dhiitryarpsagato nisaI)I)o" (p.la), and that in any event it is arpsadhiitri and arpsadhiitri for which currency is supported. Edgerton's judgment on the seeming primacy ofazikadhiitri, though, is no doubt due to his interpretation of the term arpsadhatri as meaning "shoulder nurse," instead of viewing this form to be a· Prakritization of the equally common arpsadhiitri. This would be a "nurse who carries a baby on her side," a "nurse for the side." (See T. W. Rhys Davids and William Stede [1921-25], p. 1 a under arpsa, "(b) a part (lit. side)" and such usages as given s. v. as ekena arpsena ... ekena arpsena.) Thus, it would be, as indicated above, synonymous with azikadhiitri of Divyiivadiina 475.12-18 since, strictly, azika refers to "the curve in the human, especially the female, figure above the hip (where infants sitting astride are carried by their mothers, hence often = 'breast' or 'lap')," though such a curve is a curve of the side, or to "the side or flank" (Monier-Williams [1899], 7a). Strictly, in

Is It a Crow? 75

English usage, the lap is the front side of the lower trunk and the thighs of a seated person. A standing person has no lap (see the oxford English Dictionary 6.64, usage 5). "Lap," strictly, is not intended here. ll The form on which Wayman is focusing his argument for his reinterpretation of the reading dharpka, arikadhatri, never had early currency in India. In short, its first occurrence, and only citable occurrence in Buddhist literature proper, can be explained on the basis of its context in the passage in question in the 4th. c. C.E. Divyavadana. .

It can be seen from context, and as Edgerton notes, that these types of nurses are the kinds regularly provided for princes and rich men's sons, two of each kind being provided. The reading varpka, though, refers to what Buddhaghosa in his Dighanikaya commentary defines as a "plaything of village children," and the reading dharpka is taken by Buddhaghosa in his Suttanipata commentary to refer here to "village children playing"-and the text itself in its simple usage of kumaraka gives no indication that we have here a reference to princes and the sons of rich men only. Indeed, the image would lose force if this were the case. It must also be rem em bered that it is later Buddhism in India which came to be associated especially with the wealthy. Such a reference might well be incongruent in earlier Buddhist material, in which this association did not obtain.

Perhaps more important, the word kumaraka used in the . verses does not refer to infants, who would use the services of these

nurses, but to young children, especially young boys. For instance, Ariguttaranikaya Y.203-4 refers to a dahara kumara who, when he has grown older is referred to as kumara, and when still older and his sense faculties have come into play is referred, to as kumara In Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit, Divyavadana 475.12-18 refers to such infants as daraka . To be sure, the usage and import of usage of such terms in the different languages concerned has not been studied fully, but it appears that kumaraka in normal usage refers to children beyond the tenderest of ages.

There are only two other mentions of these types of mentioned in Buddhist Sanskrit literature which I have been able to find.

One is in the instance of the laiganika (Onaka) dhatri or just

76 . nABS VOL. 16 NO.1

kri9anika, "a nurse who plays with an infant," a comparable nurse to which, the kilaI)adhai, is mentioned in the sixth anga of the Svetambara Jain Siddhanta, l'fayadhammakahasutta 1.1. The language here, as of the entire Jain Siddhanta, is Ardha-Magadhi. According to Jain tradition, the authority of their Siddhanta does not reach back before the 5th c. C.E. (though it seems certain that much of it is older, and that at least parts of it may go back as far as the earliest disciples of Mahavira, or at latest to the 2nd c. after Mahavira's death probablyin 468 B.C.E.).

The other reference is in fact to the ankadhatri as such in A bhayadevasilri 's JiIatadharmakathavrtti, Abhayadevasuri's Sanskri t commen tary on the sixth anga of the Svetam bara Jain Siddhan tao This reference no doubt rests ultimately on the aberrant listing in Divyavadana 475.12-18, but speaks to a late currency for this fonn which might explain its usage in the Mahavyutpatti. 12

There are no references to any such nurses in Sanskrit literature proper, or in PaIi literature.

While we do appear to have an instance or instances of the single usage of the name of one of these nurses in Jain tradition, as opposed to Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit tradition, shouldn't we however on the basis of the translations in the Chinese Buddhist canon expect such a reference-if it were to occur in Buddhist traditionto be the k$iradhatri (Divyavadana 475.12-18, stanyadhatn")? Of possible note in this regard is that the term dhatri alone also occurs in the Mahavyutpatti at a different location in a list headed by words for "father" and "mother," preceded by word for "mother," and followed by words for a "pregnant woman" and for a "woman who has reached puberty." It would seem that "wet nurse" is the intended purport for dhatri alone.

Leaving aside specific points regarding the usage of this list of nurses, in interpreting very early Pali verses such as those here, ought one not rely primarily on the Pali tradition, and only secondarily and when there is support for this from within the PaIi tradition, on other Indic traditions? Can one read into this material part of a later Buddhist Sanskrit tradition without internal justification for it in the PaIi material itself?

Is It a Crow? 77

It is not clear whether we have in the terms for these nurses alate tradition of the early centuries C.E., or an earlier tradition which does not surface in the literature until the early centuries c.E. The e~istence ofa comparable form for one of these terms in ArdhaMagadhi, and the form arpsadhatri standing beside arpsadhatri, suggest a tradition with a Prakritic basis - a tradition with its basis in the popular traditions of the Prakrit-speaking segment of Indian society. The tradition, further, is a tradition of the wealthy, who as time passed became more and more associated with Buddhism in India. The tradition is not mentioned in standard Sanskrit literature, is only hinted at, perhaps, in standard Prakrit material, and is not mentioned in the Pilli tradition. This point has been alluded to before, but it is worth repeating. Can we expect such a tradition of the privileged few to appear in early Buddhist literature which was directed toward a general audience? On what basis can it be read into early Buddhist material?

If I might follow another historical line of argument for a moment, so as to put more t1esh on the bones, it is to be considered in this regard that of the list of toys given in Ailguttaranikaya V.203, only one finds mention either in Sanskrit literature or in Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit literature. Varpka, for instance occurs in the Mahavyutpatti as meaning "crooked" only. The Sanskritic tradition looks down, on toys and playthings. This is because the brahman purveyors of the Sanskritic tradition did not see such pastimes to be conducive to spiritual progress. Even in the P::i1i tradition, which mentions toys and playthings more op~nly, they are mentioned with scorn. For instance, as noted, in Ailguttaranikaya V. 203 playing with a varpka or other toys is one step beyond playing with one's own excrement. If the Theravada tradition of the early centuries C.E. and earlier was feeling pressure to omit such references, can we not expect that a stray reference such as that here might not be explained away or altered? While conjecture, this may in part explain the variation between varpka and dharpka in our Suttanipata manuscripts. Certainly in this context we would not expect such a reference to a varpka in this text to be preserved in the Sanskrit Buddhist canon. This is not to say that there are not occasional references to toys in


Mahayana literature of the early centuries C.E. See, for instance, the reference to varpsaghatikii, a bamboo stick as a kind of toy, in Divyiivadiina 475.19, which mayor may n~t reflect the game of varpsa mentioned in Dighanikiiya I.6. Given Buddhaghosa's understanding of the reference to "crow" here, it is further understandable that this would not fit well in a tradition, such as the Mahayana, which emphasizes bodhisattvas and compassion toward fellow creatures. In such sources, is it not therefore likely that a reference to cruelty toward crows might in its tum be altered?

It should be emphasized, though, that 'Wayman's logic, modified, works well with regard to a development Skt. k$ira or Skt. stanya > Skt. dhiihri on the mediating basis of the form Skt. k$iradhiitri or Skt. stanyadhiitri. The impetus for such a change would have come from the development in India of ideas regarding the innate purity of children, which we can see for instance in the development of adoration for Kr~Q.a as a baby. Allusion to a child setting free, which is to say initially grasping, the mother's milk does not fit well with this.

The initial Northern Buddhist reading of "grasp" for the verb here is probably in accord with the Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit interpretation of ossajati as apotsdati (apa-ut-...JsD) in Divyiivadana 203. While in Divyiivadiina 203 this form carries the same force as avasrjati, apa- as a prefix can be constructed sometimes to change the direction of action of a verb (as it does for instance in the case of...J sr), and before nouns it is sometimes equivalent to the negative prefix. See Monier-Williams (1899). It is not at all inconceivable that Northern Buddhist writers here might have construed apa-ut-...Jsrj as the opposite of ut-...Jsrj or ava-...Jsrj "let loose," i.e., as "seize, grasp." This would be in accord with the data we have for this passage.

We seem in the Northern Buddhist tradition to be left with substitution pure and simple. P. varpka -7 P. dharpka in FaIi tradition. But both are found to be unacceptable in the Buddhist Sanskrit tradition, perhaps in part in conjunction with a Buddhist Sanskrit interpretation of ossajati as apotsrjati, and so Skt. k$ira or Skt. stanya is substituted, this leading perhaps to a late reading Skt. dhiitri on the basis of Skt. ksira or Skt. stanya suggesting Skt. ksiradhiitn- or

Is It a Crow? 79

stanyadhatri (using Wayman's line of reasoning) when this reading, itself is found to be unacceptable.

In other words, we may indeed have substitution pure and simple on account of the Buddhist Sanskrit interpretation of the verb and on account of philosophical difficulties, be they from reference here to a children's toy, traditionally looked down on inlndic and particularly in Sanskritic thought; or from comparing thoughts to something innately "crooked" as a crow; or from a reference here to what was understood to be a children's game which had as its nature . an element of cruelty toward life on the part of children. This leads to a reading Skt. k~ira or Skt. stanya, which is not inconsistent with the image in Suttanipata 272. This is followed, on account of a comparatively late idea regarding human development, by a second substitution of Skt. dhatri, perhaps in accord with a line of reasoning outlined by Wayman, but utilizing the form k~iradhatri or stanyadhatri as the mediating form between the two readings. The dating with regard to this latter change, even using the late form stqnyadhatri, would be feasible. We must remember, though, that Skt. dhatri alone as listed in Mahavyutpatti 188.49 (Minaev's 2nd ed.; Sakaki's ed., entry no. 3926) seems to carry the purport "wet nurse." It is conceivable that the listing of four different types of nurses for wealthy infants could have been bypassed completely.

This may not be the whole story, though. Hand-in-hand with the above, it may be that the p~ni reading dharpkaIp-as it appears in its accusative singular form in the verses in question-was consulted and construed to read P. dhatri, "nurse," as well, on the basis of orthographic confusion. while the period from which we first have evidence of the reading Skt. dhatri is before the development of NaqarIi script, there is a linear development for northern Indian scripts. Certain orthographic practices and confusions in Nagari scripts no doubt predate Nagan. From the vantage point of Nagari scripts, the vowel "-a" is sometimes indicated by a hook above the line. This is sometimes confused as an anusvavara. This can be seen, for example, in the manuscripts of Viradevaganin' s Mahipalacarita, on which I worked with Dr. W. Norman Brown. Similarly, anusvara is sometimes indicated in a comparable fashion-this can be seen in


some of the manuscripts in the University of Pennsylvania Library's collection. There is also the possibility here for a confusion between it and the ligature used for" -j"'. Such confusion is in evidence, for example, in readings for the patityagramaniI7).aya, the text I edited for my doctoral dissertation. The confusion of "-k-" for" -t-" would be part and parcel of the confusion of" -karp" for" -ti", and would rest on the way in uhich "-k-" is drawn. It is entirely conceivable that hand-in-hand with the historically demonstrable substitution of Skt. dhatri for Skt. ksfra or stanya, which can be seen in the Chinese translations of the Sarpyuktagam, there was a consultation of PiHi texts which read P. hdarpkarp, or other texts which read dharpkarp, and that this was construed in such fashion as to reinforce interpreatation of the reading here as Skt. dhatrion the basis ofa PaJi form dhatL Certainly, the reinsertion of Suttanipata 271 in Asanga's text, which is otherlwise dropped in Northern Buddhist versions of the verses, suggests possible consultation of p~ni texts. Of note, of course, is that Anesaki has suggested that the p~ni ccnon may have been consulted by the Northern Buddhist tradition. An such a consultation of a Pali reading may help explain in part why we seem to have used as a mediating fonn in the Northern Buddhist tradition a form which otherwise occurs in Northern Buddhist tradition only in listings with its related forms. Reliance on the form is being suggested in part through consultation of a tradition outside the Northern Buddhist tradition itself.

VI

The point of the argument in the recent article under discussion is that we have in the instance discussed an example in which Northern Buddhist sources throw light on Pili materials. While this is sometimes the case, and while certainly Northern Buddhist materials must be considered in the study of early Buddhism, the situation with regard to the reading here is not an instance of such a case. The problematic reading; dharpka "crow" can be explained perfectly well from within Pali materials themselves, and

Is It a Crow? 81

an earlier reading varpka "toy-plough" can be seen. And just as Pali tradition here preserves two readings, so also does Northern Buddhist tradition, ksira or stanya "milk," anddhiitri "nurse," which appear to be later. In fact, as just noticed, the Pali material here may help in part explain the second of these Northern Buddhist readings. We do, however, have an instance in which the Northern Buddhist tradition appears to throw light on the Pali tradition in the preservation of the twO lines of verse which may have dropped out of Suttanipiita 272 in one of the Chinese translations of these verses, that at Taish6 vol. 2 (Agon Bu 2), p. 479bc (No. 100(313)). All of this gives us a very full idea of the development within the Buddhist tradition of the passage in question, with its various readings.

NOTES

1. See Alex Wayman, "Is it a crow (p. dharpka) or a nurse (S. dhfitn)?", in Joumal of the American OrientEl Society 102.3 (July-October 1982), 515-16. All references to Pilii texts here are to the editions cited in T. W. Rbys Davids and William Stede, The Piili Text Society's Piili-English Dictionary (1921-25; Rpt.

. London and Boston, 1972). References to Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit texts are to the editions cited in Franklin Edgerton, Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Grammar and Dictionary, 2 vols. (1953; 1st Indian ed. New Delhi, 1970). Statements given in Sarat Chandra Das, A Tibetan-English Dictionary with Sanskrit Synonyms, rev. and ed. by Graham Sandberg and A. William Heyde (1902; Rpt. Alipore, West Bengal, 1960) are so indicated. When no editions exist, this is so indicated. When specific editions or translations of texts are the focus, or when Chinese texts are referred to, fuller bibliographical data is given.

I would like to thank Mr. Francis Parr of the Oriental Division of the New York Public Library, Mr. Thompson Cha of Flushing, New York, and my neighbor IyIr. Paul Chu for their help with the text of the Chinese versions of Suttanipata270-273 in the Smp.yuktfigama after I had located these. I note that this paper was originally penned in the spring of 1983. Additions and revisions had to be made, though, and these could not be researched until the spring of 1985, when they were started and in the main completed. Before they could be finished, though, circumstances intervened, and I could not get back to this paper till the summer of 1988. After that another period intervened till I could get to making further revisions on this paper. In 1992 it was further revised in line with the comments of an anonymous reader for JIABS.

During this period, on January 24, 1987, Dr. Royal Weiler, my adiguru and a true scholar and humanist, passed on. I would, with humility, like to dedicate this article to his memory.


2. Earlier, Tilak Raj Chopra (1966), 96n. similarly refers to such an alternation for a passage in the Kusajiitaka on the basis of a similarity in Nepali script between v and dh. Here, it would seem, dh> v. In the notes to K. R. Noonan (1969) see the notes for v. 1083 (v> dh). In the notes to K. R. Nonnan (1971) see the notes for v. 7 (v> dh), v. 419 (dh> v), v. 464 (v> dh). K. R. Nonnan also refers to T. W. Rbys Davids and William S tede (1921-25), under dhanayati for an instance of v> dh. K. R. Nonnan (1984-92) and (1987) note for the Suttanipiita, aside from the instance in question, v. 44 (v> db), v. 165 (v> dh), v. 349 (v> dh), v. 531 (v > dh), v. 646 (v> dh), v. 684 (dh> v), v. 910 (v> dh), vv. 1071-72 (v> dh), v. 1114 (v> dh). K. R. Nonnan (1984-92) also notes an alternation between dhaIpka and vazpkainE. Hardy (1901),338. The reading here is dhazpka; vazp.lcabeing listed as a v.l., though vazpka appears earlier in the verse. The new edition, N. A. Jayawickrama (1977),126 and 132, reads vazpkahere instead, and lists dhazpkaas the v.l. The translation, 1. B. Horner, assisted by N. A. Jayawickrama (1974), 148 also lists vazpka as the preferred reading. Vazpka is translated in this verse as "crooked" and as "uncertainty." See their n. 1 and n. 3 regarding a possible explanation for the reading dhazpka, utilizing the commentary to J III.313 noted above. The reading c;Jhazpka in N. A. Jayawickrama (1950), 41, mentioned by Nonnan (1984-92), is without doubt a misprint for dhazpka.

3. In this regard, from a comparative standpoint, see Sir Thomas More's Four Last Things on "fantasy" with regard to the negative attitude toward loose thought in Pre-Elizabethan England.

4. Woodward notes, "So SnA 303; Nett. 147,244; both texts and MSS. but Sn text v~." As noted here, this is not so with regard to Suttanipiita commentary manuscripts.

5. Geiger and Seidenstiicker, as also Mrs. Rbys Davids below (perhaps followed by E. M. Hare as well), construe mana vitakkii of the text as being in composition. This is on account of the way in which M.Leon Feer (1884-1904) construed these words in his printing of the text of the Smpyuttanikiiya in 1884. Both Geiger's translation and Mrs. Rbys Davids' translation are translations of the Smpyuttanikiiya. It is clear from Buddhaghosa's commentaries of both the Suttanipiitaas well as the Smpyuttanikiiya,though, that vitakkais to be understood as the subject of the verb ossajanti, and mana the object. Thus, Buddhaghosa's understanding in his Smpyuttanikiiya, commentary, given above, was "papavitakka (for vitakka) cittaIp. (for mana) ossajanti."

6. Or conceivably, " ... As children (set loose) a 'crooked one' (vazpka, i.e. crow)?" The answer in Suttanipiita 271, though, " ... As children (set loose) a toyplough (vazpka, 'something crooked')."

7. See T. W. Rbys Davids and William Stede (1921-25) on the difference between wood, jungle, and forest in Pilii imagery as a place of pleasures and sport ("wood"), as a place of danger and frightfulness ('jungle"), and as the resort of ascetics noted for loneliness ("forest").

8. Compare Smpyuttanikiiya III.103 regarding the annihilation of the

Is It a Crow? 83

•• }dJa11dhas. -The. khandha~ remain as long as the kno~led~e of the~ true character . 's not attained, 1.e., of thetr cause and removal. There IS a dtrect alluslOn and contrast

-~ere to the image of birth from the trunk of a Banyan, nigrodhasseva kbandhaja; "iii su/1EI1ipata 272. · . 9. See in_this regard, S. H. Levitt, "Kurukh nad, Sanskrit niItha. Burmese nat' in Haryana Sahitya Akademi Journal of Indological Studies 1(1986), 119-35. In the most usual usage, the Burmese nats correspond to the yakkhas of Sri Lanka.

"See also T. W. Rbys Davids and William Stede (1921-25) on yakkha. That it is a . yakkhahere who is the interlocutor, asking for a way out of bondage by passion . and anger, presents a forceful image. - 10. While it is not a scholarly translation, there may be some utility in ,;giving here the translation of these two lines of verse as these were given to me:

~" -<' ... ,. Roots born from the earth and after entering into the earth, Each one having its _ different place, they go by their own desire,

These two lines fit well in Suttanipata 272. I present them here in a "", footnote only, rather than in the text of the paper, simply to peint attention to them, , with the hope that at some future date a scholar better qualified than myseJf to deal !with the Chinese text, might present a better translation.

11. It should be added that T. W. Rbys Davids and William Stede (1921-25) and vol. 1 of A. M. Ghatage's Encyclopaedic Dictionary of Sanskrit appear to continue the reference to "lap" with regard to defming aIika. Perhaps it may be done

iaccurately in a number of circumstances. 12. This notice to the ankadhiitri is perhaps in a listing as in Buddhist

· Sanskrit literature. My references to these terms have come from lexicons, that to 'the aIikadhiitri from A. M. Ghatage's incomplete dictionary. I have been unable to · consult the printings o(the text and its commentary to see if ankadhatri occurs in , this context in a listing.

• References

Texts and Translations

Andersen, Dines and Helmer Smith, eds. 1913. The Sutta-Nipata, new edition. London: Published for the PaIi Text Society by Henry Frowde, Oxford University Press.

Bapat, P. y" ed. 1924. The Sutta-Nipata. Poona: P. V. Bapat, Printed by Anant Vinayak Patvardhan at the Arya Bushana Press.

Chalmers, Lord Robert, ed. and trans. 1932. Buddha's teachings, being, the SuttaNipiIta or discourse-collection, edited in the original PiIli text with an English versipn facing it. Harvard Oriental Series, 37. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.


Chopra, Tilak Raj, ed. and trans. 1966. The Kusa-Hitaka, a critical and comparative study. Alt- und Neu-Indische Studien herausgegeben vom Seminar fUr Kultur und Geschichte Indiens an der Universitat Hamburg, 13. Hamburg: Cram, De Gruyter and Co.

Coomara Swamy, M., t..rans. 1874. Sutta Nipata or, dialogues and discourses of Gomma Buddha. London: Triibner and Co.

Cowell, Edward Byles and Robert Alexander Neil, eds. 1886. The Divyavadana, a collection of early BuddhistJegends, Sanskrit text in transcription edited from the Nepalese manuscripts in Cambridge and Paris, .... Rpt. Amsterdam: Oriental Press NY, Philo Press, 1970.

Cowell, Edward Byles, ed. 1895-1907. The Jataka, or stories of the Buddha's former births, translated from the Pilii by various hands. 6 vols. + index. Index, 1913. Cambridge: The University Press.

Davids, Mrs. C. A. F. Rbys, trans. 1909. Psalms of the early Buddhists, part 1-psalms of the sisters. PaIi Text Translation Series, 1. London: Published for the PaIi Text Society by Henry Frowde, Oxford University Press.

___ .1913. Psalms of the early Buddhists, part II-psalms of the brethren. Pall Text Translation Series, 4. London: Published for the PaIi Text Society byHenry Frowde, Oxford University Press.

Davids, Mrs. C. A. F. Rbys and Suriyagoda Sumangala thera, trans. [1917]-30. The book of kindred sayings (Sarpyutta-Nikaya) or grouped suttas, 5 vols. Pali Text Society Translation Series, 7, 10, 12, 14, 16. London: Published for the PaIi Text Society by Oxford University Press.

Davids, T. W. Rbys and J. Estlin Carpenter, eds. 1886. The Sumailgala Vilasini, Buddhaghosa's commentary on the Digha-Nikaya, 2 vols. Part 1: 2nd ed. London: Published for the PaIi Text Society by Luzac and Company Ltd., 1968. Part2: Rpt. LOIidon: Published for the PaIi Text Society by Luzac and Company Ltd., 1971. [For vol. 3 see W. Stede, ed.]

___ . 1890-1911. The Digha Nikaya, 3 vols. London: Published for the Pali Text Society by Henry Frowde, Oxford University Press.

Fausb611, V., trans. 1881. The Sutta-Nipata, a collection of discourses, being one of the canonical books of the Buddhists. Sacred Books of the East, 10.2. London: Oxford University Press.

Fausboll, V., ed. [pref. 1885]. The Sutta-Nipata, being a collection of some of Gomma Buddha's dialogues and discourses. London: Published for the PaIi Text Society by Henry Frowde, Oxford University Press.

___ . 1877-97. The Jataka together with its commentary, being tales of the anterior births of Gomma Buddha, 7 vols. London: Triibner and Co.

Feer, M. Leon, ed. 1884-1904. The Sarpyutta-Nikaya of the Sutta-Pi{a.ka, 6 vols. London: Published for the PaIi Text Society by Henry Frowde, Oxford University Press.

Geiger, Wilhelm, trans. 1925-30. Sarpyutta-Nikaya, Die Gruppen geordnete Sammlung aus dem Pmi-Kanon der Buddhisten zum ersten Mal ins Deutsche iibertragen, 2 vols. Bd. 1: Miinchen-Neubiberg: Benares

Is It a Crow? 85

Verlag / Ferdinand Schwab, 1930. Bd. 2: Miincben-Neubiberg: Oscar Schloss Verlag, 1925.

Hardy, E., ed. 1883-1910. The Ariguttara-Nikaya, 6 vols. Vols. 1 and 2 ed. by Richard Morris. Vol. 6 (index) by Mabel Hunt, rev. and ed. by Mrs. C. A. F. Rbys Davids. London: Published for thePali Text Society by Henry Frowde, Oxford University Press.

.. . 1894. DhammapaJa' s Paramattha-Dipam~ part III, being the commentary - on the Peta- Vatthu. London: Published for the Pali Text Society by Henry

Frowde, Oxford University Press . . 1901. DhammapaJa' s Paramattha-Dipani, partlY, being the commentary

- on the Vimana- Vatthu. London: Published for the Pali Text Society by Henry Frowde, Oxford University Press . . 1902. The Netti-PakaraJ.1a, with extracts from DhammapaJa's commen-- tary. London: Published for the Pali Text Society by Henry Frowde, Oxford University Press.

Hare, E. M., trans. [1944]. Woven cadences of early Buddhists (Sutta-Nipata). London: Oxford University Press.

Homer, 1. B., trans., assisted by N. A. J ayawickrama. 1974. Vimanavatthu: stories of the mansions, new translation of the verses and commentariai excerpts and Petavatthu: stories of the departed, trans. by H. S. Gebman. Sacred Books of the Buddhists, 30. London: The Pili Text Society.

Jayawickrama, N. A., ed. 1977. Vimanavatthu and Petavatthu, new edition. Pili Text Society Text Series, 168. London: The Pili Text Society.

Minaev, Ivan Paulovich, ed. 1888, Petavatthu. London: Published for the Pili Text Society by Henry Frowde, Oxford University Press.

___ . 1910-11. Mahavyutpatti . .. , 2nd ed., provided with an index and prepared for press by N D. Mironov. Bibliotheca Buddhica, 13. Sanktpeterburg: Imperatorskaya akademya nauk.

Miiller, E., ed. 1893. Paramatthadipani, DhammapaJa's commentary on the Therigatha. London: Published for the Pali Text Society by Henry Frowde.

Neumann, Karl Eugen, trans. 1905. Die Reden Gotamo Buddhos, aus der Sammlung der Bruchstuecke, Suttanipato, des Pali-Kanons. 2. aufl. Miinchen: R. Piper, 1924.

Norman, K. R., trans. 1969. The elders' verses I, Theragatha. Pali Text Society Translation Series, 38. London: Published for the Pili Text Society by Luzac and Co., Ltd.

___ . 1971. The elders' verses II, Therigfithfi. PaIi Text Society Translation Series, 40. London: Published for the Pili Text Society by Luzac and Co., Ltd.

___ . 1984-92. The group of discourses (Sutta-Nipata), vol. 1 (with alternative translations by I. B. Horner and Walpola Rabu1a), and vol. 2 (revised translation with introduction and notes). Pall Text Society Translation


Sedes, 44-5. London: The Pali Text Society. _~~. 1987. "Notes on the Sutta-NipiHa," inSri Lanka Journal of Buddhist

Studies 1, 100-16. Ogiwara, Unrai. [1927]. The Sanskrit-Chinese dictionary of Buddhist techniCal

terms, based on the Mahavyutpatti. Rpt. Tokyo: Sankibo, 1959. Oldenberg, Hermann, ed. 1879-83. The Vinaya Pitakam: one of the principal

Buddhist holy scriptures in the Pilii language, 5 vols. London and Edinburgh: Williams and Norgate.

Oldenberg, Hermann and Richard Pischel, eds. 1883. The Thera- and Theri-Gathfi. (stanzas ascribed to elders of the Buddhist order of recluses). London: Published for the Pali Text Society by Henry Frowde.

Saddhatissa, H., trans. 1985. The Sutta-Nipata. London: Curzon Press. Sakaki, Ryozaburo. [1916]. Bon-Zo-Kan Wa shiyaku taiko hon'yaku myogi

[Mahavyutpattij taishii. Kyoto Teikoku Daigaku B unka Daigaku soshu, 3 and Supplement (Suppl. [1925]). Kyoto: Shingonshii Kyoto University.

Seidenstiicker, Karl, trans. 1931. "Suttanipata," inZeitschriftfiir Buddhismus und verwandte gebiete9, 23-9,105-21,166-84,260-71,357-80. [Transl. inc. (through 3.3 only)]. .

Smith, Helmer, ed. 1916-18. Sutta-Nipata commenta.r.y, being ParamatthajotikfiII, 3 vols. London: Published for the Pali Text Society by Humphrey Milford, Oxford University Press.

Stede, Wilhelm, ed. 1918. Niddesa, part II: Cu1laniddesa.. London: Published for the Pali Text Society by Humphrey Milford, Oxford University Press .

. Stede, Wilhelm, ed. from materials left unfinished by T.W. Rhys Davids and J. Estlin Carpenter. 1931-32. The Sumailgala-Vilasini, Buddhaghosa's commentary on the Digha-Nikaya, vol. 3. London: Published for the Pili Text Society by Oxford University Press.

Takakusu, J un jiro and Kaikyoku Watanabe, eds. 1924-27. TaishO shinsh ii daizokyo (The Tripitaka in Chinese), 85 vols. Rpt. Tokyo: The TaishO Shinshii Daizokyo Kanko Kai, [1961-78]. (=TaishO).

Woodward, Frank Lee, ed. 1929-37.Sarattha-ppakasini, Buddhaghosa's commentaryon the Sarpyutta-Nikaya, 3 vols. London: Published for the Pali Text Society by Humphrey Milford Oxford University Press.

Woodward, Frank Lee, trans. 193-6.The book of gradual sayings (Ailguttara Nikaya) or more-numbered suttas, 5 vols. Pali Text Society Translation Series, 22, 24-7. Vols. 3 and 4 trans. by E. M. Hare. London: Published for the Pali Text Society by Oxford University Press.

Secondary Sources

___ . 1933. The Oxford English dictionary. Rpt. Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1961.

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Anesaki, Mahasaru. 1906. "Traces of PaIi texts in a Mahayana treatise," in Le Museon n. s. 7, 33-45 . . 1906-7. "Sutta-Nipata in Chinese," in Joumal of the Pafi Text Society

- [no vol. no.], 50-1. . . 1908. "Some problems of the textual history of the Buddhist scriptures,"

- in Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan, ser. 1, vol. 35, sec. 2,81-96 . . 1908. "The four Buddhist Agamas in Chinese," in Transactions of the - Asiatic Society of Japan, ser. 1, vol. 35, se<;. 3, 1-149.

Bohtlingk, Otto and Rudolf Roth. 1855-75. Sanskrit Wdrterbuch, herausgegeben von der KaiserlichenAkademie der Wissenschaften, 7 vols. Rpt.Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1966.

Brandon, S. G.F.1972. A dictionary of Buddhism, intro. byT. O. Ling. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons .

Biibler, Johann Georg. [1904]. Indian paleography, ed. by John Faithfull Heet as an appendix to Indian Antiquary 33 (1904). Bombay: Bombay Education Society's Press, Byculla.

Coedes, G. 1966. The making of Southeast Asia, English trans. by H. M. Wright. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.

Das; Sarat Chandra. 1902. A Tibetan-English dictionary with Sanskrit synonyms, rev. and ed. by Graham Sandberg and A. William Heyde. Rpt. Alipore, West Bengal: Superintendent, Government Printing, 1960.

Davids, Mrs. C. A. F. Rbys. 1906-7. "Similies in the Nikayas, a classified index," in Journal of the Pifli Text Society [no vol. no.], 52-151.

Davids, T. W. Rbys.and William Stede. 1921-25. The Pali Text Society's PaJiEnglish dictionary. Rpt. London: The PaIi Text Society, 1972.

Demieville, Paul, Hubert Durt, and Anna Seidel. 1978. Repertoire du canon bouddhique sinojaponais: edition de TaishO (TaishO shinshudaizoky6). Paris: Librairie d' Amerique et d'Orient Adrien-Maisonneuve; Tokyo: Maison Franco-japonaise.

Edgerton, Franklin. 1953. Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit grammar and dictionary, 2 . vols. Rpt. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1970.

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Ghatage, A. M. 1976-82. Encyclopaedic dictionary of Sanskrit, 1-3.1. Poona: Deccan College Postgraduate and Research Institute.

Hoernle, A. F. Rudolf. 1916. "The SuttaNipatain a Sanskrit version from Eastern Turkestan," in Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland n.s. 48, 709-32.

___ '.1917. "The Sanskrit version of the SuttaNipata," in Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland n. s. 49, 134.

Jayawickrama, N. A. 1950. "Sutta Nipata: the yakkha ballads," in University of


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Lancaster, Lewis R., ed. 1982. Buddhist scriptures: a bibliography. New York and London: Garland Publishing Co.

Lester, Robert C. 1973. Theravada Buddhism in Southeast Asia. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.

Malalasekera, G. P. 1961-67. Encyclopaedia of Buddhism, 1-2.3. [Colombo]: Government Press.

Monier-Williams, Sir Monier. 1899. A Sanskrit-English dictionary, etymo10gi. cally and philologically arranged, ... , new ed. Oxford: The Clarendon Press.

Nanjio, Bunyiu. 1883. A catalogue of the Chinese translation of the Buddhist Tripitaka, the sacred canon of the Buddhists in China and Japan; compiled by order of the secretary of state for India.. Oxford: Clarendon Press. (=Nanjio).

Ross, E. Denison. 1910. Alphabetical list of the titles of works in the Chinese Buddhist Tripitaka, being an index to Bunyiu Nanjio's catalogue and to the 1905 Kioto reprint of the Buddhist canon. Calcutta: Superintendent of Government Printing, India.

Sastri, Haraprasad. 1925. "The northern Buddhism, 3," in Indian Historical Quarterly 1,464-72.

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Trenckner, V. 1990. A critical Piili dictionary, begun by V. Trenckner, vol. 2, fasc. 17. Copenhagen: Munksgaard.

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Wayman, Alex. 1961. Analysis of the Sravakabhilmi manuscript. University of California Publications in Classical Philology, 17. Berkeley: University of California Press.

___ . 1982. "Is it a crow (P. dhaIplca) or a nurse (S. dhatri)?" in Joumal of theAmerican Oriental Society 102, 515-16.

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Wintemitz; Moriz. 1927-33. A history of Iridian literature, vol. 1 trans. by Mrs. S. . Ketkar and rev. by the author; vol. 2 trans. by Mrs. S. Ketkar and MissH.

Kohn and rev. by the author. Rpt. New York: Russell andRussell, 1971.

Issues in the Field of East Asian Buddhist Studies: An Extended Review of Sudden and Gradual: Approaches to Enlightenment in Chinese Thought, ed. Peter N. Gregory

by T. Griffith Foulk

Introduction

This article began as a review of a substantial anthology of scholarly articles that appeared several years ago:

Peter N. Gregory, ed. Sudden and Gradual: Approaches to Enlightenment in Chinese Thought. Kuroda Institute Studies in East Asian Buddhism, no. 5. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1987,

Two considerations, however, have led me greatly to extend the scope and length of the review, with the result that it now includes a broad overview of the field (East Asian Buddhist studies) and subfield (Chinese Buddhism) to which the review volume belongs, as well as an in-depth treatment of each of its ten chapters. First, I felt that some recognition of the series in which the volume appears, Kuroda Institute Studies in East Asian Buddhism, was called for. This series, which was launched in 1983 with the publication of Studies in Ch 'an and Hua-yen (edited by Robert Gimello and Peter Gregory), includes seven volumes to date, all but one of which are

93


multi-'author anthologies.I The series has emerged as a showcase fOr the best of conten1porary North American scholarship on East Asian Buddhism, and the list of scholars who have contributed articles to it reads very much like a who's who in the field today. Because Sudden and Gradual: Approaches to Enlightenment in Chinese Thought is fairly representative of the scholarship that has appeared thus far in the Kuroda Institute series, and because the series itself can be regarded as the standard bearer of East Asian Buddhist studies in North America today, this review seemed an appropriate place to assay some of the general features of that field as it has evolved over the past two decades. Secondly, I found that the individual chapters of Sudden and Gradual, together with the Introduction by editor Peter N. Gregory and the Afterword by Tu Wei-ming, raise a number of· fundamental methodological and historiographical issues that deserve more detailed treatment than would have been possible in a short review. Taking the volume as a whole as a starting point, then, I shall proceed to layout the general parameters of the field of East Asian Buddhist Studies as it has evolved in North America; to address various questions of methodology in Buddhist Studies and the study of religion in general; and to evaluate each of the individual chapters of Sudden and Gradual in light of those broader issues.

Sudden and Gradual: Approaches to Enlightenment in Chinese Thought

This volume, a collection of ten articles focused on a more or less common theme, grew out of a conference on "The Sudden/Gradual Polarity: A Recurrent Theme in Chinese Thought." The conference, sponsored by the Committee on Studies of Chinese Civilization of the American Council of Learned Societies, was held at The Institute for Transcultural Studies (located at the Zen Center of Los Angeles) in May, 1981. The original set of twelve papers presented at the conference was distributed by the organizers to a number of universities and research institutes with major East Asian libraries in September, 1981. According to the introductory note accompanying

Review of Sudden and Gradual 95

that set of papers, one of the main objectives of the conference was to explore how the philosophical and polemical categories of "sudden" (tun) and "'gradual" (chien), which are used in diverse Ways in a variety of medieval Chinese Buddhist text, "formed part of a larger discourse in Chinese intellectual history":

The conference thus sought to take an approach different from those of previous discussions of the significance of the sudden! gradual controversy in Chinese Buddhism. Instead of trying to locate the source of the debate within the Indian Buddhist heritage, the conference attempted to provide a new perspective on the process of Buddhism's accommodation with some of the dominant themes in Chinese intellectual history, as well as Buddhism's effect upon that tradition.2

Another aim of the conference, expressed in the same note, was to investigate how the sudden/gradual controversy found in Chinese Buddhism "could be reformulated as a paradigm by which to elucidate the basic tensions in other traditions of moral and spiritual cultivation."3

The co-organizers of the conference, Peter N. Gregory (editor of the volume under review and director of the Kuroda Institute) and Robert M. Gimello, as well the majority of the other scholars who originally presented papers (including Jeffrey L. Broughton, Francis H. Cook, Neal A. Donner, Luis O. G6mez, Miriam Levering, John R. McRae, and Robert B. Zeuschner) are specialists in Chinese Buddhism and/or the historical connections between Chinese, Indian, and Tibetan Buddhism. These scholars, who are sometimes labeled Buddhologists (more on this neologism later), are representative of the growing East Asian wing of the field of Buddhist studies in North America today. Reading between the lines of the stated aims of the conference, I would venture to say that the agenda reflected the interests of this cohort, in effect acknowledging its insularity and its need to open up lines of communication with scholars outside the field of Buddhist studies. In this case, the common ground for meeting with outside scholars was defined as Chinese intellectual


history, or Sinologyin general. Apart from the Buddhologists, papers were presented at the conference by a historian of Chinese art (James Cahill), a specialist in Chinese literature (~chard J. Lynn), and a specialist in Neo-Confucian thought (Rodney L. Taylor). Concluding remarks were made by Confucian scholar Tu Wei-mingo

I would suggest that the stated desire for a closer association with the mainstream of Western Sinology (which, it may be observed, has inherited . something of the traditional elite Confucian antipathy toward Chinese Buddhism) has another dimension to it as well. It represents a rejection of the notion, long held by many leading Europeanscholars of Buddhism, that the study of Chinese Buddhist texts is valuable chiefly for the light it sheds on the Buddhist tradition in its native India. Here we find a new generation of East Asian Buddhologists insisting that Chinese BuddhislIl is worth studying in its own right as an independent., if not entirely indigenous, set of Chinese phenomena.

Editor Peter Gregory notes that the book which finally emerged from the 1981 conference has taken a shape in many ways different from the original cast of papers. Six of the original twelve papers (those by Broughton, Cook, Gimello, Levering, Taylor, and Zeuschner) do not appear, and others have been revised or completely rewritten. Other major changes were the addition of new papers written specially for the book by Whalen Lai and Robert E. Buswell, Jr., and the inclusion of translations of seminal essays by Paul Demieville (originally published in 1947) and R.A. Stein (Qriginally published in 1971). Despite these changes, Gregory asserts, the working assumption that inspired the conference "still operates as an underlying presupposition for the volume and provides an important context in which the various chapters should be understood" (p. 4). In other words, the volume is still intended "to place what has often· been seen as a strictly Buddhist problematic within the broader context of Chinese thought and culture" (p. 1).

The volume as a whole is only partially successful in this venture. Peter Gregory's Introduction and the Mterword by Tu Wei-ming do address the issue of the "peculiarly sinitic" character of the conception of sudden enlightenment in Chinese Buddhism. However, the


chapters by Demieville, Stein, and Gomez, which together comprise part I (entitled "The Sudden and Gradual Debates") focus on a rather

. different problem: the applicability of the sudden/gradual polarity that was formulated in the Ch' an school of Chinese Buddhism to the cross-cultural; comparative study of religion. The investigation of this issue, it will be recalled, was a stated aim of the original conference, but it is not mentioned in the editor's Introduction to the book. Ironically, with the addition of the chapters in Part I, the book does a much better job of addressing the issue than the original

'conference papers. Part II, entitled "Sudden and Gradual Enlightenment in Chinese Buddhism," consists of chapters by Lai,Donner, McRae, Gregory, and Buswell-all East Asian Buddhologists. Among these, only the piece by Lai touches· on the question of the . broader (non-Buddhist) context of the Chinese Buddhist understanding of sudden and gradual enlightenment. The other chapters in Part n focus rather narrowly on the sudden/gradual polarity as it was employed by particular Chinese Buddhist teachers or schools, and make few if any attempts to draw connections to non-Buddhist systems of thought or broader trends in Chinese culture. The

, remaining two chapters, by literature specialist Lynn and art historian Cahill, are relegated somewhat forlornly to a much shorter Part III,

.'" entitled "Analogies in the Cultural Sphere." The title of this part unintentionally implies that Chinese Buddhism is somehow outside the sphere of Chinese culture. It also suggests that developments in Chinese literary and art theory that employed the Buddhist categories of sudden and gradual were extraneous to the mainstream of the Buddhist tradition, which (one might gather from Part II) was chiefly concerned with philosophical matters and a religious "practice" which neatly reflected doctrinal formulations. This is unfortunate, for the chapters by Lynn and Cahill bear witness to the fact that the isolation of East Asian Buddhist studies from the mainstream of Sinology is detrimental to both sides. Other contributions from outside the circle of Buddhologists would have been a welcome addition. Whatever the reason for their absence, the very paucity of essays in Part III undermines the claim that the sudden/ gradual polarity is more than just a Buddhist problematic, and gives the


impression that few Sinologists find the topic interesting or important enough to write about.

All of this is not to find fault either with thE; editor's basic project or with the quality of the individual essays, which is generally high. The editor is to be commended for his vision of an East Asian Buddhist studies which is more attuned to broader Sinological issues, and better able to command an audience outside a narrow circle of specialists. If he is to be criticized, it is only for raising expectations in the Introduction which go unfulfilled in the body of the work. That, perhaps, is the price that one must pay for venturing to point one's colleagues in new directions. By the same token, it is not entirely fair to judge the individual chapters by the expectations raised in a frame that is basically extrinsic to them. Most of the chapters in Part II are models of good, sound East Asian Buddhological research-a virtue that only appears a vice in the context of a call to expand the scope of the field itself.

Editor Gregory's Introduction does an excellent job of alerting the reader to a situation that might otherwise be a cause of considerable bewilderment in the chapters that follow: the fact that the descriptive tenns "sudden" (tun) and "gradual" (chien) were applied in varying ways to a number of different objects in Chinese Buddhist thought, so that no single, overarching lexical definition of their meaning is possible. Gregory notes, for example, that when applied to enlightenment (wu), "sudden" in some contexts means that the object of realization can only be apprehended in its entirety or "all at once," rather than piecemeal or gradually, since the object itself is a truth or principle (11) that is essentially one and indivisible. In other historical contexts dealt with in the essays, we find that sudden enlightenment (tun-wu) could mean an enlightenment in which all of the disparate qualities of Buddhahood are gained "at once," or· simultaneously. Or it could mean an enlightenment that is "immediate" in the sense of being direct and intuitive rather than relying on mediating concepts or expedients (upaya; fang-pien); or an enlightenment that is inborn rather than produced or acquired through any meditative, devotional or moral exercises; or an enlightenment that


is apprehended fully in a moment of "seeing" rather than through a gradual process of self-purification; or simply an enlightenment that is endowed with all properties that are good and true (albeit unspecified) as opposed to the gradual (false, dangerous, inferior, impossible, etc.) enlightenment that is attributed to an opponent in a polemical debate. To this I would add that in some. cases the categories of "sudden" and "gradual" are set up as mutually exclusive termS in a strict dichotomy, and in other cases they represent a polarity-the extremes of a continuum in which any number of intermediate positions are possible. Matters are further complicated by the fact that the various dichotomies and polarities that have been formulated using "sudden" and "gradual" as key terms do not necessarily correspond to each other in any predictable way. Thus, . for example, thinkers who hold that enlightenment is innate in all living beings (the subitist or "sudden" position in the dichotomy of inborn vs. produced or acquired), have not always stressed insight (the subitist position in the polarity of seeing vs. purification) as a method of realizing or manifesting the innate enlightenment in everyday life. Furthermore, as the editor points out, the terms "sudden" and "gradual" have been applied in various ways not only to enlightenment, but to teachings (chiao) and cultivation (hsiu) as well.

One thing that is clear from the Introduction, and borne out by the evidence presented in the volume as a whole, is that from a historical point of view it is dangerous to speak loosely of "the" (singular) sudden/gradual polarity in Chinese Buddhism, or "the" subitist position. Historically, there were many different polarities and dichotomies, and many different subitist positions. These occurred at different times and places, and there is no valid a priori reason for assuming any thematic similarities or historical relations between them. Any such connections must be drawn on a case by case basis, following a careful study of each of the particular historical instances in which the terms "sudden" and "gradual" were actually brought into play. Several of the essays under review do in fact present detailed philological analyses of such specific instances. But nowhere in the volume as a whole do we find the sort of follow-up study necessary

100 . nABS VOL. 16 NO. 1

to establish historical connections among them, or to prove the hypothesis that "the" sudden/gradual polarity was a recurring theme even, in the history of Chinese Buddhism" let alone in Chinese intellectual history in general.

This being the case, are the editor and certain of the other contributors to the volume making an error of historical judgment when they speak: of "the" sudden! gradual polarity as if a single, underlying issue (or even a single complex of demonstrably related issues) had already been shown to exist? I would not make this charge. The problem, rather, lies in a failure clearly to distinguish research methodologies and the types of definitions being employed.

As was indicated above, the historical-philological method of dealing with technical philosophical terms such as "sudden" and "gradual" is not to assume any semantic unity, but to determine the meanings of the terms in question by examining their usage in as many different historical contexts as possible. Definitions arrived at by this method have been called lexical definitions.4 Because lexical definitions are reports of actual historical usage, they can he judged true or false, and are in principle always open to critical review. Once the meanings of a term have been pinned down in a lexical definition, they can be analyzed to see if there is a semantic common denominator that underlies all of them, although there need not be: irreducible ambiguity is a common fact of actual usage, and hence a common feature of lexical definitions.

An entirely different methodological approach-one that is often taken in the comparative study of religion-is to begin with a stipulative definition of a particular type of religious phenomenon and then go looking in the world's religions for concrete historical instances that fit the typology. Stipulative definitions function to establish the meaning of a symbol for use within a particular field of discourse, and thus in principle cannot be judged true or false on the basis of evidence of any sort. Because they are essentially arbitrary, stipulative definitions need not accord in any way with their lexical counterparts, but often they are used to eliminate ambiguity by giving priority to one of the established lexical meanings of a term.

Now, if we ask which of these two approaches informs the organization of the present volume, the historical-philological or the


comparative-typological, the answer is both-but in a rather haphazard fashion. When the editor and certain other contributors speak of "the" sudden/gradual polarity, it seems that they are making use of astipulative definition. The definition in question, we shall see, was one originally formulated by Paul Demieville in "Le miroir spirituel,"5 the first essay in the present volume. Demieville was not really concerned with the lexical meanings of tun and chien in Chinese texts: his aim was to present a typology for use in the comparative study of religion, and he proceeded to test that typology by applying it to texts selected from the Buddhist, Taoist, Hindu, Islamic, and Christian traditions. As he explicitly stated, "in composing this brief study I have not asked myself any historical questions ... we may see here a comparative essay" (p. 33). Demieville himself is more or less

. clear about what he is up to, but a number of follow-up studies (including ones in this volume) take him to task for philological deficiencies, as though he was presenting a lexical rather than a stipulative definition of "subitism."

By the same token, no matter how fruitful Demieville' s stipulative definition of the sudden/gradual polarity may be as a device for comparing different. intellectual and religious traditions around the world, the similarity in thought patterns that this approach discovers in different traditions must not be construed as proof of any direct historical connection among them. The same holds true even if the different intellectual traditions being compared all fall within the Chinese culture sphere: structural similarities revealed by the comparative-typological method do not constitute proof of historical relatedness. The existence of the sudden/gradual polarity as an underlying theme or pattern of thought that exerted itself throughout the course of Chinese intellectual history can only be.demonstrated by the historical-philological method.

These questions of research methodologies and types of definitions present themselves implicitly in Sudden and Gradual, but . neither the Introduction nor any of the individual chapters address them directly. In general, it may be observed that the field of Buddhist studies has lacked sophistication in these regards, having traditionally been preoccupied with the fundamental task of sorting out and

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trying to make sense of the great mass of Buddhist literature that has been preserved in several difficult Asian languages. If East Asian Buddhist studies, in particular, is to emerge, from its comfortably exotic cocoon of highly specialized philological and doctrinal concerns and begin to interact in mutually beneficial ways with other areas of Asian and religious studies, it will be necessary for scholars in the field to distance themselves a bit from the normative traditions they specialize in and give more thought to such theoretical questions. As we shall see in the following section, East Asian Buddhist studies is a relatively new branch of Buddhist studies in the West, and one that has relied heavily on sectarian Japanese Buddhist scholarship in learning to stand on its own.

The Field of East Asian Buddhist Studies

Like the fields ofIndology, Japanology, and Sinology; Buddhist studies is not tied to anyone academic discipline, arid in theory can encompass any number of scholarly approaches and methods. A major difference, of course, is that Buddhist studies is not in principle delimited by any geopolitical, cultural, or linguistic boundaries either. Indeed, research in the field almost always has a crosscultural, multi-lingual aspect. This is because as Buddhism spread from India throughout the rest of Asia (and recently to the West), it manifested itself at every place and time in a complex combination of imported and indigenous elements of belief and practice, which scholars feel compelled to sort out. Moreover, in many lands, the scriptures held as sacred and used on a daily basis by Buddhist monks and nuns have been written in foreign languages. For example,in much of Southeast Asia the Pali canon has long been regarded as authoritative, and in Korea and Japan the major Buddhist canons are written in classical Chinese. Even the study of Indian Buddhism is not free from cross-cultural, multilingual considerations, for it relies in good measure on texts translated from Indic languages that survive only in Tibetan and/or Chinese. Thus Buddhist studies, which is probably regarded by most outsiders as a rather narrow specialization, focusing as it does on a single religious tradition, is in actuality


nearly as broad in scope and potentially as diverse in methodology as the nebulous field of Asian studies itself.

In fact, the tremendous cultural diversity of the Buddhist. tradition, the vast time frame that it spans, and the sheer number and difficulty of the Asian languages pertinent to its study, effectively preclude anyone scholar (even one who adheres to a single disciplinary approach) from researching Buddhism in all of its historical contexts. A degree of specialization is necessary, and not surprisingly, Buddhist studies admits to the same sort of national, linguistic, cultural, and "area" subdivisions that are found in Asian studies. The most fundamental division in the field is between the Buddhism of lands that historically have fallen more within the sphere of Indian cultural influence, and the Buddhism of lands that have been more influenced by Chinese culture. That is to say, the primary division is between the Buddhism of South, Souiheast and Central Asia on the one hand, where the main languages of the Buddhist cannons are Pali, Sanskrit, and Tibetan, and East Asian Buddhism on the other hand, where the major canons have all been comprised chiefly of texts written in classical Chinese. Further subdivisions in the field tend to follow national and linguistic boundaries. Thus we speak of the Buddhism of Thailand, Cambodia, Tibet, China, Korea, Japan, and so on, as distinct objects of study. Nevertheless, because Buddhism itself is a cross-cultural phenomenon, the areas of specialization that individual scholars have carved out for themselves within Buddhist studies generally straddle linguistic and cultural boundaries.

Although Buddhism can, in principle, be studied from the standpoint of many different humanistic and social sCientific disciplines, historically the study of Buddhism in the West has been dominated by philological concerns. As J. W. de Jong demonstrates

. in an article published in 1974 entitled "A Brief History of Buddhist Studies in Europe and America,"6 the prevailing attitude among the leading Western (mostly European) scholars of Buddhism over the past century has been that "once texts have been properly edited, interpreted and translated it will become possible to study the development of religious and philosophical ideas."7 De Jong' s article


was followed a decade later by an update entitled "Recent Buddhist Studies in Europe and America: 1973-1983."8 These articles are of interest not only for the valuable information t~ey contain, but for the prejudice they display in virtually ignoring the work of the younger generation of scholars (mostly in North America) specializing in East Asian Buddhism. De Jong is not alone when he states that

Without any doubt, the study of Indian Buddhist texts deserves a central place in Buddhist studies because it forms the basis for any serious work in the study of religion, philosophy, history and art. 9

There are still many scholars in the field of Buddhist studies who believe that real Buddhism is Indian Buddhism, and thatthe "serious" study of Buddhism is impossible without a mastery of the linguistic tools necessary to carry out the philological study of Indian Buddhist texts. First and foremost among those tools, of course, is a knowledge of Sanskrit and Pali. De J ong notes that "most Western scholars begin by studying Sanskrit and Pali and acquire later sufficient knowledge of Tibetan and Chinese to read Tibetan and Chinese texts translated from Sanskrit or other Indian originals."lo In this view, a knowledge of Chinese (orrather "Buddhist Chinese"-the idiosyncratic language of Indian texts in translation) is an important, but decidedly secondary, concern for the serious scholar, who uses Chinese texts as a window on a relatively early stratum of original Indian texts that were either lost or greatly changed subsequent to their translation. But if a knowledge of Chinese is secondary, then a knowledge of Japanese is clearly tertiary, for until modern times no Indian texts were translated directly into that language. Thus, de Jong contends, very few Western scholars of Buddhism can read Japanese, and very few have been able to make much use of the great wealth of Japanese secondary scholarship in the field. He goes on to note that Western Sinologists have recognized the importance of Japanese scholarship, and argues that "it is undoubtedly necessary for Western Buddhist scholars to follow the example of the Sinologists."ll


The· irony of these remarks concerning the dearth of Western scholars proficient in Japanese is that they are true only if the image of the scholar of Buddhism as a philologist concerned primarily with the exegesis of Indian texts is held to be definitive. The most outstanding example of a scholar who did not fit that mold is Paul Demieville (1894-1979), whom de Jong himself rightly named in his 1974 article as the leading figure in the field of Chinese Buddhist studies. Demieville's long list of publications shows clearly that his interest in Chinese Buddhism extended far beyond texts and issues that were pertinent to the study of Indian Buddhism, although he excelled in that line of multilingual, cross-cultural research as well. As editor-in-chief of the Hobogirin, an encyclopedic dictionary of Buddhism based on Chinese and Japanese sources which was arranged in order of Japanese pronunciation and published in Japan, Demieville not only recognized the value of Japanese scholarship, but took the lead in making its findings more widely accessible to researchers in the West. Moreover, Demieville's study of Chinese Buddhist texts was not restricted to matters of Buddhist philosophy, but took into account the broader context of Chinese literature and culture. It is fitting that a translation of an essay by Demieville, "Le miroir spirituel,"12 should be included as the first chapter in Sudden and Gradual, for in many ways his work is exemplary of the type of broadly Sinological approach to Buddhist studies that editor Gregory envisions.

By the 1970s, there were also a number of other established European and American scholars, such as Hubert Durt, Philip Yampolsky, Leon Hurvitz, and Stanley Weinstein, who had spent years studying in Japan, were fluent in Japanese, and were in fact making extensive use of Japanese Buddhist scholarship in their

. studies of East Asian Buddhism. The ranks of such specialists have been swelled since the mid-1970s by many younger scholars who have also come into their own, not by the route that de J ong describes, but by first learning Chinese and Japanese, and then (depending on individual research interests) perhaps studying enough Sanskrit to investigate the Indian precedents of ideas found in Chinese Buddhist texts. East Asian Buddhist studies, conceived as a more or less

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independent field, has thus expanded in the vVest (and particularly in North America) to the point where it has a following roughly eqUal in numbers to Indian Buddhist studies. Simila~ developments, it may be noted, have been taking place in the fields of Tibetan and Southeast Asian Buddhism, where an increasing number of younger scholars are treating those traditions as worthy of study in their OWn

right, and not merely as reflections of Indian Buddhism. This is not the place for a comprehensive survey of recent

Western scholarship in East Asian Buddhist studies, but I shall make some general observations about the sorts of topics that have been addressed in the Kuroda Institute series, and the kinds of approaches that authors represented in the series have taken.

In the first place, it may be noted that despite Demieville's example of a Buddhology with strong Sinological (or, by analogy, Japanological) underpinnings, East Asian Buddhist studies in North America has tended to travel along avenues laid out and paved by Japanese scholarship. Buddhist studies in Japan is a thriving and. diverse field, but in general it is divided along lines that are similar to those described above, with Indian and Tibetan Buddhism forming one main branch and East Asian Buddhism another. The former branch, which from the Japanese perspective deals with types of Buddhism that are relatively alien culturally and linguistically, gotits start in the last decades of the nineteenth century, following the Meiji Restoration, and has from the beginning been strongly influenced by the European philological modeL Not only were the methods of late nineteenth and early twentieth century European scholarship adopted, but many of the attitudes as well. Even today it is not uncommon to hear Japanese Indologists remark that it is impossible to study "genuine" (meaning "original") Buddhism without a knowledge of Pali and Sanskrit. This branch of Japanese Buddhist studies tends to look down on the academic study of Chinese and native Japanese Buddhism as peripheral and less rigorous, although a great many of the scholars involved in all aspects of the field are themselves closely affiliated (often by birth into temple families) with one or another of the major Japanese Buddhist denominations, and may dabble on the side in the history or thought of their particular schooL The


ambivalence and reticence evinced by many Japanese Indologists and Tibetologists toward the study of their native Buddhist traditions is a product of divided filial loyalties -toward the first generation ofJapanese scholars in the field and their European teachers on the one hand, and'toward temple priest fathers and bill-paying parishioners on the other. The very proximity and familiarity of the native Buddhist traditions also breeds a certain contempt among Japanese scholars, but the personal and political risks involved mitigate against bringing innovative, critical methods of scholarship to bear too close to home. Ancient Indian Buddhism is not only "genuine," it is relatively safe to treat in an objective manner. Needless to say, it is the other, East Asian branch of Japanese Buddhist studies that has served as an inspiration and model for scholars studying Chinese and Japanese Buddhism in the West. This branch is much older and much less influenced by Western critical methods, having developed over the centuries within the context of the Japanese Buddhist tradition itself. The leading academic research centers for each of the historically important schools (shU) of Japanese Buddhism, such as Zen, J6do, J6do Shin, Nichiren, Tendai, and Shingon, are universities and institutes run by Buddhist denominations which define themselves as legitimate spiritual heirs to the schools in question. Many of the faculty and research staff are members of the denomination's clergy. Research tends to focus on the history of the parent school (understood as a spiritual lineage), with a great emphasis on the lives and teachings of founders and other revered ancestral teachers. When attention is directed to Chinese Buddhism, it is often in the context of tracing a lineage back to Chinese ancestors, or establishing the orthodoxy of doctrines and practices by elucidating the Chinese precedents for them. Schools of Chinese Buddhism that are regarded as largely defunct (having few or no living spiritual, doctrinal, or institutional heirs in Japan) receive relatively little attention, although the freedom to treat them critically is correspondingly greater. Because Japanese scholars of Chinese Buddhism tend to focus narrowly on particular Buddhist schools and patriarchs, most of them would not be regarded by Western standards as true Sinologists. Indeed, although they can read classical Chinese (kanbun) with great


facility in the traditional Japanese manner of grammatical restructuring cum transliteration (yomikudashl) , very few can speak modern Chinese. The East Asian Buddhist scholarship that goes on in the denominational universities and research centers in Japan generally meets high standards of objective verification and intellectual honesty, and it is unsurpassed in its thorough marshaling and

. utilization of historically pertinent textual sources. It is constrained, nevertheless, by the fact that it is part of a normative tradition. Much of the work produced can aptly be described as having a theological dimension (more on this term below).

The influence of Japanese scholarship on East Asian Buddhist studies in the West is evident in the considerable concern with the history of schools, founders, patriarchs, and lineages that is evinced in the first five volumes in the Kuroda Institute series. Although Western scholars do not have the same vested interests as the Japanese and are generally more willing to take critical, even, revisionist approaches in their research, the fact remains that the basic topics and problems addressed are often ones that have been defined by denominational interests in Japan. Moreover, the original textual sources that Western scholars consult are frequently ones that Japanese scholars have already discovered and/or identified as relevant to the topic. Often they are texts that have also been edited, annotated, and translated into modem Japanese.

Considering that the field of East Asian Buddhist studies in the West is still young, it is perhaps appropriate that it should have undergone a period of apprenticeship to Japanese scholarship and only now be starting to articulate its own unique set of interests. That a movement toward greater independence from Japanese scholarship is under way is clear from the first five volumes in the Kuroda Institute series. There is a growing awareness that reliance on Japanese scholarship, while it has been invaIuable in establishing East Asian Buddhism as a legitimate field of study, has had the unfortunate side effect of isolating the field from Sinology and Japanology on the one hand, and from the mainstream of religious studies on the other.

That isolation is felt all the more keenly because the leading


Japanese specialists in East Asian Buddhism generally do not read (or if they do read, do not respond to) the work that appears in publications such as the Kuroda Institute series. Pa~ of t.he problem is· simply that they are not accustomed to readmg m Western languages at all, and very little Western scholarship on Buddhism is ever translated into Japanese. (An interesting exception is Demieville' s "Le miroir spirituel," which appeared in Japanese translation in Zengaku kenkyii in 1960.13) Japanese Indologists and Tibetologists, conversely, have long made good use of publications in German, French, and English, while occasionally grumbling about the infrequency with which their own work is recognized abroad.

In any case, the sense of isolation felt by some Western scholars of East Asian Buddhism is reflected both in the desire to be part of the Sinological mainstream, and in attempts to address issues in the comparative study of religion. We have already seen how the book under review, Sudden and Gradual, exemplifies the former tendency. A movement toward the comparative approach is evident in the organization of the fourth volume in the Kuroda Institute series, entitled Traditions of Meditation in Chinese Buddhism (also edited by Peter Gregory). That volume treats various Buddhist systems of "meditation," which (as is acknowledged in the volume itself) is a Western category-one that has been abstracted from its original historical context to serve as a basis for comparative study in the field known as "history of religions." Similarly, volume six of the Kuroda Institute series, Buddhist Hermeneutics (edited by Donald Lopez), uses a category that derives from the Judeo-Christian exegetical tradition as a device for focusing attention on more or less compatible strategies of scriptural interpretation that were formulated in a number of different Buddhist schools. Neither the volume on meditation nor the one on hermeneutics include articles by scholars from outside the field of Buddhist studies, or articles that treat religions other than Buddhism in any depth, but both volumes do lay

. the groundwork for broader comparative study. Buddhist Hermeneutics, moreover, cuts across cultural if not religious boundaries, for it includes contributions from scholars in many regional and linguistic branches of Buddhist studies. The same is true of the most

110 HABS VOL. 16 NO.1

recent volume in the series, Paths to Liberation: The Marga and its Transformations in Buddhist Thought (edited by Robert F. Buswell, Ir. and Robert M. Gimello). That a series origi~ally dedicated to East Asian Buddhism should open itself up in this way is also indicative of the fact that the East Asian branch of Buddhist studies is sufficiently established for its members to reach out to and identify with the field as a whole.

Buddhology and Buddhist Theology

In the preceding pages I have occasionally used the tem Buddhology to refer to the academic study of Buddhism, and the tem Buddhologist to refer to specialists in that study. These neologisms have entered the vocabulary of scholars both inside and outside the field, but they are plagued with certain ambiguities and connotations that render them distastefulto insiders, who generally prefer to speak: of "Buddhist studies" and "scholars of Buddhism." The issue at stake behind this seemingly trivial semantic distinction is the sensitive one of belief and objectivity. But what exactly is the definitional problem, and how might it be resolved?

In one modern dictionary, Buddhology is defined as "the study of Buddha and of the nature and various forms of Buddhahood."14 Buddhology in this definition is clearly conceived as the Buddhist counterpart of Western theology, with Buddha and Buctdhahood replacing God and the divine as objects of study. Western theology can be characterized as a normative discipline which posits certain truths about the existence and nature of God and the divine as axiomatic and then proceeds to elaborate and systematize them using rational arguments and conventions of evidence and proof. Given this understanding of theology, it is not difficult to find rough parallels in the vast literature of the Buddhist tradition. Indeed, there are numerous texts in which the truths of enlightenment (bodhl) and the existence of enlightened beings (buddhas) and beings on the way to

Buddhahood (bodhisattvas) are accepted as articles of faith and subjected to various more or less systematic interpretations which draw out their meaning and implications for the religious life. In this


sense, for example, one could speak of the Buddhology of the Lotus Sutra, which contains a polemical reinterpretation of Buddhahood and the path that leads to it. Similarly, the medieval Chinese Buddhist debates over the nature of enlightenment that revolved around the complex terms "sudden" and "gradual" could be viewed as prime exaIIlples of Buddhological polemics, since the one thing taken for granted by all parties to such debates was the truth and value of enlightenment itself (however it was interpreted).

This understanding of Buddhology as a sort of Buddhist theology has gained some acceptance, but it is precisely the association with theology that makes many contemporary scholars of Buddhism eschew the term as a description of their own work. Of the ten chapters that comprise the volume under review, eight focus directly or indirectly on various Chinese Buddhist interpretations of enlightenment as "sudden" and! or "gradual." The authors of these chapters, however, all adopt a scrupulously historical, descriptive stance, and strive to avoid taking the sort of normative or apologetic positions . that are characteristic of theology. To be sure, they report on Chinese Buddhist beliefs in enlightenment and attempt to explain the inner logic of Chinese Buddhist theories about the nature of enlightenment. But their own scholarship (formally, at least) is not grounded in any particular beliefs about the nature or value of enlightenment, nor is it (theoretically speaking) concerned· with judging the truth or falsehood of Buddhist doctrines according to any ultimate criteria.

Nevertheless, the fact remains that these scholars and various others who have published essays in other anthologies in the Kuroda Institute Buddhism series, whether they like the appellation or not, are often called Buddhologists. Thus, if we were to accept the foregoing dictionary definition of Buddhology as a sort of Buddhist theology, we would have to describe contemporary Western Buddhologists as scholars who take the Buddhology of other, historical persons and texts as the object of study, but do not (intentionally, at least) engage in Buddhology themselves. But such a description is clearly too convoluted and confusing to serve any useful purpose.

The solution I propose is simply to refer to Buddhist treatments

112 . nABS VOL. 16 NO. 1

of enlightenment (bodhl), enlightened beings (buddhas), the path to enlightenment (marga), and so on, as Buddhist theology - understanding theology broadly as the study of div~ne things or religious truth as it is carried on within a normative tradition. This will allow us to reserve the. term Buddhology for the "objective" (nonnormative) study of Buddhism, including the history and present state of its social organizations, practices, literature, and systems of philosophy and theolo gy. The scholars now called B uddholo gists are, for the most part, actually engaged in this latter kind of study. Most, I believe, would be willing to accept my definition ofBuddhology as broadly descriptive of their own field of research.

Of course, when it comes to the professional credentials that count the most-those that establish a person's position in an academic department and in the humanities or social sciences in general-some scholars who work on Buddhism prefer to be identitied primarily by the disciplines (anthropology, history of religions, etc.) to which they adhere, and only secondarily as experts on a particular object of study. This is an attitude shared, no doubt, by many Asianists who accept the particular "area studies" and "-ologist" labels that apply to them when in congenial surroundings such as meetings of the Association for Asian Studies, but prefer to wear a disciplinary hat to the office.

Ambivalence about the terms Buddhology and Buddhologist is especially strong among scholars in the field of East Asian Buddhist studies, for several reasons. In the first place, it is a fact that quite a few (certainly not all) of the younger generation of scholars now active in academia have at one time or another, either in Asia or North America, participated in the life of Buddhist monastic andlor lay communities. Such intimate involvement tends to raise the level of intensity in the debate over belief and objectivity, although again there is a double standard at play. An academic conference held at the Zen Center of Los Angeles, for example, will strike many scholars of religion as more "suspect" in its objectivity than one held on the same topic at the University of Notre Dame. Secondly, there is the legacy ofD. T. Suzuki (1870-1966), who for more than half a century worked to win respect in the West for Mahayana Buddhism in


general, -and the Zen (Ch' an) tradition in particular. Many of today' s academic specialists would frankly admit that they were first attracted to Buddhism by Suzuki's writings, and would credit Suzuki with sowing the seeds that eventually grew into today's field of East Asian Buddhist studies; it is no accident that the study of Zen now holds such a prominent place within that field. However, it. must also ~be conceded that Suzuki, while unquestionably a great scholar, was essentially a Buddhist missionary and theologian who tirelessly preached the truth of the experience of enlightenment (satan) and . interpreted it in a way that he felt was best suited to his Western audience. Western scholars, to be sure, no longer rely on Suzuki's English writings. Indeed, it was at the point when scholars started to go beyond Suzuki, to investigate the primary and secondary Chinese and Japanese sources that he used, and to reach their own conc1u

.' sions, that East Asian Buddhist studies in the West really began to come of age. But elements of theology, whether overt or subtle, are • also common and accepted in the Japanese language scholarship on East Asian Buddhism upon which Western scholars relied in taking ~this step. Difficulties have sometimes arisen when the topics ad-dressed and the conclusions reached in Japanese Buddhist theology are carried over into ostensibly critical Western scholarship without being recognized and tagged as coming from a normative tradition. For example, the Zen Buddhist claim that "enlightenment" is an ineffable something that lies beyond the grasp of intellectual conceptualization and analysis is often repeated uncritically by scholars, despite the boldly self-contradictory (not to mention selfserving) nature of this sort of apophatic religious rhetoric. Such normative elements have great appeal: they are what make many books on Zen, even those that are rather academic in style, popular. Nevertheless, their presence violates a different set of norms - those

. of critical scholarship - and leaves Buddhologists open to attack or

... condescending dismissal by critics from other disciplines. In the pages that follow, I treat each of the chapters in the volume

. under review separately, discussing them in light of the main issues raised above: the development. of East Asian Buddhist studies in North America and the influence of European and Japanese scholar-

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ship on it; the nascent movement in the field toward broader cultural_ historical and comparative approaches; and the corresponding need for greater sensitivity to methodological issu~s such as the problem of definition and the relation between critical Buddhology and Buddhist theology.

Reviews of Individual Chapters in Sudden and Gradual: Approaches to Enlightenment in Chinese Thought

"The Mirror of the Mind," by Paul Demieville

Demieville's "Le miroir spirituel," translated under the title"The Mirror of the Mind," is the first chapter in Part I "The Sudden and Gradual Debates." The debates referred to in this heading, presumably, are (1) the controversy that took place in mid-eighth century China between the competing Ch' an schools of Shen-hsiu and Shenhui (who claimed that his teacher Hui-neng was the true sixth patriarch in the lineage of Bodhidharma), and (2) the controversy at the so-called "Council of Lhasa" in Tibet in the late eighth century, which is supposed to have pitted the Ch'an monk Mo-ho-yen against the Indian monk Kamalasila. However, only the lengthy essay by G6mez, which comprises the third and final chapter of Part I, actually focuses in any detail on the intellectual history of these two debates. Demieville's point of departure, it is true, is the famous story in the Platform Siitra about the verses written by Shen-hsiu and Hui-neng in their competition to become the successor of the fifth patriarch, Hung-jen. But Demieville is not terribly concerned with the history of the polemical dispute that is reflected in that story, nor does he trouble himself with a detailed investigation of the doctrinal meaning of the verses, which he airily declares is "clear" (it is anything but, as G6mez demonstrates). Are we to infer from this that Demieville was a poor intellectual historian or a sloppy philologist? No, because as I indicated above, his project in this essay is not to investigate the lexical meanings of the Chinese terms tun and chien, but rather to formulate a typology for use in the comparative study of philosophy and religion. That Demieville' s definition of the polarity is stipulative


and not lexical is apparent from the fact that he contemplates alternative names for his proposed typology - "perfectivism" vs. imperfectivism" and "totalism" vs. "evolutionism" - before settling on "subitism" and "gradualism." It is clear from these alternatives that finding an accurate translation for tun and chien is not a criterion, and that Demieville' s choice of terms is essentially

arbitrary. _ As is generally the case with stipulative definitions, Demieville

presents his subitismigradualism typology near the beginning of his essay, and then proceeds (in what he terms a "vagabond inquiry") to apply it to a wide variety of test cases drawn from all of the world's major religious traditions. (Lexical definitions, conversely, are typically formulated by way of conclusion to a historical-philological study). The typology is actually a complex, multi-dimensional one, comprised not of one polarity but a constellation of polarities that Demieville lays out in sequence. In explaining the typology here, it will suffice to list the qualities that Demieville lines up on the subitist side of the ledger, only naming the opposite pole occasionally. The subitist position holds that: 15 the seeing of the absolute in ourselves occurs "suddenly" and unexpectedly, outside all temporal conditions, causal or otherwise; the absolute is seen as a totality, "all at once"; seeing the absolute is intuitive, not analytic; it comes about in a revolutionary manner; any active effort to see the absolute is repudiated; aspiration is solely for a passive experience of the absolute; (in the Christian context) it comes via grace, not exertion (p. 31); (in Platonism) it is sufficient to resort to a wholly negative effort, a purging of the passions (p. 30); the absolute is innate and fundamental, but it is necessary to remove the veils of delusion which obscure it.

Although stipulative definitions often serve to remove the ambiguities inherent in ordinary language, Demieville' s definition of the subitist position seems to contain at least one rather obvious inconsistency. On the one hand, he holds that subitism repudiates all effort at religious cultivation, while on the other he says that the subitist position allows for or even makes a requirement of the "negative" effort of purifying the mind. This inconsistency would

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amount to a self-defeating contradiction if he were trying to establish· a sudden/gradual dichotomy. But his subsequent application of the typology makes it clear that he is concerned r,ather with formulating a cluster of polarities, each of which admits to varying degrees of subitism or gradualism. Thus, if I read him correctly, Demieville would want to say that although the most extreme subitist position is to repudiate all effort, to make a "negative" effort is still closer to the subitist pole, relatively speaking, than to make a positive effort which seeks to develop moral qualities, intellectual knowledge, or skill in meditative exercises. Actually, if Demieville had been concerned with formulating a strict dichotomy, even the elimination of the obvious inconsistency indicated above would not save him from logical contradiction, because the most extreme subitist position already contains an element of gradualism (as he defines those terms). That is, to repudiate action is itself a kind of action, and to hold an aspiration for even a completely passive experience is itself a kind of seeking. In the final analysis, to maintain any sort of attitude or position whatsoever vis-a.-vis the absolute, including one that is resolutely apophatic, or even to remain purposefully silent, is to be something of a gradualist.

Indeed, the logic of Demieville's typology is such that no historical examples of an absolutely thoroughgoing subitistic philosophy or religious stance could possibly be found: pure subitists leave no traces. This, we shall see, is treated as a problem by Gomez but it is not really a problem for Demieville, because his stipulative typology is not based on (and cannot be challenged by) historical evidence of any sort. A stipulative typology can serve as a fruitful heuristic device even if, from the historical perspective, it turns out to be a null set. Moreover, it can serve as a tool for comparative study even if all of the historical phenomena investigated tum out to have inductable dissimilarities. In short, it can remain an ideal type, forever hypothetical, and still serve its intended function. Viewed in this light, the refutations elicited from Stein and Gomez, and indeed the very existence of the Sudden and Gradual volume, are testimonies to the success of Demieville's typology.

This is not to say that Demieville's essay is entirely free from


problems. Early on, having just presented his definition of subitism and gradualism, he apparently loses sight of his own project momentarily when he states that

in the eighth century in particular, all Chinese philosophy centered around the Buddhist controversy over "subitism" and "gradualism"; we can even say that this debate epitomized, though the nomenclature varied, certain themes characteristic of Chinese thought over the centuries.(p. 17)

To make such a claim, of course, is to enter into the historical and philological arena, and to open oneself up to challenge on the basis of concrete textual evidence. The issue raised, of course, is precisely the one that editor Gregory identifies as the unifying theme of the book. But as soon as Demieville makes the claim, he changes the subject, explaining that

it is not this doctrinal question that I propose to examine here in its breadth. I would like to limit myself to commenting on the metaphor of the mirror as it occurs in the verses of the Platform SUtra, and to exploring its Chinese and Buddhist antecedents, as well as parallels outside Asia. (p. 17)

With this, Demieville gets back on track with his comparative enterprise, for the "antecedents" and "parallels" he refers to are basically phenomena identified on the basis of typological similarity rather than historical connection. Demieville's approach in the remaind,er of the essay is to adduce examples, culled more or less at random from different religious and philosophical traditions, of the use of a mirror as a metaphor for the human mind. Naturally, the metaphors cited work in many different ways, but there are some frequently recurring themes, such as the equation of dust or tarnish on the surface of a mirror with delusions or disturbances that obscure the essential purity of the mind or prevent the mind from reflecting things as they are. Demieville takes this diverse data and applies his typology to it as a framework for cross-cultural comparison. Thus,

118 . nABS VOL. 16 NO.1

he points out ways in which each of the metaphors represents a more or less subitistic or gradualistic position.

Because Demieville's framework is extemal to the data Compared, he can take this approach without regard for the questicinof whether or not the various philosophers and theologians he cites actually used a terminology or conceptual scheme directly translatable as "sudden" and "gradual." A similar approach is taken by structural anthropologists, Marxist fu"1d Freudian historians, and indeed scholars in any discipline that attempts the universal application of a theoretical framework which has been formulated by stipulative definition.

The assumption is often made, of course, that the forces or patterns discovered in a particular culture, individual, or historiCal situation under investigation really exist "out there" in the object of study, and not merely in the imagination of the investigator. In the physical sciences, the ultimate test of such claims is the ability to predict (or manipulate predictably) the behavior of measurable phenomena. Epistemological problems take a back seat to pragmatic results (except, perhaps, at the cutting edge of theoretical physics, astronomy, and so on). It is more difficult to test the explanatory value of theoretical frameworks in the social sciences, where controlled experiments are harder to set up, and the gathering of data is often indistinguishable from the interpretation of data (so that the "facts" are the product of the theories they are supposed to test). When we come to the comparative study of religion and philosophy, which is greatly influenced by the social scientific method, the epistemological problems are even more acute and the recourse to quasi-scientific testing of theories against data is even more dubious.

Thus, defining it as loosely as he does, Demieville has no trouble finding examples of subitism (in varying degrees) all over the world. But do these examples constitute data that proves the usefulness of his typology for explaining or predicting religious ideas? Obviously not, because of the circularity of the method, which amounts to a kind self-fulfilling prophecy, and does not permit objective testing. As I noted above, I do not think Demieville would claim anything more . than heuristic value for his typology, at least with respect to religions


outside of China. But if and when the comparativist does assert that the patterns or tendencies he or she discovers in the world's religious thought really exist "out there," or does claim that the theoretical framework employed has positive explanatory and predictive power and not merely an aesthetically pleasing form, on what objective basis might these claims be tested? It is at this point, I would argue, that we are inevitably drawn outside the circle of the comparative project with its stipulative definitions and artificial universal categories. It is at this point that we are forced to ask the historical question: did the people whose ideas and beliefs we are studying really make explicit, demonstrable use of the categories of thought that we, from our lofty (and thus superficial) comparative vantage point, would be inclined to attribute to them?

Actually, even if the comparativist carefully disclaims any historical validity for his or her typology (we have seen that Demieville makes just such a disclaimer), there is no avoiding this tum toward historical investigation. In the final analysis, to say that a comparative project has heuristic value is precisely to affirm that it raises interesting historical questions, and lends focus and excitement to concrete historical research. In the real world of academic religious studies, neither the comparative-typological nor the historical-philological method ever stands alone: we are constantly moving back and forth between them. Such a turnabout in approach is immediately evident in the volume under review, for the second chapter in Part I, by R.A. Stein, is a narrowly philological study_

"Sudden Illumination or Simultaneous Comprehension: Remarks on Chinese and Tibetan Terminology," by R.A. Stein

In this chapter, Stein investigates the precise semantic range of the Chinese and Tibetan words that Demieville translates as "sudden" (subit). He demonstrates that the Tibetan term cig-char, which is used at times to translate the term tun in Chinese Buddhist texts, always means something closer to "simultaneous" (simultanej than "sudden." From this he infers that the Chinese tun is ambiguous,

120 .JIABS VOL. 16 NO.1

sometimes meaning "sudden" and sometimes meaning "simulta_ neous." He. argues that when tun means "sudden," as in the expression i-shih tun, it is translated by th~ Tibetan skad-cig (::: Sanskrit ekak$aIJ.a "in one moment") . Stein was inspired to write the article, he says, by Demieville's "inadequate" translation of tun in a Chinese text which purports to record the Ch' an controversy in Tibet (p. 50). While disclaiming any expertise in Chinese Buddhist philosophy, he implies that the lexical ambiguity of the term tun, which Demieville was apparently unaware of, undermines the latter's. discussion of the subitistlgradualist polarity. Stein's philological observations are pertinent. to the historical study of the sudden and gradual debates, of course, but to the extent that they are intended to be a criticism of Demieville's treatment of subitism in "Le miroir spirituel," they miss the mark. Demieville's stipulative definition of subitism actually includes the sense of simultaneity, and in any case is in principle immune from challenge on lexical grounds.

"Purifying Gold: The Metaphor of Effort and Intuition in Buddhist Thought and Practice," by Luis O. Gomez

This chapter, the third and final one of Part I, is basically a sustained response to the piece by Demieville. Gomez challenges the latter's "facile comparisons" by demonstrating the great diversity of the "two separate polemical contexts" (Shen-hui's attacks on "Northern" Ch'an, and the so-called "Council of Lhasa") and "three distinct cultural milieux" (India, China, and Tibet) in which the sudden! gradual controversies took place. Gomez takes as his point of departure "the hypothesis that there is a complex of doctrines and images, similarity among which points to a discrete religious and intellectual phenomenon that may be adequately described as the sudden-gradual dichotomy or polarity" (p. 68). His project, in brief, is to refute the hypothesis by showing that the actual historical controversies were too complex, and the meaning of the superficially similar metaphors that were used too diverse, to be adequately described by the sudden! gradual polarity as Demieville defines it. Gomez brings to bear an impressive array of historical and philologi-


cal evidence in proving his point, which is that "whenever we let the texts speak for themselves we see how inaccurate are the categories of polemicists and scholars alike-'quietism,' 'gradualism,' 'subitism,' 'pure calm'" (p. 111).

Gomez's criticism of Demieville is devastating if one accepts his assumption that the latter's project was to accurately describe a discrete historical phenomenon. If, however, one views Demieville' s typology as a stipulative definition, then Gomez's criticism appears to be tilting at windmills. Gomez himself starts with what is basically a stipulative "preliminary definition" of the sudden! gradual polarity, borrowed from Demieville. The fact that the definition ultimately proves inadequate to describe the religious and intellectual phenomena that he treats does not detract from its usefulness as a heuristic device.

Although he does not address the methodological issues directly, 'Gomez comes across in this chapter as an opponent of the comparative approach. The high degree of specialization required to master the linguistic and philosophical subtleties of any single religious tradition, he suggests, dooms the broad comparativist to superficiality. Gomez's conclusions, which gain force from the very breadth and complexity of the evidence he adduces, lead one to a rather pessimistic conclusion about the feasibility of establishing a common ground for meaningful dialogue between Buddhologists and scholars in other fields. This is ironic, given the stated aspirations of the book, and Gomez's own fundamental sympathy with the search for universals in human thought and religious life.

"Tao-sheng's Theory of Sudden Enlightenment Re-examined," by Whalen Lai

This is the first chapter in Part II, "Sudden and Gradual Enlightenment in Chinese Buddhism." As Lai notes in his introductory remarks, a number of scholars have held that "the theory of sudden enlightenment-one of the main features of the Southern school of Ch' an-was first proposed by Tao-sheng (c. 360-434), who is also remembered for asserting the doctrine of a universal Buddha-


nature" (p. 169), Lai sets out to reconstruct the development of Taosheng's "subitisrn," noting among other things the influence upon Tao-sheng's thought of ideas deriving from the ~inayana Abhidhanna and the Neo-Taoist philosophy of dark learning (hsuan-hsueh). He also stresses the point that Tao-sheng's earlier formulations of the theory of sudden enlightenment were unrelated to the doctrine of innate Buddha nature, which he only came to espouse toward the end of his career.

For the reader who comes to this chapter with Stein's and G6mez's philological studies fresh in mind, the blithe manner in which Lai speaks of "the" (singular) theory of sudden enlightenment in Chinese thought cannot help but seem naive and overly simplistic. Lai apparently shares G6mez's assumption that Demieville's typology was intended to describe an actual historical phenomenon, but unlike G6mez he raises no questions about the accuracy or appropriateness of its application to the historical data. The result is a confusing conflation of unrelated philosophical issues under the hazy rubric of the sudden/gradual debate. At one point Lai describes Taosheng's mature subitism as the view that enlightenment cannot occur piecemeal or in stages, since the principle (Ii) to which one awakens allows no variance (i.e., it can only be grasped all-at-once or not at all); this he traces back to the Neo-Taoist Wang-pi's concept of the oneness of principle. Elsewhere Lai describes Tao-sheng's subitism as growing out of the theory that all karmic retribution, even the reward for good deeds, is transcended in a sudden leap which occurs at the end of a nine-stage path of liberation; this he traces back to a "Hinayana detour" that Tao-sheng supposedly took by studying the Abhidharma-hrdaya under Hui-yuan (344-416). Finally, Lai identifies Tao-sheng's subitism with the doctrine of "one vehicle" found in the Lotus Sutra, and labels the opposing "three vehicles" position "gradualism." The problem is that three completely different notions of "sudden" are operative here. The three are brought together, perhaps, in Demieville's typology, but that essentially arbitrary association is construed by Lai as a historical connection. In other words, Lai assumes that Tao-sheng formulated a single, multivalent theory of sudden enlightenment by drawing on the aforementioned


:sources and finally, at the end of his career, tied it together with the 'doctrine of innate Buddhahood drawn from the Nirva1J.a Siltra. . This historical scenario appears all the more dubious when one realizes that most of what Lai says about Tao-sheng's purported

i.subitism derives from sources other than Tao-sheng's own writings. 'As Lai himself states,

nothing containing a sustained argument for subitism has been preserved in Tao-sheng' s writings. We have only his allusions to it and recollections by others. (p. 173)

.Jndeed, so much of what we know about Tao-sheng' s thought comes to us via the claims of later biographers and polemicists that even: the association of Tao-sheng' s name with a theory of sudden enlighten'ment could be nothing more than the work of later proponents of a ;subitist position who were seeking a suitably prestigious "founder" . for their doctrine.

The connection that Lai draws between Tao-sheng' s thought and Neo-Taoism is one of the few instances in Part II where Buddhist

} ideas are placed in the broader context of Chinese intellectual history. Unfortunately, the connection rests on little more than the fact that

STa·o-sheng's biographical notice in Hui-chiao's Kao-seng-chuan . ·(Biographies of Eminent Monks) describes his approach to interpret·jng Buddhist siltras by using a metaphor that also appears in a work ;,by Wang-pi, and derives from the Chuang-tzu: "having caught the . fish, one can forget the trap." The use of such a stock image, however, . tells us little mote than that Tao-sheng's biographer Hui-chiao was

.aliterate Chinese. As the essay by Gomez demonstrates, superficially similar metaphors can often be shown to convey different meanings

. when one takes specific historical contexts into account and examines the deeper structures of the arguments employed. Lai further argues that "in his actions as well, Tao-sheng exemplified the freedo!ll of spirit associated with Neo-Taoism" because he paid no regard to certain Buddhist precepts such as not sitting on high seats and not eating after midday (p. 171). But the association of such behavior with Neo-Taoism is gratuitous. Often in the history of


Chinese Buddhism there were monks who ignored or adapted rules of conduct found in the Indian Vinaya texts; it would be absurd to assume that they were all motivated by the spirit of Neo-Taoism. Many, such as the Vinaya master Tao-hsuan (596-667), were essentially conservative reformers.

"Sudden and Gradual Intimately Conjoined: Chih-i's T'ien-t'ai View," by Neal Donner

Donner's project in this second chapter of Part II is to elucidate Chih-i's (538-597) use of the concepts sudden and gradual "in the context of his thought on teaching and practice." Because, as we learn in this essay, Chih-i's entire corpus can be characterized as emphasizing the combined pursuit of doctrinal studies (the "gate of teachings" chiao-men) and the practice of meditation (the "gate of contemplation" kuan-men), the context that the author chooses to work with is really Chih-i's thought in its entirety.16 Undaunted by the voluminous, architectonic nature of Chih-i's major works and Chih-i's penchant for creating numerous complex systems of categorization, Donner manages to summarize the T'ien-t' ai master's thought in a manner that is at once comprehensive, coherent and insightful. Indeed, quite apart from the technical issue ofChih-i's use of the terms sudden and gradual, this chapter stands as a good general introduction to T'ien-t'ai Buddhism.

Donner deals with the question of the meaning of the terms sudden and gradual in Chih-i's thought as a straightforward problem of lexical definition. In other words, he sets aside all preconceived notions such as Demieville's typology and simply investigates the meanings of the terms in the context of Chih-i's writings. This procedure reveals that Chili-i's use of the terms revolved around a completely different set of issues than those treated earlier by Taosheng or those raised later in the two "debates" involving monks associated with the Ch' an school. Indeed, as Donner cautiously notes, "the word tun, which we are accustomed to translating as 'sudden,' is not, so far as I have found, applied adjectivally by Chih-i to the word WU, which we usually translate as 'enlightenment'" (p. 220).


Rather, Chih-i used the terms sudden and gradual to distinguish types . of teaching and types of meditative practice.

In a nutshell, the "sudden teaching" for Chih-i (represented by the A vatazpsaka-siitra) was the doctrine first preached by the Buddha after his enlightenment, without the use of any expedient devices (upaya, fang-pien) or concessions to the capacities of the individuals in his audience. The "gradual teachings" for Chih-i included the entire collection of siitras expounded subsequently by the Buddha, all. of which were said to have made some use of expedients. Donner makes the point that for Chih-i, "sudden" was not a term of unqualified approbation, since a balance between sudden and gradual elements (i.e., a direct presentation of the highest truth coupled with the use of expedients), which Chih-i believed existed in the Lotus Siitra, made for a more successful teaching. Furthermore, a purely sudden teaching, as Chih-i conceived of it, would be free from all signification and hence would not be a teaching at all: "a perfect teaching that is completely unadulterated with the provisional, or upaya, cannot even be spoken" (p. 218). Sudden (or, more accurately, "perfect and sudden") meditation in Chih-i's scheme of things is any contemplative exercise in which the object of meditation (that upon which the mind is focused) is ultimate reality itself, understood as the emptiness of all dharmas. "Gradual" meditation, by way of contrast, .involves fixing the mind on traditional ("Hinayanistic") objects such as the constituent elements of the body, the breathing, a circle on the ground, or various doctrinal formulae. Here again, Donner makes the point that since ultimate reality for Chih-i has no signs or features (hsiang) on which the mind might be fixed, a truly "perfect and sudden" meditation would not be meditation at all. As long as "ultimate reality" is made into an object of meditation, there is a gradual element. In short, in both doctrinal study and the practice of meditation, there was no question of completely abandoning the gradual in favor of the sudden: as Donner's title indicates, in Chihi's view the two were "intimately conjoined."

Donner's article is a good example of the influence that Japanese . scholarship has had on East Asian Buddhology in the West. Like

much of the Japanese work on Chinese Buddhism, Donner focuses


on the "founder" of a lineage, viewing him as a creative genius who was steeped in, and yet gave new impetus and direction to, the Buddhist tradition. There is no attempt to deal with broader issues pertaining to Chinese intellectual history or the comparative study of religion, and little inclination to interpret the founder's thought within its social or political contexts (it is known, for example, that Chih-i and his leading disciples actively competed for imperial patronage). Whether one views these as methodological shortcomings or simply the qualities of a certain style of scholarship that prefers to analyze Buddhist doctrines on their own terms is a matter of opinion. However one feels about its Japanese-style parochialism Donner's article is a finely crafted, engaging piece of work that evinces a mastery of its subject matter. Unlike many other studies that are cast from the same mold, it manages to present Buddhist ideas in a manner that is eminently accessible to the non-specialist.

"Shen-hui and the Teaching of Sudden Enlightenment in Early Ch 'an Buddhism," by John R. McRae

This chapter, the third in Part II, contributes to a debate about the influence oftheCh'an master Shen-hui (684-758) that has been going on for six decades in the modern Japanese field of the history of the Zen (Ch'an) lineage (zenshiishl). As such, it takes for granted considerable background knowledge of the historical and doctrinal issues involved.

The debate in question was initiated by the Chinese scholar Bu Shih, who discovered records of Shen-hui's teachings among the Tun-huang manuscripts and first published his assessment of Shenhui's role in the history of the Ch'an movement in the early 1930s. Hu Shih saw Shen-hui (and the Ch'an movement in general) as the champion of a "practical" Chinese mentality which although it had been temporarily "dazzled and dumbfounded" by Indian Buddhism, recovered its senses and sought emancipation from all "superstitious" beliefs in buddhas, bodhisattvas, magical powers, charms and spells, and from "unintelligible metaphysics" and pedantic scholasticism. 17 According to Hu Shih, the "first battle in the Chinese


; Revolt against the Buddhist conquest" was actually fought in the fifth 'century by Tao-sheng, and "the war-cry was Sudden Enlightenment versus Gradual Attainment."18 This war-cry "was destined in the

'course of a few centuries to sweep 'away all worship and prayer, all 'constant incantation of sutras and dharanis, all alms-giving and merit gathering, and even all practices of dhyana or Zen."19 Final victory inthe battle against the alien religion was gained by Shen-hui, who

"successfully promoted the sudden enlightenment doctrine of his teacher Bui-neng, and thereby put an end to the Indian practice of

"meditation (dhyana). In Bu Shih's view, "this new Chinese Zennism 'of Hui-neng and Shen-hui did riot develop a working methodol~()gy":20the sudden enlightenment doctrine served only to cut attach. rnents to all views and methods, leading by a negative path to ;"intellectual emancipation." With the subsequent emergence of the Ch'an masters Ma-tsu and Lin-chi, however, the Ch'an movement developed a distinctive pedagogical method, which was to force the student to discover the truth through his own efforts by withholding all explicit instructions and giving him nothing but enigmatic sayings, shouts, or blowS.21

McRae remarks that "Bu Shih's basic work on Shen-hui was widely accepted by other authorities, although usually without reference to his largely interpretive scheme" (p. 231). This is only partly true. Bu Shih's larger interpretive scheme, we have seen, 'hinged on the notion of the Chinese mentality and its supposed antipathy to the Buddhist religion. The "authorities" who made use

;;., of Hu Shih's work, with few exceptions (e.g., Jacques Gernet and <Walter Liebenthal), have all been Japanese scholars. Those authori:~.ties, such as D. T. Suzuki, Sekiguchi Shindai, and Yanagida Seizan, ],have in fact embraced Bu Shih's interpretation to the extent that they "view the Ch'an movement as a radical reformation within Chinese i j Buddhism that stripped the religion of its unassimilable foreign ,trappings and outfitted it instead in distinctively Chinese garb. tHowever, Japanese scholars have resisted the anti-Buddhist aspect of \' Hu Shih's theory by insisting that Chinese Ch' an preserved the inner g",spiritual essence of Indian Buddhism (namely, enlightenment) even 7~ as it modified or rejected the external forms.

128 . nABS VOL. 16 NO.1

Suzuki, for example took Hu Shih to task for failing to understand that the enigmatic sayings of the Ch'an masters were profound expressions of "prajfHi-intuition,"22 not merely non-sequiturs calculated (in Hu Shih's view this was a "conscious and rational method") to rebuff students or mock Buddhist philosophizing. Hu Shih, for his part, did not hesitate to point out the "propagandist" (i.e., missionary) dimension of Suzuki's writings on Zen, and to chide him for being a "pious Buddhist" who for that reason "will never understand Chinese Ch' an."23 The exchange between Suzuki and Hu Shih, which· McRae mentions in passing, was at bottom a disagreement between a Buddhist theologian who insisted on the ultimate reality of a transhistorical, ineffable and inconceivable truth (enlightenment), and a skeptical historian who was educated in both the elite Confucian and Western positivist traditions.

Japanese scholars of the history of Zen (Ch'an) have certainly reacted, both favorably and unfavorably, to key aspects ofHu Shih's interpretive scheme, but they have not devoted much thought or research to the ideological or sociological content of the vague "Chinese mentality" that is supposed to have domesticated Indian Buddhism. That issue, of course, is identified by editor Gregory as a central theme of the volume under review, and Bu Shih's rather simplistic and chauvinistic views on the matter certainly cry out for critical reassessment. McRae, however, much like the Japanese, does not pursue the question of the broader context of Chinese thought and culture in any detail.

The issue that McRae is primarily concerned with is one that has . long been central to the Japanese field of Zen studies: the question of the internal developmenfofthe early Zen (Ch'an) school (Zenshii, Ch 'an-tsung). The Chinese word tsung, although commonly translated as "school," may better be rendered as "lineage" in this context. As is well known, one of the ways in which the Ch' an movement in China sought to define and legitimate itself was producing quasigenealogical tables which purported to trace the spiritual "blood lines" or lineage of ancestral teachers through which the Buddha Sakyamuni's dharma (here meaning his enlightened state of mind as opposed to his verbal teachings) had been handed down. Prior to the


discovery of Shen-hui's records and other Tun-huang manuscripts dating from the eighth century which contain conflicting versions of ~the early Ch'an lineage, Japanese Zen historians generally accepted .the version that had been handed down within the Ch'an and Zen schools uncontested since the Sung dynasty (960-1279). That was the account, contained in Sung texts such as the Ching-te ch 'uan-teng Iu (Ching-te Era Record of the Transmission of the Flame), of twentyeight patriarchs in India culminating in Bodhidharma, six patriarchs in China culminating in Hui-neng, and a subsequent branching out

; into the two lineages of Ma-tsu and Shih-t' ou and the so-called Five Houses ofthe late T' ang and Five Dynasties. The study of Tun-huang manuscripts, however, revealed that this traditional version of the

. Jjneage was merely the last in a series of fabrications. To the Japanese this was not only a matter of detached scholarly interest: it threatened the theological foundations of the modern Zen denominations by undermining their traditional claims to transmit the enlightenment of the buddhas and patriarchs.

Hu Shih's theory of Shen-hui's role in the history of the early .Ch' an movement, for example, severed the connection posited in the .traditional lineage between the Fifth Patriarch Hung-jen and the Sixth Patriarch Hui-neng. Both Hung-jen and his disciple Shen-hsiu, in Hu Shih's view, still made use of Indian Buddhist methods of dhyiina, and henGe fell into the "gradual attainment" camp that Hui-neng and Shen-hui repudiated. Hu Shih thus posited a radical· disjunction between the Ch' an of the first five patriarchs and the Southern school . that was championed by Shen-hui, and depicted the new pedagogical methods of Ma-tsu' s Hung-chou school and the later Lin-chi school as developments that grew naturally out of Shen-hui' s "revolution." Sekiguchi Shindai, a Japanese scholar with ties to the Tendai school, went even further than Hu Shih in dismantling the traditional lineage, arguing that the "Southern" lineages of Ma-tsu and Shih-t' ou had merely usurped the name and genealogy of Shen-hui's school while rejecting its teachings. In response to these challenges, scholars associated with the Zen denominations have striven to reconstruct the

.. traditional lineage linking Bodhidharma, Hui-neng and Ma-tsu by modern methods of philology and text criticism. The leading

130 nABS VOL 16 NO. 1

postwar figure in this effort, which has produced some excellent scholarship but nevertheless has an undeniable theological and polemical dimension to it, has been Yanagida Seizan.

McRae enters into this debate by challenging several key aspects of Hu Shih's thesis. For one thing, he brushes aside the notion that the doctrine of sudden enlightenment originated with Tao-sheng, stating that it was Shen-hui who first championed it (p. 231). Such a position might seem to highlight Shen-hui' s role as a pivotal figure in the development ofCh'an, but one of McRae's main points is that modern scholarship (following Hu Shih) actually "overestimates

.. Shen-hui's significance and distorts the nature of his contributions" to the development ofCh'an (p. 231). Mter all, McRae argues, "the teaching of sudden enlightenment was only one of the many relevant· doctrinal and practical factors involved" in the emergence of Ch'an (p. 232), not the sole defining factor, as Hu Shih would have it. Moreover, a careful examination of Shen-hui's biography and doctrinal development reveals "a much closer relationship between him and the N orthem school than has previously been thought to have existed" (p. 232). Having thus disposed of Hu Shih's depiction of Shen-hui as a revolutionary who single-handedly effected radical changes within Chinese Buddhism, McRae goes on to challenge the notion that Hui-neng's doctrine of sudden enlightenment, as promoted by Shen-hui, was directly inherited and continued in the later Ch' an tradition represented by Ma-tsu, Shih-t' ou and their followers. Like Sekiguchi, McRae argues that we should not put much stock in the fact that the later Ch'an school adopted the name "Southern school" from Shen-hui: "this continuity of sectarian label obscures the single most important distinction in eighth-and ninth-century Ch'an: that between the 'early Ch'an' factions (the Northern, Southern, and Ox-head schools), and the 'classical Ch' an' beginning with Ma-tsu's Hung-chou school" (p. 229).

In this connection, McRae introduces what appears to be a scheme of periodization-"early" and "classical"-for use in the study of the history of Ch'an. He characterizes the texts of early Ch' an as works that "contain a wide variety of doctrinal formulations, practical exhortations, and ritual procedures." These works "attempt


to fuse new meanings and a new spirit of dedication into conventional Buddhist doctrines and practices" (p. 229). Classical Ch'an, by way of contrast, "is distinguished by its almost total dedication to the practice of 'encounter dialogue,' the spontaneous and unstructured repartee between masters and students." Classical Ch'an texts "are more unifonn in their dedication to the transcription of encounter dialogue incidents, and they delight in baffling paradoxes, patent absurdities, and instructive vignettes of non-confonnist behavior" (p. 229). For McRae, the "disconfonnity" between early and classical Ch' an, as seen in the marked differences in their textual legacies, is such that "understanding the dynamics of the early-to-classical transition is one of the most important issues now facing Ch' an studies" (p. 229). Whereas Hu Shih assumed a direct historical connection between Shen-hui's doctrine of sudden enlightenment and the apparent iconoclasm of the Ch' an school in the generations following Ma-tsu and Shih-t' ou, McRae sees only a weak link between the two. Shen-hui's use of sudden enlightenment as a polemical slogan, he suggests, may have "worried subsequent [Ch'an] masters into avoiding even the hint of gradualism and the spectre of unilinear, goal-oriented logic in the presentation of their own ideas" (p. 256), and contributed to the fonnation of the encounter dialogue approach by "establishing a standard of rhetorical purity" that disallowed all dualistic fonnulations as symptomatic of "gradualism" (p. 258).

G6mez in his chapter subjects Shen-hui's doctrine of sudden enlightenment to an abstract critique on philosophical grounds, and concludes that it embraces a number of ambiguities and logical inconsistencies. The crux of Shen-hui's problem, according to G6mez, is that "if he does not speak" about the need to cultivate specific causes and conditions leading to the attainment of enlightenment, "any doctrine can be attributed to him, yet if he proposes a method, he has abandoned strict subitism" (p. 87). Indeed, as I noted earlier, strict subitism as Demieville defines it is a doctrinal position that inevitably involves its proponents in self-contradiction (because the very act of advancing a doctrine about enlightenment may be criticized from the subitist standpoint as a form of gradualism.)


Gomez concludes that "Shen-hui's inconsistencies are best under_ stood in his own polemical context.. .. His position is critical rather than constructive: it is formed by a set of obje<;tions to his opponents not by a structured system" (p. 86). '

McRae stresses the polemical context of Shen-hui's doctrine of sudden enlightenment even more than Gomez. Indeed, he offers no . explanation or analysis of the doctrine, apparently because he does not view it as a systematic philosophical position at all, but rather as a rhetorical device or slogan that Shen-hui employed to refute opponents, inspire mass audiences, and gain converts. He notes that Shen-hui's "emphasis on the idea of sudden enlightenment is greatest where his polemical tone is most strident and his overall practical and theoretical framework is most backward" (p. 256). McRae also paints an intriguing picture of Shen-hui as a proselytizer whose "chosen role of inspiring conversion to the Buddhist spiritual quest was combined with an overriding concern with the initial moment of religious inspiration" (p. 254). In other words, Shen-hui was a sort of Buddhist evangelist who used the rhetoric of subitism to deny the necessity of a long and difficult regimen of meditation and other forms of monastic discipline, and to excite a quick and fervent acceptance by his audiences of the notion that enlightenment was at hand-that they were already, as it were, saved.

McRae's periodization scheme is helpful insofar as it draws attention to the appearance in Chinese Buddhism of a genuinely new type of sacred literature - the so-called discourse records (yii-lu) , which are couched in the form of verbatim transcriptions of exchanges (wen-ta) between enlightened Ch' an masters and their interlocutors. The scheme, however, has a number of conceptual and historiographical problems that need to be addressed.

In the first place, precisely because McRae convincingly relates stresses the differences in teaching styles between Shen~hui' s Southern school and the Hung-chou school of Ma-tsu, one is left wondering what itis that justifies the association of all these schools with a single "Ch' an" tradition. The account of the Ch' an lineage found in Sung texts, of course, relates all of these schools by positing them as central


and peripheral branches in a genealogy of dharma transmission that is supposed to have been founded by the first patriarch of Ch'an, Bodhidharma. That, however, is a religious myth that took final shape in the mid-tenth century, more than a century after the heyday ofMatsU's Hung-chou school (which was, incidentally, probably the first to call itself the "Ch' an lineage"). Modern historians need to stipulate the common denominators that unify the Ch'an tradition, and/or adduce positive evidence of historical connections between the schools mentioned in the traditional (Sung) account if they wish to speak meaningfully of a "Ch' an school" that is supposed to have evolved through distinct stages (e.g., "early" and "classical") in the seventh, eighth, and ninth centuries. McRae, we have seen, argues

. that the doctrine of sudden enlightenment cannot stand alone as the defining characteristic of the Ch'ah tradition, but he offers no . alternative definition.

Another problem with McRae's periodization scheme is that it assumes that the texts which contain the encounter dialogues of the Ch' an masters of the "classical" period (Ma-tsu et al.) are in fact records of a new kind of Buddhist practice that began during the T'ang dynasty, and not merely works belonging to a new genre of Buddhist literature that may have first appeared after the demise of the T' ang. As McRae himself points out, "we simply do not have any texts relevant to the earliest period of classical Ch' an that did not pass through the hands of Sung dynasty editors, who either knowingly or unknowingly homogenized the editions they produced" (p. 230). None of the texts containing "transcripts" of encounter dialogue, he notes, have turned up among the finds at Tun-huang. Nor, I would add, did many of the texts of classical Ch' an find their way to Japan prior to the thirteenth century, or into the catalogues of Buddhist texts compiled by Japanese pilgrims to China in the ninth century.24 Indeed, we have no way of knowing for certain that the Sung editors of the discourse record literature were not, in large part, actually the authors of the encounter dialogues that they present in the form of "transcripts." The literature in question is not merely homogeneous, . it is highly formulaic, stylized, and metaphorical - all of which points to its essentially fictional character. The encounter dialogues


are presented in the fonn of "spontaneous and unstructured repartee between masters and students," to borrow McRae's words, but the reality of the process by which the dialogues ~ppear on paper before our eyes is probably one of long and careful thought, stylistic imitation and experimentation, rewriting, and editing by third parties. The "spontaneity" of these dialogues (like that of much great literature) exists within a narrowly circumscribed framework of conventions and expectations.

"Sudden Enlightenment Followed by Gradual Cultivation: Tsungmils Analysis of Mind," by Peter N. Gregory

Like the three that precede it in Part II, this chapter is dedicated to the elucidation of a single Chinese Buddhist thinker's use of the categories "sudden" and "gradual." The figure featured is Kuei-feng Tsung-mi (780-841), known in the Buddhist tradition both as the fifth patriarch of the Hua-yen lineage, and as a Ch'an master who belonged to the lineage of Shen-hui. Modem scholars have been attracted to the study of Tsung-mi because his writings include the earliest known attempts by any Chinese Buddhist historian systematically to summarize and compare the doctrines and practices espoused by various competing branches of the early Ch'an school. In this chapter, however, Gregory sets out to "examine the context, content, and doctrinal basis" of a position espoused by Tsung-mi himself, namely, the theory of sudden enlightenment followed by gradual cultivation (p. 280).

As Gregory explains it, the historic.al setting in which Tsung-mi formulated this theory was one of bitter sectarian rivalry among the proponents of the different Ch'an lineages. That rivalry had its beginnings in Shen-hui's criticism of the Northern line of Ch'an as a mistaken "gradual" approach, and his use of the "sudden" designation to champion the Southern lineage of Hui-neng. Thus,

in Tsung-mi's day the words "sudden" (tun) and "gradual" (chien) had become shibboleths of contending factions, whose


mutual antagonisms he described in martial imagery. Not only were Ch' an Buddhists divided against themselves, but, according to Tsung-mi, the Chinese Buddhist world as a whole was split between those who identified themselves with the scholastic traditions-such as Hua-yen and T'ien-t' ai-and those who identified themselves with the practice oriented tradition of Ch' an .... He perceived the primary split as lying between the scholastic traditions of Buddhist learning (chiao) and the more practice-oriented tradition of Ch' an, which emphasized the necessity of the actualization of enlightenment in this very life. (p.280)

These statements are somewhat misleading in two respects. In the first place, the term "gradual" took on such a derogatory connotation in the aftermath of Shen-hui's diatribe against the Northern school that all parties claiming to represent the "Ch' an" tradition used it to denigrate their rivals' positions, not to characterize their own. In other words, no group embraced the "gradual" label as its shibboleth.· Secondly, the characterization of Tsung-mi's view of Ch'an as "practice-oriented" (as opposed to the more "scholastic" T'ien-t' ai or Hua-yen traditions) is problematic. Tsung-mi wascertamly aware that the distinction between teachings and practice had originally been drawn by T'ien-t'ai Chih-i, who was not merely a scholastic, but a "dhyana master" (ch 'an-shih) who in fact placed great emphasis on practice as well as teachings. Indeed, in his Ch 'an Preface Tsung-mi included the T'ien-t'ai lineage founded by Chih-i in a list of ten competing lineages of Ch' an. 25 Moreover, we know from Tsung -mi' s accounts that the more radical branches of early Ch' an (e.g., the Paot'ang and Hung-chou schools) used the rhetoric of sudden enlightenment to deny the efficacy of various aspects of traditional Buddhist practice, including morality, meditation, and doctrinal study. Precisely because they stressed the "sudden" position that enlightenment was something innate, unconditioned, and thus (strictly speaking) unattainable by any means, these branches of Ch'an were portrayed by Tsung-mi as considerably less practice-oriented than the T'ienl' ai branch.


The expression, "Ch'an for practice, T'ien-t'ai and Hua-yen fOr doctrine," is one that became popular in Chinese Buddhism sometime after the Sung; the Ch' an it refers to was different than the types of Ch'an assayed by Tsung-mi and the distinction it embodies should not be anachronistically ascribed to him. Similarly, the idea that the T'ien-t'ai and Hua-yen schools transmit only doctrinal teachings (chiao) whereas the Ch' an school transmits the formless dharma of enlightenment itself is a feature of Ch' an school polemics that only gained widespread credence after Tsung-mi's day. These notionsthat Ch' an is more practice-oriented (jissen-tela) and more conducive to the personal realization (taiken) of enlightenment than other schools of Buddhism-are frequently reiterated in the works of modern Japanese scholars associated with the Zen school. They are typical of the sectarian biases and theological claims that can slip unnoticed from Japanese sources into otherwise critical Western scholarship.

In any case, it would be better to describe Tsung-mi's view ofthe split in Ch' an as one between radicals who interpreted "sudden enlightenment" in such a way as to reject some or all forms of spiritual cultivation, and conservatives whose interpretation of the "sudden" doctrine still left room for traditional Buddhist practices. This distinction is evident, for example, in Tsung-mi' s assessment of the ten lineages of Ch'an:

Some carry out all the practices, while others disregard even the Buddha. Some let the will take its course, while others restrain· their minds. Some respect the sutras and vinaya as a standard, while others consider the sutras and vinaya an obstruction to the path.26

By most accounts, the attitude toward practice evinced by the Ch'an master Shen-hui, from whom Tsung-mi claimed spiritual descent, places him on the radical side of this spectrum. Tsung-mi's own sympathies, however, were clearly with the conservatives. As Gregory shows, Tsung-mi's doctrine of "sudden enlightenment followed by gradual cultivation" actually relegates sudden enlight-


enment to the status of an initial insight (chieh-wu); full enlightenment or complete realization (cheng-wu) only comes after an extended period of gradual cultivation (chien-hsiu) in which morality, meditation, and doctrinal study all playa vital role. At pains to attribute this position to Shen-hui, Tsung-mi was forced by the lack oftextual evidence to claim that a commitment to gradual cultivation had been Shen-hui' s true intention but that the necessity of combating the false Northern school position had led the master to emphasize only the initial phase of sudden enlightenment. There is no reason to doubt that Tsung-mi genuinely admired Shen-hui's use of the rhetoric of sudden enlightenment, but it seems evident that part of his project was to appropriate Shen-hui'sprestige and turn it against the sort of radical no-practice Ch'an that Shen-hui's name had been associated with.

Gregory is right on the mark when he contrasts the ecumenical approach taken by Tsung-mi with the polemical style of Shen-hui. Precisely because Tsung-mi took the conservative side in the aforementioned debate, he depicted the Ch' an tradition in a manner that included all approaches and points of view, relativized extreme positions by juxtaposing them with their opposites, and favored the principles of balance and harmony as criteria of truth and legitimacy. Whereas Shen-hui used the categories of sudden and gradual recklessly and inconsistently to attack his opponents, Tsung-mi protested that the terms represented a metaphorical use of language, that they therefore had different meanings in different contexts, and that it was ignorant and abusive to wield them as slogans without taking heed of such distinctions;

Gregory does an excellent job of outlining Tsung-mi's explanation of the five different ways in which "sudden" and "gradual" can be applied to the categories of cultivation (hsiu) and enlightenment (wu). Tsung-mi makes it clear that different analogies are operative in each case. For example, the theory of "gradual cultivation followed by sudden enlightenment" (chien-hsiu tun-wu) is illustrated by the analogy of chopping down a tree: "one gradually cuts away at it until it suddenly falls" (p. 282). Conversely, "sudden cultivation followed by gradual enlightenment" (tun-hsiu chien-wu) is analogous to the


approach taken by the student of archery who aims at the bull's eye (i.e., resolves to attain supreme enlightenment) right from the start then gradually improves his ability actually to hit it. Tsung-mi point~ out that the terms "cultivation" and "enlightenment" have different meanings in these. various contexts. Thus, when "cultivation" is called gradual, it refers to a process of spiritual discipline or training, but when "cultivation" is called sudden, it does not necessarily indicate the instantaneous completion of such training: in the case of "sudden cultivation followed by gradual enlightenment," it is only the intentionality of the practitioner that is "sudden" (because a person aiming at a bull's eye harbors no notion of step-by-step. progress toward the goal). Likewise, the "sudden enlightenment" that is said to follow gradual cultivation represents complete realization (cheng-wu) , whereas the "sudden enlightenment" that precedes gradual cultivation is to be understood as an initial insight (chiehwu).

All of these distinctions, Gregory argues, are "useful for providing a conceptual framework for making sense out of the confusion that has often marked discussions of the sudden-gradual controversy" (p. 284). In other words, Gregory holds that Tsung-mi's analysis of the meaning of the concepts sudden and gradual is still useful to modern scholars, not only as historical data, but as a framework for distinguishing the various philosophical positions actually taken by Chinese Buddhists in the seventh and eighth centuries. This is a bold claim, since Tsung-mi himself clearly had a stake in the controversies he reported on, and was not merely an objective observer. Gregory goes a little overboard in portraying Tsung-mi as an evenhanded, critical scholar in the modern mode, but on the whole I am inclined to agree with his assessment. At the very least, because Tsung-mi stressed the ambiguity and complexity of the terms sudden and gradual in actual usage, his analysis serves as a corrective to those overly simplistic modern accounts which speak in the singular of "the" theory of sudden enlightenment in the history of Chinese Buddhism.

As Gregory indicates, the theory of sudden enlightenment followed by gradual cultivation that Tsung-mi himself favored "presupposes a three-staged model of the Buddhist path: (1) initial


insight (chieh-wu), (2) gradual cultivation (chien-hsiu), and (3) final enlightenment (cheng-wu)" (p. 283). In Tsung-mi's view, the first step in this process, which he calls sudden enlightenment, takes place when a good teacher explains things to an ordinary deluded person

and

they at once realize that [their own marvelous knowing and seeing is the true mind, that the mind-which is from the beginning empty and tranquil, boundless and formless-is the dharmakaya, that the nonduality of body and mind is the true self, and that they are no different from all Buddhas by even a hair. (p. 286)

In other words, sudden enlightenment is the realization that one is already completely endowed with Buddhahood, and that strictly speaking it is not necessary (or even possible) to cultivate Buddhahood. Nevertheless, Tsung-mi argues, it takes time and effort for such a realization to mature and to make its full benefits felt in people's lives. It is like the sun, which rises suddenly but takes time to melt the morning frost. Enlightenment is "sudden" in the sense that it is perceived as something innate and fundamentally inalienable, but cultivation is still necessary to uproot completely the karmic proclivities that give rise to deluded notions of self. Conversely, Tsung-mi stressed that for cultivation to be effective, it must be undertaken on the basis of sudden enlightenment. That is, the practitioner must cultivate without harboring any hopes of personal gain or any illusions that cultivation really produces or changes anything .

. This being Tsung-mi's interpretation of sudden enlightenment, I would question the aptness of Gregory's frequent reference to it as an "experience." When Tsung-mi speaks of the importance of "practice based on enlightenment (i wu hsiu-hsing), he seems to be referring to the correct understanding with which to undertake practice, an understanding that can be gained simply by hearing a teacher explain the doctrine of innate Buddhahood. If Tsung-mi had viewed sudden enlightenment as an "experience" that is a prerequisite to true Buddhist practice, it would indeed have been strange (as

140 . nABS VOL. 16 NO.1

Gregory suggests) that he did not advocate any sort of preparatory practice leading up to sudden enlightenment. Gregory's use of the category of "experience" to explain Tsung-mi's position leads him to make a rather awkward distinction:

Whereas chieh-wu is always a sudden experience of insight, cheng-wu can be either gradual or sudden depending on whether it is regarded from the standpoint of the process of the actualization of final enlightenment or the actual experience of that enlightenment. (p. 284)

It would be easier to explain Tsung-mi's position by saying that cheng-wu is gradual when it is viewed as the product of gradual cultivation (chien-hsiu) and sudden when it is viewed as having the identical "content" as initial insight (chieh-wu). To speak of the "actual experience" of cheng-wu is to suggest that Tsung-mi understood it as something qualitatively different from both the initial insight of sudden enlightenment and the subsequent process of gradual cultivation-an interpretation that would effectively place Tsung-mi in the ranks of those who advocated "gradual cultivation followed by sudden enlightenment." The notion that enlightenment is an ineffable experience (taiken), as opposed to an insight or understa~ding that is informed by (if not necessarily communicable through) discursive concepts, is a motif of modern Japanese (especially Rinzai) Zen rhetoric which Gregory seems to have borrowed more or less unconsciously in his otherwise astute treatment of Tsung-mi's thought. The problem with the rhetoric of "experience" is that it inevitably suggests a nexus of enabling causes and conditions, even if enlightenment is conceived as an experience that occurs "suddenly" in a temporal sense. This is inconsistent with the rhetoric of sudden enlightenment employed by Shen-hui and Tsungmi, which tends to posit enlightenment as something innate, unconditioned, and fundamentally atemporal.

Having dealt with the historical context and philosophical content of Tsung-mi's theory of sudden enlightenment followed by gradual cultivation, Gregory devotes considerable attention to the question of the doctrinal basis of that theory. Given the stated aims of the volume,


it is surprising to find here that he makes no attempt to locate Tsungrni's ideas within the broader context of Chinese thought and culture, but treats them as an outgrowth of a strictly Buddhist problematic that was inherited from India.27 In brief, Gregory explains the theory of sudden enlightenment followed by gradual cultivation as a corollary of Tsung-mi's analysis of mind, which he argues was basically a synthesis (a la the Awakening of Faith, an earlier Chinese Buddhist apocryphon) of the Indian Buddhist doctrines of tathagatagarbha and aJayavijiiana. This account is plausible, if a bit simplistic in its treatment of another immensely complex set of Buddhist technical terms, but the reader is left wondering if the synthesis that Gregory argues for was a uniquely Chinese development, and if it was, why

• the Chinese were the first to come up with it. The question of the influence of indigenous Chinese thought and culture is one which naturally arises here, but Gregory does not take the opportunity to pursue it. Gregory might also have focused some attention on Tsungmi's training in the Confucian classics and association with Confucian bureaucrats as a means of explaining his opposition to the more radical subitists in the Ch' an camp, but he lets this opportunity pass as well. In the end the reader is left with a well written and infomiative, if rather conventional, piece of Buddhological scholarship.

"The 'Short-cut' Approach of K'an-hua Meditation: The Evolution of a Practical Subitism in Chinese Ch' an Buddhism," by Robert E. Buswell, Jf.

This chapter, the fifth and final one in the Part IT, represents a departure from the focus on a single Buddhist thinker that characterizes the four preceding chapters. It offers instead a bold and speculative historical reconstruction of "a long process of evolution in Ch' an whereby its subitist rhetoric came to be extended to pedagogy and finally to practice" (p. 322). Buswell's thesis, in brief, is that the contemplative technique called k'an-hua ch 'an ("Ch' an of observing the [critical] phrase"), which first appeared in the Sung dynasty, grew out of attempts to develop a "sudden" style of

142 . nABS VOL. 16 NO. 1

meditation that would be consistent with the subitist rhetoric and subitist pedago gy that had characterized the mainstream of the Ch' an school since the latter part of the T' ang.

The term k'an-hua (literally "observing phrases") has been used within the Ch' an and Zen traditions since the 13th century to refer in a general way to the contemplation of kung-an (Jpn. koan)-those ostensibly verbatim records of exchanges between famous Ch' an masters and their interlocutors that were selected out of that vast hagiographicalliterature of the Ch' an school as especially dra.'llatic, enigmatic, or pithy expressions of the awakened mind. Buswell, however, uses the term k'an-hua in a more restrictive way to refer specifically to the practice of contemplating (k'an) a single word or phrase (hua-t' au) that is taken as the crux of a kung-an. K' an-hua in the latter, more technical sense was the innovation ofT'a-hui Tsungkao (1089-1163), an influential Ch'an master in the Lin-chi lineage whose interpretation Buswell takes as definitive:

In kung-an investigation, according to Ta-hui, rather than reflect over the entire kung-an exchange, which could lead the mind to distraction, one should instead zero in on the principal topic, or most essential element, of that exchange, which he termed its "critical phrase" (hua-t' au). Ta-hui called this new approach to meditation k'an-hua Ch' an-the Ch' an of observing the critical phrase-and alleged that it was a "short-cut" (ching-chieh) leading to instantaneous enlightenment. (p. 347)

Buswell implies here, without presenting any historical evidence, that Ta-hui himself invented the terms hua-t'ou and k'an-hua. Whether or not that is true, the fact remains that in the centuries following Ta-hui the terms were used in an ambiguous fashion in the Ch'an and Zen traditions. The term hua-t'ou referred to kung-an in general, as well as to what Buswell calls "critical phrases," and the term k'an-hua indicated the general study and appreciation of kungan as well as the use of single phrases as focal points for nondiscursive mental concentration.

Buswell himself stresses the difference "between kung-an inves-


tigationas a pedagogical tool and k'an-hua practice as a meditative technique" (p. 347). The distinction he wants to draw is between the more literary and intellectual practice of collecting, editing, and commenting on kung-an, which began in the late tenth and eleventh centuries as a means of instructing students, and the use of a single haa-t' au as a device for concentrating the mind and cutting off discursive thinking, which began in the twelfth century with Ta-hui and his followers. It was with Ta-hui, Buswell asserts, that kung-an

stopped being merely pedagogical devices or "Literary foils" and emerged as "contemplative tools for realizing one's own innate enlightenment" (p. 346). This development, he suggests, was in part a reaction against the tendencies of "lettered (wen-tzu) Ch' an," which had drifted from the pedagogical use of kung-an into an ever more refined and erudite study of kung-an as literary artifacts.

Buswell's main point, however, is that Ta-hui promoted k'anhaa meditation chiet1y as a kind of "'sudden' expedient, intended to catalyze an equally 'sudden' awakening" (p. 349). Using the same simile for "sudden cultivation" that had been employed by Tsung-mi centuries earlier, Ta-hui likened the repeated observation of a huat'ou to the training of an archer who aims directly at the bull's eye every time he shoots: the k'an-hua exercise is "sudden" in the sense that it aims directly at full enlightenment, and makes no provision for gradual progress toward the goal. One important difference between Tsung-mi's interpretation of the archery simile and that of Ta-hui, of course, is that the former used it to describe "sudden cultivation followed by gradual enlightenment," whereas the latter did not admit to gradualism of any sort. From Ta-hui's point of view, there were no degrees of success in k' an-huameditation-only "hit" or "miss"and it was enough to hit the target but once. This was because, in the words of Ta hui' s teacher Ytian-wu: "If one generates understanding and accesses awakening through a single phrase [i.e., the hua-t'au] , a single encounter (Chl) , or a single object, then immeasurable, innumerable functions and kung-an are simultaneously penetrated" (p. 346). Ta-hui himself said: "Understanding one is understanding all; awakening to one is awakening to all; realizing one is realizing all. It's like slicing through a spool of thread: with one stroke all its

144 . nABS VOL. 16 NO.1

strands are simultaneously cut" (p. 350). According to this interpre_ tation, enlightenment is "sudden" in the sense that all the qualities of Buddhahood are gained at once, or simultan~ously.

Buswell does a good job of showing how Ylian-wu and Ta-hui promoted the contemplation of hua-t' au as a direct or "short-cut" (as opposed to step-by-step) approach to enlightenment. He fails, however, to make the case that Ta-hui's method of k'an-hua represented the culmination of a long process of evolution which led from subitist rhetoric to subitist pedagogy and finally to subitist practice. Buswell's argument in support of this thesis is ingenious and plausible at first glance, but in the end it breaks down because of two flaws in its conceptual foundation and a lack of supporting historical evidence.

The first conceptual flaw is the assumptioh that the Ch' an School in the Sung, dominated as it was by proponents of the Lin-chi lineage, had evolved directly from the so-called Hung-chou school of Ma-tsu (709-788), which in turn had evolved from the "Southern" school of Hui-neng (which was promoted by Shen-hui). Buswell posits a continuous, more or less unilinear development from (1) the subitist rhetoric of Shen-hui in the eighth century to (2) the pedagogical technique of "encounter dialo gue" (chi-yiian wen-ta) invented by the Hung-chou school in the mid-T' ang, to (3) the instructional use of kung-an in the Yuan-men and Lin-chi schools in the tenth and eleventh centuries, and finally to (4) the subitist style of k'an-hua meditation perfected by Ta-hui, arguably the most influential Lin-chi master of the Southern Sung. In stating his case, Buswell proposes a three part periodization of Ch'an history-"early," "middle," and "classical" -which is a modified version of McRae's bipartite division of Ch' an history into "early" and "classical" periods. Basically, he accepts McRae's· definition of "early Ch'an," but reserves the term "classical Ch' an" for "the systematizations of Ch' an lineage, doctrine, practice, and institutions that were completed during the Sung, and that descended, in large part, from the Hung-chou schooL." (p. 327). This leaves the multifarious Ch'an movements that flourished from the middle eighth to the middle nintn centuries, inCluding the Hung-chou, Ho-tse (Shen-hui's school), Niu-


t'ou, Pa6-t'ang and Ching-chung schools described by Tsung-mi, to . be classified as belonging to "middle Ch' an." Buswell defends his addition of a middle period to McRae's scheme in the following way:

Given the proliferation of Ch' an schools during this period, as well as the pronounced regional character of those schools, to intimate that post-Northern school Ch'an refers solely to the Hung-chou line oversimplifies the vibrancy ofeh' an during the eighth century. Of course, identifying such a transitional period is not to deny that Hung-chou was the most important of these middle Ch' an schools in the later evolution of the tradition. Nor does it reject the notion that soine of the distinguishing characteristics of Rung-chou, such as encounter dialogue, came to typify mainstream Ch' an during the Sung dynasty. But it was not until such repartee was codified into the kung-an form that it can be termed "classical"; in Ma-tsu' s time it was still one of a number of variant forms of Ch'an, all of which had a chance at predominance. (p. 327)

Thus, Buswell assigns the Hung-chou school's practice of "encounter dialogue" to the middle period, and singles out the kung-an genre as a more appropriate emblem of the classical Ch' an of the Sung.

The fundamental problem with Buswell's treatment of the history ofCh'an is that it follows the Sung Ch'an school's own mythological account of its origins and development, as presented in "records of the transmission of the flame" such as the Ching-te ch 'uan-teng iu, while offering no concrete historical evidence that might serve to verify that account. It is true that Ch' an mythographers in the Sung traced the main branches of their spiritual lineage back through Linchi and the Hung-chou school to Hui-neng, but their claims cannot be accepted as valid historical evidence for the actual transmission of ideas, practices, or institutional forms along those same lines. For one thing, the Sung "flame histories" are clearly theological rather than historical documents: they deal with the mysterious transmission of something avowedly formless, signless, ineffable, and ultimately "untransmittable"-the "Buddha mind" or enlighten-


ment-and ma..~e no attempt to trace the spread or development of concrete, historically verifiable phenomena such as doctrines Or practices. Secondly, the account of the early Ch' an lineage (from Sakyamuni to Bodhidharma and Hui-neng) given in the Sung "flame histories" has been shown by the study of Tun-huang materials to be a fabrication, and there is no reason to expect any greater historical veracity in the same literature's account of the lineage in the generations following Hui-neng. A primary concern of the Sung Ch' an mythographers was to create a genealogy that would allow them to claim spiritual descent from Hui-neng. The masters of the Hung-chou school could have been included in the lineage simply because they provided a convenient link in that retrospective formulation.

Buswell asserts that "classical" (Sung) Ch' an doctrines, practices, and institutions derived in large part from the Hung-chou school of middle Ch' an, but he does not adduce any evidence for this connection other than the claims of the Sung Ch'an mythographers themselves. The fact of the matter is that virtually all of the information we have on the Hung-chou school, with the exception of Tsung-mi's brief synopsis of its teachings, comes from partisan Ch' an "flame histories" and "discourse records" that were compiled in the Sung and later. As I argued above in my review of McRae's chapter, the extant texts that present themselves as transcripts of "encounter dialogues" involving masters of the Hung-chou school could very well be works of religious fiction largely composed in the Sung. Moreover, as I have demonstrated elsewhere, the only extant account of Hung-chou school monasteries dates from the Sung, and probably represents a retrospective attempt to create a Ch' an founder (the Hung-chou master Pai-chang) for Sung Ch'an monastic forms that actually derived from the mainstream of Buddhist (not uniquely Ch'an) institutions in the T'ang.28 In short, the claim that classical (Sung) Ch' an evolved mainly from the Hung-chou school is in part unprovable, and in part demonstrably false.

Finally, I would argue that the very conception of the "Ch'an school" as a vast, multi-branched but nevertheless cohesive spiritual lineage (tsung)-a notion that informs both McRae's and Buswell's


;p~riodization sch.emes-was the br.ai~child ~f ~ung Ch' an 11lythographers. It IS true that Tsung-mI, m the mId-nmth century,

(grouped seven (and in another list, ten) different schools under the rubric of Ch'an, but neither he nor the followers of the schools he discussed had any concept of membership in a single multi-branched

'''Ch' an lineage" of dharma transmission. Most of the schools in ,:question did not even use the name .Ch'an to identify their own lparticular lineages. . . Because the Sung Ch' an school succeeded in establishing its own ~ersion of its identity and origins as historical "fact," and because the

ISung account of the history of the Ch' an lineage still provides the ~f~amework for much of the modem scholarship in the field, it is '-indeed appropriate to label Sung Ch' an as "classical" in the sense of ~;.;standard" and "definitive." I heartily endorse Buswell's remark that ~JCh'an ever had a "golden age," that age was the Sung, not the fr'ang. By the same token, McRae's distinction of "early" and :"classical" Ch' an is viable insofar as the "encounter dialogue" texts that he identifies with classical Ch' an were really the classics of Sung (Ch'an.

As a scheme of periodization for the history of a homogeneous ,>entity called "Ch' an," McRae's formula suffers from the same

:;;conceptual flaw as Buswell's, but it works rather well as a device for ;:fdistinguishing two types of literature: (1) relatively discursive texts. ;{which derive from the Northern'school and the Ho-tse school of ~tSheri-hui, were largely ignored or forgotten by Sung Ch'an editors, •. and are known to modem scholars because they were preserved at "Tun-huang; and (2) texts featuring "encounter dialogue," which were associated with the Hung-chou school and other major branches of the Ch' an lineage as it was understood in the Sung, were promoted by Sung editors as sacred records of that lineage, and were handed down to modem times within the Ch' an and Zen traditions. McRae, we have seen, notes the "disconforrnity" between these two types

,ofliterature and states that "understanding the dynamics of the early;.Jo-classical transition is one of the most important issues J?ow facing ;{Ch' an studies." Part of the solution to this problem, I would suggest, ,':rAs to realize that there may not have been any "transition" at all. . Researchers today assume that there must have been some historical


continuity between the schools that produced these very different types of literature because modem scholarship itself has identified the aforementioned Tun-huang texts as works belonging to the "Ch' an schooL" However, in making this identification (which is not made in the Tun-huang texts), modem scholarship has actually relied on the Sung conception of the history of the Ch'an lineage.

The second conceptual flaw in Buswell's thesis is the hazy formulation ofthe basic categories used: "rhetoric," "pedagogy," and "practice." The notion that the development of a terse rhetoric and a radical pedagogical style represented two distinct stages in the evolution of Ch' an subitism breaks down because the two categories themselves are often coextensive. That is to say, the particular historical expressions of subitist doctrine that Buswell labels as rhetoric also had an unmistakably pedagogical function, and the ostensibly pedagogical techniques he cites clearly made use of rhetoric. Consider, for example, the following passage in which Buswell introduces his thesis:

The rhetorical purity McRae sees as one of the foci of Shenhui's teachings was further elaborated by his contemporaries in the Hung-chou school. There, more illocutionary forms of discourse became not merely a rhetorical device but also a unique pedagogical technique: that of the "encounter dialogue" (chi-yiian wen-ta). The Hung-chou school attempted to use this new style of religious repartee as a means of catalyzing enlightenment in its students. The wider implications of this rhetoric and pedagogy were subsequently explored by later teachers in the Lin-chi Line, who attempted to reconcile them with Ch' an praxis as well. This attempt led to the development of a "sudden" style of meditation: that of the kung-an (public case) or hua-t'ou (critical phrase) investigation. (p. 322)

Here Buswell holds up Shen-hui as the architect ofthe Ch' an rhetoric of sudden enlightenment, but in the same sentence he makes it clear . that Shen-hui used that rhetoric in the context of teaching. Indeed,if we are to accept Gomez's and McRae's accounts of Shen-hui's pedagogical methods, it would seem that they consisted mostly of


rhetoric and included very little practical instruction concerning moral behavior or techniques of meditation. Similarly, "encounter dialogue" may be regarded as a pedagogical technique in the sense of a teacher actually employing witty repartee, apparent nonsequiturs, scatology, etc., to shock his students and shake them out of their ordinary deluded way of thinking, or it may be viewed as "merely a rhetorical device," namely, a fictional depiction of teachers speaking and acting in such a manner: after all, we have no historical accounts of the encounter dialo gue "method" apart from the literature which purports to record actual dialogues. But even if "encounter dialogue" is to be understood as a pedagogical technique in the first sense, it is clearly a technique that relies heavily on rhetoncal devices; and even if "encounter dialogue" is understood as something "merely" rhetorical, a flashy motif in a popular genre of religious literature, it still (like all fiction) can have a pedagogical function. However one looks at it, the distinction between rhetoric and pedagogy is difficult to sustain.

The distinction between Ch'an practice and Ch'an rhetoric and pedagogy is even more problematic in Buswell's presentation. For example, at the beginning of the chapter he says that

J propose in this chapter to focus on ... the development of distinctive techniques of meditation unique to Ch' an. Ch' an's presumption of contemplative expertise-as the adoption of the name "Meditation" (ch'an, dhyana) for the school impliescompelled it to create forms of meditation that it could claim exclusively as its own, by breaking away from the practices common to the earlier Sino-Buddhist schools. It accomplisbed this by condemning earlier Sino:. Indian techniques as gradual while claiming that Ch' an taught more direct approaches to meditation. (p. 321)

The distinction between practice and rhetoric breaks down here, for as Buswell himself argues, the creation of new forms of meditation was accomplished through the rhetorical devices of

. "condemning" and "claiming." One could, perhaps, try to restore consistency to this passage by arguing that the Ch' an school used the rhetoric of sudden enlightenment to create new theories (rather than


forms) of meditation. The more fundamental problem, however, is that the theoretical understanding with which a practitioner under_ takes a particular contemplative technique is actually an integral part of the technique itself. Indeed, there are many forms of meditation in the Buddhist tradition which consist solely in the mental contem_ plation or review bf theories and doctrines.

Another fallacy in the passage just quoted is that the term "Ch' an lineage" (ch' an-tsung) was not adopted as the name of a school until the ninth century, and even then did not gain much currency until the Sung. The earliest sporadic appearances of the term are in literature associated with patriarchs of the Hung-chou school, but those occurrences are ambiguous (tsung could mean "essential principle" rather than "school") and may well have been Sung interpolations. Furthermore, at the time when the name Ch'an was adopted as the name of a lineage, it no longer meant "meditation" (dhyana). The reinterpretation of the term ch' an had already begun in the works of Chili-i, who used it on occasion to refer to the whole of Buddhist practice.29 The reinterpretation was continued in a more radical fashion in texts such as the Platform Siitra and the sayings of Shenhui, where dhyana and prajiifiwere identified. By the time the name Ch'an was adopted by the followers of Ma-tsu in the Hung-chou school (if indeed it was-I suspect the adoption was even later), it had clearly come to mean "enlightenment," not "meditation" in the original Indian sense. There were many followers of the Ch' an school in the Sung who emphatically denied that theirs was the "meditation" school. Ch' an, they argued, was a synonym for the Buddha Mind (fohsin), i. e., enlightenment, that their lineage transmitted "outside the teachings"; it had nothing t9 do with "practicing dhyana" (hsich' an).30 It is evident from this that the Ch' an school was not, as . Buswell argues, compelled by its name to "create forms of meditation that it could claim exclusively as its own." All that was necessary was to deny that the name Ch'an meant "meditation" (dhyana) at all.

The distinction between practice and pedago gy is also difficult to sustain in Buswell's presentation. For example, he describes the Hung-chou masters' "non-conceptual, illocutionary style of teaching-by beating, shouting, or virtually any other kind of physical gesture" as a "new pedagogical style" aimed at catalyzing enlighten-


rnent. But from the standpoint of the student who approaches a master 'and asks to be enlightened (a common motif in the "encounter dialogue" literature), it is just as clearly a mode of practice. Indeed,

: one of the most common forms of religious practice described in ,'Ch' an records is traveling about seeking encounters with enlightened 'rnasters. Within the Sung Ch'an monastic institution, specific times and procedures were established for the practice of entering a

?inaster's room and receiving his instruction. , In general, Buswell's distinction of rhetoric, pedagogy, and . practice reflects a narrow conception of Ch' an practice (particularly rneditation) that excludes intellectual activity. It is this conception 'that underlies his assertion that Ta-hui was the fIrst to use kung-an

",,;'in connection with a meditative technique: prior to Ta-hui, the study ~:':i, and contemplation of kung-an still involved discllrsive thinking, and ~7'J;thus did not advance from the levels of rhetoric and pedagogy to that J~,VOf praxis (i.e., meditation). The ostensible exclusion of intellectual ;~:;;activity from the domain of meditation, it may be noted, is precisely ~'~;rilie position taken by Ta-hui himself in his advocacy of the k'an-hua Ii¥,0method. Buswell explains that for Ta-hui "the purpose of the huai:;~:'t'ou .... is to enable the student to transcend the dualistic processes --",

,[,(; of thought in a single moment of insight. ... Any kind of intellectual-':~I'ization of the hua-t'Du, any attempt to understand it in terms of 16 ordinary conceptual thought, was repeatedly denied by Ta-hui" (p. \,"349). It is clear from Buswell's account that Ta-hui denigrated all ?,attempts to understand kung-an conceptually as a sort of gradualism, • and that he associated subitism with the complete frustration and final

abandonment of the intellectual approach to enlightenment. Ta-hui's interpretation of k'an-hua as a device for cutting off discursive

',thinking, and the anti-intellectual rhetoric that he used to convey this {tr:interpretation, were very influential in the subsequent development ;:eof the Chinese Lin-chi and Japanese Rinzai traditions. So-called ;tHakuin Zen, the style of Zen which dominates the modern Rinzai ~(;school, still makes much use of Ta-hui's mode of rhetoric. Japanese ~~:historians of Ch'an associated with the Rinzai school, such as D.T. ~~;;Suzuki and his student Furuta Sh6kin, have also been strongly ~~~~influenced by Ta-hui' s interpretations of kung-an and enlightenment. jo"r--C-'


Buswell himself relies on Furuta's studies of the history of kung-an in this chapter, and seems to be influenced by the modern Rinzai stress on non-intellectual practice (shugy6) ~nd the nonconceptual experience (taiken) of enlightenment.

One of the central themes in Buswell's account of "the evolution of a practical subitism" that culminated in Ta-hui's method of k'anhua is that of the sinification of Buddhist doctrine and meditation. In his view, "it was the Ch'an school that undertook the most protracted experiments at adapting Indian meditative practices to China." The major stepping stones in the development of Ch' an that led from Indian meditative models to Ta-hui were: the collapsing of the Indian distinction between samiidhi and prajiiii, as represented by the Platform Sutra; the rejection of that Indian nomenclature altogether in favor of theories of meditation that stressed the practice of nothought (wu-nien); and the development of a distinctively Ch'an rhetoric and pedagogy-"encounter dialogue"-which in turn gave rise to the kung-an literature. At each stage in this process of evolution, Buswell argues, Buddhist doctrine and practice moved farther and farther away from their Indian roots and became increasingly sinicized. The driving force behind the entire process was the notion of sudden enlightenment which "implies, of course, that there is a more direct means to awakening than the complex, intricate series of steps taught in Indian Buddhist texts" (p. 325). The basic problem was that

if this Chinese ideal of a sudden, immediately available approach to enlightenment was to become accessible in practice, the contemplative techniques that catalyzed awakening had also to be sinified. Buddhism has traditionally prided itself on its pragmatic outlook toward religion, in which its doctrinal positions are presumed to derive from, and be supported by, explicit meditative programs. Since it is impossible to separate the ontology of Buddhism from its soteriological schemata and meditative practices, it was inevitable that Buddhist meditation would also come within the purview of the sinification that was occurring on the doctrinal front. (p. 326)


~APart from the difficulty of positing a homogeneous "Ch' an" ;tradition that is supposed to have spanned the T' ang and Sung, there ,are several problems with this view of the sinification of Buddhism.

In the first place, it is not true that the notion of sudden "enlightenment necessarily implied a, "more direct means to awaken;ing." As the present volume makes abundantly clear, sudden enlight:~enII1ent was interpreted in many different ways in the history of Chinese Buddhism, and sOIp.e of those interpretations explicitly deny

.that there are any recommendable or possible "means td' awakening, ;.~ince awakening is something innate and present no matter what one C:does. Buswell himself is perfectly aware of this, and he explains Ma;tsu'S interpretation of sudden enlightenment in precisely these terms.

fi;~;IMa-tsu' s "ontology," if it can be called that, suggested no purposive (~('cultivation at ail, but rather "letting the mind be free," since there is ;ft~no Buddhahood to attain other than the mind that one already !~frpossesses. It would probably be more appropriate to call this a ~:~i,"doctrine" than an "explicit meditative program," but even if we ~~i~t}egard it as such a program, it must be admitted that the meditative :ilt'Ctechnique being recommended consists of nothing more than taking IJ~to heart the words "do not cultivate" or "let the mind be free." In other ;A('words, Ma-tsu's doctrine either implies no method of meditation at i~ran, or a method that is virtually indistinguishable from thinking about ';~Cthe doctrine itself. In either case, this interpretation of sudden ~i;i:enlightenment leaves no room for the notion that meditative practice, (1 as opposed to doctrinal understanding, is necessary to catalyze an :{.;"experience" of enlightenment. Ma-tsu, as best we can tell, rejected

,both cultivation and any sort of special experience that it might ;.produce, on the grounds that "the ordinary mind is enlightenment." :~; An interpretation of sudden enlightenment such as Ma-tsu's, of ': .. course, need not have been taken literally by monks engaged in a 15. monastic routine of worship, study, debate, and seated meditation. ;~·.Mter all; purposely to change one's ordinary behavior in any way r.upon hearing Ma-tsu's teaching would also be to engage in a sort of :':>cultivation, and thus to mistake his advice. One might just as well ':;;;understand "letting the mind be free" to mean giving up expectations '~:r" :";f-~'

;t~,_ ::~;\:,' ,


and attachments to results even as one continues to engage in ordinary forms of monkish cultivation. I would not argue, as a number of eminent Buddhologists have in the past, that Ma-tsu's teaching· necessarily implies a rejection of seated meditation (tso-ch 'an).

Indeed, the point I wish to make is precisely that an interpretation of sudden enlightenment such as Ma-tsu' s has no logically necessary or historically predictable implications whatsoever for religious practice. Far from driving the evolution of Buddhist practice in China in a particular direction, as Buswell argues, sudden enlightenment rhetoric tended to undennine the theoretical bases of practice and therefore, paradoxically, to open the door to any and all practices that Buddhists felt like engaging in. Tsung-mi's account of the early schools ofCh' an bears witness to the tremendous diversity in practice that arose among Buddhists who all accepted the doctrine of innate Buddhahood but could not agree on its practical implications. Diversity and eclecticism also characterized the Sung Ch'an school, which was united not by any common practices but by a common mythology: the notion of a "Ch' an lineage" through which the Buddha's fonnless dharma was transmitted. Buswell makes it seem as if k'an-hua was the most important, if not the definitive, practice in Sung Ch' an, but that is not the case. Indeed, k' an-hua is never even mentioned in Sung Ch' an monastic codes, which layout detailed procedures for many other religious practices and rituals.

The vast production and enjoyment of "encounter dialogue" and . k'ung-an literature in the Sung, I would argue, was one example of a new (and, as Buswell notes, uniquely Chinese) fonn of religious practice that was able to flourish in the laissez-faire climate fostered by sudden enlightenment rhetoric. It is difficult, however, to see Tahui's protest against this style of intellectual, lettered Ch' an as a further stage in the sinicization process. If anything, I would describe his insistence on the practice of concentration, in which the mind was focused ona single object (the hua-t'ou) and brought to a stop, as a return to a more Indian style of meditation in which trance (samadhl) and wisdom (prajiia) function in tandem. Ta-hui' s insistence on a "breakthrough" experience of awakening can also be seen as harking back to traditional Indian models of a path to liberation that admits


f~f clear-cut stages. ~t·:-

i~Vf~he Sudden and the Gradual of Chinese Poetry Criticism: An 'IEip1anation of the Ch'an-Poetry Analogy," by Richard John Lynn ~-~ . i;~"/,;~~

;~ This is the fIrst of the two chapters that comprise Part II of the '~~1ume, "Analogies in the Cultural Sphere." Lynn introduces his !~opic by quoting a passage from the Ta-ching t'ang shih-hua ["(Discussions of Poetry from the Hall of Him Who Always has the :C1assicsby His Side) by Wang Shih-chen (1634-1711): ~:

Hung Sheng, [whose courtesy name is] Fang-ssu [1646?-1704] once asked Shih Yii-shan [Shih Jun-chang, 1619-1683] about the method of composing poetry (shih-fa). He replied by fIrst relating what I had once said about the main principles of poetry (shih ta-chih): "Your teacher says that poetry is like an exquisite and towering Pagoda that appears at the snap of the fIngers or like the twelve towers of the five cities of the immortals that ephemerally exist at the edge of heaven. I do not agree. To use a metaphor, poetry is like someone building a house out of tiles, glazed bricks, wood, and stone-he must put them all together, one by one, on solid ground." Hung then replied: "This constitutes the difference between the meaning of sudden and gradual enlightenment of the Ch'an sect" (ch 'an-tsung tun chien erh-l). (p. 381)

Lynn says that by the time this passage was written in the 2,;seventeenth century, "it had become commonplace to discuss poetry :~M:/in t~rms of Ch' an, to say that poetry in some way or ways 'is like' ti;J{Uu) Ch'an" (p. 381). As Lynn explains it, this was a motif that fIrst i~tbecame widespread in Sung dynasty literature on poetics. There are b~:a few intimations of the Ch' an-Poetry analogy in works dating from ;,;:~the T' ang, but "statements linking Ch' an and poetry on a theoretical ;~iilevel constitute one of the most common features of Sung poetry :~,;:criticism" (p. 384). _On the other hand,the Ch'an-Poetry analogy (\~!J~"always had detractors and opponents," and from the middle of the

156 . nABS VOL. 16 NO.1

twelfth century on there were Neo-Confucian theoreticians who borrowed the Buddhist concept of wu (enlightenment) to talk about poetry but denied that it had anything to do wi~h Ch'an. Lynn's stated . aim in the chapter is to survey the primary sources in which the Ch' an-Poetry analogy appears, limiting himself to the Northern and . Southern Sung eras. Setting aside the question of why various Sung poets and critics took the approach they did, Lynn indicates that he is content simply to take stock of "such things as who said what, when ... did he say it, and what other critics were subsequently influenced in . either a positive or negative way" (p. 383).

It is evident from the quote that stands at the beginning of the chapter, and from Lynn's subsequent introduction of his topic, that the debate concerning the Ch' an-Poetry analo gy took place on at least two different levels. In the first place, there was disagreement among critics who accepted the basic terms of the analogy but differed on the question of whether the creative process in writing poetry is best likened to sudden enlightenment or to gradual enlightenment. Whichever position such critics took, they were united in their willingness to liken the completion of a poem to the attainment of "enlightenment" as taught in the Ch'an Buddhist tradition. The second level of debate was between critics who were content to talk

. about poetry in terms of Buddhist enlightenment, and those who c

"attempted to emancipate wu from its Buddhist context" (p. 382), thereby challenging the validity of the Ch' an-Poetry analogy itself, including both the "sudden" and "gradual" positions. All of this is implicit in Lynn's presentation, but he does not make the distinction explicit.

Indeed, the chapter as a whole would benefit from an explicitly stated thesis or hypothesis at the outset, and a conclusion which sums up the significance of the data presented. As it stands, the examples that are cited from the works of various Sung poets and critics are interesting, but the reader is left to his or her own devices to sort out the evidence and decide what it proves. Despite the stated aim of the chapter, not all of the Sung critics cited treat the relationship between Ch' an and poetry as something analogical: some claim that great poetry must flow from a state of mind that is fostered by the actual


practice of Ch'an meditation techniques. Moreover, not all of them are concerned with distinguishing "sudden" and "gradual" approaches to the creation of poetry. In many cases, it is author Lynn -biinselfwho labels the poets in question as "gradualists" or "subitists," based on his own criteria (which are never explicitly defined). In .short, there is considerable confusion in the chapter as to the issues .under discussion and the standpoint from which the categories of :"sudden" and "gradual" are applied. The author does a better job of .distinguishing the various meanings of wu (enlightenment) when it is used by critics as an analo gy for success in or mastery of the poetic .'endeavor.

Although Lynn begins his survey of primary sources with the Northern Sung era, he does offer one example of a T' ang writer who '~anticipates the later craze.for the Ch' an-Poetry analogy." The T' ang

••... critic he cites is Liu Yti-hsi (772-842), who stated that Buddhists ~"t~("disciples of Sakyamuni") have gained fame for their poetry because 2~}they are accomplished in samadhi (ting) and prajiia (hUl), which I~J;-!enables them to give rise to a verbal expression that is "marvelous ~(r(miao) and profound (shen)." Thus, Liu concluded, one should ~f;."believe in the flowers that bloom in the forest of Ch' an and shun the i.; pear and jade that might be fished up out of the river!" (p. 384). ::Despite Lynn's assertion that this is an example of the Ch'an-Poetry ;.,-analogy, it is evident from the passage just quoted that Liu regarded ~;certain Buddhist monks as excellent poets whose skill derived in :'::large measure from their cultivation of samtidhi in communal ;-?meditation halls ("forests of ch' an; ch' an-lin). In other words, for Liu ~.rJhe relationship between ch 'an (i.e., meditation) and poetry was \~ practical, not analogical.

Incidentally, "ch'an forests" in the ninth century were facilities ;;for meditation found at all Buddhist monasteries; the appearance of

term in the text does not necessarily mean that Liu was speaking of "Ch' an school" (ch' an-tsung) monks. Nevertheless, it is a fact that from Sung times on many Ch' an school monks composed poetry, and

':'; ':that the ability to do so well was regarded within the school as prima ~~, facie evidence of deep spiritual insight. This explains the huge ~~.number of enlightenment verses, dharma transmission verses, verse ;/J li~";

t]';;;:;

)~L'~'


commentaries on cases in the kung-an literature, and verses (fa-Yii) recited in ritual contexts that survive in the annals of the Ch'an school. Lynn, however, does not concern him~elf with the historical phenomenon of Buddhist monks using poetry to express (or even to gain) spiritual insights. Nor does he treat the historical question of lay poets who may have gained inspiration through the practice of Buddhist meditation.

Su Shih (1037-1101), "the great painter, poet, calligrapher, writer of prose, and statesman," is the first of the Sung critics whom Lynn deals with. Lynn cites a poem by Su Shih as an example of the use of the Ch'an-Poetry analogy, but in this poem too we find that what the poet-critic is really concerned with is the way in which great poetry flows from the actual practice (or experience) of emptiness (kung) and quietude (ching). Again, the relationship between Ch'an and poetry is practical, not analogical.

Lynn concludes his discussion of Su Shih with the observation that "although he does not seem to have ever explicitly formulated a 'sudden' approach to poetic success or 'enlightenment,' the many references to freedom and spontaneity in his writings indicate that he surely would have been in the 'sudden' camp if he had to choose sides" (p. 386). He goes on to state that

by contrast, Su's contemporary Huang T'ing-chien was a thoroughgoing "gradualist." Although like Su he advocated spontaneity, he believed that spontaneity could only achieve valid results if it operated "within the rules .... " (p.386)

With remarks such as these, Lynn departs even further from his stated aim in the chapter, and involves himself in quite a different project: using his own criteria of "subitism" or "gradualism" to label the various Sung poet-critics treated in his survey, regardless of whether the figures themselves ever used those terms. Thus, for example, in the following pages, we are told: that Huang's disciple Ch' en Shih-tao was a "gradualist" since he emphasized learning (p. 388); that the poet-critic Fan Tsu-yu (1041-1098) took a "gradualist"


approach since he recommended systematic study and practice (p. '389); that Wu K'o's poetry criticism "seems to be more like the sudden enlightenment of the Lin-chi school-not training or study '.but the accidental or arbitrary device will shock or startle one into enlightenment [i.e., understanding the meaning of a poem]" (p. 394); 'and that Yen Yii "seems to be a thoroughgoing gradualist at heart, at least in the sense that he advocates a long and arduous gradual preparation for the sudden breakthrough" of poetic attainment (p. A07). The problem in an of this is that Lynn never defines his criteria Jor judging the various poet-critics he treats as "subitists" or ';'gradualists." He apparently assumes that the terms need no clarifi'cation-an assumption that very few readers 'who have made it through the preceding chapters of Sudden and Gradual will be likely

,'to share. •.... This chapter succeeds, in part by design and in part inadvertently, in raising many interesting questions about the influence of Ch' an ,Buddhist doctrine and practice on theories of poetic creativity in

:;'lo;cSung China, and about the role played by poetry in the spiritual lives \~i;of Buddhist monks. Due in part to confusion in the conceptual r~':'framework of the chapter,none of the questions are treated system:jI;atically enough to lead to any clear conclusions. Nevertheless, the r,:lauthor does convey a sense of the range and richness of the available ~~jsources, and opens a number of different avenues for future research.

As/'Tung Ch'i-ch'ang' s 'Southern and Northern Schools' in the History I@:"and Theory of Painting: A Reconsideration," by James Cahill <'?;jj>

.; According to James Cahill, "the theory of the Southern and :', Northern Schools (nan-pei tsung lun) by Tung Ch'i-ch'ang (1555-'; 1636) is ... one of the crucial and influential formulations in Chinese

.:' painting theory." Most Chinese theorists of painting after the time of ;{ its publication in the early seventeenth century "echo it, or argue with ;.l,it, or are somehow affected by it" (p. 429). The theory, as Cahill r:i·explains it, was basically an analogy: "painting of Type A is to ~::\painting of Type B as Sudden Enlightenment (Southern) Ch' an is to ~llEgradual enlightenment (Northern) Ch'an." Actually, it is clear from


Cah:ilr s explanation that Tung was not really concerned with· defining two types of painting in any cleat-cut way. Rather, his aim was to distinguish two schools or lineages (!sung) of painters, the Northern and Southern, which he claimed parted company in the . T'ang, just as the.Northern and Southern schools of Ch'an had separated in the T'ang. The Northern lineage, as Tung traced it, was "that of the colored landscapes of Li Ssu-hsun and his son Chao-tao; . it was transmitted to Chao Kan, Chao Po-chu and his brother Po-su in the Sung period, and on to Ma Yuan and Hsia Kuei and their group" .. (p. 430). The Southern Lineage, on the other hand, was "that of Wang-wei, who fIrst used graded washes [in ink monochrome painting] and thus completely transformed the outline-and-color technique. This was continued by Chang Tsao, Ching Hao and Kuan T'ung, Tung Yuan and Chu-jan, Kuo Chung-shu, Mi Fu and his son Yu-jen, down to the Four Great Masters of the Yuan" (p. 430). Implicit in this formulation, of course, was the superiority of the "Southern" style of ink painting: anyone in the least familiar with the .• story of the Ch'an split into Northern and Southern lineages would· have known that the former was the discredited and defunct line of the "gradualist" Shen-hsiu, whereas the latter represented the orthodox transmission of the true dharma from the fifth patriarch Hungjen to the champion of sudden enlightenment, the sixth patriarch Huineng.

The question that Cahill focuses on in this chapter is why Tung's retrospective formulation of Northern and Southern schools of painting, based as it was on the analogy of the Northern/gradual and Southemlsudden schools of Ch' an, was "hailed as though it were a great historical truth." He proposes to analyze Tung's theory on two. levels: (1) its function as a polemical device in a concrete historical setting-a Ming dynasty debate that had social and political as well as artistic ramifications, and (2) its intrinsic appeal as an analysis of artistic creativity, presented as a universal truth.

With respect to the first of these considerations, Cahill argues convincingly that it was precisely the vagueness of the Ch' an analogy that made Tung's theory such a potent polemical device. Other schematic histories of painting produced earlier in the Ming dynasty


had also arranged old masters in opposing groups or lineages, using such criteria as period (Sung painting versus YUan painting), socioeconomic status (painting by professional masters versus that done by amateur, literati artists), and style (looser, more spontaneous styles versus ones that are careful and detailed) (p. 430). In the earlier schemes, "these criteria of division ... tended to interlock into grand unhistoricalpatterns in which Sung dynasty professionals working in detailed, decorative, academic styles were opposed to YUan dynasty amateurs working in free, spontaneous styles" (p. 430). The weakness of such formulations, Cahill notes, was their artificiality: very few of the old masters who were placed in a particular group actually met all of the objective criteria that were supposed to be definitive of the group. By using vague categories that were suggestive of some these distinctions but not objectively definable, Tung's Southern and Northern school theory avoided the weaknesses of its predecessors and left no room for criticism on factual, historical grounds.

Cahill does not pursue the point, but Tung's use of the sudden/ gradual distinction was similar in some respects to that of the T' ang eh'an polemicist Shen-hui, as described in the chapter by John McRae. I would also note that the success of the Ch' an school's ideology of "a separate transmission" from Sung times on was, like the success of Tung's later formulation of artistic lineages, due in large part to its vagueness. The dharma that the Ch' an school claimed to transmit was not only described as the essence of the Buddha's teachings (namely, enlightenment itself), it was avowedly formless and ineffable. Thus, when Ch'an genealogies were formulated, the quasi-historical claim that this or that individual monk belonged in the lineage by virtue of his inheritance of the dharma could not be challenged on any empirical grounds. Perhaps what led Tung to formulate the Ch'an/painting analogy was not so much the applicability ofCh'an theories of sudden enlightenment to the realm of art as the usefulness of the Ch' an concept of a historically concrete and yet indefinable lineage.

Bracketing such polemical concerns, Cahill also raises the question of what Buddhism and painting have in common that renders the Ch' an/painting analogy intelligible, and allows "recog-


nizable affinities or resem blances between beliefs and tendencies and movements in them." The answer he suggests is that

although both can be discussed in rational terms, truly significant choices in both must be made on nonrational grounds; and on these choices may hang one's spiritual fulfillment, one's very "salvation." The last term, in reference to art, is only partly metaphorical; the highest creative achievements apparently break on the consciousness of their artists as a kind of enlightenment, and failure, or partial failure, is perceived as falling short of a spiritual goal. (p. 433)

Given the wealth of information on various theories of sudden enlightenment contained in Parts I and II of the volume, it is a bit disappointing that the only similarity between Buddhism and painting that Cahill mentions here is that they both make choices on nonrational grounds. There are many more interesting parallels that could be drawn out in this context. For example, the "sudden" position, which states that enlightenment cannot be the product of any cultivation or artifice because it is something innate and unconditioned, is analogous in some ways to the notion that painting only attains perfection when it is something spontaneous and natural-the work of "liberated masters" (i-chia) rather than mere "fabricators" (tso-chia). Cahill does a better job of exploring similarities between the concept of sudden practice in the Buddhist tradition and Tung's idea that the scholar-amateur painters of theSouthem school were able to "cut through the long process of technical training and reach the highest attainments in painting directly" (p. 437). Here again, however, there is little indication that the author is cognizant of the Buddhological articles that appear in Part II, such as Gregory's presentation of Tsung-mi's metaphors for sudden and gradual cultivation.

Cahill dismisses the idea of "actual Ch' an content" in Chinese painting theory, reaffirming his position that Tung's use of Ch' an in the Southern and Northern schools theory is basically analogical. "Neo-Confucian ideas," he argues, "make up a much more pertinent intellectual setting for Tung's beliefs" (p. 438). The latter assessment


may be true in the sense that Tung was more directly influenced by Neo-Confucian writings, but it is also true that the specific NeoConfucian ideas that Cahill cites in this connection (such as the erasure of inner-outer distinction) were actually derived in good measure from the Buddhist tradition.

Cahill also dismisses the idea of Ch' an content in Tung's. landscape paintings and challenges the notion that any Chinese paintings, even the so-called Ch' an paintings of the late Sung period, can be regarded as "direct expressions of a Ch'an-enlightened state of mind." After all, he argues, "their artists may not, in fact, have been Ch' an practitioners at all, enlightened or otherwise." I would add that the Ch'an tradition itself does not seem to have regarded skill in painting as evidence of spiritual attainment, although it did make such a claim for skill in composing poetry. Cahill does,however, subscribe to the notion that the so-called Ch'an paintings of the late Sung "present, through analyzable artistic means, a vision of nature and natural phenomena that is consistent with the Ch' an mode of

. experience." That experience he characterizes as "apprehending reality in a single, sudden act of perception, instead of reading and absorbing it part by part" (p. 439). Such a mode of apprehension, we have seen,is. associated with a number of sudden enlightenment· theories in the history of Chinese Buddhism, including that ascribed to Tao-sheng; there is no good historical reason to describe it as a specifically "Ch' an" motif.

Mterword: "Thinking of 'Enlightenment' Religiously," by (Tu Wei-ming

One would expect the Afterword to a volume such as Sudden and Gradual to present some sort of overview or concluding remarks regarding the issues raised and data presented by the various contributors. In the Afterword, however, Tu Wei-ming gives little more than a polite nod to "the enormous erudition ... that the preceding chapters have demonstrated" (p. 448), after which he launches into his own idiosyncratic interpretation of the meaning of "enlightenment" in the Chinese cultural milieu. Tu' s vision of


enlightenment, we shall see, is a creative amalgam of ideas drawn from such diverse sources as Confucianism, existentialism a la Jean Paul Sartre, and the Zen of D.T. Suzuki. If it, were published as an independent piece, the Afterword might be evaluated as a stimulating thesis that suffers mainly from a lack of supporting textual and historical evidence. Appearing as it does at the end of a Kuroda Institute volume replete with concrete evidence from the Chinese Buddhist tradition that directly contradicts Tu's interpretation, however, the piece becomes an ironic reminder of the fact that some sinologists and students of Chinese thought still pay little heed to the legacy of Chinese Buddhism or the work done on it by modem Buddhologists.

Tu begins his discussion by harking back to the exchange between Hu Shih and Suzuki (discussed above in connection with the chapter by John McRae), noting that despite their many differences, "they both agreed that it [Ch'an] is uniquely Chinese" (p. 447). He also observes, more or less correctly, that throughout all the advances in scholarship on Ch' an over the past thirty years, "the primacy of 'enlightenment' as the ultimate concern of Ch'an spiritual training· remains unquestioned" (p. 447). Arguing from these two premises, Tu then asserts that

If Suzuki and Hu were right in characterizing Ch' an as uniquely Chinese, and if our understanding of Ch'an as the quest for enlightenment is on the mark, then there must be a peculiarly sinitic mode of approaching the enlightenment experience. (p . 448)

Tu's reasoning here seems plausible enough on the surface, but it suffers from a logical flaw and numerous historical errors that could have been avoided had the evidence of the volume itself been taken into account. In the first place, although it follows from the two stated premises that the Ch'an quest for (or understanding of) enlightenment must have been uniquely Chinese, it does not follow that there must be something that can properly be caned "the" (singular) "sinitic approach to enlightenment." Indeed, one thing that the present volume makes very clear is that the Chinese Buddhist tradition has


included a number of different, sometimes contradictory, interpretations of and approaches to enlightenment. Such contradictions are nowhere more apparent than within the Chinese Ch' an tradition itself, which (as G6mez, McRae, Gregory, and Buswell all demonstrate in their chapters) was far from monolithic. At best, it could perhaps be said (following McRae and Buswell) that the various branches of the Ch' an school occupied a rhetorical or polemical common ground, to wit, that in matters of enlightenment "sudden" is always presented as superior to "gradual." We have seen, however, that the meaning and practical implications of "sudden enlightenment" have been subject to sundry and conflicting interpretations within the Ch' an tradition. Unanimity in the adoption of the slogan certainly cannot be taken as evidence for a single "sinitic approach

. to enlightenment." Editor Gregory is on the mark when he observes in his Introduc

tion that the sudden/gradual polarity in Chinese Buddhist thought reflected and gave form to "a deeply rooted tension in Chinese culture between effortful cultivation and spontaneous intuition ... , a tension reflected, in its broadest scope, in the respective stances of Confucianism and Taoism-or between conformity and naturalness ... " (p. 8). Tu, however, speaks as if it were the subitist position alone that is representative of the "uniquely sinitic approach to enlightenment." He states, for example, that "the subitists' faith is '" deeply rooted in the indigenous traditions of Chinese thought and religion" (p. 453), and argues that subitist Ch' an, Mencian Confucianism, and Chuang Tzu's Taoism all share a "deep-rooted sinitic faith in the perfectibility of human nature through self-effort." (p. 455)

After discussing "the classical Confucian sense of learning as enlightenment" and finding it compatible with "the Taoist idea that in the pursuit of Tao we must learn to lose ourselves" (p. 499), Tu proceeds to address the case of Ch'an Buddhism:

Without a faith in human perfectibility, there is no intelligible basis for initiating the process of self-realization as a personal responsibility. Without a faith in self-effort, there is no inner strength that can be independently mobilized for the purpose.

166 . nABS VOL. 16 NO.1

The pivotal difference between this Confucian, Taoist, and Ch' an faith in self-effort on the one hand, and the reliance on an outside source in devotional religions ,on the other, lies in the . perception of human nature. Confucians, Taoists, and Ch'an Buddhists all believe that, although we are nor what we ought .. to b~, what we are is both the necessary and sufficient condition . for us to become what we ought to be. (p. 450)

Tu's characterization of Ch'an here adequately describes the ap- . proach taken by some historical representatives of the tradition, in . particular the conservative Tsung-mi and his doctrine of "sudden enlightenment followed by gradual cultivation." But it completely ignores the historical evidence that more radical branches of Ch' an such as the Pao-t' ang and Hung-chou schools tended to interpret sudden enlightenment in a way that denied the necessity of selfcultivation, or even portrayed cultivation as something that exacerbates delusion. In fact, these radical subitists took the position that· human nature is not perfectible, precisely because it is already perfect. The whole point of the sudden enlightenment doctrine, in this latter view, is that self-realization is a kind of gnosis or intuition that involves neither a process nor any special effort, and does not change anything. By lumping Confucianism, Taoism, and Ch' an Buddhism togetJ:ler the way he does, Tu paints a picture of an all-encompassing· "sinitic faith" that glosses over the tensions that existed in Chinese thought at large, and among Chinese Buddhists, between the ideals of purposeful cultivation on the one hand, and spontaneity and naturalness on the other.

The distinction that Tu introduces between the "Confucian, Taoist, and Ch' an faith in self-effort" and the "reliance on an outside source in devotional religions" seems to be based on the modern Japanese interpretation of Zen as a religion of "own power" (jirila) as opposed to the Pure Land tradition's reliance on the "other power" (tarila) of Amida Buddha. It is disappointing to find this hackneyed characterization of Zen trotted out in the Mterword to a volume that so clearly exposes its superficiality and inaccuracy. The distinction between "own power" and "other power" was never a major issue in


Chinese Buddhist thought, and is scarcely gennane to the sudden! gradual polarity. If one were to introduce the distinction as an interpretative criterion, however, one would have to conclude that the more radically subitist representatives of the Ch'an tradition were closer to the "other power" position than the "own power" one. The essence of the "other power" theology, at least in its more radical manifestations (e.g., the teachings of Shinran), is that one is already saved by Amida's vow, so no cultivation is necessary: one need only have faith in that fact. Similarly, the radical subitist position is that one is already possessed of Buddha nature, so no cultivation is necessary: one need only realize that fact. Both the radical Pure Land and the radical subitist positions, moreover, seem to posit a reality which, although its essence is a faith or an insight that humans have access to, clearly transcends and renders ultimately irrelevant the human capacity for self-transfonnation. Tu is wrong, therefore, when he claims that "subitist Ch' an" preaches enlightenment through selfeffort and that in it "no reference is made to a transcendent reality that provides a real fiat for this incredible human capacity" (p. 448).

Having posited the belief that "human nature is perfectible through self-effort" as the cornerstone of all indigenous traditions of Chinese thought, Tu has little choice but to argue that

lest we should misconstrue sudden enlightenment as an easy way out of the rigorous spiritual discipline required of all serious students of Ch' an, let us assume that the sudden-gradual debate is not about the necessity of practice but, given the centrality of diligent spiritual discipline, about what the authentic method of achieving enlightenment ought to be. (p. 453)

Once again, it is difficult to see how anyone who had read the preceding chapters in Sudden and Gradual could deny that the necessity of cultivation was one of the main bones of contention in at least some of the historical debates that we subsume under the rubric of sudden versus gradual. Tu, nevertheless, asserts that "the subitists and gradualists alike were in favor of diligent spiritual discipline" (p. 453), arguing that they only disagreed about the


method of achieving enlightenment. The gradualists, he implies, embraced the methods of scripture, tradition, ritual and teaching, whereas the subitists did not. Given the diver$ity of thinkers in the history of Chinese Buddhism who have taken some sort of sudden enlightenment position, it would have been helpful if Tu had identified just who he was referring to. Most of the figures associated with subitism in the preceding chapters, including Tao-sheng, Chihi, Tsung-mi, Ta-hui, and even Shen-hui, do not fit Tu's description of "the subitists" very well. Moreover, it is not clear what diligent practices Tu's subitists are supposed to have embraced as a method of achieving enlightenment. In the end, his account seems to be based more on cliches made popular by D. T. Suzuki (e. g., that Zen rejects texts and rituals in favor of immediate experience) than on any historical evidence. Tu's use of the category of "experience" to characterize the subitist position is especially problematic because experience implies a nexus of enabling causes and conditions, whereas the rhetoric of sudden enlightenment employed by figures such as Shen-hui, Tsung-mi, and Ma-tsu tends to posit enlightenment as something innate and unconditioned.

Tu's idiosyncratic interpretation of human nature and enlightenment also seems to be inspired in part by Sartre's existentialism. As human beings, he suggests, we are forever on a projectory that issues from and leads back to our fundamental human nature, but are always to some degree alienated from that nature. "Enlightenment," he says, is nothing other than "the light and warmth of human nature for self-disclosure, self-expression, and self-realization" (p. 450), but that self-realization is never complete:

Even though what we ought to be is what our human nature originally is, we existentially are neither. This human predicament presents a challenge: although we are born humans, we must continuously learn to be human; although our human nature has intrinsic resources for our ultimate self-realization, we must learn the way to tap them for our own "salvation." ... Evil, in this sense, does not have ontological status. It. is but an


existential description of what has gone wrong. (p. 451)

This is a far cry from what anyone in the Chinese Buddhist. tradition ever had to say about enlightenment, sudden or otherwise. The idea that living beings have, in a primordial moment of nescience, somehow lost sight of their own intrinsic enlightenment (pen-chueh) and wandered deluded through the round of birth-and death is, of course, found in Chinese Buddhism, as for example in Tsung-mi's analysis of mind. However, unlike the Confucian tradition that Tu locates himself in, Buddhists never developed the notion of a fixed (or even dynamic) "human nature." The "nature" (hsing) that Buddhists speak of realizing or "seeing" (chien) in enlightenment is the Buddha nature (fo-hsing), or the "undifferentiated dharmakaya of the Tathagata" (p. 292), within which so-called human nature exists as something conditioned, insubstantial, impermanent, and devoid of any fixed characteristics. Furthermore,

. Chinese Buddhists have frequently held that a complete and perfect realization of the Buddha nature-meaning a complete eradication or transmutation of the delusion that ordinarily obscures it-is possible for human beings, not only "ontologically" (to use Tu's terminology), but "existentially." Indeed, we have seen that one of the meanings of "sudden enlightenment"· in Chinese Buddhism is precisely that all of the qualities and powers associated with Buddhahood are recovered "at once," completely and simultaneously.

Although Tu presents his analysis of the "uniquely sinitic approach to enlightenment" in the guise of intellectual history, his disregard for proven lexical meanings of the term "enlightenment" (wu) in the history of Chinese Buddhism shows that he is not really concerned with applying the historical-philological method, but is in fact proffering a stipulative definition of enlightenment. Unlike Demieville, however, whose stipulative definition of "subitism" is posited as an aid to the comparative study of world religions, Tu evinces no interest in cross-cultural comparisons. Tu's approach, in fact, is neither historical nor comparative, but fundamentally theological in nature. That is to say, he takes a certain understanding of the divine and its relationship to human beings as axiomatic and proceeds to work out its implications using rational arguments. Thus,

170 . nABS VOL. 16 NO.1

for ex,ample, the reader is informed that

Human nature, as conferred by the mandate of heaven, is actually a concrete manifestation of' the tacit "covenant", between man .and heaven .... Each person, in the holistic cosmic vision, forms an affinity with the total environment as a filial son or daughter of heaven and earth. The particular enlighten_ ment that is available to the person is self-discovery. Selfdiscovery takes the form of representing that which one .' originally has as one's birthright .... The process that leads to . enlightenment is always gradual, whereas the experience itself, no matter how well one is prepared, is always sudden. (p. 451).

With this kind of categorical, normative statement about the human condition, Tu stops speaking the language of intellectual history and Sinology altogether and lends a contemporary voice to the already cacophonous theological discussions of the meaning of sudden enlightenment that flourished in medieval China.

Indeed, one of the noteworthy features of the Mterword is that Tu not only adopts a theological stance himself, but criticizes the modern academic community (Western scholars of Chinese Buddhism) for failing to do so. He indirectly chides the contributors to the volume by observing that despite the general agreement among scholars that enlightenment is the ultimate concern of Ch' an spiritual training, "a concerted effort to analyze 'enlightenment' as a scholarly enterprise is rare" (p. 448). Moreover, he says, there is an

implicit demand that we must try to take an inside participant's . point of view if we are to make sense of enlightenment as a religious experience. Surely we do not find it convincing to say that the only respectable scholarly mode of analysis is from the perspective of the disinterested observer. But to learn to be

. religiously musical is one thing, to actually experience enlightenment is another-something, to say the least, extraordinarily difficult. The gradualists, in outlining the procedure by which ' enlightenment study is to be pursued, provide us with a way of .'


applying our sophisticated conceptual apparatus of classification and analysis. The subitists, without giving us any handle by which we can exert our research effort, compel usto dismiss them as unintelligible. (p. 453)

1n other words, if scholars take an insider's point of view they may ..• be able to make sense of enlightenment as explained by Tu's ';;unnamed gradualists, but because the academic community is ;f"dedicated to the programmatic pursuit of knowledge" it is "not at all .. suited to appreciate the seemingly situational and inspirational .~pedagogy" of subitism (p. 453). The'only way to make sense of the sudden enlightenment position, Tu would have us believe, is to

:~'actually experience enlightenment." This claim is familiar to Western students of Ch'an and Zen

(Buddhism, thanks to D.T. Suzuki, and many have been bamboozled 'by it in the past. The contributors to Sudden and Gradual, however, ; evidently believed that they were able to get a handle on various ~subitists (exponents of sudden enlightenment doctrines) in the history

~~;of Chinese Buddhism and did not feel compelled to dismiss those ~? subitists as unintelligible. To defend his assessment of the limitations hof scholarship, Tu would have to maintain that when these modem .. , ...•. scholars employ a "sophisticated conceptual apparatus of classificaCc 'tion and analysis" to render their eminently intelligible accounts of ~Lsudden enlightenment (tun-wu) they are, ipso facto, missing the true 'J,import (or "experience") of enlightenment. Tu complains that ~,scholars have not made a concerted effort to analyze "enlighten;( ment," but when confronted with a volume that attempts to do just t that, he lapses into theological rhetoric borrowed from modern :}, Japanese Zen, claiming that enlightenment by its very nature must '>'forever elude the grasp of the intellect.

The fundamental difficulty that besets the academic treatment of r enlightenment in the West, I would submit, is not that scholars are

blinded to enlightenment by their intellectual apparatus or constitu;:tionally incapable (e.g., by dint of cultural or linguistic differences) :::of understanding East Asian Buddhists when the latter talk about f'-enlightenment. The problem is that the language of theology, "~j:


Buddhist or otherwise, a.nd the language of critical scholarly inquiry have different scopes and operate by different sets of rules. Although one person might be fluent in both languages, things can nevertheless be said in one that defy (grammatically, as it were) translation into the other. The scope of critical historiography, as we understand it in the West, is limited to facts of human experience that are, in principle at least, ascertainable by scientific methods. Thus, if critical historiography is to accept enlightenment as factual grist for its mill, it cannot define or interpret enlightenment in a manner (a la Ch' an and Zen theology) that places it, wholly or partially, in a miraculous or sacred realm beyond the scope of ordinary experience and rational inquiry.

Basically, critical scholarship has two approaches at its disposal. One approach is to treat enlightenment as an article of religious faith, doctrine, or ideology. In this case, the ascertainable facts open to investigation are the things that people have actually said or written about enlightenment, and the observable behavior of persons who claim enlightenment as a motivating factor- in their lives. This is the approach taken by most Buddhologists, including the contributors to the present volume, Sudden and Gradual. The other possible approach would be to treat enlightenment as some sort of definite, measurable, repeatable experience that human beings actually have, quite apart from the manifold ways in which they describe it. In this case, the ascertainable facts open to investigation would be the objective causes and conditions that occasion the experience, and the physiological and psychological states that attend it.

Neither of these critical approaches, of course, is likely to satisfy Ch'anlZen Buddhist believers in enlightenment. The first approach, with its insistence on putting quotation marks around everything said in the tradition about enlightenment, and its refusal to evaluate the truth content of such statements in terms of any objective referent, may strike the believer as a de facto denial of the reality that corresponds to the name enlightenment. And even when the critical scholarly method of fastidiously avoiding normative judgments is correctly understood as entailing neither an affirmation nor a denial of that reality, the believer may well dismiss it as irrelevant


pussyfooting. The second ap~roach admits that the name enlighten:ment refers to a real expenence, but then proceeds to deny as ,superstition the function within that experience of any sacred or 'transcendent spiritual forces. It denies the validity of the religious ,language used 'to explain enlightenment, in effect reducing enlightenment to something the Ch'anlZen tradition explicitly states it is 'not: a conditioned response to a nexus of physical and psychological stimuli. Thus, critical scholarship, if it plays by its own rules, is bound to disappoint the believer. Only theological discourse, because it is 'free to treat enlightenment as a concrete fact of human experience that .js nevertheless explicable in religious language as the operation of 'sacred forces or principles, is equipped to communicate with :lJelievers on their own terms.

. Theologians, of course, can be insensitive to or intolerant of each :~,'()ther' s positions without breaking the rules of theological discourse, SI\which allow dogmatic axioms to stand unchallenged as "revealed" or JJpersonally "attested" truths. Because theologians take the point of ~{:view of inside participants in their own religious traditions, morel"over, it can be difficult for them to study foreign traditions in a ~~sympathetic manner. The idea that scholars should strive to be '~"religiously musical," as Tu puts it, is one that I subscribe to 'wholeheartedly. My criticism of Tu is not that he is too sympathetic ,to Buddhist theology to maintain scholarly objectivity, but that he is not sympathetic enough. That is to say, he does not listen to the rich

§variations on the theme of enlightenment that the Chinese Buddhist rI tradition has produced, but drowns them an out with his own song of ••... ,. truth-his own ideology of enlightenment. The perspective of the l'disinterested observer, wherein one strives to bracket one's own i,opinions and agendas and apply the methods of historical criticism, ." is in fact necessary if one is to give bygone, foreign religions and

persons a truly sympathetic hearing and not merely discern in them ,i the echo of one's own voice.

'Concluding Remarks

The five years that have elapsed since the publication of Sudden

174 JIABS VOL. 16 NO. 1

and Gradual have seen a number of interesting and encouraging developments in the field of East Asian Buddhist studies in North America.

For one thing, there has been an noticeable increase in fruitful exchange between Buddhologists and humanists in other disciplines specializing in China, Korea, and Japan. Several successful conferences have brought scholars of Buddhism together with histOrians, linguists, art historians, and experts in Taoism and "popular" religion to read papers and discuss topics of mutual interest, and more such gatherings are currently in the planning stages. A few research projects involving principals from Buddhist studies and other disciplines are also underway. These developments, to a significant degree, have been instigated by Buddhologists who have become increasingly aware ofthe conceptual and methodological limitations of the Japanese scholarship with which they were trained. Impetus has also corne from the "other side," however, as a growing number of younger Sinologists, in particular, have come to realize that ignorance of Buddhism (that ostensibly "alien" religion) represents a not insignificant gap in their own academic training. It is gratifying to see that among the current generation of graduate students and junior faculty, many of the old prejudices which have in the past kept Buddhologists isolated from their Sinological and Japanological colleagues seem to be dying out.

Another significant change that has occurred as East Asian Buddhologists wean themselves from traditional (Japanese) approaches t9 the field is an increasing experimentation with postmodernist, poststructuralist, and post-Marxist approaches to ideology. Bernard Faure's recent book, The Rhetoric of Immediacy: A Cultural Critique of Chan/Zen Buddhism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991) comes to mind as the most striking example of this tendency, but it shows up in the work of others as welL More generally, the past decade has seen movement away from the philosophical (sometimes theological) treatment of Buddhist doctrine in the abstract and toward a consideration of the specific socialhistorical contexts in which Buddhism as a religion (complete with institutions, cult, and doctrines) flourished. It is this tendency,


perhaps, that has led Buddhologists into areas traditionally covered by other disciplines, both humanistic and social scientific, and facilitated the increasing interdisciplinary exchange mentioned above.

In the final analysis , however, the distinctive expertise of the East Asian Buddhologist is (and should continue to be) the ability to read and interpret Buddhist texts of all genres.

Notes

1. The following volumes have appeared in the series to date:

RobertM. Gimello and PeterN. Gregory, eds., Studies in Ch'an and Hua-yen. The Kuroda Institute for the Study of Buddhism and Human Values, Studies in East Asian Buddhism, No.!. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1983.

William R. LaFleur, ed., Dagen Studies. The Kuroda Institute for the Study of Buddhism and Human Values, Studies in East Asian Buddhism, No.2. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1985.

JohnR. McRae, The Northem School and theFormation ofEarlyCh'anBuddhism. The Kuroda :Institute for the Study of Buddhism and Human Values, Studies in East Asian Buddhism, No.3. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1986.

Peter N. Gregory, ed, Traditions of Meditation in Chinese Buddhism. The Kuroda Institute for the Study of Buddhism and Human Values, Studies in East Asian Buddhism, No.4. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1987.

Peter N. Gregory, ed. Sudden and Gradual: Approaches to Enlightenment in Chinese Thought. The Kuroda Institute for the Study of Buddhism and Human Values, Studies in East Asian Buddhism, No.5. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1987.

Donald S. Lopez, Jr., ed. Buddhist Hermeneutics. The Kuroda Institute for the Study of Buddhism and Human values, Studies in East Asian Buddhism, NO.6. Honolulu: University of Hmyaii Press, 1988.

Robert E. Buswell, Jr. and Robert M. Gimell, eds., Paths to Liberation: The Marga and its Transformations in Buddhist Thought. The Kuroda Institute for the Study of Buddhism and Human Values, Studies in East Asian Buddhism, NO.7. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1992.


2. Unpublished cover note distributed with original set of papers from the conference on "The Sudden/Gradual Polarity," Los Angeles, 1981.

3. Ibid. 4. Richard Robinson, Definition (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1954),35-58. 5. Paul Demieville, "Le miroir spirituel" (1947), reprinted in Choix

d'etudes bouddhiques, 131-156. 6. The Eastem Buddhist 7.1 (May, 1974):55-106, and 7.2 (October,

1974):49-82. 7. Ibid, 7.2:8l. 8. The Eastem Buddhist 17.1 (Spring, 1984): 79-107. Other surveys of

aspects of the field of Buddhist studies include: J.W. de Jong, "The Study of Buddhism. Problems and Perspectives," in Buddhist Studies: Selected Essays of J. W. deJong, ed. by Gregory Schopen (Berkeley: Asian Humanities Press, 1979), 15-28; Edward Conze, "Recent Progress in Buddhist Studies", in Thirty Years of Buddhist Studies (Oxford: Bruno Cassirer, 1967), 1-32; Philip Yampolsky, "New Japanese Studies in Early Ch'an History," in Early Ch'an in China and Tibe~ Berkeley Buddhist Studies Series, no. 5, ed. by Lewis Lancaster and Whalen Lai (Berkeley: Asian Humanities Press, 1983), 1-11; and Lewis Lancaster, "Buddhist Studies," in The Encyclopedia of Religion, ed. by Mircea Eliade (New York: Macmillan, 1987) 2:554-560.

9. The Eastern Buddhis~ 17. I 82. 10. Ibid, 7. 2: 71 . 11. Ibid, 7.272. 12. Paul Demieville, "Le miroir spirituel" (1947), reprinted in Choix

d'etudes bouddhiques, 131-156. 13. Zengakukenkyi150 (Kyoto, 1960), 158-177. 14. The Random House Dictionary of the English Language (Unabridged

edition). New York: Random House, 1973. 15. Unless otherwise noted, the following list of subitist characteristics is

based on Sudden and Gradual, 15. 16. Actually, much of the systematization of "Chih-i's thought" was

accomplished by later proponents of T' ien-t' ai, notably Chan-jan (717-782), a fact that Donner neglects to bring out.

17. Hu Shih, "Development of Zen Buddhism in China," in The Chinese Social and Political Science Review XV (no. 4, Jan., 1932): 481 ff.

18. "Development of Zen Buddhism in China," 485. 19. Ibid. 20. Ibid, 503. 21. Ibid, 504. 22. Suzuki Daisetsu, "Zen: A Reply to Hu Shih," in Philosophy East and

West 3.1 (April, 1953) 25-46. 23. Hu Shih, "Ch'an (Zen) Buddhism in China: Its History and Method,"


in philosophy East and West:3 (no. 1, April, 1953):16. :. 24. See YanagidaSeizan, "The Li-taiFa-Pao Chi and TheCh'anDoctrine of Sudden Awakening," trans. by Carl Bielefeldt, in Whalen Lai and Lewis R. Lancaster, eds., Early Ch 'an in China and Tibet (Berkeley Buddhist Studies Series, No.5. Berkeley,: pniversity of California Press, 1983), 13-49.

25. TaishO shinshii daizokyo 48.400c, 1-2. 26. TaishO shinshii daizokyo 48.400c, 5-7. Translation by. Jeffrey T,.

Broughton, "Kuei-feng Tsung-mi: The Convergence of Ch' an and the Teachings" (Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1975), 117-118.

27. This omission may have been due to limitations of space, for Gregory has treated the Chinese context of Tsung-mi' s thought thoroughly in other works, "the roost recent of which is Tsung-mi and the Sinificadon of Buddhism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991).

28. T. Griffith Foulk, "The 'Ch'an School' and Its Place in the Buddhist Monastic Tradition" (ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan, 1987),264-383.

29. See Donner, p. 212. 30. See, for example, the Shih-men lin-chien lu, Dainippon ZokuzOkyo

2B-21-4.295d.


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kung-an *~ Ii f! Iniao ~y

nan-pei tsung lun m~tl-!==EA , miiM

pen-chlieh *~ satori 'tfi shen i* shih-fa ~~$ shih ta-chih ==±*f~ ii'1 El

shu I-!= m shugy6 f~1T taiken i*,~


tariki 1fuJJ ting JE tso-ch'an *t~ tso-chia 1'P% tsung ~ m tun ~ tun-hsiu chien-wu 4:~f~~tft tun-wu 4:~ltg

wen-ta Fo'~ wen-tzu X* wu Itg wu-nien :lHE4 "' ........ /~'

yomikudashi ~nrl- T l yli-lu g~}~

zen shu tIlIf~ !ji~

zenshushi :rtt~5t: !ji~

Collected Papers. Vol. 2. by K. R. Norman. London: The Pali Text Society. 1991. 276 pages

This volume, as its title indicates, is the second volume ( of three) of a collection of papers written by K.R. Norman. It includes twenty-two articles flrst published between 1977 and 1983 in selected journals. The articles include Pali etymological studies that are based in both Jain and Buddhist texts, and treatments of a wide range of topics, from a translation and critical analysis of the eighth chapter of the

. UttaItidhyayana Sutra to an essay on the early history of the Pali Text Society. The .. artides are arranged in the order in which they were flrst published.

In "The Buddha's View of the Devas," Norman indicates that the so called "problem" of describing Buddhism, with its polytheistic elements, as "nontheistic" only emerges in the endeavors of Western scholars to classify Buddhism. The problem disappears if one interprets non-theistic to mean "accepting the existence of devas, but denying them any causal role in the universe" (1). He shows that "The real problem of Buddhism vis-a-vis the devas was not in accommodating them into the Buddhist cosmology, but in fltting the eternal gods of the Rgveda into the system of sarpsiira" (1). He proceeds to examine critically several Pali Text Society translations of the Sangiirava Sutta one of the two canonical passages on the subject-and he also discusses the relevant Sinhalese and Burmese manuscripts. Norman shows that the early translations are unsatisfactory because they do not give the full context of the brahman Sangarava's question to the Buddha: "kinnukho, bho Gotama, atthi deva? d ... ", nor do they clarify that the Buddha's claim that there certainly are devas, ("tbiinaso me taIp Bhiiradvlija, viditaIp yadidarp atthi de va fl') is actually the Buddha's attempt to verify the eternal reality of the devas; and that this interpretation takes care of the confusion rendered in the old translations when the questioner flrst refutes the Buddha's answer and then accepts it. Norman demonstrates that the words atthi de va should be corrected to atthi adbidevain order to render the passage meaningful. The passage would then show that the Buddha, rather than acknowledging the brahmanical gods to the brahman Sangarava, was asserting that there were indeed earthly princes (devas) in addition to beings who were superior to them (adbidevas)-like himself. The second essay on this topic, "Devas and Adhidevas in Buddhism," examines the

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K8IJ1J.akattbala Sutta-the second of the canonical suttas which illustrate the Buddha's view of devas. Norman shows that once again adhi has been mistaken for attbj and that the text becomes more meaningful when this rendering is presented. He concludes that in these two suttas, the Buddha asserted the existence of both earthly princes (devas) and superior beings (adhi de vas) , who are both subject to rebirth. The two articles are significant not just in clarifying the misperceptions that arise in previous translations-but also in illustrating the importance of recognizing the nature of devas and adhidevas for Buddhism as a whole.

In "AM in the Alagaddiipama-sutta," Norman examines the six wrong views on atta in this text. He shows that, contrary to the views of some scholars such as E.J. Thomas and R. Gombrich, Buddhism was acquainted with the Upanishadic notion of the world soul. This is clearly evident in the AJagaddupama Sutta since in proving that what is anicca and dukkba cannot be atta the Buddha must refer to an assumed know ledge of the Upanishadic atman which is both ni tya and sukkha. He substantiates this view by showing that both a Jain text and the Anattalakkh~asutta provide very similar arguments denying the existence of the Upanishadic·atman, know ledge of which these texts must presuppose. He shows that while the BUddha might not specifically deny the existence of attain the PaIi canon, the Buddha did deny the existence of a permanent individual self. This article is a useful one not only· because it questions and corrects previously held notions concerning the Buddha's views on atta, but also because it renders the significance of attarelevant to the broader context of the meaning of papcca-samuppada.

The essay "Dhammapada 97: a Misunderstood Paradox" is significant because it explains the double meaning of saddho in this little understood verse in the Dhammapada. While Erghart's translation of the verse indicates thai one who is without faith (assaddho) is an uttamaporiso, later translators have refrained from this usual translation of assaddho because of the confusion it brings to the context of the verse. Norman shows that there is an important difference between "to have faith in" and-for lack of direct experience-"to take some one's word for something." While both may be considered accurate renderings of saddahad, it is the verse itself that indicates that faith is not necessary, but there is a question as to whether the reference is to faith in the necessity of faith, as opposed to direct knowledge. Norman shows that, like assaddho, the other adjectives in the verse have double meanings, a "good" one and a "bad" one. He suggests that the bad meanings were lost by the time this pre-Buddhist verse was included in the Buddhist collection. Norman's insights into a single riddle-like verse of the Dhammapada points to the likelihood that other similarly paradoxical verses should be examined for possible double-entendres.

The essay "The Pratyeka-Buddha in Buddhism and Jainism" is a philological examination of the term pratyeka. Norman shows that the concept of the pratyekabuddha is pre-Buddhist and pre-Jain. He demonstrates that both the terms patteyaJpacceka may be derived from pratyaya buddha. Since pratyaya has the

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....• eDse of nimitta, this could refer to a buddha who was awakened by an external

.s aUse as opposed to those buddhas who were self-awakened. Norman discusses the i~similatiOn of the pratyeka-buddha conception into Buddhism and Jainism and sUggests that it was originally borrowed from another sect and then used to flIl in

: tile gap between bl!ddha and savaka. His examination sheds light on a new meaning ;of the concept of the pratyeka-buddha, who is not just an individual buddha, but 'originally was considered as a buddha who was enlightened in a certain way. < In "Four Etymologies of the Sabhiya Sutta," Norman considers the etymologies of the four words viriyava, ariya, kusala and iijiiniya to determine the history of the sutta. He maintains that itwas originally composed in a Prakrit and by means 'of a comparison with Tibetan texts indicates that the Sutta tradition was quite different from the commentarial tradition. He suggests that a study of the Sabhiya ~Sutta and its commentary across traditions shows evidence of a commentarial tradition that may have crossed sectarian boundaries. He urges caution in using metrical analysis alone to determine the dating of a text, since in the case of the .Sabhiya Sutta this is obviously misleading. ;.. In "Magadhisms in the Kathavatthu" Norman examines the nominative and vocative singular masculine "e" forms in the atthakathifs and in the Kathifvatthu. 'He indicates that these forms were known and recognized by Buddhaghosa. He . demonstrates that the language of the Kathavatthu and the Eastern Ashokan :inScriptions share affinities and indicates that the Kathavatthu was fIrst uttered in Magadha. He suggests that the close relationship between the language of the Kathifvatthu and Sinhalese arose from the colonisation of Ceylon by people from Eastern India and that is likely that the "e'.' forms of the Kathavatthu are due to the influence of Magadhi, rather than Sanskrit or Prakrit.

The volume includes four essays on the Ashokan pillars. In "Middle IndoAryan Studies XIT' :Norman examines recensions of the Ashokan edicts in order to ascertain the procedure for the transmission of exemplars. He shows that the majority of Ashokan inscriptions are based on just two "master" exemplars. In the ''Notes on the so-called the Queen's Edict of Ashoka," he provides a new and corrected version of the inScriptions and shows that the main purpose of this edict was to give instruction about the accounting procedure involved concerning gifts made by the second queen. In "Ashokan Sila-tha:Qlbas and dhaJ!lIDa-th~bas," he emphasizes the importance of discerning the difference between the two types of pillars. He shows that Ashokan inscriptions give no indication that stone pillars did not exist before his time and that-in the light of the paucity of evidence available to the linguist-the art historian and the archeologist may be helpful. In "Notes on The Ahraura: Version of Ashoka' s First Minor Rock Edict," Norman discusses the unusual words buddhase salile, "the body of the Buddha," found in this version only, and also discusses the numerals 256 which are missing form this version, but appear in most others. He shows that a particular sentence in the edict including these discrepancies was misread by the scribe, who made conjectures and added his own meanings when he inscribed the edict. Thus Norman's philological critique clarifles the signifIcance of miswritten ak$ar8S and presents a clarifIcation of this


otherwise misunderstood edict. . "The Dialects in Which the Buddha Preached" is a slightly revised version of

"The Language in Which the Buddha Taught." These essays discuss the wellknown Vinaya passage concerning the proposed translation of the Buddha's Words. . Norman sets out to explain two problems: 1) Why, though they knew the difference between the two languages, Pili was referred to as Magadhi by the missionaries to Ceylon, and 2) Whether Buddhaghosa's sources, which say that the BUddha spoke Magadhi, are correct. He shows that since Pili., the language of the canon waS akin to Magadhi, Buddhagbosa probably called the language of the cano~ Magadhi-and hence also the language of the Buddha.

The Pili. text society has added a useful index of references to Old and Middle Indo-Aryan words used in the volume and inserted the pagination of the original versions in addition to cross references to other articles by Norman on similar subjects. However, apart from these alterations in the presentation of the papers since their fIrst appearance, there has been no effort made to reorganize the papers . in any useful way. For example, several of these articles may be grouped according to subject matter, such as the four articles on the Ashokan edicts, the three articles on Pall etymologies and the two articles on the Buddha's view of the devas. While the cross-references do serve as a useful guide to the reader who wishes to pursue a study of Norman's views on a particular topic, it might have been even more helpful if in doing so slhe were not obliged to search within and across the volumes of Norman's collected essays. Nevertheless, credit must be given to the Pali Text society for the work it has done in collecting and re-presenting these essays which originally appeared in a large number of journals.

The publication of this volume and its two companion volumes will be useful not just in providing easy accessibility to Norman's numerous philological studies on Pili. and Middle Indo-Aryan Studies, but also in reminding scholars that retranslations of the PaIi texts are long overdue.

Nirmala S. Salgado

The Dating of the Historical Buddha. Die Datierung des Historischen ,Buddha, Part I (Symposien Zur Buddhismus Forschung, IV. I), Edited by Heinz Bechert. Gottingen: Vandenhoek & Ruprecht, 1991, iX-V: 525 pp.

Although many dates have been proposed in the past for the death of the historical Buddha, the two most commonly accepted now are 543/44 'and 483/86 B. C.; the ftrst by most Buddhists and the second by most modem scholars. Both dates are bas~ originally on the accounts provided by the ancient chronicles of Sri

'LanIa!. DipavaIp.sa and MahiivaIp.sa; and the cornerstone is the date of ASoka. 'Actually, the second date is a corrected version of the ftrst after a critical

,:;~'examination of the sources. Most modem scholars have found the second date, ~;~i;based on the so-called "corrected long Chronology," unproblematic. ;;It. But in 1988 a Symposium was held under the sponsorship of the Akademie ;'ri{tlder Wissenschaften (Academy of Sciences) in Hedemunden near Gottingen to open ~;.:the question again. The volume under review originates from this Symposium.

';riFifty-two scholars contributed to the Symposium. Of these ftfty-two, there were ~{?tbirtY from Germany, including sixteen from various seminars at Gottingen, and ')i four non-European guests who probably happened to be there. Among other ·.:i,I~!European participants there were two each from France and Norway, and one each ~!ii:~;from Sweden, Austria, Belgium, and U. K. There were ftve from Japan, three from 'ii~g<U.S. A. and one each from Israel and Nepal. ~}~. The present volume is the ftrst of two (or three?) parts of the publication of :~~rthe results of this Symposium. In the present volume there are thirty-eight papers ;'~;:;)and an Appendix consisting of an extract from Lamotte's Histoire du Bouddhisme

':Indien. Seven of the papers are in German and two in French. The rest are in ,?'EngHsh. Apart from the Introductory Essay by the editor of the volume, Heinz

.'l:Bechert, the number of 37 papers have been arranged thematically under eight '1i sections as below:

i~'I. History of Research ;'.: II. The Date of the Buddha in thecontext of the Indian Cultural History :> m. The Chronology of Buddha: The Indian Tradition Evaluated

N. The Spread of the Theravada Chronology and. its implications V. Traditions of Late Indian and Tibetan Buddhism

Central Asian Traditions VII. East Asian Traditions

The Axial Age Theory

4 10 7 5 3 2 4 2

Although the body of the volume consists of thirty-eight papers, its spirit is < represented by three papers of Heinz Bechert (pp. 1-21; 222-236; 329-343), thefrrst "' of which is the Introductory Essay. It is the result of an idea nourished by him for

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more than ten years. In a paper read at the conference seminar ofIndological studies in Stockholm in 1980, he formulated the view that the "corrected long chronology" cannot be upheld any longer. A summary of his view was also presented at the 2nd conference of the International Association of Buddhist Studies at Nalanda in January, 1980. Bechert's paper was subsequently published, thanks to the encouragement he received for its publication from Eggermont (Bechert, 1983: 29-36).

In his Introductory Essay, Bechert opens with a statement:

There is no information on the dates of the historical Buddha, the founder of the Buddhist religion, which has been unanimously handed down by aJJ major Buddhist traditions and universally accepted by scholars, nor have

. scholars been in a position to arrive at a general agreement concerning this question. (italics mine) (p. 1).

But two pages later, having recognized that this "corrected long chronology" has served as something of a bed-rock for Indian chronology, Bechert appears to take a second look at this categorical statement and remarks that,

Notwithstanding a very small number of exceptions, we meet with this "corrected long chronology" in practically all the modern handbooks of Indian history, world history, history of religion etc. published in Western countries or in South Asia during the last hundred years. It is generally presented as an established fact.." (italics mine) (p. 3)

As part of the "Concluding Remarks" of his Essay, Bechert accepts:

We cannot provide the historians with a new chronology of the Buddha's dates which would be approved by all or by most experts. We may state that this symposium has at least made it clear that the "general agreement among scholars that Buddha died within a few years of 480 B. c." has become a thing of the past. The chronology is only one of the several chronological hypotheses, the validity of which was argued for in one contribution only. The majority of the contributors-including those who have analysed indirect evidence-suppose that the date of the Buddha's Parinirvai;la OCCUlTed considerably later than 480 B. C. but they could not agree how much later the event would be dated. (italics mine) (p. 20)

Referring to "the origins of chronological information and its use by historian, (sic ?)" and citing "examples of the fabrication of chronological constructions and synchronism" in the case of Sri Lanka, Becbert fmally ends the "Concluding Remarks" of his Essay:

REVIEWS 189

It seems that, as a consequence of our fmdings, various assumptions concerning the now generally accepted Indian chronology before Alexander's campaign should be reconsidered. This refers to historical dates as well as to those reflecting cultural developments and literary works, and it includes the problem of the chronological relations between early Indian and early Greek philosophy and their possible mutual influence which will be discussed by W. Halbfass in his contribution to the second volume." (italics mine) (p. 21)

}In his second contribution, evaluating the Indian tradition, Bechert states (pp. 234-

'235):

From the material available for evaluation the conclusion seems to force itself on us that there is no substantial evidence at all in favour of the corrected long chronology, while there are many arguments which point to a later date on the Nirv8I}.a.

If this is the case, the question arises whether the short chronology should be accepted, because it is clearly the earliest Buddhist Chronological Tradition. However, one hundred years, A. B. is a suspiciously round figure. In an earlier contribution, I argued that it is not impossible that Asoka decided to have his consecration performed after his conversion to Buddhism on the auspicious occasion of the hundredth anniversary of the Nirv8I}.a, which happened to fall within this period of time. However, I think that this suggestion is unlikely in the highest degree, because we have no evidence for the handing down of exact chronological information in India before the Maurya period, and because Asoka was not yet deeply influenced by Buddhism at the time of his consecration. Therefore, this date of one hundred years handed down in the relevant Indian texts in (sic.) nothing but another round figure without historical value.

Thus, the only way to fix the date of the Nirv8I}.a seems to be the use of indirect evidence. Possible methods have been listed in the introductory essay, and they have been made use of by several co-authors of this volume. From all available evidence, it seems to be that the Parinirv8I}.a of the Buddha must have taken place sometime before Alexander's Indian campaign. However, I doubt that the information which has been handed down would allow us to determine, with any reasonable degree of certainty, the decade or two decades in which this event took place. On the other hand, the indirect evidence which has been presented during the Symposium has given sufficient reason to suppose that the Buddha's Parinirv3J:la must be dated considerably later than calculated by the corrected long chronology, viz., in


the 4th cenrurj and probably after the fIrst decade of that century. I would like to refer in particular to the reasons put forward by Wilhelm Halbfass Hermann Kuke, and Georg Von Simson. From these, the conclusion on~ must come to is that Buddhism was still arather YQung movement at the time of Asoka. As I suggested above, the existence of Buddhist mythological lore at the time of Asoka by no means disproves these arguments, because such beliefs originate very soon after the demise of Indian religious leaders even today, and this is to be expected all the more for that early period. And in fact, von Simson's conclusions are corroborated by the evaluation of the archaeological material presented by Herbert Hartel. (italics mine)

In the last paragraph of the "Conclusion" of his paper, Bechert states:

Some authors, e. g. H.W. Schumann and K. R. Norman, do not reflect my views correctly when they cite me as favour1..ng the short chronology, i.e. ca. 368 B. C. In 19821 expressed the view "that any suggestions of this kind (i.. e. accepting the short chronology) may be premature. Later on I clearly stated that there is no basis for accepting the short chronology as a histOriCal date.

In the Preprints I have suggested that "the Buddha's NirYfiIJ.a may be dated between about 80 and 130 years before Asoka's coronation, i. e. not a very long time before Alexander's Indian campaign, i. e. between ca. 400 B. C. and ca. 350 B. C. After the symposium, I still subscribe to this supposition. I would think that a somewhat later date is not inconceivable, but I consider Alexander's Indian campaign as the deflnitive terminus ante quem. According to my understanding, the symposium has not produced unambiguous evidence which would allow us to make a more exact statement. It also remains rather unlikely that such evidence will be discovered in the foreseeable future. (italics mine) (p. 236)

To restate, itis clear from the excerpts quoted above that Bechert would fIrstly, reject all the theories of early dates which include not only the dead ones, but also, and particularly, the very live ones, i. e. not only 544/43 B. c., but the "corrected" version of it, 486/483 B. c., which incidentally fmds support in the "Dotted Record" too. Secondly, he does not fInd any basis for accepting the "short" chronology as a historical date. Thirdly, he is convinced that "the parinirvfllJ.a of the Buddha must have taken place sometime before Alexander's campaign, i. e. between ca. 400 and ca. 350 B. C. and, while "a somewhat later date is not inconceivable," he considers Alexander's Indian campaign as the "definitive terminus ante quem."

Whether or not the Symposium succeeded in its objective, Heinz Bechert deserves full credit for planning and conducting it. I only wish he had a few more

REVIEWS 191

chOlars from among those who believed in the traditional dates, even if it meant s less homogeneous Symposium. I cannot help also noticing a hidden Eurocentric ~otivation in Bechert' s endeavour, indicated by the obsession with Alexander and

the miracle of Greek civilization. . . Time and space will not permit me to cover fully all the contributions. I will

have to be selective. But the conclusions arrived at by some, and the circumstantial alllbiance created by others, do not help confum Bechert's claim that the Symposium, declared the "corrected" long chronology "as a thing of the past."

Leaving aside two papers in the last section (VIII) dealing with the Axial Age theory, which appear to me as unnecessary inclusions, it is clear by and large that the nine papers of Sections V to VII, dealing with the East Asian and Central Asian

· traditions on the one hand and those of the late Indian and Tibetan Buddhism on the other (see pp. 399,409-10,415,437,447-48,456,485,489,499), are either uncommitted or support one or the otherversions oflong, and longer, chronologies. Chinese sources favour not only the so-call "corrected" and "uncorrected" versions of the long chronology, but even provide extended versions ofit. Franke has noted

· that Chinese secular histories have, as a rule, never mentioned the Buddha and his • presumed dates. This is above all true for the annalistic histories (p. 447). Durt has stated that "the Korean and Japanese Buddhist sources do not contain any original

· material for objective dating of the life of the Buddha" (p. 485). And Gronbold remarks that "In the Buddhist Tantric texts there was neither inclination nor

. necessity to calculate the date of the historical Buddha." (p. 399). Section IV (pp. 329-84) deals with the spread of the Theravada chronology and

its implication. The fIrst of its five papers is again contributed by Bechert. He states:

As we have seen, the Theravada chronology is attested for the fIrst time in an inscription of the first century B. C. By the time of the composition of the Mahavamsa, it was already accepted as the Buddhist chronology in Sri Lanka. It came to be used as the Buddhist chronology by all followers of the Theravada tradition, including Buddhists in Burma, Thailand, and other Asian countries. However, it was also known and used by Buddhists of other denominations, as mentioned in the Introductory Essay (above, pp. 16 f). There it has also been mentioned that the Theravada chronology was recommended by the World Fellowship of Buddhists for acceptance as the standard Buddhist chronology.

The chronology of the "Dotted Record," which has been referred to in various sections of this volume, should also be mentioned in this context, because there is no doubt that it originated from the Theravada tradition. If calculated in the Christian era, a few years ei ther side of 485 B. C. is recorded in this document for the Buddha's Parinirv8i;1a. This means that it differs from the Theravada chronology by approximately 60 years. The explanation of this difference remains disputed. As long as Wickremasinghe' s chrono-


logical hypothesis of an earlier Buddha era of 483 B. C. in Sri Lanka Was widely accepted, it wa<; easy to bring the Theravada chronology and that of.· the "Dotted Record" into agreement. After this hypothesis was disproved (see above, p. 223), it became more difficult to (1xplain the correspondenceof the "corrected long chronology" and the "Dotted Record". (p. 341)

However, Bechertappears more interested in the chronological miscalculation in the Sri Lankan sources and the debate over apparent traces of short chronology in Dipavarpsa, thereby emphasizing only the negative aspects of the basis for the Theravada chronology. In this connection he has given special importance to questions raised recently by W. H. de Zoysa of Sri Lanka, who proposes 384 B .. C. as the "correct Buddhist era." A detailed presentation of his theory is made by Keifer Pulz (pp. 363-77).

Mallebrein examines the evidence of the Bodh Gaya inscription, which indicates continued use of the Theravada chronology in India. Mabes Raj Pant provides information on the date of the historical Buddha according to Nepalese tradition, and states:

From this it is quite clear that to frod out the year of the parinirvill}.a we have to subtract 1811 from the given Saka year 1194. In doing so, we get the result (1194-1811=617) that the Buddha's parinirvill}.atookplace 617 years before"· Saka SaI!lVat started. As Saka Sru:p.vat starts 78 years later that the Christian era, to get the year of the Buddha's parinirvill}.a in the Western calendar one should subtract 78 from 617, which gives the result of 539 B. C. This, of course, is five years earlier than the date generally accepted. (p. 361)

Out of the remaining three sections of the volume, number I has four papers dealing with the history of research on the date of the Buddha. In the frrst, Hartmann, analysing studies published in Western languages (pp. 27-45), remarks on the contributions of Indian scholars:

Not all their contributions are marked by the methods of critical research, and it is difficult at time to clearly differentiate articles which can be still be considered scholarly from those which are either unscientific or written from the standpoint of a believer be he a Jain or Buddhist. There are some which are betternot taken too seriously, but generally it can be observed that the treatment of questions of Buddhist history rather differs from the way in which some Indian scholars deal with other historical and semihistorical periods and events of their own past like, for instance, the age of the ~gveda or the Mahabharata war. Again, this can be easily explained by the fact that Buddhism is absent from India and that Buddhist matter seem to have little direct bearing on Hindu culture and the Hindu conception of its own past. Therefore, no urgent need is felt to search for indications which might help .-

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to date back to time immemorial events connected with the establishment of Buddhism. (p. 27)

It is true that the problem of the date of the Buddha has not in India attracted the required attention it deserves. But, in my opinion, this is not because "Buddhist matters seem to· have little direct bearing on Hindu culture and the Hindu conception of its own past." This Hindu-Buddhist dichotomy in life and culture of India is uncalled for. Also, I think Hartmann's statement about Indian scholarship is unfair on the whole. This not only shows bias in the author but also a selection, wittingly or unwittingly, of some of those studies which do not belong in the category of critical scholarship in India itself, and which are generally not taken seriously. It is like creating one's straw man and shooting at it, examples of which are noticed elsewhere in the volume, too.

The quality of Gustav Roth's survey of Hindi writings (pp. 49-54) is marred by his selection of authors. It is unfortunate that while he devotes five out of six pages of his paper to one scholar, Pandit Bhagvad Datta, who was respected for his knowledge of the Aryasamaj, he omits to mention even the names of many other historians whose writings in Hindi were marked by critical and balanced scholarship and which found acceptance in modern scholarship.

Braun's short contribution (pp. 45-48) is made with the limited objective "to clear up some misunderstandings about the MaJaJaiJkaravatthu and to outline its position in the history of Bmmese Buddhism." I wish a fuller treatment of the history of Burmese research and acceptance of the so-called Theravada chronology had been presented to the seminar. Similarly, it is surprising that Hajime Nakamura too, contributes and equally short paper (pp. 55-57) to give an account of Japanese research on the problem, which hardly does justice to Japanese scholarship. In a work like the present volume the subjects and authors could be assigned and planned better, and provided a fuller, more representative and thorough coverage than has been made available to readers.

Section II, which consists of the largest number (ten) of papers, deals with the problem in the contexts of Indian cultural history. The first paper of this section is by Harbert Hartel, on "The Archaeological Research on Buddhist Sites." This paper is important not only because its author is the only archaeologist in the group but also because he paper has influenced five or six scholars to change their minds on the issue. Hartel "scouts" through the ancient Buddhist sites of Kusmagara, Bodh Gaya, Rajagrha, Sarnath, Kausambi, Sravasti, Vaisllii, Lumbini, and Kapilavastu (Tilaurakot and Piprahwa-Ganwaria) and doubts "if all the places where the Buddha lived, or which he is said to have visited, existed already in the 6th century B. C." Hartel adds, "as the argumentation is open to attack, I wish to express my firm conviction that the shorter dating of the NBP will finally prove correct. From this point of view and under the consideration that we possibly have to date the first settlement of one or the other place in question later than the sixth century B. c., then the dating of the Buddha in the fifth to the fourth century B.C.


is quite probable" (italics mine) (p. 80). As noted, Hartel was the only archaeologist representing the discipline in the

Seminar. None of the archaeologists, it may be noted, who have actually worked at the above-mentioned sites and reported their results, and even others who have flrst hand experience of scientillc excavations and explorations in the relevant regions of Bihar, D. P. and Nepal, upon whose work-results Hartel has based his study, are not quite so sure as he is. And, to the best of my knowledge, the only site in India Hartel himself worked was Sonkh near Mathura, which is just outside the core relevant region under discussion. I have been fortunate in not only personally visiting almost all the relevant sites the regions of eastern D.P., Bihar and Nepal but also in actually directing and participating in the scientific excavations of such sites in the region as of Kumrahar (Pataliputra), VaisaIi, Rajghat (Varanasi). Prahladpur and Ayodhya, and I have directed a village-tovillage archaeological survey of some of the eastern districts of U.P. On the basis of my knowledge and experience, I am afraid I cannot support the conclusion arrived at by Hartel.

Now, among the sites listed by Hartel, two important ones, Sarnath and Kusmagar, have not yet been scientillcally excavated to the natural soil. At Lumbini also it is not clear whether the excavations down to the natural soil were scientifically done in any considerable area. At Bodh Gaya, where, as Hartel has noted, no trenches could be dug "at the temple itself to determine the older use of this place," excavations were recently (1981-85) carried out by the Archaeological Survey ofIndia at a mound adjacent to the temple known as Taradih. It is proven now that this region was "a very old settlement area reaching back to chalolithic times"-as Hartel admits (p. 64).

Again, of the remaining sites listed by him, Hartel appears to be incorrect in his information, with the result that his following statement regarding Rajagrha is misleading:

Quite a surprise lies in the fact that an old age for Rajagrha could not be proved anywhere. The existing radiocarbon dates lie at245± 105, 260± 100, 265± 105 for habitation and defense. The wallfrom New Raj agrha, allegedly of AjataSatru' s time has been built between 400 and 300 B. C. according to all calculations. As it remains unexplained whether some of the associated wares found again together with the NBP have an earlier origin, the time of the rise of Rajagrha can best be pushed to 500 B. C. after these results. Whatever may come, Rajagrha belongs basically to the younger ancient cities of India. (p. 65)

But the carbon dates to which Hartel has referred belong to the samples from period Ill-A at the New Rajagrha excavated by R. Singh of Archaeological Survey of India and not from the Old Rajagrha. Hartel has mixed up the old and the new in Rajagrha.

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Regarding Kausambi he admits that:·

Archeologists agree that the early habitation levels are dating back to a period just prior to the advent of the Northern Black Polished Ware, i. e. at the t.ime when the fortifications were built." (italics mine) (pp. 66-67)

But after referring to the "heated debate" on the dating of the fortification, he adds:

In the light of the pottery and associated fmds a date not earlier than sixth century B. C. is in all probability very near to the truth." (p. 67)

According to Hartel, the same is the case with Sravasti, which he says is in all probability not older than the sixth century B. C.

In regard to Vaisili, he agrees that:

The pottery situation above the natural soil is quite similar to the one reported from Sravasti, both starting in the NBP period with stray fmds of Late specimens of PGW. (pp. 68-69)

But, unlike his statement for Sravasti date, he states that,

The date of this earliest habitation at VaisaIi is to be ftxed rather around 500 B. C. (pp. 68-69).

Lastly, discussing the identity of ancient Kapilavastu, Hartel takes into account the results of work of the sites of Tilaurakot and Piprahwa-Ganwaria. But, as in the case of other sites, here, too, he does not agree with the excavator's dating of its earliest period, as 800-600 B. C. In his opinion, "here also nothing is perceptible which could have allowed a dating of Ganwaria older than 500 B. c." In this case Hartel's comparison of "an interesting circular wall" found.in the ftrst occupational layers" at Ganwaria with a similar wall in his own excavation at Sonkh (Mathura district), which is to be dated according to him in the earliest Mauryan time, is hardly justified. How casual Hartel is in making such comparisons based on similarities may be noted from his estimates of dating of Sravasti and Vais[li (pp. 68-69). The negative picture presented by Hartel is essentially based on an understanding of the NBP dates which is not correct, or is at best only partial. He as only conveniently selected the lower limit of the NBP chronology, the early phase of which would belong in the 7th-6th centuries B. C. and the late phase would begin in the 4th-3rd century B. C. His observation that "the majority prefers lower dates" is misleading.

Most of the participants in the Seminar who, to the best of my information, were not archaeologists, appear to have taken Hartel's analysis for granted. Thus, apart from Bechert in his Introductory Essay (p. 14) and again in his second paper


(p. 235), Von Simson (p. 99), Kulke (p. 107) in Section II and Bareau (p. 221) in Section III, were lured by it to give up their earlier views. The space does not pem-lit me to go into fmther details of the archaeological evidence here, but I will discuss them soon elsewhere.

In his paper entitled "Der Zeitgeschichtliche Hinterground der Entstehung des Buddhismus und scine Bedeutung fUr die Datierungs frage," Von Simson concludes (English Summary):

One of the possible ways of approaching the question of the date of the Buddha is the analysis of the economic and cultural milieu in which his religious movement started. The origin of the Buddhist Sangha is in this paper seen in connection with the emergence of cities in the Central Ganges Basin. Decisive of the development of early Buddhism seems to have been its support by rich landowners, merchants, [manciers, physicians, etc. who belonged to an urban milieu where rational thinking had got the upper hand over brahmanical ritualism and where discussions among competing movements not bound by tradition were usual.

There is some reason for the assumption that the Buddhists did not belong to the earliest among these new groups bound to an urban milieu. Especially the Buddha's concept of the Middle Way between the more radical attitudes of the earlier period. If this is true, the Buddha should not be placed at the beginning, but some time after the emergence of cities in the area. In the light of archaeological evidence (see H. Hartel's contribution to this volume above, (pp. 61-89», this would suggest a rather late date forthe founder of the new religion. (p. 99)

Concluding his paper on the significance of the Buddha's date for the history of North India, Kuke states:

Another interesting result of these deliberations would be the realization. that, according to a later date of Buddha, the process of state formation, beginning with the rise of the mahajanapada kingdoms in the early fifth century and leading to the emergence of the Maurya empire in the late fourth century, occurred within one and a half centuries, certainly a tremendously short period for such a far reaching socio-political development. In view of this discernment it may be necessary to reassess the possible impact of Alexander's short appearance in Northwestern India on this last stage of state formation in early India, leading from kingdom to empire.

Buddha's Nirvfu:1a may not be any longer the "earliest certain date of Indian history." However, it would be wrong to conclude that therefore Alexander's Indian campaign has to be regarded as India's earliest historical date, as often assumed mainly be European historians. The earliest historical date of Indian history now certainly is the conquest of Gandhara and the

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Indus valley by Darius around 520 B. C., a date which, so far, we had been used to associate with the life of Buddha and t..l:Ie rise of Magadha. (p. 107)

There are two papers in this section which deal with the date of Mahavira and bis synchronism with the Buddha. Mette observes in his paper that "all attempts to throw light on the beginnings of J ainism have to rely on early Buddhist literature" and that "Buddhist remarks which appear to refer to Jainism, possibly reach back in tbe past, to a time when the person of Mahavira had not yet reached its later inlportance" (p. 137). Eggermont states that "Mahavira died in the month of Pbalguna 252 B. C. in the 15th year of Asoka's reign at the age of 62 years" (p. 151). This is in keeping with 261 B. C. as the date of the Buddha's death, given by him in his paper in Section III (pp. 237-251). Both the Buddha and Mahavira would thus be contemporary to Asoka! This is sufficient to give a shock treatment to tbose who believe in the earlier dates; no wonder Bechert received encouragement in the initial stages of his pursuit of the problem, as acknowledged by him (p.7).

There is an interesting long paper in this section (pp. 152-82) by Gananath Obeyesekere which deals with the myth, history and numerology in the Buddhist Chronicles. While I am not inclined to attach significance to numerology in the discussion -for I believe ailka-jyoti$a is a foreign gift to India late enough for our consideration of the date of the Buddha-I also do not subscribe to the philosophy of suspicion suggested by Obeyesekere. But I would like to draw attention to his conclusion, which is worth consideration:

Once the chronological imperative in the Theravada Buddhist construction of history is formed, it motivates the later recording of historical events. They too must be given chronological specificity. As Bechert points out, this concern with chronological specificity, generally co-exists with accuracy from the reign of Devanampiyatissa onwards. Prior to this reign there is chronological specificity but not accuracy as I noted in respect of the postparinirvfu:1a events. Even in the period after Devanampiyatissa, where records were, for whatever reason, not available, chronological specificity was retained but not accuracy. This is where Dhatusena's patriIine comes in: since accurate records were not available, the gap in chronology was filled by category numbers. Rhetorical devices took the place of chronological accuracy, but these rhetorical devices did not violate the norm of specificity. That the Mahavarpsaconcern with chronological specificity was successful is very clear from the fact that modem historians have been seduced into thinking that chronological specificity indicates accuracy. (p. 182)

The last three papers in this section, by Von Hinilber, Lienhard and Halbfass, all dealing with the indirect evidence of linguistics and literature-Indian and


Greek-throw interesting light on the discussion and help create an ambiance hostile to the long chronology.

Although Hintiber admits that "languages do not develop at an any predictable let alone regular pace," and "it is impossible to use linguistic evidence alone in solving chronological problems" (p. 183), he concludes his paper with the statement:

Here, we are confronted with the result of a complicated linguistic process the working of which cannot be observed directly. Starting from th~ normalized language of the Buddhist religious literature, we have to Work our way back almost exclusively by help of the inner evidence deduced from the surviving texts to uncover the beginning of this process during the lifetime of the Buddha. The duration of this gradual development, which at the same time is a function of space and time, can hardly be estimated, if only approximately. Therefore, the inscriptions of Asoka stand as the flrst datable testimony of Middle Indic as long as the date of the Buddha has yet tobe found. (pp. 192-93)

Discussing the indirect evidence of classical poetry, Lienhard concludes:

Applying the Long Chronology, we would place early kavya as it was known to these Buddhist authors somewhere between 580 and 530 B. C., which defmitely seems to lie too far back in time. A better, more probable date can be concluded by applying a "shorter chronology" and flxing Buddha's Parinirvfu;la, as Andre Bareau does, around 400 B. C. with a margin of about twenty years added or deducted. This would move early kavya to the period of ca. 500-450 B. C. and allow us, in a much more convincing way than the. Long Chronology does, to accommodate the beginnings and the development of a new poetry which, from the latter part of the Late Vedic period onward, lead to the formation of early kavya." (p. 196)

Halbfass examines the early Indian references to the Greeks and the flrst Western reference to Buddhism and asks,

But how do we account for Megasthenes' own apparent silence concerning Buddhism, in view of the fact that he visited Patalipura and should, if we accept the traditions about this city, have noticed conspicuous Buddhist monuments and, moreover, have heard about Buddhist life and thought? Dible says that for Megasthenes the Buddhists were still too insignificant to be mentioned separately. However, this would be rather strange-' chose etrange', as Henri de Lubac notes-if, indeed, Buddhism had already been alive and growing, and enjoying the patronage of various rulers in this area, .

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fot a period of two centuries. Could it really have been that inconspicuous and insignificant that Megasthenes either overlooked it or provided that he heard about it, chose not to mention it all? Of course, we are not entirely . certain that he never mentioned it; and at any rate, the value of such an argumentQm a silentio (sic) would be limited. But the fact itself that the extant fragments do not provide clear references is remarkable. Although it does not allow us to draw precise and definitive chronological conclusions, it could be used for a cumulative argumentation in favour of a later date for the Buddha At the very least, it would seem to be easily compatible with the assumption that Buddhism was not yet two centuries old at the time of MegaSthenes, that it had not yet produced distinctive monuments and institutions, and that, instead, it was still rather young and not yet fully visible when Megasthenes visited the city of Patalipura around 300 B. C. (italics mine) (pp. 207-8)

Since Halbfass himself acknowledges the weaknesses in his speculation I need not discuss his points further here, except to note that ifby "distinctive monuments" those in durable material like stone are meant, the question of their existence before Moka, does not arise, a fact well known to art historians and archaeologists.

Section III includes seven papers. We have already referred to papers of Bechert and Eggermont. But one may note with surprise that Andre Bareau, who had so clearly expounded and supported the so-called "corrected" long chronology in his earlier contributions, and agreeing even in his present contribution to this volume that "the ASokan inscriptions of Rumindei and Nigli Sagar prove that, in 250 B. C. Buddhist mythology and devotion had reached a very high stage of development," has taken for granted the archaeological evidence as put forth by Hartel and states without a question:

However, the recent and important results of the archeological work in the Gangetic region prove, as an eminent professor has clearly shown during the symposium, that the Bhagavant' s life could not have begun much before the middle of the 5th century B. C. (italics mine)

Therefore, if we set the date of the Buddha's Parinirvfu;la around 400 B. C., within a margin of about twenty years added or deducted, we are probably not very far from the historical truth. (italics mine) (p. 221) .

In perhaps the longest paper of the volume (43 pages) Akira Hirakawa makes a detailed evaluation of the sources on the date of the Buddha and states in the end that:


. Most of the sources in the Tripitaka claim that King Asoka lived about one hundred years after the death of the Buddha. It is safe to surmise that among the Buddhists in India, the theory that the Bud9ha's death occurred on hundred years before the time of King Asoka was predominant. This dating is supported also from the perspective of the development of the Sangha, and we can conclude that this theory is the most reasonable. (p. 295)

In his second short contribution to the volume Hajime Nakamura concludes that the Buddha was born in 463 B. C. and died in 383 B. C.

K. R. Norman examines various aspects of evidence related to the dates of both the Jina and the Buddha and sets out to conclude systematically as follows:

1. All Buddhist schools agree in their accounts of the First Council in 1 A. B.

2. All Buddhists schools agree, in general terms, in their accounts of the heresy of the Vajjis (Vrijis) and the holding of the Second Council (except for the number of heresies). The Mahasanghikas also include the story in their Vinaya, so they cannot have been heretics. All sources date the event 100 A. B., but this is unlikely. The accounts in the Pali chronicles and the Samantapasiidika state that all the theras concerned had seen the BUddha. If this is true, then the council can scarcely have been later than 65 A. B.

3. The Vajjis were presumably expelled from the order, and we hear no more about them. Their expUlsion was confused by the Theravadins with a later schism, that of the Mahasanghikas. That schism was caused by Mahadeva's five points. Some Northern accounts date from this schism c. 137 A. B. and connect the occurrence with the Nandas. This must have been c. 325 B. C. If we assume that the number 137 means 37 (i.e. and indeterminate small number, say 20-25) years after the date of the Second Council, then we get a date for the Buddha of c. 410 B. C.

4. If we assume that he list of five Vinaya-dharas is a list of teachers and pupils, rather than a list of successive chiefs of the Vinaya, and take an average of 30 years for their difference in ages, then we get a date of c. 415 B. C. for the death of the Buddha.

5. The Jain tradition gives a date of 155 years after the death of Mahavira for the coronation of Candragupta, which we can date c. 320 B. C. We have a firm connection between S thiHabhadra and Candragupta's immediate predecessor Nanda, and we have a date of 170 years after the death of Mahavira for the death of SthiHabhadra's predecessor, the sixth Jain patriarch Bhadrabahu. He therefore died about fifteen years after

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Candragupta's coronation. By taking an average figure of 15 years for each of the six patriarchs we can date the death of Mahavira 75 years before the coronation of Candragupta, i. e. c. 395 B. C.

6. We shall probably not be far out if we assume that both Mahavira the Jina and Gotama the Buddha died within the period of ten years either side of 400 B. C. (pp. 311-12)

Finally in the last contribution of section III, Gen'ichi Yamazaki discuss the list of Patriarchs in the Northern and Southern legends, and on the basis of his study

. fIXes "the NirvID;la year at around 486 B. c.," with the rider that "as this is a rough calculation errors of a few years would naturally be unavoidable" (p. 320), and states in his Appendix A, that "the period bf two centuries from the days of Bimbisara to the building of the Maurya empire was not long but quite natural" (p.

A 325).

It is not surprising to note several linguistic inadvertences, spelling and grammatical mistakes in a book of such length and with such a diverse background of contributors. To give only a few examples: p. 37, "intends to established' for

, "intends to establish"; p.44. "He than demonstrates" for "then demonstrates"; p. 71, "Kapilavastu should, therefore, be sought not very farm from it" for ''Kapilavastu should, therefore, be sought not very far from it"; p. 80, "the scouting through the Buddhist sites has, rouse doubt in our mmd" for "the scouting through the Buddhist sites has, roused doubt in our mind"; p. 325, line 2; "in" for "is";

.. p.361, line 18, "earlier" for "later."

Lastly, I must again express my appreciation for Heinz Bechert's continued endeavour for almost a decade to rediscover and settle, if possible, for good, the date of the historical Buddha. Even if he has not been able to deliver the goods he has certainly succeeded in forcing others to give second thoughts to their convictions.

A. K. Narain

Gender & Salvation: Jaina Debates on the Spiritual Liberation of Women, by Padmanabh S. Jaini Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1991, 229 pp.

Padmanabh S. J aini has assembled a fascinating and significant anthology of six Jaina texts on the topic of strimok$a, the salvation of women. The texts date from c. 150 C.E. to c. 1700 and one of the many rewards of this collection is the historical unfolding of the arguments. Specialists will rejoice in the copious notes while non-specialists can easily sample the original texts. In his preface Robert Goldman points out the value of texts such as these for fIlling in the early social history ofIndia, a history he describes as having been misrepresented by scholarly studies exclusively based on the normative texts of Brahmanical culture and not giving due weight to those of the Jains, Buddhists, and Ajivikas.

J ainism is perhaps best known for its radical formulation of ahirpsa., non-injury to living things, to the point where Jaina ascetics may eventually starve themselves to death, and for the nudity of some of its monastics, the sky-clad (Digambaras) who contrast with the white cloth-clad (Svetambaras). Not surprisingly, the debate about the spiritual qualifications of women often focuses on the issue of nudity. Importantly, the nudity of male ascetics was and continues to be acceptable in Indian society. The nudity of women was and remains highly problematic.

The Jaina texts are interesting both for the arguments they put forward about women's spiritual abilities and for the ways in which they formulate their arguments. For instance, Sakatayana, a ninth century defender of women' s spiritual abilities said that women's spiritual inabilities cannot be proved through either "perception, inference, or scriptural testimony." (pp. 49-50) These are exactly the types of evidence that are almost universally used in such arguments. Scriptural testimony, though, turns out to be rather malleable, as is shown in another ninth century Jaina text that sets itself against women's spiritual abilities:

Q: How do you then reconcile your position with the sutra text which says that all fourteen gunasthanas [the fourteen stages of spiritual development] are possible for a woman? A: The word "maI}usil).si" [woman] in the sutra means a man who is characterized as psychologically female (bhavastriviSista-manu$ya); he may be called a woman because he experiences the female libido (striveda). (p. 110)

We are all familiar with these exegetical strategies. Essentially the Svetambaras (clothed) support the spiritual abilities ~fwomen

while the Digambaras (nude) oppose it. The Digambaras argue that women are inherently inferior to men and therefore cannot achieve salvation, and they offer four reasons or proofs to support this claim.

202

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1. Women differ morally from men in that they cannot commit the extremely . iInpure acts that men can; consequently women cannot be bominto the lowest hell. lama cosmology posits three realms: various hells, the earth, and various heavens. The hells and heavens are multi-layered: the lowest hell is for the worst acts and the highest heaven for the purest acts. The argument follows that since women's Illoral nature prevents them from being born in the lowest hell, therefore, as an act of cosmic balance, their moral nature prevents them from being born in the highest Heaven. In other words, being more temperate morally than men is perceived as a liIllitation-if they cannot be as bad they cannot be as good. The Digambara argument reads:

The excellence of knowledge and so forth, required for mokg is not found in women;

because such excellence and so forth must have absolute perfection; just as women lack the ultimate extreme of demerit,

which is the immediate cause of rebirth in the seventh hell. (They therefore also lack the absolute perfection required for attaining moksa.) (P.9)

2. Both the Digambaras and the Svetfunbaras agree that mok$a can only be achieved by being a monastic, but for the Digambaras, monastics must be nude and this is their second reason why women cannot achieve salvation-because they

.. cannot be nude. For the Digambaras clothes indicate a clinging to possessions and the mendicant must be free of all such things. Both sects deny women nUdity, but the Svetfunbaras still allow women to become mendicants and therefore have access to salvation. Significantly, S vetfunbara monks are not nude either, which for the Digambaras means they are not mendicants, so by arguing in favor of clothed nuns, the Svetfunbaras are also arguing for clothed monks. Obviously this was a significant factor in the debate about women. Since this whole debate was in the hands of men, in a sense the Svetfunbaras were arguing for themselves, not just for women.

3. Women have inferior skill in debating. Actually, women were not allowed to participate in debates, although J aini finds evidence for women participating in debates in the Utt:lrfidhyayana Siltra. Jaina debates were more than a measure of scholarship; they also involved the summoning of occult powers in order to defeat opponents, and such powerful public displays by women were highly problematic.

4. Their inferior position in society and the ecclesiastical order. The Digambaras argue further against the spiritual potential of women based on the inferior status of women within Indian society. For example, because of the rule of primogeniture only sons, not daughters, may inherit a king's throne and in every household the man, not the woman, is the master of the house. The idea seems to be that women's inferior social position reflects her inferior spiritual position.


From time to time Jaini also informs the reader about other aspects of the actual . lives of Jaina women, such as when he discusses the rules governing Jaina nuns rules which appear to be remarkably similar to those of the Buddhist nuns. Po; instance, the .svetlimbaras, supporters of the full liberation of women, require the· f0llowing:

Even if a nun is ordained for a hundred years she must pay homage to a young monk, even if that monk has been ordained that very day, by going forth to meet him and by greeting him in reverence. (p. 20)

Since the texts in this book focus on Jaina nuns it is a particularly Valuable source for comparative studies with Buddhist nuns. The fact that at the time of Mabavira a much higher percentage of nuns (all clothed) than monks existed in the J aina monastic communities, a percentage that holds today among the .svetlimbara sect, prompts questions about the Jaina community and the Buddhist community. For instance, what effect does their being in the majority have on the Jaina . understanding of women' s spiritual abilities? Did their superior numbers keep this debate alive? Wby has the order of Jaina nuns survived while the demise of the order of Buddhist nuns has been widespread since at least medieval times? While Jaini does not go into these questions, the materials he is presenting will be of enormous help to scholars working on women in South Asia. This study of Jaina women creates new questions for the study of South Asian women in general and ' helps us to look at old questions in new ways. For instance, learning that Jaina women can no longer participate in debates, though Jaini fmds evidence that they did in the past, leads one to reflect on the importance of debating in B uddbism and to wonder if (a) this limitation was placed on Buddhist nuns (probably) and (b) if so, how significantly did that contribute to the decline of the order of Buddhist nuns? Such debates were often public events which helped focus the attention of, the laity on the monastic orders and often led to contributions. Falk's study of the . decline of the Buddhist order of nuns in India! suggests that the contributions from the laity were significantly less for nuns then for. the monks, thereby hastening the end of the order of nuns. Not being able to debate could have had economic effects as far reaching as the spiritual effects. .

The elaborate discussions about why a female body prevents one from . achieving mok$a provide a much needed background for the shorter Buddhist·· discussions as to whether liberation can be achieved in a female body, as for instance in the Vimalakirti SiItra. Both the Jains and the Buddhists list types of . beings that are restricted to men, and these lists are used in arguments about the ability of women to achieve mok$a. The Buddhists have the five ranks, listed in chapter 11· of the Lotus SiItra as: Bra.brna, Indra, a guardian of the four quarters (these three are all divine beings), a Cakravartin (world conqueror), and a . Bodhisattva. In Sanskrit.these words are all masculine. The Jains, in turn, have a list of the five great illustrious beings which includes two of those in the Buddhist,

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list, the Cakravartin and Indra, and adds the great hero, his faithful brother, and the Tirthailkara, none of whom can be female. This helps us to understand that what appears to be a narrow sectarian view is really part of a pan-Indian attitude toward women. This was not, however, taken as the final word on the subject, and Jaini's pithy analysis of the Buddhist positions in relation to the Digambara and svetfunbara positions is eye-opening. One important distinction, though, exists between the Jaina and Buddhist positions on women's spiritual potential: while Buddhist scriptures preserve a positive statement on the spiritual potential of women attributed to the Buddha on the occasion of the founding of the order of nuns, no documents exist which show that Mahavira was ever questioned on this

point. Similarly, the frequent references to Sita, the Hindu heroine, as an example

of a spiritually accomplished woman, show the J ains dealing with a major internal sect difference and, at the same time, defining themselves in relation to the Hindu society that surrounds them. And, in the same way as the Jaina discussion sheds light on the Buddhist and Hindu discussi~n, it also fits in with and sharpens our focus on discussions about the nature of women from other times and places, such as Aristotle's biological arguments. Jaini's very particularized and detailed study awakens within the reader unpleasant memories of the various other religious, philosophical and scientific analyses that have denigrated women throughout the

.. centuries. The fourth point of Mary Daly's seven-point analysis. of the ways patriarchy undermines women is obsessive and compulsive attention to detail used to dehumanize women.2 Here, among these Jaina texts, is another example of just that. The arguments of the Digambaras discuss details about women as if these details were the very essence of women and in the process they lose sight of women as living human beings whom they are denying access to salvation. For instance, the earliest text (c. 150 C.E.) presented by Jaini, and therefore the frrst extant Jaina text to deny women mendicant status, states:

#7 In the genital organs of women, in between their breasts, in their navels, and in the armpits, it is said (in the scriptures that) there are very subtle living beings. How can there be the mendicant ordination (pravrajyff) for them (since they must violate the vow of ahiIpsfi) [by crushing these beings through the simple everyday motions of their bodies]?

#8 Women have no purity of mind; they are by nature fickleminded. They have menstrual flows. (Therefore) there is no meditation for them free from anxiety. (p. 35)

This text is quoted as scriptural authority and elaborated upon 1500 years later:

Moreover, it is said in the scriptures that on account of the constant flow of the menstrual blood, various types of minute beings are generated in the


genitals of women; this also occurs on other parts of her body, such as her breasts. For this reason, women suffer from constant itching caused by these' beings (which does not allow) them ever to have any cessation of sexual desire. Harm also occurs to those minute beings due to the destruction brought upon them. How therefore can a woman assume the mahavratas (of a mendicant when she cannot be totally free from sexual desire or causing. injury to living beings)? (p. 166) . '

These ideas about women's bodies lead to the notion that through the physical contact of sex, women cause men to kill millions of these minute beings when men rub against their skin and inside their vaginas.

Both sects agree, though, that one of the fundamental causes of being born a woman is having committed vices, such as cheating and crookedness, in other lives. In other words, women are associated with cunning. Secondly, once a person, female or male, is so advanced spiritually that they have generated the Jaina view of reality, called samyaktva, they cannot be reborn as a female. The highest wisdom, short of liberation itself, erases any femaleness.

In conclusion, Jaina discussions as to whether or not women can achieve salvation require defining first what leads to salvation for men; only then can one argue that women either have or lack the same spiritual capacities as men or not. In other words, the debate, in the end, centers on what it takes to achieve salvation. A sidebar to this debate, but one that continues to appear down through the centuries, is the discussion it generates about hermaphrodites, who are denied initiation as mendicants by both sects. One Digambara text makes an explicit connection between hermaphrodites and women:

Mok§a having the characteristic (of the Four Infinities, knowledge, perception, bliss, and energy) is possible only for men and not for women. This is because, like the hermaphrodite, she is unfit for it and because of the impossibility of establishing any proof for the existence of that mok$a. (p .. 114)

Such an argument shows its androcentric bias: the religious hero is exclusively male; women and other non-males, such as hermaphrodites, are deviant.

Notes FNancy Auer Falk, "The Case of the Vanishing Nuns: The Fruits of

. Ambivalence in Ancient Indian Buddhism," in Unspoken Worlds: Women's Religious Lives in Non-Western Cultures, eds. Nancy A. Falk & Rita M. Gross (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1980) .

. 2. Mary Daly GynlEcology: The Metaethics of Radical Feminism (Boston: Beacon Press, 1978).

Serinity Y Dung

A Bibliography of Buddhist Materials in the Recorded Sound Collection of the Library of Congress

by Floyd B. Hooker

The Recorded Sound Collection of the Library of Congress in Washington, D. C., shelves approximately two million sound recordings. In this magnificent collection are treasures on Buddhism which are an unusual resource for Buddhists and Buddhologists alike. These works reflect the development of Buddhism from its earliest times in ancient India to the various schools of the present day. The works were recorded in different parts of the world (i.e., North America, Europe, Asia and Australia). A few excerpts from a recent brochure in the Recorded Sound Reference Center are informative:

The Library of Congress acquired itsfrrst sound recording, a wax cylinder recording of the voice of Kaiser Wilhelm II of Germany, in 1904, but did not begin to systematically collect recordings until 1925 .... Private collectors have donated thousands of recorded treasures, performing artists have contributed copies of their radio programs, and corporations and associations have transferred their recorded archives to the nation .... The Library's sound recording holdings now grow by nearly 100,000 items each year, through copyright deposits, gifts, and purchases.

This article lists works from all of the major schools of Buddhism. Items in section I, LECTURES, TALKS AND SEMINARS, were recorded exclusively on cassette, in English or with English translation. Those in section II, CHANTS,

. LITURGIES AND MUSIC and Section III, IN PROCESSING, NOT YET ON SHELF were recorded predominantly on LP or compact disc with jacket notes in

. English andlor one of the many languages of Europe, or of Asia with transliteration and romanization.

The bibliography was compiled by extensive on-line searching of the computer catalogue database of The Library of Congress and downloading to 5 1/

209

210 . nABS VOL. 16 NO.1

4 inch disk. WordPerfect 5.1 was used to edit the succeeding disk on an IBM Personal Computer. Every consideration has been given to provide the researcher with the maximum amount of useful information; bence, it is annotated uSing information from the computer records where that was ,available. Recordings that contain both sacred and secular selections have been included. Moreover, the shelf list numbers, which are required to request a work in the Recorded SOund Reference Center of the Library of Congress, are printed in bold and have been verified by comparing them with the published works. The recordings are catalogued by the Library of Congress using a voluminous and dynamic text known as Anglo-American Cataloguing Rules. Thus, differences in the way cataloguers record data are to be expected and are reflected in this publication. Since the Use of diacritics varies with the publisher, sometimes varying within the same publication, the diacritics in this bibliography correspond to those used by the various publishers. This bibliography contains those materials on Buddhism which . were catalogued by November 3, 1992.

In maintaining such an immense collection, some minor errors of detail are inevitable. Since they pose no major obstacles to the researcher, I have not noted them here. For any errors of transcription in this publication however, I take full responsibility.

Finally, I want to thank the staff of the Library of Congress, particularly Mr. Edwin Mathias of the Recorded Sound Reference Center, for their and useful assistance and for allowing me expanded access to the Library's collection. My thanks are also due to Ven. Katugastota Uparatana Thera, who, amid his multifarious duties as Buddhist chaplain of American University and Coordinating Director of The Bhavana Society, found time to make his personal computer available to me for the duration of tliis project.

SECTION I LECTURES, TALKS AND SEMINARS

1. Aaronson, Bernard Seymour. Tantric chanting, poetry & hypnosis. {Sausalito}: Big Sur Recordings, RSS CASS 11016, {1969}. 2 sound cassettes: analog.

2. Aitken, Robert. Therapeutic implications of life in a Zen Buddhist training center. {Sausalito}: Big Sur Recordings, RSS CASS 11334, {1972}. 1 sound cassette: analog.

3. Bstan-'dzin-rgya-mtsho, Dalai Lama XIV, 1935-. Compassion. Ithaca: Snow Lion, RYE 1615, {198-?}. 1 sound cassette: analog.

General note: Lecture, delivered to the Theosophical Society in Wheaton, Ill. Presents a

speech of the Dalai Lama in which he describes political, social, and cultural

Recorded Sound Collection 211

conditions in Tibet. 4.---. Harvard seminars. Jeffrey Hopkins, trans. Ithaca: Snow Lion, RYB

1639-1650, {between 1981 and 1986}. 12 sound cassettes: analog. General note:

Talks in Tibetan with intermittent translation into English. "Arranged by the American Institute of Buddhist Studies, co-sponsored by the Center for the Study of World Religions of the Harvard Divinity School"-Narration. Issued also as monograph The Dalai Lama at Harvard / H.H. the Dalai Lama of Tibet; translated and edited by Jeffrey Hopkins. Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion. 1988. Lectures, delivered in Emerson Hall, Harvard University, Aug. 3-7, 1981.

Summary: Presents a five-day lecture series delivered by the Dalai Lama with the help

of translator Jeffrey Hopkins. The Dalai Lama reviews the most fundamental teachings of Buddhism by teaching the four noble truths. He goes on to elucidate the topics of selflessness, meditation, tantric practice, and the power of great compassion. He concludes by discussing the will to attain enlightenment.

Added corporate authors: American Institute of Buddhist Studies. Harvard University, Center for the Study of World Religions.

5. ---. 37 practices of all Buddha's sons. ---. Ithaca: Snow Lion, RYB 1616-1619, {198-?}. 4 sound cassettes: analog.

General note: Talks in Tibetan with intermittent translation into English. Recorded prior to

the Kalachakra initiation in Madison, Wis. Summary:

Presents a commentary by the Dalai Lama, using a translator, on the path of the Bodhisattva as found in the work of Rgyal-sras Thogs-med Bzan-po-dpal (1295-1369) titled Rgyal-sras lag len so bdun ma

Added different title: Thirty-seven practices of all Buddha's sons.

6.---. Vajrasattva ---. Ithaca: Snow Lion, RYE 1610, {198-?}.1 sound cassette: analog.

General note: Lecture in Tibetan with intermittent translation into English.

Summary: Presents a lecture by the Dalai Lama in which he describes vajrasattva

meditation and recitation, a mantric technique for purifying ill deeds and infractions of vows. .

7.---. Wisdom and compassion in tanlIa. ---. Ithaca: Snow Lion, RYE 1620, {198-?}. 1 sound cassette: analog.


General note: Lecture in Tibetan with intermittent translation into English.

Summary: Presents a lecture of the Dalai Lama who, through,a translator, expounds on

wisdom and compassion in tantric Buddhism.

8. Campbell, Joseph, 1904-. China and Buddhism. {Sausalito}: Big Sur Recordings, RSS CASS 10961, {1969}. 1 sound cassette: analog.

Added series personal: Campbell, Joseph, 1904- World Mythology Series.

9.---. Tibet. Sausalito: Big Sur Recordings, RYE 2514, {between 1969 and 1977}. 1 sound cassette (1 hr.): analog.

General note: Recorded Aug. 16, 1969 in San Francisco, Calif.

Summary: Joseph Campbell presents the plight of the Tibetan lamas and describes the

major phases of death as depicted in the Tibetan book of the dead. Huston Smith tells the story of his discovery of multi-toned chanting in a Tibetan lamasery in India.

Added author personal: Smith, Huston.

10. Cox, Harvey Gallagher. Beyond secularity. {Sausalito}: Big Sur Recordings, RSS CASS 11068, {1968}. 1 sound cassette: analog.

11. Dreyfuss, George. Debate in Tibetan Buddhism. Ithaca: Snow Lion, RYB 1942-1946, {198-?}. 5 sound cassettes: analog.

Summary: Presents a series of lectures by George Dreyfuss, the ftrst Westerner to receive

his Geshe degree, detailing the fundamentals of debate and its importance for spiritual development in Tibetan Buddhism. Includes question/answer sessions with the audience covering a broad range of issues surrounding individual practice.

12. Ganden Tri Rinpoche. Bodhisattva vows. Sharpa Tulku, trans. Ithaca: Snow Lion, RYE 1604-1605, {198-?}. 2 sound cassettes: analog.

General note: Lecture in Tibetan with intermittent translation into English by Sharpa Tulku.

"These talks were made possible by the AIBS"-Publisher's catalog. Summary:

Presents a description by Ganden Tri Rinpoche of the bodhisattva vows as he leads a group of listeners in taking them.


Added author corporate: American Institute of Buddhist Studies.

, 13. --. Revelation ofManjushri. -. -. {Ithaca}: {Snow Lion}, RYB ]870-1883, {198-?}. 14 sound cassettes: analog.

General note: Lectures in Tibetan with intermittent translation into English by Sharpa Tulku.

"These talks were made possible by the AIBS"-Publisher's catalog. Summary:

Presents a series of lectures delivered by Ganden Tri Rinpoche as a coromentary on a text titled Revelations of Manjushri 0. e. Mafijusri). This coromentary is a discussion of the graded path to enlightenment.


14. ---. Three principle aspects of the path.--- Ithaca: Snow Lion, RYE 1892-1897, {between 1984 and 1986}. 6 sound cassettes: analog.

General note: Lectures in Tibetan with intermittent translation into English. "These talks

,'> were made possible by the AIBS"-Publisher' s catalog. Recorded in Boston, ~Mass. rr Summary: ,'. Presents a two-day seminar led by Ganden Tri Rinpoche in which he lectures f;and answers questions from participants regarding Buddhist practice to attain r salvation. 1'. Added author corporate:

American Institute of Buddhist Studies.

15. Gorton, David Cole. A Zen approach to dying. {Sausalito}: Big Sur Recordings, ~SS CASS 11395, {1974}. 1 sound cassette: analog.

16. Govinda, AnagarikaBrahmacari. The cultural heritage of Tibet. {Sausalito}: Big Sur Recordings, RSS CASS 11406, {1972}. 1 sound cassette: analog.

17. ---. The practice of Tibetan Buddhism. {Sausalito}: Big Sur Recordings, RSS CASS 11462, {196-?}. 1 sound cassette: analog.

z 18. ---. The teaching of Tibetan Buddhism. {Sausalito}: Big Sur

Recordings, RSS CASS 11461, {196-?}. 1 sound cassette: analog.

19. Hopkins, Jeffrey. Approaching the tantras. Ithaca: Snow Lion, R YB 1925-1927, {198-?}. 3 sound cassettes: analog.

General note:


Recorded in Melbourne, Australia. Summary:

Presents a series of three lectures by Jeffrey Hopkins concerning the selfgeneration of proper motivation in Tibetan Buddhist pr~ctice, and the meaning of compassion, emptiness, and deity yoga. .

20.--. Death and dying. Ithaca: Snow Lion, RYE 1 0 1611-1614 , {between 1983 and 1986}. 4 sound cassettes: analog.

General note: Lecture delivered in 1983.

Summary: Presents a lecture by Jeffrey Hopkins on the stages of death, the inteIUlediate

state, and rebirth. The talk is based on teachings from a book by A-kya Yoils-'dzin Dbyans-can -dga' -ba' i -blo-gros titled G / i'i sku gsum gyi mam gzag rab sgal s gran me, previously translated by Hopkins and Lati Rinbochay as Death, intermediate state, and rebirth in Tibetan Buddhism.

21.---. Seminar on compassion. Ithaca: Snow Lion, RYB 1658-1662, {198-?}. 5 sound cassettes: analog.

Summary: Presents a series of talks given by Jeffrey Hopkins at a weekend seminar

focusing on emptiness meditation, compassion, and kindness.

22. ---. Seminar on death and impermanence. Ithaca: Snow Lion, RYB 1933-1935, {198-?}. 3 sound cassettes: analog.

Summary: Presents seminar talks of Jeffrey Hopkins discussing the concepts of imper

manence and death from the perspective of Tibetan Buddhism. Includes a question! answer session with the audience.

23. ---. Seminar on grounds and paths. Ithaca: Snow Lion, RYB 1898-1900, {198-?}. 3 sound cassettes: analog.

Summary: Presents seminar lectures by Jeffrey Hopkins centered on a text titled,

Presentation of the Grounds andPaths, Beautiful Omamentofthe Three Vehicles . . The lectures discuss the development of mental and spiritual attitudes, called "grounds" and "paths," which lead to enlightenment. Included are question! response sessions with audience.

24.---. Seminar on the two truths in the four tenent {sic} systems. Ithaca: Snow Lion, RYB 1928-1931, {198-?}. 4 sound cassettes: analog.

Summary: Presents seminar talks of Jeffrey Hopkins centering on the two truths in the


foU! tenets systems of Tibetan Buddhism. Includes discussions on the nature and jjn1its of conceptual consciousness and on the need to experience direct perception. Question/answer sessions with the audience provide some practical clues to individual application of these principles.

Added different title: Seminar on the two truths in the four tenet systems.

25. lyer, Raghavan Narasimhan. Buddhism and communism. Santa Barbara: Centerfor the Study of Democratic Institutions, LWO 4742, reel 261, {196-?}. 1 sound tape reel: analog, 3 3/4 ips, 112 track,7 in.

General note: Duration: 46 min., 16 sec.

Summary: An analysis of the two systems and what they enjoy in harmony, what

differences can be resolved or accommodated, and where the two can never meet. Discussion follows.

Added author corporate: Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions.

26. Jayewardene, Junius Richard. Professional. luncheon meeting. {N.p.}: {n.p.}, LWO 5746, reel 104, {n.d}. 1 sound tape reel: analog, 71!2ips, full track,

7in. General note:

An address to the Foreign Correspondents Club of Japan, June 24, 1968. Summary:

Junius R Jayewardene, the Ceylonese minister of state, speaks on his trip to Japan to visit Buddhist temples and meet with Buddhist leaders. His talk focuses on the similarities between the forms of Buddhism practiced in Ceylon and Japan. Includes a question-and-answer session.

Added author corporate: Foreign Correspondents Club of Japan.

27. Kennett, Jiyu, 1924-. Zen view of dying. Sausalito: Big Sur Recordings, RYB 2517, {between 1975 and 1977}. 1 sound cassette (1 hr., 30 min.): analog.

General note: Recorded at a conference held Feb. 21-23, 1975 in Berkeley Calif.

Summary: Presents Rev. Jiyu Kennett, Roshi giving a talk about the Zen Buddhist attitude

toward death. She stresses that the person who lives well and does the best he can in daily life will also die well. Following her talk, Rev. Kennett responds to audience questions on euthanasia, the afterlife, and other topics.

28. Lancaster, Lew. The histo.ry & philosophy of Buddhism. {Sausalito}: Big


Sur Recordings, RSS CASS 10989, {1971}. 1 sound cassette: analog . . 29. Rimpoche, Gelek. Compassion. {Ithaca}: {Snow Lion}, RYE 1867-1869

{198-?}.3 sound cassettes: analog. ' Summary:

Presents a series of talks in which Gelek Rimpoche outlines BUddhist psychology, the development within the individual of Buddhist ways of thinking and acting.

30. Smith, Huston. Journeys into civilization. {Sausalito}: Big Sur Record_ ings, RSS CASS 11021, {1968}. 2 sound cassettes: analog.

31. Suzuki, Shunryu. Teachings & practice of Zen. {Sausalito}: Big Sur Recordings, RSS CASS 10967, {1968}. 2 sound cassettes: analog.

Uniform title: Teachings and discipline of Zen.

32. Tara Tulku. Foundation of excellence. Robert Thurman, trans. Ithaca: Snow Lion, RYB 1884-1888, {198-?}. 5 sound cassettes: analog.

General note: Lectures in Tibetan with intermittent translation into English. "These talks

were made possible by the AIBS"-Publisher's catalog. Summary:

Presents a series of lectures by Tara Tulku on· the stages of the path of enlightenment. The text which is the basis of his teaching is the most abbreviated of Tson-kha-pa' s many versions describing these stages. These lectures consist of practical instructions for any person seeking to progress toward his or her own highest fulfillment.


33. -_.-. Mindfu{1}ness and clear compassion. ---. Ithaca: Snow Lion, RYB 1603, {between 1983 and 1986}. 1 sound cassette: analog.

General note: Speech in Tibetan with intermittent translation into English. "These talks were

made possible by the AIBS"-Publisher's catalog. Recorded at the Insight Meditation Society, Barre, Mass., Oct. 28, 1983.

Summary: Presents a speech delivered by Tara Tulku in which he delineates the role of

mindfulness in the practice of meditation. Added author corporate:

American Institute of Buddhist Studies. Added different title:

Mindfulness and clear compassion.

Recorded Sound Collection Lit

34.---. Psychology seminar. ---. Ithaca: Snow Lion, RYB 1651-1657, {198-?}. 7 sound cassettes: analog.

General note: Talks in Tibetan with intermittent translation into English. "These talks were

made possible by the AIBS"-Publisher's catalog. . Summary:

Presents a series of talks by Tara Tulku who provides, through a translator, an overview of the Abhidharma, Pramana, Madhyamilca, and Tantrika psychologies developed in India and Tibet during twenty-five centuries of investigation and experimental practice.


35. Thub-bstan-luiJ.-rtogs-bstan-'dzin-'phrin-las, 1903-1983. In praise of dependant {sic} arising. Ithaca: Snow Lion, RYB 1862-1866, {198-?}. 5 sound cassettes: analog.

General note: Lectures in Tibetan with intermittent translation into English.

Summary: Presents Kyabje Ling Rinpoche's commentary on a classic Tsmi-kha-pa text

referred to in the narration as The intertwined praise, which is itself a commentary on an older text by another writer titled, Praise to the teachings of Buddha which show the interdependent origination. Both of these texts deal with the Buddhist doctrine of Sunyata, nothingness.

Added different title: In praise of dependent arising.

36. Thmman, RobertA.F. Culture as mandala. Ithaca: Snow Lion, RYB 1889-1891, {198-?}. 3 sound cassettes: analog.

Summary: Presents a lecture on the triple mandala of the Dalai Lama which consists of

the Hinayana, Mahayana, and Vajrayana mandalas.

37. --. Female dieties {sic}. Ithaca: Snow Lion, RYB 1919-1921, {198-?}. 3 sound cassettes: analog.

Summary: Presents a lecture by Robert T1imman in which he details the mythology,

symbolism, and practice associated with various female deities of the Tibetan Buddhist pantheon.

Added different title: Female deities.


38.---. Fierce dieties. Ithaca: Snow Lion, RYE 1913-1914, f198-?}. 2 sound cassettes: analog.

Summary: Presents a lecture by Robert Tburman on the Buddhist view of evil, apparent

fOlms of evil, wrathfulness, and anger. Includes a question/answer session with the audience. Following the lecture is Robert Tburman's commentary accompanYing a slide show of Tibetan tankas. . .

39. Trungpa, Cbogyam, 1939-. Buddhism andmeditation.{Sausalito}: Big Sur Recordings, RSS CASS 10995, {1970}. 2 sound cassettes: analog. .

40. Wallace, B. Alan. Mahamudrii. Ithaca: Snow Lion, RYB 1917-1918, {198-,?}. 2 sound cassettes: analog.

Summary: Presents a lecture by Alan Wallace exploring Mabamudrameditation. The fIrst

stage of this is Samatha meditation in which one attains and seeks to maintain the barest level of samadbi. In the second stage of Mabamudra meditation one seeks to probe the ultimate nature of the mind and gain a direct empirical realization of it.

41. ---. Path of awakening in Tibetan Buddhism. {Ithaca}: {Snow Lion}, RYB 1915-1916, {198-?}. 2 sound cassettes: analog.

Summary: Presents a lecture by B. Alan Wallace describing the training and developmen

tal stages on the Tibetan Buddhist path. Special empbasis is placed on the importance of proper motivation. Includes a question/answer session with the audience.

42. ---. Stabilizing the mind. Ithaca: Snow Lion, RYB 1947-1960, {between 1984 and 1986}. 14 sound cassettes: analog.

General note: Recorded in Amberst, Mass. during the autumn of 1984.

Summary: Presents an in-depth series of lectures by Alan Wallace in wbich be explores

the cultivation of mental stability, of mental clarity, and of the integration of these two. This is a practical course of mental discipline designed to beigbtenone's awareness both during daily activities and periods of solitude.

43. ---. Student-teacher relationship. Ithaca: Snow Lion, RYB 1911-1912, {198-,?}. 2 sound cassettes: analog.

Summary: Presents a lecture by Alan Wallace in whicb be presents the concept of


gutUyoga and discusses the advantages and disadvantages of different types of . student-teacher relationships. In a questionlresponse session with the audience he .... also gives advice concerning individual practice.

44.---. Theory & exploration of consciousness. Ithaca: Snow Lion, RYB .. 1936-194l, {198~?}. 6 sound cassettes: analog.

Summary: Presents a weekend seminar given by Alan Wallace exploring Western

assumptions about the nature of consciousness and comparing these to the Tibetan Buddhist concept of the mind. Includes question/answer sessions with the audience about the relation of these ideas to individual practice.

Added different title: Theory and exploration of consciousness.

45. Watts, Alan Wilson, 1915-1973. BeatZeil-beatHasidism. {Sausalito}: Big Sur Recordings, RSS CASS 11297, {1967}. 1 sound cassette: analog.

Added author personal: Friedman, Maurice s.

46. ---. The diamond way. {Sausalito}: Big Sur Recordings, RSS CASS 11361, {1969}. 1 sound cassette: analog.

47. Zasep TuIku Rinpoche. Six session guru yoga. Ithaca: Snow Lion, RYB 1857-1861, {between 1981 and 1986}. 5 sound cassettes: analog.

Summary: Presents a series of seven lectures delivered by Zasep TuIku Rinpoche on the

practice of six session guruyoga. Added different title:

Six session guruyoga.

SECTION II CHANTS, RITUALS AND SACRED MUSIC

1. Bhattacharya, Deben, compo Religions of India. {Chicago}: Argo, Argo ZFB 55, {1971}. 1 sound disc: analog, stereo., 33 1/3 rpm, 12 in.

Language note: Predominant language of item: Hindi.

General note: The Living tradition. Sung and played by local musicians. Recorded between

1954 and 1968. Program notes by the compiler on slipcase. Contents:

Hindu: temple bells and drums. Vedic chants. Raga Asavari. Kazhagam. Mariyammn Padal. Mira's Bhajan. Buddhist: Namo tatsat. Tibetan prayer. Pali


prayer. Sikh: In praise of guru Nanak. 2. Buddhist drums, bells, and chants. {New York}: Lyrichord, Lyrichord

LLST 7200, {1970?}. 1 sound disc: analog, stereo., 33 1/3 rpm, 12 in. , Language note:

Predominant language of item: English. General note:

"Recorded at actual services in the temples of Kyoto, Japan". Program notes on container.

Contents: Drum of the zen service. Hannya shingo (Heart sutra). Goeika (Pilgrim chant).

Aki-wasan (Jodo funeral). Goshygyo-wasan (Pilgrim funeral). Cheshi (Meian priests). Shomyo (Shichi-kango). Somyo (Godai-gan). Temple bells (Myoshinji).

3. Chanting with tamboura & dulcimer. {Sausalito}: Big Sur Recordings, RSS CASS 11551, {1970}. 1 sound cassette: analog.

Language note: Predominant language of item: English.

Added author personal: Kimmel, Tenny.

Added author corporate: Ram Dass.

4. Chinese Buddhist music. {New York}: Lyrichord, Lyrichord LLST 7222, {1971}. 1 sound disc: analog, stereo., 33 1/3 rpm, 12 in.


General note: Recorded by J. Levy at Precious Lotus Monastery, Lan Tao Island, Hong

Kong, and Good-fortune Monastery. Commentary by L. Picken and Levy on container.

Contents: Waking the monks. Morning service. Recitation with large bell. Solo melodic

chant. Morning service nuns. Pei-tou liturgy (Great bear liturgy). Hua-yen tzu-mu ' liturgy (solo chant) Shui-Iu fa-hux (plenary Requiem Mass) Ch'ing-ming (Ceremony at graves of ancestors) Ch'ac-u wang-hun (private Requiem Mass).

Added author personal: John Levy.

5. Cho, Kyu-dong, compo Sounds of Korean temple bells. Seoul, Korea: Korean Cultural Treasues {sic} Institute, Matrix no. EJ, {1966}. 1 sound disc: analog, mono., 33 1/3 rpm, 12 in.



General note: Narrated in English by Song Du-Young and others. Contains selections from

the compiler's Buddhist Temple Bells of Korea. "Notes on Korean temple bells" ({4} p. illus.) inserted in slipcase. . . Added author personal:

Song, Du-Young. Added author corporate:

Han'guk Munhwajae Yon'guhoe. Added different title:

Buddhist temple bells of Korea.

6. Dai hannya tendoku e. {Chicago}: Phillips, Philips 6586021, p1974. 1 sound disc: analog, stereo., 33 1/3 rpm, 12 in.


General note: Musical sources. Ceremonial, ritual, and magic music, II, 3. Unesco collection.

Title on container: Shomyo-Buddhist ritual from Japan. Ceremony performed by the Buzan division of the Shingon sect. Program notes by P. Landy and T. Kido on container.

Added different title: Shomyo-Buddhist ritual from Japan.

Added series titles: Musical sources. Ceremonial, ritual, and magic, II, 3. Unesco collection.

7. Fanbai: chant liturgique bouddhique: lecon du soir au Temple de Quanzhou. Paris, France: Ocora, Ocora C 559080, p1989. 1 sound disc (66 min., 3 sec.): digital, stereo., 4 3/4 in., compact.

Language note: Predominant language of item: Sanskrit.

Series title: Chine.

General note: Chanted in Sanskrit. Parallel title on container (romanized): Fan pai. Program

notes (unpaged) inserted in container. Recorded Jan. 29, 1987 in the Temple Kaiyuan, Fukien Province, China.

Contents: Harmonisation-Xiang zan-Fo shuo Amito jing-Mengshan shishi yi

Hymne a Amitabha-Circumambulation-Da huixiang-San gui yi-Dabei zhou-Jialan zan-Sortie.

Participants note: Monks of the Temple of Quanzhou.

Added author corporate:


K'ai-yuan gSU (Ch'uan-chou shih, China). Added different title:

Fanpai. . . ,

. 8. Folksongs of Nepal. New York: Lyrichord, LyrichordLLST7330, {197?}. ' 1 sound disc: analog, stereo., 33 1/3 rpm, 12 in.

Language note: Predominant language of item: Newari.

General note: Title on container: Folksongs of Nepal. "Field recording by Stefano Castelli"_

Container. Program notes in Italian with English translation on container. Contents:

Padma Sambhava can't eat-Ganv ganv bathauta-Sunna na sunna-Do you hear?-Sunna nahin-Soldier's letter-The condition of man-Song of the unhappy maiden-Story of Manu Tamang-Jhyaure: Lhasa gita-Evening jhyaure-Jhyaure of the Dharma-Story ofPadma Sambhava-Jayangri: Shaman therapy-Story of the man with two houses-The rani of the jungle-Mountaineer' s love song.

Participants note: Various performers.

Added author personal: Castelli, Stefano.

Added different title: Folk songs of Nepal.

9. Gunarathan, Henepola Mahathera. Buddhist devotions; Theravada tradition. {New York}: Sheikh Records, Sheikh Records SRLP 002, {1970}. 1 sound disc: analog, mono., 33 1/3 rpm, 12 in.


General note: Pall: Venerable Mahathera Henepola Gunarathan. English: Edwin H. Kaplin.

Contents: Introduction. Homage. Three refugees. The 5 precepts. Meditation on benevo

lence. The blessings. The 3 jewels. Loving kindness.

10. Gyuto Monks. Freedom chants from the roof of the world. Salem: Rykodisc, Rykodisc RCD 20113, p1989. 1 sound disc: 25 digital, stereo., 4 3/4 in., compact.

Language note: Predominant language of item: Tibetan.

General note: Recorded at Skywalker Ranch soundstage, Nov. 15, 1988, and at the Cathedral


of St. John the Divine, New York, Dec. 3; 1988. Contents:

Yamantaka (27:44}-Mahakala (26:58)--#2 for Gaia (9:17). Participants note:

. The Gyuto Monks; with Philip Glass, Mickey Hart, and Kitaro (3rd work). Added authors personal:

Glass, Philip. Hart, Mickey. Kitaro, 1953-.

Added different title: Gyuto Monks in America, 1988.

11. Japan. Record 4, Buddhist music. Kassel, W. Germany: Musicaphon, Musicaphon BM 30 L 2015, {1960?}. 1 sound disc: analog, stereo., 33 1/3 rpm,

·12 in. Language note:

Predominant language of item: Japanese. Series title:

Unesco Collection. Musical anthology of the Orient; 15. General note:

Title on container: The music of Japan, record IV, Buddhist music. Vocal and instrumental music. Program notes in English, French, and German bound in container. Recorded between 1953 and 1957.

Contents: Hokku=Great summons to prayer-Fusatsullore=Ceremony of communal

penitence-Sange=the scattering of lotus flowers-Shichi-butsu=shornyo, perfonned as a funeral hymn for the death of a monk or nun-Santobachi=percussion concertaccornpanyingafuneralcerernony-Bai=Bombai;Nyoraimyoshoku=The Buddha of wisdom in the splendour of his thousand colours-Mas6-biwa=the lute

. of the blind monks-Kaichin=evening signal to retire. Participants note:

Buddhist monks in various monasteries and temples in Japan. Added different titles:

Japan IV. Japan 4. Japan four. Music of Japan IV. Music of Japan 4. Music of Japan four. Buddhist music.

12. Japanese Buddhist ritual. {New York}: Folkways Records, Folkways Records FE 4449, {1956}. 1 sound disc: analog, mono., 33 1/3 rpm, 12 in.

224 . nABS VOL. 16 NO.1

Language note: . Predominant language of item: English.

General note: Ethnic folkways library. Recorded by D.G. Baring, principally at the

Noumanji Temple at Kawasaki. Program notes by D. G. Haring (7 p. ill.) inserted in contariner.

Contents: Large temple bell. Morning prayers. Gongs and drum. Wasan goeka hymn.

Wasan goeka hymn. Hymn of Mt. Hiei. Memorial service. Tenri-kyo Chant. Nokuchumnu. PiIramita. Teritori.

Added authors personal: Miyoshi, Akira, 1933-Nokuchurunu. Hirose, Ryohei, 1930---PiIramita. Yuasa, Joji, Teritori. .

Added author cOIporate: Tokyo GojiisOdan.

13. Japanese temple music; Zen, Nembutsu, and Yamabushi chants. {New York}: Lyrichord, LyrichordLLST7117, {1970?}. sound disc: analog, stereo., 33 113 Ipm, 12 in.


General note: Recorded by K. Takasago during temple ceremonies in Kyoto, Japan. Program

notes on container. Contents:

Sutra chanting (Nembutsu) by priests of the Jodo Sect at Kurodani Temple: Koge (Chant of purification); Sanporai (Salutation to Tri-Ratna); Shibujo (prayer of invitation to B uddah); Kokaige Preachings of Buddah Zen solo chants by priests at Myoshinji Temple: Daishindarani; Prayer to Avalokitesvara. Chanting of morning services by Yamabushi of the Shuken Sect at Shogoin Palace: Hokesampo sutra; Hannyashingo (Zen heart sutra); Kito (prayers for peace and security).

Added author personal: Takasago, Katsumasa.

14. Ladakh: musique de monastere et de village. Paris, France: Le Chant monde, Le Chant du monde LDX 274662, p1989. 1 sound.disc: digital, stereo., 3/4 in., compact.

Language note: Predominant language of item: Miscellaneous.

Series titles: Musee de l'homme. Collection du Centre national de la recherche scientifique et du Musee de

~'"

"l'bOnune. , ; General note:

>"


Additional title on container: Ladakh: monastic and village music. Program '~oteS and texts in French and English (31 p.: ill.) inserted in container. Recorded 'Aug. 1976. Contents: ,

'. Musique de monastere: Rituel en l'honneur de A-phyi-Epopee du roi Ge-sar: iCnat du roi Ge-sar; Chant du cheval Rkyang-shes-Musique de village: Musique pour Ie tir a I'arc Danse de l'oiseau; Sur ce papier blue--Sur Ie stupa de cristalChant de bon augure-Chant en l'honneur d'un la

Participants note: Performed by Tibetan Buddhists and native musicians.

Added author personal: Helffer, Mireille.

15. Liang, Tsai-p'ing. Music of cheng. {N.p.}: Four Seas Record Pub. Co., Four Seas Record Pub. Co. Matrix no. 7112251; 7112253, 7112263, {1971}. 3 sound discs: analog, stereo., 33 1/3 rpm, 12 in.


Uniform title: Works, cheng. Selections.

General note: Title from album. Performed by the composer. Program notes in Chinese and

i~c' English on album. Contents:

,.:I.

:' Buddhist prayer song. Night rain in plantain leaves. Hundred birds courting ',the phoenix. Ascending the tower. Wild geese alighting on the sandy shore .

. " .. ' Relieving my heart. Flowers on brocade. Longing for an old friend. Winter ravens sporting over the water. Song of the sweetcake vandor {sic} Lament of a laundry lady. Universal celebration. Dream image of life. Floating lotus. Reunion at the

··'silverriver. Pei-tsiko. Mien tab hsui. Mutual longing. {Restoration song} Old song in memory of homeland} {Battle song}.

16. Luneau, Georges, compo Musique sacr~e tiMtaine. {Paris, France}: Ocora, Ocora OCR 71, {ca. 1972}. 1 sound disc: analog, mono., 33 113 rpm, 12 in.

Language note: Predominant language of item: French.

General note: Recorded 1971 at the monasteries of Thamiand Thamu in the province of

Khumbu in north-east Nepal, the Sherpa region near the Tibetan frontier. Durations on labels. Notes by Luneau in French with English translation by J. Benett ({5} p. illus.) on and bound in album. .

Contents:


.Mani-Rimdu: Ceremonie de bienvenue. Procession et "roI-'cham." RitueI en. l'honneur de la Venerable Yoghini de Diamant.

17. Mayuzumi, Toshiro, 1929-. Nirvana-symphony; Mandala-symphony.1be Netherlands: Philips, Philips 9500 762, p1978. 1 sound disc: analog, stereo., 33 1/ 3 rpm, 12 in.

Language note: Predominant language of item: Japanese.

Uniform title: Nehan kokyokyoku.

General note: The 1st work for male chorus (12 parts) and orchestra, sung in Japanese. Words

of the 1st work: the Zen Sutra "Suramgamah" and the Tendai text "Shomyo." . Durations: 34:00; 20:33.

Participants note: Japan Chorus Union (1st work); NHK Symphony Orchestra; Yuzo Toyama

(1st work), Kazuo Yamada (2nd), conductors. Added authors personal:

Toyama, Yuzo, 1931-cnd. Yamada, Kazuo, 1912-cnd. Mayuzumi, Toshiro, 1929-Mandala symphony.

Added authors corporate: Japan Chorus Union, prf. NHK Kokyogakudan, prf.

Added different titles: Nirvana-symphony. Mandala-symphony.

18. Music in Sikkim. {New York}: ABC Command, ABC Command COMS 9002, p1975. 1 sound disc: analog, mono., 33 1/3 rpm, 12 in.


General note: Music of the earth. Recorded in Sikkim Dec. 1969. and Jan. 1970. Durations

on container; program notes and texts with translations ({ 14} p. ilL) inserted. Contents:

Ceremonial and folk music: Lepcha band ceremonial music. Sukhbir (a narrative singer) Lepchanarrative song. Tibetan folk song. Sherpa folk song. Metal and bamboo jew's harps. Music of the Buddhist liturgy: Hymn for shawms and long trumpets. Private memorial service (excerpt).

Added series title: Music of the earth.


..... 19. Music of Southeast Asia. {New York}: Folkways.Records, Folkways ;Records FE 4423, {1959}. 1 sound disc: analog, mono., 33 1/3 rpm, 12 in.

. Language note: Predominant language of item: English.

General "note: Ethnic folkways library. Traditional and popular music. "Recorded in Burma,

Malaya, Thailand, Viet Nam, Laos, South China." Program notes by H. Cowell ({3} p.) inserted in container.

Contents: Bmma: Shan song; Flower of heaven; The southern island; Buddhist ceremo

ntal ode. Malaya: Chinchem; Siku. Thailand: Admiration of a sleeping maiden; Orchestral compositions (2 works) Viet Nam: Folk sQng; Recitation from Hue van. Laos: Woman's song; Folk dance; Love song. South China: Folk tune.

Added series title: Ethnic folkways library.

20. The Music of Tibet; the Tantric rituals. {New York}: Anthology, Anthology AST 4005, {1970}. 1 sound disc: analog, stereo., 33 1/3 rpm, 12 in.


General note: A Musical anthology of the Orient, 6. An Anthology of the world's music. Title album. Performed by the lamas of Gyume and GyutO Monasteries, Lhasa,

Tibet, now living in exile at Dalhousie, North India. Notes ({ 12} p. illus.) bound in album.

Contents: Drumbeat to summon· deities. Guhyasamaja tantra. A prayer of refuge.

. Invocation of mGon-po. Invocation of Mahakala. Prayer of ablution and purifica,tion. Selections from Guhyasamaja tantra, chap. 5. Prayer to mGon-po. Prayer to . ····Hla-Mo. Prayer to Chos-rGyal. Prayer for the preservation of Buddha-Dharma.

Invocation of Mahakala. Prayer to Mahalcala. Added series titles:

A Musical anthology of the Orient, 6. An Anthology of the world's music.

21. The Music of Viet-Nam II. Entertainment music and music of the modernized theatre. Kassel, W. Germany: Musicaphon, Musicaphon BM 30 L 2023, {1974?}. 1 sound disc: analog, mono., 33 1/3 rpm, 12 in.

Language note: Predominant language of item: Vietnamese.

Series title: Unesco Collection. Musical anthology of the Orient; 23.


General note: .Titles on container: Viet-Nam II; Music of Viet-Nam Record II. Program notes

in English, French, and German bound in container. Contents:

Bai trong lay and thet-Buddhist chants and prayers-Bai ha-RespectfuJ. invitation to the Goddess of the West-Xang Xa-Rao nam, hoi ai-oan-Binh ban-The wind blows and bends the weeping willow-The four generations-The beautiful tay thi-Longing for the past.

Participants note: Native musicians.

Added different titles: Music of Viet-nam 2. Music of Viet-nam two. Viet-Nam II Viet-Nam 2. Viet-Nam two. Entertainment music and music of the modernized theatre ..

22. Musica Tibetana. {Stuttgart, W. Germany}: Fono Gesellschaft, Fono GesellschaftFGLS 304705, {1969}. 1 sound disc: analog, stereo., 331/3 rpm, 12 in.


General note: Folk, art, sacred, and liturgical music performed by native musicians.

Introductory notes in German, French, Italian, and English on slipcase; notes on the music in German (leaf) inserted.

Contents': Tibetische Nationalhymne. Tanzweise. Kinderlied.Zithersolo. Hirtenlied.

Volkslied. Lied "Katanige." Hirtenweise. Bauerngesang beim Dreschen. Epische Gesange historischen Inhalts. Damnye-Solo. Hirtenlied Volksweise. Kinderlied. Weise fiir vier Floten. Tanzlied. Puja im kloster Rumtek. Om Mani Padme Hum. Puja imkloster Svayambunath. Chor des Gyuto-Klosters. Gyaling-Solo. Tibetisches Totenbuch. Totenmusikfiir Schwarzhut-Iamas. Hymnen des Milarepa. Lamatanze.

23. Musique bouddbique de Coree. France: Vogue, VogueL VLX253, p1969. 1 sound disc: analog, mono., 33 1/3 rpm, 12 in.

Language note: Predominant language of item: Korean.

Series title: Collection Musee de l'homme.

Series different title: Serie Loisirs.


General note: '. Performed by monks in the Tae Ch'o Sung order. Recorded 1964 in the Sae

~hol (the New Temple), Seoul, South Korea. , Contents: . :,',' Koryong-san-Sam kwi eui ryeh/Panya simgyong (l)-Panya simgyong ;(2)--Hwach'ong-'-Ch'onsu para. ; Added author personal:

i., Levy, John.

24. Musique rituelle tibetaine. Paris, France: Ocora, Ocora OCR 49, p1983. 'J sound disc: analog, stereo., 33 1/3 rpm, 12 in. . Language note:

Predominant language of item: Tibetan. Edition statement:

Reed. General note:

Buddhist chants and instrumental music. Field recordings, texts, and photos. 'by Georges Leneau. Ethriographical notes and notes on the recordings in English and French (6 p.: ill.) bound in container. Recorded Apr. 1969 at Tibetan religious communities presently located in Nepal.

Contents: Ceremonie d' offrande-Appel de conques-Moulin a prieres-Ceremonie de

';~~sprostemation-Ceremonie de benediction-Ceremonie a Yamantaka. ~f:;i,' Added author personal: ~~ .. Leneau, Georges. ~s~';

t 25. Musique sacree des moines tibetains. France: Arion, Arion ARN 33 335, j:~rpI976. 1 sound disc: analog, stereo., 33 1/3 rpm, 12 in. il; . Language note: k'; Predominant language of item: Tibetan. 'i.e General note: ! ~;. " ,0 Buddhist chants. Unidentified performers. Recorded in Buddh Gaya and ,;. Dharamsala, India and in Swayambunath (Katmandou), Nepal by Gerard Kremer. •. Contents: '~::;,

. Moine tibetain en priere-Appel des conques-Office du matin-Tambours ~: a deux peaux-Office de I' apres midi -Moines tibetains en priere a Dharamsala;t" Trompes telescopiques-Office du sair. ,i"

• Added author personal: Kremer, Gerard.

26. Padmasambava chopa with theMahakala offering: A Tibetan Buddhistrite from Nepal. New York: Lyrichord, Lyricbord u..ST 7270, {1974'7}. 1 sound. disc: analog, stereo., 33 1/3 rpm, 12 in.



General note: Chants and instrumental music. Sung in Tibetan. R~corded by T. Laird at the

Sri Karma Raj Maha Vehave monastery, Swayambunath, Nepal, Mar. 27-Apr. 2, 1973.

Contents: Padmasambava prayer-Mahakala prayer.

Participants note: Performed by monks of the Kargyiidpa sect.

Added different title: Tibetan Buddhist rite from Nepal.

27. Prayer and devotion. Regensburg, W. Germany: G. Bosse Verlag, RZA. 2075, p1985. 2 sound cassettes: analog.


Series title: Music of the globe; 4.

General note: Traditional music. Program notes in English ({ 20} p.: ill.) bound in container.

Field recordings. Contents:

Tibetan ritual-Jewish music-Islamic religious chanting from YemanLiturgical chants of the Armenian Mechitharist Community.

28. Rituals of the Drukpa Order. {New York}: Lyrichord, Lyrichord llST 7255, {1973?}. 1 sound disc: analog, stereo., 33 1/3 rpm, 12 in.

Language note: Predominant language of item:. Hindi.

General note: Tibetan Buddhist rites from the monasteries of Bhutan, v. 1. Chants and

instrumental music performed by monks at Thimphu, Bhutan, and nuns at Punakha, Bhutan. Recorded in 1971 by J. Levy. Program notes by J. Levy ({ 6} p. ill.) inserted in container.

Contents: In praise of Genyen. Offering of the golden drink. Long trumpets: Throat

ornament; Two notes prolonged. Invitation to Gonpo. Petition to Chakchen. Invoking Tshetro's blessing. Supplication to the buddhas. Aspiration to be reborn in the western paradise. Petition to Dramar. Prayer for Lama's long life. Large mani-wheel, with mantra. Rite to cure disease. Tibetan shawrn processional music Processional music for shawrns and percussion. Long trumpets: Auspicious ending.


Added author personal: Levy, John.

Added series title: Tibetan Buddhist rites from the monasteries of Bhutan. v. 1.

29. Ritue1 du soir. {France}: Playa Sound, Playa Sound PS 33504, {1980?}. disc (44 min.): analog, stereo., 33 1/3 rpm, 12 in. Language note:

Predominant language of item: Tibetan. Series different title:

Musiques de l' Asie traditionnelle; v. 4. Tibet. General note:

Title on container verso: Bod kyi san sol kyi flo1 mo. Program notes by Hubert Fraysseix with English translations on container.

Added different title: Bod kyi san sol kyi flo1 mo.

Added series uniform titles: Musiques de 1'Asie traditionnelle; v. 4. Musiques de l' Asie traditionnelle. Tibet.

30. Sacred dances and rituals of the Nyingmapa and Drukpa Orders. {New York}: Lyrichord, Lyrichord LLST 7256, {l973?}. sound disc: analog, stereo., 33 113 rpm, 12 in.


General note: Tibetan Buddhist rites from the monasteries of Bhutan, v. 2. Chants and

instrumental music performed by monks at Nyimalung and Tongsa, Bhutan. Recorded in 1971 by J. Levy. Program notes by J. Levy ({6} p. ill.) inserted in container.

Contents: Peling shachham, deer dance. Dramatse ngachlam, drum dance. Lama norbu

. gyamtsho, annual ritual dedicated to Padma Sembhava. Supplications to Padma

. Sambhava: Entreaty to the three Buddha-bodies; Invitation to Padma Sambhava; Rise up, Padma; Words of prayer; Tibetan shawms.


Added series title: Tibetan Buddhist rites from the monasteries of Bhutan.

31. Sarachchandra, Ediriweera R. Saraccandrage Simhabiihu. Colombo, Sri Lanka: Singlanka, RYB 2354, {198-?}. 2 sound cassettes (ca. 120 min.): analog, stereo., Dolby processed.


Language note:

Predominant language of item: Sinhalese. Uniform title:

Simhabahu. General note:

In Sinhalese. Title on container: Sarachchandra's Sinhabahu. Notes on inserts in Sinhalese, notes on container in English.

Summary: Based on the style of the folk opera known as Na<;iagama, this work dramatizes

the legend of the MahavaIp.sa, which attributes the origin of the Sinhala race to a lion who consorted with a princess of Vanga (modem Bengal).

Added author personal: Mahanama, 5th cent. MahavaIp.sa.

Added different title: Sarachchandra's Sinhabahu.

32. Satoh, Somei, 1947-. Margaret Leng Tan plays Samei Satah. {San Francisco}: New Albion Records, New Albion Records NA 008, p1986. 1 sound disc: analog, stereo., 33 1/3 rpm, 12 in.

Language note: Predominant language of item: Undetermined.

Uniform title: Selections.

General note: The 1st work for violin and piano; the 2nd work for two pianos with electronic

tape delay; the 3rd work for soprano, piano, and percussion; the 4th work for piano with electronic tape delay. The text of the 3rd work taken from Buddhist chant. Margaret Leng Tan, piano; Frank Almond, violin (1st work); Lise Messier, soprano, Michael Pugliese, percussion (3rd work). Recorded at the State University of New York at Purchase, Aug. 6-8,1985.

Contents: Birds in warped time II : 1980 (l1:lO)-Litania: 1973 (12:58)-Theheavenly

spheres are illuminated by lights: 1979 (11:45)-Incarnation II: 1970 (10:11). Added authors personal:

Tan, Margaret Leng, prf. Almond, Frank, prf. Messier, Lise, prf. Pugliese, Michael, prf. Satoh, Somei, 1947- Birds in warped time, no. 2. Satoh, Somei, 1947~Litania. Satoh, Somei, 1947-Heavenly spheres are illuminated by lights. Satoh, Somei, 1947-Incarnation, no. 2.


33. Shakuhachi: flute traditionnelle japonaise. France: Auvidis, Auvidis AV 6508, p1984. 1 sound disc: digital, stereo., 4 3/4 in., compact.

. Language note: Predominant language of item: None.

Series title: Musique zen; vol. 2.

General note: Issued also as analog disc (A V 4508) and cassette (A V 5508). Program notes

in English and French by A. Saron (6 p.) in container. Recorded in Japan. Contents:

Koku-reibo (20:46)-Mukaiji-reibo (25:32). Participants note:

Judo Notomi (in 1st work), Goro Yamaguchi (in 2nd work), shakuhachi. Added authors personal:

Notomi, Judo, 1895- prf Yamaguchi, Goro, 1933- prf.

34. ShOmyo: chant Jiturgique bouddhique, secte Shingon: Kob6daishi mieku. Paris, France: Ocora: Ocora C 558 657, p1987. 1 sound disc: digital, stereo., 4 3/ 4 in., compact.

Language note: Predominant language of item: Sanskrit.

Series title: Musiques traditionnelles vivantes. II, Musiques rituelles et religieuses.

Series different title: Japon; 7.

General note: Sung in Chinese, Japanese, or Sanskrit. "Disque realise avec la collaboration

du Musee Guimet et l' Association musicale franco-japonaise"-Container. Program notes in French by Akira Tamba, with English translation by Michael Vogel (11 p.: ill.) in container. Recorded at the Maison de Radio-France, Oct. 25, 1985, under the direction of Akira Tamba.

Contents: Shichibongosan-Salmon-Ungabal-Sange-Taly6-Hy6byaku

Jimbun-Sh6rei-Damichisan: Zen san-Rishukyo-Eko. Added authors personal:

Kukai, 774-835. Tamba, Akira.

Added different title: K6b6da1shi mieku.

Added series uniform title: Japon (Radio-France); v. 7.


35. ShOmy6: chant lirurgique bouddhique, secte Tendal. France: Occra, Ocara 558539, p1979. 1 sound disc: analog, stereo., 33 113 rpm, 12 in.


Series title: Musiques traditionnelles vivantes. II, Musiques rituelles et religieuses.

Series different title: Japon; v. 2.

General note: Program notes by Akira Tambain English and French on container. Performed

by B uddhist monks. Recorded Oct. 21, 1978, at the Maison de Radio-France, Paris. Added series uniform title:

Japon (Radio-France); v. 2.

36. Singhalese music, singing, and drumming. Kassel, W. Germany: Musicaphon, Musicapilon BM 30 SL 2566, {between 1977 and 1984}. 1 sound disc: analog, stereo., 33 1/3 rpm, 12 in.

Language note: Predominant language of item: Sinhalese.

Series title: An Anthology of South-East Asian music. Sri LaIika.

General note: Program notes and recording data by Josef Kuckertz in English and German

and texts with English and German translations (8 p.: ill.) bound in. Recorded Mar. 3-5, 1972 by JosefKuckertz in the Kandy and Matale regions and in Ambalangoda; 13th-14th selections recorded 1976-1977 by Cyril de Silva Kulatillake.

Contents: Nelum-gi (4:50)-Nelum-gi (2: 53)-Nelum-sindu (1:36}-Andahera (:29)

Harvest song (1:03)-Tiila tika sivpada(2:00)-Nelum-gi (3:04)-Song to honor the local gods (1:00)-Talamala-gi (1:41)-Cradle-song (1:21)-Pil-gi (:57)Chiirnikii (4: l1)-Gajaga-vannama (5: 18)-Mailgala ~taka (2:41)-Athya-bera (5: 11)-Suddha-matra (2:00)-Magul-bera (2:09}-Asirvada-kavi (1 :02)-Ritualsong with drum (yak-bera) accompaniment (2:31)-Samayan-bera (5:17).

Added author personal: Kuckertz, Josef.

37. The Songs of Milarepa: Tibetan music from the Mahayana Buddhist Nunnery. New York: Lyrichord, Lyrichord LLST 7285, {197-?}. 1 sound disc: analog, stereo., 33 1/3 rpm, 12 in.


Contents:


Milaladup: Milarepa's prayer (17:53)-Predictions of Marpa: song / attrib to Milarepa (3: 15)-Please return: song / attrib to Dakpu Rimpoche (6:35)-We are SO glad: song / attrib. to Dakpu Rimpoche (3:00)-Mabakala prayer (10:16).

Participants note: Performed by nuns of the Mahayana Buddhist Nunnery, Tilokpur, India.

Added author personal: Mi-Ia-ras-pa, 1040-1123.

Added author corporate: Mahayana Buddhist Nunnery (Tilokpur, India).

38. Sri Lanka. {Paris, France}: Ocorn, Ocorn 558552, p1982. 1 sound disc: analog, stereo., 33 1/3 rpm, 12 in.

Language note: Predominant language of item: French.

Added author personal: Vuylsteke, Herman C.

Added series title: Musiques traditionnelles vivantes. II, Musiques rituelles et religieuses.

39. Les Tambours magiques de CeyJan. France: Playa Sound, Playa Sound PS 33516, {1973?}. 1 sound disc: analog, mono., 33 1/3 rpm, 12 in.

Language note: Predominant language of item: Sinhalese.

Series different title: Musiques de l' Asie traditionnelle; v. 12. Ceylan.

General note: Ritual music. Title on container: Sri LaIikave- Sampradayika sa.riJ.gitaya.

Program notes by Francnois Jouffa with English translations on container. Recorded in Sept. 1973 by Franqois Iouffa during the shooting of his film "The Bonzesse."

Contents: Temple de la dent de Bouddha a Kandy (20:45)-Ordination d' une bonzesse

a Gangodawila (lO:OO)-Cremation a Ambalangoda (1:44)-Exorcisme a Hikkaduwa (8:00)-Hommage a Siva (1:45).

Added author personal: Jouffa, Franc;ois.

Added different title: Sri Lailkave Sampradayika sa.riJ.gitaya.

Added series uniform titles: Musiques de l' Asie traditionnelle; v. 12. Musiques de l' Asie traditionnelle. Ceylan.

40. TempJerituals andpubJic ceremonies. {New York}: Lyrichord, Lyrichord


lLST 7257, {1973?}. 1 sound disc: analog, stereo., 33 113 rpm, 12 in. Language note:

Predominant language of item: Hindi. General note:

Tibetan Buddhist rites from the monasteries of Bhutan, v. 3. Chants and instrumental music performed by monks at Kyichu and Bumthang District of, Bhutan. Recorded in 1971 by J. Levy. Program notes by J. Levy ({ 6} p. ill.) insetted" in container. """"

Contents: Nyule drelwa, calling down of deities to subjugate evil spirit, and Kulwa, its

death, stabbed by Black Hat. Part of jinbeb, the coming down of grace. MOnks in procession playing portable instruments, followed by chanting of the Heart-drop teaching. Dramnyen choshe, song of offering. Dramnyen choshe, song in praise of Chinese silk. Monks, a clown, crowds and instruments and public. End of festival. Manip, reciting Milarepa poem and mantra. Cymbals (silnyen) Cross-flute (zurlim) Manip reciting Milarepa poem. Manip as story-teller.


Added series title: Tibetan Buddhist rites from the monasteries of Bhutan. v. 3.

41. Tibet, Lieder aus demLand der Gotter. Giitersloh, W. Germany: Athena, Athena 53 134G, {1960?}. 1 sound disc: analog, stereo., 33 1/3 rpm, 10 in.

Language note: Predominant language of item: Undetermined.

General note: Recorded by Dr. Rene von Nebesky-Wojkowitz in Tibet, 1950-1959.

Contents: Lieder der Karawanenstrasse: Karawanenglocken undLied des Maultiertreibers.

Gebetslied eines Bettelmonchs. Lamaistisches Legendenlied. Volkslied aus Lhasa. " Tanzlied aus Osttibet. Ausschnitt aus dem Kesar-Epos-Aus den Klostern Tibets: Gebet eines reinkarnierten Lamas. Gebetsgesang. Anrnfung einer Orakelgottheit. Nachtlichte Diimonenbeschworung: Ton der Trommeln; Zimbeln; Oboen und Knochenfloten; Rezitieren der Zauberformeln. Begleitmusik eines kultischen . Maskentanzes. Gebet der Klostergemeinde und Tempelmusik.

Added author personal: Nebesky-Wojkowitz, Rene de.

42. Tibetan Buddhism: tantras of GyiitO: MahakaJa. {New York}: Nonesuch, Nonesuch H-72055, {1973}. 1 sound disc: analog, stereo., 33 1/3 rpm, 12 in.


General note:


Recorded at GyiitbTantric College, Dalhousie, Himachal Pradesh, by David Lewiston. Explorer series. Durations on labels. Program notes by Lewiston on

slipcase. . . Added author personal:

Lewiston, David. Added author corporate:

Gyiitb Tantric College. Added different titles: Mahakala. Tantras of Gyiitd.

43. Tibetan Buddhism: tantras of GyiitO: Sangwa diipa. {New York}: Nonesuch, Nonesuch H 72064, p1975. 1 sound disc: analog, stereo., 33 1/3 rpm, 12 in.


General note: Recorded at Gyiitb Tantric College, Dalhousie, Himachal Pradesh, by David

Lewiston. Explorer series. "Forty lamas and monks chant a recitation of part of the gyushung (text of the tantra) which, in its entirety, lasts over seven hours." Duration: about 41 min. Program notes by F. Fremantle and D. Lewiston on container.

Added author personal: Lewiston, David.

Added author corporate: Gyiito Tantric College.

Added different titles: Sangwa diipa. Tantras of GyiitO.

44. Tibetan Buddhism: the ritual orchestra and chants. {New York}: Nonesuch, Nonesuch H 72071, p1976. 1 sound disc: analog, stereo., 33 1/3 rpm, 12 in.


General note: Explorer series. "Rituals of the Drukpa Kagyii Order {performed by the}

Lamas and Monks of Pal Phuntsol Chokorling, Tashi Jong, Himachal Pradesh, India. "Recorded by David Lewiston." Durations and program notes by L. Lhalungpa and D. Lewiston on container.

Contents: Padma Sambhava tsechu sadhana: Invocation. Mahakala sadbana: Dunkye.

Mahakala sadhana: Dakye. Added author personal:


Lewiston, David. 45. Tibetan music from Ladakh andZanskar.New York: Lyrichord, Lyrichoru

LLS! 7383, {1982?}. 1 sound disc: analog, stereo., 33 113 rpm, 12 in. Language note:

Predominant language of item: Sino-Tibetan. General note:

Field recordings of folk songs, folk instrumental music, Buddhist chants, and Buddhist ritual instrumental music. Sung probably in Ladakhi. Recorded by Eric Larson. Various performers. Recorded in Ladakh and Zanskar, summer, 1982.

Contents: Folk songs and music. Dance music-Wedding song~Serchen demo-

Apundu lu-Shari ti zug nyima-Yangs-Sporting music-Sngasa pon-po Iu. Chant and sacred music. Two gya-ling airs-The heart sutra-Prayer service~ Procession-Hemis mela closing roImo-Prayer of Nagmjuna.

Added author personal: Larson, Eric.

46. Tibetan ritual music. {New York}: Lyrichord, Lyrichord LLST 7181, {196-?}. 1 sound disc: analog, stereo., 33 113 rpm, 12 in.


General note: Chanted and played by lamas and monks of the 4 great orders. Recorded May

June 1961 by Peter Crossley-Holland. Program notes by P. Crossley-Holland on container.

Contents: Offering of the saviour Gompo; chorus and orchestra (Gelugpa Order)

Invocation of the Gompo; unacc. chant (Kagyupa Order) A Buddha prayer; unacc. chant (Gelugpa Order) Offering to the guru Drakmar; chant and instrumental music (Nyingmapa Order) Glorification of the past Buddha; unacc. chant.

Added author personal: Crossley-Holland, Peter, 1916-.

47. Tibetan Tantric Choir, prf. Guhyasamaja Tantra., chapter II; Melody for Mahakala. Stanford: Windham Hill Records, Windham Hill Records WD-2001, p1987. 1 sound disc: digital, stereo., 4 3/4 in., compact.


General note: Program notes by Robert A.F. Thurman and Fred Lieberman ({5} p.) in

container. Durations: 23:33; 25:08. Recorded at Fantasy StudioD, Berkeley, Calif. Contents:

Guhyasamaja Tantra, chapter II-Melody for MahaIcala.


Participant note: Tibetan Tantric Choir of the Gyuto Monks.

Added different title: Melody for Mahakala.

48. The Way of Eiheiji; Zen-Buddhist ceremony. {New York}: Folkways records, Folkways Records FR 8980, {1959}. 2 sound discs: analog, mono., 33 11 3 rpm, 12 in.


General note: Recorded in the Eiheiji, Fukui Prefecture, Japan, 1957, by John Mitchell.

Manual sequence. Explanatory notes by Elsie P. Mitchell, text of the ceremonies in Japanese and Japanese (transliterated) with English translations, and glossary (15 p.) laid in container.

Added author personal: Cultus, Buddhist.

49. Yeshe DOIje Rinpoche, prf. Tibetan Buddhism: Shedur, a ghost exorcism ritual. New York: Nonesuch, Nonesuch H-72081, p1978. 1 sound disc (44 min.): analog, stereo., 33 1/3 rpm, 12 in.


Series title: Explorer series.

General note: Notes by Glenn H. Mullin on container. Performed by Yeshe DOIje Rinpoche

in Tibetan. Recorded Apr. 1977, in Dharamsala, Himachal Pradesh, India by David Lewiston.

Added author personal: Lewiston, David.

Added different title: Shedur, a ghost exorcism ritual.

50.Yokomichi,Mario, etal. ShOmyo taikei. Japan: Columbia, ColumbiaGES-367~3701, 3727-3730, 1983-1984. 32 sound discs: analog, stereo., 33 1/3 rpm, 12 in.


General note: In 8 containers; in part stereo., in part mono. Program books which include the

music (8 v.: ill.; 31 cm.) in containers. Contents:


1. Nanto--2. Shingon-3. Tendai~. JOdo--5. JOdo Shinshii----6. Zen-7 Hokke-{8} Bekkan. Tendai sb6myo / Tab Donin dokush6. .

Participants note: Sh6myo (Buddhist chant) performed by singers and instrumentalists of the

various sects. Added author personal:

Yokomichi, Mario, 1916.

51. Yokoyama, Katsuya, 1934-, prf. Zen: classical shakuhachi masterworks. Mainz, W. Germany: Wergo, Wergo SM 1033/34, p1982. 2 sound discs: analog, stereo., 33 1/3 rpm, 12 in.

Language note: Predominant language of item: None.

Series different title: Spectrum.

General note: Honkyoku. Subtitles on container: Katsuya Yokoyama plays classical

shakuhachi masterworks =Katsuya Yokoyama spieltMeisterwerke der klassischen sh8kuhachi-Musik. Program notes in English and German on container. Katsuya Yokoyama, shakuhachi. Licensed by RVC Corp., Tokyo; 1st pressing, 1976, RCA Records, Tokyo.

Contents: Shika no toone (with Ranpo Yokoyama, shakuhachi)-Tsuru no sugomori

Komoi jishi-San-an-Tamuke-Yamagoe- Honshirabe-Saga ri ha-Hi fu mi hachikaeshi-Azumajishi-San-ya-Nezasa shirabe-Daha-Shingetzu-Kokuu.

Added different titles: Katsuya Yokoyama plays classical shakuhachi masterworks. Katsuya Yokoyama spielt Meisterwerke der klassischen Shakuhachi

Musik.

52. Zen, goeika, and sMmyo chants in actual Buddhist temple services. {New York}: Lyrichord, Lyrichord LLST 7116, {1970?}. 1 sound disc: analog, stereo., 33 113 rpm, 12 in.


General note: Recorded by K. Takasago in Kyoto, Japan. Program notes on container.

Program notes on container. Contents:

Sutra chanting in the Zen Rinzai Sect at Myoshinji Temple: Hokekyo no. 25; Daihishu; Shikuseigan. Goeika: Waka (short poems) sung by 20 women pilgrimS from Ishikawa Prefecture at Myoshinji Temple the pipa or (in the 4th and 6th


works) the chin. Snow in sunny spring. Moonlight over tbe spring river. Chinese soldier's march. A Buddhist chant. Plum blossoms. The lament of Empress Chen. The running brook. Song of the frontier. The hero's defeat.

Added author personal: Lui, Tsun~yuen.

SECTION III IN PROCESSING, NOT YET ON SHELF

1. Amemiya, Yasukazu. Zen percussions; Natsu nebutsu; monochrome sea. France: RCA, RCA RC 9217, p1978. 1 sound disc.


2. Japan, shomyo Buddhistritual. {France?}: Unesco, Unesco D 8036, p1991. 1 sound disc: digital, stereo., 4 3/4 in., compact, 1 booklet (7 p.).


Series different title: Anthology of traditional musics.

General note: Variant title: Japon, ritue1 bouddbique shomyo.

Participant note: Buzan Division of the Shingon Sect.

3. Musique sacree des moines tiMtains. Paris, France: Arion, Arion ARN 64078, p1989. 1 sound disc: digital, stereo., 4 3/4 in., compact.


General note: Program notes inserted in container. Recorded by Gerard Kremer. Recorded

in 1976 in India and Nepal. Contents: Rituels tibetains a Bodh Gaya: Moine tibetain priant; Rituel du

matin.-Rituels tibetains a Swayambunath: Tambour a deux peaux; Rituel de fapres-midi ; Trompes telescopiques-Rituel tibetain a Dharamsala: Moines tibetains priant ; Rituel de soir.

Added author personal: Kremer, Gerard.

4. Musique TiMtaine du sikkim. France: Vogue, Vogue L VLX 187, p1968. 1 sound disc.



5 Musiques du toit du monde: Ladakh et Nepal. France: P18yasound Playasound PS 65021, p1988. 1 sound disc: digital, stereo., 4 3/4 in., compact. '


General note: Buddhist chant, folk: songs, and folk: music of Ladakh and Nepal. Sung Or

chanted in Tibetan. Parallel title on container: Roof of the world musics. Collected by Gerard Kremer. Program notes in English and French (7 p.: ill.) inserted in container. "The recordings on this CD have been collected in the Tibetan monasteries of Ladakh and Nepal"-container.

Contents: Rituel tibetain-Danse sherpa-Le flutiste de Kathmandu-Danse du dbime_

Le flutiste de L'Himalaya-La ballade du "gaine"-Musique traditionnelle_ Danse sorathi-Le prieur tibetain.

Added author personal: Kremer, Gerard. Added different title: Roof of the world musics.

International Association of Buddhist Studies

Financial Statement January 1 - December 31, 1991

~Opening balance ~{.

tIncome

;tDues \.,

'Interest

Total

Expenses

Typesetting Printing Postage Freight Computer Program Loan repayment to International Association of Shin Buddhist Studies

$514.31

$22,006.00 76.19

$9,273.05 5,519.09

310.00 146.39 200.00

5,200.00

$22,083.19

JIABS VOL. 16 NO.1

Bank charges/returned checks

Total

Ending Balance

Signed: Lewis Lancaster, Treasurer

Comments:

382.62

$21,031.15

$1,566.35

The $5,200 loan repayment was for a loan given to the Association to pay for printing and typesetting fees in 1990 when we had a severe cash flow problem. OUf income for the year came from dues collected at Berkeley $14,016.00 and dues collected in Japan representing the years 1987-1991 of $7,990.00. Having used our resources, we owed $4,500 for printing and mailing of 14.2 at the end of the year. For this reason, we have been forced to raise the dues to cover our expenses for the journal.

CONTIBUTORS :Ms. Anne M. Blackburn Dept. of South Asian Languages and Civilizations Univeristy of Chicago

. Foster Hall ·1130 E. 59th Street Chicago, IL 60637

Prof. T. Griffith Foulk Dept. of Asian Languages and Cultures University of Michigan 3070 Frieze Building Ann Arbor, MI 48109

Dr. Floyd B. Hooker 430 Taylor St. N. E., Apt. D-32 Washington, D. C. 20017

Dr. Robert Kritzer 17-12 Shimofusa-cho Koyama, Kita-ku Kyoto 603 Japan

Dr. Stephan H. Levitt 144-30 78th Road, Apt. IH Flushing, NY 11367

Prof. A. K. N arain "Usha-Kanta" Nandnagar Varanassi 221005 India

Prof. Nirmala Salgado Dept. of Religion Angastana College Rock Island, IL

Prof. Serinity Young Sacred Heart University 5151 Park Ave. Fairfield, CT 06432

jiabs 16-1

Documents